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# Preface

*Dear Reader,*

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union emphasises the “indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity” and prohibits discrimination “based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation”.

Robust human rights in a diverse, tolerant and multicultural Europe are not only essential for the protection of minorities. They form the very essence of social cohesion and healthy democracy. Whether Europe opts for or against tolerance and diversity depends on the actual integration of heterogeneous groups. It is the extent of prejudices towards e.g. migrants, Muslims, homosexuals, or unemployed that reflects the will of Europeans to mutual acceptance and recognition.

On top of the everyday discrimination documented by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the growing success of populist and extremist right-wing movements attests to a yawning gulf between desire and reality. Especially in times of crisis, the extreme right scores with exclusionist slogans and allegedly simple “solutions”.

If we consider their electoral successes in countries like Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Austria and Hungary, we cannot ignore the question: “What is Europe’s present state as far as our fundamental democratic values are concerned?”

Do Europeans believe in the values of human rights, such as tolerance, intercultural diversity and solidarity? How widespread are prejudices towards “others” who are supposedly “different”? And to which extent are we willing to accept social, ethnic, cultural and religious minorities as equals and grant them equal participation? What does this mean for politics and society?

With this investigation into the extent of prejudice, intolerance and anti-democratic attitudes in eight European countries the “Project on Combating Right-

Wing Extremism” of the Forum Berlin of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung hopes to advance society’s political discourse on anti-democratic tendencies in Europe. We hope that this both informative and worrying European report on intolerance, prejudice and discrimination will stimulate efforts to promote democracy and counteract right-wing extremism, racism and other prejudices.

Our heartfelt thanks go to the authors of the report, Dr. Beate Küpper, Prof. Dr. Andreas Zick and Andreas Hövermann, along with all others involved in its publication. You can find this report and other information on the work of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for democracy and against right-wing extremism at <http://www.fes-gegen-rechtsextremismus.de>.

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Project on Combating Right-wing Extremism  
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# Authors' Foreword

Intolerance threatens the social cohesion of plural and democratic societies. It reflects the extent to which we respect or reject social, ethnic, cultural and religious minorities. It marks out those who are “strange”, “other” or “outsiders”, who are not equal, less worthy. The most visible expression of intolerance and discrimination is prejudice. Indicators of intolerance such as prejudice, anti-democratic attitudes and the prevalence of discrimination consequently represent sensitive measures of social cohesion.

Investigating intolerance, prejudice and discrimination is an important process of self-reflection for society and crucial to the protection of groups and minorities. We should also remember that intolerance towards one group is usually associated with negativity towards others. The European Union acknowledged this when it declared 1997 the European Year against Racism. In the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam the European Union called for joint efforts to combat prejudice and discrimination experienced by groups and individuals on the basis of their ethnic features, cultural background, religion, gender, sexual orientation, age or disability.

It is therefore all the more surprising that we still know so little about the general extent of prejudices against different groups in the countries of Europe. Until now, we have had no cross-cultural data set created using uniform methodology.

This report is the very first to supply comprehensive and comparable data about the extent of prejudice and discrimination against the main target groups in eight selected European countries. This representative data, based on the findings of a research project on *group-focused enmity in Europe (GFE Europe)* initiated by the University of Bielefeld, allows us to analyse the differences between countries and discover what they have in common.

The objective of this publication is to make the findings and data available to the international research community in an accessible and manageable form, and above all to stimulate social and political discussion. Accordingly, the focus is on advancing the political discussion about prejudice and discrimination

rather than on the complexities of theory. If Europe wishes to know whether prejudices, stereotypes and discriminatory mentalities in individual member states are endangering or even corroding democracy then the findings of the present publication supply an alarming wake-up call. We hope that our data and analyses will invigorate the European discussion and supply empirical evidence that has hitherto been sorely lacking.

We owe very special thanks to the *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* for making it possible to publish this research report, which we hope will channel our scientific findings into the broader political debate in society. Most of all, we are grateful to *Nora Langenbacher* for her conceptual contribution and editorial reworking of the study.

Thanks are also due to *Eva Fenn*, media researcher and editor, for polishing the language and standardizing the style of the original German report. She has ensured that our academic texts are highly readable and accessible to a lay audience, a priority we share with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Under sometimes difficult circumstances she put great energy into supporting and assisting us competently during every phase of production.

*Meredith Dale* translated the German text and edited the present English edition, assisted by his close colleague *Melanie Newton*. He is a very experienced translator with terrific knowledge and flair for social scientific texts. A big thank you to him for his excellent work.

Our gratitude is also due to *Carina Wolf* for her great work processing the data and our student assistants *Silke Grygier*, *Lisa Beckmann*, *Judith Raum* and *Marie-Luise Alders*, who showed skill and intelligence in helping to produce this publication.

This report is based on survey data collected in the scope of a major international research project based at the University of Bielefeld (see p. 18/19). We would like to thank our entire *team* for their hard work and dedication in developing and implementing the study, and our *sponsors* for their financial support for the workshops and survey (see chapter 1).

# Summary

We investigated the broad extent, major determinants and possible causes of group-focused enmity in eight European countries on the basis of a telephone survey of a representative sample of one thousand subjects per country. "Group-focused enmity" describes the syndrome of interlinked negative attitudes and prejudices towards groups identified as "other", "different" or "abnormal" and assigned inferior social status. These take the form of anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia as well as prejudices against other identified groups. Our central findings are:

- ▶ Group-focused enmity is widespread in Europe. It is weakest in the Netherlands, and strongest in Poland and Hungary. With respect to anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes and racism there are only minor differences between the countries, while differences in the extent of anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia are much more marked.
- ▶ About half of all European respondents believe there are too many immigrants in their country. Between 17 percent in the Netherlands and more than 70 percent in Poland believe that Jews seek to benefit from their forebears' suffering during the Nazi era. About one third of respondents believe there is a natural hierarchy of ethnicity. Half or more condemn Islam as "a religion of intolerance". A majority in Europe also subscribe to sexist attitudes rooted in traditional gender roles and demand that: "Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously." With a figure of about one third, Dutch respondents are least likely to affirm sexist attitudes. The proportion opposing equal rights for homosexuals ranges between 17 percent in the Netherlands and 88 percent in Poland; they believe it is not good "to allow marriages between two men or two women".
- ▶ These at first glance very different prejudices are interconnected. Those who denigrate one group are very likely to target other groups too. Although prejudices sometimes appear to be isolated they are in fact closely interconnected.

- ▶ Three ideological orientations are especially associated with group-focused enmity: authoritarianism (an underlying attitude espousing law and order and discipline), Social Dominance Orientation (advocating social status hierarchies) and the rejection of diversity (a general rejection of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity within a country).
- ▶ Group-focused enmity increases with age and decreases with education and income; attitudes differ little between men and women.
- ▶ General political attitudes are relevant only to a certain degree. Respondents who describe themselves as tending to the right, who feel politically powerless and who wish for a strong leader and support the death penalty are on average more prejudiced. The intensity of political interest is of little relevance for the dissemination of prejudice.
- ▶ Group-focused enmity need not remain restricted to attitudes. It can also have consequences for action. We investigated this in relation to immigrants. Respondents who denigrate weak groups are more likely to oppose integration of immigrants, to refuse them equal political participation, to discriminate against them and to use violence against them.
- ▶ Alongside an authoritarian mentality that supports hierarchies the most important explanatory factors for group-focused enmity are a subjective feeling that immigrants represent a threat and a general feeling of social disorientation. Low income and the feeling of being disadvantaged also play a role.
- ▶ The most important factors mitigating against group-focused enmity are trust in others, the ability to forge firm friendships, contact with immigrants, and above all a positive basic attitude towards diversity. Religiosity on the other hand does not mitigate against group-focused enmity, and holding general values that emphasize security and universalism plays only a small role in explaining tolerant attitudes.

# 1. Multicultural Europe between Tolerance and Prejudice: General Observations and Project Design

The countries and cultures of Europe have always been diverse and heterogeneous in their ethnic, religious and social composition. The opening of borders, globalization of markets and production, worldwide migration and new communication technologies mean this trend will continue, even if populist and extremist forces on the right persist in their attempts to stir up antipathy and mobilize citizens against any acceptance of cultural heterogeneity.

As a continent of very many different countries, languages and cultures Europe is by its very nature diverse. It is a place where people from different cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds, men and women with different sexual orientations, individuals with and without physical and mental disabilities pursuing widely differing lifestyles and inhabiting different economic milieus all live together. So diversity is both a fact and a project to be pursued for the future.

The future of Europe depends not only on the acceptance of diversity but also on the quality of integration of heterogeneous groups, and that in turn is a question of recognizing their equality. Hitherto marginalized and subordinated groups are increasingly demanding equal treatment as well as involvement, participation and support for their group with its specific identity and cultural characteristics. Whether people from different social groups manage to live together peacefully as equals or find their coexistence charged with conflict will depend on the willingness of the hitherto dominant groups and majorities to treat others as equals and integrate them, and on their general attitude to diversity.

Europe faces three fundamental questions that will exert a decisive influence on the equality of individuals in societies (as enshrined in declarations of human rights but rarely achieved in reality):

- Which groups are accepted as members of society?
- How equal is the participation of, for example, immigrants, religious minorities, women, homosexuals and disabled people?

- What degree of conformity and subordination is demanded and how are outsiders treated?

The first point is a question of tolerance. To what extent are heterogeneity and diversity desired or tolerated in Europe? The second question follows on from the first, pointing us towards the social order. It asks how strong the desire is to arrange social groups in hierarchies, or, conversely, how great the willingness is to treat these groups as equals and place them on a par with one another. The third question touches on the relationships between individuals and groups and concerns how strongly the individual must submit to the social order and to what extent outsiders and non-conformists can expect rigidity or tolerance.

The visible and invisible dislike, rejection and exclusion of social groups that we designate and identify as “different” are the yardstick to answer these three questions. This is where the power of prejudice comes into play. The extent of prejudices against migrants, Muslims, black people and Jews, and the treatment of women, homosexuals, disabled, poor and unemployed people show us whether a society is for or against tolerance, diversity and integration. Importantly, prejudice against immigrants, Jews, black people, and increasingly also Muslims form central components of right-wing populist and extremist attitudes (Decker and Brähler 2006; Zick and Küpper 2009), and a sexist and homophobic undertone often resonates through right-wing populist and extremist propaganda. Perpetrators of violence against homeless and disabled people commonly share right-wing extremist attitudes (at least subliminally), or even feel encouraged to commit such acts of violence by the concomitant ideologies.

After a long period during which Europe was reluctant to take the connections between widely differing forms of discrimination seriously and seek joint strategies for action against all facets of prejudice and discrimination, the EU finally used the European Year against Racism in 1997 to call for action against all forms of prejudice and discrimination. Under the Treaty of Amsterdam:

*the Council ... may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.*

The struggle against what we term group-focused enmity has thus been a declared political goal of the EU for thirteen years now. In pursuing these ob-



jectives some European countries have assumed a pioneering role while others continue to drag their feet. This applies especially in relation to prejudice-based discrimination in the labour market (Chopin and Gounari 2010 for the European Commission). Transforming the pertinent European directives into national legislation was no easy matter, and laws and regulations can only do so much to address bigoted personal opinions.

So it is little surprise that when it comes to access to education, health, housing or work, for example, people continue to suffer discrimination on the basis of their group membership. While certain countries have made great progress in their efforts to achieve equality, for example for women or homosexuals, elsewhere equal rights and opportunities still continue to be obstructed, withheld or even refused to many groups, either through structural conditions, or in some cases even quite openly through laws and regulations.

In relation to hate crime we observe a similar situation. Despite their promises to the OSCE, many European countries still supply incomplete statistics on prejudice-driven acts of violence, or none at all (Human Rights First 2009). One reason for this is that hate crime is not (yet) separately specified in national legislation. Another possible cause is a lack of awareness, leading to a failure to record prejudice-based hate crimes as such.

And finally, we must also consider the aspect of general ignorance about prejudice. In the public sphere the prejudices that constitute group-focused enmity are widely classed as individual attitudes or mentalities and judged to be of little relevance for the quality of democratic culture. Here it is all too easy to overlook the way anti-democratic extremist and populist groups feed on prejudice; indeed, prejudice could be said to be the essence of right-wing extremism. If acceptance of plurality and tolerance of difference and diversity are essential pillars of democracy, then agitation designed to undermine them is a serious threat to the very foundations of the structure. Widespread prejudices that classify particular groups as inferior and exclude them from equal participation make a mockery of democracy.

Moreover, prejudices play havoc with efforts to promote diversity, equality and integration. This work is always an uphill struggle, and often experiences set-backs where hostility towards people on the basis of their group membership comes to dominate. Political actors, opinion leaders and the media, as well as individual European citizens, need to ask themselves critically whether

they may in fact— possibly without even noticing — encourage, condone or prepare the ground for group-focused enmity. The hostility towards people of Islamic faith that is currently rampant in Europe provides clear evidence that even those who overtly reject prejudice can be involved here, willingly or unwillingly. Those who occupy political offices and public roles are human too, and as such not immune to prejudice. As these observations demonstrate, it is high time to take a closer look at the severity and dissemination of prejudices in Europe.

### The structure of the study

The present volume documents the European population's attitudes and beliefs concerning tolerance, diversity and integration. In this respect it supplies a solid analysis of the state of affairs in Europe that is fit to serve as the basis for serious discussion. More than ten years after Europe set itself the ambitious goal of ending discrimination, this volume investigates the current extent of group-focused enmity employing scientific criteria and methods. Using survey data from eight European countries we document the magnitude of prejudice towards migrants, black people, Jews, Muslims, women and homosexuals. As well as their quantitative relevance, these groups are also decisive in defining the discourse. The choice of groups was constrained by the limits of the survey and is by no means exhaustive: Europe suffers from many other prejudices that have come to permeate everyday life. We were, for example, unable to consider prejudices against homeless, poor, overweight or disabled people, to name but a few of the marginalized groups that are singled out and treated as inferior.

The analysis is based on survey data collected in telephone interviews of a representative sample of 1,000 persons aged 16 and above per country conducted in autumn 2008 in the scope of the *Group-based Enmity in Europe* study. The countries involved were France, Germany, Great Britain,<sup>1</sup> Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. The countries were selected to reflect the different geographical regions of the EU, taking old and new member states into account. The number of countries included was restricted by the available funding. The study was designed and conducted in collaboration with an

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1 The survey was conducted in England, Wales and Scotland, but not Northern Ireland.

international interdisciplinary team of renowned experts in prejudice and survey research and funded by private private foundations.<sup>2</sup>

We begin by providing a brief overview of the groups targeted by the surveyed prejudices, describing the groups and determining their size (chapter 1.1). We believe it is important to document how the statements about these groups – which many respondents agreed with – are not only negative but also at odds with the objective facts. As we show in our findings, the level of prejudice against a particular group has little to do with its actual numerical presence. But before we come to the results we outline what we understand by prejudice, how it is expressed and what consequences it has. Finally, at the end of the volume, we consider which especially important influencing factors promote or prevent discriminatory attitudes (chapter 9).

## 1.1 Outsiders in Europe – the Targets of Prejudice

The present study concentrates on European attitudes towards migrants, black people, Jews, Muslims, women and homosexuals. It is against these and other groups that group-focused enmity is directed and it is they who are most often the victims of deliberate discrimination and structural disadvantage. Moreover, these groups are specifically targeted by right-wing populist propaganda and extremist violence, with right-wing politicians often claiming that “we” are being “swamped” or arguing that the cultures are incompatible. In the following we provide some objective facts about the targeted groups, touching on their experience of discrimination in order to demonstrate the harm prejudice causes.

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2 Grants were dedicated to Andreas Zick and Beate Küpper, who also managed the project. The team included: France: Dr. Nonna Mayer, CERI, Sciences Po Paris and Dr. Guillaume Roux, University of Grenoble; Germany: Prof. Ulrich Wagner, University of Marburg and Carina Wolf, University of Bielefeld; Great Britain: Prof. Miles Hewstone and Dr. Katharina Schmid, University of Oxford; Hungary: Prof. Antal Örkény and Luca Váradi, Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest; Italy: Prof. Alberto Voci, University of Padua; the Netherlands: Dr. Bertjan Doosje, Prof. Roel Meertens and Anja Zimmermann, University of Amsterdam; Poland: Prof. Pavel Boski and Marta Penczek, Polish Academy of Sciences, University of Warsaw; Portugal: Prof. Jorge Vala, Dr. Alice Ramos and Cicero Pereira, University of Lisbon. The project was supported financially by the Compagnia di San Paolo, the Freudenberg Stiftung, the Groeben Stiftung, the VolkswagenStiftung, and two other private foundations. We would like to express our particular gratitude to Christian Petry, Prof. Piero Gastaldo and Dr. Wilhelm Krull, who opened unexpected doors for us, as well as to the Amadeu Antonio Foundation for their constant support. The project was also supported by the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at the University of Bielefeld, which provided resources for staff and equipment.

As the continent with the greatest inward migration, Europe should be especially interested in prejudice against *immigrants*. Every year about two million people migrate to Europe, with almost the same number leaving again. Migration within Europe is even greater still. The proportion of immigrants in the total population varies in the countries under consideration here from 1.3 percent in Poland to 12.2 percent in Great Britain (Table 1).

Immigrants to Europe originate from very different countries, by no means forming a homogeneous group. In *Great Britain* many immigrants come from the former colonies of India, Pakistan and the Caribbean, while more recently many labour migrants have arrived from Poland. In *Germany* immigrants from Turkey who arrived as temporary labour migrants (“guest workers”) but stayed form the largest group. Germany also has many ethnic German immigrants from the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe who enjoy automatic German citizenship. The third major group in Germany are labour migrants from southern European countries that are now in the EU, along with their descendants. Most immigrants in *France* have North African roots; many originate from the former colony of Algeria and possess French citizenship. The *Netherlands* is home to many immigrants from the former Dutch colonies of Indonesia and Surinam, as well as many people with Moroccan and Tunisian roots. In *Italy* the proportion of immigrants is considerably smaller, the main groups being undocumented migrants from sub-Saharan Africa and Roma from Romania seeking work. Migration from the Balkan states increased during the Yugoslavian wars. As a former colonial power *Portugal* also records considerable immigration from Africa, and has recently also attracted labour migrants from Ukraine. The official statistics show very little immigration in *Poland*, but many temporary labour migrants come from neighbouring eastern European countries, especially to work in agriculture. Most immigrants in *Hungary* originate from formerly Hungarian regions of neighbouring Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Ukraine. These immigrants are perceived not as foreigners but as people with Hungarian roots. In that sense they are comparable to ethnic Germans from the former Soviet Union whose German citizenship means they do not appear as foreigners in official German statistics, even though empirical studies show that the population at large often sees them as foreign (Zick et al. 2001). The same often also applies to immigrants from former colonies, who are frequently treated as foreigners even though they are legally citizens.

Thus the extent to which people are perceived as foreigners or outsiders does not necessarily depend on their birth, citizenship or origins. A person may pos-

sess a country's citizenship and have lived there for decades yet still be regarded by the majority of the population as a migrant, foreigner or outsider. This may even apply if they were born there and have lived there all their lives. This is above all the case when they are members of a group identified as foreign, a group that is categorized as "other" in ethnic, cultural or religious terms and negatively stereotyped.

Immigrants who belong to a non-Christian religion are quickly labelled as outsiders in the overwhelmingly Christian continent of Europe. In the surveyed countries there are comparatively few adherents of non-Christian religions, but here we are dealing with estimates rather than hard data. France has the highest proportion of *Muslims* in the population, with approx. 10 percent. In Germany and the Netherlands Muslims represent between 6 and 7 percent of the population, in Great Britain 4 percent. Even fewer Muslims live in Hungary, Poland and Portugal; in all three the proportion is less than 1 percent (Table 1). It is estimated that altogether 1.12 million Jews live in the European Union (Della Pergola 2010). With about half a million France has by far the largest Jewish population. In all other surveyed countries the proportion of Jews is less than 1 percent; it is particularly small in Poland and Portugal.

Table 1: **Migrants and Muslims in Europe (percent of population)**

	Muslims <sup>a</sup>	Migrants <sup>b</sup>	Main countries of origin
France	10.0	10.4	North Africa, esp. Algeria
Germany	7.0	12.3	Turkey, former Soviet Union, eastern Europe
Great Britain	4.0	9.1	South East Asia, Pakistan, Caribbean islands, Poland
Hungary	0.03	3.1	Romania, especially former Hungarian territories
Italy	2.1	4.3	Balkan states incl. Romania, Africa
Netherlands	6.0	10.1	Indonesia, Surinam, Morocco, Turkey
Poland	0.07	1.8	Eastern Europe, esp. Ukraine
Portugal	0.14	7.3	Africa, Ukraine

a Kettani (2010), percentages based on total population of country regardless of citizenship. Figures are somewhat higher than those calculated on the basis of national citizenship.

b Foreign-born residents as percentage of total population (Muenz 2006; OECD data).

We also consider *homosexuals* as targets of group-focused enmity. Although churches and the state conduct a lively moral and legal discourse about homosexuality, there are as yet no reliable figures for their proportion of the population. This is generally estimated to be approx. 5 percent (for men and women alike), although far from all live their homosexuality openly. In some studies, a considerable number of people who would not describe themselves as homosexual report having felt attracted to a person of their own gender at some time.

Gender is of course one of the central categories on which the prejudices and stereotypes of everyday life are based. The lack of equality between men and *women* in all spheres of life is a persistent deficit, for women continue to suffer massive structural disadvantage. Although women are affected by prejudice and discrimination, unlike the other listed groups they are not a minority. In fact, in all of the countries considered here women tend to represent a slight majority.

## 1.2. The Experience of Discrimination

In 2008 the European Commission published a comprehensive special report on discrimination, using Eurobarometer data to determine how many people see themselves as part of a minority and examine how prevalent the experience of discrimination is.<sup>3</sup> The following figures taken from the *Special Eurobarometer 296: Discrimination in the EU 2008* outline the dimensions of discrimination experienced by the groups targeted by the prejudices surveyed for this study. Thus the findings reported below are also based on surveys and therefore reflect subjective perceptions, assessments and reported experiences of both the affected minority and the corresponding majority.

*Contact with outgroups:* According to the Eurobarometer survey, 61 percent of Europeans say they have friends or acquaintances who are “of a different religion or have different beliefs to them”. More than half say they know someone with a disability or a person of a different ethnic origin (55 percent in each

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3 The European Commission's Eurobarometer opinion survey has been conducted at regular intervals in all EU member states since 1973. The topics covered include environmental and climate protection, health, culture, poverty and social exclusion, human rights and equality, and integration of minorities. ([http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm)).

## On the role of subjective perception

People's subjective views of the world, including their understanding and interpretation of discrimination, are of course not necessarily identical with the objectively measurable facts. There are occasions where institutions and individuals insist that particular reported experiences of prejudice and discrimination lack any objective basis. That is a mistaken perception. *Firstly*, when analysing the state of a democratic society the subjective impressions and perceptions of its citizens – the “soft data” – are not only revealing but absolutely indispensable. Democracies require a broad consensus on values and norms, where violations cannot be reduced to objective facts alone. Social attitudes and convictions, collective emotions and experiences of discrimination are all indicative of the climate and the strength of cohesive forces, and signalize where conflicts and problems exist or might emerge. Individual interpretations, the respective excerpt of social reality, fundamental values and many other aspects always feed into people's subjective perspectives on society. *Secondly*, with reference to discrimination, we must note that subjectively reported or perceived discrimination need not necessarily coincide with objectively measurable discrimination. That said, the subjective aspect cannot be completely divorced from the objective facts either. Both facets are relevant. For example, being personally affected can lead to an overestimation of the actual extent of discrimination. Or conversely, inattentiveness, lack of interest and habituation can lead a person to overlook real existing discrimination or fail to recognize it as such. If it is “normal” that children from migrant communities do less well at school, many people will not even consider the possibility that systematic individual or structural discrimination might play a role. Where particular forms of discrimination, such as sexism and homophobia, are so deeply rooted in our society that they are reflected in legislation – for example restricting the privilege of marriage to heterosexual relationships – many people may fail to recognize this as discrimination, treating it instead as part of the culture.

case), while one third have a friend or acquaintance who is homosexual (34 percent). Younger and better-educated respondents are more likely to report contact with people of a different ethnic origin, as are those who live in urban areas or themselves belong to an ethnic minority. A large majority of those surveyed – 87 percent – say they belong to no minority group, markedly more than we would actually expect on the basis of the statistically reported proportions of ethnic and religious minorities, homosexuals and disabled people.

*Perceived discrimination:* Many Europeans believe that minorities in Europe suffer discrimination: 62 percent of respondents believe that discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin is widespread, 51 percent recognize sexual orientation as grounds for discrimination and 42 percent suspect widespread discrimination on the basis of faith or religion. 45 percent say they believe disabled people suffer discrimination and 36 percent believe gender is a cause of discrimination. Almost one third of respondents – 29 percent – said they had witnessed discrimination against another person during the previous twelve months, largely on the basis of ethnicity. Especially many of the Dutch and German respondents shared this experience, followed by British and Hungarians. Respondents in Portugal and Poland, on the other hand, relatively rarely reported having witnessed discrimination against other people. A close connection was found between observed discrimination and the respondent's own experience of discrimination.

*Experience of discrimination:* Overall 15 percent of the European respondents reported having suffered discrimination or harassment during the previous twelve months because of their gender, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, religion or age. Conspicuously many in Austria shared this experience, followed by Italy and Hungary. The proportion in Great Britain and France was above the European mean, too. In Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Poland the proportion who had experienced discrimination was below the European average. People born outside the Europe most frequently reported ethnic discrimination (23 percent), followed by those from non-EU European countries and those not living in the country they were born in.

*Anti-discrimination:* 48 percent of Europeans believe that too little is done to tackle discrimination in their country. Those who believe discrimination to be widespread express this opinion especially frequently. Only 11 percent believe enough is being done. One section of the European population is plainly sensitized to discrimination and consequently calls for stronger action, whereas



another section fails to perceive discrimination and therefore also believes current measures to be adequate. Sensitivity to discrimination depends strongly on whether people have themselves experienced or observed discrimination against people they know. It is stronger among the young, the better-educated and those who live in urban areas. There are also strong differences in sensitivity between the different European countries.

One important group that denies the existence of discrimination and sabotages action to rectify it are followers of right-wing populism and extremism, who make use of group-focused enmity to justify discrimination against the aforementioned groups. Next, we will briefly examine how extremism and populism are connected with prejudice.

### 1.3. Treating Others as Inferior as a Core Element of Right-wing Populist and Extremist Ideologies

While there are many definitions of right-wing extremism and populism, comprising distinct but partly overlapping elements, there is broad consensus that treating outgroups as inferior represents an important component of right-wing populist and extremist attitudes.<sup>4</sup> According to Wilhelm Heitmeyer (1987), extreme right-wing orientations are based on an ideology of inequality in conjunction with an acceptance of violence that sets them apart from right-wing populism. The ideology of inequality, he writes, expresses itself in the treatment of others as inferior, in extreme nationalism, in racist categories, in social Darwinism, in totalitarian norms and in an emphasis on ingroup homogeneity. The conviction that violence is a legitimate means for regulating conflicts leads to an acceptance of its use (see also Zick and Küpper 2009).

On the basis of quantitative and qualitative data gathered in eight European countries the *SIREN Project* identifies the following four factors as core elements of right-wing populist attitudes: outgroup negativity, ingroup favouritism, authoritarianism and rejection of the institutions of representative democracy (Hentges et al. 2003; de Weerd et al. 2004). According to Wilhelm

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4 We restrict ourselves here to definitions that treat right-wing extremism and populism as attitude complexes. In other contexts, especially political science, both terms appear as designations for movements, groups, parties, individuals and political currents. In that usage too, treatment of outgroups as inferior is generally an important element.

Heitmeyer, right-wing populism is essentially constituted by anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and an aggressive authoritarianism with a heavy emphasis on law and order (2002, see also Klein, Küpper and Zick 2009). Oliver Decker and Elmar Brähler (2006) define right-wing extremism as a pattern of attitudes whose unifying element is the idea that not all groups should enjoy equal status. This is expressed in the dimensions of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, social Darwinism, support for right-wing dictatorship, national chauvinism and trivialization of Nazi crimes.<sup>5</sup>

Building on these definitions, we propose that treatment of groups as inferior represents a central dimension of right-wing populist and extremist attitude complexes. In terms of hostility to outsiders that means above all anti-Semitism and old-fashioned racism. Current trends in many European countries suggest that anti-Muslim attitudes have also become a central component of right-wing populist and extremist ideas. We also find prejudice against women and homosexuals in right-wing extremist propaganda, and to some extent also in populist materials. This thus also forms one of the components of right-wing extremism, although it is not (yet) one of its core aspects.

The kind of prejudices instrumentalized and propagated by extremist groups in the different countries of Europe depend on the history of the respective group, prevalent ideologies of unequal status, and the culture and history in which they develop. But the groups against which right-wing extremists agitate are often similar across the different countries: immigrants, black people, Jews and Muslims, women and homosexuals are the central target groups in all the countries we have studied. In other words, the extremist and populist movements are united in their prejudices and in the group-focused enmity these constitute. Intolerance of others, which includes insiders accused of violating norms as well as outsiders, is an enormously important propaganda instrument, because it attracts people who share these sentiments and is a powerful instrument for reinforcing cohesion. Because it permeates everyday life, the power of prejudice in Europe is much greater than has generally been assumed. In the next chapter we outline more precisely what we understand by prejudice and why it is so powerful and dangerous.

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5 This definition is also the one used in the studies of right-wing extremism in Germany published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, most recently *Die Mitte in der Krise: Rechts-extreme Einstellungen in Deutschland 2010* (Decker et al. 2010).

## 2. Prejudice and Group-focused Enmity

Given their centrality to this study, it would now be pertinent to provide an overview of our fundamental understanding of prejudice and present the concept of group-focused enmity (GFE) on which our work is based. First we describe how we define prejudice, which forms of expression it may assume, which social functions it fulfils and what consequences it has. Our perspective is rooted in social psychology, in an understanding of prejudice as a set of social attitudes that arises through the interaction of individual and environmental causal factors. Individuals hold prejudices because their environment leads them to. Although we focus mainly on individuals and their attitudes, perceptions, feelings and interpretations, these are also reflected in social discourse because that is where prejudices are rooted, where they emanate from. The concept of prejudice we outline below also provides a basis for understanding the current political discussions. After defining prejudice itself we present the concept of group-focused enmity, which places the various social prejudices in an overall context. The concept was introduced by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002) and has since been elaborated and empirically verified by other scholars (Zick et al. 2008).<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1 A Fundamental Understanding of Prejudice

Classical prejudice research understands prejudices as negative attitudes towards groups and individuals based solely on their group membership (Allport 1954). Following this perspective, Aboud defines prejudice as a “unified, stable, and consistent tendency to respond in a negative way toward members of a particular ethnic group” (1988, 6), which we would extend to any group. In other words, individuals are looked down upon not on the basis of their personal characteristics but through nothing other than their categorization as a

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6 The *Group-focused Enmity in Germany* project has been running for ten years (2002–2011) and surveys German opinion about identified groups in an annual representative telephone survey. A parallel panel survey is also being conducted in which the same respondents are interviewed at two-year intervals. The study is supported by regional analyses in specific social areas and an interdisciplinary postgraduate programme. The results are published in the annual Suhrkamp series *Deutsche Zustände* (in German; ed. Wilhelm Heitmeyer); see also [www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg](http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg).

member of an outgroup. It is utterly irrelevant whether they see themselves as a member of this group or whether their group membership can be determined objectively. What matters is solely the categorization by the person holding or expressing the prejudice. Take the example of the categorization of a person as a “foreigner”. For xenophobic prejudices to exist against this person it is generally irrelevant whether he or she in fact possesses the country’s citizenship, was born there, or has ever lived anywhere else.

In prejudice research there is broad consensus that prejudices arise as generalized negative attitudes towards groups and individuals and are based solely on the fact that these groups are outgroups or these persons belong to an outgroup (Allport 1954; Zick 1997).

Racism, sexism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and many other prejudices are thus not personal traits, but social attitudes that must be understood through the context of the person who holds them. As social attitudes, prejudices have a cognitive, an affective and possibly also a behaviour-related dimension. As attitudes they are learnable – and unlearnable – even if this is often a long and difficult process in cases where attitudes are deep-seated.

## 2.2 Three Steps to Prejudice

A prejudice is created through a three-stage process involving: 1) categorization, 2) stereotyping and 3) judgement (affective priming).

The first step is *categorization*. This is a fundamental cognitive process that occurs almost automatically and helps individuals to understand and make sense of the complex information they receive from their environment. We categorize our material surroundings, plants, animals and other people too. We differentiate people by whether they belong to our own ingroup or to an outgroup, regardless of what specific features we use to define in- and outgroup. The features by which we categorize people are essentially those which are currently available to us, in other words those to which our attention is directed or of which we are currently particularly aware. Depending on the situation, for example, we might categorize people by gender or else apply age as the relevant category; in another context we might categorize them into native and immigrant. The media play a decisive role, directing our attention to specific features – for example Muslim/non-Muslim.

Whether a person applies categorizing labels such as “foreigner”, “Muslim” or “Jew”, “woman”, “homosexual” or “disabled” depends largely on their environment, on the debates conducted in their immediate lifeworld and in the public sphere. In political discourse, too, we can observe how categories are continuously discussed and assessed. But categories and their application are not in themselves prejudices; first they must pass through two further processes. Prejudices are always “group-based” and “group-focused”. They express the position of individuals as members of categories vis-à-vis persons or groups who belong to another category.

In the second step we attribute particular characteristics to people on the basis of their group membership, imagining them so to speak as particular “types”. These *stereotypes* can be understood as little pictures we make in our heads (Lippmann 1922, cited in Aronson, Wilson and Akert 2004, 485). Stereotyping involves generalizing about a group of people, attributing identical characteristics to all of them even though they may in reality be very different. The stereotypes that exist within cultures are remarkably similar, and very resistant to change. In stereotyping we observe an outgroup homogeneity effect and an ingroup heterogeneity effect: members of outgroups all appear the same while we perceive members of our own group to be quite distinct from one another. But the step of stereotyping does not occur automatically. We also have the option of stopping to think and consciously reconsidering or revising our stereotypes (Devine 1989). Nor are stereotypes necessarily prejudices in the sense of generalized negative attitudes implying inferiority. Stereotyping of others also entails self-stereotyping. In defining how members of an outgroup are different we simultaneously attribute to ourselves stereotyped characteristics of the ingroup (Zick 2005).

Not until the third step of prejudice formation are the people we have categorized into groups and stereotyped finally *evaluated positively or negatively*. As a rule, members of society tend to assess members of their ingroup positively and members of identified outgroups negatively. This is driven by a desire to create a positive social identity and preserve or enhance self-esteem (Tajfel and Turner 1979). This ingroup favouritism is not just an abstract positive evaluation, but expresses itself in very real partiality and patronage, even towards completely unknown members of the ingroup.

Identifying and denigrating an outgroup is a simple means of gaining a positive social identity and can also strengthen cohesion within the ingroup. One classic

example of this is where football fans mock the other team and celebrate their own. In the political context extreme nationalism and chauvinism are expressions of the nexus of ingroup overidentification and outgroup inferiority, here directed against the citizens of another nation. All prejudices share an implicit assumption that all members of the outgroup are the same, and that they are different from and worse than the ingroup.

There are of course also positive prejudices towards groups, and theoretically these also confer an unequal status on those towards whom they are directed. But because they cause no disadvantage to those affected, they are less problematic and of less urgency when setting research priorities. More problematic are prejudices that at first glance appear positive but actually have negative consequences for those they address. Examples of such superficially positive prejudices are the idea that women are especially emotional and men more rational. Although both may be unproblematic in the private interpersonal sphere, they serve to legitimize social discrimination, for example in the appointment of senior managers. Such benevolent prejudices are a subset of the class of modern or subtle prejudices, which are discussed in the next section.

## 2.3 Overt and Covert Prejudices

Prejudices may be expressed openly and directly or in subtle, indirect and hidden ways. One important example of the latter is the rejection or refusal of sympathy for a particular outgroup, or the exaggeration of alleged cultural differences (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995). Covert prejudices consist of a series of arguments that on closer examination turn out to be similar regardless of which target group they are directed against. The negative characteristics of overt and covert prejudices are always the same: stupidity, laziness and indolence, uncleanliness, physical weakness and psychological instability, criminality, deviousness and slyness. Prejudices often involve double standards, where something that is criticized in the outgroup is ignored or dismissed as unimportant in the ingroup. One example of this would be where Muslims are criticized for favouring gender inequality while support for traditional gender roles in the majority population is ignored. Furthermore, all prejudices share the aspect of holding all members of a group responsible for the deeds of an individual, for example blaming all Muslims for terrorist attacks conducted by radical minorities or individuals.

*Traditional prejudices* are *overt prejudices* (open prejudices, old-fashioned racism), and as a rule express a clearly negative generalized attitude. Often the targets of these prejudices are accused of threatening the ingroup, for example stealing its members' jobs. They are also expressed through open rejection of personal contact with members of an outgroup. Overt prejudices often involve attributions of blame, where groups are told that their own behaviour is responsible for prejudices or even persecution. Outgroups are often also instrumentalized as scapegoats for political, economic or social problems.

In recent decades in Europe, however, strong social norms of tolerance and anti-racism have become established, and increasingly inhibit open expression of prejudice. But the extent to which these are active and effectual in everyday life varies from country to country and milieu to milieu. Marked differences can be observed between target groups: Something that may not be said aloud about one group may (still) be perceived as socially acceptable in relation to another.

Yet even where social norms of tolerance are widely shared, negative emotions towards particular groups often remain extant. The negative labelling of particular groups is often so deeply rooted in cultural memory and individual socialization that negative emotions persist. Thus even individuals who consciously reject anti-Semitism may still possess latent reservations, having for example been shaped by anti-Semitic attitudes in their childhood environment.

*Modern prejudices* that undermine or subvert a public norm of tolerance emerge especially where traditional prejudices are inhibited or condemned (Zick 1997). They comprise more *subtle or hidden* forms of prejudice that are less easily identifiable and/or communicated circuitously. Modern prejudices express stereotypes in a more polite manner, for example through statements that a particular group is less high-achieving or holds completely different and incompatible values with respect to education or gender equality. Covert prejudices are also expressed through denial or refusal of positive emotions such as affection or sympathy for or admiration of an outgroup. There is no open hostility here but no affection either, making it difficult for members of this outgroup to feel personally liked as individuals. Modern prejudices can also appear in the guise of an overemphasis on individual equality. Sometimes equality is used as an argument to deny demands for measures to improve the opportunities of particular groups, for example when specific quotas for women to

overcome structural inequality of opportunity and discrimination are rejected on the grounds that individual achievement is what counts – forgetting that the decisive structures are made by men, designed to meet the needs of men and dominated by men.

Prejudices can be expressed consciously and in a controlled way, but they may also exert influence unconsciously and almost automatically without the actors being aware of the process. In this case prejudices are expressed without thought in the form of blithely repeated “common knowledge” and “traditional” opinions. These include insulting designations for particular groups such as black people or women. The point is to realize that even these unconscious and thoughtless prejudices have negative consequences for their targets. The same applies to prejudices communicated more or less directly in media images and reports, such as pictures of violent Muslim youth or brutal Israeli soldiers.

## 2.4 Functions of Prejudices

Prejudices are especially persistent when they fulfil social-psychological functions, meaning they have social and individual utility for groups and individuals. These functions are social because prejudices are relevant less for individuals than for the integration of individuals in groups, nations and cultures (Zick, Küpper and Heitmeyer 2010). There are five main social functions of prejudice.

*1. Prejudices bond.* The most important function of prejudice (and of extremist attitudes and ideologies) is probably bonding, where differentiation from the other creates social identity and a sense of belonging within the ingroup. This is why political propaganda so often plays the prejudice and racism cards (Mendelberg 2001), because devaluing minorities heightens the importance of the ingroup. A leader can present himself as a saviour by depicting the national or ethnic ingroup as endangered. Other problems such as unemployment or unfair distribution of resources fade from view or worse still are blamed on the “outsiders”.

*2. Prejudices serve to preserve and enhance self-esteem.* This function is directly connected with the first. The more inferior the other in comparison to the ingroup the more positive the self-esteem gained through group identification.



*3. Prejudices offer control and legitimize hierarchies.* Prejudices often contain justifications for an existing social order. By explaining why certain groups possess greater wealth and power than others they defend a hierarchical status quo or even help to establish it in the first place. This is seen particularly clearly in long-established racist ideas or sexist views, which refer to special characteristics or biological differences in order to justify the inferior position of black people and women. Prejudices are thus also legitimizing myths for creating and maintaining group-based hierarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). As traded myths they are widely disseminated and socially shared. This may even lead subordinate groups to share prejudices against their own group, for the reasons stated above: Prejudices strengthen the feeling of belonging together with the dominant group and explain – albeit at the price of reduced self-esteem – why the subordinate group occupies its subordinate position. In other words, prejudices supply knowledge, which brings us to our next point.

*4. Prejudices supply “knowledge” and “orientation”.* Prejudices provide a handy frame of reference for understanding the world. They are especially potent where complex social realities have become incomprehensible. The cliché explains. This is why prejudices appear especially in situations of crisis, such as economic recession, natural disaster or famine, where the need for explanations is especially strong. Where little real factual knowledge about a group is available, deeply rooted stereotypes, old wives’ tales and anecdotes serve as a substitute. This stereotype-based “knowledge” in turn guides perceptions of the group in real situations. Information about a group, for example immigrants, is often received and selected to fit existing stereotypes. This can also occur in media reports, whose producers themselves filter the information they select and present through the prism of stereotypes.

*5. Prejudices show who can be trusted and who cannot.* The “knowledge” imparted by prejudices also tells its recipients which individuals and groups can be trusted and which cannot. Social prejudice thus fulfils a confidence-building function and at the same time sows mistrust.

## 2.5 Individual and Societal Consequences of Group-focused Enmity

Prejudice on the grounds of a person's attributed membership of a group defined as "foreign", "strange" or "other" is not simply one possible personal opinion among many. Prejudices have far-reaching negative consequences for those targeted and for the social climate as a whole.

So far we have examined prejudices as attitudes. They may have a behavioural component, but as attitudes they need not necessarily provoke actions or reactions. As complex ideologies prejudices can remain in the realm of ideology without any impact at the level of objective relations. Nonetheless, attitudes are still relevant for real-world activities in several respects.

From attitude research we know that attitudes can lead to acts. The same applies to prejudices. Although prejudices do not lead automatically and directly to discrimination, they can supply the basis and above all the justification for discrimination and even violence. The more strongly a person advocates an act, the more likely it is that they will carry it out. If the circumstances are favourable they will perhaps act on their attitudes. As we know from the field of *hate crime*, in the extreme case prejudice can lead to violence. Then the targets of prejudice become victims of violence solely because they are identified as members of a particular group, for example because of their skin colour, homosexual orientation, disability or homelessness. This form of violence is also referred to as hate crime and is always accompanied by prejudices. Domestic violence can also involve prejudices, for example when a woman has exercised liberties to which – as a woman – she is not entitled according to conventional opinion. A less drastic but still relevant example is the way middle-class children are favoured by teachers who treat them from the very start as cleverer and more ambitious.

### Types of discrimination

Under the term discrimination we understand negative, unjustified or exclusionary behaviour towards members of a target group solely because they are identified as members of this group (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986, 3).

Discrimination is found in three forms: Firstly there are acts of *direct discrimination*. This would include decisions concerning job appointments and housing, where members of one group (for example the national ingroup) are

favoured and members of an outgroup (for example immigrants) disadvantaged on the basis of their group membership. Direct discrimination is also expressed through social distance, for example when parents forbid their child from marrying a member of an outgroup or do not wish to have a member of that group as their neighbour. It also applies when parents avoid sending their children to a school attended by significant numbers of migrants' children. Especially when it comes to choice of school, prejudices often serve very specifically to justify inequality of educational opportunities by pointing to supposedly insuperable cultural or religious differences or a lack of motivation or achievement on the part of children from migrant communities. But discrimination can also be expressed in immediate physical terms. This is the case, for instance, when people distance themselves physically from stigmatized groups in public space.

Secondly, there is *structural discrimination* by institutions, organizations and businesses, where the rules, regulations, laws and procedures favour certain groups and disadvantage others. For example, schools that demand parental participation and support with homework automatically disadvantage those pupils whose parents are unable to provide this, whether because they have poor command of the language or because their own education is inadequate. Where teachers place great importance on correct spelling in all subjects, pupils whose mother tongue is not the teaching language face difficulties that others do not. Companies that schedule important training events in the evenings inevitably hinder the careers of those who have to care for small children, who tend to be overwhelmingly women. Structural discrimination, too, is ultimately shaped by people and implemented by individuals. It is reflected in individual support for discriminatory structures, for example voting for parties that mobilize against immigrants or supporting special policing measures targeting individuals on the basis of their specific group membership.

Thirdly, discrimination can also take the form of *harassment*. This involves denigrating individuals on the basis of their group membership or creating an environment in which people are humiliated, intimidated or insulted on the basis of particular group characteristics.

### Prejudice as legitimization of inequality

Prejudices encourage or facilitate action by *justifying* acts (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). They supply explanations for existing inequalities by pointing to a

“natural order”, supposed biological differences or “typical” characteristics that predispose particular groups for places at the top or bottom of the social ladder.

Prejudices also create social *norms*. They have the power to define what is proper and customary – what is “normal”. In the political context prejudices (for example those of politicians and other decision-makers) can even influence the rules, regulations and legislation that encourage or discourage individual discriminatory behaviour. Prejudices shared in peer groups such as families, clubs and societies, political parties or groups of friends influence a person’s attitude and their willingness act on it by offering *legitimization*. Violent right-wing groups justify their acts through prejudices. As long as these are shared more broadly in society, the extremist group is able to say it is only putting into practice what everybody thinks anyway (Wahl 2003).

### Consequences for the targets of prejudice

Prejudices also have consequences for their targets. Experiencing prejudice has negative effects on the target’s physical and emotional well-being as well as on their achievements and success in life. Research has found that experiencing prejudice and discrimination destroys self-respect and can lead to self-stigmatization. For example, as David R. Williams and Ruth Williams-Morris show, black school students in the United States have a worse opinion of their own marks than white students with the same level of achievement (2000). Moreover, ongoing experience of prejudice is experienced as threat. In order to escape this threat and avoid a permanent fight against prejudice, the targets of prejudice sometimes alter their behaviour to conform to the popular stereotype. In this way prejudices can ultimately become self-fulfilling (see also Zick and Küpper 2010).

So prejudices are used to justify existing discrimination through ideas of unequal status and contribute to the establishment and maintenance of discriminatory structures and thought patterns. Prejudices shape people’s understanding of their world and create reality. Prejudices are thus ultimately reflected in the distribution of power, influence and money, in access to education and housing, in health, and much more besides. To be able to do so, they require the additional quality that is described by the syndrome of group-focused enmity.

## 2.6 Group-focused Enmity

The concept of group-focused enmity places group-specific prejudices in an overall context of anti-democratic mentalities. We speak of *enmity* to denote the hostility that constitutes the essence of any prejudice and is the common factor underlying all individual prejudices. We use the term *group-focused* to take into account the aforementioned observation that prejudice is about groups differentiating themselves from one another rather than about personal ill-will or misanthropy.

We understand a spectrum of prejudices, including anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism and sexism, as elements of a syndrome of group-focused enmity. We speak of a *syndrome of group-focused enmity* in order to make it clear that prejudices directed towards different target groups are linked to one another and share the common core of an ideology of unequal status.<sup>7</sup> Individuals who share this ideology look down upon outgroups regardless of these groups' specific identity.

**Group-focused enmity describes a generalized devaluation of outgroups. At its core is an ideology of unequal status.**

The crucial reason to treat group-focused enmity as a syndrome is that as a rule one prejudice is generally associated with others. Back in the 1950s the founder of modern prejudice research, Gordon Allport, stated (1954, 68):

*One of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group.*

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<sup>7</sup> Group-focused enmity is related to the concepts of racism and ethnocentrism, but not identical with them (see for example Sumner 1906). Following the approach of prejudice research, we use the term racism in a narrow sense to denote prejudice against black people (or more generally prejudice based on physical ethnic traits). We believe it makes sense to distinguish conceptually between ethnocentrism and prejudices against groups. The extent to which an ethnic ingroup's inflated perception of its own worth is associated with – or independent of – negative perceptions of the worth of other ethnic groups is an empirical matter (Bizumic et al. 2009).


We follow Allport in assuming that prejudices against different target groups are connected to one another, but go a step further. According to Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2002), different prejudices share a common core, which he identifies as an ideology of unequal status. The German survey project on group-focused enmity has been able to confirm this empirically (Zick et al. 2008). Here we adopt the construct of Social Dominance Orientation as an indicator of an ideology of unequal status (Sidanius and Pratto 1999, see chapter 5.3 in this volume). Later in this report we are able to show that persons who generally condone group hierarchies tend to hold negative attitudes towards certain specific groups. In their concept of the authoritarian personality, Adorno and colleagues (1950) demonstrate that authoritarianism is associated with prejudices against many different groups (see chapter 5.3 in this volume, also Decker and Brähler 2010). Here, too, we have been able to confirm that the conceptually and empirically closely related phenomenon of authoritarianism codetermines the core of group-focused enmity along with Social Dominance Orientation (Küpper and Zick 2005).

## 2.7 The Elements of Group-focused Enmity Investigated in the European Project

Group-focused enmity is a fundamentally open concept into which further prejudices can be integrated as required by cultural and socio-political developments (a case in point being prejudices against Roma). The *group-focused enmity in Europe* research project on which this study is based investigated the following prejudices as elements of a syndrome of group-focused enmity: anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia (Figure 1).

The choice of elements of group-focused enmity to investigate in the European project was governed by empirical and methodological aspects and by the restricted length of the interviews rather than theoretical considerations (see chapter 3). We were nonetheless still able to survey and observe a socially and politically relevant syndrome of group-focused enmity directed towards some of the groups worst affected by intolerance and exclusion. In the following we outline our understanding of the individual prejudices studied.

Figure 1: **The syndrome of group-focused enmity in the European study**



### 2.7.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

Anti-immigrant attitudes are a central element of the GFE syndrome. They are directed against persons who are actually or supposedly “foreign” or “immigrants”. The targets of this prejudice need not in fact be foreign at all; it is enough to be perceived as such. Immigrants from other countries are often identified as foreigners, but by no means all countries of origin are equally associated with negative prejudices. In western Europe negative prejudices are currently directed above all against people from other cultures – usually meaning dark-haired people from Muslim countries – whereas towards Swedes, for example, rather positive prejudices are widespread. This example clearly illustrates the three characteristics of prejudice: Firstly, the categorization of persons as “foreign” is flexible (indeed, it could mean a neighbour). Secondly,

prejudices are context-dependent, with the targets of anti-immigrant attitudes differing in different places and historical eras. And thirdly, we see here how anti-immigrant attitudes are closely interlinked with other elements, namely, racism and anti-Muslim attitudes.

### 2.7.2 Racism

We define racism as prejudice against groups or their members on the basis of biological or “natural” features. People are identified as black, white, Latino or Asian by external ethnic features and assigned particular characteristics and abilities on the basis of those features. In the Western world where “whites” are the majority “white” is generally regarded as positive and people with other physical ethnic markers are regarded as inferior. Even in regions with non-white majorities people are categorized and qualified by ethnic markers, often according to the darkness or lightness of their skin. But the instrumentalization of natural, biological and genetic differences is not restricted to racism; it also shapes sexism, anti-Semitism and the biologization of culture (where cultural differences are explained in evolutionary or biological terms). In Europe a culturally and religiously tinged hostility towards Muslims also appears to be assuming traits of biological racism. But we would prefer not to define all forms of prejudice as racism. We consider racism as one element of group-focused enmity, measuring it in the form of “blatant, direct racism” based on ethnic features.

### 2.7.3 Anti-Semitism

Anti-Semitism brings together religious, supposedly biological and cultural features to categorize people negatively as Jews. We define anti-Semitism as social prejudice directed against Jews simply because they are Jewish. Its particular power seems to be that it can be very flexibly argued and instrumentalized to justify discrimination. Anti-Semitism takes many different forms: political (“Jewish world conspiracy”), secular (usury), religious (“responsible for the death of Jesus”) and racist (“Jewish character”). Although the definition of anti-Semitism as social prejudice is common currency in American anti-Semitism research (Zick 2010b), other authors, especially Europeans, argue for a broader, more sweeping definition that extends beyond Jewishness to encompass anti-Americanism, anti-capitalism and anti-modernism. In our view the narrower definition of anti-Semitism as social prejudice is helpful when analysing the expression, dynamics and function of anti-Semitism in practice



and in relation to research findings on other prejudices. The extent to which anti-Semitism is associated with other ideologies is an empirical matter. What is central is that it identifies a group, the Jews, and cements its inequality. Anti-Semitism is thus prejudice against Jews because they are Jews.

#### 2.7.4 Anti-Muslim Attitudes

Anti-Muslim attitudes are directed against people believed to be of Muslim faith or generally against Islam as a religion, regardless of whether those affected are actually religious and which branch of Islam they belong to. In many European countries with large Muslim immigrant populations there appears to be a trend to equate “immigrant” with “Muslim” and perceive all Muslims as immigrants regardless of their citizenship or place of birth. Like Jews, Muslims are frequently regarded as “foreign” rather than as an integral component of the majority society.

#### 2.7.5 Sexism

Sexism is based on the idea of inequality between men and women. The different characteristics, capabilities and preferences assigned to men and women on the basis of supposedly biological facts are used to explain and justify why women tend to have less power, influence, wealth and opportunity than men. Traditional sexism, which expresses itself in clearly negative stereotypes, is today frowned upon in many European countries. But wherever the normative thresholds are reduced – in bars, football stadiums, etc – it quickly surfaces in comments and jokes. The modern facets of sexism are more “respectable”. For example, evolutionary explanations for gender differences enjoy great popularity in public discourse. Here traditional prejudices reappear in scientific guise, explaining observed gender-typical behaviour as the outcome of biological factors. Cultural explanations that acknowledge learned patterns of behaviour or socialization conditioned by external structures are under-represented. Instead the subordinate status of women (as manifested in income differentials and promotion to top jobs) is presented as a natural state of affairs.

#### 2.7.6 Homophobia

Homophobia means prejudice against people who are sexually attracted to others of their own gender. Expressions of homophobia include charges of immorality and refusing homosexuals equal rights (for example the right to marry

or to adopt children). We are aware that this does not cover prejudices against transgender people and person with other sexual orientations.

The term homophobia is contested because it describes as “phobia” a phenomenon that does not necessarily bear the features of neurotic fear, and thus reduces prejudice to illness. We are of the opinion that phobic fear is not the driving force of prejudice. Other terms appear more suitable, but for the sake of comparability we defer to the established terminology in the field.

Now that we have presented the basic ideas and concepts we would like to turn to the methodology of the empirical study we conducted to investigate group-focused enmity in Europe.

## 3. Methods

This report is based on a survey conducted for the *Group-focused Enmity in Europe* research project. The GFE Europe survey was conducted in eight European countries in autumn and winter 2008/09 by international experts led by the Bielefeld Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, which initiated the research. In each country a representative sample of the population aged 16 and above was interviewed by telephone.<sup>8</sup> In order to maximize comparability the same methods, sampling techniques and survey schedules were applied in each country.

The study covers *France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland* and *Portugal*, thus including both old and new EU member states. The eight countries differ to greater and lesser degrees in their integration policies, migration history, immigrant populations and general affluence. It would be extremely productive to repeat the study in order to monitor trends of intolerance and to expand it to cover more countries.

### 3.1 Questionnaire Design and Pretests

For the telephone interviews we developed a questionnaire that reliably and validly records prejudices against various target groups as well as measuring causal and influencing factors for group-focused enmity. The latter include ideologies, political attitudes, opinions about the respondent's own economic, political and social situation, and factors that mitigate against prejudice such as empathy, intercultural contacts or the desire to avoid making negative value judgements about groups. The challenge when designing the questionnaire was to cover a selection of the most important constructs taking into account various scientific perspectives. On the basis of preparatory theoretical work, constructs were drafted for discussion and revision by international groups of experts. We sought to cover the depth and breadth of the constructs in a balanced manner and to paint a complex picture of the prejudices and various possible influencing factors that does justice to the different theoretical

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<sup>8</sup> The survey was conducted for us by TNS Infratest and partner institutes in the respective countries.

approaches without overtaxing the attention span and patience of the interviewees. We also selected the constructs with an eye to their possible contribution to wider prejudice and discrimination research, practical application and political intervention.

In cross-cultural comparisons it is always important to consider whether constructs and statements need to be equivalent and comparable across all the countries or whether cultural and national singularities are more important (for more on cross-cultural research see Zick 2010a). For the present study we gave priority to the former. In eight workshops an international interdisciplinary team selected the constructs, discussed which items (statements) should go with them and drafted a model questionnaire in English.

The constructs and associated statements were selected on the basis of the following criteria:

- A solid, innovative and interdisciplinary theoretical foundation.
- Tried and tested scales and items.
- Intercultural comprehension and relevance.

The model questionnaire was then translated into each working language by two members of the respective team working independently of one another, after which the translations were compared, discussed and revised. The process of drafting the questionnaire was extremely time-consuming, but crucial for ensuring the quality of the survey.

In autumn 2006 we subjected the interview materials to a pretest in which 150 people in each of the eight participating countries took part.<sup>9</sup> The objective of the pretest was to arrive at a suitable questionnaire for the main survey. The questionnaire as a whole and individual items were tested for quality, comprehensibility, acceptance and statistical reliability. The pretest was conducted in the form of interviews lasting on average forty-five minutes and contained more items than we ultimately intended to use in the main survey.

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9 Sweden was pretested too, but had to be excluded from the final survey due to funding limitations

The results of the pretest led to a number of revisions of the questionnaire, with certain items being replaced or retranslated. The revised questionnaire was itself pretested and reduced in length. The final questionnaire contained 120 items, most of which had been tested twice in each country.

The survey data proper was collected in autumn 2008 by means of standardized telephone interviews as a CATI survey (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews, see glossary). The main survey interviews lasted on average thirty-five minutes. Participation was voluntary and the data was saved in anonymized form.

## 3.2 Measuring Group-focused Enmity

The final questionnaire contained items for measuring prejudices against immigrants, Jews, black people, Muslims, women and homosexuals.<sup>10</sup> In the interviews participants were asked about their attitudes, emotions and experience concerning these groups and about their ideological convictions and general values. In all cases we also collected demographic data on economic status, age, gender and education as well as a self-assessment of the respondent's financial situation. In this publication we report on a selection of the surveyed indicators.

The prejudices and negative attitudes towards the groups targeted by group-focused enmity were as a rule recorded using items already tested in earlier studies. However, many items that had previously been used successfully in national studies proved unsuitable for cross-cultural comparison: some did not make sense across all countries, others were widely misunderstood in certain countries or provoked anger.<sup>11</sup> For constructs where pre-existing survey items were unavailable we had to design items from scratch specially for this survey.

For certain selected prejudices we chose a more differentiated approach to cover several different aspects. As well as negative attitudes towards the

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10 We also surveyed items measuring prejudices towards disabled and homeless people. Unfortunately in these cases we were unable to achieve cross-cultural comparability and were therefore forced to omit those prejudices from this report.

11 For example many participants in the Hungarian pretest failed to understand statements about Muslims that reflect widespread opinion in western Europe, because there is very little discussion of Muslim immigration in Hungary. Certain statements probing anti-Semitic prejudice provoked such resistance in France and the Netherlands (including interview terminations) that we were forced to omit them from the main study.

groups of interest we also surveyed certain positive attitudes. Because we are interested in negative prejudices most of the statements in this survey were negatively formulated. This creates a risk of response bias which can be counteracted by including individual positively formulated statements that encourage participants to listen closely and form an opinion on each statement, rather than simply automatically agreeing or disagreeing with all the statements on the basis of a pattern. Moreover, respondents might have found a very negative questionnaire to be annoying or troubling. Quite apart from that aspect, surveying positive attitudes is just as interesting for any investigation of the constructs, whereby we observe that a negative item and its positive counterpart may sometimes represent two different dimensions of a construct rather than one and the same. All in all, it appeared to make sense to include at least one positive item for each construct in the questionnaire.

At the beginning we discussed including other dimensions of prejudice in the questionnaire, with items examining prejudices against Roma, overweight people and people with AIDS. The constraints of interview length meant that we had to leave these out, along with a range of statements elucidating additional potential explanatory factors.

At the time the survey was conducted *France* was involved in a heated controversy about opinion surveys in general, with an allegation that surveys themselves create attitudes and prejudice by using categories such as “native French” and “immigrant”. There were grounds to fear that French public opinion would take an especially critical view of opinion surveys on the question of prejudice at that point in time. For this reason we reformulated certain items in the French questionnaire to measure positive attitudes and omitted others altogether.

### 3.3 Scales

We measured agreement or disagreement with each single indicator of prejudice (item). Generally, unless stated otherwise, respondents were asked to choose from four response categories (“strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree”). These responses were then assigned numerical values, with a high score corresponding to a highly negative statement. Positively formulated statements were reverse coded so that rejection of the positive statement produced a higher numerical value. The individual statements that serve as indicators for the prejudices were statistically verified and then combined to create a mean scale for each prejudice with a value

between 1 and 4. Each mean scale is based on at least two items of the corresponding construct. As a rule, scales supply more reliable information than individual indicators because they compensate for the influence of random error and individual misunderstandings.

Equivalence checking was conducted to ensure that the meaning of individual prejudices was identical in all the countries and that all respondents shared the same understanding of the different language versions of the statements.<sup>12</sup> This cross-cultural comparability was confirmed for all prejudice types with the exception of prejudice against homeless and disabled people, which were therefore excluded from further analysis. Following the frequency analyses we analysed the extent to which the different prejudice types correlate with one another, first for the eight European countries together and then for each country individually. We generally used the combined scales, applying individual items where statistically necessary.

To create the scales we took two, three or four statements that served as indicators for a particular prejudice and whose reliability and comparability had been confirmed, and combined them into a mean scale by assigning numerical values to the response categories, adding them up and then dividing by the number of statements.<sup>13</sup>

### Critical notes on method

Representative surveys provide us with useful and important information for scientific analysis and social and political intervention. But the method has its limits. Quantitative surveys can tell us about frequencies and means and provide data about relationships between variables, but they grant us no insights

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12 All scales were tested using confirmatory factor analysis and multiple-group comparison, meaning that the relationships between the individual statements designed to record a particular prejudice were tested simultaneously.

13 The items were coded so that higher values for agreement corresponded with stronger prejudice. The following items were reverse coded: anti-immigrant attitudes, item 4; anti-Semitism, item 10; anti-Muslim attitudes, item 22; homophobia, items 28 and 29 (see chapter 4 for items and numbering).

into the thoughts, feelings and experiences of individuals. They provide us with an overview of the average extent of particular prejudices and attitudes, from which each individual deviates.

Furthermore, surveys record only those attitudes and prejudices that the interviewee reports to the interviewer. These expressed prejudices tell us little about the interviewee's personality or underlying motives, and we do not focus on personalities, since we understand prejudices not as character traits, but as negative social attitudes towards particular groups. If, for example, a person agrees with an anti-Semitic or racist statement, we do not jump to the conclusion that the person is anti-Semitic or racist as a person, in the sense of that being a stable and unchanging personal trait. Such negative attitudes are subject to change. Individuals are capable of reflecting on prejudices, learning that prejudices encourage discrimination and inequality, recognizing that they themselves could potentially be affected by prejudices and their negative consequences, developing empathy for the addressees of prejudice, accepting new information about a marginalized group, or enhancing their own self-esteem without negativity towards others.

Alongside their actual attitudes and prejudices, many other factors may influence a person's responses. In a personal interview, responses concerning negative attitudes towards weak groups are swayed by social norms. Distorted responses may result where respondents tend to give answers conforming to the norms of their society. Thus a respondent in an interview situation is very likely to express less prejudice than in a private setting, especially where the social environment strongly disapproves of prejudices against minorities. There may also be reasons outside the immediate interview situation why a participant might be in an especially negative or positive mood, distracted or unmotivated. Finally there is also the possibility that respondents will understand a statement differently from how it was originally meant. All these factors can influence responses.

The approach of prejudice research is to interview as many individuals as possible to minimize the impact of individual anomalies on the overall results. Basing analysis on scales rather than individual items and using mean scales comprising several items measuring the same construct also help to neutralize the effect of individual misunderstandings.



## 3.4 Samples

In each country a sample of 1,000 individuals aged 16 or above was selected for landline telephone interviews. The samples were selected to be representative of the respective national population. Households were contacted in advance to select the interviewee using either the *last/next birthday* method or the *Kish grid*. Deviations from population demographics were dealt with by weighting. All told, we are able to report data taken from 8,026 European interviewees representing approx. 270 million Europeans aged 16 or above. The samples include only persons holding the citizenship of the surveyed country.

Table 2 shows the demographic composition of the samples. In line with the official population statistics slightly more women than men participated in the survey in all the countries. The mean age was just under 47, with the youngest sample in Poland (44) and the oldest in Germany (48). Taking the sample as a whole, 16 percent of respondents had at least one parent or grandparent who was an immigrant, but the countries differed considerably in this respect. In France almost one third of interviewees belonged to a migrant community in some sense, in Italy fewer than 3 percent.

Table 2: **Samples**

Country	N	Men (percent)	Women (percent)	Age (mean)	Parents and grandparents not immigrants (in percent)
France	1 007	48.0	52.0	46.5	68.1
Germany	1 000	48.3	51.7	48.4	84.3
Great Britain	1 000	48.3	51.7	46.8	79.4
Hungary	1 000	44.5	55.5	46.4	90.4
Italy	1 001	48.1	51.9	47.6	97.4
Netherlands	1 011	49.0	51.0	46.3	91.3
Poland	1 000	47.7	52.3	44.2	91.8
Portugal	1 007	47.8	52.2	46.6	92.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>8 026</b>	<b>47.7</b>	<b>52.3</b>	<b>46.6</b>	<b>86.9</b>

## 3.5 Countries

The countries investigated were France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Portugal. They differ in their integration policies, migration histories, immigrant populations, standard of living and level of social inequality, as well as in their discourses on tolerance and equality and their implementation and enforcement of EU directives and national laws against discrimination. These differences are potentially relevant for the country-specific prevalence of prejudices.

In the survey year (2008) GDP was below the European average in Portugal, Poland and Hungary and above it in the other countries. The worst of the economic crisis was still to come, but the foreshocks were already being felt. France, Germany, Hungary and the Netherlands recorded weak growth, while Portugal experienced no growth at all and Italy and Great Britain saw an economic contraction. Only in Poland was the growth rate conspicuously high at 5.1 percent. Social inequality of income distribution measured by the *Gini coefficient* was greatest in Portugal and Great Britain, smallest in Hungary.<sup>14</sup> The unemployment rate was between 7 and 8 percent in France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Portugal, and slightly below that figure in Italy. The Netherlands had the lowest unemployment rate at 3 percent.

The hard economic data is reflected to some extent in respondents' subjective assessments of the economic situation in their country, but with important deviations. In almost all countries a majority assessed the economic situation to be negative. Indeed, in Hungary, Italy and Portugal more than 90 percent of respondents said that the economic situation in their country was quite or very bad, in Great Britain just under 90 percent. In Germany and Poland the figures were lower, but still 61 percent and 56 percent respectively. Only in the Netherlands was the mood of a majority positive in this respect.

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14 The *Gini coefficient* is a measure of inequality. A value of 0 indicates that all people in a country have exactly the same income, while a value of 100 means that one person receives all the income. So the greater the inequality in a country the closer the Gini coefficient will be to 100.

Table 3: **Selected indicators of standard of living and social equality, 2008**

	GDP (per capita)	Economic growth (percent)	Gini coefficient	Unemploy- ment (percent)	Negative eco- nomic outlook (percent)
France	107	0.2	.28	7.6	84.1
Germany	116	1.0	.30	7.2	60.5
Great Britain	115	-0.1	.34	5.3	89.2
Hungary	64	0.8	.25	7.7	90.6
Italy	104	-1.3	.31	6.8	91.6
Netherlands	134	1.9	.28	2.8	40.0
Poland	56	5.1	.32	7.2	55.6
Portugal	78	0.0	.36	7.6	92.4

Notes and sources

*Per capita GDP*: At purchasing power parity, EU-27 = 100, 2008 (Institut für Wachstumsstudien, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de&pcode=tsieb010&plugin=1>).

*Economic growth*: Real GDP, 2008 (<http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=de&pcode=tsieb020>).

*Gini coefficient*: Eurostat, <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=de&pcode=tessi190&plugin=1>.

*Unemployment*: Seasonally adjusted rate, May 2008 (Eurostat Presse release 97/2009: <http://www.eds-destatis.de/de/press/pressrel09.php?m=press>).

*Negative economic outlook*: Percentage who assessed the economic situation in their country as quite or very bad and believed that their own financial situation was likely to deteriorate (GFE-Europe Survey 2008 and chapter 9.4).

In autumn and winter of 2008 representative samples of 1,000 persons aged 16 and above were interviewed by telephone in each of eight European countries: France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal. These countries differ in many respects: standard of living and social inequality, migration history and size of immigrant population, and current debates on immigration and protection of minorities. The standardized questionnaire contained pretested questions optimized for cross-cultural comparison. Several statements were used to record each individual prejudice as an element of group-focused enmity, with interviewees indicating their agreement or disagreement on a four-point scale. The statements for each prejudice were tested for their cross-cultural reliability and then combined to create a mean scale.

## 4 The Extent of Group-focused Enmity in Europe

In this chapter we report on the extent of group-focused enmity, in the form of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia in the eight countries. For each of these dimensions of prejudice we first present a table showing what proportion of respondents in each country agreed with the associated prejudice statements (items). For each country we aggregate the figures for those who “somewhat agree” with a statement with those who agree “strongly agree”.<sup>15</sup>

In a second step we analyse the statistical differences in the extent of individual prejudices between the countries using the mean values for each prejudice (averaged scales made up of two to four items). Mean values for the countries are illustrated in bar graphs.

### Notes on interpreting tables and figures

1. In the tables, a difference in the value for a single item between two countries is not necessarily statistically significant. We tested the significance of differences in the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia between the eight countries at a later stage by conducting univariate variance analyses on the mean scales (formed from several individual indicators of a particular prejudice).<sup>16</sup> In other words, we statistically tested the probability that the means represent real (rather than random) differences between the countries. The figures (graphs) show the mean scale values.

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15 The full frequency tables with all four response categories can be found in the appendix.

16 Here there may be slight differences to values given elsewhere, where initially multivariate variance analyses were calculated. The sample sizes and thus also the corrected means may vary slightly because of individual missing values.

2. Likewise, in the graphs showing means, visual differences are not automatically statistically significant. Only the subsequent post-hoc tests show whether the difference between two countries is statistically significant.<sup>17</sup> This information is stated beneath the graphs. Differences with error probability less than 5 percent are statistically significant. For example, “NL, GB < D, I” means that the extent of a prejudice in Germany and Italy is significantly greater than in the Netherlands and Great Britain, but that there are no statistically significant differences between the Netherlands and Great Britain or between Italy and Germany. “NL, GB, D < D, I”, on the other hand, would mean that respondents in the Netherlands and Great Britain score significantly lower than in Italy, while the level of agreement among German respondents does not differ from any of the other three countries.
3. We find it especially important to point out that this data does *not* permit comparison of the relative extent of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism or homophobia *within* a particular country. The individual prejudices were measured using specific indicators whose statements differed in their subject matter, choice of wording, bluntness and force. In other words, we can say whether anti-Semitism is greater in Italy or Portugal but not whether anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim prejudice is worse within Italy, because the two prejudices were measured Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

We used four statements to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, some of which had previously been used in other studies (Table 4, items 1 to 4). The statements cover the general impression that there are too many immigrants in the country, the feeling of being a stranger in one's own country and the perception of possible competition for jobs. We also collected data on one positive attitude towards immigrants, in the form of the idea that immigrants enrich the culture. This item was reverse coded so that higher values represent rejection of the statement. Two further statements expanded our observation of anti-immigrant attitudes, but for reasons of capacity (length of questionnaire) were presented to only a randomly selected half of each interview sample and are therefore excluded from the mean scale.

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17 Post-hoc tests were conducted retrospectively on individual pairs of countries to test whether the extent of a prejudice in one country differs significantly from its extent in the other. Here we chose to use the statistical method after Duncan.

## 4.1 Anti-Immigrant Attitudes

We used four statements to measure anti-immigrant attitudes, some of which had previously been used in other studies (Table 4, items 1 to 4). The statements cover the general impression that there are too many immigrants in the country, the feeling of being a stranger in one's own country and the perception of possible competition for jobs. We also collected data on one positive attitude towards immigrants, in the form of the idea that immigrants enrich the culture. This item was reverse coded so that higher values represent rejection of the statement. Two further statements expanded our observation of anti-immigrant attitudes, but for reasons of capacity (length of questionnaire) were presented to only a randomly selected half of each interview sample and are therefore excluded from the mean scale.

Table 4 shows very clearly that about half of all European respondents agree that there are *too many immigrants* in their country. This pan-European trend applies to almost all the individual countries, with deviations of about 10 per-

Table 4: **Anti-immigrant statements (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
1	There are too many immigrants in [country].	50.0	62.2	40.3	46.0	62.5	59.6	27.1	58.7
2	Because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger in [country].	37.6	45.8	31.0	37.7	27.0	19.1	19.4	44.6
3	When jobs are scarce, [country natives] should have more rights to a job than immigrants.	42.4	50.3	29.5	24.7	55.9	58.2	74.1	71.2
4	Immigrants enrich our culture.	75.0	71.2	70.8	74.9	61.0	73.7	64.2	57.0
<b>Additional items in random half of each sample</b>									
5	Immigrants are a strain on our welfare system.	40.8	60.2	54.7	20.3	31.7	42.5	45.8	77.2
6	We need immigrants to keep the economy going.	60.7	59.5	66.1	64.5	70.7	68.1	42.4	24.2

cent in either direction. Only Poland stands out with a value of 27 percent, meaning that comparatively fewer people there believe there is a problem of “too many” immigrants.


Similarly, about half of all European respondents believe that *jobs* should be given to locals first when work is scarce. Here we found much larger differences in the responses between the countries. In the eastern European countries of Poland and Hungary about three quarters of respondents wanted preference to be given to non-immigrant workers, whereas in France and the Netherlands the figure is about one quarter. About one third of all European respondents shared the sentiment of feeling like a *stranger in their own country*. At the national level this feeling is most widespread in Great Britain (46 percent) and Hungary (45 percent), and least prevalent in Portugal and Poland with about 19 percent of respondents in each case.

A counterweight to these negative attitudes is that almost 70 percent of all European respondents saw immigrants as an *enrichment* for their own culture. The figures are highest in Germany, the Netherlands and Portugal, where about three quarters confirm the enriching role of immigration. Even where they are lowest, in Hungary, Italy and Poland, more than half of respondents agreed with the statement. A certain ambivalence is typical of prejudice, and acknowledgement of the cultural enrichment factor appears not to be incompatible with the clear claims to dominance expressed in the other statements.

This is underlined by the two statements surveyed in a randomly selected half of the sample (items 5 and 6 in Table 4). A majority in Europe sees immigrants as a *burden* on the *welfare state*. Hungary stands out with an especially high value of 77 percent, while “only” 32 percent of Italian and 20 percent of Dutch respondents agreed with this statement. In Italy, Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain a majority acknowledge the positive effects of immigration for *the economy*. In Poland 42 percent see a necessity to accept immigrants for economic reasons, in Hungary 24 percent.

We went on to use the mean scales to test whether anti-immigrant attitudes actually differ significantly between countries. Figure 2 summarizes the often slight differences outlined above to provide a concise impression of the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes in the eight countries.

Figure 2: **Anti-immigrant attitudes in European comparison (mean scale)**



Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.  
Difference between countries:  $F(7, 7508) = 51.00, p < .001$ .  
Post-hoc comparisons: F, NL < D, PT, I < PT, I, PL < I, PL, GB < HU.

As already suggested by the frequency analyses, Hungary has the significantly highest anti-immigrant attitude values, followed closely by Italy, Poland and Great Britain. Germany and Portugal come next, with France and the Netherlands recording the significantly lowest values. We must emphasize, however, that in absolute terms the differences in the extent of anti-immigrant attitudes between the countries are small.

## 4.2 Anti-Semitism

We used four statements to measure anti-Semitism, some of which had likewise previously appeared in other studies (Table 5, items 7 to 10). The statements represent traditional and secondary anti-Semitism, covering the anti-Jewish conspiracy theory that Jews have *too much influence* in the country in question and the reversal of victims and perpetrators contained in the accusation that *Jews try to take advantage of past persecution*. Here there is an undertone of the ancient anti-Semitic stereotype of the “money-grabbing Jew”. Another statement suggests that *Jews only care for their own* (implying illoyalty to the nation). Here again we also included a positive attitude suggesting that Jews represent a *cultural enrichment*; this item was reverse coded so that higher values represent rejection of the statement. Our survey also in-



cluded two statements designed to capture anti-Semitism communicated via issues connected with Israel, but these were excluded from the anti-Semitism mean scale.

Table 5: **Anti-Semitic statements (agreement in percent)**


No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
7	Jews have too much influence in [country].	19.7	13.9	27.7	5.6	21.2	19.9	49.9	69.2
8	Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.	48.9	21.8	32.3	17.2	40.2	52.2	72.2	68.1
9	Jews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind.	29.4	22.5	25.8	20.4	26.9	54.2	56.9	50.9
10	Jews enrich our culture.	68.9	71.5	60.6	71.8	49.7	51.9	51.2	57.3
<b>Additional statements</b>									
11	Considering Israel's policy I can understand why people do not like Jews.	35.6	35.9	-	41.1	25.1	48.8	55.2	45.6
12	Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians.	47.7	42.4	-	38.7	37.6	48.8	63.3	41.0

The responses to the anti-Semitic prejudice statements (Table 5) varied considerably between countries. Almost half of Polish and 69 percent of Hungarian respondents believe that Jews in their countries have *too much influence*, whereas at the other end of the scale only 14 percent in Great Britain and 6 percent in the Netherlands are of this opinion. The same is found for statements 8 and 9, which attribute avarice and egotism to Jews. Here again we find the strongest agreement in Poland and Hungary – although more than half of Portuguese respondents also agree with these statements – and the least agreement in the Netherlands and Great Britain where about one fifth judge Jews to be *profit-seeking* and *self-interested*. In all surveyed countries, however, a majority agrees with the statement that Jews are an *enrichment* for their culture.

The two additional statements on the current *policies of Israel* (Table 5, items 11 and 12) provide the following picture: About half the respondents in Portugal, Poland and Hungary see anti-Semitic sentiments as based on Israel’s political activities, while around 40 percent of respondents in most participating countries affirm the drastic assessment that the Israeli state is conducting a *war of extermination against the Palestinians*. In Poland 63 percent of respondents share that view.

Analysis of the mean scale formed from the first four items statistically confirms the impression gathered so far (Figure 3). The significantly strongest agreement with anti-Semitic prejudices is found in Poland and Hungary. In Portugal, followed closely by Germany, anti-Semitism is significantly more prominent than in the other western European countries. In Italy and France anti-Semitic attitudes as a whole are less widespread than the European average, while the extent of anti-Semitism is least in Great Britain and the Netherlands.

Figure 3: **Anti-Semitism in European comparison (mean scale)**



Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.  
 Difference between countries:  $F(7, 7233) = 204.07, p < .001$ .  
 Post-hoc comparisons: NL, GB < I, F < D < PT < PL, HU.

### 4.3 Racism

The two statements measuring racism relate to distinctions made between people with light or dark skin, expressed in the perception of “natural” differences between races and rejection of mixed-race marriage (Table 6, items

13 and 14). These two statements form the racism mean scale. Three additional statements used in a random half of the samples went on to measure a generalized racism that treats certain cultures and “races” as superior to others.

About one third of all European respondents believe there to be a *natural hierarchy* of white and black, with the national figures ranging from about 40 percent in Portugal, Poland and Hungary to just under 19 percent in Italy. The proportion of respondents who *oppose marriage between black and white* lies between 5 and 30 percent in the various countries: less than one in ten in the Netherlands and Italy, one in ten in Great Britain, one in seven in Germany and France, 18 percent in Portugal, 24 percent in Poland and 30 percent in Hungary.

Table 6: **Racist statements (agreement in percent)**


No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
13	There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people. [France: There is no natural hierarchy between black and white people.]	30.5	34.6	38.5*	32.4	18.7	45.1	41.6	41.8
14	Preferably blacks and whites should not get married. [France: It is no problem if blacks and whites get married.]	13.5	10.6	13.6*	4.7	7.5	17.9	23.5	30.3
<b>Additional items in random half of each sample</b>									
15	Some cultures are clearly superior to others.	41.6	20.1	29.4	37.9	28.6	61.3	49.4	38.5
16	We need to protect our own culture from the influence of other cultures.	51.9	59.2	54.8	54.1	49.4	70.1	69.0	78.5
17	Some races are more gifted than others.	45.0	27.5	25.0	43.6	31.2	57.1	50.4	53.8

\* In France the statements were formulated positively and subsequently reverse coded (for reasons see chapter 3.2). In these cases the value for France is the percentage of respondents who “somewhat” or “strongly” disagreed with the statement.

The feeling of having to *protect one's own culture* from the influences of other cultures predominates in all the countries and is especially widespread in Poland, Portugal and above all Hungary, where a majority of respondents also said that some races are more gifted than others. In Poland nearly half and in Portugal 61 percent of respondents share the belief that *some cultures are superior to others*. In France, Great Britain and Italy between one quarter and one third hold this opinion.

We combined the first two racist statements into a scale from which we calculated means for the countries (Figure 4). Racism is significantly most widespread in Portugal and Hungary, followed by Poland. In Germany and France racist attitudes are more widespread than in Great Britain and the Netherlands, while the extent of racism is significantly smallest in Italy.

Figure 4: **Racism in European comparison (mean scale)**



Answer scale: 1 = "strongly disagree" to 4 = "strongly agree".

Difference between countries:  $F(7, 7417) = 116.56, p < .001$ .

Post-hoc comparisons:  $I < NL < GB < D, F < PL < PT, HU$ .

## 4.4 Anti-Muslim Attitudes

After statistical testing, three statements were used to produce the anti-Muslim attitudes mean scale (Table 7, items 18 to 20). These cover the general impression that there are too many Muslims in the country, the charge that Muslims

make too many demands, and broad-brush criticism of Islam as a religion of intolerance. Four further statements were surveyed in a random half of the sample. These cover a positive attitude that sees Muslims as an enrichment and the idea that there are great cultural differences between the majority society and Muslims, especially concerning attitudes towards women. We also surveyed the idea that Muslims generally support and condone terrorism.

In most of the countries a majority believe Islam to be a *religion of intolerance*, with agreement just below 50 percent only in Great Britain and the Netherlands. In almost all the countries more than half of respondents said that Muslims make *too many demands*; Portugal was the only exception with about one third. The statement that there are too many Muslims in the country is affirmed by just over one quarter in Portugal and by about one third in France. In Germany, Great

Table 7: **Anti-Muslim statements (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
18	There are too many Muslims in [country].	46.1	44.7	36.2	41.5	49.7	27.1	47.1	60.7
19	Muslims are too demanding.	54.1	50.0	52.8	51.8	64.7	34.4	62.3	60.0
20	Islam is a religion of intolerance. [France: Islam is a religion of tolerance.]	52.5	47.2	52.3*	46.7	60.4	62.2	61.5	53.4
<b>Additional items</b>									
22	The Muslim culture fits well into [country/Europe].	16.6	39.0	49.8	38.7	27.4	50.1	19.0	30.2
23	Muslims' attitudes towards women contradict our values.	76.1	81.5	78.8	78.2	82.2	72.1	72.1	76.8
24	Many Muslims perceive terrorists as heroes. [France: question not asked].	27.9	37.6	-	29.2	28.5	30.3	30.2	39.3
25	The majority of Muslims find terrorism justifiable. [France: not justifiable]	17.1	26.3	23.3*	19.9	21.5	22.4	26.0	29.6

\* In France the statements were formulated positively and subsequently reverse coded (for reasons see chapter 3.2). In these cases the value for France is the percentage of respondents who "somewhat" or "strongly" disagreed with the statement.


Britain, Italy and the Netherlands more than 40 percent of respondents complain that there are *too many Muslims in their country*, in Hungary about 60 percent.

Interviewees were also asked to respond to four further statements covering perceived cultural differences and supposed affinity of Muslims toward terrorism (Table 7, items 22 to 25). Despite correlating closely with anti-Muslim attitudes these items represent separate constructs and were therefore excluded from the scale measure.

The figures for those who say that *Muslim culture* is compatible with their own range from 17 percent in Poland and 19 percent in Germany to about half the population in Portugal and France. A majority of more than 70 percent of European respondents find that *Muslim attitudes towards women* are incompatible with their own values. Overall in the surveyed countries about one third think that *Muslims treat Islamist terrorists as heroes*, although somewhat fewer believe that *terrorism* finds moral support in the Muslim community (ranging from under 20 percent in Germany and the Netherlands to nearly 30 percent in Hungary).

The scale created from the first three statements clearly illustrates the extent of anti-Muslim attitudes in the studied countries (Figure 5). It is conspicuous that

Figure 5: **Anti-Muslim attitudes in European comparison (mean scale)**



Answer scale: 1 = "strongly disagree" to 4 = "strongly agree".  
Difference between countries:  $F(7, 6932) = 14.97, p < .001$ .  
Post-hoc comparisons: PT, NL < NL, F, GB < D, I, HU, PL.

Europeans are largely united in their rejection of Muslims and Islam. The significantly most widespread anti-Muslim attitudes are found in Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland, closely followed by France, Great Britain and the Netherlands. The extent of anti-Muslim attitudes is least in Portugal. In absolute terms, however, the eight countries differ little in their levels of prejudice towards Muslims.

## 4.5 Sexism

Sexism was surveyed in terms of agreement with the traditional division of gender roles, which gives men more power, influence, income and wealth than women, as well as better career opportunities and access to education (Table 8, items 26 and 27).


Table 8: **Sexist statements (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
26	Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.	52.7	53.2	57.0	36.4	63.2	67.9	87.2	88.4
27	When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women.	12.0	15.0	13.0	14.9	21.0	25.2	28.7	36.1

The extent of sexist attitudes varies greatly between the surveyed countries. In Poland and Hungary more than 80 percent think that women should take their role as *wives and mothers* more seriously. In Italy and Portugal the figure is more than 60 percent, and in all the other countries apart from the Netherlands more than half the respondents propagate this traditional role division. In Poland 36 percent and in Hungary 29 percent want *jobs for men* when work is in short supply, along with 25 percent in Portugal, 21 percent in Italy, and between 15 and 12 percent in Great Britain, the Netherlands, France and Germany.

The means calculated from these two statements reveal the following country-specific distribution of sexist attitudes (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Sexism in European comparison (mean scale)



Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.  
Difference between countries:  $F(7, 7504) = 178.56, p < .001$ .  
Post-hoc comparisons:  $NL < GB < D, F < I < PT < PL < HU$ .

The broadest acceptance of sexism is found in Hungary, followed in statistically significant steps by Poland, Portugal, and Italy, all above the European average. Germany and France come next, statistically speaking at the same level, followed, again in statistically significant steps, by Great Britain and the Netherlands.

## 4.6 Homophobia

We recorded homophobia by measuring rejection of two positively formulated statements: one about same-sex marriage and the other about the morality of homosexuality (Table 9, items 28 and 29). The percentage figures indicate how many respondents reject equality for homosexuals.

Whereas almost 90 percent of Polish and about two thirds of Hungarian, Italian and Portuguese respondents reject *same-sex marriage*, the figure is between 52 and 40 percent in France, Great Britain and Germany, and lowest in the Netherlands with 17 percent. Similar differences between countries are found for the statement that there is nothing *immoral* about homosexuality. More than three quarters of Polish respondents find *homosexuality immoral*, as do about two thirds of Hungarians. In the other countries this sentiment is shared by between 44 and 36 percent, apart from the Netherlands, which again has the lowest figure by a large margin: one in six.




Table 9: **Homophobia statements (rejection in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
28	It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women.	39.7	42.1	52.3	17.0	64.1	62.4	88.2	69.3
29	There is nothing immoral about homosexuality.	38.0	37.2	36.2	16.5	42.5	44.0	75.8	67.7

The mean scale formed from the two statements confirms statistically what we have just outlined (Figure 7): Homophobia is most widespread in Poland followed by Hungary, Italy and Portugal, France and Great Britain, and Germany (in that order). It is by far the least prevalent in the Netherlands.

Figure 7: **Homophobia in European comparison (mean scale)**



Answer scale: 1 = “strongly disagree” to 4 = “strongly agree”.  
 Difference between countries:  $F(7, 7504) = 178.56, p < .001$ .  
 Post-hoc comparisons:  $NL < D < GB, F < PT, I < HU < PL$ .


Negative attitudes towards the target groups of group-focused enmity addressed here are widespread in Europe. Rejection of immigrants and Muslims is conspicuously similar across the sur-

veyed countries, whereas the extent of racism, anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia differs, sometimes considerably. The responses were least negative in *the Netherlands* where only anti-Muslim attitudes exist at a level comparable with the other countries. In *France* there is less anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim prejudice than in other countries, but their extent is still noteworthy. In *Italy*, by contrast, the figures for anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia are higher than in the other western European countries, whereas support for racism is conspicuously weak. Anti-immigrant attitudes are comparatively widespread in *Great Britain*, while anti-Semitism there and in the Netherlands is less prevalent than in the other countries, even if that still means worrying numbers of respondents espouse anti-Semitic attitudes. In *Germany* we find relatively strong anti-Muslim attitudes, while otherwise the responses correspond largely with the European mean. In *Portugal, Poland and Hungary* we find relatively high levels of anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Semitism and sexism. In Poland and Hungary these are joined by strong homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes. The eastern European countries of Hungary and Poland stand out for their high levels of prejudice against all the surveyed groups.

## 5. Ideological Configurations

As explained in chapter 2, we understand prejudices against immigrants, Jews, black people, Muslims, women and homosexuals as elements of a syndrome of *group-focused enmity* (Figure 8).

Figure 8: **The six elements of group-focused enmity examined in this study**



This theoretical concept implies that there is a close empirical relationship between the individual prejudices. So we would assume that respondents who target one of the groups (for example immigrants), will probably also tend to target the other groups (Jews, black people, Muslims, women and homosexuals). Of course this will not apply strictly in every individual case, but across all respondents it should be possible to demonstrate clear and significant relation-

ships. That would mean that all these prejudices are represented by a single dimension, the one we term *group-focused enmity*.

Earlier empirical research into group-focused enmity has already confirmed this relationship for Germany (Zick et al. 2008). Here we move on to test whether the surveyed dimensions of prejudice correlate empirically in the European context and whether they can justifiably be combined in a single construct of *group-focused enmity (GFE)*.

After that we turn to the question of whether other theoretically related constructs correspond with group-focused enmity. Bringing together broader research into right-wing populist and extremist attitudes with the concept of a syndrome of *group-focused enmity*, we test the relationship between prejudice against weaker groups and the constructs of authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity (which we also explain in a little more detail).

### What are correlations?

A correlation indicates the relationship between two constructs (here prejudice towards two different groups). It expresses the probability that a person who agrees (or disagrees) with one type of prejudice will also agree (or disagree) with another. Such a relationship is quantified using a correlation coefficient. A correlation coefficient  $r$  has a value between  $-1$  (perfect negative relationship) and  $+1$  (perfect positive relationship). A value of  $0$  means that there is no relationship. Correlations up to  $r = .3$  are classed as weak, because a considerable number of respondents agree with one of the constructs but not with the other. A correlation of  $r = .3$  to  $r = .5$  means a moderate relationship, while a correlation of  $r > .5$  represents a strong relationship, where many respondents agree (or disagree) with both constructs. The level of significance (see glossary) indicates the probability that the identified relationship is real rather than coincidental.

## 5.1 Relationships between the Investigated Prejudices

As expected, the six prejudices correlate statistically significantly at moderate to strong levels ( $r = .25$  to  $.59$ ; Figure 9). We find especially strong relationships in the western European countries of Great Britain, the Netherlands, Germany,

Italy and France (but less in Portugal; see Table 10, below). So it is indeed the case that people who hold a prejudice against one group also reject other groups that are at first glance completely different. A person with generalized negative attitudes towards immigrants is likely also to target Jews, black people, Muslims, homosexuals and women.


There is evidence of an especially strong relationship between *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *anti-Muslim attitudes* in Europe ( $r = .59$ ). Many of the European respondents who show prejudice against immigrants also exhibit generalized negative attitudes towards Muslims or Islam. This is especially the case in the western European countries of Great Britain ( $r = .71$ ), France ( $r = .69$ ) and the Netherlands ( $r = .66$ ), as well as in Italy and Germany ( $r > .55$ ). With the exception of Italy, these countries all have in common comparatively large immigrant populations from Muslim countries and sometimes heated debates over integration where immigrants and Muslims are often spoken about in the same breath or equated (even though a considerable proportion of the immigrant population also comes from non-Muslim countries).

Between *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *anti-Semitism* we also find a significant moderate relationship for Europe as a whole ( $r = .41$ ). For many respondents prejudice against immigrants goes hand in hand with prejudice against Jews. In the individual countries the relationships range from .25 in Portugal to .49 in Germany.

The relationship between *sexism and homophobia* is also conspicuous ( $r = .42$ ). These two dimensions are especially closely related in Great Britain and the Netherlands (.45), whereas the weak relationships in Hungary and Poland (.22 and .19) show that in those countries homophobia is not necessarily connected with sexism. In Great Britain and the Netherlands, as in several other countries, respondents are generally either equally open to equality for women and homosexuals or opposed to equality for both groups, with few respondents favouring equality for one group but not the other. When considering the relationship between sexism and the other prejudices it is pertinent to note that the group in question here is not a minority. The low social status that women share with other groups that are identified as inferior is plainly attributable to widespread ideas about the inequality and inferiority of women.

There is also a noteworthy correlation between *anti-Semitism* and *anti-Muslim attitudes*, with a figure of .37 for Europe as a whole. In the individual countries

Figure 9: Relationships between the six prejudice dimensions in Europe



All coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level.

the strength of the relationship ranges from .23 in Hungary to .46 in France and is once again stronger in the western European countries (apart from Portugal). What that means is that in these countries a considerable proportion of respondents are prejudiced either against both minorities or neither, whereas respondents in Hungary and Portugal tend to exhibit more specific patterns of prejudice against either Jews or Muslims.

In Europe as a whole we find only a weak relationship between *racism* and *anti-Muslim attitudes* ( $r = .28$ ), with country-specific figures ranging from .12 in France to .39 in the Netherlands. In other words a meaningful proportion of respondents were specifically negative about either black people or Muslims. Nor is the relationship between *racism* and *anti-Semitism* particularly strong

in Europe as a whole ( $r = .32$ ), with the weakest country-specific figure .21 in France and the strongest .37 in Great Britain. So here, too, the prejudices of many European respondents tend to be group-specific, targeting either black people or Jews. The relationships between homophobia and racism and between homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes are even looser at the European level, with figures of .25 and .27.

In France we find comparatively weak relationships between racism based on skin colour and the other types of prejudice. This is perhaps because comparatively many black people possess French citizenship and therefore in relative terms more black people took part in the survey.

Table 10: **Relationships between individual GFE elements by country**

		Anti-Semitism	Racism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
Anti-immigrant attitudes	D	.49	.41	.55	.35	.26
	GB	.41	.39	.71	.34	.36
	F	.47	.23	.69	.31	.25
	NL	.35	.42	.66	.39	.20
	I	.35	.35	.60	.30	.34
	PT	.24	.40	.30	.36	.16
	PL	.44	.40	.29	.41	.29
	HU	.34	.31	.40	.25	.20
Anti-Semitism	D		.30	.40	.33	.23
	GB		.35	.38	.27	.32
	F		.22	.46	.35	.21
	NL		.30	.33	.28	.19
	I		.27	.34	.27	.14
	PT		.26	.25	.17	.09
	PL		.29	.29	.34	.24
	HU		.27	.22	.11	.14

		Anti-Semitism	Racism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
Racism	D			.33	.38	.22
	GB			.38	.38	.42
	F			.12	.13	.12
	NL			.39	.40	.27
	I			.35	.31	.19
	PT			.20	.41	.21
	PL			.22	.35	.14
	HU			.24	.26	.09
Anti-Muslim attitudes	D				.23	.24
	GB				.35	.37
	F				.25	.20
	NL				.40	.26
	I				.31	.36
	PT				.15	.09 (ns)
	PL				.23	.13
	HU				.15	.03 (ns)
Sexism	D					.35
	GB					.49
	F					.29
	NL					.45
	I					.37
	PT					.38
	PL					.19
	HU					.21

All coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level or better, except those identified as “ns” (non-significant).



## 5.2 The GFE Index

These altogether close relationships between the six different prejudices suggest that it might be possible to represent them as a single dimension of *group-focused enmity*. We therefore combined the six surveyed dimensions of prejudice to create a *GFE Index*. Calculated as the mean value of the six individual GFE elements, it expresses the overall intensity of group-focused enmity.

$$\text{GFE Index} = \text{anti-immigrant attitudes} + \text{anti-Semitism} + \text{racism} + \text{anti-Muslim attitudes} + \text{sexism} + \text{homophobia} / 6$$

The internal consistency (reliability) of this index composed of anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia is confirmed empirically for Europe as a whole (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .76$ ), and at the country level (internal consistency ranges from  $\alpha = .62$  in Hungary to  $\alpha = .79$  in Great Britain).<sup>18</sup> That means that in all the countries all six prejudices are so closely related that they can be treated as a single dimension (group-focused enmity).<sup>19</sup>


As the mean of the six surveyed prejudices, the *GFE Index* must be a value in the range from 1 to 4. Values above 2.5 indicate that agreement with the prejudice statements is greater than rejection. Taking all eight countries together this applies to 38 percent of respondents. Figure 10 shows the extent of group-focused enmity in the individual countries. It is smallest in the Netherlands with 15 percent. In France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy between one quarter and one third tend towards group-focused enmity, and in Portugal 41 percent. Group-focused enmity is most prevalent in Hungary and Poland, where it is identifiable among nearly two thirds of respondents.

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18 For explanations of "reliability" and "Cronbach's alpha" see the glossary.

19 A principal component factor analysis of the six elements extracted a factor with an eigenvalue of 2.8 and explained variance of 46 percent. Using confirmatory factor analysis and multiple group comparison we were also able to confirm the fit and comparability of the GFE syndrome in all countries (Küpper, Zick and Wolf 2010). The model with metric invariance has an acceptable fit, meaning that the GFE syndrome can be confirmed for all eight countries individually and that there is a similar understanding of the prejudices in all the countries; CFI = .911; AIC = 4444; RMSA = .023; P-Close = 1; Chi2/df = 5.21. In the individual countries the internal consistency of the GFE Index created from the six GFE elements is: GB:  $\alpha = .79$ , D:  $\alpha = .75$ , F:  $\alpha = .79$ , NL:  $\alpha = .76$ , I:  $\alpha = .74$ , PT:  $\alpha = .66$ , PL:  $\alpha = .71$ , HU:  $\alpha = .62$ .

Figure 10: **GFE in the individual countries (percentages)**



### 5.3 GFE and other Constructs Indicating Right-wing Extremism

As discussed in chapter 1.3, several other constructs are widely regarded as central components of right-wing populist or extremist attitudes. In prejudice research social psychologists have discussed and empirically confirmed certain of these constructs as influencing or explanatory factors rather than constitutive elements. In the following we examine whether certain selected ideological convictions are indeed related to prejudice against weaker groups. Our selection of constructs is grounded in the theories and restricted by the configuration of the raw data. We were forced to omit certain ideological elements that extremism researchers consider relevant and theoretically closely connected with prejudice simply because the relevant data was not recorded in our survey.

We begin by briefly outlining the constructs involved. Numerous studies have already confirmed that the first two, *authoritarianism* and *Social Dominance Orientation*, are especially relevant for the tendency to target prejudice against weak groups (Duckitt and Sibley 2006; Zick et al. 2008). We added a third: to examine whether group-focused enmity is related to a general *rejection of diversity*.

*Authoritarianism* describes a tendency towards subordination and obedience to authority, including an aggressive *law-and-order* mentality that seeks punishment for norm deviations (Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1988). The relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice was first proposed in 1950 by Theodor Adorno and his co-authors and has since been confirmed by numerous empirical studies (for example Stellmacher 2004; also Decker et al. 2010). The more strongly a person tends towards authoritarianism, the more likely they are to target weak groups that deviate from prevailing or perceived norms. Deviation from the norm may be defined in terms of many different characteristics, such as skin colour, cultural or religious background, gender, sexual orientation or lifestyle.

*Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)* centres on attitudes to group-based hierarchies (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Individuals with high SDO find it right that certain groups are at the top of society, while others are at the bottom, and they want this social hierarchy to be preserved. Individuals with low SDO prefer equality between social groups. Here again, numerous empirical studies confirm that persons who fundamentally support a hierarchical social order also tend to express prejudices. Andreas Zick and colleagues (2008) were able to confirm empirically that group-focused enmity is essentially determined by SDO, and thus by an ideology of inequality.

*Rejection of diversity* describes the extent to which individuals favour cultural, religious and ethnic diversity in society. Individuals who reject diversity and wish for a homogeneous society based on uniform values and traditions tend towards prejudice (Zick and Küpper 2010).

We surveyed each of these constructs using two statements and aggregated the figures for those who “somewhat” or “strongly” agreed with a statement. Table 11 shows the results by country.

A strong and fairly uniform tendency towards *authoritarianism* is found in all the surveyed countries. The proportion who believe that *stronger action should be taken against troublemakers for the sake of law and order* ranges from more than 90 percent in Hungary, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal to two thirds in Italy. At least 80 percent in all countries (and 94 percent in Portugal) also think that *school should primarily provide a sense of discipline*.

The tendency towards *Social Dominance Orientation* is only moderate. In most of the western European countries less than 20 percent of respondents believe that *inferior groups should stay in their place*, with figures ranging from 7 percent in France to 24 to 29 percent in the eastern European countries, Italy and Portugal. In the eastern European countries of Hungary and Poland around 40 percent of respondents also believe it is *probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top, while others are at the bottom*. In Great Britain, Italy and France less than one in five share this view.

In all countries apart from Portugal and Poland at least half of respondents support *religious diversity* in their country, with the highest figure – three

**Table 11: Statements on theoretically related constructs (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
<b>Authoritarianism</b>									
1	To maintain law and order, stronger action should be taken against troublemakers.	79.2	92.0	76.8	91.7	65.3	91.6	84.1	95.7
2	School should primarily provide pupils with a sense of discipline.	81.3	88.3	87.6	78.8	85.0	94.0	82.0	84.7
<b>Social Dominance Orientation</b>									
5	Inferior groups should stay in their place.	19.4	13.2	6.7	15.6	26.9	23.9	24.9	28.5
6	It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top, while others are at the bottom.	26.5	18.5	14.3	22.8	14.5	20.4	40.2	40.8
<b>Diversity</b>									
7	It is better for a country if there are many different religions.*	65.8	62.5	65.7	58.9	53.5	43.6	43.0	75.6
8	It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions.	36.6	42.5	36.7	40.5	48.9	61.7	74.6	57.1

\* When creating the mean scale we reverse coded this item so that a high value represents rejection of diversity.

quarters – in Hungary. A counterweight here is formed by the respondents who think it would be better *if almost everyone shared the same customs and traditions*, whose proportion ranges from one third in Germany and France to three quarters in Poland.

We combined the statements to create a mean scale for each construct and investigated how they correlate with the GFE Index. Taking the European countries together we find significant relationships between group-focused enmity and authoritarianism ( $r = .40$ ), Social Dominance Orientation ( $r = .42$ ) and a negative attitude towards diversity ( $r = .45$ ) (Table 12). What this means is that respondents who exhibit prejudice against weak groups are also fairly likely to espouse ideological convictions that oppose equality for different groups.

**Table 12: Relationships between ideological constructs and GFE for Europe and by country**

		Authoritarianism	Social Dominance Orientation	Rejection of diversity
GFE	EU	.40	.42	.45
	D	.53	.46	.43
	GB	.44	.42	.52
	F	.50	.36	.49
	NL	.44	.50	.51
	I	.56	.47	.50
	PT	.11	.46	.40
	PL	.42	.30	.36
	HU	.24	.18	.32

All correlation coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level.

Significant positive relationships are found in all the individual countries without exception (Table 12).<sup>20</sup> In the *western European countries* the correlations

<sup>20</sup> The range of bivariate correlations between GFE and the ideological convictions is: Authoritarianism:  $r = .24$  in Hungary up to  $r = .56$  in Italy (Portugal  $r = .11$ ); Social Dominance Orientation:  $r = .18$  in Hungary up to  $r = .50$  in the Netherlands; rejection of diversity:  $r = .32$  in Hungary up to  $r = .52$  in the United Kingdom.

between ideological conviction and group-focused enmity are especially strong in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands with individual outliers in France and Portugal. In France Social Dominance Orientation correlates less strongly than the other two constructs with the GFE syndrome, while in Portugal there is a conspicuously weak relationship between group-focused enmity and authoritarianism ( $r = .11$ ). In the *eastern European countries*, Poland and Hungary, the relationships are generally weaker but nonetheless significant. In all the countries we can confirm a significant positive relationship between the three constructs and group-focused enmity.

We were able to measure the six prejudices – anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism and homophobia – reliably and ensuring cross-cultural comparability, and found significant and substantial relationships between them. After statistical testing we combined them to create an index of group-focused enmity. The GFE Index confirms that the extent of group-focused enmity is comparatively small in the Netherlands and conspicuously large in Poland and Hungary. The ideological convictions of authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity are closely related to group-focused enmity, especially in Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy; in Portugal and Hungary the relationship tends to be somewhat weaker.

## 6. The Demography of Group-focused Enmity


In this chapter we consider the extent of prejudice in relation to the demographic variables of age, education, gender and income, analysing the extent to which the six elements of the *group-focused enmity* syndrome are present among different demographic groups in the eight European countries.

We first calculated the GFE means for each demographic variable (the average agreement for all six prejudice types together). For each demographic variable the first graph shows the results for all eight countries together, the second differentiated by country. Then we analysed how the extent of each of the six elements relates to each of the demographic variables. Statistically significant differences between the mean scale values are indicated beneath the figures.

### 6.1 Age Differences in GFE

To what extent does the age of the European respondents affect the extent of their prejudices? Figure 11 shows an almost linear relationship. In all age groups from 22 years upwards, the older the respondents the stronger their


Figure 11: **GFE in Europe by age (means)**



Difference by age:  $F(4, 7488) = 143.11, p < .001$ .  
Post-hoc comparisons: 22–34, 16–21 < 35–49 < 50–65 < above 65.

prejudice. The youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, however, exhibit noticeably stronger prejudices than the next-oldest age group; the difference between their GFE mean and that of the 22- to 34-year-olds is not statistically significant. The 35–49, 50–65 and over-65 cohorts each express significantly more prejudice than the next-youngest age cohort.

Figure 12: Social prejudices in Europe by age (means)



Differences by age:

Anti-immigrant attitudes:  $F(4, 7478) = 27.72, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $22-34, 35-49, 16-21 < 16-21, 50-65 < over 65$ .

Anti-Semitism:  $F(4, 7207) = 31.51, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $16-21, 22-34 < 35-49 < over 65 < 50-65$ .

Racism:  $F(4, 7387) = 52.51, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $22-34 < 35-49, 16-21 < 50-65 < over 65$ .

Anti-Muslim attitudes:  $F(4, 6906) = 32.46, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $22-34, 16-21 < 16-21, 35-49 < 50-65 < over 65$ .

Sexism:  $F(4, 7474) = 148.12, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $22-34, 16-21 < 35-49 < 50-65 < over 65$ .

Homophobia:  $F(4, 7370) = 108.70, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons:  $16-21, 22-34 < 35-49 < 50-65 < over 65$ .



### 6.1.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type

The finding for group-focused enmity as a whole is confirmed for the individual elements (Figure 12). Here too, broadly speaking, the older the respondents the stronger their prejudices against all groups under consideration here. The over-50 cohorts exhibit an especially conspicuous tendency towards prejudice. The oldest respondents, the over-65s, show significantly more anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, and above all sexism and homophobia, followed by the 50- to 65-year-olds. One exception is *anti-Semitism*, which is significantly more prevalent among the 50- to 65-year-olds than the over-65s. The age distribution of racist attitudes also deviates slightly from the overall trend, with the youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, exhibiting significantly stronger prejudices than the next-oldest group, the 22- to 34-year-olds. The latter age group also has conspicuously low values for the other dimensions of prejudice, with the lowest values for anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes and sexism.

### 6.1.2 Results Differentiated by Country


Within the individual countries, too, we observe that the extent of group-focused enmity increases with age. In *Great Britain* the over-65s, and in Germany the over-50s exhibit conspicuously more prejudice than younger respondents, especially where anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim and racist statements are concerned. In Germany, however, the high level of sexism and homophobia among 16- to 21-year-olds is also striking.

Although we find the linear trend repeated for the older age groups in France and Italy, here again this does not apply to the youngest respondents. In *Italy* the youngest respondents, the 16- to 21-year-olds, express just as much prejudice as the 35- to 65-year-olds and thus considerably more than the next-oldest group, the 22- to 34-year-olds. Anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and racism are especially prevalent among the youngest Italians. In *France*, too, the responses of the youngest age group were more negative than those of their 22- to 34-year-old compatriots, with racism conspicuously widespread among the youngest French respondents. Otherwise in France, the responses of those over 50 were clearly more negative than those of the under-50s.

In the *Netherlands* agreement with statements expressing prejudice is comparatively small, but the linear relationship between age and group-focused


enmity is still present. Here too the over-65s most frequently affirm all the surveyed social prejudices, although again the 16- to 21-year-olds express more prejudices towards immigrants than the 22- to 34-year-olds.

Figure 13: Country comparison of GFE means by age I



In Portugal and Hungary the age groups differ less in their extent of group-focused enmity, but a linearity is observable here too. Whereas the same also applies to the individual dimensions of prejudice in *Portugal*, the picture for the individual prejudice types in *Hungary* is more complex. Here anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia clearly increase with age, but with one caveat: the oldest respondents, the over-65s, are less negative towards Jews. The conspicuously broad dissemination of anti-immigrant attitudes and racism among the youngest respondents in Hungary is also noteworthy. In *Poland* group-focused enmity is conspicuously strong among all respondents aged over 35. Only the two youngest age groups stand out with significantly smaller values. In Poland this linearity is also found in the individual elements of group-focused enmity. In *Italy*, the younger adults (aged 22–34) scored the lowest on GFE, the oldest respondents (over 65) the highest .

Figure 14: Country comparison of GFE means by age II




Group-focused enmity increases with age in all countries.

## 6.2 GFE and Education

To what extent is prejudice a question of education? Because European education systems are very diverse and tricky to compare, we classified the participants in this survey into three groups, distinguishing only between a low, medium and high level of education. We made this division within each country sample rather than in relation to the absolute level of education, so that each of the education categories represents about one third of the country's population.


The GFE means for the three education categories show that the lower the respondents' level of education the stronger their overall level of prejudice (Figure 15).

Figure 15: GFE in Europe by level of education (means)



Education:  $F(2, 7144) = 541.88, p < .001$ . Post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low.

Figure 16: Prejudices in Europe by level of education (means)



Differences by education:

Anti-immigrant attitudes:  $F(2, 7134) = 256.02, p < .001$ ; anti-Semitism:  $F(2, 6871) = 221.34, p < .001$ ; racism:  $F(2, 7053) = 329.18, p < .001$ ; anti-Muslim attitudes:  $F(2, 6583) = 162.01, p < .001$ ; sexism:  $F(2, 7136) = 313.60, p < .001$ ; homophobia:  $F(2, 7028) = 120.19, p < .001$ .

All post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low.


### 6.2.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type

The same relationship can also be demonstrated for each of the six individual dimensions of prejudice (Figure 16). Respondents with a lower level of education exhibited more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist, anti-Muslim, sexist and homophobic attitudes than the better-educated.

### 6.2.2 Results Differentiated by Country

The same trend is found when the results are differentiated by country (Figure 17). In all surveyed countries we found less education to be associated with higher values both for group-focused enmity as a whole and for the individual dimensions of prejudice. It is also worth noting that in all countries the difference in means between the top and middle group is greater than the difference between the middle and bottom group. Especially in Hungary, Great Britain and Portugal the difference between respondents with a medium and low level of education is very small. Thus it is above all the better-educated who are less likely to express prejudices.

Figure 17: **Country comparison of GFE means by level of education**



Differences by education:


Germany:  $F(2, 866) = 79.80, p < .001$ ; Great Britain:  $F(2, 902) = 56.40, p < .001$ ; France:  $F(2, 810) = 42.60, p < .001$ ; Netherlands:  $F(2, 943) = 80.72, p < .001$ ; Italy:  $F(2, 933) = 92.61, p < .001$ ; Portugal:  $F(2, 943) = 156.34, p < .001$ ; Poland:  $F(2, 827) = 92.61, p < .001$ ; Hungary:  $F(2, 899) = 39.99, p < .001$ .

Group-focused enmity declines with better education.

## 6.3 Gender Differences in GFE

Are women or men more likely to agree with negative statements about weak groups? To find out, we analysed the responses of all European respondents by gender. The resulting GFE means show that women are more likely to express prejudice than men (Figure 18).

Figure 18: **GFE in Europe by gender (means)**




Gender:  $F(1, 7523) = 17.88, p < .001$ .

### 6.3.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type

A differentiated examination of the individual dimensions of group-focused enmity reveals a largely similar pattern (Figure 19). Women express significantly more anti-immigrant attitudes, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes and sexism than men. No difference was found for anti-Semitism. Only in relation to homophobia did men give significantly more negative responses than women.

One possible reason for the wider dissemination of prejudices among women might be that in the representative sample they are on average slightly older and less educated. To test this we controlled for the effect of age and education. Although this does indeed reduce the observed influence of gender, the trend remains significant. Thus the different extent of group-focused enmity among men and women is not caused solely by differences in age and education in the sample.

Figure 19: **Social prejudices in Europe by gender (means)**



Gender differences in Europe:

Anti-immigrant attitudes:  $F(1, 7513) = 58.02, p < .001$ ; anti-Semitism:  $F(1, 7239) = 1.45, ns$ ; racism:  $F(1, 7422) = 27.05, p < .001$ ; anti-Muslim attitudes:  $F(1, 6937) = 46.39, p < .001$ ; sexism:  $F(1, 7509) = 47.10, p < .001$ ; homophobia:  $F(1, 7405) = 45.66, p < .001$ .


### 6.3.2 Results Differentiated by Country

In the individual countries, too, women generally give more negative responses than their male compatriots, but there are differences between the countries (Figure 20). In France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy the extent of overall

prejudice (GFE) does not differ significantly between men and women, but if we examine the individual dimensions, certain differences become visible. In all four countries male respondents gave more homophobic responses than female. In Great Britain and Germany prejudices towards Muslims were stronger among female respondents, and in Italy anti-immigrant attitudes, racism and sexism. French women gave more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist and anti-Muslim responses than their male compatriots.

In Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal the GFE Index itself clearly shows female respondents expressing more prejudices. This picture is generally confirmed for the individual dimensions: In all four countries women gave more anti-immigrant, sexist and anti-Muslim responses than men, and in Hungary, Poland and Portugal also more racist ones. Only in Hungary and Poland is anti-Semitism stronger among male respondents. Unlike in Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy, women in the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Hungary are also more homophobic than their male compatriots.

Figure 20: Country comparison of GFE means by gender



Gender differences by country:  
 Germany:  $F(1, 914) = .921$ , ns; Great Britain:  $F(1, 987) = .877$ , ns; France:  $F(1, 913) = 1.51$ , ns;  
 Netherlands:  $F(1, 967) = 6.84$ ,  $p < .01$ ; Italy:  $F(1, 965) = .23$ , ns; Portugal:  $F(1, 944) = 17.97$ ,  $p < .001$ ;  
 Poland:  $F(1, 913) = 4.64$ ,  $p < .05$ ; Hungary:  $F(1, 906) = 19.06$ ,  $p < .001$ .




Men and women differ only slightly in their extent of group-focused enmity.

## 6.4 Income Differences in GFE

To what extent does prejudice against weak groups depend on the income of the respondents? Like the education systems, incomes vary considerably between European countries. In order to ensure comparability we created artificial categories, dividing respondents into groups with low, medium and high income. Here again, the division is not in terms of absolute income, but relative within each country sample. Thus each of the income groups represents about one third of each country's population.

The calculated means in Figure 21 reveal a linear relationship: respondents with low income tend to express more prejudice than those with middle or high income.

Figure 21: **GFE in Europe by income (means)**



Difference by income:  $F(2, 5718) = 110.44, p < .001$ .  
Post-hoc comparison: high < middle < low.


Because income and education are closely related, we conducted a second analysis (not shown here) controlling for the effect of education, to isolate the influence of income alone. Although this does indeed reduce the observed

influence of income, the trend remains significant. Regardless of their education, people with lower income tend to express more group-focused enmity than those with higher income.

### 6.4.1 Results Differentiated by Prejudice Type

This trend is also confirmed in all six individual dimensions (Figure 22). The lower their income, the more anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, racist, anti-Muslim, sexist and homophobic the respondents' attitudes. This effect is statistically significant for all social prejudices in almost all income groups. Only in the case of racism are the responses of low-income respondents not significantly different from those of middle-income respondents.

Figure 22: Social prejudices in Europe by income (means)




Differences by income:  
 Anti-immigrant attitudes:  $F(2, 5712) = 105.70, p < .001$ ; anti-Semitism:  $F(2, 5552) = 51.52, p < .001$ ;  
 racism:  $F(2, 5648) = 44.73, p < .001$ ; anti-Muslim attitudes:  $F(2, 5328) = 28.90, p < .001$ ; sexism:  $F(2, 5712) = 93.76, p < .001$ ;  
 homophobia:  $F(2, 5657) = 21.73, p < .001$ .  
 All post-hoc comparisons: high < middle < low, except racism: high < middle, low.

### 6.4.2 Results Differentiated by Country

The linear trend of increasing prejudice with falling income is found in almost all the countries: the lower the relative income the stronger the prejudice. Individual deviations were found in France, Hungary, Italy and Portugal. In France and Italy respondents with high income did not differ significantly from those with middle income, while in Hungary and Portugal there were no differences between respondents with low and middle income.

The causes of these irregularities emerge when we consider the individual elements separately. In Hungary and France there is no linearity for racism: whereas in Hungary respondents with middle incomes most frequently expressed racism, French low-income respondents were the least racist in their country. In Italy the linear relationship is completely inverted for homophobia: the higher the income, the more homophobic the attitudes. There are no significant differences between the income groups for homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes in France, anti-Semitism and sexism in Italy, or anti-Muslim attitudes in Portugal.

Figure 23: Country comparison of GFE means by income



Differences by income:

Germany:  $F(2, 785) = 21.05, p < .001$ ; Great Britain:  $F(2, 782) = 16.51, p < .001$ ; France:  $F(2, 809) = 7.00, p < .001$ ; Netherlands:  $F(2, 828) = 29.30, p < .001$ ; Italy:  $F(2, 367) = 2.76, ns$ ; Portugal:  $F(2, 610) = 41.26, p < .001$ ; Poland:  $F(2, 728) = 49.28, p < .001$ ; Hungary:  $F(2, 788) = 12.93, p < .001$ .

Group-focused enmity increases as income falls.

## 6.5. Summary

The extent of group-focused enmity (GFE) is strongly dependent on certain demographic characteristics. Animosity towards weak groups generally increases with age for all the investigated elements in all the surveyed countries. GFE is especially strong among the over-65s, and weakest among the 22- to 34-year-olds. An exception to this trend is observed in Hungary, where the extent of anti-Semitism is smallest among the oldest respondents. In many countries the trend in the youngest age group of 16- to 22-year-olds is worrying. In France, Hungary and Italy, and to a lesser extent also in Poland and Portugal this age group exhibits considerably more racism than the next-oldest groups. In Hungary and Italy the tendency towards anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-Muslim attitudes is also conspicuously strong in this youngest age group. In Germany we find a slight tendency towards more sexism, homophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes among the youngest respondents than in the middle age groups. The same trend is observed in the Netherlands with respect to anti-immigrant attitudes. Portugal stands out for the very small differences between age groups for most prejudices, with only prejudices against women and homosexuals increasing clearly with age.

The extent of GFE falls as education increases. The trend is clear and applies to all six surveyed prejudices. The highly educated express noticeably less prejudice, while in many countries those with middle-level education are not significantly different from those with low education in terms of the extent of GFE.

Income affects the extent of GFE even after the effect of education has been taken into account and neutralized. For almost all the elements of GFE we found that prejudice increased as income fell. The only exception at the European level is racism, where respondents with medium and low income do not differ from each other (but here again those with higher income agree less with racist statements). At the level of countries we found further deviations from the overall trend. In France those with the lowest incomes show the least

tendency towards racism. In Italy homophobia increases clearly with income. In Italy income plays no significant role for the extent of anti-Semitism and sexism. In Portugal the level of income is irrelevant for the strength of anti-Muslim attitudes and in France income has no significant effect on the extent of anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia.

Gender is largely irrelevant for the extent of prejudice against weak groups. Women tend to exhibit slightly stronger GFE, even after we account for women in the sample being on average slightly older and having less education. Women exhibit somewhat more anti-immigrant, racist and anti-Muslim attitudes than men and – perhaps surprisingly – more sexism, while men are more likely than women to affirm homophobia. It must be stressed that the absolute differences between men and women are very small at the European level (although slighter greater than elsewhere in Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland and Portugal). In all the countries apart from Germany anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes tend to be stronger among women than among men.

Demography affects group-focused enmity. Hostility towards weak groups increases with *age*; this applies to all investigated elements of group-focused enmity and to all the surveyed countries. The trend among the 16- to 22-year-olds in certain countries is worrying. Group-focused enmity falls with increasing *education* in all the countries. Group-focused enmity also falls with increasing *income*, with noteworthy exceptions in individual countries. Although income is often related to education, the income effect is independent. *Gender* plays only a very marginal role. In almost all countries women tend to express more anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes, and in some cases also more racism and sexism than their male compatriots; in most countries men express somewhat more homophobia.

## 7. Political Attitudes and Prejudice

In this chapter we consider the relationship between general political attitudes and group-focused enmity. First we examine political self-characterization and attitudes towards the European Union (7.1). Then we move on to the question of respondents' fundamental political interest, in terms of how important political participation is to them and how frequently they vote in elections (7.2). We also wish to learn to what extent respondents feel a sense of political powerlessness (7.3) and finally whether they countenance extreme political attitudes such as support for the death penalty or calling for a strong leader (7.4). We report the strengths of the various indicators of political orientation and discuss the relationship with group-focused enmity in each case.

### 7.1 Political Orientation

To determine general political orientation we employed the classical method of self-characterization in the left/right spectrum. We asked interviewees to say where they would place themselves on a scale ranging from 0 (far left) to 10 (far right) (without specifically recording what respondents actually understood by "left" and "right" in their particular country at that specific time). The self-characterization overlaps to some extent with actual voting for parties regarded as "left" or "right" but is not identical with it.<sup>21</sup> Traditionally supporters of socialist and social democratic parties place themselves at the left-hand end of the spectrum, with adherents of conservative parties towards the right-hand end. Which specific parties these are varies over time and from country to country. This simple political self-characterization permits no differentiated conclusions about political stances nor can opinions about concrete political issues necessarily be derived from it.

Table 13 lists the percentage of respondents who classify themselves as far right (self-categorized between 8 and 10 on the scale) or far left (scale value 0 to 2) for each of the investigated countries.

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21 Voter behaviour in the European parliamentary elections of 2004 corresponded closely to political self-characterization figures for each country, although it made a difference whether the parties themselves could be clearly located on the left-right spectrum (Freire, Lobo and Magalhães 2009).

Table 13: **Statements on political orientation (percent)**


No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
1a	Political self-characterization (right-wing)	8.8	7.4	13.5	12.0	19.3	12.8	7.7	11.9
1b	Political self-characterization (left-wing)	6.6	8.3	11.3	5.0	13.6	12.5	6.9	8.7
1c	Political self-characterization (moderate)	68.8	66.2	56.2	57.6	47.4	60.5	61.4	68.4
2	In general, what image does the European Union conjure up for you?	25.0	36.0	21.8	16.1	11.8	18.2	15.3	20.4

1 = very positive to 5 = very negative?  
(proportion with negative image)

In Great Britain, Poland and Germany the proportion who say they are politically extreme *right-wing* is well under 10 percent, with the range extending up to nearly 20 percent in Italy. Overall fewer respondents place themselves at the extreme *left-wing* end of the political spectrum. In the Netherlands, in Germany, Poland, Great Britain and Hungary the figure is under 10 percent. More respondents in France, Portugal and Italy place themselves at the left-wing end of the political spectrum, but even here the figure never exceeds 14 percent. The great majority of respondents in all countries place themselves in the political centre (scale values 4 to 6), even more so if moderate left (3) and moderate right (7) are added.

We find an almost linear relationship between political self-characterization and the extent of *group-focused enmity* ( $r = .24$ ): the more right-wing respondents feel themselves to be, the stronger their prejudice against weak groups. The linearity is interrupted, however by the extreme left-wing respondents. As Figure 24 shows, prejudices are also relatively widespread among respondents at the very left-hand end of the political spectrum, who generally express stronger prejudice than those who classify themselves as moderate left-of-centre. The extent of their prejudice is thus not distinguishable from those who place themselves in the political centre and moderate right. But the greatest extent of group-focused enmity is found in the right-hand third of the spectrum.

Figure 24: **GFE in relation to political self-characterization**



The described trend is found in all investigated countries apart from Poland, as Table 14 shows. Note that the relationship between group-focused enmity and political self-characterization as extreme right-wing is especially strong in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands.

We measured *attitude to the European Union* using a five-point scale where 1 stood for very negative and 5 for very positive. Most European respondents were positive about the EU (Table 13, item 2). In Italy, Poland, the Netherlands and Portugal less than 20 percent of respondents were negative about the EU. The German and British respondents were considerably more sceptical; in Germany one in four and in Great Britain more than one in three saw the EU negatively.

We find a slight tendency for respondents who have a negative attitude towards the EU to tend towards group-focused enmity, but this relationship is fairly loose ( $r = .19$ ; Table 14). Especially in France and Portugal a negative attitude towards the EU is comparatively weakly linked with prejudice against identified groups. The relationship is clearest in Great Britain.



Table 14: **Relationship between political orientation and GFE**

		Political self-characterization	Negative attitude to EU
GFE	EU	.24**	.19**
	D	.40**	.20**
	GB	.23**	.37**
	F	.28**	.11**
	NL	.40**	.20**
	I	.38**	.28**
	PT	.17**	.16**
	PL	.06 ns	.24**
	HU	.13**	.24**

Correlation coefficients: \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; \*\*\* significant at the 0.1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

## 7.2 Political Interest

To measure how strongly interviewees felt interested and involved in politics we used three statements probing general political interest, motivation to influence others and participation in elections (Table 15).

Table 15: **Statements on political interest (percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
3	How interested are you in politics? (proportion disinterested)	25.1	34.6	43.5	34.8	40.9	52.8	43.8	58.2
4	For you, is it (1 = very important to 4 = not important at all) to influence the way problems are solved in our society? (proportion who find it unimportant)	8.4	6.0	6.2	9.5	14.9	13.4	10.9	40.8
5	Do you vote regularly? (proportion who "never" vote)	7.0	10.3	2.5	3.1	1.8	6.3	9.2	6.1

First we asked interviewees to indicate their general *interest in politics* on a four-point scale where 1 stood for “very interested” in politics and 4 for “not interested at all”. In Hungary and Portugal more than half of respondents said that they were not interested in politics, along with more than 40 percent in Poland, France and Italy. In the Netherlands and Great Britain about one third, and in Germany about one quarter of respondents said they had little or no interest in politics. We also asked interviewees how important it is for them to be able to *influence* the way problems are solved on a four-point scale from 1 (very important) to 4 (not important at all) (Table 15). The proportion who felt having influence was unimportant was smallest in Great Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland (between 6 and 11 percent). The figure is somewhat higher in Portugal and Italy with 13 and 15 percent, but that still means that political influence is important for a large majority in these countries. Not so in Hungary, where strikingly many respondents feel it is unimportant to be able to influence the political resolution of social problems (nearly 41 percent). The wish for political participation is markedly weaker here than in any other investigated country.

Table 16: **Relationship between political interest and GFE**

		General political interest	Relevance of political influence	Election participation
GFE	EU	-.22**	-.03 ns	-.06*
	D	-.18**	-.02 ns	-.14**
	GB	-.18**	-.01 ns	.03 ns
	F	-.25**	.13**	.03 ns
	NL	-.17**	-.03 ns	-.05 ns
	I	-.31**	-.07 ns	-.09**
	PT	-.26**	-.05 ns	-.04 ns
	PL	-.07*	.13**	.01 ns
	HU	-.04 ns	.05 ns	.00 ns

Correlation coefficients: \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; \*\*\* significant at the 0.1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

Finally we also asked our interviewees whether they vote regularly. Here our indicator of political interest is not an official figure for non-participation but exclusively the information given by the respondents. Table 15 shows the proportion in each country who say that they never vote. In Italy, France and the Netherlands 2 to 3 percent of respondents say they are non-voters, in Hungary Portugal and Germany between 6 and 7 percent, in Poland 9 percent. Only in Great Britain do just over 10 percent report never taking part in elections. The proportion of self-reported non-voters is relatively small in all the investigated countries.<sup>22</sup>

Unlike political interest, the wish for political influence and self-reported election participation are only weakly connected with group-focused enmity or not at all (see Table 16). In other words, non-voters and those who place no importance on political influence are not more susceptible to prejudice than others. Individual exceptions are found at the country level. The more important French and Polish respondents find political influence, the stronger their prejudice. In Germany and Italy we find a weak relationship between election participation and group-focused enmity: the more rarely the German and Italian respondents vote, the more likely they are to express prejudices. General political interest, on the other hand, correlates significantly with prejudice against weak groups across Europe ( $r = -.22$ ). The less the European respondents are interested in politics the more strongly they tend towards prejudices. This relationship is confirmed relatively uniformly for all the surveyed countries with the exception of Hungary, where it is not significant. It is especially strong in Italy.

### 7.3 Political Powerlessness

In prior research in Germany the feeling of political powerlessness has already been identified as an important predictor of group-focused enmity (Klein and Hüpping 2008). To investigate whether this also applies to other European countries we confronted interviewees with two statements expressing that feeling (Table 17). Note that this survey recorded only the subjective personal impression of political powerlessness.

*In all the countries a majority of respondents feel ignored by politicians. In Great Britain and Germany about two thirds of respondents share this feeling;*

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22 When interpreting deviations from official election turn-out figures it must be noted that these usually indicate participation in a specific election. Here we asked about voting in elections in general.

in France and Italy about three quarters, and in Portugal, Poland and Hungary more than 80 percent. Only in the Netherlands do “only” about one third of respondents feel that politicians do not care. The second statement, suggesting that interviewees have no influence on the government’s plans, also found great agreement across Europe. In Portugal one third of respondents agreed with it, in the Netherlands nearly 40 percent. In France, Great Britain and Germany about two thirds of respondents feel they have *no influence on government*, and in Poland and Italy more than 80 percent.

Table 17: **Statements on political powerlessness (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
6	Politicians do not care what people like me think.	66.6	64.2	71.0	34.6	76.5	80.5	87.3	82.4
7	People like me do not have any say about what the government does.	64.6	64.4	59.7	39.3	81.1	33.5	80.4	50.2

We combined the two statements into a mean scale and examined its relationship to group-focused enmity. We can confirm a moderate, significantly positive relationship for Europe as a whole ( $r = .31$ ). Those who feel politically powerless are more likely to target weak groups than those who feel they are able to influence political decisions. This relationship is confirmed for all investigated countries, but is weaker in Poland, Hungary and France (just under .20) and stronger in the Netherlands and Great Britain (.35 and .38).

## 7.4 Extreme Political Attitudes

Finally we also surveyed two extreme political attitudes that are closely linked to the concept of authoritarianism (Table 18). The first relates to the *death penalty*, which is forbidden by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. We confronted respondents with a statement demanding that it be reintroduced in their country. In Germany, the Netherlands and Italy just under 20 percent of respondents would welcome the return of the death penalty; in Portugal and France one third and in Great Britain 44 percent. Agreement is particu-

larly strong in Poland and Hungary, where about two thirds would have no objections.

The second statement examines the *desire for a strong leader*, which is expressed by almost one quarter of respondents in the Netherlands, almost one third in Germany, and between 38 and 43 percent in Italy, Great Britain and France. Agreement is strongest in Hungary, Poland and Portugal, where more than half of respondents want a strong leader.

Table 18: **Statements on extreme political attitudes (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
8	The death penalty should be restored in [country].	19.0	44.4	33.8	19.4	19.6	33.0	61.9	69.8
9	What the country needs most is a strong leader who does not bother about parliament or elections.	32.3	41.8	43.2	23.1	38.2	62.4	60.8	56.6

We found clear positive correlations between these two statements and the extent of group-focused enmity (Table 19).

Table 19: **Relationships between extreme political attitudes and GFE**

		Support for death penalty	Desire for strong leader
GFE	EU	.45	.43
	D	.36	.40
	GB	.47	.34
	F	.49	.40
	NL	.36	.43
	I	.31	.45
	PT	.30	.37
	PL	.21	.35
	HU	.28	.23

All correlation coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level.

The more respondents supported the death penalty ( $r = .45$ ) or wished for a strong leader ( $r = .43$ ), the stronger their prejudices towards weak groups. These positive relationships are significant in all surveyed countries. The relationship between support for the death penalty and the extent of prejudice is conspicuously strong in France and Great Britain.


## 7.5 Summary

Some political attitudes (but not all) influence willingness to target prejudice against weak groups (Figure 25). For political orientation the relationship is quite clear: The further right respondents place themselves in the *political spectrum*, the more likely they are to hold prejudices against the target groups under consideration here. However, we found prejudices to be stronger among respondents at the extreme left-wing end of the spectrum than among the moderate left. In fact, respondents who classified themselves as extreme left were just as susceptible to group-focused enmity as those who regarded themselves as political moderates. The relationship between political orientation and extent of prejudices is found in all the countries, but is particularly close in the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and France. The same applies to the relationship between a negative *image of the EU* and group-focused enmity, although the effect is considerably weaker overall and especially in Portugal, Poland and Hungary.

We also found a clear relationship between the feeling of *political powerlessness* and the tendency to target weak groups: the stronger the feeling of political powerlessness the greater the extent of group-focused enmity. This tendency is particularly clear in the Netherlands and Portugal. Support for the *death penalty* is also associated with stronger prejudice; this relationship is found in all the countries, but is especially strong in Great Britain and France. Furthermore, we found that a desire for a *strong leader* clearly correlates with the extent of group-focused enmity in all the countries.

The influence of political interest on group-focused enmity is quite weak. Respondents who are generally disinterested in politics tend more to target weak groups (especially in Italy). On the other hand, individual election participation and the importance of having political influence play almost no role.

Figure 25: Relationships between political attitudes and GFE in Europe



The figure shows the correlation coefficients ( $r$ ). The closer the point is to the centre the stronger the relationship between that political attitude and group-focused enmity. All coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level, except for the non-significant correlations between group-focused enmity and voting (non-voters) and between group-focused enmity and political influence.

## 8. Grave Consequences: From Prejudice to Discrimination

In this chapter we move on to examine the possible consequences of group-focused enmity. The focus here is on immigrants, who form the largest minority group and are the subject of heated political debate about issues of integration and equal status. We investigate the extent to which group-focused enmity (in the form of negative attitudes) is connected with intentions to act. We report on the willingness of majority populations to support integration (8.1), the extent to which respondents concede immigrants the right to participation (8.2), how they imagine future coexistence with immigrants (8.3) and finally their willingness to discriminate (8.4) or use violence against immigrants (8.5). In each case we examine how the surveyed attitudes and intentions relate to group-focused enmity.

*Intentions:* In the scope of an opinion survey it is not possible to measure the actual behaviour of interviewees. But we can determine the extent to which respondents condone or tolerate behaviour and whether they intend to act on their prejudices. We know from research that attitudes do not automatically lead to behaviour. But behaviour in practice is certainly encouraged by corresponding attitudes and above all by intentions. Attitudes are most likely to lead to behaviour when important peers share the same attitudes and when behaviour is tolerated or even desired under prevailing social norms (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975). Discrimination against immigrants in everyday situations (school, employment, housing) becomes more likely where the social climate – shaped by individual attitudes, political actors, media and social norms – permits or even encourages this. Comparatively few people actually engage in *hate crime* (violence against immigrants or other minorities). Those who do are almost exclusively young men – often from the lower social classes – motivated by anti-immigrant attitudes and racism. In defending their actions they often cite the support of their social milieu, saying they were only doing what most people wanted anyway (Wahl 2003).



## 8.1 Integration, Assimilation and Separation

About two million people migrate to the European Union every year, many legally, some illegally, others as asylum-seekers. Even more people migrate within the European Union.<sup>23</sup> In 2008 there were altogether 31 million EU and non-EU foreigners living in the twenty-seven member states of the European Union (6.2 percent of the population).<sup>24</sup> The motives for immigration are diverse: people migrate for *private reasons* (for example to join their spouse or family), for *economic reasons* (career development or hoping to escape poverty and find a better life in one of the most prosperous parts of the world) and for *political reasons* (for example fleeing from political persecution or war).

In many places immigrants – especially when they come from poor regions outside the EU – encounter rejection, exclusion and discrimination by the receiving population (Gauci 2009). Yet at the same time numerous EU member states find themselves facing population decline and demographic ageing. Immigration, especially of young, well-educated individuals, is one potential means for addressing skill shortages, underfunded pension systems and the need to care for a growing elderly population. Regardless of whether Europe wants or needs to accept immigrants, immigration will continue. In the countries where many immigrants already live today, immigration and integration are controversial issues. The special relevance and topicality of the integration question provides good grounds to take a closer look at the attitudes involved and their relationship with group-focused enmity.

Integration can only succeed if all those involved play their part, so fundamental attitudes to integration on both sides – minority and majority – are crucial (Zick 2010a). Immigrants must be willing and able to participate, while the receiving population must be willing to accept “newcomers” as full members of society; that means not only allowing them to participate but also conceding them a certain degree of cultural autonomy.

Acculturation research identifies two central dimensions that crucially determine the quality of integration: participation in the culture of the receiving


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23 Eurostat, “Recent Migration Trends: Citizens of EU-27 Member States Become Ever More Mobile while EU Remains Attractive to non EU-citizens”, *Statistics in focus* 98/2008.

24 Eurostat, “Large Differences in GDP and Consumption per Inhabitant across Europe”, *Statistics in focus* 95/2009.

country and retention of an independent cultural identity (Berry 2003; see also Zick 2010a). Depending on the *acculturation orientation* of the immigrants – their wish to preserve or abandon their own culture, to take part in the culture of the receiving country or to distance themselves from it, acculturation proceeds in the form of integration, assimilation, separation or marginalization (Figure 26).

Figure 26: **Participation and retention of culture as central dimensions of integration (after Berry 2003)**



Looking at the matter from the other side, the acculturation orientation of the receiving society is expressed in its acceptance of immigrants' retention of their original culture and its willingness to allow them to participate. These two aspects together characterize *integration* on the part of the receiving society. If its members make participation conditional on immigrants' abandoning their original culture, what they are striving for is *assimilation*, whereas the opposite case, conceding cultural autonomy but refusing participation is the enforcement of *separation*. If a society allows immigrants neither to maintain their

original culture nor to participate in the cultural life of the receiving country the outcome is *marginalization*. In this case the receiving society probably rejects immigration altogether. There is, however, also a fifth possibility, that of *individualization*. This happens when individuals remove themselves from their cultural group and define themselves primarily as individuals without any group ties or identity. Acculturation then becomes an individual matter, or is regarded as such. Many studies have investigated acculturation orientations (for an overview see Zick 2010a). Where immigrants and receiving society pursue the same strategy there is less conflict. Under certain circumstances this strategy may even be one of separation where immigrants and receiving society live parallel lives; but separation often creates its own problems such as lack of participation in the labour market, which can ultimately cause conflicts. If integration is to be successful, it must be the goal pursued by both sides.

In the survey we investigated the acculturation orientation of non-immigrants, as the number of interviewed immigrants was too small for analysis. In order to measure the interviewees' views we asked them about three statements standing for integration, assimilation and separation, following Berry' concept (2003, outlined above) (Table 20).

Table 20: **Statements on willingness to integrate immigrants (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
1	<b>Integration:</b> Immigrants should maintain their own culture and also adapt to the [country's] culture.	80.6	92.2	95.7	94.3	93.0	93.3	87.0	75.7
2	<b>Assimilation:</b> Immigrants should give up their culture of origin and adopt the [country's] culture.	29.0	29.9	24.1	31.9	18.0	20.3	15.4	27.6
3	<b>Separation:</b> Immigrants should maintain their culture of origin and not mix it with the [country's] culture.	34.8	22.8	43.2	23.9	35.3	30.5	72.3	70.6

Note: Multiple responses were permitted; i.e. respondents indicated agreement/disagreement with all three types of acculturation.

A very large majority of European respondents chose *integration*. They believe that immigrants should both keep their own culture and adopt the culture of their new country. This attitude is held by more than 90 percent of respondents in France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Great Britain. In Poland and Germany 87 and 81 percent share such strong support for integration, in Hungary the figure is three quarters.

Considerably fewer European respondents called for immigrants to *assimilate* by abandoning their original culture in favour of the culture of the receiving country. In the Netherlands, Great Britain, Germany, Hungary and France between one third and one quarter of the population subscribe to this demand, along with 20 percent in Portugal, 18 percent in Italy and 15 percent in Poland. The figures for these first two statements demonstrate that respondents sometimes vacillate between integration and assimilation.

Surprisingly many respondents call for *separation*. In Portugal, Germany and Italy about one third of respondents accept immigrants' keeping their original culture but reject the idea that they might mix it with the culture of the host society. This view is shared by 43 percent in France and more than two thirds in Hungary and Portugal. Later we will return to examine the determinants of the support for separatism measured in these countries: is it readiness to allow immigrants to keep their own culture or worry about mixing their culture with one's own? The figures are lower for Great Britain and the Netherlands, where such an attitude towards immigrants is shared by 23 and 24 percent of respondents, respectively.

All in all, 41 percent of respondents espouse a "pure" integration concept without at the same time calling for assimilation or separation. This purely integrative attitude is found among, respectively, 55 and 54 percent of respondents in Portugal and Great Britain, about half in Italy and the Netherlands, 42 percent in France, 38 percent in Germany, 21 percent in Poland and 14 percent in Hungary.

The three acculturation orientations considered here correlate significantly with *group-focused enmity* both for Europe as a whole and in the individual countries (Table 21).

Table 21: **Relationships between acculturation orientation and GFE**

		Integration	Assimilation	Separation
GFE	EU	-.21**	.29**	.23**
	D	-.15**	.34**	.05 ns
	GB	-.21**	.50**	.04 ns
	F	-.12**	.39**	.09*
	NL	-.16**	.49**	.04 ns
	I	-.18**	.35**	.08*
	PT	-.21*	.36**	.31**
	PL	-.09*	.27**	.19**
	HU	-.07*	.13**	.06 ns

Correlation coefficients: \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

European respondents who support separation tend towards prejudices against weaker groups ( $r = .23$ ). The relationship is especially strong in Poland and Portugal, suggesting that the separatism orientation measured there is attributable to a wish to safeguard the national culture. A similar relationship is found between group-focused enmity and the call for assimilation. Respondents who demand that immigrants assimilate are more likely to express prejudice towards weaker groups than those who do not share this attitude ( $r = .29$ ). This relationship is especially strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands. For those who prefer the strategy of integration we find a negative relationship with group-focused enmity. Respondents who concede immigrants their cultural autonomy while at the same time encouraging them to adopt the new culture also show a more positive attitude towards weak groups as a whole ( $r = .21$ ).

Overall, in the western European countries of France, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the call for assimilation is especially strongly positively correlated with the extent of prejudice while the integration concept is relatively strongly negatively correlated. In Poland and Portugal an especially strong relationship between support for separation and expression of prejudice can be demonstrated. In Hungary none of the three concepts correlates especially strongly with prejudice against weak groups, so the acculturation orientation there is largely independent of the extent of prejudice.

Analysis of the extent to which an acculturation orientation is linked to the individual elements of group-focused enmity reveals relationships with the other surveyed prejudices, as well as with anti-immigrant attitudes (Table 22). A separation orientation correlates especially with anti-Semitism, sexism and homophobia, while an assimilation orientation correlates with anti-immigrant attitudes and sexism. An integration orientation, on the other hand, correlates negatively to a lesser extent not only with anti-immigrant attitudes, but also with racism and anti-Semitism.

**Table 22: Relationship between acculturation orientation and the individual GFE elements in Europe**

	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
Assimilation	.31	.17	.15	.24	.31	.12
Separation	.09	.16	.23	.06	.22	.16
Integration	-.16	-.19	-.16	-.06	-.13	-.12

All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 5 percent level.

## 8.2 Participation in Society

Participation in society requires rights. One important measure of the willingness of the receiving society to encourage integration is its willingness to grant such rights to immigrants. Should immigrants be allowed to vote? What conditions should be attached to the acquisition of citizenship? What about the right to freely practice a religion, especially where its principles or customs conflict with other fundamental rights, for example gender equality, individual self-determination or freedom of speech? In the following we consider whether and how a lack of willingness to grant immigrants the rights required for participation in society goes hand in hand with prejudice against them. In our survey we used statements concerning the right to vote and arrangements for naturalization for long-term immigrants to measure the willingness to grant immigrants such rights. Table 23 shows what proportion of respondents would refuse these rights to immigrants.

Table 23: **Statements on granting rights to immigrants (rejection in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
3	Immigrants should be allowed to vote in all elections.	49.2	43.2	42.5	32.0	54.6	27.2	45.9	67.9
4	Immigrants who have been living in [country] for some years should gain [country's] citizenship easily.	22.3	32.1	19.0	37.2	37.9	19.6	32.9	50.9

Overall 55 percent of European respondents would grant immigrants a general *right to vote*, while 45 percent would not. At the country level the situation is similar in France, Great Britain and Poland, where about 45 percent of respondents oppose general voting rights for immigrants. Rejection is somewhat greater in Germany and Italy (50 and 55 percent of respondents, respectively) and a good deal greater in Hungary (two thirds). Only in Portugal and the Netherlands is the proportion who reject general voting rights for immigrants less than one third.

The idea of making *naturalization* easier for immigrants who have been living in the country for some time is rejected most widely in Hungary (by about half the population). In Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Great Britain about one third of respondents opposed easier naturalization, and in Germany, Portugal and France about 20 percent. Across all the countries 69 percent of respondents supported making it easier for immigrants to apply for citizenship after they have lived in a country for some years.

Refusal of the rights required for political participation is positively related to group-focused enmity (Table 24). Respondents who concede immigrants only limited voting rights and reject easier naturalization tend to express more prejudice against weak groups. This relationship is statistically significant in almost all the individual countries, but is especially strong in Great Britain, Italy, Germany and France. Only in Poland and Portugal is the relationship statistically marginal or insignificant (Table 24).

Table 24: **Relationships between rejection of rights for immigrants and GFE**

		Rejection of right to vote	Rejection of easier naturalization
GFE	EU	.31**	.30**
	D	.35**	.36**
	GB	.44**	.39**
	F	.33**	.32**
	NL	.28**	.30**
	I	.41**	.39**
	PT	.05 ns	.08*
	PL	.11**	.19**
	HU	.17**	.25**

Correlation coefficients: \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

Analysis of the relationships between rejection of political rights for immigrants and the individual elements of group-focused enmity shows, as one might expect, the strongest correlation with anti-immigrant attitudes. But rejection of political rights also has a bearing on the other prejudices considered here (Table 25). Respondents who refuse immigrants a general right to vote and reject easier naturalization are also more likely to express anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes and homophobia.

Table 25: **Relationship between rejection of rights for immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe**

	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
Rejection of general right to vote	.37	.11	.22	.28	.14	.20
Rejection of easier naturalization	.42	.12	.19	.30	.11	.16

All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level.



## 8.3 Integration Prospects

We also asked interviewees about their preferences for immigration policy and how harmoniously they think immigrants and the majority population will live together in future. For the former, we asked whether interviewees would like to allow “many” immigrants, “some”, “few” or “none” to come to their country and aggregated the last two response categories. For the latter, we asked interviewees whether they thought relations with immigrants would improve or deteriorate. Table 26 shows the results.

**Table 26: Statements on desired immigration policy and future coexistence with immigrants**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
6	How many immigrants do you think [country] should allow to come and live here? (proportion responding with “few” or “none”)	21.8	33.9	33.6	18.5	25.0	18.6	32.1	60.5
7	In the course of the next few years, do you expect the relationships between immigrants of different ethnic origins and [natives in country] to improve, stay about the same, or get worse? (proportion responding “get worse”)	31.1	45.2	28.6	30.0	30.1	40.8	13.2	36.9

Overall nearly 6 percent of respondents in the eight selected countries said they wanted *no more immigrants* at all to be allowed into their country, and nearly one quarter would allow only a few. On the other hand, 56 percent would allow at least some immigration and nearly 14 percent would allow many in. In the Netherlands, Portugal and Germany about 20 percent would restrict immigration to few or none at all, in Italy one quarter, in Poland, France and Great Britain about one third. This opinion is strikingly prevalent in Hungary, where more than 60 percent of respondents would allow only “few” immigrants to enter or “none”.

On the question of *future relations with immigrants* Europe is divided into three, with about one third of European respondents pessimistic, one third optimistic and one third neutral. The British and Portuguese respondents were especially pessimistic in this respect, with more than 40 percent expecting relations to deteriorate. In Hungary, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and France about one third expect relations with immigrants to worsen. The figure is smallest in Poland, at 13 percent.

For both statements we find positive relationships with group-focused enmity, especially for the wish to restrict immigration ( $r = .45$ ). Those who would prefer to allow immigration only for a few or stop it altogether tend more strongly towards prejudices than those who support immigration. This correlation is significant in all the countries and especially strong in Germany, Italy, Great Britain, France, Poland and Hungary.

The relationship between a pessimistic outlook on future coexistence and group-focused enmity is weaker ( $r = .19$ ). Those who predict a deterioration of relations tend more strongly towards prejudice against weak groups than those who are optimistic. This correlation is statistically significant in all the individual countries, but especially strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands and rather weak in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal.

**Table 27: GFE, desired immigration policy and expectations concerning future relations (correlations)**

		Desire to restrict immigration	Expectation of worsening relations with immigrants
GFE	EU	.45	.19
	D	.51	.27
	GB	.51	.30
	F	.43	.24
	NL	.36	.29
	I	.51	.18
	PT	.33	.20
	PL	.43	.19
	HU	.41	.13

All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level.

Analysis of the relationships between these two statements and the individual GFE elements shows that the wish for immigration restrictions is linked especially strongly to anti-immigrant attitudes, but also meaningfully with all the other GFE elements (Table 28). The same can also be observed for pessimism about future coexistence of immigrants and the receiving society. Here too, the relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes is especially strong. Correlations with the other GFE elements are significant but weaker.

Table 28: **Individual GFE elements, desired immigration policy and expectations concerning future relations, for Europe (correlations)**

	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
Desire to restrict immigration	.50	.26	.29	.33	.26	.23
Expectation of worsening relations with immigrants	.29	.10	.11	.19	.08	.05

All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 1 percent level.

## 8.4 Discrimination and Distance

Hostile mentalities come to light directly in everyday situations. In the next stage of our examination of the consequences of prejudiced mentalities we turn to the extent to which the European respondents condone discriminatory behaviour in concrete everyday situations. As already mentioned above, through the telephone interviews we were able to measure only intentions and reports concerning activity rather than actual activity, but we know from attitude research that the intention to carry out an act may lead to actual activity (although not automatically).

We used four statements to measure the extent to which respondents expressed readiness to discriminate against and distance themselves from immigrants in different everyday contexts (Table 29). Specifically, we asked whether interviewees would send their child to a school attended by a majority of immi-

Table 29: **Statements on discrimination against immigrants (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
8	I would be reluctant to send my children to a school where the majority of pupils are immigrants.	53.8	52.7	35.6	55.6	32.3	25.2	34.7	40.7
9	I would be reluctant to move into a district where many immigrants were living.	56.3	54.4	42.4	68.5	48.6	32.9	36.6	54.1
10	In the next elections, I will vote for parties that want to reduce the further influx of immigrants.	25.8	52.7	21.6	37.8	35.2	16.4	31.3	46.2
11	An employer should have the right to employ only native [country].	16.6	21.8	9.8	11.1	18.4	17.8	26.4	42.8

grants or move to an area where many immigrants live. We also asked whether they would vote for a party that took a hard line on immigration and whether they tolerated discrimination by employers.

Altogether 41 percent of all European respondents agree somewhat or strongly that they would *not send their child to a school where a majority of the pupils are immigrants*. In the Netherlands, Germany and Great Britain more than half of respondents share this opinion, in France, Poland and Italy about one third. In Portugal the figure is one in four.

Overall 49 percent of all European respondents would prefer not to *move to an area where many immigrants live*. The figures for Germany, Great Britain, Hungary and Italy are close to the European average, with about half of respondents saying they would avoid such areas. In France 42 percent and in Poland and Portugal about one third find such residential areas problematic. The figure for the Netherlands is strikingly high, at 69 percent.

There is also strong agreement with the statement about *voting for a party* that intends to restrict immigration. Exactly one third of all European respondents somewhat or strongly agree with this statement. In Great Britain and Hungary immigration policy is an important issue for many respondents, with about half say-

ing they intend to vote for parties that promise to restrict immigration. The figure is about one third in the Netherlands, Italy and Poland, 26 percent in Germany and 22 percent in France. With 16 percent such parties have least support in Portugal.

Finally we asked whether employers should have the right to *exclude immigrants*. About one fifth or 20 percent of all European respondents agreed. Below the European average were France and the Netherlands with about 10 percent, Germany with 17 percent, and Italy and Portugal with 18 percent. Great Britain and Poland, where about one quarter would accept employment discrimination, are slightly above the average, while the figure for Hungary is strikingly high at 43 percent.

For all four statements we find strong positive relationships with group-focused enmity: respondents who hold prejudices are more likely to condone discrimination against immigrants or themselves behave in discriminatory fashion. The targeting of weak groups is especially clearly related to the call for employers to have the right to employ only national citizens ( $r = .51$ ). A similarly strong relationship is found between prejudice and the intention to elect a party that calls for restrictions on immigration ( $r = .50$ ).

Table 30: **Relationships between discrimination against immigrants and GFE in Europe**

		Discrimination in choice of school	Discrimination in choice of housing	Voting for anti-immigrant parties	Discrimination in employment
GFE	EU	.26	.31	.50	.51
	D	.25	.44	.55	.45
	GB	.47	.53	.62	.52
	F	.36	.43	.54	.50
	NL	.29	.42	.56	.40
	I	.38	.46	.60	.44
	PT	.28	.25	.35	.44
	PL	.35	.21	.49	.56
	HU	.31	.38	.54	.43

All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.

The relationship with voting intention is especially strong in Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany. In Poland, Great Britain and France there are especially strong relationships between group-focused enmity and the call for jobs to be given to non-immigrants first. In Great Britain and Italy the extent of prejudice correlates especially with the intention to avoid sending one's child to a school where there are many immigrants and not to move to an area where many immigrants live.

Alongside the expected clear relationship with anti-immigrant attitudes, analysis of the extent to which discriminatory behavioural intentions towards immigrants and spatial avoidance of them relates to the individual elements of the group-focused enmity syndrome also reveals correlations with other GFE elements, especially with anti-Muslim attitudes, but also significantly with anti-Semitism, racism and sexism.

**Table 31: Relationship between discriminatory behavioural intentions towards immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe**

Discrimination	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
... in choice of school	.36	.16	.14	.28	.10	.07
... in choice of housing	.41	.15	.19	.37	.13	.09
... by voting for anti-immigrant parties	.59	.29	.30	.42	.30	.21
... in employment	.50	.33	.35	.33	.34	.25

All correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level.

## 8.5 Willingness to Use Violence

As the last aspect of the consequences of group-focused enmity, we examine willingness to use violence against immigrants. We note at the outset that the study on group-focused enmity in Germany has already shown that willingness to use violence against immigrants is closely connected with general willingness to use violence (authors' own analysis of data from the German GFE survey 2008). Thus we can assume that those who demonstrate willingness

to use violence against immigrants will more generally tend to use violence against others.

We measured willingness to use violence against immigrants through agreement with two statements (Table 32). We first asked interviewees if they could imagine reacting violently if they were insulted by an immigrant. Overall 12 percent of European respondents considered that response to be plausible. In the individual countries the figures were 4 percent in the Netherlands, 8 percent in Germany and Great Britain, about 12 percent in Portugal and Italy, more than 17 percent in Hungary and more than 20 percent in Poland and France.

We also asked whether interviewees could imagine using violence against an immigrant over an issue of importance to them. Overall 15 percent of all European respondents held that response to be possible: 5 percent in Great Britain, nearly 10 percent in Italy, France and Germany, and about 20 percent in Portugal, the Netherlands, Hungary and Poland.

**Table 32: Statements on willingness to use violence against immigrants (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
12	If an immigrant insults me, I am likely to hit him.	8.0	7.9	22.0	3.5	11.3	12.2	21.3	17.4
13	On an issue important to me, I might use violence against an immigrant.	13.1	4.8	12.1	19.6	10.3	18.3	22.0	19.6

Willingness to use violence against immigrants correlates positively with group-focused enmity. Respondents who tend more towards prejudice can more often imagine punching an immigrant following a slur ( $r = .24$ ) or using violence against an immigrant for an important cause ( $r = .21$ ). The correlation between GFE and readiness to use violence against immigrants after an insult is statistically significant for all the countries (except France), but particularly strong in the Netherlands. The correlation between GFE and readiness to use violence against immigrants for an important cause is statistically significant in all countries, but somewhat weaker in France, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Poland.

Table 33: **Relationships between GFE and willingness to use violence against immigrants**

		Violence against immigrants after insult	Violence against immigrants for important cause
GFE	EU	.24**	.21**
	D	.25**	.26**
	GB	.29**	.27**
	F	.03 ns	.11**
	NL	.33**	.10**
	I	.24**	.21**
	PT	.22**	.28**
	PL	.09*	.13**
	HU	.18**	.09*

Correlation coefficients: \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

The willingness to apply violence against immigrants in particular situations correlates not only with anti-immigrant attitudes, but at similar levels with the other GFE elements too. The comparatively weak relationships, however, suggest that willingness to use violence against immigrants is only partly motivated by prejudice, and is rather a product of a general willingness to use violence.


Table 34: **Relationship between willingness to use violence against immigrants and the individual GFE elements in Europe**

Violence against immigrants	Anti-immigrant attitudes	Racism	Anti-Semitism	Anti-Muslim attitudes	Sexism	Homophobia
... after insult	.17	.22	.22	.13	.17	.13
... for important cause	.17	.19	.21	.13	.15	.05

All correlation coefficients are at least significant at the 5 percent level.



Figure 27: **Relationships between behavioural intentions and GFE in Europe in comparison**



Showing correlation coefficients  $r$ . All coefficients are highly significant at the 0.1 percent level. The closer the point is to the centre the stronger the relationship between that intention and group-focused enmity.

## 8.6 Summary

We analysed acculturation orientation, willingness to grant rights to immigrants, expectations of future immigration policy, willingness to discriminate in everyday situations, and willingness to use violence against immigrants as expressions of intentions to act and looked at how these correlate with group-focused enmity. It appears that the consequences of prejudice may indeed be grave for immigrants, since all the investigated intentions are related to the set of prejudices that we term group-focused enmity, with the clearest correlation of all being with anti-immigrant attitudes.

When we analysed our findings in more detail we found that widespread *acceptance of integration* in Europe as a whole correlates with weaker group-focused enmity, especially with respect to anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and racism. Respondents who hold prejudices against weak groups are more likely to call for assimilation or separation. The same applies to the question whether respondents concede rights of participation for immigrants: here respondents who demonstrate strong anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and homophobia tend to reject a general right to vote and easier naturalization. Respondents who tend strongly towards group-focused enmity would generally like immigration policies to be more restrictive and tend to be pessimistic about future relations with immigrants. Respondents who hold prejudices against weak groups are also more likely to be willing to condone discrimination against immigrants or to behave in a discriminatory fashion themselves. This applies especially to the call for employers to have the right only to employ non-immigrants and the intention to vote only for parties that support restrictions on immigration at the next election. Finally, respondents who express more prejudice also tend to be more willing to use violence against immigrants in particular situations: They can more easily imagine using violence against an immigrant for an important cause or in response to an insult.

Group-focused enmity is not restricted solely to prejudicial attitudes; it can also have very tangible consequences. Those who support integration (conceding both participation and autonomous cultural identity) tend to express less anti-immigrant sentiment, and generally less group-focused enmity towards other identified groups too. By contrast, the call for assimilation or separation is associated with greater prejudice. The same applies to those who would place obstacles in the way of political participation for immigrants by opposing easier naturalization and a general right to vote. Group-focused enmity at the level of attitudes correlates with greater willingness to discriminate against immigrants and to use violence against them. Here, too, the relationship applies not only to anti-immigrant attitudes, but also to negative attitudes towards other outgroups.

## 9. Determining and Preventive Factors

The various strands of research into prejudice, discrimination and right-wing extremism have produced a comprehensive repertoire of factors explaining prejudiced attitudes against weak groups (for example Wagner, van Dick and Zick 2001; Zick 1997). Sociology, social psychology, education, criminology and political science each have their own paradigms and explanatory concepts, some of which overlap and others of which differ. Not every theory that is discussed has been well tested, and not every model that has been tested has actually been verified empirically. We can broadly differentiate the determining factors (determinants) by whether they locate the source of prejudice in the individual, in the group context or in the macro-social context (Zick and Küpper 2007; Zick and Küpper 2009). A second possibility is to classify these factors into spheres of influence, such as the political, economic or social environment.

Here we pursue a new alternative approach rooted in the social motives and functions of prejudice described in chapter 2.4. We begin by outlining this approach, which understands prejudice in terms of five basic *social motives*, to which different explanatory factors can be assigned. We present possible determinants that are discussed in the literature as important explanatory factors and test their influence on group-focused enmity empirically. We distinguish between determinants that can be subsumed under the keyword of *social capital or social integration*, determinants that reflect *ideological orientation, values and insecurity*, and determinants associated with *economic disadvantage*. The findings also offer starting points for identifying factors that protect against prejudice and as such are relevant for developing intervention and prevention strategies.

### 9.1 Fundamental Motives for Human Thought, Feeling and Action

Why does a person think and act as they do? That is a question that has long concerned psychological research into social motives. Social motives lead our thoughts and actions in communication and interaction with others. They support our goals and are implemented creatively and flexibly in different situa-

tions. Social motives control thought, feeling and action vis-à-vis others. Susan Fiske (2004) identifies five core social motives for human interaction, which we also regard as decisive for intergroup relationships shaped by prejudice:

- belonging
- trusting
- understanding
- controlling
- enhancing self

The motive of *belonging* serves the need for strong and stable relationships. *Trust* is rooted in the need to perceive others – especially those on whom we depend – as fundamentally sympathetic and well-meaning. The motive of *understanding* stems from the need to share meaning and importance with others. *Control* designates the need to perceive behaviour and its outcome as congruent (both in controlling our own behaviour and influencing the way others behave). *Enhancing self* relates to the need for a sense of self-worth and possible improvement – in other words, a positive image of the self. To Fiske's definition of the latter motive, we would like to add that self-enhancement is closely associated with the need to dominate others.

We propose understanding group-focused enmity in the context of these five core motives. We assume that people express prejudices, whether consciously or unconsciously, for precisely these motives. This means that we examine group-focused enmity from a functional/motivational perspective that also offers points of departure for prevention and intervention and helps us to identify the obstacles to prejudice reduction. The crux of the matter is to serve these core needs not through prejudices, but through positive alternatives.

To take the example of anti-Muslim attitudes: The rampant and overt anti-Muslim attitudes currently observed in Europe can be understood in terms of some of the aforementioned motives. Prejudices against Muslims are based on a shared perception and common understanding that prejudiced individuals have of the "foreign" and "unknown" Muslim, which they continuously reciprocally confirm and thus consolidate. Here prejudices serve the social motives of *understanding* and *belonging*. Labelling Muslims as archaic, patriarchal and aggressive is also associated with a *self-enhancement* of the ingroup and

thus also of the individuals concerned, who take the opportunity to demonstrate their own “enlightened” and “liberal” attitudes. This causes infighting within the ingroup, for example over equality for women and homosexuals, to fade into the background, which enhances *belonging*. Finally, in anti-Muslim attitudes we also see the effect of the social motive of *control*. Muslim immigrants increasingly demand recognition, opportunities and rights, but are kept in check by prejudices that force them onto the defensive.

We now move on to discuss some of the central explanatory factors associated with these five core motives: social capital and social integration (9.2); ideological orientation, values and insecurity (9.3); and economic disadvantage (9.4).

The explanatory factors social capital and social integration touch on the motives of *belonging* and *trust*. Friendships, having a spouse or partner, membership in clubs, ability to trust, identification with the ingroup and contact with people from groups identified as “other” play a role here. We also take account of general satisfaction with life.

Under ideological orientation, values and insecurity we find the motives of *understanding and control*. We have already addressed some of the ideologies and values involved here in chapter 5 and shown how they are closely related to group-focused enmity: authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and attitude to diversity. Now we broaden the scope to include the influence of religiosity, universalism and security orientation. Indicators of insecurity that undermine the motive of *control*, such as a general sense of disorientation (anomie) or feeling threatened by immigrants, are also of interest here.

The explanatory factor of economic disadvantage touches on the motive of *self-enhancement*. Economic disadvantage may mean de facto absolute poverty, or it may express itself in a subjective assessment of the individual's own financial position, the feeling of being worse off than others. In our view the need for *dominance* and *improvement of social status* also play a role in this respect. Following the social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) we assume that the need to maintain and enhance social status promotes prejudice and discrimination. Unlike Sidanius and Pratto we would not restrict this motive to groups of equal status, but regard it as a fundamental human motive (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010).

## Notes on statistical analysis

By means of linear regression analyses (see glossary) we test the influence of the considered determinants of group-focused enmity (GFE) for each case. The advantage of linear regression is that the degrees of influence exerted by each determinant are comparable; they reveal which determinants have stronger explanatory power for group-focused enmity, which have weaker explanatory power and which have none at all.

The strength of a predictor (a factor or determinant) is indicated by beta coefficients; the higher the value of the beta coefficient, the stronger the influence of the predictor. A beta coefficient close to 0 means that the factor has practically no influence on GFE. A beta coefficient close to -1 or +1 indicates a strong negative or positive relationship between the factor and GFE. Beneath each figure we also state the total explained variance of all the factors considered there. This indicates the total explanatory power of these factors and how much room is left for other possible explanatory factors.

For these calculations we again use the combined GFE Index. In determining what influence each individual factor has on GFE, we always feed all the factors of the associated category (i.e. social capital, ideological orientation or economic disadvantage) into the model simultaneously and always control to neutralize the influence of gender, age and education. The analyses seek meaningful patterns in the variation of opinions that do not automatically apply to individual respondents.

## Notes on interpreting the findings

In our description of the results we speak of explanatory or influencing factors. It is, however, impossible to test true causality on the basis of the present cross-sectional data. All we can do is report statistical relationships, without being able to draw conclusions about their causal direction. This restriction applies to many similar studies, meaning that very few factors have yet been subjected to real causality testing. So a certain degree of caution must be exercised when interpreting the results. To take the example of satisfaction with life, which is assumed to correlate with the extent of prejudice: One common interpretation is that low satisfaction with life leads to more prejudice. But it is also conceivable that negative attitudes towards particular groups lessen a person's satisfaction with life. Because prejudices are often based on threatening, fear-inducing stereotypes, a person who shares such stereotypes will feel threatened by "strangers" in their vicinity and this could itself impair their satisfaction with life.

## 9.2 Social Capital and Social Integration

Social capital, meaning a person's integration in social systems, is a possible determinant of group-focused enmity. The concept was introduced by Robert Putnam, who understands social capital as the web of cooperative relationships between citizens that holds together the members of a society. It is the foundation of civil society and helps society to solve collective problems that arise. In his famous book, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (2000), Putnam argues that Americans – the civic society par excellence – have gradually lost their ties to social networks, and in the process have also lost the norms of reciprocity they reproduce and the trust that grows out of them. Instead they are increasingly “bowling alone”, eroding the civil society on which democracy is based and endangering democratic values such as tolerance and pluralism. For the individual, social capital may consist in having stable and lasting relationships and contacts with others, being part of a community, being involved in societies and organizations, or being able to trust others. All these play a major role in satisfaction with life (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Some theoretical approaches also emphasize integration in social networks through spouse/partner, friends and neighbours as an important preventive factor for GFE (for example Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000).

Whereas Putnam's social capital approach focuses on friends and neighbours and membership of clubs, organizations and communities, the *contact hypothesis* (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998) concentrates on contact with members of outgroups. From the perspective of *Social Identity Theory* (Tajfel and Turner 1986), identification with the ingroup is also important for negativity towards particular outgroups.

### 9.2.1 Indicators of Social Capital and Social Integration

In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of social capital and social integration. In the text box on “Measuring social capital and integration” (see p. 130–32) we describe precisely how these indicators were recorded in the GFE Europe survey and provide some statistical information on the dissemination of the factors in the surveyed countries. At the end of the section we report the explanatory power of the indicators for group-focused enmity.

## Membership in clubs and organizations, spouse/partner, friends and neighbours

Putnam (2000) especially stresses the positive role played by organizations and clubs in promoting democracy and civil society. In response to criticism that not all organizations pursue democratic goals or are egalitarian, anti-racist and anti-ethnocentric in their activities, Putnam introduced an important distinction between *bridging* and *bonding social capital*. Very exclusive organizations bond their members together but isolate them from others, and are generally structured by social categories such as gender, ethnicity or social class. Professional bodies come into this category. At the other end of the spectrum open and very integrative organizations unite widely differing members across these category divisions. One example of this would be a multi-ethnic football team. In fact, this example shows how an organization can both *bridge* and *bond*, because such a team brings together men from different ethnic or cultural backgrounds, but separates them from women (unless there is a female team too).

Membership of organizations of the exclusive type is less likely to promote the idea of equality of different social groups and is more associated with separation processes. On the other hand it would seem obvious that membership of organizations of the inclusive type would promote values such as equality, tolerance and pluralism among its members (Mayer 2003). Independent of these hypotheses, clubs (especially sports clubs) and other organizations (for example church groups) are assigned an important role in intervention and prevention aiming to reduce prejudice.

### Trust

Mutual trust between individuals plays an important role for social integration and social capital. But establishing mutual trust is also important for groups in conflict, as politicians emphasize when tackling persistent group conflicts (confidence-building). Very broadly, trust can also be defined as positive distortion in the processing of imperfect information (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994). Studies show that trust in others can be developed to avoid insecurities (for example Kollock 1994). In successful and repeated social exchange, trust is linked with positive affect (Lawler and Yoon 1996). In social relationships such reliable and continuous exchange may occur between individuals or between groups. Trust and civil society commitment are closely linked, as commitment promotes trust (Brehm and Rahn 1997). Many studies point to the importance



of trust for reducing intergroup conflicts. Contact between the members of hostile groups increases trust, which in turn creates positive behavioural intentions and reduces negative ones. In the case of the Northern Ireland conflict this was demonstrated using a student sample (Tam et al. 2009).

### Satisfaction with life

On the basis of the theoretical account of social capital we assume that greater satisfaction with life leads causally to less group-focused enmity. But the legitimizing function of prejudices – which supply grounds for existing inequalities – also permits the opposite case to be made. It is easier to live with inequalities if prejudices are available to justify them. That would mean that prejudices could actually lead to greater satisfaction with life.

There is indeed empirical evidence for both propositions. A comparative study of thirty-two countries in the World Value Survey found the following pattern in relation to sexism (Napier, Thorisdottir and Jost 2010): In countries where there is greater overall equality of the sexes, those who openly espouse sexism are less satisfied with their lives than those who express apparently positive prejudices about women (benevolent sexism), whilst in countries where there is great inequality open sexism correlates positively with high satisfaction with life. So whereas in countries with greater equality between the sexes only the more respectable version of sexism provides emotional relief, in countries with great inequality this is also accomplished by the openly hostile version of sexism. Most of the countries covered by the GFE Europe survey have a comparatively high degree of equality between men and women. Applied to GFE, which in the present study encompasses overt and hostile prejudices, we would tend to expect a negative relationship between satisfaction with life and group-focused enmity.

### Identification with region, nation and Europe

Social identity is a key concept when it comes to prejudiced attitudes towards outgroups (Zick 2005). Although the idea of social capital would suggest that identification with a community tends to be associated with democratic and thus plural and tolerant attitudes, alternative theoretical approaches and a great deal of empirical research suggest the opposite. Social Identity Theory has a central place in social psychology research on intergroup conflicts and prejudices (see chapter 2.2). Negativity towards outgroups is a simple and easy strategy for gaining a positive social identity. Strong identification with an in-

group – for example the nation or any other group understood as ingroup – leads as a rule to more prejudice and intolerant attitudes towards outgroups.

This applies especially to exclusive overidentification in the form of national pride. The study on group-focused enmity in Germany found that pride in being German and in German history leads causally over time to more anti-immigrant attitudes (Wagner et al. 2011). Civic patriotism – in the sense of pride in German social security – is negatively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes. For the present GFE Europe survey we did not measure national pride, but only the extent to which respondents identify with their region, their nation and Europe. On the basis of prior research we suspected that regional and national identification would tend to correlate positively with group-focused enmity, whereas identification with Europe would lead to less group-focused enmity, because Europe is an inclusive category that overlays country categories.

### Contact with immigrants

In theory and practice (intervention) there is agreement that group conflicts lessen when the members of the groups enter into contact (Allport 1954; Pettigrew 1998). This applies especially where contact occurs as equals, where both groups share a common goal, and where contact is supported by authorities (such as teachers). A major meta-analysis of empirical studies confirms that intergroup contact reduces prejudices across a range of different contact situations and in relation to different outgroups (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). It has also been shown that as well as direct personal contact with members of an otherwise prejudice-targeted group, the mere idea of contact reduces the extent of prejudice (Turner et al. 2007), as does indirect contact via friends (Wright et al. 1997). Even those who only imagine contact or who have a friend who is friends with a member of a prejudice-targeted outgroup express less prejudice. Contact with one group (e.g. immigrants) not only reduces prejudice towards that specific group, but also reduces prejudice towards other groups such as religious minorities and even homosexual people (Pettigrew 2009).

### Measuring social capital and integration

*Friendships:* “Finding real friends is becoming more and more difficult nowadays” and “Relationships are getting more and more unstable”. Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” to

“strongly agree”. Both statements were reverse coded and combined to form the “friends” scale, where high scale values correspond with a positive sense of friendship (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .73$ ). 62 percent of all European respondents find that it is becoming more and more difficult to find real friends and 76 percent believe that social relationships are becoming more unstable. In other words, about two thirds of Europeans express insecurity about friendships. Especially many share this impression in Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal with values around 80 percent.

*Contact with neighbours:* “How many people are you socially acquainted with in your neighbourhood?” Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from “none” to “many”. 52 percent of all European respondents said that they had contact with many people in their neighbourhood, another 29 percent with some. Interestingly, in the four aforementioned countries (Hungary, Italy, Poland and Portugal) strikingly many respondents – 80 to over 90 percent – said that they had many local contacts. That would suggest that having contact with neighbours and ease of making friends are empirically completely independent of one another (correlation  $r = -.01$ ).

*Contact with immigrants:* “How many of your friends are immigrants?” and “How many of your [country native] friends have themselves friends that are immigrants?” Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from “none” to “many”. The two questions were combined to form the “contact with immigrants” scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .78$ ). 28 percent of all European respondents said they had some or many friends from an immigrant community, ranging from a good half in Portugal to just 15 percent in the Netherlands and Poland and 11 percent in Italy. 42 percent of all European respondents have friends who are friends with immigrants, ranging from 72 percent in Portugal to 19 percent in Italy and the Netherlands. In the other countries between 40 and 50 percent of respondents count immigrants among their friends.

*Trust:* We used two statements to measure trust: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” and “Generally speaking, would you say that most people try to take advantage of you when they have the opportunity to do so or that they do their best to behave decently?” Respondents were asked in each case to agree with one of the two possibilities. The first question was reverse coded and combined with the second to form the “trust” scale where high

scale values correspond with stronger trust (Cronbach's  $\alpha = .51$ ). 67 percent of all European respondents said that one cannot be too careful in dealing with people, 34 percent believe that most people try to take advantage of them when they have the opportunity to do so. Respondents in Portugal and France tended to be mistrustful of others, although they also stood out for assuming that others would do their best to behave well.

*Satisfaction with life:* To measure satisfaction with life we asked: "On the whole, are you (very satisfied – not at all satisfied) with the life you are living?" 84 percent of European respondents said they were fairly or even very satisfied. In most countries 85 to 95 percent were fairly or very satisfied with their life, but only 64 percent in Portugal and Hungary.

*Spouse/partner:* Interviewees were asked about their marital status, and those who were not married were asked if they had a "long-term partner". The country comparison shows about 70 percent of the population living in a long-term partnership, with about half the population married.

*Membership:* "How many organizations (like sports clubs, cultural or hobby activities, trade union or business organizations, church, environment or animal protection groups) do you belong to?" We recorded the total number of memberships but distinguished only between those who were a member of at least one group and those without any memberships. In Germany and Great Britain about 70 percent of respondents were members of an organization or club, in the Netherlands 88 percent. In Hungary with 28 percent comparatively few respondents were members of an organization.

*Identification:* We used three statements to measure the extent of regional, national and European identification: "I feel attached to my region", "I feel attached to [country]" and "I feel attached to Europe". Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree". 74 percent of all European respondents rather or strongly identify with Europe, 93 percent with their country and 82 percent with their region. In all the individual countries a majority of respondents identify with their region, with the exact figures ranging between 75 and 90 percent. In Great Britain only 43 percent of respondents identify with Europe, in the Netherlands and Italy about 70 percent and in the other countries between 80 and 87 percent. Identification with the nation is relatively uniform between the countries, with figures of about 90 percent.

Table 35: **Indicators of social capital and social integration (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
Friendship									
1	Finding real friends is becoming more and more difficult nowadays.	56.7	36.2	58.2	30.4	72.6	86.6	78.1	80.4
2	Relationships are getting more and more unstable.	67.9	69.1	70.2	60.5	79.7	88.4	85.2	84.9
Trust									
3	Generally speaking, would you say that you can't be too careful in dealing with people.	64.5	53.7	80.2	39.3	56.4	83.7	77.4	78.5
4	Generally speaking, would you say that most people try to take advantage of you when they have the opportunity to do so?	33.7	25.0	40.2	13.4	39.4	51.8	30.2	38.2
Neighbours									
5	How many people are you socially acquainted with in your neighbourhood? (some, many)	79.6	70.6	74.8	78.4	82.7	89.1	94.4	80.8
Memberships									
6	How many organizations (...) do you belong to? (membership at least in one organization)	70.7	68.2	51.9	87.9	39.0	46.0	49.4	27.8
Contact with immigrants									
7	How many of your friends are immigrants? (some, many)	39.3	25.9	39.5	15.4	11.2	56.0	15.3	21.4
8	How many of your [country native] friends have themselves friends that are immigrants? (some, many)	46.9	36.5	51.7	18.3	19.7	72.4	56.9	34.5
Spouse or partner									
11	Any long-term partnership	69.1	72.4	72.2	78.0	71.7	71.0	74.0	76.3
10	Married	48.6	52.3	52.4	61.2	56.4	60.5	61.5	60.1

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
Identification									
12	I feel attached to Europe.	82.7	43.2	68.4	68.0	82.6	76.3	86.9	86.2
13	I feel attached to [country].	89.2	89.5	92.6	94.5	95.2	88.4	95.3	95.4
14	I feel attached to my region.	76.9	81.1	80.9	83.9	81.5	86.4	90.0	73.3
Satisfaction with life									
15	On the whole, are you (very satisfied – not at all satisfied) with the life you are living? (fairly, very)	89.6	92.5	84.9	96.3	89.5	63.9	87.5	64.3

### 9.2.2 Results for Social Capital and Social Integration


To what extent do social capital and social integration affect group-focused enmity? Does its extent decline where respondents are integrated in social networks? The following analyses underscore the influence of social capital on the extent of group-focused enmity. For reasons of capacity some of the indicators used to survey these aspects were presented to only a randomly selected half of the sample, so in these cases the sample size was about 500 respondents per country.

The indicators of *social capital* and *social integration* certainly have explanatory power for the extent of GFE. Together these factors explain 32 percent of the variance (see note under Figure 28), so their strength allows us to make quite a good estimate of the extent of a person’s GFE. These indicators have the greatest explanatory power in Great Britain, the smallest in Portugal and Hungary. As that suggests, other factors aside from social capital are of relevance.

Within this model the impression that it is easy or difficult to *find real friends* turns out to be the strongest influencing factor ( $\beta = -.26^{**}$ ). The more negative respondents’ views about friendship today (whatever undertone of nostalgia may be involved), the stronger their group-focused enmity. This relatively strong effect is confirmed in all the countries apart from Portugal. *Neighbourhood contacts* also play a role for GFE, although not the one we might have expected. The more contact a respondent has with neighbours the more likely they are to express prejudices. This effect is found above all in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands.

Confirming the results of numerous empirical prejudice studies, we find that *contact with immigrants* clearly reduces GFE. The less contact respondents have with immigrants the more strongly they express prejudices. This applies equally to direct personal contact and to indirect contact via friends. In all the individual surveyed countries we likewise find that contact with immigrants reduces GFE, most clearly in France ( $\beta = .35$ ) and least in Portugal ( $\beta = .08$ ). So contact with persons in the social context of the neighbourhood is associated with greater prejudice whereas contact with immigrants is clearly associated with less, as is the feeling of being able to make friends easily.

Figure 28: **Social capital and social integration as determinants of GFE in Europe**



Regression analysis. Total explanation of variance:  $R^2 = .32$  (excluding control variables age, education, gender); in the individual countries: D:  $R^2 = .31$ , GB:  $R^2 = .35$ , F:  $R^2 = .31$ , NL:  $R^2 = .32$ , I:  $R^2 = .29$ , PT:  $R^2 = .16$ , PL:  $R^2 = .19$ , HU:  $R^2 = .17$ . The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable's impact. Strongest predictors are highlighted grey.

\* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

*Trust* in others also affects GFE. The less respondents trust others, the more likely they are to express prejudices. This effect is found in all the surveyed countries apart from Hungary. We also find a weak but significant influence of satisfaction with life on GFE: the less satisfied respondents are with their lives, the more likely they are to express prejudice. Here, however, the results in the individual countries reveal how weak this trend is; in none of the individual countries did this relationship reach significance. An equally weak but significant influence was found for membership. Respondents who are not members of any organizations or clubs tend on average rather more to express prejudice against weak groups. The existence of a spouse or partner plays no role.

Finally we also investigated how *regional, national and European identity* affect GFE. Where respondents identify especially with Europe there is no noticeable effect on the extent of GFE. For identification with the respondent's own nationality there is a weak effect, with those whose identity is strongly defined by nationality slightly more likely to express prejudices. Identification with the region also has a weak effect: the more strongly respondents feel they belong to their region, the more likely they are to express prejudices. Overall it is clear that regional and national identification tend to contribute to prejudices while identification with Europe does little to counteract them.

In the individual countries we find different patterns concerning the influence of identity on GFE. Respondents who define themselves as Europeans are less likely to express prejudices in the western European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) but more likely in Hungary. On the other hand, in France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands, strong identification with the nation is linked with greater prejudice, whereas in Portugal, Poland and Hungary it is associated with less prejudice. Only for regional identity did we find uniform effects across all countries. The stronger the identification with the region the stronger the prejudice.

Social capital and social integration are theoretically significant preventive factors against intolerance and prejudice. Our results confirm this for certain indicators: those who trust other people and feel that it is easy to establish stable friendships tend to express less group-focused enmity. We also found that contact with immigrants – either direct or mediated via mutual friends – is related to lower levels of prejudices while, conversely,



prejudices are widespread among those who have little contact with immigrants. Other indicators exhibit weak effects. Those who are satisfied with their lives tend rather less to express prejudice against identified groups, as do those who are members of at least one organization. Having intensive contact with neighbours, on the other hand, tends to have a negative effect and appears to actually foster prejudices. Having a spouse or partner plays no role. Finally, we found that those who identify with nation and region tend rather more towards group-focused enmity, while identification with Europe does not protect against prejudices.

### 9.3 Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity

In this section we investigate how ideological orientation, values and insecurity affect group-focused enmity. Various theoretical traditions highlight the special relevance of ideological orientations for attitudes towards outgroups. In chapter 5.3 we already addressed how authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity relate to prejudice. In the following we go into these and other constructs in greater detail.

The constructs we discuss as ideological orientations would be described by authors in other theoretical traditions as ideologies, generalized attitudes or personality traits. However they are labelled, the constructs discussed here have come to be understood across the board as stable and firmly rooted beliefs often already learned through childhood and adolescent socialization. They define our view of the world and our understanding of social relations between individuals and groups. Social psychology emphasizes that ideological orientations are in principle open to change. We share that perspective and assume that the respective context exercises a certain moderating influence on general beliefs. So the extent to which a belief leads to specific attitudes or behaviour depends not only on the person and their socialization, but also on the circumstances. Social comparison processes, which depend on which comparison group is available and focussed upon in the given context, play an important role for attitudes towards outgroups (Zick 2005). People from two neighbouring villages may regard one another as mutual outgroups or jointly as Germans; as Germans they may compare themselves with the outgroup of the French or, broadening out the perspective, juxtapose themselves together with the French as Europeans against the outgroup of Americans.

Beyond the realm of ideological orientation we take a closer look at general values and examine specifically how universalistic, security-orientated and religious values affect GFE. Finally we also consider general insecurity as a possible determinant of GFE and investigate the constructs of anomie (a feeling of disorientation triggered by social change) and the perceived threat of immigrants.

### 9.3.1 Indicators of Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity

In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of ideological orientation, values and insecurity. In the text box on “Measuring ideological orientations, values and insecurity” (see p. 142-44) we describe precisely how these indicators were recorded in the GFE Europe survey and provide some statistical information on the dissemination of the factors in the surveyed countries. At the end of the section we report the explanatory power of the indicators for group-focused enmity.

#### Authoritarianism

When Theodor Adorno and his colleagues wrote *The Authoritarian Personality* in 1950, memory of the crimes of Nazi Germany was still very fresh. In the book they argue that an authoritarian style of education that demands obedience and subordination to authority and places great weight on discipline and strictness was directly responsible for the holocaust. They propose an authoritarian personality that is closely connected with anti-Semitism. Its nine facets are conventionalism (rigid adherence to the conventional values of the middle class), submission (uncritical obedience of idealized moral authorities of the ingroup), aggression (a law-and-order mentality that seeks to condemn and punish norm violations), lack of introspection, superstition, admiration of power and strength, cynicism, projectivity and excessive fixation on sexuality (see also Decker et al. 2010).

On that basis Altemeyer developed his concept of right-wing authoritarianism (1988) and a scale to record it in the dimensions of submission, aggression and conventionalism. More recent theoretical works often tackle authoritarianism in connection with the concept of Social Dominance Orientation (see chapter 5.3 and below), understanding it as comprising two world views: one that perceives life as a *competitive jungle* and another that sees the world as a *dangerous place*. Authoritarian individuals quickly feel threatened by other groups and respond by denigrating and excluding them. Dominance-orientated

persons, on the other hand, perceive the world as a place of competition and rivalry. They denigrate and exclude groups in order to do well in competition themselves (Duckitt 2001). The great explanatory power of authoritarianism for prejudice against weak groups has, like the concept of Social Dominance Orientation described in more detail below, been confirmed in numerous studies (for example Ekehammar et al. 2004; Duriez and van Hiel 2002).

## Social Dominance Orientation

The concept of Social Dominance Orientation is comparatively recent. It focuses on the extent to which people support social hierarchies between groups and correspondingly reject social equality. The social dominance theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) assumes that individuals differ in their extent of Social Dominance Orientation, with persons from higher-status groups, for example white people or men, having higher Social Dominance Orientation than persons from lower-status groups, like for example black people or women. People who belong to higher-status groups justify the existing hierarchies with prejudices, which the theory calls legitimizing myths. Alongside prejudices such as racism and sexism, ideologies such as nationalism or the Protestant work ethic also serve as legitimizing myths. The sexist prejudice that women are biologically “different” and therefore tend to be more emotional and less rational serves as an argument for keeping women out of top jobs. On the basis of our own empirical findings, however, we assume – in a departure from the original theory – that people from groups whose status in terms of power, influence or money is low can gain advantages by distinguishing themselves from groups even further down the ladder, for example immigrants (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010).

## Diversity

Diversity describes the extent of subjectively perceived or objectively discernible difference between the members of a social group (van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). This actual or perceived heterogeneity may relate to differences in gender, age, ethnicity, religion, cultural or social background, or disability. The concept of diversity has thus far been investigated above all in work contexts, particularly with respect to the effects of heterogeneity on cooperation, productivity and job satisfaction of work teams (for an overview see van Knippenberg and Schippers 2007). It is assumed that demographic diversity in work teams is associated with different experience, abilities, attitudes, values, personalities, emotions and cognitive approaches. These real or supposed differences may be

utilized creatively and experienced as an enrichment but they can also lead to misunderstandings and stress. Alongside the type of task to be accomplished, the outcome depends on the fundamental attitude of those involved (van Dick et al. 2008). If they regard its diversity as an advantage then they are more able to identify with their team, which has positive effects on their productivity and job satisfaction. Thus a positive attitude to diversity can offset the negative effects of social categorization. Using the same data on which this report is based we have already been able to demonstrate that those who support diversity and value the diversity of cultures and religions in their country tend less towards anti-immigrant attitudes (Küpper, Wolf and Zick 2010; Zick and Küpper, 2010).

## Universalism and security orientation

The two values of universalism and security are drawn from the value theory of Shalom H. Schwartz (1992), who defines values as convictions that apply regardless of the situation and motivate individuals to act in accordance with desirable goals. Value orientations give individuals criteria by which they can judge themselves, their own and others' behaviour and external events. Every individual has their own individual value system within which their personal values are ordered by importance. Schwartz identifies ten universal value types according to the different motives they are based on. From these we have selected two: security and universalism. Security-orientated values emphasize safety and protection as central social objectives. Weak groups and minorities differ from the majority society through features such as origin, ethnicity, religion, sexuality or gender. They may appear as a threat to a person's own values and goals and consequently as a danger to the stability and security of the social order. And indeed, an empirical relationship can be found between values focused on security and negative attitudes towards immigrants (Leong 2008). People with universalist values seek to appreciate, understand and protect other people and the environment. The value of universalism thus stands opposed to category-based negativity towards weak groups.

## Religiosity

All the major religions and especially Christianity – which is naturally foremost in the European context of the study – propagate peaceableness and neighbourly love; many people cite their faith as a reason to work for charitable causes. But people are also repressed, persecuted and even murdered on religious grounds. Churches stress their differences and confessions quarrel. "Religion makes and

unmakes prejudice”, as Gordon Allport recognized back in the 1950s (Allport 1954, 444). Since then numerous empirical studies have scrutinized the relationship between religiosity and prejudices. In the scope of this study of group-focused enmity in Europe, we analysed the relationship between religiosity and prejudices in terms of the different elements of the GFE syndrome (Küpper and Zick 2010). What emerged was that the extent of sexism and homophobia clearly increased with religiosity. Religious people have a significant tendency towards stronger prejudices against women and homosexuals. For racism we found a similar tendency in a weaker form. The effect of religiosity on anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim attitudes was small and differed from country to country, making it difficult to generalize except to note that religiosity does not necessarily protect against these prejudices either.

## Anomie

We understand the sociological concept of anomie as arising from the loss of norms in society as a consequence of rapid social change (Durkheim 1983 [1897]). Within a short space of time people find that what was previously regarded as right and proper no longer applies, unsettling their sense of order and producing a feeling of disorientation and insecurity. This individual response to a loss of binding social norms is what we term anomie. The dissemination of anomie, in turn, itself has repercussions for society as a whole. Numerous studies confirm that those who feel disorientated are more likely to express prejudice against other groups. As they see it, “foreign” groups threaten to further complicate the society they have to deal with and endanger its already eroding values and norms (Hüpping 2006).

## Perceived threat by immigrants

Certain prominent theories of conflict, such as the social psychological theory of realistic group conflict (Sherif 1966; LeVine and Campbell 1972), see prejudices as the outcome of conflicts over limited resources. Here both subjectively perceived and real competition over land, water or jobs, for example, can lead to negativity towards actual or supposed rival groups, which are experienced as a threat to prosperity, security but also as challenging their power to define what is “right” or “wrong”.

According to integrative threat theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000) a perceived threat leads directly to prejudices against the supposedly threatening group.

This theory distinguishes between realistic threat, where the outgroup is felt to threaten material property or security, and symbolic threat, which is rooted in the suspicion that outgroups threaten an ingroup's values or way of life. This feeling can sometimes arise simply because the other group is perceived as being very different, which puts the concept of threat close to that of covert prejudices, which are partly couched in terms of large perceived or imputed cultural differences (chapter 2.3). This theory also distinguishes between personal threat, where an individual feels personally threatened by the other group, and collective threat, where one group feels threatened by another (for example "natives" by "foreigners"). A meta-analysis of numerous empirical studies found perceived threat by an outgroup to be closely related to prejudice (Riek, Mania and Gaertner 2006). Moreover, the results of a longitudinal study on group-focused enmity conducted in Germany suggest that the feeling of threat leads causally to more anti-immigrant attitudes and not the other way round (Schlüter, Schmitt and Wagner 2008). It is also noteworthy that as well as promoting negative attitudes towards the involved outgroup, rivalry perceived as threat can sometimes also lead to negativity against completely uninvolved groups (Sassenberg et al. 2007).

In this study we measured perceived threat by immigrants in terms of both personal and collective threat. We would like to stress that what we are talking about is *perceived* threat, which can be very subjective and requires no basis in reality. A feeling of threat by immigrants sometimes arises through a lack of real experience that would allow realistic images to replace the stereotypes of members of "foreign" groups, finding things in common and recognizing specific personal differences in place of the assumed group characteristics. In regions where hardly any immigrants live or in very closed neighbourhoods residents experience few opportunities to encounter people from migrant communities and replace the feeling of threat with more varied and possibly positive experiences.

### Measuring ideological orientations, values and insecurity

Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity:  
See chapter 5.3, Table 11

*Religiosity*: "How religious are you?". Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from "very religious" to "not religious at all". The item was reverse coded so that a high value indicates strong religiosity. Almost 55 per-

cent of European respondents said they were quite or very religious, ranging from about 34 percent in Great Britain and France to 88 percent in Poland.

*Anomie:* “Nowadays things are so confusing that you sometimes do not know where you stand” and “Nowadays things are so complex that you sometimes do not know what is going on”. Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 77 percent of all European respondents said they felt that today everything was confusing, and 76 percent that things were too complicated. The strongest agreement with both statements was found in Portugal and Poland with more than 85 percent. Both items were combined to form the “anomie” scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .81$ ).

*Universalism:* “A man/woman who believes it to be important that every person in the world is treated equally. He/She believes that everyone should have equal opportunities in life” and “A man/woman for whom it is important to listen to people who are different from him/her. And even if he disagrees with them, he/she would still want to understand them”. Respondents indicated in four response categories ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like me” how similar they thought the described person was to themselves. Both items were reverse coded so that high values indicate strong universalism, and both were combined to form the “universalism” scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .52$ ). 88 percent of European respondents said that the described person was somewhat or very much like them ( $m > 2.5$ ). Universalistic values are widespread in all the countries, with the lowest values in Portugal, followed by Poland and Hungary, and the highest in Italy.

*Security orientation:* “A man/woman for whom it is important to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety” and “A man/woman for whom it is important that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens”. For each pair of statements, respondents indicated in four response categories ranging from “not like me at all” to “very much like me” how similar they thought the described person was to themselves. Both items were combined to form the “security” scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .56$ ). 75 percent of all European respondents said that the described person was somewhat or very much like them ( $m > 2.5$ ). Security was significantly most important to respondents in Hungary and Italy and significantly least important to Dutch respondents.

*Threat:* “Immigrants living here threaten the economy in [country]”, “Immigrants living here threaten my personal financial situation”, “Immigrants living here threaten our way of life and our values in [country]” and “Immigrants living here threaten my personal way of life and my values”. Respondents chose from four response categories ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. All four statements were combined to form the “threat” scale (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .78$ ). 16 percent of all European respondents recorded a value greater than 2.5, indicating that they (somewhat or strongly) feel their standard of living or way of life is threatened personally or as group by immigrants. Above all in Hungary, followed by Portugal, Great Britain and Germany the feeling of threat by immigrants is significantly stronger than in the other countries.

Table 36: **Indicators of ideological orientation, values and insecurity (agreement in percent)**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
<b>Authoritarianism</b>		See chapter 5.3, Table 11							
<b>Social Dominance Orientation</b>									
<b>Diversity</b>									
<b>Religiosity</b>									
1	How religious are you? (proportion responding with at least “somewhat religious”)	48.2	34.3	34.6	52.0	65.9	54.7	88.3	59.3
<b>Anomie (disorientation)</b> (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .81$ )									
2	Nowadays things are so confusing that you sometimes do not know where you stand.	61.5	70.3	86.1	65.7	73.4	92.4	88.7	76.6
3	Nowadays things are so complex that you sometimes do not know what is going on.	65.5	70.4	78.3	62.6	78.6	88.3	86.2	80.6



No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
Universalism <sup>a</sup> (Cronbach's $\alpha = .52$ )									
4	A man/woman who believes it to be important that every person in the world is treated equally. He/She believes that everyone should have equal opportunities in life. [Proportion who say they are similar to the described person]	90.9	94.8	95.5	91.6	93.9	92.2	90.5	83.3
5	A man/woman for whom it is important to listen to people who are different from him/her. And even if he disagrees with them, he/she would still want to understand them. [Proportion who say they are similar to the described person]	94.4	94.8	94.7	91.6	94.7	86.8	86.8	85.3
Security <sup>a</sup> (Cronbach's $\alpha = .56$ )									
6	A man/woman for whom it is important to live in secure surroundings. He/she avoids anything that might endanger his/her safety. [Proportion who say they are similar to the described person]	77.6	77.4	75.9	62.7	86.0	80.1	77.6	83.6
7	A man/woman for whom it is important that the government ensures his/her safety against all threats. He/She wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens. [Proportion who say they are similar to the described person]	82.2	83.7	86.8	76.2	87.2	89.4	86.6	80.5

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
<b>Threat (Cronbach's <math>\alpha = .78</math>)</b>									
8	Immigrants living here threaten the economy in [country].	23.9	42.4	21.2	17.7	26.0	32.8	22.4	51.6
9	Immigrants living here threaten my personal financial situation.	14.6	22.7	11.9	8.3	11.3	16.9	10.0	37.8
10	Immigrants living here threaten our way of life and our values in [country].	28.2	40.9	27.3	35.7	36.2	26.2	16.3	41.2
11	Immigrants living here threaten my personal way of life and my values.	9.9	18.6	14.7	12.2	17.3	15.4	5.8	28.6

a The proportion of respondents who feel they are somewhat or very like the described person.


### 9.3.2 Results for Ideological Orientation, Values and Insecurity

What influence do ideological orientation, values and insecurity have on group-focused enmity? Can the reported findings from previous research be replicated in the present study's pan-European dataset?

Overall, the indicators of ideological orientation, values and insecurity possess remarkably large explanatory power for the extent of group-focused enmity, explaining more than half of the variance in our model ( $R^2 = .53$ ; Figure 29). So if we know a person's ideological orientation, values and insecurity we can fairly reliably estimate the extent of their prejudices. The explanatory power is especially strong in Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands, least in Hungary. In the following we examine the individual determinants of GFE, in each case controlled for the influence of gender, age and education.

Perceived *threat* by immigrants has an especially clear effect on the extent of prejudices ( $\beta = .28$ ). The more strongly respondents feel that immigrants threaten their prosperity and way of life, the more strongly they express prejudice. This effect is conspicuously strong in all the countries without exception,

Figure 29: Ideological orientation, values and insecurity as determinants of GFE in Europe



Total explanation of variance:  $R^2 = .53$  (excluding control variables age, education, gender); in the individual countries: D:  $R^2 = .62$ , GB:  $R^2 = .61$ , F:  $R^2 = .52$ , NL:  $R^2 = .61$ , I:  $R^2 = .58$ , PT:  $R^2 = .47$ , PL:  $R^2 = .44$ , HU:  $R^2 = .28$ . The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable's impact. Strongest predictors are highlighted grey. \* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level.

with beta coefficients exceeding .30 in Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal.

Appreciation of *diversity* also has a clear effect on the extent of group-focused enmity. The more strongly respondents reject diversity, the more likely they are to express prejudices, and vice versa. This influence was found in all the countries, but is weakest in Portugal and Poland. Social Dominance Orientation and authoritarianism have similarly strong effects on GFE. As already described in chapter 5.3, even after controlling for other indicators both *Social Dominance Orientation* and *authoritarianism* correlate strongly and positively with group-focused enmity. The more respondents support hierarchies in society and the more enthusiastic they are about discipline and punishment the more strongly they tend towards

prejudices. This effect is statistically significant in all the countries. The influence of Social Dominance Orientation is especially strong in Portugal with a beta value of .26, and weakest in Italy and Hungary with .12 and .04. The influence of authoritarianism is seen especially clearly in Poland, France and Italy with beta values exceeding .20, and is weakest in Portugal, the Netherlands and Hungary with .10.

The two value orientations of *universalism* and *security* both also have statistically significant effects on group-focused enmity. The data shows that respondents with universalist values tend to be less prejudiced. The more respondents are interested in the well-being of all and the environment, the less likely they are to express prejudices, although this effect is weak and is found largely in the western European states of Germany, Great Britain, France and the Netherlands. In Hungary, Poland, and Portugal it is even weaker and in some cases statistically insignificant. A security orientation has a similarly weak effect on group-focused enmity. Respondents who place more emphasis on security are more likely to express prejudices, but the effect is conspicuously weak in all the countries. In other words, there are many respondents who do not necessarily express more prejudices, even though they value security. This influence is clearest in Germany, and it is weakest in Great Britain and Poland (below the significance threshold in Poland).

*Anomie* has a noticeably stronger effect on group-focused enmity. The more strongly respondents report a feeling of disorientation the more likely they are to express prejudice against weak groups. This effect is found above all in Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland; it is not statistically significant in Portugal.

Finally, the extent of self-reported *religiosity* has a significant influence on group-focused enmity. Religious respondents are more likely to express prejudices than non-religious respondents, even after controlling for age, gender, education and the other surveyed value concepts. This striking effect is found in all the countries with the exception of Hungary. The influence of religiosity is particularly strong in Great Britain and the Netherlands.<sup>25</sup>

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25 The data suggests that the influence of religiosity is largely restricted to homophobia and sexism, in other words to prejudices that Christianity and other religions do not clearly disapprove of (unlike prejudices against black or poor people). Religiosity does indeed correlate most strongly with these elements of group-focused enmity ( $r = .34/.30$ ). But even if we measure GFE in the model without homophobia and sexism we still find a small positive effect of religiosity ( $\beta = .08^{**}$ ). In a departure from our earlier publication (Küpper und Zick 2010), here we report the aggregated survey values without adjusting for the relative size of the country.

To summarize, we note that ideological orientation and insecurity play a considerable role for the extent of group-focused enmity. In particular we can confirm perceived threat by immigrants, rejection of diversity, Social Dominance Orientation, authoritarianism and religiosity as important determinants of group-focused enmity. The stronger these factors are, the more likely respondents are to express prejudices against weak groups. For anomie we find a slightly smaller but still significant effect; people who feel disorientated tend more strongly to target weak groups. The values of universalism and security also play a role for the extent of group-focused enmity, but a small one. Respondents with universalistic values tend somewhat less to prejudice; respondents who particularly prioritize security somewhat more. It is also conspicuous that the influence of the factors grouped under ideological orientation, values and insecurity is fairly similar in all the countries.

In many theoretical approaches ideological orientation and general values are important determinants of prejudice and other anti-democratic attitudes. The same applies to general social disorientation and the specific feeling of threat by outgroups. Our results show that with the exception of values all these factors are relevant for group-focused enmity: Those who feel disorientated or feel threatened by immigrants, reject diversity, generally support social status hierarchies and/or share authoritarian convictions are more likely to express prejudice against weak groups. Critically, it should be noted that some of the considered concepts – especially perceived threat – are conceptually very close to prejudice. We also found that religiosity tends to foster prejudices rather than protect against them. Whereas values that emphasize universalism tend to be associated with less prejudice, the opposite applies to values prioritizing security. That said, these general values play only a subordinate role for the individual strength of group-focused enmity.

## 9.4 Economic Disadvantage

Many influential theories of conflict treat scarcity as a central cause of intergroup conflict and prejudice (for example Blalock 1957, LeVine and Campbell 1972, Sherif 1966, Olzak 1992). Some of these theories restrict themselves solely to limited, lacking or threatened resources such as water, land or income. Others emphasize the role of social comparison where hostile attitudes and behaviour arise when a person feels worse off in comparison with other individuals (Crosby 1976) or a group in comparison with other groups (Gurr 1970). The same is proposed for comparisons over time: negative attitudes may arise if a person feels they or their group is worse off than in the past, or if they fear becoming worse off in future (Redersdorff and Guimond 2006), or believe that their own situation will worsen in comparison to that of others (Runciman 1966). This feeling of disadvantage in comparison to others, to one's own expectations or to what a person believes they are entitled to is described by the term *relative deprivation*.

These conflict theories also distinguish whether or not a group is explicitly named as a real or supposed rival for scarce resources ("foreigners are stealing our jobs" versus "there are not enough jobs to go round"). In the case of material and economic disadvantage we also distinguish between objective and subjective deprivation. Objective deprivation relates to limited, threatened or lacking resources that are objectively definable, for example an income that is extremely low in absolute terms or below the country's poverty line. Subjective deprivation relates to a person's own subjective assessment of their financial situation and the feeling of being disadvantaged compared to others or to their own expectations (Pettigrew et al. 2008). The objective situation and the subjective assessment are not always identical. Individuals with a small income may not actually feel deprived (for example students) whereas others whose income is objectively considerable may see themselves as financially hard done by in comparison with richer people (Pettigrew et al. 2008).

Numerous studies have investigated the effect of economic deprivation on protests, violence and also prejudices. The findings to date underscore above all the importance of fraternal relative deprivation for the extent of prejudices: the feeling that the ingroup is worse off than an outgroup (Pettigrew et al. 2008). In the scope of the Group-focused Enmity in Germany project we were also able to demonstrate that where Germans feel relative deprivation in comparison with foreigners this not only leads to more prejudice against immigrants, but also to more prejudice against other groups too (Zick et al. 2008).

### 9.4.1 Indicators of Economic Disadvantage

In the following we first provide a brief overview of individual indicators of economic disadvantage. In the text box on “Measuring economic disadvantage” (see p. 151/152) we describe precisely how these indicators were recorded in the GFE Europe survey. At the end of the section we report the explanatory power of the indicators for group-focused enmity.

On the basis of the conflict theories outlined above we test the influence of objective and subjective indicators of economic deprivation. As an objective criterion we take personal *income*, here as net equivalent household income taking into account household size. For our indicators of *subjective economic deprivation* we asked interviewees to assess their own personal financial situation and the economic situation of their country. To assess their *outlook*, we asked interviewees how they expected their personal financial situation to develop in coming years. We also measured *relative deprivation* as individual relative deprivation (comparing the interviewee’s own financial situation with that of most compatriots) and fraternal relative deprivation (comparing the financial situation of the receiving population with that of immigrants as a group).

#### Measuring economic disadvantage

*Income:* First of all interviewees were asked about their income: “If you add up the income from all sources, what is your household total net income per month? Please stop me when I reach your level of income.” Responses were given on a 10-point scale adjusted to the general level of incomes in the country. The stated household income was divided by the (weighted) number of persons in the household, recorded by the question: “What is the total number of people living in your household, including all adults, children and yourself?” The net equivalent household income was standardized relative to the country average rather than the European average, so that in each country we have similar numbers of respondents with high and low incomes regardless of the general level of wages.

*Subjective assessment of national economy and own financial situation:* “According to you, is the economy doing very well, quite well, quite badly, very

badly"; "And how would you rate your personal financial situation?" Respondents chose again from four response categories ranging from "very good" to "very bad". Shortly before the outbreak of the financial crisis in autumn/winter 2008 almost 76 percent of all European respondents believed that the economic situation in their country was "quite bad" or "very bad". In France, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy and Portugal very many respondents shared this opinion, with figures of over 80 percent and in some cases over 90 percent. The figure was lower in Poland with 56 percent and least in the Netherlands with 40 percent. 42 percent of all European respondents said that their own financial situation was "quite bad" or "very bad", ranging from 65 percent in Hungary and 59 percent in Portugal to just under 9 percent in the Netherlands. The two assessments correlate only moderately with one another ( $r = .39$ ).

*Financial outlook:* "In the course of the next few years, do you expect your personal financial situation to improve/stay about the same/get worse?" Almost 30 percent of all European respondents said that they feared their own financial situation was set to worsen. Worries about the future were most widespread in Hungary, Portugal, France and Germany with more than 30 percent of respondents, followed by Italy with 26 percent, and in Poland, Great Britain and the Netherlands with about 20 percent.

*Relative deprivation:* To measure individual relative deprivation we asked: "If you compare your personal financial situation with that of most other [country natives], would you say that your financial situation is much better, better, roughly the same, worse or much worse?" Fraternal relative deprivation was measured using the statement: "If you compare the economic situation of most [country natives] with that of immigrants living in [country], would you say that the situation of [country natives] is much better, better, roughly the same, worse or much worse?" About 15 percent of all European respondents feel personally disadvantaged, while about 17 percent feel that the majority population is worse off than immigrants. In Poland and Hungary almost one in four feels worse off in comparison with others in the country, in the Netherlands considerably less than one in ten. In Hungary, Portugal and Great Britain about one quarter of the established feel disadvantaged in comparison with immigrants, but in France and Italy only about 8 percent.



Table 37: **Indicators of subjective economic deprivation and relative deprivation**

No.	Item	D	GB	F	NL	I	PT	PL	HU
<b>Subjective economic deprivation<sup>a</sup></b>									
1	According to you, is the economy doing...? ( <i>quite/very badly</i> )	60.5	89.8	84.0	40.0	91.6	92.4	55.6	90.5
2	And how would you rate your personal financial situation? ( <i>quite/very bad</i> )	36.4	30.3	40.3	8.7	48.4	58.9	43.0	64.7
3	In the course of the next few years, do you expect your personal financial situation to (improve/stay about the same/get worse)? ( <i>get worse</i> )	30.0	19.5	38.6	18.5	25.6	39.8	20.5	44.1
<b>Relative deprivation<sup>b</sup></b>									
4	<b>Individual:</b> If you compare your personal financial situation with that of most other [country natives], would you say that your financial situation is better/roughly the same/worse? ( <i>worse, much worse</i> )	12.8	10.7	9.4	6.8	10.8	18.7	26.6	23.8
5	<b>Fraternal:</b> If you compare the economic situation of most [country natives] with that of immigrants living in [country], would you say that the situation of [country natives] is better/roughly the same/worse? ( <i>worse, much worse</i> )	16.9	23.3	8.2	12.0	8.4	24.5	14.7	27.8

a The proportion of respondents who answered “quite bad” or “very bad” or who expect their future financial situation to get “worse”.

b The proportion of respondents who see their own financial situation or that of their non-immigrant compatriots as comparably “worse” or “much worse”.

## 9.4.2 Results for Economic Disadvantage


What influence does economic deprivation have on group-focused enmity? Here again, we controlled for the influence of age, gender and education.

Overall the indicators of economic disadvantage do not have any great explanatory power for the extent of group-focused enmity. So whether a person feels economically disadvantaged is relatively unimportant for the extent of their prejudices. In the individual countries the considered indicators relatively uniformly explain only 15 percent of the variance in the GFE scale; only in Italy is the explained share somewhat higher with 22 percent. What that means is that alongside economic disadvantage numerous other determinants must be responsible for group-focused enmity.

However, if we examine the indicators of economic disadvantage individually we find a more complex pattern. For the objective indicator of net equivalent household income we do find a negative influence on GFE: the lower respondents' income is, the more likely they are to express prejudices. This effect is especially strong in Hungary, Poland and Portugal; in France, Great Britain and Italy it is statistically insignificant after the effect of education has been removed.

Overall, economic deprivation has only a minor effect on group-focused enmity. This applies equally to a negative assessment of the national economic situation and to a negative assessment of the respondent's own economic situation. Nevertheless, respondents who have a negative assessment of one or the other are somewhat more likely to express prejudices. Examining the results for individual countries, the assessment of the country's economic situation is relevant for the extent of prejudices only in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands, and not in the other countries. Conversely, subjective personal financial situation has a clear effect on group-focused enmity in Hungary and Poland, but is irrelevant in Great Britain, the Netherlands and Portugal. In Germany and France there is even an opposing trend; the better the Germans and French assess their own economic situation the more likely they are to express prejudices. However this effect is weak, so it applies to relatively few respondents.

Figure 30: **Aspects of economic disadvantage as determinants of GFE**



### in Europe

Regression analysis. Total explanation of variance:  $R^2 = .15$  (excluding control variables age, education, gender); in the individual countries: D:  $R^2 = .14$ , GB:  $R^2 = .15$ , F:  $R^2 = .14$ , NL:  $R^2 = .15$ , I:  $R^2 = .14$ , PT:  $R^2 = .18$ , PL:  $R^2 = .22$ , HU:  $R^2 = .12$ . The higher the beta value, the stronger the variable's impact. Strongest predictors are highlighted grey.

\* Significant at the 5 percent level; \*\* significant at the 1 percent level; ns = non-significant.

In overall terms how respondents assess their future financial situation is absolutely irrelevant for the extent of group-focused enmity. The influence of future personal finances is statistically insignificant for Europe as a whole, but there are differences between the countries. In Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal there is no effect, whereas in France, Hungary and Poland we find a slight effect in the expected direction: the more pessimistic respondents are about their own financial prospects, the more likely they are to express prejudices. In Great Britain there is a significant unexpected effect in the opposite direction: the more optimistically the British see their financial future, the stronger their prejudices. In Hungary and Poland a negative assessment of either current or future personal financial situation is associated with greater prejudice.

Fraternal relative deprivation on the other hand is of considerable relevance for GFE. The more strongly respondents in Europe feel disadvantaged compared

with immigrants, the more likely they are to express prejudices. Here striking effects are observed especially in France, Great Britain, Italy and the Netherlands, while in Hungary and Poland fraternal relative deprivation has no significant effect on the extent of prejudices. The effect of individual relative deprivation on group-focused enmity is considerably smaller. Overall the effect is weak; only in Germany is it somewhat stronger.

To sum up we can say that economic disadvantage overall plays a comparatively small role for the extent of group-focused enmity. Where negative effects on group-focused enmity are found they are for income and for the feeling of being worse off than immigrants as a group. Interestingly, in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands we find a slight tendency in the opposite direction, where the better respondents assess the economic situation of their country the stronger their prejudices against weak groups.

With respect to income we feel it is also relevant to add the following: In an alternative calculation (Küpper, Zick and Wolf 2010) we also included the feeling of threat by immigrants (discussed here in chapter 9.3) along with the indicators of economic disadvantage used here in the analysis. This completely removed any effect of income on group-focused enmity. That would suggest that low income contributes to prejudice against weak groups above all when they are perceived as a threat.

Many conflict theories treat economic deprivation as a central cause of group conflicts from hostile attitudes to violent clashes. Our empirical analyses indicate that the explanatory power of economic factors is relatively limited and suggest that the form of deprivation matters. Two factors are relevant for the extent of group-focused enmity: income and the feeling that the ingroup is disadvantaged. Those who have an objectively low income are more likely to express prejudiced attitudes against weak groups, but this effect is found only in the poorer countries of Portugal, Poland and Hungary. Similarly those who feel that the majority population is disadvantaged in comparison with immigrants are also more likely to express prejudices. This factor is most relevant in countries with larger immigrant populations, and not at all in Poland and Hungary (where the feeling of individual disadvan-

tage in comparison with others contributes most to prejudice). Financial worries about the future are completely irrelevant for the extent of group-focused enmity, and subjective assessments of the personal financial situation and the national economy play only a small role. However it is striking that in the more prosperous countries of Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands an opposite tendency is found: those who are more positive about the country's economic situation tend to be more hostile towards immigrants.

## 10. Summary and Outlook

The state of a society or community is revealed above all by the quality of relations between its members. The question of integration is decisive for the countries of Europe, affecting not only immigrants, but also other groups including Muslims, Jews, dark-skinned people, women and homosexuals. For the European Union and its member states, protecting the identity of groups and enabling them to participate in the life of society are central preconditions for cohesion.

Social relations and their expression in democratic communities depend decisively on the level of equality between the various groups to which the members of society belong. This criterion of equality is anchored in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union:

*The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.*

Equality of groups is the ultimate barometer for the state of democracy. Recognizing equality means appreciating cultural diversity and difference and applying the same standards to all groups without distinction. The member states of the EU unanimously commit themselves to this in the EU treaties, but realizing this promise in everyday life is not easy and by no means automatic. Societies – at least the kind represented by the countries of Europe – are not just legal entities or top-down formations. They are composed of living groups pursuing and negotiating particular interests, values, norms and ideologies. Even where equality is enacted in law and protected as a democratic norm, it means nothing unless it is negotiated, accepted, internalized and lived by the different social groups. Democracy and equality do not emerge automatically simply by defining rules; they are the outcome of negotiating processes. Precisely for that reason they are always endangered and threatened, vulnerable to the whims of power and influence. In social and political relations, social groups distin-

guish themselves from one another to secure identities, create relationships and cohesion, preserve power and control and express trust between members.

Article 2 of the EU Treaty implies that intolerance, social prejudices and discrimination are serious threats to social cohesion and community. Prejudices that feed on a shared ideology of inequality inscribe especially deep signatures, for their destructive power is paired with an ability to create bonds and order. *Group-focused enmity* is a central instrument of identity-creation and separation. It legitimizes inequality by discrediting certain groups through generalized negative opinions and prepares the ground for the discrimination that creates and maintains group differences. *Group-focused enmity* is based on similar social motives to the concert of right-wing extremist and populist ideologies in which it plays a part. As components of group-focused enmity, prejudices are capable of creating self-esteem, trust and identity, establishing bonds, serving motives of power and control and “explaining” apparently complex social processes. In this respect the effect of prejudices is simple and effective, especially where they are not restrained or suppressed by norms. Anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism, homophobia and even racism are supported or at least tolerated in many sectors of the population.

Prejudices are the lifeblood of right-wing populism and extremism, both of which threaten social cohesion and peaceful coexistence in the European Union. Populists channel prejudice into calls for exclusion, while right-wing extremists take their prejudices further and often propagate ideologies of violence against those seen as “foreign” or “different”. Populism barks, but extremism bites. Both currents draw on and create prejudices.

These developments can be observed in all the countries of the European Union. Where it succeeds in concealing its violent leanings, right-wing populism makes relatively successful use of prejudices by playing on people’s existing concerns and fears. Populism seeks to draw in people whose need for belonging, self-esteem, trust, control and understanding can no longer be satisfied by politics, parties and mainstream institutions, using prejudices that apparently satisfy these needs. We currently see this happening most of all in extremist (and mainstream) discourses that inflame and stoke anti-Muslim attitudes and thus allow the Union to slide to the right. As our data shows, this mechanism also possesses traction in relation to other facets of group-focused enmity, such as anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, sexism and homophobia.

Prejudices against the different target groups of group-focused enmity are linked to one another and share a common core that we identify as an ideology of inequality. This group-related generalized hostility endangers democracy and inscribes its signatures into conflicts and violence. If prejudices – often traded as fact – are accepted rather than combated in the European Union intolerance is likely to increase. The extent of prejudice in a society is therefore an indicator not only of extremism, but also of the failure of established democratic forces.

The present study uncovers one excerpt of this extreme reality. Although only a small section of a much broader picture, it is an important one in the history of European mentality and democratic consciousness. The study documents some of the groups targeted by prejudice, the form these prejudices take, who espouses them, and where in Europe they are most widespread. In other words, it supplies us with a picture of the extent of prejudice in selected European countries.

In conclusion we would like to reiterate the central aspects of inequality uncovered by our data and highlight empirical observations of significance for the political debate. Our efforts to initiate a discussion about prejudiced and extreme right-wing ideologies that transcends the national borders of Europe are guided by two central questions: Where does inequality lurk in the majority societies of Europe? And what strategies and measures are appropriate for tackling it?

## 10.1 Inequalities

If we review the most important findings of the study, we can identify groups and contexts that pose a particular danger to democracy. We review these below, and consider what questions they provoke for future European discussion.

First of all, we must note that the developments we observe in the investigated countries are the same ones we have already been observing for some time in Germany. With respect to the norm of equality, the social centre is eroding in the surveyed countries. In all the countries concerned, group-focused enmity is not just a problem of the margins; it extends far into the centre. Even after many years of immigration, generalized negative opinions about *immigrants* and “people from migrant communities” are very widespread in Europe. Despite the long history of immigration and the objectively small immigrant population the idea that “we” are being “swamped” still has a great deal of sup-



port. Willingness to exclude immigrants is strong, as expressed especially in a tendency to support immigration restrictions. This applies least to the Dutch respondents, and also in Italy the atmosphere – at least as reflected in individual attitudes towards immigration – is better than in other countries. Nonetheless, in all the surveyed countries many people are open to mobilization in favour of discrimination and immigration restrictions, despite migration and coexistence with immigrants being a fact of European life.

Europe must ask why successful everyday coexistence has so far had so little impact on attitudes towards immigrants? Why has the possibility of intercultural contact not been enough to erode persistent prejudice?

Populists and extremists see the answer to these questions in the migrants' own unwillingness to integrate (implying to assimilate). But this one-sided opinion fails to recognize that intercultural relations depend on the will and possibilities of all involved. The distance inherent in such emotionally charged attitudes is large. But integration is a mutual process that depends not only on the attitudes and behaviour of immigrants but also on the acceptance and participation of the majority society (Zick 2010a). Where the majority society fails to recognize the minority's achievements and willingness to integrate, the results are fatal. So it is worrying that the majority society in Europe, to judge by the attitudes we have uncovered, exhibits great distance and little recognition.

As far as *anti-Muslim attitudes* are concerned, the boundaries between countries and cultures blur: this prejudice is more or less evenly distributed across Europe. The findings presented here and in other studies reveal an astonishing extent of distance, suspicion and mistrust towards Muslims and Islam in Europe. The generalized suspicion against Islam that fosters prejudice cannot be explained by the numbers of Muslims. Anti-Muslim attitudes exist without Muslims. In fact, also in the eastern European countries, where the number of Muslims is negligible, prejudice against Muslims is quite prevalent. That is the power of prejudice: it exists even in the absence of contact with the group against which it is directed. Especially where information about the group is rejected and contact avoided, there is no real experience that could refute the prejudice.

That is not itself new, but for Europe another hefty problem looms over future relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Our data shows with incontestable clarity that religious difference – the accusation that Islam is a religion of

intolerance – is exceedingly prevalent. A large majority, especially in Germany and Poland, also believe that Islam is incompatible with their own culture.

The example of anti-Muslim attitudes demonstrates very well how prejudice can be politically charged and seeded. As our anti-Muslim attitudes scale shows, prejudice against Islam and Muslims is made up of individual opinions that mutually confirm and justify each other. On their own, each of the items we presented to interviewees might not even appear to represent proper prejudice (see chapter 4.4); for example the statement that “Muslims’ attitudes towards women contradict our values”, with which very many people in all the countries agree. But respondents frequently associate other negative and prejudiced opinions about Islam with the individual statements, and these together distil into prejudice. Tracing the dynamics of the process that entwines individual statements into prejudice will require further qualitative analyses and the application of other methods. All the same, the opinion scales by which we observe attitudes point to consistent and uniform anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim constellations.

*Anti-Semitism* has a long and uniquely terrible history in Europe. The German surveys that we have been conducting at regular intervals since 2002, as well as studies in other European countries that have a different history of anti-Semitism, demonstrate that anti-Semitism is an important component of group-focused enmity. It is particularly conspicuous in the eastern European countries. In all European countries a shift appears to have occurred from traditional anti-Semitism to secondary anti-Semitism. In Germany, Italy and the eastern European countries a reversal of perpetrator and victim is observed alarmingly frequently; many respondents agree with the accusation that “Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era”. The data also shows anti-Semitism often appearing in the guise of criticism of Israel. Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel comes close to majority support in all European countries. If this observation is any measure of Europeans’ attitudes to Israel, then we must conclude that perceptions of Israel are coloured by anti-Semitism. In that context we also need to discuss whether secondary anti-Semitism – refusal to acknowledge the crimes of the holocaust – has taken the place of traditional anti-Semitism.

Our findings also identify two elements that are less controversially discussed these days as empirical components of the group-focused enmity syndrome. Here we are talking about sexism and *old-fashioned* racism. The study shows

that a form of old-fashioned *sexism* involving support for traditional role divisions continues to enjoy widespread support in Europe. The question of the dissemination of modern forms of sexism remains unanswered. This applies for example to the strong emphasis on individual freedom, which overlooks the impact of discriminatory norms and structures.

Blatant biological *racism*, as manifested in the rejection of marriage between black and white people, is less widespread in Europe. But the cultural version of racism, for example claiming that particular cultures are less talented, is alarmingly widespread. Surprisingly many people also believe in a natural hierarchy between black people and white, especially in eastern Europe. A majority in Portugal and almost a majority in Poland believe that their culture must be protected from the influence of other cultures. This attitude, which covertly claims cultural superiority for the nation, has the potential to cause grave difficulties and slow the development of a multicultural Europe. Our analysis of racism shows that citizens are exceptionally reticent about accepting other and supposedly “foreign” cultures.

*Prejudice against homosexuals (homophobia)* runs counter to equality too. Prejudices against homosexuals, characterized by a charge of immorality and an intention to discriminate, are widespread, especially in eastern Europe. This is less the case in western Europe, possibly because the fight against anti-homosexual opinions has a longer history. The data suggests that the attitudes found in eastern Europe today resemble those that existed in western Europe a few years ago.

Our findings show a strong *East-West difference* in the general prejudice syndrome measured by the GFE Index. Although in the countries of eastern Europe the individual elements are less strongly connected to one another than they are in western Europe, we can still demonstrate a linked syndrome of group-focused enmity there. In the countries of eastern Europe the overall strength of group-focused enmity is greater than in western Europe. Despite differences in the degree of prejudice against specific minorities, the composition of the syndrome is similar across the board.

The prejudices studied here, which we understand as components of the group-focused enmity syndrome, are but one facet of intolerant and anti-democratic mentalities. Prejudice is a tool that creates and cements inequality. Group-focused enmity is also closely bound up with other ideologies. Our cross-cultural

analyses show that people with a specific triangular ideology pattern are especially susceptible to prejudiced attitudes. Europeans who reject cultural, religious and ethnic diversity and have higher Social Dominance Orientation (meaning that they fundamentally support social hierarchies in society and thus espouse an ideology of inequality) are especially likely to agree with prejudiced statements. The same applies to Europeans with an authoritarian orientation (who call for submissiveness and obedience to authority and lean towards punitive law-and-order). It is this triangular ideological formation of *authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of diversity* that in all the countries predisposes respondents to prejudice. Punitive, authoritarian opinions find great agreement in all the surveyed countries, and Social Dominance Orientation is also relatively widespread, but where support for cultural homogeneity is concerned we find great differences between the countries. The study clearly shows that reducing such ideological convictions, or creating a climate that is inconducive to authoritarian and dominance-oriented views and accepting of cultural, ethnic and religious diversity, can protect against unthinking agreement with prejudices. That is an important pointer for intervention and prevention.

Our *demographic analyses* indicate which groups prevention and intervention measures most need to reach: older people, people with less education, people in eastern European countries, people with low economic status and people with a politically conservative orientation. The analyses show that group-focused enmity and the triangular ideology pattern that promotes it are thus not a marginal phenomenon but an issue at the *centre of European society*.

According to our findings the centre is interested in politics but not necessarily active and feels very powerless politically. If we refer to the surveyed *attitudes to politics*, and regard them cautiously as an indicator of democratic potential, we find a worrying relationship. The extent of subjective lack of influence on politics is very great across all the countries. The indicators of lack of political participation, whether as perception or as intention to become involved, correlate with group-focused enmity in almost all the countries. This is also associated with negative attitudes to the European Union, a lack of political interest, a feeling of powerlessness and the desire for a strong national leader. These relationships are potentially important for political discourse and integration in the political sphere. They reflect the way group-focused enmity can express a political stance or disinterest (or positive ignorance) that it is associated with the subjective feeling of lack of participation and with detachment from the established political system. The latter especially hampers efforts to

enhance equality, because right-wing populist and extremist groups are able to appeal to political dissatisfaction as well as prejudice. In other words, if citizens' political orientations can no longer be integrated within the political system (or citizens no longer find a place in the established political system for their orientations) then not only is prejudice close at hand, as the correlations show, but also openness to extremist political groups. That at least is our fear.

This cutting of political ties, which is only hinted at in the data and requires more thorough research, is reflected in attitudes towards integration and unwillingness to grant concessions on naturalization. A survey of the kind conducted here is unsuited to measuring actual political activity, and is restricted to empirically recording (behavioural) intentions towards groups and systems. Rejection of rights for immigrants and its relationship to anti-immigrant attitudes and anti-Muslim attitudes suggest, however, that attitudes can also lead to political intentions.

This is supported by the strongly attitude-based *discriminatory intentions* that are particularly conspicuous in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands. Even if prejudiced attitudes are less prevalent in these countries than in eastern Europe, many people there would prefer not to send their child to a school attended by many immigrant children or move to an area where many immigrants live. It is difficult to avoid the impression that group-focused enmity in certain western European countries expresses itself less in open hostile prejudice and more in social distancing. That shows how strongly these sentiments are rooted in the centre of European society.

## 10.2 Analysis, Prevention and Intervention

Although this is not a prevention or intervention study, it does identify relevant aspects with implications for action against intolerance and extreme right-wing ideologies. In particular, it allows the political discourse about desirable prevention and intervention measures to be conducted with greater clarity and based on scientific evidence. In the following we would like to raise a number of aspects that we consider relevant to the discussion. Ideally they would be taken up by political parties and institutions strong enough to establish norms against prejudice.

First of all we appeal emphatically for the European Union to commission continuous scientifically independent *monitoring* of right-wing extremist and

populist opinions and intentions across Europe. The existing institutions and instruments conducting monitoring are unable to supply precise and comparable data. If we are to gain a proper basis for discussion and action we will require considerably more facts about where, how and why ideologies, opinions and intentions develop and consolidate in the countries of Europe.

Our results paint a picture of the existence of prejudices, but also document the concerns and fears of European majority populations. Populists are always demanding that the fears of the populace be taken seriously (by which they mean exclusion, discrimination and harsh measures against minorities). To take these fears and concerns seriously means acknowledging the threat they pose to a democracy built on tolerance and pluralism. They must be tackled by reducing mutual fears and suspicions rather than demanding stricter laws against minorities. Here we need European initiatives for intervention and prevention rather than a simple law-and-order populism that adheres to the power of blind obedience. A precise analysis of citizens' fears reveals the potential and danger of intolerance in Europe and shows where coexistence of majorities and minorities can be improved.

It would appear to us that neither the *European Social Survey* nor the Eurobarometer is equipped for the task, because their ability to reveal prejudiced tendencies and their causes and consequences is limited. That is not their primary purpose anyway. Nor can our study provide anything more than the basis for a *monitoring* operation. Politics needs facts and evidence as the basis for action, and political responses should be based on singular evidence that is not methodologically comparable across countries. We already have broadly comparable data concerning crimes and acts of discrimination (for example from the *European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights*). What is needed is clarity about the prejudiced opinions, emotions, intentions and norms that encourage such acts. These opinions are also what moves people to give their vote to right-wing populist and extremist parties.

Secondly we appeal to those involved in intervention and prevention to take the facts seriously. Politicians in particular must urgently translate these into social practice. Since the surveyed European countries share many identical causes for prejudiced attitudes it would be obvious to take joint European action to combat group-focused enmity. Fundamentally we can distinguish between two groups of causes: *individual causes* which bind people to groups and describe an individual collective disposition, and *contextual causes* located in circumstances outside the individual.

The individual causes include the aforementioned triangular ideology of authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and rejection of cultural diversity. People whose socialization leads them to adopt these convictions are more likely to take on board right-wing extremist and populist opinions. We observe this in almost all the European countries. This can be the point of departure for joint efforts to establish attitudes that are positive about equality. In order to promote equality we need more acceptance of cultural difference (rather than rejection of multiculturalism), less authoritarian attitudes and behaviour and more support for horizontal rather than vertical structures in society. A country where a majority of citizens challenge cultural diversity may be able to learn from others where this works better. And they in turn could ask themselves how they could better communicate their belief in diversity.

Although we still lack adequate data on the influence of the macro-social context, the present study has been able to identify certain contextual factors that apparently favour prejudiced attitudes. According to our findings, the main contextual conditions that make people susceptible to prejudiced opinions are a low level of education, low income in a low-income region and a culture where prejudices as a whole are more widespread (as is partly the case in eastern Europe).

Individual disposition, opinions and emotions are less decisive for prejudice as a whole. Prejudice is a *social* stance adopted by groups towards other groups. It is influenced by the environment of prejudice-bearers out of which these socially shaped negative opinions about groups emerge. This is also supported by the potentials and dangers we identify in the political orientation of respondents. So European political education is of great importance. According to our findings, citizens are not politically disinterested but feel subjectively detached from the political system. Many complain of a sense of political powerlessness, frequently associated with fears and worries about issues including immigration. The dissatisfied seek a hearing, but they are unlikely to find it in the established political system that they blame for their powerlessness.

Gains made by right-wing populism show that citizens no longer direct their ire against the established political system, but blame immigrants, Muslims and other minorities. Political detachment melds with prejudice to create an ideological mixture that is poison for democracy. It comes as no surprise that European identity alone is not enough to prevent hostile discriminatory intentions. Europeans' great pessimism about the prospects for intercultural coex-

istence will hamper efforts to integrate all citizens in individual countries and across the European Union.

Our results demonstrate the importance of intervention and prevention strategies for combating group-focused enmity directed against “the others”. Questions of democratic process in groups should be taken seriously, calls for political participation need to be acknowledged and considered in the political discourse. However, in all cases, the process of social negotiation must be conditional on tolerance and the acceptance of diversity – if necessary with explicit reminders.

Our concluding appeal is to make equality a central topos in Europe. We will continue to do our part, monitoring and analysing the development of prejudiced, intolerant and anti-democratic mentalities in Europe to identify where political education can have most impact. Studies such this one hold up a mirror to us Europeans, showing us as we really are with respect to prejudice and exclusion of groups. We hope that what we see there will spur efforts to build a more democratic and tolerant Europe.



# Appendix

Anti-immigrant attitudes								
There are too many immigrants in country .								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	20.7	16.3	29.8	30.8	26.6	14.8	8.3	4.9
3 = somewhat agree	29.3	24.0	32.4	27.9	35.8	31.2	18.8	54.7
2 = somewhat disagree	35.5	34.6	22.7	27.9	19.7	35.5	52.1	35.7
1 = strongly disagree	14.4	25.2	15.1	13.4	17.8	18.5	20.8	4.7
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	971	996	976	903	942	1003	912	968
Because of the number of immigrants, I sometimes feel like a stranger in country .								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	15.2	16.1	18.9	18.4	9.8	12.4	5.4	1.8
3 = somewhat agree	22.4	14.8	26.9	26.2	17.2	25.3	14.1	17.3
2 = somewhat disagree	39.1	29.0	26.2	26.7	28.8	34.6	45.0	66.2
1 = strongly disagree	23.3	40.1	27.9	28.6	44.2	27.7	35.5	14.7
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	991	1003	993	950	995	1005	934	981
When jobs are scarce, country natives should have more rights to a job than immigrants.								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	20.5	13.2	23.4	50.4	31.0	7.0	44.5	11.4
3 = somewhat agree	21.9	16.3	26.9	20.7	25.0	17.7	29.5	46.8
2 = somewhat disagree	37.2	26.6	32.7	16.5	23.6	39.9	17.8	37.9
1 = strongly disagree	20.5	43.9	17.0	12.3	20.5	35.5	8.1	4.0
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	985	992	978	972	958	998	991	973
Immigrants enrich our culture. <i>reverse coded</i>								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
1 = strongly agree	26.7	26.9	21.7	21.0	15.3	20.2	14.8	7.4
2 = somewhat agree	48.3	44.0	49.5	36.0	45.7	54.6	49.4	66.3

Anti-immigrant attitudes								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
3 = somewhat disagree	20.5	21.2	20.0	24.8	23.7	18.6	26.8	24.9
4 = strongly disagree	4.5	8.0	8.8	18.2	15.3	6.5	9.0	1.4
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	994	997	977	928	961	1005	936	971
Racism								
There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.								
F: There is no natural hierarchy between black and white people. <i>reverse coded</i>								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	9.5	40.0	8.3	19.9	5.6	4.4	9.0	3.9
3 = somewhat agree	21.0	21.5	26.3	21.9	13.1	28.0	32.6	41.1
2 = somewhat disagree	27.9	19.6	27.3	33.2	16.1	22.5	33.1	43.9
1 = strongly disagree	41.6	19.0	38.1	25.0	65.2	45.1	25.3	11.1
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	983	987	966	872	970	998	936	959
Preferably blacks and whites should not get married.								
F: It's no problem if blacks and whites get married. <i>reverse coded</i>								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	6.5	68.1	4.5	16.6	3.4	.8	8.0	2.0
3 = somewhat agree	7.0	18.3	6.1	13.7	4.1	3.9	15.5	15.9
2 = somewhat disagree	26.9	7.6	19.3	24.4	16.8	19.4	35.1	57.6
1 = strongly disagree	59.6	6.0	70.1	45.3	75.7	75.9	41.3	24.4
N (weighted dataset)	977	1001	991	895	961	1008	941	982
Anti-Semitism								
ews have too much influence in country .								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	9.9	11.6	3.6	43.2	3.4	1.4	20.3	1.0
3 = somewhat agree	9.7	16.1	10.3	26.0	17.8	4.2	29.6	18.9
2 = somewhat disagree	56.7	43.1	54.1	18.5	42.3	56.2	38.0	74.8
1 = strongly disagree	23.6	29.1	32.0	12.2	36.4	38.2	12.1	5.3
N (weighted dataset)	929	942	912	778	783	960	883	767

Racism								
ews in general do not care about anything or anyone but their own kind.								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	11.0	10.7	5.8	27.3	8.9	5.1	22.0	4.8
3 = somewhat agree	18.4	15.1	16.7	23.7	18.1	15.4	34.9	49.4
2 = somewhat disagree	46.0	33.8	34.7	26.0	31.2	43.3	31.2	41.7
1 = strongly disagree	24.6	40.4	42.9	23.1	41.9	36.2	11.9	4.1
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	912	938	935	808	826	959	867	820
ews enrich our culture. <i>reverse coded</i>								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
1 = strongly agree	23.9	19.6	19.5	25.5	14.3	15.7	14.7	3.8
2 = somewhat agree	45.0	41.0	52.0	31.7	35.4	56.1	36.5	48.1
3 = somewhat disagree	25.1	25.3	24.5	21.7	29.1	22.7	34.2	44.3
4 = strongly disagree	6.1	14.1	4.0	21.0	21.2	5.5	14.6	3.8
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	951	958	926	821	783	963	919	819
ews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era.								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	22.9	13.4	5.4	39.1	9.4	3.9	30.2	4.9
3 = somewhat agree	26.0	19.0	16.4	28.9	30.8	13.4	42.0	47.2
2 = somewhat disagree	32.3	38.4	39.4	17.2	24.0	41.2	22.7	43.9
1 = strongly disagree	18.8	29.2	38.8	14.7	35.8	41.6	5.1	3.9
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	969	948	948	779	883	986	922	836
Anti-Muslim attitudes								
The Muslim culture fits well into country Europe . and -uro e								
	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	3.3	11.7	5.9	8.3	3.0	3.7	2.4	4.7
3 = somewhat agree	13.3	38.2	33.1	21.9	24.4	35.0	16.6	45.4
2 = somewhat disagree	60.0	38.7	39.3	28.3	47.5	41.5	56.9	43.6
1 = strongly disagree	23.3	11.5	21.7	41.5	25.0	19.8	24.1	6.3
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	964	949	929	767	877	979	882	819

## Anti-Muslim attitudes

There are too many Muslims in country Europe . and -uro e

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	18.4	17.2	20.5	28.0	20.5	13.3	17.6	2.5
3 = somewhat agree	27.6	19.0	24.2	32.7	29.2	28.3	29.5	24.6
2 = somewhat disagree	43.5	37.2	36.1	24.2	30.5	39.1	46.5	66.8
1 = strongly disagree	10.4	26.6	19.2	15.1	19.8	19.3	6.4	6.1
(weighted dataset)	923	917	910	516	792	966	736	706

Muslims are too demanding.

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	24.9	26.2	20.2	29.2	28.2	18.0	22.6	1.1
3 = somewhat agree	29.2	26.6	29.8	30.8	36.5	33.8	39.7	33.3
2 = somewhat disagree	38.6	33.2	34.8	21.3	19.7	37.5	31.3	59.2
1 = strongly disagree	7.3	13.9	15.2	18.7	15.6	10.7	6.4	6.3
(weighted dataset)	912	920	925	599	879	974	762	748

## Homophobia

There is nothing immoral about homosexuality. reverse coded

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
1 = strongly agree	39.3	41.1	36.4	15.6	28.1	53.2	11.2	7.3
2 = somewhat agree	22.6	22.8	26.4	16.7	29.4	30.3	13.0	48.6
3 = somewhat disagree	23.0	18.7	16.9	19.7	19.9	9.7	26.3	33.5
4 = strongly disagree	15.0	17.5	20.4	48.0	22.7	6.8	49.4	10.5
(weighted dataset)	971	992	977	876	914	994	945	933

It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women. reverse coded

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
1 = strongly agree	34.5	24.4	27.4	13.9	16.0	51.5	2.6	5.1
2 = somewhat agree	25.8	23.3	30.4	16.8	19.8	31.6	9.2	32.5
3 = somewhat disagree	19.1	20.8	13.9	14.0	15.5	7.5	26.0	36.4
4 = strongly disagree	20.7	31.5	28.2	55.3	48.7	9.4	62.2	26.0
(weighted dataset)	986	1002	976	911	965	998	973	940

## Sexism

### Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	22.0	31.3	18.7	69.2	31.8	12.8	57.6	15.6
3 = somewhat agree	30.7	25.7	34.5	19.2	31.4	23.6	29.6	52.3
2 = somewhat disagree	25.8	21.7	20.4	6.1	15.1	25.6	7.6	26.0
1 = strongly disagree	21.5	21.2	26.4	5.5	21.7	38.0	5.2	6.2
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	989	1002	977	943	980	998	981	979

### When jobs are scarce, men should have more rights to a job than women.

	D	F	GB	HU	I	NL	PL	PT
4 = strongly agree	5.7	7.3	7.0	22.1	8.2	5.8	14.7	4.7
3 = somewhat agree	6.3	5.7	8.0	13.9	12.8	9.1	14.0	20.5
2 = somewhat disagree	30.8	21.0	19.4	23.8	19.1	22.8	36.2	52.0
1 = strongly disagree	57.2	66.1	65.7	40.2	59.9	62.3	35.1	22.8
<i>(weighted dataset)</i>	992	1001	992	969	983	1011	972	1001

# Glossary

**Beta coefficient:** Indicates the share of explained variance, i.e. the relative influence of one particular influencing factor on a variable (such as prejudice) in comparison to the other measured influencing factors (see variance analysis). For example, the beta coefficients tell us whether the prejudice varies between respondents more in connection with the strength of authoritarianism or more with Social Dominance Orientation.

**CATI Survey:** For a Computer Assisted Telephone Interview (unlike a Computer Assisted Personal Interview; CAPI), the interviewer does not meet the interviewee in person, which saves time and money. The results are available immediately in digital form.

**Correlation:** A measure of the closeness of the linear relationship between two constructs or factors (variables). A correlation has a value between -1 and +1, where 0 means no relationship, -1 a perfect negative relationship and +1 a perfect positive relationship. Concretely, a positive relationship between A and B means that as the value of variable A increases so the value of variable B. Conversely, a negative correlation means that as the value of variable A increases the value of variable B decreases. If two factors do not correlate there is no relationship between them. A correlation must be statistically significant. Interpretation is restricted to the existence of a relationship and allows no conclusions to be made about causality.

**Cronbach's alpha:** See "Reliability".

**Explained variance  $R^2$ :** This value indicates what percentage of the variance in an investigated phenomenon (e.g. prejudice) is explained by a particular factor (independent variable, e.g. authoritarianism).

**Factor analysis:** Factor analysis reduces dimensions to discover structures; put simply it is an attempt to form factors by grouping several items together. For example, from the six elements of the GFE syndrome (anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-Semitism, racism, anti-Muslim attitudes, sexism, homophobia) we attempted to find a shared factor that expresses the GFE syndrome (corresponding with the "shared part" of the six elements. An eigenvalue and an

explained variance value indicate what proportion of total variance is explained by a factor. In our example the GFE syndrome is understood as the cause for the arising connections of the six elements.

**GFE Project:** A long-term survey on group-focused enmity in Germany initiated in 2002, which gave rise to the GFE Europe project (Group-Focused Enmity in Europe) documented here. For further details see <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/gmf/einfuehrung.html>.

**Gini index:** The Gini index or Gini coefficient is a statistical measure of distribution. It is used primarily as an indicator of income or wealth distribution within countries (economic inequality). The value of the index ranges from 0 (income/wealth equally distributed among all citizens) to 1 (one citizen receives all income or wealth). So the closer the Gini index is to 1 the greater the inequality.

**Item:** An item is the smallest unit in a questionnaire, an individual statement, question or task. In our case these were statements to which responses were given on a scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree".

**Post-hoc test:** General term for tests conducted after omnibus tests over several groups (e.g. variance analysis) have confirmed significance. Post-hoc tests are used above all to explore data and when no hypotheses were formulated before a general test. Post-hoc tests may only be conducted when the preceding general test has confirmed significance, because the general test examines all the groups at the same time and therefore has greater overall validity. In this study we used Duncan's post-hoc test because it focuses on individual error probability.

**Regression analysis:** Regression analysis predicts one factor (variable) in terms of another. Here one factor is chosen as the independent variable that influences another factor (the dependent variable). This method shows what kind of influence one factor has on another and how strong the relationship is. In contrast to correlations, regression analysis is often interpreted causally by assuming the independent variable (e.g. age) to be causal for the dependent variable (e.g. prejudice). Strictly speaking, regression analysis performed on cross-sectional data cannot demonstrate causality.

**Reliability:** Reliability indicates the internal consistency of two or more items, i.e. whether all items measure the same construct. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  (alpha) is the

standard method for estimating the reliability of a scale. The standard convention is that values  $< .50$  indicate inadequate reliability, values  $> .50$  adequate reliability. The coefficient also depends on the number of items, because the use of more items leads to a higher value regardless of the fit of the scale.

**Significance/statistically significant:** Even if there is a difference between the means of two groups, the difference is not necessarily statistically significant. We must always test whether they could have arisen through coincidence by investigating the probability that the difference in values is indeed caused by real differences between the two groups. Here we calculate the probability that these differences are actually random (which would mean that the difference was falsely interpreted as significant). For a difference to be classified as statistically significant the error probability must be less than 5 percent. Error probability is also indicated in decimal figures. The usual thresholds are less than 5 percent ( $p < .05$ ), less than 1 percent ( $p < .01$ ) or less than 0.1 percent ( $p < .001$ ). Different test methods are used to calculate statistical significance depending on the type of difference (for example a difference between means or between frequencies).

**Variance:** Variance is calculated as the sum of the squared deviation of all individual measured values from the mean divided by the number of measured values. Generally a particular group of respondents is described in terms of their mean, for example the mean strength of prejudice in one country or age group. This mean will describe the group more or less well depending on how strongly the individual values differ from the mean. The average deviation of individual values from the mean is known as the standard deviation. The higher the standard deviation, the worse the mean describes the actual characteristics of the group. Because variance is calculated using the square of the deviation it is more sensitive to the effect of individual large deviations.

**Variance analysis:** Variance analysis examines the influence of one (univariate) or several (multivariate) factors on one or more dependent variables. For example, the influence of the factor of experience of deprivation on the dependent variable of prejudice could be investigated using variance analysis. The result indicates how much of the deviation from the mean is caused by one or more other factors; in this case, whether the factor of experience of deprivation explains higher or lower values for prejudice. The value for explained variance indicates in percent how much of this deviation is explained by the examined factor.



# Abbreviations

<b>D</b>	Germany
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>F</b>	France
<b>GB</b>	Great Britain
<b>GFE</b>	Group-focused enmity
<b>HU</b>	Hungary
<b>I</b>	Italy
<b>NL</b>	Netherlands
<b>ns</b>	non-significant
<b>PL</b>	Poland
<b>PT</b>	Portugal
<b>SDO</b>	Social Dominance Orientation

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# The Work of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung for Democracy and against Right-Wing Extremism



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## Publications



Decker, Oliver; Brähler, Elmar: Vom Rand zur Mitte. Rechtsextreme Einstellungen und ihre Einflussfaktoren in Deutschland. Hrsg. von der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Forum Berlin. Berlin 2006.



Decker, Oliver; Rothe, Katharina; Weißmann, Marliese, Geißler, Norman/ Brähler, Elmar: Ein Blick in die Mitte. Zur Entstehung rechtsextremer und demokratischer Einstellungen. Hrsg. von der Friedrich-Ebert- Stiftung, Forum Berlin. Berlin 2008



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