TY  - JOUR
AB  - This paper analyzes the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of any finitely repeated game with complete information and perfect monitoring. The main result is a complete characterization of the limit set, as the time horizon increases, of the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff vectors of the finitely repeated game. This model includes the special case of observable mixed strategies.
DA  - 2020
DO  - 10.1007/s00182-020-00735-z
KW  - Finitely repeated games
KW  - Pure strategy
KW  - Observable mixed strategies
KW  - Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
KW  - Limit perfect folk theorem
LA  - eng
M2  - 1129–1142
PY  - 2020
SN  - 0020-7276
SP  - 1129–1142-
T2  - International journal of game theory
TI  - A complete folk theorem for finitely repeated games
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29464956
Y2  - 2024-11-22T13:38:38
ER  -