TY  - GEN
AB  - Reanalyzing 12 experiments on the repeated prisoner’s dilemma (PD), we robustly observe
three distinct subject types: defectors, cautious cooperators and strong cooperators.
The strategies used by these types are surprisingly stable across experiments and
uncorrelated with treatment parameters, but their population shares are highly correlated
with treatment parameters. As the discount factor increases, the shares of defectors decrease
and the relative shares of strong cooperators increase. Structurally analyzing behavior,
we next find that subjects have limited foresight and assign values to all states of
the supergame, which relate to the original stage-game payoffs in a manner compatible
with inequity aversion. This induces the structure of coordination games and approximately
explains the strategies played using Schelling’s focal points: after (*c;c*) subjects
play according to the coordination game’s cooperative equilibrium, after (*d;d*) they play
according to its defective equilibrium, and after (*c;d*) or (*d;c*) they play according to its
mixed equilibrium.
DA  - 2021
KW  - Repeated game
KW  - Behavior
KW  - Tit-for-tat
KW  - Mixed strategy
KW  - Memory
KW  - Belief-free equilibrium
KW  - Laboratory experiment
LA  - eng
PY  - 2021
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 107-
TI  - Inequity Aversion and Limited Foresight in the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29569398
Y2  - 2024-11-22T08:22:13
ER  -