TY - GEN AB - Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality. DA - 2021 KW - Social Choice Function KW - Ambiguity Aversion KW - Ellsberg Urns KW - Strategy-proofness KW - Unanimity KW - Anonymity KW - Neutrality LA - eng PY - 2021 SN - 0931-6558 SP - 35- TI - Ambiguous Social Choice Functions UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29603681 Y2 - 2024-12-25T17:38:40 ER -