TY  - GEN
AB  - Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.
DA  - 2021
KW  - Social Choice Function
KW  - Ambiguity Aversion
KW  - Ellsberg Urns
KW  - Strategy-proofness
KW  - Unanimity
KW  - Anonymity
KW  - Neutrality
LA  - eng
PY  - 2021
SN  - 0931-6558
SP  - 35-
TI  - Ambiguous Social Choice Functions
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29603681
Y2  - 2024-11-22T03:18:01
ER  -