TY  - GEN
AB  - We consider network games in which players simultaneously form partnerships and
choose actions. Players are heterogeneous with respect to their action preferences. We
characterize pairwise Nash equilibria for a large class of games, including coordination
and anti-coordination games, varying the strength of action preferences and the size
of the linking cost. We find that, despite the symmetry and simplicity of the setting,
quite irregular network structures can arise in equilibrium, implying that heterogeneity
in players' action preferences may already explain a large part of observed irregularity
in endogenously formed networks.
DA  - 2021
KW  - network games
KW  - strategic network formation
KW  - preference heterogeneity
KW  - efficiency
LA  - eng
PY  - 2021
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 34-
TI  - Network games with heterogeneous players
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29602582
Y2  - 2024-11-22T07:08:32
ER  -