TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper we explore the role of social influence for the coordination of
effort choice in a game with strategic complementarities. Players are repeatedly randomly partitioned in groups to play a minimum effort game and choose their effort based on their beliefs about the minimal effort
among the other members of their group. Individual expectations about
this minimal effort is influenced by own experience as well as by communication of beliefs within a social network. We show that increasing the
importance of social influence in the expectation formation process has
positive effects on the emerging (long run) effort level, thereby improving the efficiency of the outcome. Furthermore, a more centralized social
network leads to higher average efficiency, but also to increased variance
of outcomes. Finally, communication of actual minimum effort cannot
replace the communication of beliefs as a device fostering the emergence
of high long run effort.
DA  - 2020
DO  - 10.4119/unibi/2943950
KW  - Minimum Effort Game
KW  - Expectation Formation
KW  - Social Influence
KW  - Belief Communication
KW  - etace_WP
LA  - eng
PY  - 2020
SN  - 2196-2723
SP  - 53-
TI  - Efficiency Gains through Social Influence in a Minimum Effort Game
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29439502
Y2  - 2024-11-22T02:10:25
ER  -