

CIVILIZATION VERSUS BARBARISM

**The Images of Arabs and Muslims & the National Self-Concepts
in German and U.S. Print Media around 9/11**

von

Romy Wöhlert

Dissertation eingereicht zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades (Dr. phil.)

der Fakultät für Soziologie

Universität Bielefeld

Gutachter

Prof. Dr. Günter Albrecht, Universität Bielefeld

Prof. Dr. Mathias Bös, Philipps-Universität Marburg

2007

Die vorliegende Dissertation wurde bei der Fakultät für Soziologie der Universität Bielefeld im August 2007 eingereicht. Das Promotionsverfahren wurde am 19. Dezember 2007 erfolgreich mit der Disputation abgeschlossen.

Gedruckt auf holz- und säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier °° ISO 9706.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
I. THE STATE OF RESEARCH	11
1. German and American National Self Perceptions	11
2. Arab and Muslim Mass Media Images	18
2.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media	18
2.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media	23
2.3. The Media Image of Islam	30
3. Conclusion: Open Questions & Research Aims	34
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WESTERN RATIONAL PRINCIPLES & THE CONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND OTHERNESS	37
1. The Worldwide Diffusion of Western Rational Principles	37
1.1. The Neo-Institutional World Polity Approach	38
1.2. Mass Media as a Communication Platform for Western Principles and National Collectivity	44
2. A Taken-for-Granted Myth: The Distinction of Occident and Orient	48
2.1. Geographical and Cultural Dimensions of the Terms “Orient” and “Occident”	49
2.2. Research on the Western Perception of the Orient	51
2.3. The Oriental Image Today: A Taken-for-Granted Myth	54
3. The Construction of a Collective Self and Otherness	58
3.1. Why do We Need a Collective Self Image?	60
3.2. Why do We Need the Other?	62
3.3. The Self/Other Nexus as a Boundary-Formation Process	67
4. Conclusion: Basic Theoretical Assumptions and Guiding Research Questions	69
III. DATA SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODS	73
1. Data Sample of the Media Analysis	73
1.1. Media Selection and Survey Period	73
1.2. Definition of the Research Sample	76
2. The Quantifying Qualitative Content Analysis	77
2.1. Quantitative Analysis of Formal Characteristics and Occurring Actors	78
2.2. Qualitative Content Analysis of Actor Images	80
3. The Formation of an Actor Typology	83
3.1. General Remarks on the Typological Analysis	83
3.2. The Analysis of Empirical Regularities	83
3.3. Characterization of the Actor Types	85

IV.	OCCURRING ARABS AND MUSLIMS AND THEIR MEDIAL CONTEXT	87
1.	Relevance of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media	88
2.	Focused Topics and Countries	91
	2.1. Countries of Reference and Topics before 9/11	92
	2.2. Countries of Reference and Topics after 9/11	99
3.	Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media – A Cross Section through Society	108
	3.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media	109
	3.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media	120
4.	Conclusion: The Medial Settings for Arabs and Muslims, Their Composition and Their Quantitative Relevance	122
V.	THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WEST AND ARABS AND MUSLIMS	125
1.	The Political Dimension	127
2.	The Cultural Dimension	130
3.	The Personal Dimension	133
4.	The Social and Economic Dimension	135
5.	The Aspect of Delinquency	138
6.	Conclusion: Western Principles and German and U.S. Self Images that Shape the Images of Arabs and Muslims	140
VI.	HOW DIFFERENT IS THE OTHER? – TYPES OF ACTORS AND LEVELS OF DIFFERENCE	145
1.	Types of Actors & Levels of Difference: An Overview	145
2.	Level 1: The Devaluated Other	147
	2.1. Type 1: Gunmen, Terrorists & <i>Hostile</i> Politicians	148
	2.2. Type 2: The Culturally <i>Backward</i> and <i>Fundamentalist</i> Other	153
	2.3. Type 3: The Politically Devaluated Other	157
	2.4. Type 4: The <i>Poor</i> and <i>Underdeveloped</i> Other	160
	2.5. Type 5: The <i>Wealthy</i> Political Elite	164
	2.6. Type 6: The Villain	166
	Summary: The Devaluated Other	171
3.	Level 2: The <i>Weak</i> Other	173
	3.1. Type 7: The Victim	173
	3.2. Type 8: The Weakened <i>Western-Oriented</i> Other	182
	Summary: The <i>Weak</i> Other	188
4.	Level 3: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	189
	4.1. Type 9: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	190
	4.2. Type 10: The Strategically Used Other and The Western Ambivalence	200
	Summary: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	212

5.	Level 4: The Self Within the Other	213
	5.1. Type 11: The Role Model Other	214
	5.2. Type 12: The Unchallenged Alliance After 9/11	218
	5.3. Type 13: The Political Critic of the West	220
	Summary: The Self within the Other	223
6.	Level 5: When the Other Enters the Western Space	225
	6.1. Type 14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other	226
	6.2. Type 15: The <i>Peaceful</i> Arab and Muslim Communities	230
	6.3. Type 16: The Murderers among Us	232
	6.4. Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West	239
	Summary: When the Other Enters the Western Space	241
7.	Conclusion: Distance and Similarities between Self and Other	243
VII.	FINAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION	253
1.	The German and U.S. Worldview and Self-Perception	254
2.	The Perception of the Arab and Muslim Other	259
3.	The Boundary between Self and Other: How Difference Is Constructed	263
4.	Benefits and Limits of the Study	272
	WHY WE ARE NOT ABLE TO UNMAKE DIFFERENCE	277
	References	279

FIGURES AND TABLES

Table III.1:	Overview of the Research Sample	77
Table IV.1:	Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors before 9/11	89
Table IV.2:	Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors after 9/11	90
Table IV.3:	Numbers of External and Internal Actors in German and U.S. Print Media	109
Table IV.4:	Composition of Occurring External Actors	110
Table IV.5:	Quantitative Occurrence of External Actor Groups	111
Table IV.6:	Composition of Occurring Internal Actors	120
Table IV.7:	Quantitative Occurrence of Internal Actor Groups	121
Table VI.1:	The Devaluated Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance	148
Table VI.2:	The <i>Weak</i> Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance	173
Table VI.3:	The <i>Strategic</i> Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance	189
Table VI.4:	The Self Within the Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance	214
Table VI.5:	The Internal Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance	226
Table VI.6:	Levels of Difference of the Internal Actor Types	242
Table VI.7:	Overall Typology of Internal and External Actors	244
Table VI.8:	Quantitative Significance of the Levels of Difference	249
Figure IV.1:	Spectrum of foreign countries focused on before 9/11	92
Figure IV.2:	Spectrum of foreign countries focused on after 9/11	100

See the animal in its cage that you built
Are you sure what side you're on?

...

What if everything around you
Isn't quite as it seems?
What if all the world you think you know
Is an elaborate dream?
And if you look at your reflection
Is it all you wanted to be?
What if you could look right through the cracks?
Would you find yourself
Find yourself afraid to see?

– Trent Reznor, *Right Where It Belongs* (2005)

“Heard every word you said,” I muttered, [...] “... an’ they all thought it was Stoner’s Boy messin’ up their clubhouse an’ throwin’ ink all over it an’ [...] they chased him ‘n’ never could catch him ‘cause they didn’t know what he looked like, an’ Atticus, when they finally saw him, why he hadn’t done any of those things ... Atticus, he was really nice...”

“Most people are, Scout, when you finally see them.”

– Harper Lee, *To Kill A Mockingbird* (1960)

INTRODUCTION

“Seriously, those Arabs are totally different. You can see that in the reports on television, they sit in cafes all day long or go begging. And they have 14 kids.”¹

Arabs and Muslims have a difficult position in the West today. If we look, for example, at public opinion in countries like Germany, we see that in the GFE Survey of 2005, over 60 % of interviewees agreed with the statement that Islamic terrorists find strong support among the Muslim population and that those terrorists are even admired as heroes by many Muslims.² Similarly in the United States, according to a poll carried out by CBS News and the NEW YORK TIMES in September 2006, 76 % of the interviewees supported the opinion that the terrorist threat from Islamic fundamentalism is constantly growing and presents a real, immediate danger to the U.S. Furthermore, a poll carried out by CNN, USA TODAY, and Gallup in February/March 2006 revealed that even when Arab countries are part of the anti-terror coalition that the American president declared after the attacks, they cannot really be trusted: 51 % of the interviewees said that the U.S. government should trust them less than its other allies.³

And are they not right? Do we not learn every second day of another terrorist attack in the Middle East? Do we not read every second day of suicide bombers blowing themselves up in downtown Baghdad, and do we not feel a slight doubt that the attempts to establish democratic structures in Iraq might fail due to the increasing strength of radical forces in the country? Are we not confirmed in the perception that Arabs and Muslims do not fully support Western standards like freedom of speech when – in the context of the controversy about the Mohammad cartoons that were published in a Danish newspaper in 2006 and the ensuing riots – we see aggressive demonstrators in the Middle East and Muslim countries who burn effigies of the American president and destroy a Danish embassy building?

And when we look at the relationship between Arab or Muslim minorities and their German and U.S. host societies, we see that people in Germany and the U.S. have a rather skeptical attitude towards those minorities as well. The German GFE Survey of 2005 found that over 70 % of the people interviewed say that Muslims in Germany do not want to integrate but instead segregate themselves from German society. Furthermore, over 70 % also say that the Muslim culture does not fit into the Western world. In the United States, according to a Gallup poll carried out for USA TODAY in July 2006, only half the interviewed American adults agreed with the statement

¹ Own translation; original statement in German: “Die Araber, also ehrlich, die sind ganz anders. Das sieht man ja auch im Fernsehen in den Reportagen, die sitzen den ganzen Tag im Cafe oder gehen betteln. Und haben 14 Kinder.” This statement was made by a German woman in an interview with Staud (2006: 238) that was published in DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE, issue 4.

² The survey on group-focused enmity (GFE) is carried out annually by the GFE project. The results are published in the German book series DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE. The GFE survey data in this chapter is taken from Leibold and Kühnel (2006).

³ www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007.

that Muslims in the U.S. are loyal to their country, while 34 % of the interviewees believed that Muslim Americans in the U.S. sympathize with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.⁴

And is this skeptical attitude not also justifiable? In England, the suicide attackers of the 2005 London bombings were all British citizens who were seemingly integrated in British society but who turned out to disapprove of or even hate it. The Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri, who assassinated the Dutch film director and writer Theo van Gogh, was a Dutch citizen who was said to be well-educated and apparently well-integrated.⁵ And the 9/11 terrorists are said to have lived for years in the United States and in Germany – inconspicuous and seemingly integrated – before they carried out their deadly attacks.

Thus, when we want to describe the relationship between Western countries and Arab and Muslim countries or immigrants in the West, we could immediately say that it is a conflictual relationship, one that is shaped by a large degree of skepticism within German and U.S. society and by great perceived distance between both sides. But where do the distance, the skepticism, and the conflict come from? One answer that seems plausible, and that is also often cited by politicians, experts, and the mass media, is the 9/11 attacks in 2001. As the media and public reactions after the attacks often put it, the 9/11 attacks changed the world. The INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE wrote two days after the event that “the new world order is a clash of civilizations,”⁶ and since 2001 we are constantly reminded that the 9/11 attacks have heralded a new form of “war” that 49 % of all interviewees of a 2006 Pew Research survey see as a new major conflict between the people of America and Europe and the people of Islam.⁷

It seems obvious that the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims today is basically the result of events like the attacks in the United States in September 2001, the Madrid bombings in March 2004, and the London bombings in July 2005. But is that so? Was it the attacks of 9/11 that created the perception in the West that there is a large gap, a significant distance, an antithetical difference between the West and Arab and Muslim countries? As the title of the book suggests, the image of Arabs and Muslims is not the only information that is communicated when mass media or politicians talk about them. The confrontation between civilization and barbarism is also about civilization. This side was in play when the U.S. President George W. Bush addressed his nation on the evening after the 9/11 attacks with the words:

⁴ USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, July 28-30, 2006, from www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007.

⁵ Van Gogh directed the controversial short movie *Submission*, which dealt with the topic of violence against women in Islamic societies by telling the stories of four abused Muslim women. The movie caused huge discussion especially because of its depiction of naked women veiled with semi-transparent shrouds as they kneel in prayer and tell their stories as if they are speaking to Allah.

⁶ INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, September 13, 2001, p. 2

⁷ According to a survey carried out by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in August 2006, from www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007. We can furthermore say that politically as well as militarily, the consequences of the event have been enormous. The American government declared the start of a “war on terrorism” against all those countries that support terrorism and harbor terrorists. Before 2001 was over, U.S. military forces in a “coalition of the willing” waged a military offensive against Afghanistan and the Taliban regime which was believed to harbor bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks on New York and Washington. And also the military invasion in Iraq in March 2003 by a U.S.-led coalition was argued to be another step in this new “war on terrorism.”

Today [...] our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist attacks. [...] America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. [...] Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature.⁸

And this side of the Self was also included when German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder addressed the German Bundestag a week after the 9/11 attacks with the words...

This is not only a war against the United States; this is a war against the civilized world.⁹

... and thereby indicated that not only had the United States been a victim of the incident, but that Germany had also been symbolically attacked.

Thus, at the same time as we talk about the uncivilized, barbaric, and evil Other, we also learn something about ourselves. The question that arises from that diagnosis is whether we actually learn more about our own image and self-perception than about the "real" image of Arabs and Muslims?

To answer this question, this book takes a closer look at the interplay between the German and US-American perception of Arabs and Muslims and the national self-perception of both countries. One central assumption of this book is that the German or U.S. self-perception has a decisive influence on the way in which others (in this case Arabs and Muslims) are seen, and that in this context, events like the 9/11 attacks are only one factor that shapes the perception of the other side. Another assumption is that the image of and the assumed distance and difference between Arabs and Muslims, on one side, and Germany and the United States, on the other side, already existed before the attacks. But if it already existed before the event that "changed the world," what are the basic parameters that shape the images of Arabs and Muslims? The perspective that is taken up in this book is that self-perception plays a decisive role for this construction of image, and that an analysis therefore has to include two sides when it wants to answer the question of where the image that we (as Germans or as part of the so-called Western world) have of Arabs and Muslims comes from, and why the image is as it is. The side of the perceived Other AND the side of the perceiving Self.

Therefore, the main questions to be answered in this book are (1) why Arabs and Muslims are perceived as they are portrayed, (2) if and how the German and American national concept of self shapes the perception and the images of Arabs and Muslims, and (3) (combining these two sides) how different and distant from the German and American Self Arabs and Muslims are regarded to be.

To answer those questions, I analyze the single source from which we learn most about Arabs and Muslims – not only those who live abroad and who we never really see in person or who do not affect our everyday life directly, but also those who live right next to us. This source is of

⁸ Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, accessed June 5, 2007.

⁹ Statement of the German chancellor in the German Bundestag am September 19, 2001, <http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/14/14187.pdf>, accessed June 4, 2007. Original quote in German: "Dies ist nicht nur ein Krieg gegen die USA, dies ist ein Krieg gegen die zivilisierte Welt."

course the mass media. In an age in which people more and more rely on the mass media for their information about the world, and in many cases know certain parts of the world only from the realities and information they are provided with by mass media, it seems important to discuss not only what we know about others from mass media but also what we can learn about ourselves in these contexts. Thus, the topics, the actors, and the stories that are communicated by mass media are very central to our perception of the environment that surrounds us and that forms our reality. To answer the questions that have been raised before, the book will proceed according to the following structure:

Structure of the Book

CHAPTER ONE looks at the state of research on the media portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in German and American mass media and at the way in which national concepts of self are defined and national identity is constructed. The chapter includes a survey of the studies that have already been done on national and Western self-perceptions and identity construction, and of studies that have already analyzed images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media. I will point out the limits of these studies with regard to the research questions of the book, listed above. For instance, it will be shown that the existing studies provide some information about how Germany and the United States define themselves, but that this information does not stem from mass media analyses. Furthermore, some information can be gained about the question of how German and U.S. media see Arabs and Muslims. However, most of those studies fail to combine the two sides of self-perception and perception of the Other, and fail to focus on the question of what relevance self-image has for the perception and portrayal of Arabs and Muslims – and vice versa.

CHAPTER TWO introduces the main theoretical hypotheses that have been developed to answer those research questions. Three basic theoretical elements have been combined here. First of all, I examine some general considerations about the concept of a world society and cultural patterns that define and structure social life, to outline the central criteria that shape the German and U.S. concept of belonging (II.1). I proceed from the basic assumption that a set of Western principles, norms, values, and myths (such as democracy, equality, belief in progress, etc.), form the evaluation pattern according to which Western countries like Germany and the United States observe and evaluate their environment, i.e. other countries and actors.

A second aspect that is crucial for the Western perception of Arab and Muslim countries is introduced in the second subchapter (II.2): the Oriental myth. I assume here that this myth shapes the perception of Arabs and Muslims in the sense that it provides the implicit knowledge that Arabs and Muslims are part of an overall Oriental Other that represents the antithesis to Western culture and values. This myth strongly shapes the perception and the evaluation of the focused outgroup in both Germany and the United States.

Thirdly, another crucial assumption of the book is that from the perspective of intergroup relations, and with regard to collectivity construction, collective (national) groups need a certain outgroup if they are to construct national collectivity, which means that in the analysis of the image of Arabs and Muslims, the self-perception and self-depiction of Germany and the United States will also have to be taken into account. This aspect will be further outlined in the third subchapter (II.3). It will be argued that the construction of collectivity mainly works via demarcation from an outside Other. In addition to that demarcation, the outgroup is also measured by the Self in order to enhance the own ingroup status and to strengthen the ingroup coherence.¹⁰ Arabs and Muslims are regarded to be a central potential outgroup that is particularly focused on and demarcated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks due to the circumstances of the event.

These theoretical assumptions lead to several more concrete research questions that guide the process of analysis. To reveal the worldview and self-perception of Germany and the United States, I analyze whether and how both countries reflect upon themselves in the mass media contexts in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed. I will answer the question what basic Western principles are emphasized in these self-descriptions, and whether the German self-perception differs from the American self-image. To explore the images of the Other, I ask what actors and countries the mass media of both countries focus on and how those actors and countries are portrayed. Finally, to illustrate how difference is constructed between German and U.S. Self and Arabs and Muslims, I look especially for differences among the portrayed Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. media. I analyze what levels of difference can be identified between Other and observing Self in the images of the different Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' mass media, and I look at what happens when the geographical distance between Self and Other is diminished, i.e. when Arab and Muslim actors cross the geographical boundaries and enter the Western space. I also examine the impact of the crucial event – the 9/11 attacks – on the German and U.S. perception of Arabs and Muslims, and find out how central the Oriental myth really is for the Western worldview before and after 9/11.

CHAPTER THREE outlines the composition of the data sample (III.1) and explains the used research methods. In the first step, the newspaper articles are analyzed with the method of a quantifying qualitative content analysis to identify occurring Arab and Muslim actors, describe the ways in which German and U.S. newspaper articles portray them, and to reveal the German and U.S. self-perceptions that are implicitly and explicitly communicated in these contexts (III.2). This first step aims at reducing the complexity and variety of the information that is found in the data sample. In a second step, the gathered images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries are classified and described on the basis of a typological analysis (III.3). This step forms the basis for answering the question of how different Arabs and Muslims are from the German and U.S. Self and on what criteria this difference is constructed. The actor typology is empirically based, i.e. actors types are formed from the actual images of occurring actors in the data sample.

¹⁰ In this book, “ingroup” basically refers to the communicated perception of the German or U.S. nation state as a collective concept of belonging.

The results of the quantifying qualitative content analysis are described in chapters IV and V. CHAPTER FOUR first of all summarizes the frequency of articles in which Arabs and Muslims are constructed before and after 9/11. I show that the media focus on this group increased tremendously after the attacks, but that Arabs and Muslims were already an integral part of the daily news coverage before 9/11 (IV.1). Furthermore, the most relevant contexts and topics in which the focused actors appear are outlined (IV.2). Last but not least, the composition of the Arab and Muslim Other is described, i.e. what kinds of actors occur in both countries' analyzed print media (IV.3).

Chapter four also includes information about the quantitative significance of occurring actors and of the topics that are focused on. I show that the media contexts in which Arabs and Muslims appear are largely similar in German and U.S. print media, and that the occurring actors come from all parts of society. Altogether, the overall image of Arab and Muslim actors is predominantly shaped by an external focus on foreign news. Arabs and Muslims within both countries are referred to only marginally before the attacks, although their quantitative relevance changes to some extent after 9/11. Nevertheless, one initial finding is that the image of Arabs and Muslims in both countries is shaped by geographical distance.

However, CHAPTER FIVE shows that geographical distance is not the only characteristic of the majority of Arabs and Muslims. In this chapter I outline additional central facets that shape the German and U.S. self-perception and the image of the Arab and Muslim countries and actors as they are communicated in mass media contexts and discussed in connection with the 9/11 attacks. I demonstrate that the overall picture of Arabs and Muslim is multifaceted, and that the images of Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' print media can be described according to five dimensions: a political (V.1), a cultural (V.2), a personal (V.3), a social and economic dimension (V.4), as well as a dimension of delinquency (V.5) on which actors are described, for instance, as criminal, violent, or as terrorists.

With regard to the image of self, I show that the Other is first and foremost an implicit counter-image of the Self, but both countries also explicitly refer to the own concepts of national identity, especially after 9/11. Differences between the German and the American images are few. One aspect that is emphasized more in the U.S. print media than in the German context is the comparison of the technological progress of American Self and Arab and Muslim Other. Compared to that, German print media more often see a cultural difference between a German or Western Self and Arab and Muslim otherness, and here especially emphasize the religious affiliation of occurring actors.

However, the chapter also reveals that in the overall image of Arabs and Muslims we find a number of facets that can be regarded as favored characteristics for the Self. This observation indicates that the dichotomy between a German and U.S. self and Arab and Muslim otherness is not only based on antithetical difference. Rather, we also find a certain degree of similarity between Self and Other, and some Arab and Muslim actors in the mass media possess features that are promoted as central for the German and U.S. concept of self as well.

CHAPTER SIX goes on to look at this phenomenon of similarity more closely. Here, I present the results of the typological analysis and present a more detailed analysis of the internal composition of the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other as it was outlined in chapter five. I elaborate how the Other is evaluated and subclassified on the basis of the Western standards and principles that are central for the German and U.S. self-concept. Chapter six illustrates the complexity of Arab and Muslim media images by introducing the different types of actors that have been formed with the typological analysis (VI.1-6), and by demonstrating that we cannot simply summarize the media perceptions of Arabs and Muslims as completely different and distant from the West. Instead, I show how multifaceted the difference between the German and U.S. concept of self and the Arab and Muslim countries and actors in question is constructed, and that the Arab and Muslim Other can be regarded as similar and different or similar and distant at the same time:

The majority of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. media receive devaluated images that predominantly consist of features, views and actions etc. that the observing German and U.S. Self disapproves of or criticizes with the Other. Those actors can be classified as most different from the German and U.S. self-concept, and several types of devaluated actors can be introduced here (VI.2).

We also find a large group of Arab and Muslim actors that are regarded as similar to a certain degree. Some of those actors reveal a certain similarity with the Self, either because they share the views of the Self but are not able to accomplish them in their own societies or communities, or because they share the disapproval of certain views with the Self. In both cases, what is crucial about those Others is that they are not really able to change those negative conditions. The third subchapter (VI.3) will give examples of those actor types.

The fourth subchapter (VI.4) introduces actor types which summarize similar actors that are, however, critically observed by the Self with regard to their similarity. Especially after 9/11, this perspective on Arab and Muslim actors becomes increasingly relevant and reflects the increased uncertainty and skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks with respect to the Arab and Muslim Other. Those actors are only seemingly similar to the Self, and are thus difficult to classify with regard to their relationship and distance towards the Self. Boundaries between Self and Other seem to blur here because either the Other or the Self strategically conceals the difference between the own group and the respective counterpart.

Last but not least, Arabs and Muslim can also form a mirror image of the German and U.S. concept of self. Some actors are described in German and U.S. print media as positive and only possess features or reflect standards and principles that the Self regards as central for its own society as well. The fifth subchapter (VI.5) will introduce actor types that fall into this category. These similar Arabs and Muslims are quantitatively least relevant and are simply eclipsed by the dominant quantitative occurrence of the negative or ambivalent and weakened Arabs and Muslims. Furthermore, they are also less relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for the different topics and issues that are discussed in German and U.S. media.

Subchapter six (VI.6), finally, discusses how internal Arabs and Muslims, i.e. Arab and Muslim immigrants and minorities in Germany or the United States, are distinguished and distanced from the national concepts of self of both countries. I show that geographical distance is not the crucial criterion to distinguish between German and U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim Other. Similar to external Arabs and Muslims, also internal Arabs and Muslims are distinguished according to different degrees of similarity with the Self. Some internal actors possess a large difference and distance to the German or American concepts of self and belonging; others reveal a rather high degree of similarity or are even portrayed as part of the national Self (the latter being the case for some actors in the American media especially). Compared to that, internal Arabs and Muslims in the German context are viewed much more skeptically and are to a large extent still regarded as different, mainly due to their religion and cultural facets, but also and especially after 9/11 due to the suspicion of terrorism that is expressed by the Self with reference to the internal Others.

CHAPTER SEVEN summarizes the basic findings of the analysis with regard to the research aims that were outlined in the beginning (VII.1-3). I discuss the benefits and the limits of the introduced study, and give suggestions for further studies (VII.4). One central result of the media analysis is, for instance, that Arabs and Muslims are predominantly constructed as different from the national Self in German and U.S. media, but that both countries also appreciate and portray similarities between German and U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim actors and countries. The criteria according to which Arabs and Muslims are evaluated can be summarized as a basic set of Western principles, values, and ideals that are used by both Germany and the U.S. to deal with the complexity of their environment and to either integrate the Other in the national concept of self or exclude it from it.

The analysis shows that the perception of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media is significantly shaped by the national concept of self of both countries. Furthermore, the observation of Arabs and Muslims is not an objective process, since the national concept of self is regarded as the ideal. The observation of Arabs and Muslims is additionally shaped and distorted by certain myths that have an influence on the evaluation of those people. Even though events like the 9/11 attacks do not create images of Arabs and Muslims, they may strengthened certain assumptions about and facets of the observed outgroup that were already part of the image before the event. The 9/11 attacks can thus rather be seen as a catalyst that sharpened the focus on Arabs and Muslims and intensified the attempts of the German and U.S. Self to distance and demarcate itself from large parts of this focused group.

Finally, it is emphasized that further studies should thus look more closely at the constructions of self and otherness with regard to other ethnic groups, countries and actors to see whether the introduced forms of portrayal are reduced to the group of Arabs and Muslims or not. In addition to that, studies should also focus on the question of the impact that the constructions of Self and Other (and the images that result from those differentiation processes) may have – not only on

the members of the ingroup, i.e. of the German or U.S. society and their view and perception of Arabs and Muslims, but also on the portrayed Other.

The book closes with some final remarks on the question whether we are able to unmake difference.

I. THE STATE OF RESEARCH

Let us, first of all, look at those studies that have already been done on the questions that are relevant for the following analysis. The two research areas that might help to answer those questions are studies that – so far – have either looked at national and Western self-perceptions and identity construction, or analyzed the images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media. In the following two subchapters, the most relevant of those studies with regard to our research questions will be introduced.

1. German and American National Self-Perceptions

First of all, we will take a closer look at the aspect of German and American national self-perception: In general, people may ascribe themselves to a number of different social groups or culturally relevant parameters. They can be members of a certain ethnic group, of a political party, of a family; they can have a certain life style, or be devoted to a certain kind of music. What is central for the following analysis however, is the membership of individuals to a national, or even transnational, collectivity and the criteria that are consulted by the members of this collectivity to describe and define this group concept.

When we look at existing scientific approaches to learn more about such concepts as national identity, nationalism, or nation states, we are confronted with a wide-ranging research field. As this book does not aim to review the whole of this research field, we will in the following only look at selective studies that may offer an idea of what national self-images can be identified in Germany and the United States, and that may help to understand the German and American perspective on other countries.

In a first step, we will approach the concept of a national self-perception in more general terms to define what we are looking at in the context of this analysis. It has to be noted, first of all, that in most studies the self-concept is equated with the term “identity”: As Poole (1999) argues, “when we imagine the nation we do not merely construct an object of consciousness but we also form a conception of ourselves as existing in relation to that object” (Poole 1999: 12). Thus, members of a nation also recognize themselves through their concept of nation, and according to Poole, the nation is therefore also a form of identity, since it exists as an object of consciousness (Poole 1999: 13). Thus, when in the following we talk of national self-perceptions this largely refers to what most of the authors that are quoted would refer to as national identity as well.

The basic elements that are regarded as relevant for a national self-conception can be summarized as follows. According to Poole (1999), national (and other collective) self-concepts have two sides. On the one side, people conceive themselves as belonging to a certain imagined community and on the other side, the respective concept of community informs the way in which those people live, relate with others, and thus are located in their social environment (Poole 1999: 11). Hereby, constructionist views like that of Anderson (2005) regard nations less

as a material phenomenon but more as a concept of belief, which thus have to be regarded as a constructed concept of collectivity. However, national concepts of belonging also have real effects: As other approaches argue, nations as national group concepts have become a material reality, since they are institutionalized, for instance, in the education system, political and social rituals, cultural institutions, and the media (Piper 1998: 54).¹

Nevertheless, approaching the concept of a national collectivity from a constructivist point of view, it is relevant to emphasize that an objective, fixed, and overall definition of such a concept cannot be given. Therefore the following analysis does not strive for a comparison of the ways in which national group concepts are constructed and communicated in German and American mass media with a fixed definition or even a written document that objectively defines the German or American national identity. Such a universal definition does not exist. National identities are permanently negotiated and defined in the context of different situations, under different circumstances, and with different attempts and aims, and they can be relevant to a different degree depending on those circumstances.

We may come to a different result, for example, when we analyze political speeches, watch a German or American movie in which this question is debated, or ask people in the street about their national self-concept. In Germany, the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (BPB), for instance, on its website summarizes central facts about German institutions and principles. In this context, the BPB also lists some basic rules for social life as they are written down in the German Constitution and other documents. In the United States, the same formal definition for social rules can be found in such documents as the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, or the amended Bill of Rights. Those documents to some extent also reflect upon the definition of being American or German and define the criteria that are crucial for this national self-concept.

This rather basic self-definition on the basis of certain documents can be augmented with a few more abstract theoretical aspects that are also relevant for a national self-concept. As a number of authors have defined it, we can summarize four central elements that form the basis of national sentiment.²

Every national group concept is centrally defined by a commonly shared territory that forms the space for which the identity is defined. Herb (2004) refers to this aspect of national identity as territorial differentiation, in which a bounded geographic entity is created by excluding other geographic entities and the people associated with them (Dittmer 2005: 633; originally Herb 2004: 144). Thus, a certain homeland territory can be seen as the literal ground for a national identity.

Second, the sharing of a culture and a common history, i.e. of collective symbols, values, principles and myths, national heroes, historic sites, or battlefields is also crucial for a national

¹ See also Heckmann (1992).

² See for instance Billig (1995), Bohn and Hahn (2002), Dittmer (2005), Gauger (1984), Poole (1999), Salazar (1998), or Schirmer (1998).

identity. Especially a commonly shared language is regarded as relevant. Furthermore, in the context of public debates on national identities there is often discussion of what values, ideals and norms shape a society and are crucial for its members. As Haque (1995) argues, “values are basic to a culture because they provide a framework for evaluating what is desirable or undesirable, admirable or despicable, in life and society” (Haque 1995: 21). Thus, values and commonly shared societal principles can be seen as the standards or criteria that guide the actions of a group’s members and provide a pattern with which the members of the group can structure, evaluate, and understand their environment (Haque 1995: 21-22). Certain ideal models like that of a democratic, free, and open society and other worldviews can have a crucial meaning for the formation and cohesion of a nation, as they define more or less the rules for the members of this collectivity. Or, as mentioned in the first pages of this book, when German politicians ask for stronger integration of Muslims in the German society, they often ask those Muslims (and immigrants in general) to declare their belief in the German values and norms. And a commonly shared history provides stories of triumphs, tragedies, victories, and betrayals that shape the national collectivity (Poole 1999: 17).³

Third, ethnicity or, as Salazar (1998) labels it, the idea of “myths of descent,” is regarded as crucial for the membership of this national collectivity insofar as it raises the criterion of common origin. The sharing of a culture and ethnicity may also be labeled as territorial bonding. As Herb (2004) defines it, this bonding creates a common emotional linkage to a territory, which enables citizens to establish the notion of a collective “we” (Dittmer 2005: 633; originally Herb 2004: 153).

And finally, Salazar (1998) mentions the state as a fourth element of the national sentiment that supplies the institutional, ideological, and structural frame for its members (see Salazar 1998: 116-119). The institution of national citizenship, and citizenship or immigration laws, for instance, can be seen as mechanisms for a nation state to determine on a political and legal level who is a member of a nation and who is not, since this granting or denial of membership is combined with privileges, like political participation or residence rights, that non-citizens do not have.

At the same time, what may also be relevant for the context of our analysis are approaches that have looked at the dimension of individual feelings and attitudes and have explored the way in which national self-concepts shape the interaction of people. On a social-psychological and individual dimension, a number of studies have in addition analyzed the way in which the individual acquires its own identity and how individuals integrate or demarcate others from their own collective group. As Mummendey and Simon (1997) have noticed,⁴ feelings of dislike of other groups or the degree of self-reflection are crucial for a group’s perception of the

³ A large part of the research on national identities and self-images focuses on the historical formation of nation states and the nationalism and collective identities that accompany or have resulted from this state formation process. See here for instance Anderson (2005), Billig (1995), Greenfeld (1992), Llobera (1994), or Mann (1992).

⁴ But see also Tajfel (1982) or Turner (1987).

environment and of other groups, and can be taken as possible explanations for such phenomena as racism, xenophobia, or group-focused enmity.⁵

But also other sociological perspectives can be mentioned here. As Stäheli and Stichweh (2002) have outlined, poststructuralist approaches have looked at the constitution of identities as a precarious process of identification, which inevitably depends on creating an area of exclusion and the excluded. In this context, poststructuralists mainly look at the processes and modes of drawing frontiers, or at the way in which the included is affected by those whom he or she excludes. Thus, identity definition is constantly negotiated (Stäheli and Stichweh 2002: 3). And systems theory has also looked at collective identities – here mainly in the context of inclusion and exclusion processes, arguing mainly that these twin concepts are a correlate of functional differentiation (Stäheli and Stichweh 2002: 3-4). According to this perspective, no individual is completely integrated into only one function system, but can be included in different systems and concepts of collectivity as well, which would mean that the national self-concept is not the only concept that forms the perspective of individuals on their environment. Nevertheless, the authors argue that inclusion necessarily implies the counter-concept of exclusion, and thus indicate what will be of relevance for the following work as well, namely that the possibility of universal overall inclusion of individuals cannot be achieved.

Therefore, we can first and foremost summarize here that it is the commonly shared values, histories, territories, and experiences that form a collectivity, create a social unity, and form a perception of belonging. Thus, what is emphasized when the national Self defines its own group are aspects like the commonly shared religion, descent, language, history, but also the society's own institutions and structures. At the same time, those self-concepts also shape the way in which the national collective group perceives others, i.e. other national groups or, in more general terms, its environment. But before we turn to this “outside” Other, a few words will be added about the basic features that are assumed to shape the German and American national self-concept as it can be derived from the state of research so far: The following summary does not aim at drawing a complete and absolute picture and definition of both countries' self-images, of course, since that would form a research project of its own.

The first aspect that has been distinguished with regard to the self-concepts of both Germany and the United States is the distinction between an individualistic, civic nationalism and a particularistic nationalism. As, for example, Piper (1998) defines it, the first form of nationalism principally regards nationality as open and voluntaristic, and the United States is regarded as one example here. Particularistic nationalism summarizes the perception that nationality is seen as inherent, and Germany can serve as an example here (Piper 1998: 53). This difference has consequences for the way both countries deal with their own identity definition.

⁵ See for instance the numerous studies of the research group of Heitmeyer et al. that have been published for example in *DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE* (2003-2007).

German National Collectivity

According to Schirmer (1998), the traditional German identity rests primarily on the nonpolitical and supposedly primordial factors of a homogenous ethnicity or descent and a common language and culture. As Schirmer (1998) emphasizes, even during the forty years of the German division both regimes agreed on a commonly shared culture and a commonly shared language. This culture consists, for instance, of cultural heroes like Goethe and Schiller, or legendary heroes that “emerge from the deep and dark world of ancient Teutonic myths,” like Barbarossa or Hermann (Schirmer 1998: 117).

A number of studies on German nationalism have focused on the historical development of the Germany nation state, and have specifically looked at the development of the German national identity in the context of the Third Reich or the impact of the German division on the national concepts after World War II.⁶ As Piper (1998) argues, German national consciousness developed very rapidly in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was largely initiated by the educated middle classes (the “Bildungsbürgertum”). Central elements of the developing character of German national consciousness are the German language, the emphasis of territory, and membership based on inheritance (Piper 1998: 56; Schirmer 1998: 117). Especially the aspect of language has remained crucial for German identity until today, as the discussions about the naturalization and integration of immigrants reflect.

After World War II and as a result of extreme nationalism and the indoctrination of a national identity concept that was strictly based on racial purity and demarcation, the German self-concept was shattered: As Piper (1998) argues, the complete destruction in 1945, the experiences of atrocities and the feeling of shame and guilt resulted in a self-image that reflected fragility and ambiguity. In the collective consciousness, the self-definition as German was regarded as highly problematic, and a positive self-image was now emotionally burdened and not possible, since the memory of National Socialism blocked the positive use of nationalism as a source of identity. Thus, and as Piper (1998), Schirmer (1998), and others have outlined,⁷ this either led to a complete and total rejection of any national reference, or national “pride” was deflected to other forms of positive self-conception that were shaped for instance by a high degree of “economic patriotism” or led to a stronger integration into transnational political and other alliances like NATO⁸ or the European Union (EU) (Piper 1998: 66).

European integration can be seen as a substitute for a national identity. The positive parameters of this transnational group concept became economic growth, prosperity, individual wealth, social peace, and international recognition (Schirmer 1998: 118). As a result, as Knischewski (1996) remarks, Germans strongly identify with the economic achievements of the country and emphasize the social security system, but at the same time they also reveal a strong fixation on

⁶ For the historical development of the German nation state and national identity, see, for instance, Piper (1998), Weidenfeld and Korte (1991), or Weigelt (1984).

⁷ Piper (1998) here largely refers to Weidenfeld and Korte (1991).

⁸ North Atlantic Treaty Organization

crises and anxieties and a strong need for security with regard to those achievements (Knischewski 1996: 130-131).

One group that is frequently discussed to threaten the economic security but more recently also the security of the public safety is the group of immigrants, which brings us to a second aspect that shaped the German self-perception since World War II – the shift from being an emigration country to a country that has now increasingly experienced large-scale net immigration over recent decades. This immigration was to some extent actively pushed due to work migration processes. But apart from the influx of guest workers and their families, also a large number of refugees came to the country. This immigration has confronted the country with a new permanent “foreign” population of a considerable size (Piper 1998: 62-63), and has also challenged the question of German national citizenship, an aspect that will become relevant in the following analysis with regard to the internal Arabs and Muslims as well. The influx of immigrants led to the establishment of “new” ethnic minorities. However, as Piper (1998) argues, this fact was for a very long time “ignored” more or less by a German policy towards immigrant groups that maintained a legal and political distinction between German citizens and foreigners. This growing immigration, however, challenged the traditional concept of the German nation that asked for blood-relatedness to gain citizenship and be naturalized (Piper 1998: 66). To this day, Germany struggles with the notion of being an immigration country, and the aspect of belonging and what criteria are required for membership are still debated controversially. It is especially this struggle that we have to keep in mind when we look at the way in which Arabs and Muslims within Germany are portrayed in German mass media.

American National Collectivity

Very similar to the German identity concept, the United States is characterized by a collective identity concept that is founded on political values, and here foremost the symbolic duality of democracy and freedom. Like the German self-concept, the American identity concept is also characterized by an emphasis on common Enlightenment values like liberty, freedom, democracy, equality, individualism, and self-government (Dittmer 2005: 630). This common consensus about basic values, beliefs, and political principles is expressed in a number of historical texts or cultural symbols like the Statue of Liberty etc. The wealth of the country, and the confidence and optimism that flowed from it, have formed a strong belief in a secure and prosperous future of the country. The American culture is shaped by a well-known set of national heroes or semi-divinities like former presidents such as Abraham Lincoln, scriptures like the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and mythic narrations that relate to the American Dream, a commonly shared notion of individual freedom, equal opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness (Schirmer 1998: 101-102).

What is mainly referred to in scientific discourse when American self-conceptions are discussed is the notion of the American “civil religion.” First introduced by Bellah in 1967,⁹ the term refers to a set of values, symbols, and rituals that are institutionalized as the central framework for the America national collectivity. As a concept that follows the rhetoric of religion, it draws certain guidelines for the American Self and provides the basis for the foundation mythology that shapes the American self-perception and that promotes the notion of a commonly shared mission and exceptionalism of the American people. According to Bellah (2005), this foundation mythology includes the assumption that the American people are regarded as “God’s chosen people” who have fled from the political and religious repression of the “old world” (Europe) and have established a new country in the “promised land” (Bellah 2005: 45-46). These religious notions of the founding myth of the nation have outlived their Puritan origin and can be traced into the present, for instance in political rhetoric (see also Vorländer 2001: 23-25). This aspect of the American self-perception may become relevant when we look at the way in which other nations (and here especially Arab and Muslim ones) are perceived from the American mass media perspective.

Another aspect that contributes to this notion of exceptionalism is that the country is not founded on supposedly primordial factors such as ethnic and cultural homogeneity, tradition, or language, since the country was mainly formed by immigration (Schirmer 1998: 101). According to Han (2000), one of the dominant ideological concepts that shaped the immigration history of the United States up to the 1950s was that it is possible to completely integrate and even assimilate the large numbers of immigrants that came to the country every year, and to form a single American society across different ethnicities, races, and cultural differences. This ideology never fully reflected the American reality, since American society was always shaped by racial and ethnic discrimination as well, as slavery and immigration regulations like the Immigration Act of 1924 indicate.¹⁰ Integration was long equated with the simple assimilation of the immigrants into a dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) culture. Nevertheless, and especially with the ideological idea of “cultural pluralism” that has developed since the 1950s,¹¹ the American self-perception of being a nation of people of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins and variety has strengthened (Han 2000: 289-292).

As Mintzel (1997) summarizes it, the central aim of this integration still is the melting of the immigrants into a new “race” of men on the basis of new universalistic ideas (Mintzel 1997: 60). This aspect may become relevant again when we look at the perception of Arab and Muslim immigrants in the United States as it is reflected in mass media portrayals. Maidment and McGrew (1991) argue, that even though other states also possess a social and religious diversity,

⁹ As one source, for a reprint of this article see for instance Bellah (2005; reprint) but also Bellah and Hammond (1980).

¹⁰ This act set up a quota system for immigration according to which the quota for immigrants from non-European and eastern European countries were drastically lowered, whereas the quota for north-western European nations remained high, to prevent further changes in the ethnic composition of American society. See also Bernard (1998) or Marger (1991).

¹¹ I.e. the idea that ethnic groups can also be integrated into the American culture without losing their own cultural heritage

what characterizes the American self-perception is that people see themselves as “a people apart” who possess a unique past and regard themselves as destined to be the “chosen” people to establish and promote a new social order – and thus see themselves as exceptional (Maidment and McGrew 1991: 12-16).¹²

Altogether, what can be said about the analyses that have been introduced so far is that they do not mainly refer to mass media contexts in their discussions of national identity concepts and construction processes. Furthermore, they only marginally discuss more closely those people that are not regarded as members of a nation. Some of the authors do mention or refer to the outside of a national concept of belonging. Dittmer (2005), for instance, argues that central group values like liberty, freedom, or equality have to be contrasted against other nations to become meaningful, thus indicating that an Other is relevant and has to be consulted to define the Self. Other authors indicate that identity concepts work with the process of social comparison, within a national context but also towards an outside Other. For example, in their definition of national identity Bohn and Hahn (2002) have also pointed out that this identity cannot be produced without a corresponding definition of the foreign (see Bohn and Hahn 2002: 21-23). This foreign could also be called an Other and thus does not automatically have to be located in another country, but can also represent an ethnic minority or immigrant group within the national boundaries. For the following analysis we should keep in mind these aspects when we look at the way in which Arabs and Muslims are described in German and American mass media.

However, as noted before in the analyses that have been mentioned so far, this other side from which a German or U.S. national self-concept is demarcated is mostly not further examined. Therefore, as our second research question aims at identifying and explaining the perception of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. society (and mass media in particular), we may take a second look at those studies that have already studied Arab and Muslim mass media images.

2. Arab and Muslim Mass Media Images

The studies that can be mentioned here differ mainly according to their focus. They either analyze the foreign news coverage on Arab and Muslim countries, or they look at the way in which internal Arabs and Muslims in Germany or the United States are portrayed in the media.

2.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media

When we look at foreign news coverage, the imaging of Arab and Muslim countries and actors becomes relevant, for example, in contexts where certain events, conflicts, crises, violent acts (like terrorism), or even wars are focused on in Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, one field of media research has looked at the way in which Arab and Muslim actors and countries are portrayed in

¹² For further elaborations on American exceptionalism and the historical development of American national identity see, for instance, Maidment and McGrew (1991).

foreign news coverage on those events. Such events are, for example, the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, the Iranian hostage crisis, or the war in Lebanon in 1982.

The first author that might be mentioned here is Ghareeb (1983) who has compiled studies that look at the role of the media in shaping American perceptions of Arabs and, in this context, has pointed out some of the exaggerations with which mass media work. One part of the book presents interviews with American journalists in which the imbalances in the American media are discussed. In the second part, the media products are focused on more closely. In this context, a number of different authors look at the image of the Arabs on American television, Arab stereotyping in contemporary American political cartoons, or the effect of American perceptions of Arabs on Middle Eastern news coverage. One article that is especially relevant for the context of the following analysis analyzes the U.S. print media and TV news coverage of events like the Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, or the war in Lebanon in 1982.

According to Ghareeb (1983), the war in Lebanon offers a good example of the superficial and distorted coverage of Middle Eastern issues by the American media. The author especially criticizes that during the seven years of the “Lebanon crisis” the media and many Middle East experts rarely looked at the Lebanese side of the conflict but tended to see the crisis mainly as one between Israel and Palestine.¹³ This changed, however, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the bombing and occupation of West Beirut in 1982. As Ghareeb (1983) argues, this incident led to greater objectivity and balance in the coverage not only of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict but also of the Lebanese side and a stronger focus on the victims of this conflict (Ghareeb 1983: 164-186).

In the same book, McDavid (1983) has especially looked at the different stages of news coverage of the TV networks and the print media coverage that went from a simple adoption of the Israeli perspective on the conflict to an increasingly critical perspective which also led to a public debate on the question of how biased U.S. politics and media should be towards Israel (McDavid 1983: 299-300). As Ghareeb (1983) argues, especially the Israeli government’s mishandling of the press and the attempts to influence the coverage by heavy censorship increased the doubts about “the wisdom or humanness of Israeli’s actions” (Ghareeb 1983: 184).

In both Germany and the United States we also find a number of analyses that look at the media coverage of the 1991 Gulf War.¹⁴ Artz and Pollock (1995), for example, have done a rhetorical analysis of the dominant images of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people in several different American newspapers from August to December 1990. The authors point out that the American media’s “symbolic aggression” against Iraq in the context of the Gulf War may

¹³ The author refers mainly to the second civil war that started in 1975 and was closely interwoven with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the increasing political activity of Palestinian guerrilla groups against Israel that was carried out from Lebanese territory and caused retaliatory attacks by the Israeli military against Lebanon. In 1982, Israeli military forces invaded the country and bombed and occupied West Beirut. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) and its military forces were driven out of Lebanon.

¹⁴ In addition to the authors mentioned here, see also Liebes (1992) who looked at the differences in the news coverage on the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1994) and the Gulf War in 1991 in American and Israeli television, or Bennett and Paletz (1991).

also explain the high degree of public support for the American offensive in the Persian Gulf. And Palmbach and Kempf (1994), for example, analyzed – from a social-psychological point of view – the construction of the hostile stereotype of Saddam Hussein in German national newspapers in the context of the 1991 Gulf War. Altogether we can say that Saddam Hussein is the centrally focused actor in the context of this event.

Similar to that, but focusing on yet another enemy, Iversen (2004) compared the image of Osama bin Laden, the man behind the 9/11 attacks, with that of Timothy McVeigh, the man who killed 168 people with a car bomb in Oklahoma city in 1995.¹⁵ Among other things, the author's analysis is guided by the question, how different or similar American (McVeigh) and non-American (bin Laden) Evil are represented in the selected American news magazines. Iversen (2004) argues here that in the American perception after 9/11, bin Laden presents the evil manifestation of the Oriental Other.

Apart from those studies that have been introduced so far and that mainly focus on certain events, another set of studies analyzed the portrayal of certain Arab and Muslim countries in the news media over a certain timeframe. In the American context, Mousa (1984), for example, has done a content analysis of articles in the NEW YORK TIMES between 1917 and 1947 that focus on the Middle East, presenting a very broad analysis of a timeframe that is rarely focused. In another early analysis, Belkaoui (1978) compared the images of Arabs and Israelis in the American press between 1966 and 1974 in the context of a variety of Middle Eastern issues.¹⁶ The author hereby looks at a broad spectrum of different Arab countries that are directly or indirectly involved in the conflict between Israel and Palestine.

One very comprehensive study on Arab and Muslim countries can be found in the anthology THE U.S. MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: IMAGE AND PERCEPTION that was edited by Kamalipour (1995). In this book, Zaharna (1995) described the historical development of the perception and depiction of the Palestinian people and its leadership from 1948 until 1993. Here, the author especially highlights the transformation of the Palestinian image in U.S. media from invisibility to high visibility and illustrates the change from a direct opposition of the images of the leadership as the “villain” and the Palestinian people as the “victims” or “helpless refugees” to an increasing congruence of both images. In two other studies in the book, Naficy (1995) looked at the representation of the Muslim country of Iran in American popular culture since the Iranian revolution in 1978-79, whereas Bieber-Roberts (1995) analyzed the American perspective on Turkey from 1950 to 1990.¹⁷ Similarly, Quandt (1995) analyzed the image of Turkey in German print media and TV channels over a timeframe of two months in 1995, and Gür (1998)

¹⁵ The qualitative analysis of nine articles focuses on the American news magazines TIME INTERNATIONAL and NEWSWEEK. The author compared the portraits of both men in the different articles.

¹⁶ The content analysis included the American news magazines TIME, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS, and WORLD REPORT, and the Sunday NEW YORK TIMES. Furthermore, the results of the media analysis were combined and compared with opinion poll data that reflected public opinion towards both groups.

¹⁷ All of the authors used a large variety of different methods: Zaharna (1995) did a qualitative content analysis, whereas Naficy (1995) used psychoanalytical approaches.

has done a content analysis of the Turkish image in German national newspapers from 1987 to 1995, here especially looking at the portrayal of the relationship between Turkey and the EU.

Especially interesting for the research questions of the following analysis is the study of Hashem (1995). The author has done a quantitative analysis of the complexity of the media portrayal of Arabs in the American news magazines *TIME* and *NEWSWEEK* over a time period of four years (1990-93). In this context, Hashem (1995) gathered all relevant terms that are used to describe the occurring Arab actors in the two news magazines, and classified them into favorable, neutral, and unfavorable terms to derive the attitudes of the respective media towards those actors.

For the German context, the most comprehensive and for our context most interesting study so far was carried out by Hafez (2002), who analyzed the image of Islam and the Middle East in the German press over a timeframe of nearly fifty years (1947-94).¹⁸ The study identifies and summarizes the image of the region and of Islamic religion in German print media, and offers a comprehensive overview over the major topics, focused countries, and the general tendency of the news coverage on Middle Eastern countries and Islam. A detailed summary of his results will not be given here (for more details see Hafez 2002) but it can be noted that for the German context the study presents an important groundwork research about the media perspective on the Middle East and Islam in Western Germany since the 1950s.

A longtime analysis for the U.S. media context, covering the timeframe between 1945 and 2003, has been done by McAlister (2005) who examined how popular culture has shaped the parameters of U.S. national political or economic interests in the Middle East. As the author argues on a very broad level, U.S. foreign policy, while grounded in material and military realities, is also developed in a cultural context. As a consequence, the U.S. understanding of the Middle East is to a large extent shaped by the way in which this region is reviewed in the news media and popular culture. McAlister (2005) argues, for that “to understand these multifaceted relationships [between the U.S. and the Middle East] we must consider the politics of representation: that is the negotiation of political and moral values, as well as the development of an uneven and contested public understanding of history and its significance” (McAlister 2005: 3).

Last but not least, one author that also has to be mentioned here, even though his analyses have mainly focused on television and American film portrayals, is Shaheen (1984, 2001). His film and television analyses are among the most comprehensive and keen studies on the use and formation of Arab and Muslim stereotypes and one-sided negative images in the American mass media. Even though basically focusing on television and film images of Arabs and Muslims, his results have been picked up and quoted by a large number of scholars. Furthermore, the images that can be derived from television and film also have to be seen as a basis for the imaging that is done in the press, and both sides influence each other, since popular culture and news reports do not operate in a vacuum but observe and influence each other.

¹⁸ In a combination of a quantitative long-term analysis and qualitative case studies

The majority of these introduced studies note that altogether Arab and Muslim countries and actors are predominantly focused on in the context of political and violent conflicts and incidents. Hashem (1995), for instance, reports that both of the news magazines he analyzed extensively discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. And also for the German context, Hafez (2002) notes that the German focus on the Middle East mainly concentrates on political issues, followed by economic topics as the second most relevant focus. Compared to that, cultural, religious, or social issues are only minor relevant (Hafez 2002: 114-127).

A number of the authors have identified and often also emphatically emphasize negative actor images. Others argue that since the news coverage predominantly concentrates on violence and conflicts, the majority of the images of occurring actors are also shaped by the negative contexts in which they appear. For example, El-Farra (1996) reports that newspapers often use certain key terms like “extremists,” “terrorists” and “fanatics” to describe Arab actors. The author claims that this form of portrayal, “these distortions of the Arab people” may be seen as one cause for the general mistrust and dislike for Arabs among Americans (El-Farra 1996: 1).¹⁹

Similarly, Ghareeb (1983) reports that in U.S. media up to the 1970s Arab countries have been predominantly contrasted with Israel, and that this contrast created an image of overall backwardness compared to the portrayal of the Western-oriented, middle-class Israelis. Furthermore, despite major differences among Arab states, the press mainly classifies all Arabs as part of one great mass. As Ghareeb (1983) argues, “Arabs are portrayed as either desert-dwelling Bedouins or millionaires; little attention is paid to the strong urban and rural origins of the vast majority of the Arab people” (Ghareeb 1983: 22-23). Most mass media also miss out on including information about the origins and history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in their news coverage (Ghareeb 1983: 19). Artz and Pollock (1995) even argue that American media’s symbolic aggression against Iraq in the context of the Gulf War and the media employment of culturally acceptable anti-Arab images can be seen as one explanation for the predominant public support for the American offensive in the Persian Gulf (Artz and Pollock 1995: 120-121). Altogether, most of the previous studies come to the conclusion that the overall image of external Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media is negative.

However, some authors also trace positive images in the analyzed media. McDavid (1983), for instance, argues that the U.S. news coverage on the war in Lebanon in 1982 is – in the beginning of the crisis – strongly influenced by the censorship of information that was given out by the Israeli government and military. However, in the course of the conflict the U.S. media increasingly went beyond reporting the official Israeli version, and in the latter stages of the conflict even moved towards a more objective news coverage that also produced more positive images of the Lebanese side (McDavid 1983: 299-300). And Belkaoui (1978) argues that the

¹⁹ El-Farra (1996) notes in this context that when the same acts are presented in connection with non-Arab actors the press seems to be more eager to communicate a more neutral and less biased and one-sided image. One example he refers to in this context for the American news coverage is the construction of McVeigh, the Oklahoma City bomber. Within minutes after the attack, the American press had assumed that the culprit had to be an Arab or Arab American. Raised with unpopular stereotypes of Arabs, the American public was quick to develop images of Arab terrorists destroying American property, especially with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in mind.

serious American press at that time has a rather contradictory perception of Arab actors (and here especially Arab leaders), in the course of the analyzed time shifting from a negative villain image to more positive hero images (Belkaoui 1978: 737-38).

Nevertheless, according to El-Farra (1996) these positive images in most cases only exist as long as the focused countries remain positively affiliated with the U.S. on foreign policy issues (El-Farra 1996: 2-3). Similar to that, also in Hashem's study (1995) it is noted that even though the portrayal of the occurring actors is mostly negative, a somewhat positive shift can also be identified over the analyzed time period, which the author mainly puts down to new alliances that resulted from the 1991 Gulf War and certain improvements in the peace negotiation process between Palestine and Israel (Hashem 1995: 159-160). Last but not least, Shaheen (1984, 2001) also admits that a small number of television documentaries and films can be found in his analyzed data set that have attempted to present a more accurate portrayal of Arabs and also of Arab and Muslim Americans, but that the image of Arabs presented in entertainment programs and film can still be summarized as predominantly negative. This image can be broadly summarized with a quote from Shaheen (1984) who in his first study outlined four major myths that shape the Arab and Muslim stereotype:

They are all fabulously wealthy, they are barbarians and uncultured, they are sex maniacs with a penchant for white slavery, and they revel in acts of terrorism. (Shaheen 1984: 4)

Thus, the introduced studies already indicate that not all Arab and Muslim actors are bad guys, enemies, or fanatics, but that positive images are still quantitatively rare.

2.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Media

A second research field focuses on the internal media news coverage and the portrayal of ethnic minorities and "foreigners" in German and U.S. media.²⁰ First of all, and before we look at those studies, a few words will be said about the societal background in Germany and the United States to see what and how many Arabs and Muslims do actually live in the two countries. This is also done to understand the slightly different research foci of both countries with regard to these internal Arabs and Muslims that will be outlined subsequent to that.

²⁰ In German public discourse, the term "foreigner" is largely used to refer to all kinds of people with a "migration background," i.e. who themselves or whose families have migrated to Germany and are thus of not of German ethnic origin. From a legal perspective, the German Federal Statistical Office distinguishes between "citizens" (which can also be people with a migration background who have already received German citizenship, like the so-called "Spätaussiedler" from Eastern Europe or former Turkish immigrants), "foreigners" (i.e. immigrants who have not yet received German citizenship or are only in residence for a certain period of time, for example because they are students) and "asylum seekers." Depending on what categories are included when media or politicians refer to foreigners, this results in rather different numbers (for a more detailed overview of the different legal status groups

Arab and Muslim Minorities in German and U.S. Society

According to the German Federal Statistical Office, by the end of 2005 the number of foreigners living in Germany was 7.7 million.²¹ Among those foreigners, Turkish immigrants form the largest immigration group. By the end of 2005, more than 1.7 million Turkish immigrants lived in Germany. These people are mainly descendants of so-called guest workers and their relatives who started coming to Germany in 1961. After the recruitment stop in 1973, many of the former guest workers (and their families who also immigrated to Germany to join them) stayed and settled permanently in the country. Turkish immigrants have now been in the country for three generations, some of them have received German citizenship. Nevertheless, in public discourse or in German mass media contexts, people of Turkish origin are often still perceived and referred to as “Turkish immigrants,” or they are labeled as “foreign.”

But also other Arab and Muslim “foreigners” live in Germany. We also find immigrants from Morocco (71,600), Iran (61,800), Afghanistan (55,100), Lebanon (40,100), and Pakistan (30,000) in the country.²² Furthermore, there are a number of people from countries like Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Turkey, or Iraq who have applied for asylum and who are thus formally categorized as asylum seekers.²³

With regard to the religious affiliation to Islam in Germany, the BPB reported in 2004 that more than 3 million Muslims live in Germany.²⁴ The majority of them have an immigration background, more than 700,000 of them are German citizens of which again only a small number is of German origin however. As the BPB reports, Muslims in Germany differ not only according to their ethnicity,²⁵ but can also be distinguished with regard to their religious branches²⁶ or their religious-political orientations.²⁷

Compared to that, in the United States the first wave of Arab immigrants arrived already in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These immigrants largely came from the province of Greater Syria in the Ottoman Empire, the area of present-day Lebanon and Syria. Later immigrants came from nearly every Arabic-speaking area. Since the 1970s, the influx of highly politicized immigrants from Palestine also led to an increasing political activism among Arab Americans, especially in the context of the Israeli conflict.²⁸ The most recent immigrants have

for people with a migration background in Germany, see www.destatis.de/basis/d/bevoe/bevoetab9.php, accessed Jun 5, 2007.

²¹ So-called “Spätaussiedler” are not included in these numbers, since they have German citizenship, even though they could be regarded as immigrants since they have only recently migrated to Germany.

²² Figures from www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bevoelk.php, accessed June 5, 2007.

²³ The figures from the German Federal Statistical Office here are less significant since they only reflect how many applications for asylum have been made over a certain timeframe. The countries that have been listed here present some of those countries from which most asylum seekers have come who have applied for asylum in the timeframe between January and April 2007 (see also www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bevoelk.php or www.bamf.de).

²⁴ Figures from www.bpb.de/themen/G1RPNN,0,0,Was_ist_Islam.html, accessed June 5, 2007.

²⁵ Most of them being of Turkish, Bosnian, Arab, Pakistani, or Albanian origin.

²⁶ Most of them being Sunnis or Shiites.

²⁷ Being conservative-orthodox, Islamist, or secular.

²⁸ For instance, in 1973 the National Association of Arab Americans was founded to encourage political activity and to present a unified voice on the U.S. Middle East policy, and Arab and Muslim American interest groups increasingly criticized the unfavorable Arab images in the U.S. mass media in this context (Jackson 2001: 109-111).

been mainly Muslims, fleeing from wars and persecution not only in Arab countries but also in Sudan and Somalia (Jackson 2001: 109-111).

Until 2001, quantitative data of a classification of Arab Americans as a distinct ethnic group were difficult to find, as, for instance, the U.S. Census 2000 did not list them as a distinct ethnic or cultural group, but classified them as whites and/or Caucasians,²⁹ and only distinguished immigrants according to their national origin. However, in 2003 and 2005, the Census has subsequently issued two reports that specifically analyze the 2000 Census data with regard to the composition of the Arab population in the United States.³⁰ This was done to contribute to the ongoing research about people in the U.S. who identify an Arab ancestry, and was especially influenced by the increasing criticism from the Arab community, as Naber (2000) has pointed out. According to those new Census reports, 1.2 million people in the U.S. reported Arab ancestry in 2000. The largest proportion of those people reported coming from Lebanon (one third of the Arab population), followed by people of Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian origin. Furthermore, 20 % of the Arab population identified their ancestry with the general term “Arab” or “Arabic.”

Since not all Arabs are Muslims we can not automatically equate those numbers with the Muslim population in the U.S.³¹ However, and as a very recent study by the Pew Research Center (2007) has pointed out, there exists no reliable scientific count of Muslims in the United States. The Census does not give any information for the Muslim American proportion, since no religious information is tabulated. Thus the Pew Research Center has developed a survey-based study design to collect those numbers. This study estimates that about 2.35 million Muslims live in the United States. According to the study, and just like in the German context, the U.S. Muslim population consists predominantly of Muslim immigrants (72 %), but also includes U.S.-born Muslims and converts to Islam.³² These numbers do not solely include Muslims from Arab or Muslim countries in the Middle East or South East Asia, but also the large group of African American Muslims.

Thus, altogether we can say that in both countries Arab and Muslim immigrants come from a variety of different countries, and that the majority of Muslims are of foreign origin. This short

²⁹ Since the Census only classifies the American population according to race, we only find a distinction being made between five different races (white; black or African American; American Indian and Alaska Native; Asian; Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander) – see also www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race.html, accessed June 4, 2007.

³⁰ Those two reports (“We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States” and “The Arab Population: 2000”) have given a more detailed overview of the composition of the Arab population on the basis of the data on ancestry and national origin of immigrants – see also www.census.gov/population/www/ancestry.html and www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html, accessed June 4, 2007.

³¹ For example, and as Jackson (2001) and others have pointed out as well, most of the Arab immigrants of the first wave were Christians.

³² The numbers have been taken from <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf>, accessed June 3, 2007.

overview does not aim at summarizing the history of immigration of Arabs and Muslims to both countries, but only the most relevant facts are sketched here.³³

Arab and Muslim Minorities in German and U.S. Mass Media

When we now look at the state of research on the portrayal of those Arab and Muslim immigrants and minorities in German and U.S. mass media, we first of all have to note that in both countries the analysis of ethnic minorities and immigrants in Western societies is a large research field that has produced a variety of studies which not only focus on mass media portrayals of those groups but also analyze aspects of integration, citizenship status, and conflicts with the German or American host societies. In the media sciences, the largest number of studies focuses on the analysis of the way in which minorities and ethnic groups are described in mass media. Especially in the U.S. but throughout the last years also increasingly in Germany we find a large variety of research on the mass media images of immigrant and ethnic groups in Germany and the U.S.

In the German context, a number of those analyses look more generally at the news coverage of minorities or immigrants in the German press or on television – and in this context mainly refer to the group of Turkish immigrants, even though many of the studies often do not distinguish the focus according to different ethnicities or national backgrounds. Some of the rather “classical” studies that can be mentioned here are those of Delgado (1972),³⁴ Ruhrmann and Kollmer (1987),³⁵ or Merten and Ruhrmann (1986).³⁶

Throughout the last twenty years, the research on the news coverage of immigrants and foreigners has constantly increased. Especially since the early 1990s, a number of these studies have turned their focus to the question, what influence the German media coverage of foreigners and immigrants has on the development and strengthening of xenophobia, right-wing extremism, and violence, or has vice versa analyzed how xenophobic and stereotypical mass media images of immigrants and foreigners are. Studies like that of Predelli (1995),³⁷ Funk and Weiss (1995), Hoemberg and Schlemmer (1995), or Ruhrmann and Demren (2000) have looked at the discourse on asylum and immigration in German print media or television, and have analyzed, for instance, how the affected actors are described in this context or have discussed the effects of the media coverage of foreigners on xenophobia and right-wing extremist violence. The book of Butterwegge et al. (1999) discusses the perspective of mass media on the multicultural society, and here specifically the German one. The authors in this anthology not only look at the question of whether the image of immigrants in German mass media is racist (Butterwegge 1999) or give a

³³ For a more detailed overview on Arab and Muslim immigration to the United States see, for instance, Haddad (1991), Jackson (2001), Leonard (2003), Naber (2000), Suleiman (1988, 1999), Younis (1995), or Zogby (1990). For the German context see, for example, Bade (1992) or Wenning (1996).

³⁴ One of the first who analyzed the depiction of guest workers in the German press.

³⁵ Did a quantitative content analysis of the news coverage on foreigners and immigrants in six different local newspapers of Bielefeld, Germany between 1981 and 1983.

³⁶ Also did a quantitative content analysis over 8 months.

³⁷ Analyzed five national German newspapers over a timeframe of 2 ½ months in 1992.

more general survey on the media coverage of foreigners (Ruhrmann 1999), but also compare the way in which the press portrays German and foreign criminals and in this context also look at the depiction of Turkish culprits (Jäger 1999).³⁸

Delgado (1972) has, for example, found out that foreigners occur most of all in the context of topics like criminality or reports on the labor market. Ruhrmann and Kollmer (1987) have come to a similar result: They report that one third of the analyzed articles in their study have a criminal context. Moreover, Jäger (1999) argues that criminal acts of foreign criminals are then also described as far more brutal and dangerous than those of the German criminals, while we learn less about their motives (Jäger 1999: 121). This imaging reflects a German perception that – to some degree – regards immigrants as a threat for German society.

However, the authors also mention positive images of foreigners, mainly in the local sections and when topics like the status or identity of foreign or immigrant actors are focused on. Merten and Ruhrmann (1986) come to the conclusion that especially the Turkish guest workers receive a rather negative image and are mostly referred to in combination with criminality. Similarly, Predelli (1995), who looked at articles in which foreigners are focused on as private actors, comes to the result that they are mainly depicted in connection with issues like immigration, criminality, or internal security. Furthermore, Predelli (1995) argues that the rather complex collective term “foreigner” actually summarizes a large variety of different nationalities and different forms of residence status of the respective actors, which is however not clearly distinguished in the news coverage (Predelli 1995: 121-24).

Apart from the criminal focus, Jäger’s discourse analysis furthermore revealed that the national origin of foreign actors is also especially emphasized, and that immigrants are often highlighted with regard to their look or their lack of German language skills. If their nationality is not explicitly mentioned, their foreign status is identifiable via their foreign names (Jäger 1999: 121). And Farrokhzhad (2006), who analyzed the images of “foreign” women in German mass media and here especially focuses on the portrayals of Muslim and Turkish women, argues that by constantly depicting the suppression of and violence against Muslim women due to religious rules, etc. the German media also reflect a German self-perception according to which equality between men and women is a central standard in the own culture. The author also claims that the present-day image of the Turkish or Muslim woman in Germany is shaped by the headscarf and is predominantly assumed to reflect religious suppression and fundamentalism – ignoring that non-Muslim women also wear headscarves for religious reasons or as a fashion (Farrokhzhad 2006: 55-73). Farrokhzhad’s study indicates that religion seems to be another central facet in the image of internal Arabs and Muslims in German mass media. In addition to that, the author presents one of only a few studies that explicitly look at the side of the self-perception as well.

So altogether, German media studies predominantly focus on the images of foreigners and immigrants in more general terms, and only in some cases specifically focus on Arab or Muslim

³⁸ Jäger (1999) did a discourse analysis of five German daily newspapers and one weekly news magazine over a timeframe of three months in 1997.

minorities. Nevertheless, we also have to note that – in the German context – the term “immigrant” or “foreigner” is to a large extent associated with people of Turkish origin. Thus, the results presented here are also relevant for our research questions, as they indirectly or directly provide information about the image of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German mass media.

In the American context, the research on the images and perceptions of ethnic minorities in U.S. mass media has long been dominated by the focus on African Americans, Hispanics, or Native Americans.³⁹ Some of those studies are interesting for the research questions of this book, because they approach the topic of ethnic minority images on a more general level. Chávez (2001), for instance, presented a cultural history of the immigration issue in the United States since 1965 using over seventy cover images from politically diverse magazines, including TIME, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, BUSINESS WEEK, THE NATION, and AMERICAN HERITAGE. He traced the connections between the social, legal, and economic conditions surrounding immigration and the images through which it is portrayed. One of the author’s results is that media images not only reflect the national mood but also play a powerful role in shaping national discourse.

According to Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003), what is often critically remarked is that the images of those immigrant minorities are shaped by the tendency to highlight the extraordinary and to ignore aspects of everyday life in these communities. Such extraordinary facets do not have to be exclusively negative (criminality, poverty) but also include positive examples like successful careers in the music or sports section (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 135-136). Furthermore, and as was outlined in the last section, also the quantitative dominance of clichés and stereotypes to portray and characterize Muslims and Arabs is well documented. But what can we say about the specific portrayal of internal Arab and Muslim Americans?

The media images of internal Arabs and Muslims in the United States have gained more and more attention in the last couple of years. Nevertheless, as Naber (2000), Shaheen (2001), or Jackson (2001) have pointed out, until 9/11 Arabs and Muslims within the United States could be largely described as an “invisible minority.” In the societal dimension, this is first of all largely due to the fact that they are not distinguished as an ethnic group in the American racial and ethnic classification system, and are simultaneously seen as whites and as non-whites (Naber 2000: 37). Secondly, this invisibility is also reflected in the fact that Arab and Muslim Americans are largely non-existent in the mass media, since Arab and Muslim characters in film, or figures in the news are to a large extent foreign. As Naber (2000) criticizes, this image ignores the fact that the Arab American community is very complex and diverse, belonging to a multiplicity of religious affiliations and coming from diverse regions (Naber 2000: 42). When internal actors are focused on, they are defined as a monolithic category in U.S. television, film, and the news media, and are – if they occur – described just like external Arabs and Muslims: as irrationally violent, particularly towards women.

³⁹ See, for instance, Friedman (1991) or Miller (1980).

The invisibility of Arab and Muslim Americans turns into high visibility, however, after 9/11. One analysis that illustrates this change was carried out by Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003), who compared the way in which Muslim-Americans are portrayed before and after 9/11 in American print media and television.⁴⁰ They shown that Muslim Americans and Arab-Americans are very seldom explicitly focused on in the U.S. press before 9/11, which may explain why there is not that much research on these internal groups before 9/11. Before the attacks the predominant news themes that related to Muslim Americans and Arab Americans reported on political issues and politics. Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) argue that foreign news coverage also affects the domestic stories in which internal Arabs and Muslims occurred, and here name the example of Arab American organizations and actors who are quoted with their opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, etc. Apart from those foreign political issues, internal Muslims and Arabs only significantly occur in the context of national or local political campaigns, either as politicians or as representatives in public opinion polls (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 150-152).

After 9/11, the news coverage of internal Arabs and Muslims increases tremendously. They are now often quoted with their opinion on issues like the military actions against the Taliban or the “war on terrorism.” Some of the frequently covered topics about Muslim and Arab citizens and residents now deal with the civil liberties and civil rights of those groups. Furthermore, actors now frequently appear in the context of a more general debate on immigration and national security. What is also interesting for our research questions is that Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) report that according to their study the images of American Muslims and Arab Americans are more positive and less negative in the aftermath of the attacks compared to the previous year. Altogether, the authors see a quantitative shift from a fairly limited and stereotypical coverage before 9/11 to a more comprehensive, inclusive, and less stereotypical news presentation after the attacks (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 150-152).

Similar findings are presented by Weston (2003) who examined a similar timeframe to Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003), but used a qualitative analysis method.⁴¹ The author reports that in the timeframe before 9/11, Arab Americans are not prominent in the press coverage. The dominant theme of the pre-9/11 articles revolves around Arab-American resistance to stereotypes and discrimination, and debates about civil rights. After 9/11, internal Arabs and Muslims surge onto the news agenda, and now are either portrayed sympathetically, as loyal patriotic members of the American national community, or as targets and victims of hate crimes and of government roundups and detentions (Weston 2003).

⁴⁰ The quantitative study compared the amount and the valence of news coverage of Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam during the twelve months before 9/11 and six months afterwards, and included the NEW YORK TIMES, NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, USA TODAY, and selected television news.

⁴¹ The timeframe of analysis here covers three and one half months before and one month after 9/11, and apart from the major national newspapers like USA TODAY, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, or WASHINGTON POST, also the CHICAGO TRIBUNE and the DETROIT FREE PRESS were analyzed.

Nevertheless, as a study by Stone (2006) points out,⁴² internal Arabs and Muslims still predominantly occur in the context of issues like terrorism in U.S. media, or are even blamed for terrorist attacks against the U.S. or in general. Stone (2006) claims, that this is not only the case after but already before 9/11. According to the author, internal Arabs and Muslims are described predominantly as violent, before as well as after the attacks. Interestingly enough, though, Stone (2006) also notes that the number of positive images of Arab and Muslim Americans increases after the attacks (Stone 2006: 49-69). These findings suggest that it would be especially interesting to look more closely at those positive actor images in the following analysis to learn more about the German and U.S. perspective that shapes those images.

2.3. The Media Image of Islam

In addition to studies that focus on the media images of foreign or internal Arab or Muslim actors and groups, a third set of studies that is also relevant for our research questions analyzed the news coverage and the image of Islam in German and U.S. mass media, and in this context has also looked at the portrayal of Muslims. Especially in Germany, we find numerous media studies on this issue. Thofern (1998), for example, conducted a quantitative content analysis of the image of Islam in the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL.⁴³ Similarly, Kliche et al. (1998, 1999) analyzed the construction of Islam in the German press between 1993 and 1995 in the context of the news coverage on Algeria.⁴⁴ In their discourse analysis, the authors among other things looked at the way in which actors are depicted. Hippler and Lueg (1995) analyzed central elements of the image of Islam and the construction of an Islamic threat in international media and here also examine how such perceptions arise and what functions they have. And Hafez (1999, 2002) analyzed the image of Islam in the context of the foreign news coverage.

Two of the most recent studies come from Ateş (2006) and Schiffer (2005). Schiffer's qualitative analysis concentrates on the linguistic and semiotic structure of print media perceptions of Islam.⁴⁵ The author here specifically looks at the potential effects of the constructed image. Ateş (2006) focused especially on the image of Islam in German media after 9/11.⁴⁶ The author's qualitative content and image analysis examines the way in which Islam and Muslims are presented in the context of the media discourse on terrorism. Ateş (2006) especially emphasizes the relevance of mass media for the public's perception of Muslims in the German context. The author argues that the commentaries and opinions that are offered to the reader or viewer include interpretation patterns ("Deutungsmuster") for events and issues that the public is not able to

⁴² A quantitative content analysis that covers a timeframe of four years (from September 11, 1999 to September 11, 2003) and includes several local and national newspapers.

⁴³ Spanning the long timeframe of nearly forty years (from 1950 to 1989).

⁴⁴ The authors analyzed fifty-three articles from three German news magazines, one weekly newspaper, and one daily newspaper.

⁴⁵ The analysis includes several different German print publications like the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, STERN or DIE ZEIT, etc. (see Schiffer 2005).

⁴⁶ The analyzed articles stem from the German KÖLNER EXPRESS and were published in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks as well as from different weeks in 2003 (here focusing on articles that discuss the war in Iraq).

derive from direct observation. Thus, mass media have to be carefully examined to learn more about the knowledge about and perspectives on Muslims in a society (Ateş 2006: 153).

For the American context, Said (1981) looked at the way in which U.S. media cover Islam. In this study, the author illustrates the methods of hyperbole, euphemism, baseless accusations, guilt by association, or extrapolation from the weakest evidence that lead to a discrediting image of Arabs and Islam. Similarly, Karim (1997) and Esposito (1992) traced and deconstructed the discourses on and perceptions of Islam in the West, and present examples from the U.S. press and television. Esposito (1992) thereby also aims at deconstructing the perceived Islamic threat to the West, for instance, by outlining the history of its relation with the West and by showing the large diversity of Islamic orientations. And Wiegand (2000) has discussed the media's impact on the misperceptions of Islam in the West, arguing that it is especially the casual approach to ethnic and religious identity that furthers Western misperceptions about Muslims but also about ethnic conflicts in Muslim countries. As the author explains on the basis of the example of the Bosnian-Serbian conflict, Western print media, for instance, frequently use a careless terminology or mix up religious and ethnic identities, which has contributed to a simplification and misperceptions among the Western audiences (Wiegand 2000: 246-247).

Especially the German studies illustrate that the subject "Islam" belongs to those themes that are most often picked up in contexts in which also foreigners and immigrants occur. Furthermore, Islam becomes predominantly relevant in the context of events like terrorist attacks or in articles that treat violence in connection with Islamic extremism, religious faith, social conflicts, or cultural habits and ways of clothing of internal Muslims that seem to conflict with the German or U.S. host society. Thus, this connection of Islam and violence can be regarded as crucial for the mass media image of Islam – also before 9/11.⁴⁷

Thofern (1998) furthermore stresses that in the news magazine he analyzed Islam is mainly described as a backward, extremist religion that is hostile towards progress. Hippler and Lueg (1995) also report that the Western image of Islam is mainly characterized by ideas of aggression and brutality, fanaticism, irrationality, medieval backwardness, and antipathy towards women. Hostility towards progress, reactionary political ideas, and a desire to "return to the Middle Ages" are often attributed to Islamic fundamentalism. As the authors point out, the historical processes that have run through Islam since its early days and have influenced and changed it remain unconsidered. This may create the impression that practically no historical change has taken place in the religion Hippler and Lueg 1995: 7-13). The portrayed difference of Islam is predominantly evaluated negatively, and the West perceives Islam as a religion which is made out to be responsible for countless political, cultural, and social phenomena in Islamic countries (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 24-27).

⁴⁷ Ghareeb (1983), for instance, presents an article from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE in 1981 that was entitled "Violence, the Islamic Curse" and that was accompanied by a cartoon which showed "four bearded figures wearing robes and stabbing each other in the back with daggers" (Ghareeb 1983: 161).

With the concrete example of Algeria, Kliche et al. (1998) report that aspects like despotism and totalitarianism are frequently ascribed to the Algerian government but also to Islam in general. As the authors argue, “more or less explicitly the discourse labels all actors in Algeria as irrational” and this irrationality is also ascribed to the religion (Kliche et al. 1998: 100). This observation is also made by Hafez (2002) who argues that the German print media reflect the overall assumption that political Islam and radical fundamentalism are closely connected, that many Muslims are regarded as irrational and fanatic, and that political actions are predominantly religiously motivated. Furthermore, the author also points out that the image of Islam is shaped by the assumption of a unity of an Islamic world and a unity of political leadership and people, which largely ignores national, regional, and cultural differences (Hafez 2002: 300-303). Similarly, Said (1981) also points out the constant confusion of Iranians and Arabs and argues that “Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended either as suppliers of oil or as potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Muslim life has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Islamic world” (Said 1981: 26).

Studies like those of Karim (1997) and Esposito (1992) also show that just like in the German mass media the image of Islam in U.S. media is largely reduced to fundamentalism and is strongly connected with violence. Like Wiegand (2000), Esposito (1992) says that even though it might be an understandable perception in the context of certain events like the Iranian Revolution or the 1991 Gulf War, this portrayal fails to do justice to the complex realities in the Muslim world. It leads to an image of Muslims as one monolithic threatening mass, ignores the diversity of Islamic movements as well, and does not really give an insight into the real causes and reasons for those events in most cases (Esposito 1992: 172-174).

For the timeframe after 9/11, Hafez (2002b) observes that the news coverage on Islam has improved slightly with regard to the mentioned aspects, arguing that the German press tries to distinguish more clearly between the religion of Islam and the peaceful Muslims, and hostile and violent fundamentalists. Still, as the author notes, these more positive articles also mainly focus on political Islam, and predominantly report on the religion in connection with a violent event (Hafez 2002b: 225-227).

Many of the studies that have been mentioned here consider the image of Islam as a hostile stereotype, or as Esposito (1992) puts it, front cover headlines like “The Roots of Muslim Rage” in combination with a picture of a scowling, bearded and turbaned Muslim with an American flag in his glaring eyes⁴⁸ create a confrontational undertone and a threatening motif (Esposito 1992: 174). Furthermore, Hippler and Lueg (1995) point out that this hostile stereotype of Islam or an Islamic threat is not a new one, but has deep historical roots that date back as far as the Crusades (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 4). Ateş (2006) argues that this hostile stereotype reflects the perception on the part of the German Self that the Germans’ own societal concept is the only right one and that the Islamic Other is clearly demarcated from this concept (Ateş 2006: 163). Like Hafez

⁴⁸ Which he found on the front cover of the ATLANTIC MONTHLY in 1990 (see Esposito 1992: 174).

(2002b), Ateş comes to the conclusion that after 9/11 the overall perception of Muslims and Islam has not changed really: it is still superficial, and it predominantly personalizes and emotionalizes the respective events and topics in which context Muslim actors or Islam become relevant.

The last aspect that seems important to mention for many of the introduced studies is the argument that the images of Islam are shaped by the Western perception of a fundamental difference between an Islamic Orient and a Christian Occident.⁴⁹ Hippler and Lueg (1995) argue that the current vogue of popular literature about the Islamic threat has more to do with Western thinking than with an actual threat. According to the authors, this Western perception is one result of the end of the Cold War and a shift towards more attention that is now drawn to the Islamic countries rather than to Communism. The authors say that the portrayal of Islam as violent, backward, irrational, and oppressive presents an easy way to externalize those facets from the West's own culture. Instead of criticizing the faults of one's own society and using the same yardsticks in criticism of other societies, mass media but also many scholars and writers set the two cultures against each other (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 1-2). As Karim (1997) notes, an "us versus them" constellation can be frequently found in news headlines, for instance, when the confrontation of "Islam versus the West" is constructed.⁵⁰ The indication for the Western self-image that can be derived from this perception is that, for example, the Enlightenment and the related separation of religion and state are regarded as indicators for a Western superiority in comparison to Islam. Islam thus presents the antithesis to the West, a polar opposite against which the West can assure itself of its own identity and values (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 20-24).⁵¹

To sum it up, as the last subchapter has outlined, we find quite a number of media studies that have analyzed the images of Arabs, Muslims, or Islam in German and U.S. mass media already. The list of studies that have been introduced here is by far not complete.⁵² Nevertheless, I stop the review of the state of research at this point to indicate some of the gaps that most of the introduced studies in my view show with regard to the questions that have been raised in the beginning of this book.

⁴⁹ See, among others, Hafez (2002), Hippler and Lueg (1995), or Kliche et al. (1998, 1999).

⁵⁰ For instance the reference to a "dark side" of Islam or the emphasis of Muslim rage in American news magazines like TIME (see Karim 1997: 155)

⁵¹ As Terkessidis (2002) writes, when Islam is depicted as irrational, fanatical, and restrictive, the Self can also identify in this image the perception that "we" are rational, reasonable, and open (Terkessidis 2002: 35).

⁵² Rodinson (1988) or Hentch (1992), for example, give a broad historical overview of the major developments in the perception of Islam in the West, and Daniel's classic study (1960) explores the political and religious considerations behind distorted Western views of Islam, examining Christian-Muslim interaction from medieval times to the modern world. For a more detailed and well-discussed overview of other relevant studies see for instance Hafez (2002), Kamalipour (1995), or Schiffer (2005).

3. Conclusion: Open Questions and Research Aims

Even though there is a large spectrum of media analyses on the image of Arabs and Muslims, these studies mostly only have a limited focus, i.e. looking only at portrayals of specific countries or actors like the Palestinian government, the Iranian or Turkish population, or the Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. Broader comparisons of different Arab and Muslim countries, to see whether the imaging of different countries and actors may be similar if not identical, do not take place. Also, comparisons between different countries' media are rare with regard to the focused questions. Studies that do take a broader perspective (see Hafez 2002 or Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003) do not provide very detailed qualitative information on the images that are ascribed to the different actors and countries. Thus we do not learn whether all actors really have the same images, or whether there are differences between the individual actor profiles, which would then indicate that the German or American view of the Other is not one-sidedly negative or reveals a certain variety and complexity. The only analysis that does take a quantitative approach to actor imaging is Hashem (1995), but he does that only for the American context and he also leaves out the observation of the American perspective.

Nearly all of the studies mentioned emphasize an overall negative image of Arabs and Muslims, internal as well as external, in German and U.S. media. Media attention is mainly directed towards conflict-laden or crisis-laden negative events. Arab and Muslim countries, and also migrants in Germany and the U.S., thus often occur in the context of problems and conflicts. The studies furthermore indicate that not only do popular press and entertainment media reveal one-sided images; the quality press and TV news programs do too. Nevertheless, a number of authors have also noted positive images. What is missing in their analysis however is a more detailed look at what those positive images look like in the context of the different articles. Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the change of the image of external Arabs and Muslim in German and U.S. media – especially around 9/11 – has so far not been done – most analyses have mainly looked at the changing perception of Arabs and Muslims within the West.

Most of the media analyses that have been introduced in the last subchapter also do not go into much detail about the possible motivations or influences on behalf of the Self to perceive or portray the actors in a certain way, or – if we want to take back a little the intentional aspect of image construction – the perceptions or possible myths and stereotypes or other ideas about Arab and Muslims that shape the image of the actors. Most studies do not discuss the German or U.S. perspective that may form the roots for the media images but mainly concentrate on describing the images that they find in the articles. Studies that provide some insight into the perspective of the German and U.S. Self that creates the media images of Arabs and Muslims have mainly been identified in the third set of studies that looked at the image of Islam. Those analyses not only describe but also give interpretations for the occurring media images.

However, these studies are often not based on a concrete set of media, but more or less broadly summarize the two countries' media discourses on Islam, giving media examples that support their argument. Furthermore, from those studies we may derive that in German and U.S. media

we find a more or less homogenous image of Islam. We get the impression here that ALL actors are portrayed that way, ACROSS different Arab and Muslim countries, or ALL internal Arabs and Muslims. This would, however, contradict the results of other studies that have also identified positive actor images of Arabs and Muslims. So, how homogeneous is the image of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. media? The positive images would not fit into a solely negative opposite image of an Oriental or Islamic Other. None of the analyses that have been introduced has discussed the question of how the possibility of similarity between Muslim actors and the West can be integrated in this two-sided contrast between Islam or a hostile stereotype of Arabs and Muslims and the West.

Altogether, the studies that have been introduced lead us to the following fragments that seem to be the first step toward the explanation of the image of Arabs and Muslims in Western media. First of all, we could conclude that to construct a national self-concept it seems relevant to know the central criteria of this self-concept. However, as some of the introduced authors have already pointed out, to know that often includes knowing as well who is not part of this self-concept, which was assumed here to be for example Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, the look at the state of research has confirmed that to answer our research questions it is crucial to not only look at the way in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed but to connect this analysis with a look at the way in which the German and U.S. Self is described in comparison to that, to understand how those people are described who are not members of the national self-concept.

Up to this point we have already gained some information to answer the question of how Germany and the United States define themselves, but most of this information was not derived from mass media contents. Furthermore, we have gained information to answer the question of how German and U.S. media see Arabs and Muslims. But except for some studies on the imaging of Islam, most of those studies did not combine the two aspects. Thus, one of the questions for this research still remains unanswered: namely, what relevance does the self-image have for the perception and portrayal of Arabs and Muslims – and vice versa. A question that has become more crucial is why the image of Arabs and Muslims is so negative in both German and U.S. media?

Therefore, the following analysis combines the two research fields that have been outlined in chapter I. To answer the raised questions, I will combine the individual aspects that have been focused on by other studies: By looking at the way in which a certain group of actors is constructed by Western media I would not only like to find out WHY this group is portrayed in a certain way. Instead, I argue that to answer that question we have to look at two aspects – images of Arab and Muslim Others and the German and U.S. Self – and have to analyze as well how difference between both sides is constructed and how similarities are integrated in the differentiation.

This book will therefore:

- (1) reveal the worldview of the Self and identify the national or even Western self-perceptions that play a role in contexts in which Arab and Muslim Others are observed,
- (2) summarize the image of Arabs and Muslims that results from the Western perception around the 9/11 attacks, and
- (3) illustrate how difference is constructed between Self and Other to reach a new perspective on the interplay between (national or Western) self-perceptions and the perception of (Arab and Muslim) otherness in Germany and the United States.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WESTERN RATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND OTHERNESS

For each of the aims that have been listed in the last chapter, several theoretical assumptions have guided the analysis that will be outlined in the following chapter. With regard to the first aim – the analysis of the German and U.S. concepts of belonging – we will first of all have a look at some general consideration about the concept of a world society and cultural patterns that define and structure social life. On a more detailed level, we will then have a look at a concrete myth that shapes the Western perception of Arab and Muslim countries and that becomes relevant for the analysis of the mass media images of the same. And finally, and with reference to the question of collectivity construction and the concepts of Self and Other, the basic theoretical assumptions will be outlined for the question why collective (national) groups need to construct images of Self and Otherness.

1. The Worldwide Diffusion of Western Rational Principles

One central idea of this analysis is to show that the portrayals of Arabs and Muslims that can be found in German and U.S. mass media are to a decisive extent influenced by the worldviews of the Western observers that can, for instance, be traced in the mass media communication processes of both countries.

Worldviews are conceptions for making sense of and interpreting the world. They are reflected for instance in a culture's orientation towards such things as God, humanity, nature, the universe, and other philosophical issues that are concerned with the concept of being (Haque 1995: 18). According to Weber (1972),¹ worldviews always imply a coherent set of values which relate "internally" to each other to varying degrees. They form a perspective on the environment that offers comprehensiveness for occurring phenomena in the same and can answer the fundamental questions of existence like the meaningful totality between humankind and the cosmos.² The coherent and expansive value constellations and the ordered meaningfulness of a worldview can be either grounded in the supernatural or the "worldly" realm (Kahlberg 2004: 140-142). A supernatural basis can for instance be found in religious worldviews like Christianity, whereas the modern worldview of democracy is based on ideals like equality, individual rights, tolerance, personal liberties, or government by law and is thus established on the basis of worldly criteria. It has to be noted here that according to Weber (1972) the correctness and superiority of a worldview can never be definitely proven. Instead, the legitimacy of certain worldviews is acquired solely on the basis of a belief in it by those who adhere to it (Kahlberg 2004: 142).

¹ The following summary of Weber's concept of worldviews is largely taken from Kalberg (2004).

² As Kahlberg (2004) outlines, in Weber's (1972) perspective prophets most strongly articulate worldviews and thus offer explanations for example for the existence of suffering and name possibilities and pathways to rescue believers from those sufferings. Other transmitters for worldviews can be intellectuals, or political and social movements (see also Kahlberg 2004: 142).

For our analysis I assume that worldviews have an influence not only on people's beliefs, values, and attitudes but also on the way in which other people, societies, or cultures are observed, evaluated, and dealt with. In the following subchapter, some central facets will be introduced that are regarded as relevant for the worldview of societies like Germany and the United States:

1.1. The Neo-Institutional World Polity Approach

The analytical concept that will serve as a theoretical background for the following analysis is based on the sociological concepts of the neo-institutional world polity approach. This theory of the "topography of the world society" (Wobbe 2000: 26) was developed in the late 1970s by the research group around the American sociologist John W. Meyer and is often referred to as the "Stanford School." According to Meyer and his colleagues (see 1994, 2005) the term "world society" first of all refers to a field of highly institutionalized cultural patterns that strongly structure the purposes and actions of nation states, organizations, and individuals, who are all regarded as collective or individual actors (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 127).

Second, the world polity approach sees world society as a level of interaction that determines or regulates other dimensions of social organization and that serves as a horizon of orientation for individual and collective actors. Third, the theory assumes a global framework of institutionalized values that form the frame of reference for the world society (Wobbe 2000: 38-39). In the following, the key terms of the world polity approach will be briefly introduced and the main theoretical assumptions for the upcoming analysis will be outlined.

Institutions

First of all, the approach assumes that individual behavior and social interaction are always embedded in institutions. Those institutions are basically assumed to be cognitive rules or, in other words, the cultural assumptions about reality that are generally known, taken for granted and shared by the members of (world) society. This view is combined with the assumption that individual and collective actors neither act exclusively goal-oriented and rationally nor are they solely guided by norms. Instead, their behavior often appears like a "dramatic execution of cultural standardizations, models, scripts or myths" (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 129).

The empirical studies of the Stanford School so far have mainly focused on the analysis of the formal, institutional structural principles of organizations and nation states, and have observed mainly the formal organizational structures on the national level.³ For those studies, world societal, i.e. global, phenomena are not solely derived from the interests and power relations of sovereign states but go beyond this level of interaction.

³ These studies have analyzed, for instance the level of structural isomorphism of different national education systems, of women's rights, citizenship, or environment protection.

“Culture” as the Central Category

In contrast, for example, to macro-realistic concepts like the World Systems Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein,⁴ world society is also not regarded as a system of economically determined dependent relations between a center and a periphery. Instead, world society is seen as a composition of cultural structures of expectations that define the legitimate forms, interests and relations between states, formal organizations, and individuals (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 130).⁵ Hereby, for the world polity approach, “culture” is the central category for the analysis of social processes and structures and is used here in a very broad sense:

Society appears as culture and, more concrete, as the embodiment of Occidental rational principles whose worldwide diffusion is analyzed. [...] These basic components of the Western society are regarded as an unchallengeable culture that precedes the actors and that pushes forward globalization as a world polity. (Krücken 2005: 10-11)⁶

World culture can therefore be understood as an imagined world that consists of different value orientations and that constructs its actors according to those orientations. As Meyer et al. (1994: 2005a) argue:

[...] we conceptualize Western society as essentially a cultural project organizing human activity to forge the proper links between the moral and natural worlds. (Meyer et al. 1994: 11; 2005a: 17)

The rules for social action in modern societies become manifested in cultural theories, ideologies, and rules that define the functioning of society, either as it can actually be found or as it should be from the perspective of collective aims. Meyer et al. (1994) phrase this as follows:

Lines of thought treating culture as only rules of value and technique at the moral and natural boundaries of society ignore the fact that the central cultural myths of modern society are those giving meaning and value to society and its components. Beyond a sociology of religion or of science, a proper analysis must focus on institutions – the cultural rules of society itself. (Meyer et al. 1994: 17)

Culture ascribes a reality to actors, actions and ends. In addition to that, culture also provides those actors, actions and ends with meaning and legitimacy. Thus, the term “culture” in the world polity definition is based on a cognitive concept that consists mainly of taken-for-granted myths, scripts, or rules which form institutions. The execution of institutional patterns – according to this constructivist view – is therefore based on imitation and routines of action (Wobbe 2000: 39).

In addition to that, at the level of nation states culture is not only regarded as a combination of values and norms but more as a set of cognitive models that define what criteria, goals, resources, technologies, or sovereignty a nation state has to have. Meyer (2005) argues that nation states mainly have to be viewed as “imagined communities” that are socially constructed via basic criteria of belonging and exclusion (Meyer 2005: 133).⁷ Nation states are imagined on the basis of

⁴ See for example Wallerstein (1986), Balibar and Wallerstein (1990) or Imbusch (1990).

⁵ For further details see also Meyer (1980).

⁶ Own translation, original quote in German: “Gesellschaft erscheint als Kultur, genauer; als Verkörperung okzidental-rationaler Grundprinzipien, deren weltweite Diffusion untersucht wird. [...] Diese Grundbestandteile der westlichen Gesellschaft gelten als nicht-hinterfragbare Kultur, die den Akteuren vorausgeht und als ‘world polity’ die Globalisierung vorantreibt.”

⁷ Here, Meyer (2005) follows Anderson (2005) who has defined the concept of “nation” as an “imagined political community” that is “imagined as being limited and sovereign.” The phrase “imagined” is used here because

models that have been established on the world societal level and can be seen as social institutions that offer possibilities for identification and – less self-reflexively phrased – integrative structures.

Occidental Rational Principles

These integrative structures are provided, for instance, by a set of cultural patterns and standards that define the criteria of belonging and exclusion. According to the authors, the cultural and structural patterns that are relevant, for example, for the analysis of the German and American self-concept have developed in the course of the Occidental rationalization (Krücken 2005: 10-13). Here, the world polity approach adopts Max Weber's concept of Occidental rationalization that defines "rationality" as a myth, rational action as a ritual act, and rationalization as the institutionalization of a cultural system of goals, goal/means attributions, and rational actors (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 130-131).⁸ According to Meyer et al. (2005a) the cultural system of Occidental rationalism originates from the transformations of Christianity during the European early modern period and the development of a highly generalized, universalistic idea of the rational design of the world. Rationalization is not understood as an increase in efficiency but as a result of the institutionalization of rational actorhood. Also, the convergent development of different societies is not seen as the result of a functional adjustment but as a consequence of the adjustment and orientation of different societies towards legitimate cultural models of rationality (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 131; Meyer et al. 2005a: 38-40).

In the course of this rationalization and the removing of a divine authority from society the moral organization of society changes fundamentally, as we now find a central authority of abstract and universal principles that take the position of the formerly sacral authority of religion. However, Meyer et al. (2005a) here also note that despite the linguistic differentiation and the change of authority structure, the moral organization still has the same structure which defines the sacred and relates it to the profane:

Thus the "secular" content of the world polity's ontological structure is not less religious than that of the Christian church. (Meyer et al. 2005a: 40)⁹

Only now, the central principles of the Western cultural account and modernity are identified as progress, equality and justice,¹⁰ and nationally institutionalized worldwide norms such as human rights (Meier 2004: 230).¹¹ In the Western tradition, these institutionalized rules and principles

Anderson argues that "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 2005: 15).

⁸ See also Weber (1988, reprint of 1920) or Collins (1980).

⁹ See also Meyer et al. (1994: 22-23)

¹⁰ The term "justice" here especially refers to individual chances of participation in society.

¹¹ This does not mean that religion has become completely irrelevant in the course of the Occidental rationalization process. Especially in the United States religion still functions as a decisive structure of meaning in which the society and the nation state expresses itself. As was already mentioned in chapter I.1, especially the American political culture is shaped by a civil religion that is marked by an idiosyncratic blend of the religious and the political. As Bellah (2005, reprint) outlined, the American civil religion as an ideology strongly adopts religious symbols and

embody universalized claims linked to moral purpose and rules of nature. Descriptions of social action (political, economic, etc.) thereby become more and more comprehensive. At the same time, the underlying cultural principles and rules become increasingly invisible and thereby more and more exclude alternative rules and possibilities of action. Consequently, these rules become more and more unassailable and thus are less manipulable by the involved actors. Actions are organized by institutionalization and are anchored in extending ideologies and theories which are functional and located on a normative and a descriptive dimension (Meyer et al. 2005a: 45-46). Thus, the social structures of modern societies can be regarded as ideological buildings which are made of institutionalized building blocks and which draw their authority from even more universal rules and conceptions (Meyer et al. 2005a: 40).

Altogether, modernity and Western principles are regarded as a cultural frame with a Western origin that has however spread globally today (Meier 2004: 230). What results from the worldwide diffusion of those Occidental rational principles is a worldwide adaptation of cultural patterns, orientations and formal structures.¹² This does not consequently mean that the countries of the world society all become undistinguishable. The spread of formal structures that have been imported or have diffused to other societies can remain exogenous and may be decoupled from the actual local practices. Besides that, in the course of the expansion of the Western world during the past centuries,¹³ the diffusion of a universalized culture had only slowly proceeded. In this process, Meyer et al. (2005b) argue that the members of non-Western societies were often regarded as morally and naturally different from the Western world, and were mostly viewed as inferior and unqualified for (Western) civilization. In the course of the Western expansion and the institutionalization of Western principles on a global level, those formerly “uncivilized” parts of the world are increasingly regarded as “candidates for a full-fledged membership in the global community of nations and individuals” (Meyer et al. 2005b: 129-130).

For the following analysis, this assumption allows us to observe the perception and classifications of Arabs and Muslims in Western societies and derive those highly universal and far-reaching institutionalized rules from the different types of actors, like nation states, organizations but also medially observed actors like politicians, terrorist groups, or individual actors that occur in a world society as well as in the specific forms of actions that those types of actors occupy since:

Actors enact as much as they act: What they do is inherent in the social definition of the actor itself. Consequently, rules constituting actors legitimate types of action, just as legitimated action constitutes and shapes the social actors. (Meyer et al. 2005a: 31)¹⁴

narrations (like Christian symbols, Old Testament metaphors, or the Protestant sense of mission) that shape the American self-perception.

¹² As Bös and Zimmer (2006) have argued for the example of the worldwide institutionalization of norms like the human rights, nation states as well actors in the same regard the adoption of worldwide standards as a chance to increase the legitimacy of their political action (Bös/Zimmer 2006: 223-224).

¹³ That – according to Meyer et al. (2005b) – also involved the subjection and annexation of other societies in the rest of the world, as can be seen in the course of the Crusades but also the colonization era.

¹⁴ Original quotation in German: “Akteure inszenieren ebenso sehr, wie sie handeln. Die Handlungen von Akteuren sind in der sozialen Definition des Akteurs selbst schon enthalten. Es gilt also, daß Regeln ueber die Konstitution von Akteuren auch Handlungstypen legitimieren, ebenso wie legitimierte Handlungen soziale Akteure konstituieren und formen.”

In the case of the following analysis it is thus also assumed that Muslim and Arab countries and actors as well as their described actions are observed and valued from a Western perspective according to the “Western rules.”

Altogether, we can say that the world polity approach perceives modern cultural systems as “institutionalized accounts that map out the entities and processes of modern society and integrate them together within general frameworks” (Meyer et al. 1994: 11). Social actions in modern societies are highly structured by institutionalized rules and “those rules take the form of cultural theories, ideologies and prescriptions about how society works or should work to attain collective purposes, especially the comprehensive and evolving goals of justice and progress” (Meyer et al. 1994: 9).

The empirical analyses of the Stanford School so far mainly focused on the structure and actions of collective actors on the organizational and on the state level. From this perspective, one of the focused institutions, the nation state, has two central functions. First of all it is regarded as a segment of the world society and therefore as an element of the internal differentiation of the same. Second, as an organization – and therefore as an agent of the world society – the nation state picks up and institutionalizes global expectations and thereby constitutes its own authority and world societal norms (Wobbe 2000: 34).

What makes this approach interesting for the upcoming analysis is the thesis that an institutionalized set of rational principles have been spread and have become established on a global scale, i.e. that they have globally diffused on a very abstract level, for instance in form of structural similarities in nearly every country. As Meyer and Hannan (1979) argue:

Common definitions of the (technical) nature of reality, of value, of the nature of man, and of equity, seem dominant in the modern system. The world system has moved towards a single stratification system, in which all nations compare their progress on the same scales. Differences among societies are seen more as inequalities and distributional inequities within a single system, rather than as a result of independent evolution of discrete units. (Meyer and Hannan 1979: 301)

A second aspect that is relevant for the following analysis is that these principles and institutionalized rules not only can be used by actors of a society as theories and knowledge about the world and as concepts for actions but, at the same time, may also be used to value and classify other countries and actors themselves. With regard to Arab and Muslim countries this would mean that Germany and the United States compare their own progress and implementation of the defined principles with that of Arab and Muslim countries.

Following the world polity approach we may thus assume that both Germany and the United States reveal similarities in their definition and conception of national collectivity. As the world polity approach suggests, the basic principles that shape their concept of collectivity (like equity, progress, or equality) are derived from the definitions and valuation rules of the global cultural account that springs from and is applied by Western societies for the explanation of global structures and phenomena in the context of globalization processes. It is expected that in the communication of their national self-concepts and the construction of Arab and Muslim

countries and actors both Germany and the United States consult this commonly shared set of Western principles.

Several of the media analyses that have been introduced in the last chapter have revealed that Arab and Muslim actors and countries are predominantly described as “underdeveloped” in different societal dimensions.¹⁵ One question that arises from those observations is, to what extent Arab and Muslim actors and countries are (or are not) regarded as equal with regard to the Western “standard?” Are they – at least to some extent – identified as Westernized already, since they form nation states, have established constitutions and a legal system according to Western standards, or have economic systems that work according to capitalist principles? Or are Arab and Muslim countries and actors still predominantly regarded as completely non-Western in the different societal dimensions and are constructed as having not or not fully implemented the rules and principles according to the Western standards?

Why Western Principles Have to Be Negotiated

Last but not least, I assume that these principles have to be permanently negotiated. Meyer and his colleagues do not concentrate on this question in their analyses, but mainly focus on the simple relevance of the introduced principles in different societal contexts. For my analysis, however, one central assumption is that Western principles and norms are permanently communicated and moreover, permanently negotiated and filled with concrete meaning, even though we might assume we talk of commonly shared knowledge at the same time. Why this has to take place explicitly might be answered with four possible explanations:

(1) One argument would be that principles, rules, and norms have to be communicated to emphasize their relevance. In contexts where we do not have an institutionalized fixation of those principles in form of constitutions or other written documents the principles have to be communicated to make clear that they are regarded as basic guidelines for the observation and evaluation of events and actions.

(2) But also when those principles are constituted in rules and policies of institutions they exist on an abstract and rather invisible level and might be consulted and negotiated for different (strategic) reasons. We could say, for example, that one reason for the permanent usage of those principles in different communication processes might be that political, military, or economic steps and actions have to be permanently legitimated and those principles can serve as a basis for their legitimacy.

(3) It could be also suggested that Western principles are used as criteria for the discussion and evaluation of events and issues that take place or come up every day. Societies consult central

¹⁵ For instance, some of the analyses have noted that in mass media Arab and Muslim actors are depicted to lack rationality since they are centrally described in the context of Islamic fundamentalism (irrational), personally ruffian (evil) or choleric (see El-Farra 1996, Ghareeb 1983, Kliche et al. 1998, Shaheen 2001, or Thofern 1998).

societal principles and standards to structure and classify the complexity of their respective environments and realities, and to evaluate other actors according to their own parameters.

(4) And last but not least, the permanent negotiation of the rather abstract principles might be due to the fact that the abstractness has to be filled with concrete content and meanings. The different actors in the world society have to interpret those abstract principles and fill them with contextual meaning due to changing contexts of usage and due to changing relevancies.¹⁶ Furthermore, societal principles also form the basis of a construct – the state – that itself has to be permanently negotiated and re-emphasized in its composition, to attach a symbolic meaning to this territory. As Dittmer (2005) phrased it, “as institutionalized regions, states are best understood as an ongoing process of creating and maintaining territorial practices and ideologies” (Dittmer 2005: 626).

Thus, we can assume that even though Western principles and rules are globally spread they have to be permanently communicated as well as negotiated in the different contexts in which they are deployed. According to Meyer et al. (2005a), these negotiation processes of institutional universal rules and principles can not only be found in the legal, social scientific, or customary foundations of a society but also in the linguistic and other “cultural” foundations, and should therefore also be traceable in the communicated content of mass media (Meyer et al. 2005a: 31). In the upcoming analysis, this negotiation of Western principles will be observed when Germany and the United States refer to Arab or Muslim countries and actors.

1.2. Mass Media as a Communication Platform for Western Principles and National Collectivity

The following analysis will look at mass media as a platform where central German and American national rules, norms, or principles for the interpretation and construction of national collectivity are reflected in the way in which Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed and portrayed. According to the world polity approach, the Western cultural ideas and scripts are diffused throughout the world society to a more or less institutionalized extent and are therefore expected to be traceable in the mass media communication as well. Furthermore, it is expected that in mass media, Western principles are negotiated and applied to the world society and the world’s societies. Since the world polity approach so far does not give any detailed analytical concepts about the conception and role of mass media in the world society, I will first of all shortly define the key terms that are worked with here.

¹⁶ Bös and Zimmer (2006) illustrated this negotiation of Western principles with the example of the norm adoption (here with the concrete example of the freedom of travel). The authors not only outlined the steps that are taken from the adoption of norms to their implementation in different societies, but also emphasized the problems that impede the implementation of the normative (theoretical) idea into praxis due to norm ambiguities, a possible conflict between norms and different needs in a society, or the problem of norm conformity, i.e. that the compliance with a norm cannot be fully guaranteed or controlled by a state (see also Bös and Zimmer 2006: 223-229).

The Mass Media System in Modern Society

In the context of the following book, mass media are defined as those large-scale organizations and institutions of society that use technical tools of duplication to publish communication, like print, radio, or television. Thereby, mass media are no longer based on a direct interaction or direct communication between communicator (sender) and recipient, because this direct contact is impeded by the interposition of a technical instance (Luhmann 1996: 9-11).¹⁷

From a differentiation theory perspective, mass media are furthermore regarded as a specialized subsystem that has developed in the course of the transition from a European pre-modern first primarily segmented then primarily hierarchically stratified society to a modern society that is primarily functionally differentiated. This transition is shaped by an increasing division of labor and a more and more exclusive specialization of different branches of society according to different functions. As a result, in modern societies we find specialized subsystems like the political, economic, legal, or educational system, and institutions like governments or universities.¹⁸

Subsystems like mass media have developed to perform a specific function for the overall society that they are part of and at the same time fulfill a specific service for other function systems. According to the theoretical assumptions of the systems theory of Luhmann,¹⁹ society is regarded as reproducing itself on the operational basis of communication processes that strengthen the cohesion of society. From this perspective, mass media are a subsystem of society that is specialized on the societal integration of the different subsystems that form the complex, specialized, and functionally differentiated modern society. As Marcinkowski (2002) argues, the specific function of mass media is the self-observation and self-description of society, since:

[...] With the medial system of society or rather with the produced description of reality from one moment to another that is produced in this system, we find a medium of the self-observation of modern societies, from which none is excluded in principle, and that in this respect can serve as a collective thematic frame of internal societal communication, since this frame cannot be provided by the individual horizon of experience of the systems of consciousness. (Marcinkowski 2002: 114)²⁰

Yet, Marcinkowski (2002) also emphasizes that mass media cannot accomplish the observation and description of the whole societal system, i.e. including all subsystems. Also mass media only observe and describe a certain part of reality, and only from a certain perspective. This

¹⁷ Exceptions in the form of direct communication, like letters to the editor etc., are defined as staged direct communications by Luhmann (1996).

¹⁸ For a more detailed overview of the different theories of the structural differentiation of modern societies, see also Schimank (1996).

¹⁹ In this context, considerations are incorporated that have roughly adopted the conceptions of Luhmann as they were captured in his book on the REALITY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1996) and as they have also been taken up by Marcinkowski (2002).

²⁰ Own translation; original quote in German: “[...] dass mit dem publizistischen System der Gesellschaft bzw. mit der von Moment zu Moment reproduzierten Beschreibung von Realität, die dort angefertigt wird, ein Medium der Selbstbeobachtung moderner Gesellschaften vorliegt, von dem prinzipiell niemand ausgeschlossen wird und das insoweit als gemeinsamer thematischer Rahmen gesellschaftsinterner Kommunikation fungieren kann, der von den individuellen Erfahrungshorizonten der Bewusstseinsysteme naheliegenderweise nicht angeliefert werden kann.”

perspective is shaped by the system's own criteria of observation, the selection-code that distinguishes between information and non-information (Marcinkowski 2002: 114-115).²¹

Thus, the role of mass media can be summarized as the overall guide and conductor of the self-observations of modern society. Thereby, mass media merely provide a conglomerate of different descriptions that will not form an overall world until they are merged by the observer of those descriptions, i.e. the public as a recipient of the media communication (Marcinkowski 2002: 114-115). Mass media make available certain forms of statements and views that can provide the recipient of mass media products with gathered and compact knowledge about issues, topics, and – in our concrete case – actors and countries of Arab and Muslim origin that appear in those contexts.

Mass Media Reality

The second term that has to be defined is that of “media reality.” As mass media research today is very complex and focuses on a variety of different topics,²² it has to be emphasized that the following work will focus on media content only. The following media analysis will not aim at distinguishing the differences between a “primary” reality and a “secondary” media reality, and it is not argued here that one of the two concepts is a mere reflection of the other. Furthermore, the analysis does not aim at elaborating the conditions under which media contents and messages are produced, as is done for example by the theories and empirical studies that focus on news selection.²³ And third, the analysis also does not strive for an analysis of the patterns of presentation that is focused for instance by the tradition of the Media Bias Research or the analysts of media frames.²⁴

Mass media products are perceived as a form of constructed reality that is provided by the media system according to its own criteria. The reality of mass media is shaped by the system's observation, reflection, and summary of overall communication and institutionalization processes of the society it reports on. In this context, the constructed media reality is not regarded as being

²¹ As Marcinkowski (2002) argues, social function systems do not consist of persons and human beings, and also not of actions or decisions; they solely consist of communications that are further taken up by following communications. Thereby the media system is self-reproductive (autopoietic), self-organized, structure-determined, and thereby functionally closed. The system demarcates itself from an environment of non-corresponding communications via its own specific semantics. According to this view, mass media exclusively orientate their selection and further processing of information on the basis of their own binary code that differentiates between “information” and “non-information” (Marcinkowski 2002: 112).

²² Altogether, we may distinguish four central areas of research today: media content studies, media system studies that deal with the operations of mass media etc., research that focuses on media production and the ideological background of the producers of media contents, and research into media effects.

²³ One approach here is the tradition of research on so-called “gate-keeping” mechanisms which focuses on the selection processes in media production and has produced for example the news value theory. Research with this perspective mainly focuses on documentary media content. For more information on this research field see among others Bonfadelli (2002: 49-50), Galtung and Ruge (1965), or Shoemaker and Reese (1996).

²⁴ Media Bias Research, for instance, deals with the question, to what extent media reality does or does not match with an assumed primary reality and analyzes bias and levels of objectivity that might guide the production process. A similar approach in this context is the framing theory that assumes that the news coverage about topics is shaped by certain frames that can also be understood as structures of argumentation. For more details on those approaches, see also Bonfadelli (2002: 50-51), Kepplinger (1989), or Scheufele (1999).

comparable with a “primary reality,” since the media system as an observer of society is, at the same time, always also an integral part of the same. Mass media can both reflect observed societal processes or events and shape them via their own construction criteria, views and perspectives.²⁵

Thus, the following analysis focuses on the product of mass media – the constructed media reality that is communicated to the public. It is hypothesized that this reality brings to and keeps certain issues, topics, and also actors in the focus of public attention. What is analyzed in the following is this reality, this extract of the world that is transmitted on a mass scale for the public perception and that provides a collective pool of knowledge for the German or U.S. society.

Mass Media Discourses

The last term that has to be defined shortly is the term “discourse.” In the course of this book, it will be used once in a while to refer to the various mass medial topical settings in which Arabs and Muslims appear. Following the perspective of Gerhards (2004), a public or social discourse is regarded as social communications of societal actors about topics, events, or also other actors. These communications (or communication processes) consist, for instance, of the different positions and arguments that actors hold with regard to the discussed topics, events, or actors, as well as of different interpretations that actors provide for those issues. Furthermore, I assume that discourses take place in different forums and are negotiated on different communication platforms. As Gerhards (2004) argues, the mass media can be regarded as the most important platform for the presentation and negotiation of discourses, since they allow a large number of actors to (indirectly) take part in their communication processes (Gerhards 2004: 300-301). A social discourse, for example about Arabs and Muslims, thereby, is not reduced to the level of mass media of course. However, since mass media also reflect and summarize communication processes and the different positions of other societal systems with regard to societal phenomena or topics they can have an influence on the foci that discourses may take.

With those assumptions in mind, the following media analysis could also be labeled as a systematic content analysis of discursive negotiations about Arabs and Muslims as they can be found in mass media contents. Nevertheless, we do not mainly aim at tracing and summarizing the discourses, i.e. the topics and contexts in which Arabs and Muslims are focused on, or the strategies of argumentation that are used to locate the actors with regard to the contextual events and topics. Instead, the analysis will focus on the way in which Arab and Muslim actors are constructed IN those different topical contexts and discourses. Consequently, such a research perspective does not take into account the individual articles as separate independent units but regards them as part of overall communication processes about Arabs and Muslims, and about

²⁵ Constructivist theories have influenced a number of theoretical as well methodological approaches towards the analysis of mass media in recent years. Those developments will not be further outlined and discussed here. For an overview of the most relevant constructivist approaches and their applications to media research see for example Weber (2003: 184-201). For more detailed elaborations of the relation between mass media and reality see for instance Schmidt (1994: 4-6).

the perceptions of a German or American national collectivity that may also become explicit in these communication processes.

Therefore, we can sum up this section by saying that mass media are focused on as a platform for the presentation and discussion of Western principles. At the same time, mass media also serve as a platform for the negotiation and diffusion of the same. It is expected that these Western principles become relevant in discourses about Arab and Muslim countries and actors as well, as they also form the central standards and principles according to which the society's own national collectivity is described and defined. Western principles are thereby assumed to be institutionalized expectations and a common sense or "taken-for-granted" knowledge that shapes the structure of the actor images in mass media, not only in the context of one topic but ACROSS different topics.

2. A Taken-for-Granted Myth: The Distinction of Occident and Orient

Continuing with the considerations of the first subchapter, which introduced the societal background for the definition of the constructed collectivities of Western countries and Arab and Muslim Otherness, and emphasized the Western rational principles that are relevant in this context, the analysis has also to take into account one special aspect of distinction: the taken-for-granted myth of a distinction between Occident and Orient.

In general, from a sociological perspective, a myth can be regarded as a basic form of human conception of reality, an unchallenged narration about basic questions of human life, about cultural aspects, conflicts, and norms and values. It can be an essential part of a certain worldview that is used, for instance, to legitimate value and action patterns that may not be substantiated on a rational basis.²⁶ Möller and Sander (1997: 160) also refer to myths as legends, popular narrations, or metaphorical, emblematical, and ritualized concretions. They argue that these metaphors are needed in the construction of collectivity to provide the rather abstract collective concepts – and here especially national identity concepts – with illustrative, visual language, and "concrete imageries" since ethnic and national "images" serve as a transformation of an intellectual-formal into a visual-concrete semantic of nationality (Möller and Sander 1997: 160).

This would mean, for instance, that abstract terms like "nation" are visualized. On the level of (Christian) religion, Möller and Sander (1997) here mention the transformation of rather abstract terms like "justice" or "divineness" into more popular and "naturalistic" allegories like ritualized holidays (e.g. Easter), or the personification of salvation and redemption by concrete figures or martyrs (Möller and Sander 1997: 160). Adding the assumptions of the world polity approach here and reconsidering the set of Western principles that are regarded to form the Western cultural account, we can thus assume that those rather abstract principles are also transformed into more concrete, more figurative, and therefore more manifest allegories. This transformation

²⁶ This definition was derived from Krech (1994) given in the German LEXIKON ZUR SOZIOLOGIE, edited by Fuchs-Heinritz et al.

can make the abstract principles applicable and comprehensible for the actors who use them and for the contexts in which they are used.

Following this assumption, I would like to highlight the Oriental myth as one central taken-for-granted idea that shapes the Western worldview: The assumption that Occidental and Oriental collectivities confront each other can be seen as a visualization of an external Otherness for Western societies that shapes a certain set of criteria according to which Western collectivity is constructed. The Oriental myth in our context is especially relevant for the analysis of German and U.S. mass media because a number of the analyses that have been introduced in I.2 have already outlined that it forms a basic way of communicating Arab and Muslim topics and constructing Arab and Muslim actors. As Karim (1997) argues, this myth is preserved in collective cultural memory. Therefore, this second subchapter will briefly summarize some of the origins of the Oriental myth, list the most relevant studies that have been made with regard to the Oriental Other, and illustrate its explicit relevance in the context of mass media constructions of Arabs and Muslims.

2.1. Geographical and Cultural Dimensions of the Terms “Orient” and “Occident”

Let us first of all define what is referred to in the following when we speak about “the Orient.” As several authors like Sardar (1999), Said (1978), or Kabbani (1993) have pointed out, “Orient” is a term that is traditionally used from a Eurocentric perspective to refer to a cultural space that is geographically somewhat vaguely defined. Also when Western media refer to the “Orient” this may include the region of the Middle East, but also of South Asia, or East Asia. As the authors above argue, since the Middle Ages “Orient” was also increasingly understood as the dominion of Islam. Because of its biblical association as the Holy Land described in the Bible, from the European perspective the Orient was first and foremost the Middle East. In general it can be said that the term “Orient” (or also “East”) forms the oppositional label to the terms “Occident” or “West” that were traditionally used to refer to the countries in Europe, and today also conceptually include the North American continent or even Australia.

Thus, a solely geographical location of the concepts of Occident and Orient is not the crucial point for the categorization of countries – as the example of Australia illustrates. The distinction between the two terms is not predominantly negotiated through political or geographical aspects but more via religious and cultural ones. The modern cultural geography approach introduced by Kolb (1962) – in contrast to the physical geography approach that defines continents – distinguishes different cultural areas that are defined by human societies with a certain lifestyle and economy, and therefore have similar cultural developments.²⁷

Derived mainly from the way in which the terms are used in mass media contexts, for the following analysis the term Occident is regarded as a partner of the term “West,” which is used to

²⁷ This idea of “cultural continents” was taken up later for instance by Huntington in his thesis of a “Clash of Civilizations” (1996).

summarize not only the cultural continent of Europe but also North America or Australia.²⁸ In contrast to that, the term “Orient” in its present day usage in mass media mainly refers to Arab countries in the Middle East but can also include Muslim countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, or the North African region (with Egypt and Morocco). However, other countries that are also taken into account for our analysis because of their large Muslim population like Indonesia and the Philippines, or Sudan are on the other hand not included in this narrow concept of Orient.

Said (1978) has summarized this contrasting of Occident and Orient as a European system of imaginations that forms a dual image of the world that confronts an Oriental and an Occidental sphere and argues that...

Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. (Said 1978: 2)²⁹

According to Said (1978), this distinction can be traced back to the Middle Ages and has to this day a decisive impact on Western thought and perceptions about Eastern societies (Middle as well Far Eastern) – and here especially about Muslim societies.

Said’s thesis that he first outlined in his book *ORIENTALISM* in 1978 can be regarded as the starting point for a research field that has critically analyzed and discussed the perceptions and images of the Orient, of Islam, and of Arab countries in Western culture. As Said (1978) argues, the term “Orientalism” thereby mainly refers to the Western attitudes towards Islam, Arabs and the Orient.³⁰ The Western perspective on the Orient is shaped by a network of easily comprehensible categories, concepts, and norms that are taken from a Western context and that are used for the observation of a complex variety of Arab and Muslim cultures (Said 1978: 55-58) and has become an integral part of Western culture, a commonly shared myth that was especially shaped by the geographical distance between the observer (the West) and the observed object (the Orient) (Said 1978: 222-223).

²⁸ Even though in the classical definition the term Occident only referred to a Western European cultural area.

²⁹ With the term “discourse,” Said mainly refers to the vocabulary that is employed when the Orient is spoken or written about (see Said 1978: 71).

³⁰ His definition of the term covers three different levels: an academic, an imaginative, and a historical level. On an academic level, any person who studies, researches, teaches, or writes about the Orient can be labeled an Orientalist. On an imaginative level, according to Said (1978), Orientalism covers the very notion of a distinction between East and West, of “us” and “them” that people have been taught and thus are aware of and use as a taken-for-granted belief or myth in theories and literature. And finally, on a historical level, Orientalism is regarded as a discursive way or a “corporate institution” for dealing with the Orient, to describe it, to authorize certain views about it, or, as Said phrases it “as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1978: 2-3). In the following analysis, only the imaginative level will be of central interest.

2.2. Research on the Western Perception of the Orient

A number of scholars have picked up this thesis and have analyzed the roots, the history, and the composition of the Western perception and images of the Orient since Said's book. Looking at only a few of those scholars, the following section will outline the most essential aspects of the Western perception of the Orient that have an influence on the perception of Arab and Muslim countries to this day, as they shape the perspective on Arabs and Muslims and are also reflected in the images that can be found of them in Western mass media. The overview that will be given in the following does not claim to be complete, but presents only the most central facets that are regarded as relevant for the Western perception of the Orient until today. I will thereby not go into too much detail about the way in which the Oriental image has changed and developed from the Middle Ages until today.³¹

Encounters with the Orient are documented throughout the history of Western literature – in fictional writings and travel reports but also in scientific works. Sardar (1999), for example, argues that especially the Crusades dominated European imagination and fiction about the Orient, and the crusading ethos became a central motif of Western thought and literature and endured even centuries after the actual campaigns into the Orient had ceased (Sardar 1999: 20). Historical markers like the Siege of Vienna in 1529 (when the Turkish army expanded into Europe) are consulted to this day as relevant cases to describe the historical relationship between Occident and Orient.

A number of authors outline in their studies that in European portrayals and narrations about the Orient the mentioned attributes largely emphasize a basic difference between Orient and Occident. As Kabbani (1993) puts it, two central motifs can be highlighted here that shape the traditional Western perception of the Orient. On the one hand, the Orient is described as a place of lascivious sensuality; on the other hand, the Orient is regarded as violent and barbaric by nature (Kabbani 1993: 19-20). Sardar (1999) emphasizes that in addition to the exclusion of the Oriental Other we also find a certain attractiveness expressed towards it, since “the pathology of the Orientalist vision is based on two simultaneous desires: the personal quest of the Western male for Oriental mystery and sexuality and the collective goal to educate and control the Orient in political and economic terms” (Sardar 1999: 1-2).

Historically, Rotter (1993) outlines that during the Middle Ages – with the culmination of Arab sciences and arts and the expansion of Arab cultural and material goods and scientific knowledge to Western Europe – the European perception of the Oriental region is not exclusively negative. During the sixteenth century, the perception of the Orient is also increasingly shaped by the

³¹ For a more detailed retrospective I suggest the comprehensive studies and books by Heine (1996), Hentsch (1992), Kabbani (1993), Sardar (1999), or Suleiman (1989). Kabbani (1993), for instance, presents a comprehensive and very descriptive overview of the clichés, myths, and stereotypes that for centuries have stimulated the Western imagination about the Orient. She thereby for example discusses the Western Crusades, the European travel narrations, but also European painting and poetry that has adopted those myths and has thereby created a European perception of the Orient that is not only a place of fantasy but has remained influential until today – and not only in fictional literature of movies but also for political relations between Europe and Middle Eastern and Islamic countries.

positive images of travelers, traders, and diplomats. The created image of the Orient is rather complex and differentiated but also reflects a fascinated and romanticizing view of the Orient and the Islamic world (Rotter 1993: 54-55). Furthermore, the translation of the *ARABIAN NIGHTS*, a Medieval Middle Eastern compilation of historical tales, love stories, tragedies, and poems into European languages and its wide reception in Western countries had a large influence on the way in which the Orient is perceived. As Suleiman (1989) reports, countries and actors were identified with the book to a great extent, and the characteristics and lifestyles that are described in the tales were transferred to the “real” Arab and Muslim figures that the Western observer came into contact with. Those “fictional” images were in addition supported by the stories of merchants and travelers who wrote about their adventures in the Orient and with its people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Suleiman 1989: 257).

However, parallel to the romantic enthusiasm, we can also find a continuous negative side of the perception. As already mentioned, violent political conflicts and events like the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 or the expansion of the Ottoman Empire also to Europe also strengthened the Western perception of the Orient as a potential threat (Rotter 1993: 52-55). A number of the authors that have also been introduced in chapter I.2.3 have argued that the religion can be regarded as the crucial element here for the perception of difference between Occident and Orient. Sardar (1999) argues, for example, that it was the encounter with Islam that can be seen as one of the central influences for the Western vision of the Orient as an “unfathomable erotic and exotic place where mysteries dwell and cruel and barbaric scenes are staged” (Sardar 1999: 2). As the author writes,

The Crusades, for example, both initiated and perpetuated the representation of Muslims as evil and depraved, licentious and barbaric, ignorant and stupid, unclean and inferior, monstrous and ugly, fanatical and violent. (Sardar 1999: 2)

Sardar (1999) sees a close connection between those images and the religious confrontation of a Christian Europe with a predominantly Islamic Orient that is mainly traced to the geographical expansion of the Ottoman Empire:

For Christendom, Islam was the darker side of Europe. The Protestant Reformation and the rise of the Ottoman Empire led to the transformation of Christendom to “the West” [...] Western civilization [...] became the yardstick, as Christendom had been earlier, by which Oriental cultures and civilizations were measured. (Sardar 1999: 2-3)

Similarly, Suleiman (1989) mentions a study by James Waltz (1963) who analyzed the attitudes of the West towards Muslims before the Crusades and argued that those attitudes often reflected indifference and (political, military, academic, or religious) hostility, but occasionally also interest in coexistence.³² However, as Suleiman (1989) argues:

[...] although there was much ignorance, indifference, and some prejudice, the major change in Western attitudes toward Arabs/Muslims came when the church hierarchy – the popes – took over political leadership and power from inept secular authorities, called for peace among warring Christian nations, and sought to direct that antagonism and war against the Muslim outsiders [...] an anti-Muslim ideology was developed which painted a dark and evil picture of Islam, the Prophet, and Muslims in general, including, of course, the Arabs (Saracens, Ishmaelites, and so forth). (Suleiman 1989: 257)

³² For more details on the different historical steps of these attitudes see also Suleiman (1989: 257-258).

Arabs and Muslims were perceived as pagans, who worshipped Muhammad as well as other gods, or were described as extremely cruel and savage. According to Suleiman (1989), this picture then came to dominate the Western European attitudes for a number of centuries and can even be identified in present day perspectives as well. The author claims that these images were first and foremost maintained and reproduced by Western literature, giving the example of Elizabethan literature about the Orient, where the main themes concerning Arabs and Muslims were identified as war, conquest, fratricide, treachery, and lust (Suleiman 1989: 257).

Most of the authors who have been quoted so far mainly refer to the European context and the Oriental image that has developed there. However, similar findings have also been presented by U.S. scholars for the perception of the Orient and the constructed Oriental image in the United States. Suleiman (1989), for example, emphasizes that the Medieval Western picture of the Orient were later also inherited by the inhabitants of the American colonies. At the same time, however, he claims that “Americans added other specifically American ingredients – influenced by distinctly American factors” (Suleiman 1989: 258). The author here summarizes four central differences of the U.S. image of the Orient:

First of all, the Oriental image of the American colonies and the early American republic included a greater emphasis on the Bible as a literal representation of the events and processes in the Middle East. Arabs were, for example, presented as “God’s agents of retribution and temptation” (Suleiman 1989: 258). Similarly, also McAlister (2005) emphasizes that for most of the nineteenth century, American’s primary interest in the Middle East was the “Holy Land” and most American visitors to the region (Protestant Christians) went, for example, to Palestine for religious reasons. As McAlister (2005) notes, those travelogues from Holy Land trips were extremely popular in the U.S. in the nineteenth century (McAlister 2005: 13-20). Second, Americans tended to identify themselves with the ancient Hebrews, and the early settlers and here especially the Puritans in New England regarded themselves as ancient Israelites. In the twentieth century this perception led to a comparison of the modern Israelis with the American pioneers. In both cases, Arabs were – on the contrary – perceived as a continual threat to the Hebrews, i.e. not only to the modern Israelis but also to the Israelites in the United States (Suleiman 1989: 258).

Suleiman (1989) sees a third difference between Europe and the United States that results from the American experiences of the settlement era. As Suleiman (1989) argues, the early American settlers developed an ideology of Savagism that was regarded to protect them, as civilized people, from the “uncivilized” Indians (Native Americans) who had to be either Christianized or eliminated to protect the settlers from becoming uncivilized savages as well. According to the author, in the twentieth century this ideology of Savagism and the original orientation toward Indians was broadened to the Arabs as well, and here especially to Palestinian Arabs in their conflict with Israel (Suleiman 1989: 258). Last but not least, in the nineteenth century the establishment of Christian missionaries in Arab and Muslim countries and the attempt to convert Muslims to Christianity further shaped the negative perception of the region. According to

Suleiman (1989), the reports and books that the Christian missionaries wrote about the different countries that they lived in were mainly negative (Suleiman 1989: 259).

The historical development and relevance of the Oriental myth may be summarized with Sardar's argument that...

[...] underlying the complexity of the history of the West there is a continuity of stance to a necessary construct that is called the Orient. The overriding opinions were set when information was most limited and as information expanded its meaning and effect for the internal purposes of the West changed, but continuity was the essential feature of the Orient. (Sardar 1999: 52)

As Sardar (1999) indicates here, the origins for the developed oriental image can be traced back to the times of the Christian Crusades and have since then formed the elementary features according to which the Otherness of the Orient was constructed, not only but also in literary and artistic genres.

2.3. The Oriental Image Today: A Taken-for-Granted Myth

Thus, when we look at present day perceptions of Arab and Muslim countries and actors, we have to be aware of this taken-for-granted myth that assumes a general difference between Orient and Occident. Present day references towards the idea of an Oriental Otherness as they might be found in German or U.S. mass media thereby are regarded as a continuation of this tradition of summarizing a geographical and cultural region under the concept of Orient. The confrontation of two cultural and geographical areas like the Orient and the Occident is not a new idea, even though some political and cultural analysts have argued that this confrontation line was replaced to some extent for a few decades by the East-West confrontation during the Cold War era.³³

Concerning the present day perceptions of the Orient, a number of the studies that have been introduced in I.2 have also referred to this historical dimension of present day images.³⁴ In the already mentioned study by Artz and Pollock (1995) the authors note, for example, that reporters for non-fictional newspapers and television news also use existing cultural beliefs about an Oriental distinction, for example to frame the Persian Gulf crisis. As both authors argue here, this is first and foremost due to the fact that news professionals and entertainment professionals in the U.S. share the same cultural heritage, and thus also "factual" non-entertainment images of the Oriental Other "reinforce their fictional counterparts" (Artz and Pollock 1995: 124).

In the same book, Wiegand and Malek (1995) argue that modern mass media have continuously used stereotypical and ethnocentric thought in their perception and portrayal of the Oriental Other. The authors emphasize that the violent aspect has come to dominate the Western

³³ See for example Huntington (1996), or Rotter (1993) who argues, for example, that the collapse of the Communist regimes and the end of the East-West conflict has also led to the dissolving of the hostile stereotypes that were associated with this confrontation. At the same time, a new hostile stereotype stepped into the vacant spot that was an old and well known one though: the Orient, and more precisely, Islam and especially the Arab Muslims. According to the author, this new hostile stereotype was especially reinforced by Saddam Hussein's annexing of Kuwait which resulted in the Second Gulf War in 1990-91 (Rotter, 1993: 44-45).

perception of the Orient especially since the 1970s due to numerous crises and conflicts in the region (Wiegand and Malek 1995: 204).³⁵ One of the examples that the authors mention here is the foreign news coverage of U.S. mass media has increasingly focused on the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and the establishment of a militant streak of Islamic fundamentalism, especially in the context of countries like Egypt, Lebanon, or Israel and Palestine (Wiegand and Malek 1995: 205).

Thus the present day perceptions of the Orient are mainly shaped by a strong focus on Islamic militants, fundamentalists, terrorism, and violence, still ignoring largely the possible diversities among Arab and Muslim cultures, religious sections, or historical circumstances of political and violent conflicts. As Hafez (2002) argues, this Oriental concept occurs as a well-established, timeless and largely unchallenged myth that is not bound to specific topics but can appear in nearly every context that refers to Islam or the Middle East. Despite the changing topics over the last decades, the Oriental construction is a continuous element of the news coverage on this cultural and geographical region. The only thing that changes in the different contexts of its usage – according to Hafez (2002) – is the focused-on dimension and the emphasized facet of the Oriental image (Hafez 2002: 293-311).³⁶ For the following analysis we may therefore assumed that the Oriental myth is also of central relevance in the context of the coping with the 9/11 attacks when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are focused on. The comparative analysis of German and U.S. mass media may also reveal some of the current Oriental facets and the relevance of the Oriental myth in German and U.S. mass media when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are constructed.

Media Usage of the Terms “Arab” and “Muslim”

At this point, some final comments have to be made about the usage of the terms “Arab” and “Muslim” in the context of my analysis. Following the considerations of the last few pages, it can be said that the concept of Orient is used synonymously with the concepts of Islam and Arabs. Therefore, when in the following we use the term “Oriental Other” this is equated with referring to Arab or Muslim countries and actors. This decision can be supported by the simple fact that the same synonymous use of the terms can be found in the analyzed set of mass media.³⁷ In the analyzed data, the terms “Orient,” “Arab,” or “Muslim” are very often used interchangeably in

³⁴ See, for instance, Campbell (1995), Fuller (1995), Kamalipour (1995), McAlister (2005), Said (1981), Shaheen (1984, 2001), or Wöhlert (2004).

³⁵ Here, examples are, for instance, the continuing conflict between Israel and Palestine, the oil crisis in 1973, the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, or the Lebanese civil war that started in the mid-1970s.

³⁶ For instance, for the German print media context Hafez has shown that up to the 1960s the Oriental focus was dominated by rather positive depictions of Oriental royal dynasties. This changed however with the Iranian Revolution, when the former positive image was replaced by an increasing Islamization and a growing politicization. In the course of this change, new topical foci were established that included issues like fundamentalism, terrorism, or the oppression of women (Hafez 2002: 293-311). This shift can be assumed to have become even more manifest in the media after the terrorist attacks of 2001.

³⁷ The media selection will be introduced in chapter III.2.3.

the various contexts in which they are applied, or they at least remain rather undefined according to their distinctiveness.³⁸

Furthermore, a combined usage of these terms includes two central connotations that are closely connected with the considerations that have been made so far. First of all, the combined usage of both labels indicates the broadness of the Oriental concept. Second, the usage of both terms indicates the two central aspects that shape the Oriental myth which has an influence on the Western perception of the observed countries and actors and which is also assumed to be reflected in the mass media images of the same: the Orient is regarded as different on a geographical dimension (i.e. Arab countries) and on a cultural or religious dimension (i.e. Islam and Muslim countries).

As scholars like Suleiman (1989) have noted, also historically often no distinction was made for example between Arabs and other residents of the area under Ottoman rule. Even though they might have been given different names (depending on the region they were living in) or slightly different attributes, they were nevertheless all perceived as wild, cruel or savage.³⁹ As the author argues, also in the present day context most Americans do not distinguish between Arabs and Muslims and think that both terms are synonymous. To some extent, this might be due to the fact, that the vast majority of Arab people are Muslims.⁴⁰ The indefinite character of the term “Arab” is furthermore increased by the fact that – according to Suleiman (1989) – Americans also do not distinguish between Arabs, Turks, or Iranians, which can lead to the result that a potential conflict with one of those countries is perceived as a conflict with “Arabs” in general (Suleiman 1989: 257-258). In the context of the 9/11 attacks, this became quite obvious when the religious and political aggression of a few terrorists caused the assumption that “a network of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists has spread out over Europe and the whole world.”⁴¹

Therefore, in the following analysis, both terms are used in combination. Not all of the occurring actors are Muslims, just as not all of them are of Arab origin. Nevertheless, the analyzed mass media predominantly do not distinguish between the concepts when they identify actors from the observed regions. In the particular contexts in which certain actors appear, we may find a differentiation according to national origin, just as some of the occurring actors may or may not be (additionally or solely) referred to as being Muslims. And comparing the German and American mass media, German news more often use the label “Muslims” than “Arabs” to refer

³⁸ Other authors like Ghareeb (1983) or Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) have also argued that American media generalize both categories and tend to report on Muslims and Arabs within the United States but also abroad in the same stories and use the terms as if they were interchangeable (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 137).

³⁹ For example, the name “Arabs” was given to those people who were living in the desert, whereas people from North Africa were referred to as “Moors,” and those from Egypt as “Mamelukes” (see also Suleiman 1989: 257).

⁴⁰ Even though, as for example Shaheen (2001) has emphasized, we can also count more than fifteen million Arab Christians (Shaheen 2001: 2-3).

⁴¹ This statement was given by the then German Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily in an interview with the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL (Sp-01-i39: 32-34). The quotation was taken from the analyzed print media set. From now on, the newspaper references will be abbreviated according to the following structure: abbreviated name of the medium-year-volume-issue: page (for the news magazines) and abbreviated name of the medium-year-month-day: page (for the newspapers).

to those actors who live within Germany, whereas in the U.S. we can at least find a distinction being made between Muslim Americans and Arab Americans.

Nevertheless, in the analyzed data set for this book the labels “Muslim” or “Arab” are predominantly used synonymously and interchangeably, for instance when several countries come under one label. U.S. media refer, for example, to “the vast majority of Muslims, Arab and non-Arab alike,” and talk of “Arab regimes,” “Muslim countries in the Middle East” or “the Arab world” when referring to countries ranging from Algeria and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. German mass media construct the “Arab world” as part of an overall “Islamic world” and thereby also refer to countries like Saudi Arabia as well as Turkey, or label the Middle East as the “central area of Islam.” Although both concepts are somehow differentiated, it is not clear at what point the difference becomes relevant or not. An editorial commentary in the American NEWSWEEK claims that, as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks “Learning Arabic would be an especially patriotic act. Or international economic development to bolster moderate Muslims,”⁴² indicating that both actions refer to the same group of people.

And the following quotation from the NEW YORK TIMES illustrates how broad the geographical radius is when the Arab-Muslim world is focused on:

Many of these super-empowered angry people hail from failing states in the Muslim and third world. They do not share our values, they resent America’s influence over their lives, politics and children, not to mention our support for Israel, and they often blame America for the failure of their societies to master modernity.[...] So what is required to fight a war against such people in such a world? To start with, we as Americans will never be able to penetrate such small groups, often based on family ties, who live in places such as Afghanistan, Pakistan or Lebanon’s wild Bekaa Valley.[...] We need to have a serious and respectful dialogue with the Muslim world and its political leaders about why many of its people are falling behind. The fact is, no region in the world, including sub-Saharan Africa, has fewer freely elected governments than the Arab-Muslim world, which has none. (NYT-01-09-13: 27)

To come to a conclusion, we can say that one central assumption for the following analysis is that the Western perspective on Arab and Muslim countries and thus the German and American worldview is shaped by the taken-for-granted myth of a contrast between two geographical and cultural entities that confront each other: Occident and Orient. As I have outlined throughout the last subchapter, one crucial element of this myth is the idea that both geographical and cultural entities are assumed to be DISTANT from each other, and here not only with regard to the geographical dimension but also on the political, economic, and especially on the cultural dimension. This distance is furthermore taken as an indicator for DIFFERENCE as well.

Thus, when we look at the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims we have to take into account that this perception and the images of Arabs and Muslims that are communicated for instance in mass media are shaped by a well established myth of a contrast between two geographically distant and culturally distinct entities: the West (Occident) and the East (Orient). As was outlined, this myth has developed and institutionalized as a form of taken-for-granted knowledge that is consulted by the West to observe and explain the actions and behavior of the

Oriental counterpart, and to compare and evaluate this counterpart according to the Western rules and principles that are taken as a yardstick and structuring pattern for the classification and estimation of social events and action.

For both the German as well as the American context, I assume that the comparison between the German and U.S. national self-concept and Arab and Muslim countries and actors in mass media is guided by this myth to a significant extent. It is expected that this also has an influence on the evaluation of the occurring Arabs and Muslims with regard to the Western standard principles. As might be expected from the outlined facets of the Oriental myth, those effects may be predominantly negative.

3. The Construction of a Collective Self and Otherness

After having outlined the relevant societal criteria, principles, and myths that are regarded to shape the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims, the last subchapter will discuss a third aspect that I assume to be central for the media imaging of Arabs and Muslims. We may approach this theoretical level with two questions: First of all, we could ask, why is it important for actors in the world society to not only negotiate their societal principles but actually – in doing so – also to permanently negotiate their own collective identity or self-image? And second, why does this process of self-definition work via the observation and construction of a distinguished group with which the society's own principles, rules, and structures are compared and through which they are communicated?

To answer those questions, the last section of this chapter will introduce some theoretical assumptions for the relevance of the concept of the Other in the construction of social structures, norms, and collectivities. It will be shown that on the one hand, the construction of difference is regarded as central for the reduction of global and social complexity of the observed environment. At the same time, however, the construction of difference is also directed towards the inside, as it communicates and evaluates central rules and guidelines for the members of a (in our case national) group.

When we look at the way in which difference between groups and societies but also between members within a group or society is constructed, theoretical approaches of the social disciplines that become relevant here have focused on the field of intergroup relations as well as on the role of boundary drawing and collective identity construction. What can be looked at for instance is the different ways in which ethnic or other social groups deal with each other and out of what motivation they form groups. A large spectrum of sociological and social-psychological research in this area has concentrated on the study of ethnic groups and has looked for example at ethnic minority groups and their status in society. Other studies have analyzed the topic of collective or social identity construction in this context and have analyzed and compared ethnic or national identities in Western countries. Or, studies in the political sciences have concentrated, for

⁴² NW-01-v138-i14: 63

example, on national citizenship rights and have discussed the structural and formal definition of minority or immigrant groups and the interrelation of citizenship and national identity definition.

The following analysis aims at describing the perceptions that can be found of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. media and the images that result from those perceptions. One central idea in this context is that these perceptions and images are strongly influenced by the national self-perceptions of Germany and the United States. Thus, we will also look for ascribed images and communicated collective self-descriptions. The construction of Arabs and Muslims in mass media is regarded as an example of how national self-images are defined and communicated, and how boundaries are drawn between the society's own collective concept of belonging and the outside of this concept. The analyzed images are assumed to reflect and summarize the societal communication processes about national group concepts and the characteristics and features that are regarded as relevant for these concepts by the respective (German or U.S.) societies. And, by identifying and summarizing the central dimensions of difference that are referred to in the context of Arab and Muslim actors in Western mass media, the analysis will redraw the demarcation line between the constructed concept of a German or U.S. self-image and one representative of the outside of this concept: the Oriental (Arab and Muslim) Other. The actual process of identity construction is therefore less central here; the analyzed images and communicated group concepts in mass media are rather considered to form sets of knowledge and ideas that may then have an influence on the actual process of identity construction and active identity definition as it is analyzed by other studies.

Based on those assumptions, I will first of all outline some general assumptions for the question, why a collective self-image or a concept of belonging is relevant for individuals and groups. Here, some social-psychological considerations will be consulted that deal with the construction and definition of collective identities in the world society. Subsequently, and also resulting from those assumptions, some considerations will be introduced for the question why an Other is needed for the concept of self, and how the different possible roles of this Other can be summarized. Here, some social-anthropological considerations about ethnic group relations and the construction of boundaries constructions within or between groups and societies will be consulted. The role of the geographical distance and the construction of (geographically, but also political, cultural, symbolic, etc.) difference are regarded as two key elements. Last but not least, some basic assumptions will be introduced for example from the sociological field of deviance theories that offer an explanation for the evaluation and portrayal of largely negative features in the media constructions of Arabs and Muslims.

3.1. Why do We Need a Collective Self Image?

But first of all, let us start with a rather general question: Why does difference matter? This question can actually be divided up into two sub-questions that open up two central theoretical assumptions about concepts of belonging or collectivity. First of all, we may ask why the definition of a collective self-image is relevant for actors (individuals as well as groups). Second, we could ask why this definition mainly works via the differentiation and demarcation of an outgroup.

To answer those questions, we may start from a rather general sociological definition according to which the self-concept or self-image summarizes the beliefs, attitudes, expectations, evaluations, and opinions that an individual holds in terms of their own physical, psychological, social, and behavioral characteristics, skills, values, or interests etc.⁴³ Those beliefs and evaluations of the individual about their own image mainly refer to the individual level of the conceptualization of self, but they may also be applied to the level of collective concepts of group affiliations, for example in the form of a national collectivity. On a national or cultural level – two aspects that are basically focused on in the context of this analysis – collective concepts of “nation” or Western “culture” can form comprehensive reference systems for actors. These reference systems may help the members of a society to locate themselves and other actors in a (world) society and may offer certain patterns according to which social phenomena and actions can be classified and evaluated.

One approach that can give an answer to the question why the Self needs a concept of collective belonging can be found in the considerations of Weller (2000) who also brings us back to the theoretical assumptions about the world society that were discussed in II.1.1. Weller (2000) looks at collective identities and identity construction in the world society and in this context emphasizes the distinction between society formation and community formation.⁴⁴ The author, thereby, follows Weber’s distinction of “community” and “society” as two dimensions of the world society. As Weller (2000) argues:

For Weber [...] the ideal-typical distinction between society and community formation is based on a difference of attitude that lies at the root of these two forms of social relationship. Community formation is not motivated by interests, but comes about on the basis of a feeling of belonging (Weller 2000: 46).

According to this perception, specific expressions of community formation are forms of social fragmentation like nationalism, ethnicity, or separatism. Weller (2000) argues that a significant proportion of social action can be defined as community formation rather than as rationally motivated formation of society, though both forms of formation are regarded as modes of social relation that “exist in a constant interrelationship with one another, neither of which can replace the other because each of them performs a specific function within human society as a whole” (Weller 2000: 45).

⁴³ This definition was derived from Klima (1994) given in the German LEXIKON ZUR SOZIOLOGIE, edited by Fuchs-Heinritz et al.

⁴⁴ One example of society formation here would be the development of a world society or a German society as a global or national society formation.

The author thus provides an answer to the question of what motivations lay behind community formation and why we need a collective self-image or concept. Weller (2000) argues that the individual's need for a positive social identity can be regarded as the basic motivation for the construction of a self-image or self-collectivity. According to this assumption, the striving for a positive identity is therefore also central for community formation in social relations. Weller (2000) thereby adopts the social-psychological approach of the social identity theory that was originally formulated by Tajfel and Turner.⁴⁵ He derives a definition for collective identity according to which a collective group concept can be identified "when a number of individuals accept a social categorization that enables them to differentiate themselves as a group from the rest of the world" (Weller 2000: 46). Social identity concepts, therefore, are cognitive representations that reflect elements of the self-concept. In this process, it is assumed that groups rank themselves higher than a potential outgroup from which they demarcate themselves, and thereby strengthen their self-esteem. Weller (2000) describes this as follows:

[...] the desire and striving for a positive self-image is the driving force behind the evaluation of social categories and groups, because there is an individual advantage to be derived from a positive evaluation of categories and groups of which one is oneself a member. (Weller 2000: 46)

Following this approach, we can say that national and other community concepts can be regarded as constructions of belonging and exclusion that demarcate an outgroup on the basis of certain categories that allow the members of a collective group to structure the perceptions of their environment. As I already said before, according to Anderson (2005) these constructions of community are regarded as existing mainly in a mental sense, i.e. in the imagination of the actors who define them and who identify with this imagined community even though they do not know every member of this collective group (Anderson 2005: 14-16).

And Weller (2000) offers another answer to the question of why concepts of belonging are so crucial for the individual when he argues that "the categories used to draw boundaries between groups and to attach a lower value to the out-group are not given from the start, but are based on the respective perceptions of reality of those involved" (Weller 2000: 61). When we define ourselves according to social categories we are able to orient ourselves within our social environment. Categorization is decisive because categories segment the world. Again, Weller (2000) here adopts this aspect from social identity theory when he argues that the grouping and

⁴⁵ In short, Tajfel and Turner have combined concepts of social categorization, social identity, social comparison, and social distinction and have derived a concept that will here only be shortly outlined. The following summary is adopted from Mummendey and Otten (1992: 98-101). Via the process of social categorization, individuals classify and structure the social world on the basis of characteristics and value-dimensions into social categories and groups. They thereby differentiate between categories that they themselves belong to and categories that they do not belong to themselves, and so distinguish between ingroup and outgroup. The process of categorization helps the individual to orientate him- or herself in the social world and define their own position in this world. This constructed belonging to a certain (in)group and the relationships of an ingroup to other groups shapes the social identity of individuals. Individual receive their information about the characteristics of their social identity via social comparison with other groups. One crucial point for the following analysis is that – according to this approach – every individual strives to have, to maintain, and to increase a positive social identity. This can be established when the social comparison between ingroup and outgroup produces positive results in favor of the ingroup. For further details on social identity theory see – amongst others – Abrams (1990), Mummendey and Simon (1997), Tajfel (1982), or Turner (1987).

classification of other individuals or groups on the basis of perceived similarities and differences is due to cognitive economy:

Without such a categorization we would be unable to deal with the enormous variety of stimulations reaching our consciousness. The order we create in this way, however, contributes not only to self-orientation but also to the structuring of the world in terms of categories and of the social world in terms of groups, and this enables each individual to find an answer to the question, “Who am I?” (Weller 2000: 62).

Thus, we can say that the perception of Self and Other is mainly influenced by the structures of the social world that shape the different categories with which an individual (or in our case a national group) observes its environment. Arguing with the world polity approach, these categories are expected to be shaped mainly by the commonly shared Western principles, norms, and normative patterns that provide the central objectives and orientations for the individual and collective actors in a society. As has been emphasized before, these Western principles are not only nationally institutionalized but are also used to structure the perception of the environment of the members of the German or American national community and are thus consulted as well to structure and evaluate the complexity beyond the national borders, for example when Arab and Muslim countries are focused on.

It can be concluded therefore, that a conception of self (on whatever level) is crucial for individual as well as collective actors to define themselves in their inner structure of views, opinions and behavior, and to position themselves in their external environment. On the one hand, the self-concept is therefore part of the individual’s personality that has an impact on the individual’s actions. On the other hand, the concept itself can be the object of observation and negotiation. The self-concept does not only develop out of the self-observation of the individual’s (or group’s) own behavior or the own inner (cognitive and physical/emotional) processes, but that it is also shaped by examination of the social environment.

3.2. Why do We Need the Other?

At this point, the Other comes into play. When I assume that the construction of the self-concept is shaped by interaction with the social environment, the imagining of a self-community involves at the same time the imagining of an Other from whom the Self is distinct.

Who is the Other?

In sociological research, the Other as a social concept can be seen as one of the central themes for the analysis of societies and intergroup relations. However, in the context of different research foci, different forms of Others can be distinguished:

On the one hand, the Other can be a PART of a society. This form of otherness within a society can either refer to individuals who are demarcated from certain branches of society, for example because of their deviant behavior (e.g. delinquents, or ill people). A number of studies on social

deviance have focused on the group of delinquent Others in society and have tried to analyze the images and functions those outsiders have for a society.⁴⁶ Furthermore, according to the analytical tradition that looks at the sociology of the stranger,⁴⁷ the Other can also be a foreigner or stranger in our own culture or society, who crosses the collective (national) borders and who – as Simmel (1968) argues – comes but also leaves again. Shimada (2006) refers to those temporary visitors as “intra-Western” Others, a particular population group of modern Western societies who stand outside the context of their own society. These Others are regarded however as “nearby” Others that are not consequently very different from the host society’s own self-concept (Shimada 2006: 85-86, see also Schütz 1971). Examples of this Other are the group of Jews in Western societies⁴⁸ or the economic traveler.⁴⁹ And as for the internal immigrant Other, the broad research field of ethnic and minority studies but also a large number of media studies has focused on this group of Others, the way they are perceived by their host society and the problems that may result from those perceptions. The group of Arab and Muslim immigrants that will also be focused on in the following analysis can be seen as one representative of this internal immigrant Other.

On the other hand, the Other can also stand OUTSIDE of society, as an external figure who is placed outside of the geographical borders of a society, and who – according to Shimada (2006) can for example be labeled as those “who are not part of modern Western civilization” (Shimada 2006: 86). In the context of our analysis, the observed Arab and Muslim countries and actors in German and U.S. mass media could be classified as those external Others that are observed by the German and U.S. Self from the outside.

For all these conceptions, I assume that the social comparison with those different forms of otherness is important for the structuring and evaluation of a nation’s collective self-perception. As Mummendey and Simon (1997) assume,⁵⁰ this distinction and comparison between self-concept and an outgroup predominantly aims at positively enhancing the Self, mainly by devaluating the Other.⁵¹ Inevitably, it seems, the construction of a collective Self mainly works via the identification or construction of DIFFERENCE. This consequently means that the construction of a Self has to be based on an idea of what is regarded as non-Self and therefore presents a difference or a constructed outside.⁵²

⁴⁶ See here, for instance, Becker (1973), Sibley (1995), or Young (2006).

⁴⁷ According to Stichweh (1997), this tradition “documents the near universal tendency of societies to classify some social entities as strangers, and to build social structures on the basis of these classifications” (Stichweh 1997: 45-64).

⁴⁸ An example that was introduced by Simmel (1968) one of the classical representatives that can be mentioned here.

⁴⁹ For more current research and theoretical elaborations on the stranger see, for instance, Bielefeld (1991), Münkler et al. (1997), or Stichweh (1997, 2002).

⁵⁰ But see also Abrams (1990), Tajfel (1982), or Turner (1987).

⁵¹ Billig (1995) points out that the Other in this context is not a homogenous one, but can be subdivided into various groups of Others, that are distinguished on the basis of different focused characteristics and criteria. The author lists for example the different stereotypes that are ascribed to different nationalities and points out that some of those outgroups are presumed to be more admirable and appreciated than others, or even more like “us” (Billig 1995: 80).

Borders and Boundaries

One object of investigation to approach this construction of difference is the analysis of borders as social and symbolic boundaries. Diez (2006) ascribes borders and boundaries the defining role in the construction of political system or, in more general terms, political order. According to the author, borders establish a certain structure by defining constitutive units (Diez 2006: 180-181). Similarly, Weller (2000) argues that community formation is associated to a large extent with the drawing of boundaries. He supports this thesis with the fact that identity formation requires a demarcation of one's own group from those individuals who do not belong to the group (Weller 2000: 47).

In the anthropological field, this idea can – among others – be traced back to the theoretical works of Barth (1969) and Cohen (1982, 1986). Adopting the assumptions of these authors, communities or collectivities exist only by virtue of their opposition to another community or collective group, and are therefore a construction that is based on a relational perception that implies both similarity and difference. Boundaries are therefore constructed by actors in their interaction with others from whom they wish to distinguish themselves (Donnan and Wilson 2001: 24). Ethnic groups – and this is assumed for the national collectivity as well in our context – are thus socially constructed. As Barth (1969) notes, ethnic groups – or more generally speaking – collectivities “are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the characteristics of organizing interaction between people” (Barth 1969: 10). What has to be noted in this context is that cultural definitions, symbols, or depicted differences are thus significant only insofar as they are socially effective. “The members are marked off or mark themselves off from other collectivities in a process of inclusion and exclusion which differentiates and categorizes ‘us’ from ‘them’” (Donnan and Wilson 2001: 21-22), and they do so to create a boundary that helps to demarcate and thereby structure their environment.

Therefore, what are centrally focused on are not only the group constructions but the boundaries between the groups. For Cohen (1982), the construction of boundaries has been the key focus of his series of books that has been mentioned earlier. Referring to Barth's idea, Cohen (1982) argues, for instance, that a community's awareness of its own distinct criteria is crucial for the way in which the members of this group will express their attachment to it. For the author, the boundaries of a group are the places at which the group's definition becomes relevant and meaningful when a group engages with others (Cohen 1982: 3). Cohen (1982) furthermore notes “that people become aware of their culture when they stand at its boundaries. [...] But we do not simply become aware of our culture: we also attribute value to it, positively or negatively, and accordingly attribute values to the culture which confronts our own. We are not, therefore, merely aware of our distinctness, but we tend to value it as well” (Cohen 1982: 3, 5).

⁵² An interesting book that not only deals with different theoretical approaches to the relevance of difference but also discusses the construction of difference in the context of different contemporary issues like the integration of Muslims in Norway or identity formation in “Creole” societies was published by Rottenburg et al. (2006).

Even though the author mainly outlines those assumptions in the context of an ethnographic analysis of group membership and belonging in the context of the anthropology of Great Britain, his ideas can also be applied to the following analysis that looks at mass media constructions of belonging and boundaries between Western societies and an Oriental Other, when we assume that in order to construct a Self, the Other is a crucial element. The categories of self and otherness can be regarded as basic categories for cognitive and social differentiation. This differentiation not only helps to reduce the complexity of the environment, but is also needed to demarcate the environment by defining, what is part of the self-concept and what is not. We can say therefore that the drawing of a boundary or demarcation line between Self and Other is the first and central step toward a concept of belonging. At the same time, it is a cognitive delimitation that is based on the assumption of dissimilarity between both sides.

Evaluation of the Other

In addition to the aspect of an assumed difference between the concept of Self and the Other, Cohen's (1982) approach also implies a second assumption: the Self not only observes the Other but will consequently also evaluate it as a distinct entity. For the following analysis we may assume that this evaluation takes place on the basis of the valuation pattern of the Western values and principles, because those principles have developed over time and have proved their appropriateness to the members of the ingroup over time (Cohen 1982: 5).

Similarly, Fuchs et al. (1995) point out the aspect of evaluation in their analysis on nationalism and ethnocentrism in Western Europe, where they argue that the drawing of a boundary between Self and Other has a double significance as it not only presents a cognitive delimitation but can also help to evaluate Self and Other. Referring to a potential national outgroup, they note that:

They are not only dissimilar from the in-group (cognitive) but also inferior to the in-group (evaluative). [...] Through a cognitive and evaluative construction (imagination) of "us" and "them", through internal *attraction* and external *rejection*, the identity of a collectivity is constituted. (Fuchs et al. 1995: 165-166) [emphasis by the authors]

This assumption brings us back to the social identity approach which suggests that – due to the striving for a positive self-image – different strategies are used by the Self to achieve a positive distinction from the Other. According to Mummendey and Otten (1992), the Self may for example leave a certain group with a lower status to advance to a group with a higher status. Another possibility that seems relevant in the context of our analysis is that the level of comparison is changed, for example, by choosing a different dimension of comparison between Self and Other according to which the Self comes off better than the Other, or by choosing a different outgroup for comparison with the Self (Mummendey and Otten 1992: 101-102). Regardless of which strategy is used for the comparison between Self and Other, this comparison is shaped by an evaluation of the two sides that aims at a positive result for the self-image.

Besides a positive self-affirmation, the evaluation of the Other is also assumed to strengthen ingroup cohesion and the norms that are decisive for the self-concept. Billig (1995), for instance,

mentions a study by Quattrone (1986) who found that people ascribe more stereotypic traits to outgroups than to ingroups. The author concludes that the Self more often assumes itself and its own collectively shared principles and values as the standard, or an unmarked normality, against which the deviations of the Other are noted and emphasized (Billig 1995: 81). We may say, therefore, that the features and characteristics of the Other are identified and evaluated on the basis of a set of standard criteria like Western principles which form a normative pattern by Western countries like Germany or the United States.

At the same time, this construction of deviance can serve as a contribution to social order, to the definition and accomplishment of societal rules and principles, and to the manifestation and strengthening of the collective conscience. Here, we can also consult Durkheim's (1976, 1992) considerations about the differentiation between normal and pathological phenomena.⁵³ If we adopt this perspective and alter it for our broader perspective of the construction of difference, the following assumptions are possible. One of Durkheim's (1976, 1992) theses is that deviance can help to define the moral boundaries which distinguish between right and wrong. Those boundaries can symbolize the established normative conventions of a society and communicate to its members what is expected of them (see also Pfohl 1985: 179-180). If we alter this thesis, we could derive the assumption that difference between Self and Other defines the collective boundaries between the two concepts of belonging, and that the communication of this difference can be understood as a communication of societal rules.

In addition to that, Durkheim (1976, 1992) also assumes that deviance strengthens the collective conscience or, in other words, the internal solidarity of a group (see also Pfohl 1985: 180). Following this argument, the ingroup solidarity of national collectives may also be strengthened by the construction and demarcation of Arab and Muslim actors that are portrayed as lacking the favored or postulated Western principles, structures, and norms. In the context of devastating events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks that are directed against a national group like the United States, an increasing emphasis on the deviance of Arab and Muslim actors (for example in the construction of the 9/11 terrorists) can not only re-emphasize the moral boundaries of the Western Self but also may help to strengthen the social bonds of the non-deviant Western insiders against the terrorist enemy.

We may conclude that the evaluation of an Other or outgroup and its construction as negative or deviant from standard norms and rules not only has negative, but also positive effects. It can help a society to maintain and stabilize the social system and the societal organization. The construction of deviance and the demarcation of actors not only as geographical outsiders (outgroup) but also as normative outsiders (deviating from norms and rules) may also help to strengthen ingroup cohesion as it signals to the members of the ingroup where the borders of the

⁵³ Here, Durkheim (1976, 1992) distinguishes between those features that are functional ("healthy") for a society and those that are dysfunctional ("unhealthy, pathological"). In this context, he chooses the phenomenon of criminality to illustrate this distinction, and argues that the pathological features (here criminality) are nevertheless crucial and useful. For more details see Durkheim (1976, 1992).

group are located and what features or criteria are relevant and expected from the members of the group.⁵⁴

3.3. The Self/Other Nexus as a Boundary-Formation Process

We can summarize, therefore, that to explain and understand the images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media the focus of the following analysis also has to include the concepts of German and American belonging and collectivity that form the basis for processes of identity formation. We will thus also look at the self-images or group concepts that occur in mass media of both countries to identify the relevant categories that are formed or already exist in the Western perception of the social world and that create the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup, i.e. the German and U.S. Self and the Arab and Muslim Other. The major reason that was elaborated for the question of why concepts of self and otherness are negotiated in mass media (and in the societies they are embedded in), is the construction of a collective identity concept or, in more general terms, the formation of community. The focus of this analysis thereby does not lie in the exploration of the process of identity formation but of the concepts of belonging and collectivity that form the knowledge frame for those processes.

Based on the theoretical assumptions that have been outlined, the construction of collectivities can take place on different societal and geographical levels, which reflects the variety of contexts in which self-imaging can be relevant. Geographically, differentiations between Self and Other take place on a national level, distinguishing a German or U.S. nationality and the national affiliation of the Arab and Muslim Other. Furthermore, when we also take into account the Oriental myth, differentiation between Self and Other may also take place on the broader geographical level of cultural areas, here the West and the Orient. Socially, difference could be constructed between the Christian and the Islamic religion, whereas on a political dimension, a distinction could be established between democratic and undemocratic political systems. In all these contexts, the construction of Self and Other is marked by the perception and assumption of DIFFERENCE.

⁵⁴ One specific form of devaluation that summarizes some of those aspects mentioned here is the construction of hostile stereotypes of Arabs, Muslims, or Islam that has been frequently analyzed in sociological and especially in social-psychological studies. A number of the media studies that have been introduced in chapter I.2 argue that the images of Arabs and Muslims in Western Media depict them as enemies – creating a negative and counterpart hostile stereotype. See here especially Ateş (2006), Brüggem and Jäger (2003), Klemm and Hörner (1993), Kliche et al. (1998, 1999), Palmbach and Kempf (1994), or Wagener (1999), but also Poerksen (2000). Wagener (1999), for instance, has given an introduction to and a historical overview of the concept of hostile stereotypes and here integrates the role of hostile stereotypes into the larger context of constructions of otherness. And Poerksen (2000) argues that hostile stereotypes are constructions of an Other that the Self does not communicate with and are therefore especially rigid agglomerations of negative conceptions of an Other. This also makes hostile stereotypes especially stable and hardly modifiable (Poerksen 2000: 38-39). To some extent, hostile stereotype constructions of Arabs and Muslims or Islam overlap with the negative facets of the Oriental myth that have been introduced before. However, for the following analysis a one-sided focus on hostile stereotypes seems to be insufficient when we aim at grasping the overall complexity of the media depictions of Arabs and Muslims.

In order to define this difference – the constructing Self has to know what it is not, if it is to define what it is. The observing Self not only defines what is part of the own concept but also observes, defines, and evaluates the concept of those who are not regarded as part of the Self. Therefore, the Self constructs an image or concept of the Other that distances the same from its own group concept. With regard to the following object of investigation, the German as well as the U.S. perception of the Arab and Muslim Other is shaped by a number of central aspects.

(1) The Oriental Other is regarded as distinct and distinguishable as an object – this is necessary to identify it as different. It is measured by the Self according to the valuation patterns of Western principles since we can assume that the Self regards itself as the “standard.” (2) Those principles, structures and values are, at the same time, regarded as absolute and uncontested from the viewpoint of the Western observer. (3) The Other is constituted as largely lacking the Western principles, structures, and values. To what extent the Other lacks those features will be elaborated in the following analysis. (4) The observation of Arab and Muslim actors and their comparison with the Western Self is regarded as being not only done to be communicated to the Other but also to members of the Self. By realizing the precariousness of those who lack the Self’s standards (here: Western principles) the certainty of those standards is confirmed and the Self is strengthened in its own values and principles.⁵⁵

Thus, besides difference, the assumption of DISTANCE and the construction of BOUNDARIES are regarded as relevant criteria for the conceptions of Self and Other. By assuming an essential difference and geographic, cultural, economic, or other distances the Other can be distanced as a whole – not only geographically but also with regard to its cultural, personal, or other features, as will be elaborated in more detail in the next chapters. The construction of difference enables the Self to safely distance the Other, for instance, when it may present a threat to social, economic, or other resources and structures. Furthermore, the distancing of the Other helps to ignore or symbolically exclude negative features in one’s own society. In the context of the following analysis, it will thus be interesting to see what forms of distancing or demarcation can be identified in the mass media images of Arabs and Muslims that may not only work via a geographical differentiation but are also constructed via cultural, political, and other features.

Arabs and Muslims – in the following – serve as an object of investigation with which we can not only show what Western principles are regarded as relevant, but also demonstrated what consequences a lack of those principles has. The German and U.S. Self – according to this scale – is thereby expected to be predominantly regarded as higher developed than the observed Arab and Muslim Other. However, one ambition of this book is to find out whether the image of the Arab and Muslim Other is really solely negative as most of the other studies have argued that

⁵⁵ Kliche et al. (1999) very similarly argue that the Self constructs an image of the Other that denounces most of the Other’s features to establish and communicate the social norms to the members of the own group. Those social norms like civilized behavior, rationality, efficiency, technological progress, democracy that the authors refer to as “ethos of a machiavellistically reduced modernity” can be seen as what we refer to as the Western principles (Kliche et al. 1999: 316-319).

have been introduced in chapter I.2. The evaluation of other countries and actors can also turn out positive, or the Self may also discover similarities and a certain degree of proximity with the Other. The study will analyze whether and how German and U.S. mass media integrate those similarities and proximity, how the differentiation and evaluation of Arabs and Muslims is carried out and what influence the Western principles have in this context.

4. Conclusion: Basic Theoretical Assumptions and Guiding Research Questions

Basic Theoretical Assumptions

Altogether, we can summarize the following assumptions that form the basis for the analysis at hand. First of all, the neo-institutional world polity approach serves as a basic frame for the definition of society and culture in the context of this work. It provides a useful concept to explain why Arabs and Muslims are predominantly focused on in German and American mass media and may also offer some explanation for the composition of the images that we find of Arabs and Muslims in both countries' mass media discourses. I assume that the classification and evaluation of Arab and Muslim countries and actors is guided by a certain set of rules, norms, and myths that form the Western cultural account ("Zurechnungssystem"). Following Meyer et al. (2005), this cultural account forms the basis for the national identity concepts of both Germany and the United States is centrally shaped by so-called "Occidental rational principles."

We furthermore assume that when Western countries like Germany or the U.S. observe and evaluate Arab and Muslim countries or actors, this classification and evaluation of the Other is centrally guided by the taken-for-granted myth of a distinction between two cultural hemispheres: the West and the Orient. It is expected that those two aspects not only have an impact on what Arab and Muslim actors and countries are paid attention to by the Western observer but also on the way in which those actors are perceived and constructed.

Second, mass media are regarded as an overall observer of societal communications, events, or issues, and are seen as a medium of self-observation of modern societies that constructs a reality that is collectively available. Another central assumption for the following analysis is thus that mass media are also a central platform for the negotiation and communication and thus also the diffusion of the basic principles, rules, norms, and myths, etc. of the world society. They summarize the overall societal perceptions of Arab and Muslim actors and countries and the principles, norms, and other criteria that are relevant for the observation and evaluation of those actors.

Third, by defining and communicating images of national collectivity, Western mass media not only focus on the Self (i.e. on events, issues, and processes within their own national or Western boundaries) but also need a conceptual Other or counterpart image that can be demarcated and against which the own collective image is constructed. I therefore also assumed that the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media necessarily reflects German or U.S. self-perceptions as well, since the constructing Self has to know what it is not, if it is to define what it

is. The German and U.S. perception of self and of Arab and Muslim otherness is thereby guided by the assumption of an overall difference and distance of the Other.

However, according to the world polity approach, Western rational principles have diffused and institutionalized globally. This would mean that they can be found in Arab and Muslim countries as well.⁵⁶ Furthermore, we can also find a significant group of Muslim and Arab minorities within the West today. Thus, what is expected is that the evaluation of the Arab and Muslim Other in the mass media contexts may lead to different levels of similarity, difference, and thus distance towards the Self. Whether or not this assumption is confirmed and how similarities between Self and Other are integrated in the Western worldview will be elaborated in the following study.

The Selected Event and the Comparison of Two Countries

A comparative analysis of two Western countries – Germany and the United States – allows filtering out whether both countries reveal the same perceptions of a non-Western Other and whether they use the same patterns and criteria to evaluate the Other and thus also define the self-image. Most of the previous studies on the construction of Arabs and Muslims (see I.2) have only focused on the mass media of one country and the used data sets, timeframes or methods have been rather manifold, and a direct comparison between the different results is only possible to a certain extent. Furthermore, most of those studies did not take into account the German or U.S. self-perception in the analysis of the Arab or Muslim media images. The following comparative analysis will integrate both aspects and will concentrate on the interrelation between the media constructions of both German and U.S. Self and Arabs and Muslims.

We can also find out whether the rather abstract Western principles that I assume to be central for the German and U.S. self-image are defined and interpreted differently in the contexts in which they are communicated, and what impact those principles have on the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in the mass media. The analysis may therefore also be able to offer new ideas on how similarly or differently Western countries define themselves and Arab and Muslim countries or actors. Moreover, a country comparison offers a higher internal comparability since it allows us to see whether or not the structures of actor construction that are observed for one country can also be identified in another media context. It may help us to reveal whether the images of Arabs and Muslims are not only guided by certain worldviews that may be similar or different in two Western countries but whether they are also influenced by certain “universal” techniques of identity construction and the demarcation of certain people from the constructed self-concept.

The concepts of self and otherness are not regarded as a fixed and stable construction, even though the distinction of both may be guided by a more or less commonly shared and stable set of myths, scripts and rules. Instead, it is expected that the Western principles as well as the concepts of self and otherness are permanently negotiated in Western societies to apply them to

⁵⁶ For instance, as they are institutionalized in political, legal, or educational structures.

every new societal situation, development, and change – for instance when the security or coherence of a certain group is threatened like on September 11, 2001.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – as far as media coverage and public attention is concerned – were not a national but an international event. Although the attacks took place on American soil only, they received media attention all around the globe. Furthermore, six years after the attacks, we can also note that the geopolitical consequences of the event had effects on a number of countries – in Europe as well as in the Middle East, since the attacks were politically interpreted by the West as an act of aggression towards the Western world as a cultural and political unity – as the introductory remarks have already illustrated. And last but not least, to this day the attacks are frequently cited as a measure of comparison to evaluate other violent clashes with Islamic terrorists or incidents like, for example, the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004, the London bombing in 2005, or the controversy about the Mohammad cartoons in 2006.

Thus, it seems as if events like the 9/11 attacks serve as a trigger event with regard to the attention that is paid to Arabs and Muslims in Western countries, since the attacks were regarded as religiously motivated and the attackers and the masterminds behind the attacks were identified as Islamic fundamentalists who came from a number of different Middle Eastern countries. At the same time, the attacks also serve as a trigger event with regard to the national attempt not only of the United States as a direct victim of the violence but also of other Western countries like Germany to re-emphasize its own group identity and strengthen the national (or Western) boundaries and coherence. These two aspects make the 9/11 attacks an attractive object for the research questions that have been outlined in the beginning of the book.

Guiding Research Questions

In continuation of the raised questions in chapter I and based on the theoretical assumptions that have been outlined in this chapter, three central research aims and the following research questions will guide the analysis:

First of all, the analysis wants to reveal the worldview and German and U.S. self-perception. Here, the analysis is guided by the questions:

- (1) How do Germany and the United States reflect upon themselves in the mass media? We will look at the implicit or explicit references to the national or Western self-image that can be traced in both countries' mass media when Arabs and Muslims are discussed.
- (2) What Western principles can be identified in those national self-concepts? We will specifically look at the principles, ideals and standards that are communicated in the different contexts in which the Self refers to its own collectivity and will also see how relevant those principles are for the Self when the Other is observed.

(3) Does the German self-perception differ from the American one? Here, we will look at how both countries may also differ in their application and definition of Western principles, and whether we find different relevancies of the principles, myths or scripts that shape the self-image.

Second, the analysis aims at summarizing the perception and images of Arabs and Muslims to filter out the definition of otherness in both countries' mass media. Here, the analysis is guided by the following questions:

(4) Who is the Arab and Muslim Other in German and U.S. mass media? We will find out what Arab and Muslim actors and countries appear in German and U.S. mass media, which countries they come from and what societal group or branch they belong to?

(5) What images of Arabs and Muslims can be found in German and U.S. media around 9/11? We will summarize and analyze the features and characteristics that are used to construct those actors and countries, and will see whether the images of those actors and countries differ in the German and U.S. mass media, whether they either change with the attacks or instead remain invariable and stable over a certain timeframe.

Finally, the analysis aims at illustrating how difference is constructed between Self and Other. Here, we specifically look at the evaluation of Arabs and Muslims. This can also lead us to an explanation for the perception of Arabs and Muslims in Western countries and their images in Western media. With regard to this aim, the following questions guide the analysis:

(6) How different is the Arab and Muslim Other? To answer this question we will analyze what levels of difference between Other and observing Self can be identified in the images of the different Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' mass media. We will also look at what happens when the geographical distance between Self and Other is diminished, i.e. when Arabs and Muslims cross the geographical boundaries and enter the Western space.

(7) Did 9/11 change the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims? Here, we want to find out what relevance the event has on the perception of Arabs and Muslims, and whether or not the event has changed this perception of the Other in the West.

(8) How central is the Oriental myth for the Western worldview? We will analyze whether the Arab and Muslim Other is as homogeneous and different from the West as some of the studies on the reciprocal perception of Occident and Orient that have been introduced before have argued, or whether the Western view integrates similarities between both sides as well, for instance, because of the world polity assumption that Western structures and institutions have already established and can thus be identified in the respective Arab and Muslim countries, and that the Other is thus not as different as one would expect.

III. DATA SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODS

To answer the research question that have been raised in the last chapter, a media analysis of German and U.S. press was conducted. Before the questions will be answered and the results of this press study will be presented, the methodological realization of this analysis will be outlined in the following chapter. First of all, the data sample of the study will be introduced. In subchapters III.2 and III.3 the two methods that were used to analyze the selected data sample will be described in more detail.

1. Data Sample of the Media Analysis

As already indicated in the last chapter, in the following analysis, comparison takes place on two levels. On the one hand, the data are compared on a chronological level. This allows a trend analysis of the news coverage in the face of the focused event. On the other hand, a comparison is possible with regard to the media portrayals of Arabs and Muslims and the national self-perceptions that are reflected in those portrayals in two different Western countries. This comparison may show us whether there are possible similarities or differences in the construction of otherness and the national self-perception.

1.1. Media Selection and Survey Period

The media analysis concentrated on the German and U.S. print media sector only. Following the argument of Schiffer (2005) here, national newspapers and news magazine may be less consumed than television these days, but they are considered as a serious news medium and are furthermore assumed to present and comment on information in much more detail than television formats (Schiffer 2005: 26-27).

To be able to derive representative statements about the image of Arabs and Muslims in the German and U.S. press coverage, different print media formats were included in the analysis. Daily newspapers of the high and the low end and weekly news magazines are analyzed. According to Hafez (2002), this composition of different publication formats is one basic premise for a content analysis as the formats are also connected with different content profiles. As Hafez (2002) argues, daily newspapers exercise a political and social “recording function” because they can treat events and developments in a much broader and wider ranging news stream by using different text formats that weekly magazines are not able to present and use. In contrast to that, weekly newspapers are able to have stronger thematic foci and can extend and reinforce these by integrating them in a broader analytical and opinion-oriented frame (Hafez 2002: 31). Furthermore, different print media formats may also be addressed to different readerships.

Altogether, six print media have been selected for the analysis. The German SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG¹ and the American NEW YORK TIMES² have been chosen as representatives for serious daily newspapers. The analyzed more popular dailies are BILDZEITUNG³ and USA TODAY, and from the news magazine section, the weekly magazines DER SPIEGEL and NEWSWEEK have been selected.

For both countries, the selected print media can be regarded as some of the main representatives of the three genres. Another criterion for the selection is their national availability, and apart from that the news media are among the newspapers with the highest circulation in the respective country. Furthermore, the selected media embrace different angles of the spectrum of political opinions. As newspapers can be regarded as a medium for orientation not only for the reader but also for other journalists (Hafez 2002: 32), it is assumed here that the news coverage of the chosen print media has an influence on other news media as well and that the topics and views which are focused on and communicated here are more or less representative for the German and U.S. press coverage of Arab and Muslim countries or actors. By including different print media formats in the analysis we are thus able to cover different possible ways of news coverage and frame a broader spectrum of the print media sector of both countries.

As for the comparability of the chosen newspapers of both countries, a few remarks have to be added: The NY TIMES is one of the traditional daily newspapers of the U.S. print media market and – in addition to that – is nearly one hundred years older than the German representative of the serious daily newspaper section, SZ. The German SZ is only published from Monday to Saturday, whereas the NY TIMES is published on Sunday as well – even though only with a smaller up-to-date news section. Both newspapers approximately cover the same news sections like a daily news block, the culture and society (“feuilleton”) section, a business and economy section, a sports section and an editorial.⁴ In addition to that, both the NY TIMES and the SZ have a local and regional news section that is however not included in the analysis due to its lack of comparability on a national scale.

USA TODAY and the German BILD can both be seen as comparable representatives of the national tabloids. For BILD it has to be noted however, that it is a street sale newspaper. Apart from that, both newspapers offer the subject groups daily news, sports, entertainment, and a service section. Especially the national sports section is a central subject group for both tabloids. Furthermore, both print media place a strong emphasis on pictures and eye-catching colors, and attract attention with sensational headlines. One difference between the BILD and USA TODAY is that the BILD articles are generally very short and only include one or two basic and reduced messages that are communicated in a very emotional and colloquial tone. In addition to that, the BILD predominantly focuses on specific individual actors, famous and unknown. Compared to that, USA TODAY articles are longer and more complex, even though they are also less complex

¹ As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “SZ.”

² As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “NY TIMES.”

³ As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “BILD.”

⁴ For additional information about the respective newspapers see also www.sueddeutsche.de and www.nytimes.com.

and substantiated than those of the chosen serious newspapers.⁵ A second difference is that the BILD is published six days a week (Monday to Saturday) whereas USA TODAY is only published from Monday to Friday.

The chosen weekly news magazines DER SPIEGEL and NEWSWEEK both combine daily political topics with more substantiated analyses and background stories, and they offer more complex background information and explanations for the depicted political, cultural, social, or economic issues and topics than daily newspapers. A significant difference that has to be noted is the publication output of both news magazines: Whereas the American NEWSWEEK normally has an average size of about one hundred pages, DER SPIEGEL normally exceeds two hundred pages.⁶

The data sample includes most of the different used text formats like articles, brief news, interviews, editorials, etc. The only two formats that have not been included in the analysis are articles etc. in the regional or local sections and letters to the editor.⁷ In the following, the different text formats will be summarized under the label “articles.”

The study covers a period of eight weeks before and four weeks after the 9/11 attacks. It starts with the publication day “July 17, 2001” and ends with “October 9, 2001.” The longer time period of eight weeks before the attacks has been chosen to gain a contrastable volume of newspaper articles that deal with Arab and Muslim issues and actors compared to the data sample after the event. This is especially important to find out whether the overall focus on the Middle East or other Muslim countries and Arab and Muslim actors is similar before as well as after the attacks – despite the fact that maybe the frequency with which these countries and actors are focused on is lower before 9/11.

In contrast to that, the publication output of articles that focus on Arab and Muslim topics and actors increased significantly after the attacks. Therefore, the analyzed period only covers four weeks. It also seems reasonable to stop the analysis after four weeks as the U.S. military offensive in Afghanistan starts in the first week of October 2001, which leads to yet another shift of the focal point of the news coverage. This would have unilaterally distorted the thematic and geographical focus that was much broader in the direct aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

⁵ For additional information about the respective tabloids see also Pick (2004: 25-26), www.usatoday.com or www.bild.t-online.de.

⁶ For additional information about the respective news magazines see also Pick (2004: 25-26), www.spiegel.de or www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032542/site/newsweek/.

⁷ As already noted, those sections are ignored since they are not comparable on a national scale. With regard to letters to the editor, it is assumed furthermore that they present a reaction to earlier news coverage that cannot be fully retraced in the analysis of the defined time period. Therefore, letters to the editor are not regarded as part of the mass media discourse here, but are rather seen as part of the public discourse reflected by the readers that is again in itself part of the observed reality and societal discourse that mass media reflect.

1.2. Definition of the Research Sample

The newspaper articles were basically downloaded from the full-text internet database LexisNexis,⁸ except from the articles from BILD, which were directly downloaded from the Springer publishing company's database program MediaPILOT.⁹ It has to be noted that the online versions of the newspaper articles may not be 100 % identical with the printed versions due to subsequent editing on behalf of the operators of the database programs – this cannot be controlled for all analyzed media, but has only been randomly checked.

The total number of relevant articles was determined via conscious selection of thematically relevant contents that were identified by scanning the index of contents and individual article abstracts. What guided the selection was the theoretical assumption of a differentiability of a Western Self and an Arab or Muslim Other as two opposing hypothetical concepts (see II.3). In the case of our data sample, the viewpoint of the Self can be defined as the viewpoint of the researcher as well as of the reader and the publishing print medium. Thus, the Self therefore can be equated with the German or American print medium that publishes articles in which perceptions of the national self and concepts of otherness are communicated.

The Other in our analysis is assumed to be presented by Arab and Muslim countries and actors that occur in the different newspaper articles, and this Other is assumed to be constructed geographically, culturally, as well as nationally. Thus, for the data sample every article was selected that has a geographical focus on countries of the Near and Middle East or on other countries where Islam is one occurring if not the main religion like, for example, in Indonesia, Sudan, or Turkey. In addition to that, also those articles are taken into account that discuss Arab and Muslim immigrants or ethnic groups within the West, i.e. in Europe, North America, or Australia (see II.2). Last but not least, articles are taken into account when they focus on Islam or terrorism as a general topic and in this context also include Arab or Muslim actors or country descriptions.¹⁰

On the basis of those criteria, the articles of the chosen newspapers were scanned and selected. In a second step, and because of the large number of articles that fulfill these criteria,¹¹ a systematic random sample was drawn from the material of the daily print media over the analyzed timeframe. Starting with the first day that was set for the timeframe of analysis, only every second weekday was included in the analysis. For the German BILD and SZ, this sampling results in a two-week-rhythm of the publication days Monday-Wednesday-Friday and Tuesday-Thursday-Saturday. As USA TODAY is not published on the weekend, the two-week-rhythm consists of a Monday-Wednesday-Friday week and of a Tuesday-Thursday week. The NY TIMES is published Monday to Sunday; therefore, the analysis includes a change of a Monday-

⁸ For additional information on LexisNexis see also www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/home/home.do.

⁹ For additional information on MediaPILOT see also www.mediapilot.de.

¹⁰ At this point, I would like to thank Tülay Zengingül for her assistance with the scanning and selection of relevant newspaper articles from BILD in the database program MediaPilot.

¹¹ Altogether more than 2100 articles.

Wednesday-Friday-Sunday week and a Tuesday-Thursday-Saturday week. As for the weekly news magazines, all identified relevant articles are included in the data sample.

This reduced sample presents a smaller but still structurally equivalent composition of the original sample. As Brosius and Koschel (2001) have argued, the method of systematic random sampling thereby provides the highest probability to reflect the real or actual distribution of the characteristics and features of the universe data set in one sample (Brosius and Koschel 2001: 82-83). Despite the reduction of the material, the results for this sample are regarded to be representative for all publication days of the analyzed timeframe. A reduction to every second day still makes it possible to take into account all relevant events and topics that occur in the timeframe of analysis. In addition to that, the changing rhythm also makes it possible to take into account different publication categories like the travel section, etc. that may only appear on specific week days.

Altogether, the systematic random sampling has led to the following text corpus that forms the data sample for the analysis:

Table III.1: Overview of the Research Sample

	Total number of Articles	Before 9/11	After 9/11
Weekly News Magazines			
DER SPIEGEL	102	27	75
NEWSWEEK	51	9	42
Serious Daily Newspapers			
SZ	294	140	154
NY TIMES	350	145	205
Tabloid Newspapers			
BILD	129	39	90
USA TODAY	143	14	129
Total Number of Articles	1069	374	695

2. The Quantifying Qualitative Content Analysis

The analysis of this sample was carried out in two steps: In a first step, the newspaper articles were analyzed with the method of a content analysis.¹² Based on the definition of Früh (2001), this content analysis, as an empirical method, aims at systematically describing the ways in which German and U.S. newspaper articles portray Arabs and Muslims, and in this context also reveal perceptions of their own national concepts of belonging. The descriptive aim of this form of analysis is to reduce the complexity and variety of the information that can be found in the large

¹² As defined by Mayring (2003) or Früh (2001).

data sample. Only selected aspects of the content are focused on, and the perspective on the data sample is shaped by the research questions and research aims that have been outlined earlier. The two main questions in this step of the analysis are, how Arab and Muslim actors and countries are described in the newspaper articles, and whether the respective newspaper articles explicitly refer to national self-conceptions in those contexts as well.

In addition to that, and here mainly following Merten (1995), I assume that the content analysis offers a method to analyze social reality: The term “content” – according to Merten (1995) – is limited to the communicated content, and here only to that content that can be made manifest with certain notation techniques and with certain text forms like newspaper articles. At the same time, we may assume that the content of the articles summarizes and reflects the communication processes of the German and U.S. society about Arabs and Muslims as well (Merten 1995: 15).¹³

On the basis of the theoretical assumptions about media reality (see II.1.2), the content of a newspaper article is therefore regarded as part of a constructed media reality that is not predominantly supposed to be revealed as true or false, but is taken as one construction of reality that reflects societal communication about Arabs and Muslims. The shared as well as differing framework of the articles of the two countries before and after 9/11, i.e. the overall societal values, set of beliefs and knowledge, or attitudes, but also political, social or economic aspects, is expected to shape the images of those Arab and Muslim countries and actors in the analyzed print media. What is not considered here, however, is the motivations or needs of the producers of news media or the possible influences of the produced images and views on the attitudes of the readers etc.

2.1. Quantitative Analysis of Formal Characteristics and Occurring Actors

Altogether, the content analysis has systematically captured and described several different aspects. First of all, on a quantifying level, the formal features of the different newspaper articles were analyzed and all occurring Arab and Muslim actors and country portrayals that appear in the different articles were identified. This analytical step can be labeled as a quantifying content analysis since I quantitatively captured what topics and country references dominate the news coverage on Arab and Muslim countries and actors, how many actors occur in the different articles, and how frequently those actors are referred to.

With regard to the formal characteristics of the articles, it was basically analyzed what countries the articles' contents refer to and what topics and issues are covered. To identify the relevance of certain topics and countries, frequency analyses were carried out to describe the overall thematic contexts in which Arabs and Muslims become relevant or are focused on. Besides that, the analysis of the most frequent country references of the different articles makes it possible to develop a map of the geographical origin of the Arab and Muslim Other that is focused on by the German and U.S. press. The formal description also makes it possible to compare the differences

and similarities in German and U.S. print media with regard to the different topics in which contexts Arabs and Muslims occur. In addition to that, we can show whether or not the 9/11 attacks have changed the topical or geographical focus on the Arab and Muslim Other.

Furthermore, all occurring Arab and Muslim actors and countries in the different articles were identified and labeled with an identification code. I have concentrated on actors mainly due to the theoretical assumption that the definition of collective group concepts works via the communication of a set of criteria and principles, characteristics, and features that are regarded as crucial for this group concept (see II.3). Since one central way of constructing collectivity is via the construction of distance and difference, and the drawing of a boundary between the ingroup and an outside Other, the images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries are assumed to reflect these forms of collectivity construction by being the outside Other against which the national concept of collectivity is demarcated. Actors thereby are regarded as more interesting for this construction of difference and distance than, for example, societal structures because they can be described not only on a political or cultural dimension but also with regard to their personal features and behaviors.

Altogether, the quantitative descriptions give an overview over the general relevance of the Arab and Muslim Other in German and U.S. American print media. We are able to compare the different entities, and can retrieve the quantitative relevance of actors that are focused on in both countries' newspaper articles for the analyzed timeframe. The quantitative analysis of all occurring actors also allows to illustrate the composition of the object of investigation – Muslim and Arab actors as representatives of the Other – and allows to describe the total complexity of this Other. We are able to reveal possible differences and similarities in both countries' press focus, for example, if different actors or actor groups appear more frequently in one country or if only certain topics are discussed.

However, a solely quantitative analysis disregards that indicators that convey a certain meaning may change their meaning and relevance under the influence of different cultural or situational contexts and circumstances (Merten 1995: 50). For example, the construction of the actor Osama bin Laden may take place with similar attributes before and after the 9/11 attacks. However, these attributes may form a different overall image of the actor simply because he now receives a completely different importance for the articles in which he appears. Before the attacks, bin Laden was merely mentioned in combination with brief news messages, whereas after the attacks, he becomes a central actor or even the topic of the newspaper article, and now can be the linchpin for the line of argument of the respective news medium. This spectrum of different relevancies cannot be retrieved via a quantitative analysis; it has to be developed via a qualitative analysis of an actor's construction as well as the setting in which he or she occurs.

Furthermore, on the basis of the quantitative description, actors who appear less often might be classified as less significant as well. However, if we look at their relevance and ascribed images in the articles and at the contexts in which they occur they may be more significant for the discussed

¹³ Merten (1995) calls this a "reference to non-manifest contexts" (Merten 1995: 14).

topic than actors that simply appear more frequently. For example, it can be observed that after 9/11 Palestinian freedom fighters in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – as a group – occur more frequently in German and U.S. articles than the 9/11 terrorists. However, on a qualitative level they are far less relevant for the different articles in which they appear than the 9/11 terrorists are in articles about the attacks etc. In addition to that, the way they are portrayed in the text creates a much more complex image of the actors than the one that can be drawn from the Palestinian suicide bombers and gunmen. Altogether, it can therefore be said that the 9/11 terrorists are qualitatively more central for the news coverage after 9/11 than the Palestinian gunmen and suicide bombers.

2.2. Qualitative Content Analysis of Actor Images

Therefore, the quantitative description is combined with a qualitative content analysis that looks at the way in which the identified Arab and Muslim actors and countries are constructed in the content of the different newspaper articles. Following Mayring (2003) here, qualitative content analysis aims at collecting and describing the semantic characteristics of the occurring Arab and Muslim actors and countries in the German and U.S. print media (see for instance Mayring 2003: 59).

Thus, in a second step I have concentrated on the semantic level of the written text and have retrieved the terms, i.e. the attributes, characteristics, and features that are used in the articles to construct and describe the different occurring Muslim and Arab actors and countries. Each identified actor or country portrayal was not only labeled with an identification code, but in addition to that, all features were coded that are used to describe the respective country or actor. The resulting personal description that summarizes the image of the identified actors or countries is not derived from one article but from the media portrayal of the same in one of the analyzed countries before or after the 9/11 attacks. This basically means that repeatedly occurring actors receive an overall image that consists of all the different features that the actor received in the particular discourse – before or after the event and in the U.S. or the German media. Altogether, each actor therefore may have up to four different images in the overall data sample.

This cross-textual collection of Arab and Muslim actors and images aims at drawing a cross-section through the print media set to reproduce the overall complexity of the focused Other and its central traits and features in German and U.S. mass media. One basic assumption is that with this method we are able to grasp the media reality, as it is offered to the reader, more realistically. This assumption also includes that actor images may be contradictory in articles of DER SPIEGEL and SZ, or they might change from one day to another. It is assumed here that for the reader the constructed image of an actor¹⁴ is not only shaped by one article but by the combination of different articles and content that he or she occurs in over a longer timeframe, and by the overall set of features that are ascribed to him or her.

¹⁴ That might be recalled when you ask the reader maybe after one week of newspaper consumption.

A pre-test with about one hundred articles from DER SPIEGEL produced a basic pattern according to which the data sample was analyzed and the actors and country features were categorized. The pretest also produced a number of crucial dimensions of actor construction that were used as an overall pattern for the coding process. The basic categories that were established from the pre-test are the actor's country of origin, his or her societal context group, the ascribed religious affiliation, as well the basic subdivision of features into a political, social-economic, cultural, personal dimension as well as the dimension of delinquency. The actual features that are used in the different articles to describe the different actors were categorized according to this pattern. Following Mayring (2003) here, one central aim of this qualitative step of analysis is to develop the respective aspects of evaluation out of the concrete text, i.e. on a concrete descriptive level that sticks close to the material. Inductive coding offers the possibility to derive categories from the actual material and the information it has to offer. Therefore the articles are taken as the source and the starting point of the analysis, and the categories are established close to the analyzed text (Mayring 2003: 4-5). Nevertheless, the research questions and theoretical assumptions still play an influential role in the analysis as well. As Mayring (2003) suggests, the used technique of inductive coding is regarded as a "structuring process" that is largely guided by the theoretical assumptions and by the research questions that were outlined in chapter II (Mayring 2003: 82-83).

Altogether, and as Mayring (2003) or Kuckartz (1999) also point out, the inductive coding process and the formation of relevant categories from the data material presents a central method to structure and restrict the complexity of information that a text may offer (Mayring 2005: 12; Kuckartz 1999: 204). This restriction is guided by the selection criteria that are defined in the beginning of the coding process. The inductive coding process stuck very closely to the written text and, as a summarizing and paraphrasing process, was finished when the main and decisive criteria had been captured. This abstraction presents the basic difference to a simple summarization of the articles' contents. The structuring inductive coding process only concentrated on the Muslim and Arab actor and country portrayals in the analyzed articles. The different contexts of the article as well as the interplay of actor and content are not taken into account in this first step of the analysis.

Last but not least, all text passages were identified and coded that explicitly reflect upon the German or American self-perception and refer to the self-images of both countries. Based on the theoretical assumptions of the Self/Other nexus as a boundary-formation process (see II.3) the overall coding process was guided by the idea that the construction of Arab and Muslim actors and countries also implicitly reflects how the Self sees itself. This basically means that not only are certain terms used to describe the Arab and Muslim Other but that those features and characteristics to a large extent form the binary opposite to the features and characteristics that are regarded as central for the Self's own collective group concept. Thus, this implicit national self-references cannot be directly traced in the respective news articles, but can only be derived from the images of the Arab and Muslim actors and countries. However, the pre-test analysis

revealed that national self-perceptions are also explicitly communicated in the articles. These explicit self-references were therefore coded as well.

Computer-Assisted Data Analysis with the Software Program Atlas.ti

The quantifying qualitative content analysis was assisted by the software program Atlas.ti and all relevant articles were edited and analyzed with this program. One advantage of using software programs like Atlas.ti is that large data sets can be managed and structured more easily, and a computer-based analysis makes it easier to transfer the data to different work settings as well as between different coders, since parts of the data sample were analyzed by a second coder.¹⁵ In addition to that, Atlas.ti offers greater transparency of the coding process as interpretations of the data and coding processes can be retrieved and re-checked quickly and easily at any time.

A second advantage is that the program offers higher flexibility because it is possible to go back into the qualitative data at any time to control the ascribed codes and categories and test them with regard to possible inconsistency that may have occurred during the coding process.¹⁶ Existing codes and categories can be later changed (in name etc.), new codes can be created out of old ones or already existing codes can be merged to form a new – more abstract – one. It is furthermore possible to connect the written data with numeric data, as the use of the program offered the possibility to export numeric data into statistical programs like SPSS, to carry out the mentioned frequency analyses. Finally, the program allows selective text retrievals that can put together every text passage (quote) that refers to a certain actor. This quotation list has been especially useful for the second methodological step of our analysis, formation of the actor typology that will be further outlined in the next subchapter.

¹⁵ At this point, I would like to thank Florian Spengler for his assistance with the coding of the German newspaper articles. Furthermore, I want to thank my “Atlas.ti working group” (i.e. Anna Kosmützky, Marion Müller and Frank Berner) for their assistance, their ideas and critical remarks on the coding process, and their ideas and suggestions in the process of the establishment of the actor typology.

¹⁶ For instance, all codes are directly connected with the relevant text passages; this makes it possible to list all relevant text passages at any time.

3. The Formation of an Actor Typology

In the previous subchapter, I have outlined the first step of the methodical analysis – the quantifying qualitative content analysis. The results of this first step will be introduced in the chapters IV and V. In a second analytical step, the gathered images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries have been further classified and described on the basis of a typological analysis that will be shortly sketched in the last subchapter.

3.1. General Remarks on the Typological Analysis

Following Kuckartz (1988, 1995, 1999¹⁷), the typological analysis was carried out to get from a “quantified” description of the images of the identified Arab and Muslim actors and countries in German and U.S. print media to a systematic and traceable identification and illustration of possible structures and patterns of actor portrayal (Kluge 1999: 178). This aim was reached via the formation of an empirically based actor typology as, for instance, Kuckartz (1988, 1999) has introduced it. Kuckartz (1988) defines “types” as a way to grasp phenomena and rules of social processes in adequate terms – theoretically as well as with regard to their meaning (Kuckartz 1988: 62-63). Following this definition, a typology can be understood as the result of a grouping process that subsumes objects of research to types which are similar with respect to one or several features. An actor type is characterized by a high internal homogeneity that allows to clearly emphasize the commonly shared, characteristic features of the including actors. The different types are also marked by a high external heterogeneity between each other. A type is not only used to structure a field of research and – as in the research project at hand – to group the analyzed elements, i.e. the occurring actors. Rather, the established types are also regarded as sharing a certain meaning – in our case by reflecting different levels of perceived otherness.

Thus, the aim of the typological analysis is not only to uncover structural regularities between the different actor and country images but also to understand those regularities. The actor types that have been established and that will be introduced in chapter VI, are not only constructed in a similar way, i.e. with the same features or on similar dimensions. In addition to that, those actor types also reflect different levels of otherness, or in other words, of demarcation between a German or American national Self and Arab and Muslim Others.

3.2. The Analysis of Empirical Regularities

The first step towards the formation of this actor typology was the analysis of empirical regularities. In this step, the coded text passages that describe the identified actors are decontextualized, and we thus step out of the content of the text. One problem that occurred in this first step was the high complexity of the material, i.e. of the identified actors and country

¹⁷ But see also Kluge (1999).

images and the large variety of characteristics and features with which they are described. As Kuckartz (1999) points out qualitative data – even more than quantitative data – are highly complex, and in view of the richness of the data it can be very difficult to identify the relevant patterns that embrace the whole material.

Therefore, the actor typology was systematically developed, starting with very simple distinctions that were subclassified and differentiated in different steps. First of all, rough scanning frameworks were defined that were then further differentiated hierarchically. Actors were divided into four basic groups. The first group included all those actors and countries that only possess features that are disapproved of by the (hypothetical) German and U.S. Self in the articles. The disapproval of those features is expressed either implicitly, for example when these features form the (negative) opposite to those features that are highlighted in the texts as crucial features of the national or Western self-image, or explicitly when they are criticized by the respective article.¹⁸ Examples of disapproved features are being politically *undemocratic*, *culturally uncivilized*, a *terror supporter*, *fanatical*, *cruel*, *arrogant*, or economically *lavish*. The second group included actors and countries that only possess features that are implicitly or even explicitly favored by the (hypothetical) German and U.S. Self in the articles or that are even labeled as features of the national self-concept of both countries.¹⁹ Examples of favored features are being politically *pro-western* or *reform-oriented*, culturally *modern* or *tolerant*, *against violence* and *terrorism*. A third group was formed of actors and countries that are described as rather neutral with regard to the distinction of positive and negative facets. Those actors only possess features like being personally *shy* or *reserved*, or being politically *influential*. But most of all, this group includes actors that are described as victims. Finally, a group was formed of actors and countries that appear to be contradictory with regard to the distinction between favored and disapproved features, since they carry both kinds of features.

In a second step, those groups were further subdivided according to the different dimensions that the features can be ascribed to. For instance, some actors of group one, i.e. who only possess disapproved features, are only described on a political dimension, whereas others possess disapproved features also in a cultural, social-economic, and/or personal dimension.

In a third step, the resulting subgroups were compared with each other again across the different dimensions to see whether the actor images reveal similar or only slightly differing structures and patterns according to which the features on the different dimensions are combined – to derive types of actor construction. It has to be noted that not all actors that were summarized to those actor types may possess all of those features, and not all actors are identically portrayed. Nevertheless, the features that are central for the distinctive features of the actor type are inherent in all actors that are ascribed to this type.

¹⁸ And that usually have negative connotations.

¹⁹ And that usually have positive connotations.

3.3. Characterization of the Actor Types

After those patterns of actor construction had been identified and classified to different types of actors, in a final step it was then necessary to “go back into the data” to finally also capture the contexts in which the actors occur that have revealed the same structure of portrayal, to re-examine the concrete usage of the different actor types in the context of the different articles. In this final step of the typological analysis, the derived structures were re-embedded into the content of the different articles to be fully comprehensible.

For the description and characterization of the established actor types different prototype actors were selected on the basis of the significant aspects of each actor type. According to Kuckartz (1988), those prototypes can be seen as representative cases of the different actor types that were derived from the material. They summarize and outline the typical aspects and central characteristics of each actor type (Kuckartz 1988: 223). The selection of a prototype therefore can also be seen as the most important step to create an analytical frame of orientation that makes social reality readable by highlighting the essential and omitting the unessential facts (Kuckartz 1988: 224).

The different prototype actors were then re-embedded in the articles’ contents, to derive the relevance of the different actor types for the media discourses and to see how those actor types interact with each other.

The results of this second step of analysis, i.e. the formed actor typology, the quantitative relevance of the different actor types and the prototype examples of each type will be introduced and discussed in chapter VI.

IV. OCCURRING ARABS AND MUSLIMS AND THEIR MEDIAL CONTEXT

Let us first have a look at the general composition of what we are dealing with when talking about Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media. The following chapter will sketch the most relevant contexts in which those actors occur. Due to the selection criteria that have been outlined in the last chapter (III.1.3), this analysis is not able to make generally valid statements about overall publication output with regard to discourses on topics like “terrorism,” “Islam,” or the overall news coverage of the Near and Middle East or of Muslim countries, nor does it aim to. For instance, if articles that refer to those discourses did not include any reference to Muslim or Arab actors or described certain country criteria they were not included in the further analysis. Therefore, when in the following chapters we look at the publication output of articles that refer to Arab and Muslim countries and actors (IV.1) and at the range of focused topics and countries (IV.2) the quantitative results only refer to those articles. According to this limitation, the following chapter introduces the print media frame and contexts in which Arab and Muslim actors and countries appear or are referred to and in which the construction of a collective (national or transnational) identity is done via the othering of Arabs and Muslims. Furthermore, we will look at the basic composition of this constructed otherness and the complexity of different actors and actor groups that occur in the analyzed print media samples of both German and U.S. newspapers (IV.3).

Before the different results will be outlined, a few words have to be added on how the data will be quoted and presented in the following. Referring to the level of abstraction that presents the results from the content analysis, in the following all features that are introduced to illustrate the facets of the different actor images will be written in *italics*. The terms that are given present the codes that have been formed in the inductive coding process. Those terms are not necessarily the linguistic terms that are used in the respective articles, since two countries with two different languages have been analyzed. Thus, those terms summarize possible linguistic differences under one label when those different linguistic terms refer to the same feature, or summarize more complex descriptions under one feature.¹

In addition to those codes, quotes from the data sample will be given throughout the following chapters to further illustrate the way in which the abstract codes that describe the features of Arab and Muslim actors and countries are used in the different articles. The different actor types that are introduced in chapter VI will also be illustrated with quotes from the German and American print media sample. In this context, the quotes from the German newspapers will be given in German, in order to convey the original wording and tone of the different newspapers, and to reflect the individual differences that may be used in the German language to talk about Arab and Muslim actors and countries. Additionally, it has to be noted here that the newspaper articles that have been downloaded from the databases have not been changed according to their

¹ For example, when an article refers to an actor being poor, describing at length the different facets of this poverty or simply writing that an actor does not have the money to buy food, those different aspects are summarized under the label economically *poor*.

content, thus also no grammatical or spelling mistakes have been corrected, etc., but the quotes have been adjusted to the English form of punctuation that is used in this book. As for the German spelling, one systematic difference between the articles from the German SZ and those from DER SPIEGEL and BILD has to be mentioned: The database versions of DER SPIEGEL and BILD were downloaded with their original spelling. SZ articles have only been available in the database LexisNexis with a spelling that includes [ue], [oe] or [ae] instead of an umlaut, and [ss] instead of [ß], which presents a modified version of the original articles as they were published in the print version of the newspaper. This spelling has been maintained for the analysis.

1. Relevance of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media

As a number of studies have already discussed and outlined empirically, the focus on Arab and Muslim countries in Western media has had a permanent space in the everyday news coverage, also and already before the 9/11 attacks.² Those results have already indicated that Arab and Muslim actors and the geographical focus on Arab and Muslim countries is an integral and central part of the Western observation of the non-Western environment, and that a certain number of topics and issues are more or less permanently negotiated in the news in both countries.

Before 9/11

The review of the newspaper articles and the collection of relevant articles have revealed that topics on Arab and Muslim actors and countries had a regular space in the daily news coverage even before the events of September 11, 2001. As Hafez (2002) has already stated for the German newspaper coverage of the Middle East and Islam, we can also summarize for the analyzed print media that Arab and Muslim actors and countries have a constant and stable position in everyday newspapers and weekly magazines. This conclusion can also be drawn from the analysis of the American print media.

² As the different studies of Bieber-Roberts (1995), Hafez (2002), Hashem (1995), Thofern (1997), or others that have been introduced in I.2.3 also noted.

Table IV.1: Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors before 9/11

	Total Number of Analyzed Articles	Average Media Coverage ³
German Print Media	206	8
SZ	140	6
DER SPIEGEL	27	3
BILD	39	2
U.S. Print Media	168	6
NY TIMES	145	5
NEWSWEEK	9	1
USA TODAY	14	1

Altogether, 206 German and 168 American articles were analyzed for the eight weeks before 9/11. As Table IV.1 illustrates, in the German data set, this makes an average of eight articles per analyzed publication day in the eight weeks before the attacks, whereas in the U.S. print media, an average number of six articles per analyzed publication day include references to or depictions of Arab and Muslim actors. In both countries, the serious daily newspapers NY TIMES and SZ cover Arab and Muslim actors most frequently with an average of five (NY TIMES) and six (SZ) articles. Compared to that, in the news magazines we find an average of only one article per analyzed day in NEWSWEEK and of about three articles in DER SPIEGEL. Similarly, the news coverage in the tabloids USA TODAY and BILD lies at an average of one (USA TODAY) and two (BILD) articles per analyzed publication day. We can say therefore that the news coverage of Arab and Muslim actors was existent before the attacks and quite similar with regard to the quantitative amount in both countries' analyzed print media, even though German print media report slightly more frequently about Arabs and Muslims.

After 9/11

With the event of September 11, and as expected, the number of articles which include Arab and Muslim Islamic actors increased significantly in the four weeks after the attacks. Altogether, 319 German and 376 American articles were identified in the four analyzed weeks after the attacks that include Arab and Muslim actors. Thus, in the U.S – where the attacks took place – the average number of articles per analyzed publication day multiplied by almost five from six to twenty-seven articles.⁴ But also in Germany – a country that was not directly targeted by the attacks – the newspaper focus on Arab and Muslim actors and countries increased tremendously:

³ Average number of articles per analyzed publication day in the timeframe before 9/11 that focus on Arab and Muslim countries and actors.

⁴ Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) presented similar quantitative results for their analyzed U.S. media set around 9/11, which included the NY TIMES, NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, and USA TODAY, reporting that in the six analyzed months after the attacks the four newspapers published nearly eleven times as much news that included Arab and Muslim actors as in the six months before the attacks (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 139).

The number of articles grew to an average of twenty-nine per analyzed publication day, which means that it nearly quadrupled (see Table IV.2).

Table IV.2: Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors after 9/11

	Total Number of Analyzed Articles	Average Media Coverage ⁵
German Print media	319	29
SZ	154	14
DER SPIEGEL	75	19
BILD	90	8
U.S. Print Media	376	27
NY TIMES	205	15
NEWSWEEK	42	11
USA TODAY	129	13

As we can see in Table IV.2, the U.S. print media USA TODAY and NEWSWEEK increased their media coverage of Arab and Muslim actors and countries most tremendously – by more than 1000.0 % – after the attacks, an average of now thirteen (USA TODAY) and eleven (NEWSWEEK) articles deal with the hypothetical Other. But the NY TIMES also tripled its coverage to an average of nearly fifteen articles per analyzed day. In Germany, the results are quite similar: The SZ increased its coverage to an average of fourteen articles per analyzed day, whereas with BILD and DER SPIEGEL we can register a steep rise in the number of relevant articles to eight (BILD) and even nineteen with regard to DER SPIEGEL.

Thus, it can be noted that in both countries, compared to the serious newspapers, especially the tabloids and the news magazines tremendously intensified their focus on Arab and Muslim actors and countries and the topics they occur with. In addition to that, the event has increased the newspaper coverage of Arab and Muslim actors and countries not only in the United States as the direct victim of the attacks but also in Germany. Three different reasons may be given for this.

First of all, the culprits of the terrorist attack were quite immediately identified as Muslim extremists of Arab origin, which increased the focus of public and medial attention on Arab and Islamic countries almost overnight. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian citizen who is hosted by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, claimed to be responsible for the attacks in Washington and New York. This combination of proclaimed *anti-western* activity in combination with the religious values of the Taliban regime seems to have classified the attacks in the context of Islamic fundamentalism.

Secondly, the attacks were violent and brutal, and have caused a tremendous amount of disturbance because of the high number of victims that resulted from the plane crashes and

⁵ Average number of articles per analyzed publication day in the timeframe after 9/11 that focus on Arab and Muslim countries and actors.

especially from the collapse of the World Trade Center in New York. That the events took place on U.S. American soil not only shattered the feeling of national security of the U.S. American Self. It also called into question the internal (national) security in Germany, because, on the one hand, some of the terrorists were assumed to have planned the attacks in Germany and had thus infiltrated a Western country that – so far – had regarded itself as secure due to strict immigration rules and regulations. Thus, the event not only pushed the public discourse about national security in the U.S. but also in European countries like Germany. The discussions also addressed security threats that might emanate from the country's large Muslim minority, Muslim fundamentalism, and a potential terrorist threat in Europe. As a consequence of this perceived threat, discussions were also conducted about new immigration restrictions and the effectiveness of previous integration policies, since it was assumed that the potential radicalization of Muslim immigrants might be due to a possible lack of integration in Western societies.

Thirdly, in public discourse and as could also be traced in the course of the print media analysis, the event was perceived as a threat to Western culture, not only to the United States. The German perception that was reflected in political speeches as well as in the different societal discourses that the mass media have taken up and summarized, constructed Germany and the overall construct of a “West” as a symbolic victim. How the German or Western Self is perceived in this construction in German media will be taken up again and considered in more detail in chapter V and VI when the textual construction of Arab and Muslim actors in contrast to the communicated self-perception of the country will be discussed.

2. Focused Topics and Countries

If we look at the formal level of the news articles we can describe the medial context for the construction of Arab and Muslim Others on the basis of focused topics and countries that articles in which those actors appear deal with. This level of analysis summarizes the different discourses in which Arab and Muslim actors become relevant. In the following subchapter I will elaborate the content of the German and U.S. news articles which focuses on Muslim and Arab actors. An overview will be given over the range of topics that Muslim and Arab actor and country depictions occur in connection with, and I will also circumscribe the geographical radius of the Arab and Muslim Other as it is drawn in both countries' print news coverage.

First of all, we have to distinguish between an internal versus an external focus of news coverage. The overall image of Arab and Muslim actors is predominantly shaped by an external focus on foreign news, and on Arab and Muslim countries. Arabs and Muslims within the German or U.S. national context are only marginally referred to before the attacks. In German print media, these internal Arabs and Muslims are noticed in the context of criminality, immigration policies, debates about Islam lessons at public schools, or the wearing of headscarves in public institutions. Especially the German BILD portrays Muslim immigrants mainly in the context of criminality or cultural differences. In U.S. print media, Arab actors are only brought up in the


context of the election campaign for the New York mayor.⁶ It is only after 9/11 that the internal Other becomes significantly relevant, and here especially in the context of terrorism.

With the external focus of news coverage both countries' print media integrate a wide range of different countries. The following two sections will introduce the major countries that are focused on in the articles that deal with Arab and Muslim actors, before and after 9/11. The kinds of topics and issues discussed in the articles will be described in order to summarize an overall setting in which Arab and Muslim actors appear in the German and American print media before and after the 9/11 attacks.

2.1. Countries of Reference and Topics before 9/11

Before 9/11, Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media of both countries appear in a broad setting of a number of different countries and topics. Altogether, German articles that include relevant actors focus on up to twenty-eight different countries. In American articles, we find twenty-one countries or regions that are referred to. There is also a wide-ranging diversity of topics discussed in both countries, with about forty-three different topics in Germany and thirty-eight topics in the U.S. From this large variety of countries and topics that include relevant actors the most central ones will be introduced in the following:

Figure IV.1: Spectrum of foreign countries focused on before 9/11



⁶ However, these occurrences were not included in the analysis since the articles were published in the regional sections of the NY TIMES.

⁷ In %, given the proportion of articles with the listed country focus in relation to all articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

First and foremost, in both countries one third (Germany: 33.5 %⁸, USA: 33.3 %) of the analyzed media articles which include Arab and Muslim actors focus on Israel and Palestine, and here predominantly report on the ongoing conflict between both countries.⁹ The discourse about the conflict in the Middle East therefore dominates the news coverage of the subject of research before 9/11.¹⁰ Both Germany and the United States perceive themselves as crucial parties in the peace negotiations and the process of establishing a Palestinian state solution which can be seen as one reason for this central and permanently high focus on events in Israel and Palestine. Furthermore, for the U.S. context Zaharna (1995) has argued that the focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also due to the special political relationship between the Jewish community within the United States and prominent American officials and politicians which also reflects in the mass medial attention that is put on the conflict and political decisions and negotiations in this region (Zaharna 1995: 38).

The internal as well as foreign political relevance of this conflict for the Western Self is also reflected in the fact that the majority of articles about the Middle Eastern conflict in both discourses deal with political issues. They discuss, for example, the positions of the different government actors that are involved in the ongoing violent conflict, like the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat,¹¹ the Israeli government, or political leaders of Palestinian organizations like Hamas or Islamic Jihad, etc. Furthermore, articles deal with the diverse attempts to design a road map for a peace plan for the region.

Another aspect that dominates the articles about the conflict in Middle East is the daily interplay of violence that consists of suicide attacks by Palestinian freedom fighters or extremists and the military reactions of the Israeli state. Both topics are often intermingled in the different articles and create a circle of daily violence, counter-violence, and political peace initiatives. It can be suggested here that the conflict between Israel and Palestine offers continuing news relevance because of the (nearly) daily attacks, violent confrontations between the two parties, and the civilian victims that this conflict offers and causes.

⁸ In the following, when only the percentages are given, this always refers to the percentages of articles as measured by the total number of analyzed articles. The given average numbers were rounded up or off to one decimal place.

⁹ The ongoing political as well as military conflict between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbor states as well as the Palestinian people and their political leaders, that basically developed with the withdrawal of Great Britain from Palestine in 1948 and the proclamation of Israel as a sovereign state. It often overlaps with other conflicts in the region. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000-2005) the conflict is characterized by continuous suicide attacks in Israel carried out by Palestinian terrorists and counter-measures of the Israeli military like repeated occupations of Palestinian territory or the Israeli policy of so-called preventative, systematic killings of potential terrorist leaders.

¹⁰ Similar findings were published for the German context by Hafez (2002) as well as for the American context by Hashem (1995) who analyzed the U.S. news magazines TIME and NEWSWEEK for the time period between January 1990 and December 1993, and found that actors from Palestine make up the second largest group behind actors from Iraq which are probably focused more often during this time period due to the Kuwait invasion in 1990 and the subsequent Second Gulf war in 1991 (see also Hashem 1995: 151-155).

¹¹ Yassir Arafat was Chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority from 1993 to 2004.

Afghanistan and Shelter Now

In addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can be identified as the leading topic in both countries' print media in the analyzed timeframe, a relatively large number of articles in both countries focus on Afghanistan (Germany: 10.2 %, USA: 8.3 %), which is mainly due to the Shelter Now affair that began in July 2001.¹² The Shelter Now issue not only attracted great attention in Germany where four of the arrested staff of the organization came from, but also U.S. newspapers took high notice of the topic. The issue also revives the focus on the political situation in Afghanistan. The ruling Taliban regime, which at that time was not awarded state recognition politically by Germany and the U.S. as well as by almost the entire international states community, becomes highly focused again for its strict, fundamentalist rule, domestic power struggles with opposition groups like the Northern Alliance, and the regime's diplomatic behavior in general and in the context of the Shelter Now affair in particular.

Conflict in Macedonia

A third focus that would not automatically be considered to be of high relevance when discussing images of external Arabs and Muslims is Macedonia and the province of Kosovo, especially not as the country geographically lies in the European continent. Altogether, 9.2 % of all analyzed German articles and 7.7 % of the U.S. data sample before 9/11 focus on Macedonia or the province of Kosovo. The articles considered here predominantly deal with the Macedonian conflict and mainly focus on the members of the National Liberation Army (UÇK) who consisted of Albanian extremist rebels and who fought for the independence of the Kosovo region that is to a large extent settled by Muslim Albanians (Kosovo Albanians). Other articles discuss the group's violent conflicts with the NATO troops in the course of the disarmament process.¹³ The high interest of both countries in this conflict could be explained with the military involvement of both Germany and the United States in the NATO security troops that were stationed in the country during the analyzed time period to secure the demilitarization of the UÇK.

¹² In early August 2001 the Taliban regime arrested eight foreign staff of the aid organization "Shelter Now International" in Kabul, among them also four Germans. They were accused of Christian missionary activity, which was illegal in Afghanistan at that time.

¹³ The violent conflict in Macedonia is mainly a conflict between the Slavic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority, the second-largest population group in the country, which seeks more political independence and state autonomy. In 2000, the conflict between the two sides became more violent as Albanian rebel groups (especially the UÇK) increasingly and more and more systematically attacked the Macedonian security forces. A massive intervention by the United Nations in August 2001 led to a ceasefire and the formulation of a peace plan that also included plans for political reforms and the political betterment of the Albanian minority in Macedonia. Among other things, the agreement includes the demobilization of the UÇK and, in return, a guarantee for amnesty for its members. The demobilization process was supported and monitored by NATO, which was reduced in size but remained in the country after the process was finished, mainly to support the Macedonian security forces and to protect the EU and OSZE monitors who are also stationed in the country (Hansen 2004). The media analysis partially covers the timeframe of the demilitarization process.

General European and Western Focus

Apart from the interest in the Macedonian conflict, we also find a small amount of articles that deal with Arab and Muslim actors within European countries (Germany: 1.9 %, USA: 1.8 %). Besides the focus on Macedonia, Arab and Muslim actors also occur in the context of German as well as American articles that refer to countries like Italy, Belgium, Serbia, or Bosnia, although only to a limited extent compared to the other countries mentioned so far. The topics of these articles are similar in both German and U.S. newspapers; they discuss immigrants or refugees with Arab or Islamic background, the ethnic Albanian minority in the Kosovo region, or a Tunisian hijacker in Italy.

Iraq

Apart from such “leading” topics as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we find countries that are focused rather frequently but in the context of a diverse range of different topics. The media focus on Iraq may serve as an example here: On a quantitative scale, 2.9 % of the analyzed German articles and 6.0 % of the U.S. articles deal with the country. The focus on Iraq is dominated by the ongoing conflict between the Iraqi government and the former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in particular on the one hand and the U.S. military on the other hand. This ongoing conflict includes, for instance, the military confrontations in the no-flight zones in northern and southern Iraq that were established after the Persian Gulf War in 1991 to protect ethnic groups threatened with repression by the Iraqi government.¹⁴ The news coverage on Iraq also includes aspects like the sanctions that were imposed against Iraq after the Gulf War by the United Nations, which were especially supported by the United States. In this context, German media also focus on the social and economic consequences of those sanctions for the Iraqi population – an aspect that is not picked up in the analyzed American articles.

In both countries’ print media articles that focus on Iraq, special attention is paid to the actor Saddam Hussein and his personal political but also private actions. For the surveyed time period before the 9/11 attacks, we can for instance find articles about his private family conflicts or his literary work in the German newspaper SZ, as well as a discussion about a possible legal prosecution of the ruler at the International Court of Justice in the news magazine NEWSWEEK.

Iran

A second country that is focused on quite often in both countries print media (Germany: 6.3 %, USA: 10.1 %) but with reference to different issues is Iran. With regard to the Islamic republic, German and U.S. newspaper articles predominantly report on political issues that concentrate on

¹⁴ The Persian Gulf War took place from August 1990 to March 1991. It was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition force of approximately 30 nations led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations in order to liberate Kuwait, which had been invaded by Iraq on the basis of the contention that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling petroleum across Iraq’s border.

domestic political frictions and conflicts between the conservative powers like the religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or the Guardian Council, and the reformers of the parliament and President Mohammad Khatami. The struggle over democratic practices in Iranian politics seems to be of central interest for both German and American news coverage, and is embedded in the context of several legislative and executive decisions and actions that take place in the country.

Furthermore, both countries' print media focus on events and phenomena of Iranian society that predominantly center on societal conditions, rights of women, or religious and legal restrictions that are enforced by religious conservative forces like Guardian council and that the Iranian population have to live with. Last but not least, the trial of a serial killer who murdered more than a dozen prostitutes arouses attention in both countries' print media in the period of analysis, and here is especially picked up in the German tabloid BILD and the American NEWSWEEK magazine.

As for the topics, focused on countries, and discourse that have been listed so far, the medial context for Arabs and Muslims can be summarized as rather similar in both German and U.S. print media. However, the two countries' media samples before 9/11 also reveal some slight differences.

The Focus on Turkey in German Print Media

One country that is more frequently referred to in German print media with nearly 10.2 % is Turkey. Compared to that, only 3.0 % of the articles in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 deal with the country. First of all, the German interest in the Turkish politics or society seems to be due to the fact that Germany has a large Turkish minority. Apart from that, Germany – as a European country – is involved in the Turkish accession talks with the European Union. In the context of these negotiations, news about the Turkish foreign policy toward Cyprus, internal political processes towards more democratic structures, civil rights abuses like torture, or the freedom of the Turkish press are of great interest from a European perspective for the evaluation of whether or not the Turkish nation state fulfils the Western criteria and standards that are required for accession to the European Union. The internal political issues and decisions are therefore also evaluated with regard to the level of institutionalization of European or Western principles (human rights, freedom of the press. etc.) that become relevant in this context.¹⁵ Furthermore, the German interest in the country also concentrates on the growing influence and popularity of the Islamic fundamentalist party for Justice and Progress (AKP) and its leader and later prime

¹⁵ Gür (1998) comes to a similar result in a content analysis of the image of Turkey in the German press for the timeframe 1987-1995: In addition to the mentioned topics, the author argues that the human rights situation and the status of the Kurdish minority or other central topics that are focused in the context of the news coverage of Turkey. In another analysis that also includes television programs, Quandt (1995) comes to the result that besides the Kurdish minority problem, German media mainly concentrate on political issues, and largely disregard cultural and economic issues. In this point, Quandt's results differ slightly from the observations that have been made around 9/11.

minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan, in 2001 that is closely watched by the German and European political public in terms of its democratic accomplishment.

In addition to these political issues, German print media also discuss Turkish actors in the context of social or economic issues and topics. Here, articles predominantly deal with the problems of the Turkish economy and their effects on Turkish society. Again, these articles reflect the relevance of this issue being derived from the accession negotiations of the country to the European Union and indicate certain skepticism of the German Self towards those attempts. But also topics of the private or entertainment sector are newsworthy, and not only in the tabloid newspaper: among other things we also find an article about the murder of a Turkish business man in the SZ, or another article about a “sex strike” of Turkish women in a village in Southern Anatolia in BILD.¹⁶

The Focus on Indonesia and Pakistan in U.S. Print Media

Just as we find a stronger focus on Turkish issues in German media, U.S. newspapers more frequently focus on political and other events and topics in Indonesia. Even though, for instance, the political change of government in Indonesia found its way into the news coverage in both countries, the attention paid towards Indonesia was much more prominent in the American media as the number of analyzed articles reflects. It has to be noted that German newspaper articles pay more attention to Indonesia than to a number of other countries, with about 3.9 % of all analyzed articles. Nevertheless and compared to that, the proportion of analyzed articles referring to Indonesia in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 stands at 13.1 %.

The majority of these articles focus on Indonesian domestic politics, and here especially on the political change of power from President Abdurrahman Wahid to the former Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri that took place in 2001. For the United States, the personal profile of the new president and the degree of her commitment to democracy, as well as her willingness to solve the social, economic and political problems of the country, for example with religious extremists, are of great interest in particular. Other articles discuss the reactions of Wahid concerning his loss of power, and examine the political and private consequences for the ex-president. Finally, on a social and economic dimension, U.S. articles also cover issues like the consumption of cigarettes in Indonesia, a natural catastrophe, or a railroad accident that took place during the period of analysis – events that received no attention at all in the analyzed German data sample before 9/11.

A second country that is referred to more often in the American news media before 9/11 than in the German ones is Pakistan. About 4.8 % of all U.S. articles focus on the country, compared to

¹⁶ It has to be noted however that other studies have shown that U.S. media also focus on Turkey in their news coverage (see for instance Bieber-Roberts 1995). This is especially the case in the context of the different military coups that took place in Turkey since the 1950s, even though the authors here also emphasizes that the news coverage has decreased steadily since the last coup in 1980. According to the author, and similar to the German news coverage on Turkey, U.S. media here mainly focus on the inner political, but also the military issues in the country, democratic developments, the Cyprus Crisis, or the economic stability of the country.

only 1.9 % in the German news media. The majority of the American articles report on domestic politics, and cover such issues as recent cases of execution of the death penalty, or political conflicts between the Pakistani government and religious and political fundamentalist groups. Furthermore, the discourse about the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India about the Kashmir region draws attention to Pakistani actors in U.S. media.

The Discourse on Islam

One non-geographical context in which Arab and Muslim actors become relevant as well in both countries' media is the discursive examination of Islam. Since the discourse on this religion becomes highly relevant for both countries in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the quantitative relevance of this topic shall also be mentioned before the event. Here, it has to be noted that both countries only marginally focus on the topic of Islam before the attacks. In the NY TIMES, an article discusses the role of religion in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another NY TIMES article reports on the growth of Islam and the rising conflicts in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. In the German SZ, we find two articles about suicide bombers in Palestine and the question of how terror and Islam are interrelated, and how terrorism is justified in the religion. An article in the SZ has a national focus as it refers to the national debates about the wearing of headscarves in Germany.¹⁷

The National Focus

This brings us to the last relevant context in which Arab and Muslim actors can occur in German and U.S. print media, namely the focus on and discourse about national topics and events in which context Arab and Muslim actors can appear. Again, this topical context is less significant for the time period before the attacks but it becomes increasingly relevant after 9/11. Nevertheless, already before 9/11 we find articles with a national self-focus that also include references to Arab or Muslim actors – even though the number of articles for the analyzed timeframe before 9/11 is rather small. For both countries, articles that refer to national issues are treated as a distinct category. Of the articles referring to Arab or Muslim actors, only 3.4 % of the German ones and about 1.8 % of the American texts focus on national issues and topics, after all. In the American news media, the respective articles discuss the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East and the national discussion about that. In the Germany newspapers, these articles focus on the discourses about integration of immigrants or, more concretely, the wearing of headscarves in public institutions like schools or work places, in Germany. Or they report on criminal behavior

¹⁷ Even though the focus on Islam is only of minor relevance in the timeframe analyzed here, Islam is a relevant facet of the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other also before 9/11. As Hafez (2002) has noted in his long-time study of German newspapers, the news coverage on Islam is quantitatively only of minor relevance but becomes important when it is combine with political issues (political Islam). As Hafez (2002) argues, especially the Iranian Revolution (1978-79) increased the quantitative relevance of Islam in the German print media. At the same time, the circumstances especially of the political radicalization of Islam have also ascribed the image of the religion with a predominantly negative connotation (see for instance Hafez 2002: 47-64).

of Arab or Muslim actors that is carried out within the national borders, i.e. by immigrants or ethnic minority members, or in a more concrete case by an Iranian spy who is reported on in the SZ and the tabloid BILD. In yet another context, the news magazine DER SPIEGEL discusses the negotiation strategy of the German foreign minister in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the reactions of other German and European politicians to that. In this context, the articles also include references to actors in the Middle East.

Altogether, the complexity of topics and countries of references is already quite broad before the events of September 11, in German as well as in U.S. articles. We find quite similar ranges of discourses on topics and focused countries in which Arab or Muslim actors are referred to in the analyzed print media of both countries.¹⁸ In addition, it can also be noted that the different newspapers in both countries do reflect the same composition of depicted countries and topics as we find more or less similar geographical and topical foci in all of the different analyzed newspapers in both countries before the attacks. The only exception might be the slightly stronger internal focus of the German tabloid BILD since articles with a national focus rank second highest rank in that newspaper.

Nevertheless, and despite these large similarities of topical and geographical foci, we also find some mentionable differences between the German and U.S. media contexts in which some Arab and Muslim actors occur: The stronger German focus on political and social events in Turkey and the stronger American focus on the political developments in Indonesia as well as in Pakistan have been mentioned here. What has also been outlined is that both countries pay only little attention to issues that concern the content and practice etc. of Islam before 9/11, and only to a very small extent refer to Arab or Muslim actors in the respective national contexts. This changes however quite significantly with the attacks, as will be outlined in the next section.

2.2. Countries of Reference and Topics after 9/11


On a quantitative level, after the 9/11 attacks the number of different topics and the countries that are focused on in the news coverage when Arab and Muslim actors appear has only partially increased. This is due in part to the fact that a number of articles that include Arab or Muslim actors or country depictions do not have a specific country reference any more (Germany: 31.7 %, USA: 16.0 %). The majority of these articles are part of the discourse on the 9/11 attacks. They deal, for instance, with the 9/11 investigations of the police, the identified suicide attackers, the presumed mastermind behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden, or other terrorist suspects that were identified in the course of the investigations. These articles either focus on a number of different countries or highlight no specific country at all as the news media discursively negotiate the event and its societal impact on a rather abstract level.

¹⁸ For the U.S. press between 1990 and 1993, Hashem (1995) has presented similar significances, just as Hafez (2002) has done for the German print sector since the 1950s. We can thus back up our finding that before 9/11 the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts present one of the central topics in the context of which Arab and Muslim actors are depicted.

Apart from that, a number of articles can be found that deal with the international reactions to and political, cultural, or economic consequences of the attacks that refer not to one but to a wide range of different countries. Regarding the geographical focus, the number of countries that are looked at in the German articles declined to eighteen from formerly twenty-six, which means that the focus slightly narrowed. Nevertheless, and despite that reduced focus, the variety of topics increased to forty-six, compared to forty-two before 9/11.

Compared to that, in the analyzed American news articles the number of countries that are focused on increased from twenty to twenty-four. This increase is combined with a rather decisive growth in the variety of discussed topics from formerly thirty-eight to now fifty. Altogether it can thus be said that the variety of topics in both countries' media increased and additionally shifted to some extent as well since the geographical focus of the topics that are discussed after 9/11 in both countries changed too.

Figure IV.2: Spectrum of foreign countries focused on after 9/11¹⁹



The National Focus

First and foremost, the focus on the Self, i.e. the focus on the national (and Western) territory and internal issues and actors has increased tremendously. For the context of the United States this development seems obvious since the attacks took place within the country. Consequently, in U.S. media nearly half of the articles (42.6 %) analyzed after the attacks have a predominantly national focus in which Arab and Muslim actors now occur. Every fourth article deals with the reactions to and consequences of the attacks as they are observed in American society. For instance, articles discuss the reactions of different societal groups like foreign students from Arab or Muslim countries or Muslim and Arab American citizens. Other articles report on such

¹⁹ In %, given the proportion of articles with the listed country focus in relation to all articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

negative consequences as hate crimes against Arab and Muslim immigrants, traumatized children, and the grieving of the relatives of the 9/11 victims.

In a political dimension, articles focus on the reactions and possible or actual foreign political or military consequences – for example to fight the terrorist threat – that are discussed by the U.S. or German government. In view of the internal impacts, the analyzed print media also look at the internal political decisions after the event, like the measures that are taken to improve internal security, or the investigations against the mastermind and possible accomplices of the attacks. In the American context, we also find a number of articles that explicitly discuss the self-image of the United States, or that look at the way in which the attacks may change international policies – and here especially emphasize the imminent military action against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

What is surprising, however, is that this focus on the Self and on Arab and Muslim actors within the national boundaries also strongly increases in the German articles after 9/11. A focus on national Arab and Muslim actors can be found in 18.2 % of the analyzed German articles in the time span after the attacks. This high significance of the internal Other already indicates that the attacks also had a strong impact on the self-reflection of German society. We will again come back to this aspect of the self-observation in chapters V and VI.6 when we look at the way in which those internal actors are constructed and will see why it becomes so relevant for the German Self as well to look at and demarcate internal actors more strongly after the attacks.

General European and Western Focus

Besides the national focus we also find an increased focus on other Western (and here mainly European) countries after 9/11. In both countries, the Macedonian focus nearly disappears completely from both countries' print media (Germany: 0.3 %, USA: 0.8 %). However, some differences can also be observed here between the German and the American news coverage. Whereas in the American context, the focus on Europe and other Western countries (like France, Spain, or Germany) only increases slightly to now 5.1 %, in the German media the focus on Europe increases significantly, as about 18.8 % of all analyzed articles after the attacks focus on Arabs and Muslim in a Western or European context. Especially the German focus on the United States – as a Western nation – increases strongly with the event, which explains the increased overall Western focus in the German print media after the attacks.

The topics that are focused on in the national and Western contexts in both American and German articles can mainly be explained by the event itself – as well as by the roots of the terrorist network and the regional provenance of the suspects and their helpers. In both print media samples, articles in this context especially look at terror investigations in European countries. The actors that appear in articles with a Western focus are predominantly the 9/11 suicide attackers or their accomplices and supporters in the U.S. as well as in Germany. Both countries' print media thereby report, for instance, on the so-called “terrorist cell of Hamburg,” a

group that is believed to have organized and mainly carried out the attacks. The fact that the majority of the culprits lived or stayed in Germany and/or the U.S. for a longer period of time before they carried out their attack, increased the perception of a potential threat that comes from the Arab and Muslim Other not only in distant places but also within the Western hemisphere. This realization, which is communicated very strongly in both discourses after 9/11, also throws back the geographical focus on the Western sphere and raises the awareness of a potential future threat that might come from other possible – and yet still invisible – terrorist cells within the national and Western boundaries.

Apart from this shift in focus towards internal topics and actors, i.e. onto the Self, both countries' newspapers also reveal a similar shift in the external perspective onto the potential Arab and Muslim Other. Here, the new significance of Afghanistan has to be listed:

Afghanistan

As noted before, Afghanistan was a relevant focus before the event as well. Now the attention that is paid to the country further increases but also shifts slightly to a new topic since the presumed mastermind of the attacks, Osama bin Laden, is a guest of the ruling Taliban regime, a fact that is now frequently emphasized in German and U.S. media discourse on the attacks. Due to this connection, Afghanistan very quickly becomes the central focus of the U.S. investigations on the background, the masterminds or supporters, and the political or military consequences of the attacks. This increased focus may explain the grown media focus as well: In the analyzed timeframe after the attacks, 14.4 % of the German and 16.0 % of the American articles look at Afghanistan, which makes the country the most frequently focused on country in the U.S. context.

Most articles with reference to Afghanistan in German and American newspapers deal with the reactions of the Taliban regime towards the attacks or with their diplomatic negotiations with the United States regarding the handing over of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, the great interest in Afghanistan is maintained by the foreign political strategy of an anti-terror coalition that the U.S. government strives for, and that aims at integrating not only European countries, but also Arab and Muslim countries in the military actions that are planned against terrorist groups as well as governments or countries that support and sponsor terrorist organizations and activities against Western countries. Afghanistan's Taliban regime is regarded as one of those terror supporters and becomes the first target of a military campaign by the anti-terror coalition.²⁰ The war in Afghanistan that finally started at the beginning of October 2001 therefore has constantly drawn the medial focus to Afghanistan in both U.S. and German articles.²¹

²⁰ With regard to Afghanistan this anti-terror coalition very quickly worked towards a military operation against the country that not only aimed to arrest Osama bin Laden but also to displace the ruling Taliban regime which – was noted already – was not recognized politically by Western countries mainly because of its way of seizing power, but also because of its exclusive and religiously fundamentalist politics.

²¹ This topic is also frequently discussed in German newspapers since Germany is one of the coalition partners that will take part in the military campaign in Afghanistan that starts in October 2001.

Apart from that, also the Shelter Now affair did not disappear completely after 9/11 but can be regarded as a minor topic that is still reported, even though now only in the larger context of the “war on terrorism” and Osama bin Laden. The trial of the Shelter Now staff is now seen as a further – supporting – argument for a military campaign against the ruling Taliban regime.

Pakistan

A second country that is quite similarly pushed into the limelight of both countries’ attention after the attacks is Pakistan. In German print media, compared to the timeframe before the attacks²², now 5.0 % of all analyzed articles now focus on Pakistan. In the U.S. data sample the focus on Pakistan remains stable almost stable, increasing only slightly from formerly 4.8 % to now 5.9 % of all articles. The focus on Pakistan after 9/11 is, on the one hand, due to the geographic proximity of the country to Afghanistan. On the other hand, the interest in Pakistan can be associated with the very fast political decision of Pakistan’s government to take sides with the United States in the anti-terror coalition. This strategically favorable and militarily central position provides the country with an increasing amount of attention.

The main focus of both German and U.S. newspapers is put on political issues and here especially on the country’s President Pervez Musharraf’s internal political conflict with fundamentalist groups and the military over his *pro-western* course and the country’s role in the anti-terror coalition. Especially Musharraf’s support for the U.S. military in the war in Afghanistan are frequently discussed, because up to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was regarded as an ally of the Taliban regime. After the event, the political turn of the Pakistani government against the Afghan leaders as well as its political strategy to support the plans of the U.S. and the NATO to carry out military actions against Afghanistan in order to destroy terrorist structures etc. provides one explanation for the increasing focus on Pakistan in the analyzed print media.

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Whereas Afghanistan and Pakistan clearly come to the fore in the news coverage after the attacks, the formerly central topic and geographic focus – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – loses its central position. The conflict does not disappear completely but the news coverage on the topic declines significantly and with it, also the actors from this region lose their quantitative relevance. Altogether, only 6.0 % of the analyzed German articles and 5.3 % of the U.S. articles after the attacks focus on Arab and Muslim actors in Palestine or Israel (compared to one third of the data before the event).

Regarding the content, both countries’ media discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still mainly deal with the everyday violent conflict between the Israeli military and Palestinian gunmen and groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Apart from that, articles also discuss the reactions of

²² When 1.9 % of all analyzed German articles focused on the country.

both Israeli and Palestinian politicians, of religious groups, and of private people towards the attacks in the U.S. Here, the articles put a strong emphasis on the way in which both sides do or do not take sides with the United States in the anti-terror coalition. Especially the demonstrated support of some Palestinian demonstrators for the attacks in Gaza is critically discussed and is embedded in the broader reflections on the ambivalence of Arab regimes but also of Arab and Muslim populations towards terrorism and *anti-American* or *anti-western* sentiments.

Arab and Muslim Countries, Terrorism, and the Anti-Terror Coalition

In addition to the strong focus on the two countries Afghanistan and Pakistan, another discourse that can be identified refers to a wide range of different countries in the Middle East. German and U.S. newspapers frequently refer to Arab and Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Iraq, Libya, or Egypt and the reactions of those nation states, their governments, and also their populations to the 9/11 attacks. On a quantitative scale, most of those articles do not have an explicit focus on one specific country but refer to the “Arab region,” “Muslim world” or “the Middle East” as an overall category. In Figure IV.2, most of those articles are thus categorized under “unspecific” or “other” country reference. Articles discuss the degrees of involvement of those countries in international terrorism, their diplomatic behavior and their positions towards U.S. foreign policy, or their concrete positions, engagement, and possible involvement in the anti-terror coalition.

In the context of these topics, some countries especially stand out, and here we find slight differences in the German and American focus. One case in point here, for example, is Saudi Arabia. The country increasingly became the focus in German and U.S. print media after the 9/11 attacks, but the amount of news coverage is somewhat larger in the U.S. articles than in the German press. Three American articles exclusively highlight and discuss the Saudi Arabian connection with international Islamic terrorism, and locate some of the roots of Islamic terrorism in the country’s political history and present day politics. In Germany, we find only one article on this issue in the news magazine DER SPIEGEL.

In addition to that, U.S. articles also focus specifically on the terror connections of Syria and Egypt, whereas two German articles discuss the terror connections of Iraq and a possible involvement of Iraqi Islamic extremists in the 9/11 attacks instead. Nevertheless, altogether both countries put a strong focus on the participation of the already mentioned countries in the proclaimed anti-terror coalition, whereby both countries’ media largely include the same range of countries that have been outlined before. The only exception in German newspapers is the inclusion of Turkey in this discourse. German articles also discuss the Turkish position and reactions towards the attacks.

The Discourse on Terrorism

Compared to the timeframe before the 9/11 attacks, after the event new topics enter the arena as well. Triggered off by the attacks and as the other introduced topics have already indicated, “terrorism” becomes a central topic of discussion in both countries’ articles, mostly in the context of the topics that have already been introduced, but in some articles also as an abstract issue with a specific country reference. 2.4 % of the analyzed U.S. articles and 6.0 % of the German ones exclusively deal with this topic²³ – stimulated of course by the 9/11 attacks but also focused on the broader subject of terrorism in general.

Apart from this rather abstract discourse on terrorism, a number of articles that portray actors from an Arab or Muslim background now strongly measure the political actions of countries according to the degree to which they support or refuse terrorist activities. A second issue that became extremely relevant in both discourses is the discussion about a general and permanent terror threat that is assumed to have become obvious with the attacks on New York and Washington. In this context, articles focus mainly on Islamic and political groups within Germany, the United States, and Europe, and discuss whether or not and why those groups can be perceived as an increasing terror threat.

Altogether, it has to be noted here that the discourse on terrorism after 9/11 also includes a rather abstract discussion about the roots and the geographic origins of terrorism, and here in particular about the structures and the specific form of Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, the American perspective more intensively focuses on the weapons that terrorists use or could use in the future, like nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, etc. Here, it becomes obvious from the content of the respective articles that these discussions about terrorist weapons are embedded in the general overall considerations and negotiations of military strategies of both the discussed terrorist groups but more than that of America’s own counter-strategies to fight terrorism.

Compared to that, German articles deal with the question of counter-terrorism in more general terms, e.g. by discussing the effectiveness of the “war on terrorism” in general. This more distant perspective on the topic might be explained by the observing status of Germany after the attacks – at least with regard to the military consequences of possible retaliatory measures. Instead, we find more articles in German print media after 9/11 that discuss the roots of and reasons for terrorist activities, the role that Western politics has had in the development of terrorist movements and groups in the Arab world, and possible social and economic causes or religious reasons that might motivate terrorist actors.

Beyond that, both countries keenly deal with established and partly well-known terrorist figures, historically incisive terrorist attacks, and existing terrorist groups and structures in the Middle East, by introducing their major goals, historical development, and societal background. In other articles both countries’ print media also try to answer the question why people become terrorists. Here, especially the American media continuously pick up and discuss the involvement of Arab

governments of countries like Syria, Pakistan, Iran, and other “state sponsors” with diverse terrorist groups and networks. Particularly the latter topic indicates interchangeability between the discourses on terrorism in general and the specific focus on terrorism in connection with Arab and Muslim countries and actors after 9/11.

The Discourse on Islam in German Print Media

Finally, a discourse that also becomes more prominent after the attacks, but here more often in German newspapers than in American ones, is that on Islam. In the German newspaper articles after 9/11 examination of the Islamic religion becomes one of the central topics of discussion. This increased interest in Islam as an independent topic distinguishes the German focus from the American news media after September 11, at least when focusing on Arab and Muslim actors. Whereas only 0.8 % of the U.S. articles in our analysis deal with Islam and Islamic terrorism as abstract topics, in German articles, we find more than 6.6 % discussing the religion and its connection to terrorist activities.²⁴

It has to be admitted, however, that first of all, religion is a crucial feature for Arab and Muslim actors in U.S. print media as well. U.S. articles simply do not discuss the religion as an independent unit and in its essence as a spiritual worldview. Religious affiliation is used mainly as a cultural identifier and element of classification for actors (as will be further outlined in the chapters V and VI).

Second, after 9/11 it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between articles that predominantly focus on either terrorism or Islam because the majority of these texts discuss the connection between both phenomena. The German articles focus, for instance, on Islamic terrorism and in this context discuss the possible roots for violence and aggressive behavior in the religious rules and scripture itself. In other contexts, the German media discourse on Islam looks at the attitudes of Muslims in the Middle East towards violence, war, and terrorism. The questions that guide those articles are whether or not Islam – in its basic principles – is a violent religion. This is done, for example, by introducing the substance and basic rules of the religion, outlining the “violent” history of Islam, and introducing religious and historic experts who emphasize, for example, that an actually peaceful religion has been taken hostage by a small number of radical extremists. The German tabloid BILD even publishes a series on the history of Islam where the well-known but also controversially discussed journalist and expert on the Middle Eastern region, Peter Scholl-Latour, gives an overview about the religion and its social and historical context in articles on questions like “Was Mohammed a benevolent prophet?”,

²³ Those articles on “terrorism” are listed in the category “others” or “unspecific” (see Figure IV.2) depending on whether they have either no or no specific country focus.

²⁴ Again, those articles on “Islam” are listed in the category “others” or “unspecific” (see Figure IV.2) depending on whether they have either no or no specific country focus.

“Who are the great Islamic leaders?”, “The holy sanctuaries of Islam,” or “Will Islam rule the world?”²⁵

Altogether, we can say that the topics that have been outlined for the weeks after 9/11 in the last section present the most frequently depicted contexts in U.S. and German print media in which Arab and Muslim actors occur. There are a number of topics from the pre-9/11 time period that have become marginalized by the event, like for instance the discourse on the conflict in Macedonia or the formerly more frequently focused country Indonesia. Those discourses and countries and the actors that occurred in their context did not disappear completely from the respective media. But even though we can still find three German articles about the Macedonian conflict and three American articles referring to Indonesia, those countries have simply been pushed aside by the topics that have been mentioned throughout the last section.

However, and despite the geographical shift, what can be noticed with respect to the images of those countries after 9/11 is also the changing perspective upon the Other’s features and characteristics. U.S. and German media turn their focus mainly on the political dimension. This is reflected (a), in the focus on democratic developments in diverse regions and countries like Indonesia, the Middle East, etc. that are discussed in a number of articles; (b), in a frequent integration of political quotes by U.S. politicians in the respective articles; and (c), in the frequent theoretical discussion about the American norm and value system and core ideas like democracy, freedom, and liberalism. In this context, only those countries with political or military relevance in the up-coming “war on terrorism” receive special focus, a relevance that Indonesia does not have for example because of its strategically less important geographical location. This irrelevance could also be assumed for the formerly important Macedonian conflict.

Despite this political focus, especially U.S. articles after the attacks now increasingly discuss social and economic features of Arab and Muslim actors and countries. Here, especially the economic usefulness of certain countries and the advantage of political relations are frequently discussed – again mainly in the new geographical framework of an anti-terror coalition. This change will become even clearer in the chapters V and VI when we look at the way in which the identified Arab and Muslim countries and actors are constructed.

²⁵ Similar to that but a couple of years before 9/11, according to Esposito (1992), the BOSTON GLOBE (a serious American national newspaper) has run a four-part series on Islam in 1991 with the title “The Sword of Islam” (see also Esposito 1992: 168).

3. Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media – A Cross Section through Society

After having outlined the basic contexts in which Arab and Muslim actors appear, the next subchapter will take a look at the basic composition of this constructed Other and the complexity of the actors and actor groups that occur in the analyzed print media articles. In the comparison of German and U.S. print media and the actors that occur in both media contexts we could of course primarily compare whether or not the same actors appear in both countries. However, this comparative result would not be sufficient to answer the questions of how the construction of Arab and Muslim Other and Western Self are connected, and what overall image of the hypothetical Other can be found in both countries media reality. U.S. articles may focus on other actors and countries than German ones, and these differences in focus could be explained with aspects like geographical closeness of certain countries (as in the case of Germany and Turkey), or with a certain political, social, economic, or cultural relevance, like Saudi Arabia has for the United States.

However, one finding of this analysis is that behind this ostensible focus on the appearing individual actors or countries we find similar if not nearly identical structures and patterns of perception and construction of Arab and Muslim actors as a group conceptualized as a non-Western Other. In other words, U.S. and German print media might just have different persons or countries in mind when they think of an Oriental Other or of their commonly shared image of this Other.

In the context of the various topics and discourses that have been outlined in the last two subchapters, the overall composition of Arab and Muslims actors that can be found in German as well as American newspaper articles can be summarized as rather complex, and the identified actors come from a large variety of different societal branches as well as from a large spectrum of different countries. Altogether, before the 9/11 attacks 257 Arab and Muslim actors have been identified in the analyzed articles of German print media compared to 232 actors in U.S. newspapers. After the attacks, the numbers increased slightly to now 269 actors in the German and more significantly to even 386 actors in the American data set. If we compare the occurring actors in both countries and before as well as after the event, we can also say that there are a number of actors that appear in both countries media and/or before as well as after the attacks, whereas other actors may only occur in one of the countries or only before or after the analyzed event. So, to give a total number of the variety of Arab and Muslim actors that are analyzed in the following, we can say that about nine hundred different actors have been identified and further analyzed in this study.

Furthermore, and as has already been noted for the medial context in the last subchapter, we have to distinguish between an internal and an external focus of news coverage. Most of the identified Arab and Muslim actors occur in the context of the foreign news coverage, and are therefore of foreign origin. Especially before 9/11, Arab and Muslim actors within Germany and the United States (and other Western countries) are only marginally referred to in the analyzed newspapers.

Table IV.3: Numbers of External and Internal Actors in German and U.S. Print Media

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
External Actors	249	230	216	319
Internal Actors	8	2	53	67
Total Number of Actors	257	232	269	386

Therefore, and as Table IV.3 illustrates, before the attacks more than 95.0 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' newspapers that are discussed here are external actors. Only two internal actors (about 0.9 %) have been identified in U.S. newspapers before the attacks, compared to eight actors (about 3.1 %) in the German print media sample. As already mentioned in IV.2, in German articles they appear only in the context of issues like immigration legislation, Islam lessons in public schools, the wearing of headscarves in public institutions, and criminal activity. In U.S. news media, Arab actors are only brought up once, in the context of the election campaign for the New York mayor.

After the terrorist attacks, this ratio between internal and external actors changes significantly as the focus of both German and U.S. print media now also shifts towards actors and issues within the national borders. Due to this shift in attention, the numbers of identified internal actors rise noticeably (see Table IV.3): Now in both countries' data sample nearly every fifth occurring actor (Germany: 19.7 %, USA: 17.4 %) is located within the national boundaries of Germany or the United States. This may especially be due to the fact that it became clear soon after the attacks that the terrorists were immigrants who had already lived in the countries for a certain time. Therefore, the West now also increasingly takes notice of its Arab and Muslim communities. Thus, the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other is shaped by an external focus and is thus dominated by external actors, even though after 9/11, the internal Other receives growing attention in the Western perception. In the following two sections the internal composition of these two groups of actors will be further differentiated and described in more detail.

3.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media

The large number of external Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media articles can be further differentiated according to two aspects – the actors' geographical origin and the societal sphere that those actors can be assigned to.

Geographical Origin

Geographically, the composition of external actors is similar to the overall geographical focus of the articles (see IV.2). To roughly summarize the geographical complexity, we can say that Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed data set come from countries like Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, or Palestine, from former Russian republics like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, from Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, from countries of the Gulf region and Arabian peninsula like Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen or the United Arab Emirates, from Europe (Kosovo, Albania), or Sudan and Indonesia.

In both countries' print media before 9/11, the majority of actors are however of Palestinian origin.²⁶ Besides that, in German articles most actors come from Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, or Yemen, compared to a large number of Indonesian, Iranian, or Pakistani actors in U.S. articles. In connection with the topical shift that has already been outlined in IV.2, after 9/11 we can also identify a geographical shift in the national origin of the appearing actors. The number of Palestinian actors strongly declines. These actors are somewhat pushed aside by the large number of actors from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in U.S. context also by the increased number of Saudi Arabian actors that now shape the image of the Other in the German or U.S. perception.

In addition to that geographical variety, the occurring actors are also from different societal spheres, as not all actors are from the political sphere. The composition of external actors can be described on the basis of different societal contexts in which the respective actors appear, as is summarized in Table IV.3:

Table IV.4: Composition of Occurring External Actors²⁷

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Government Actors/Nation States	15.7	20.4	20.8	21.9
Political Groups/Parties	12.4	12.2	8.8	6.9
Terrorist Groups	11.6	8.7	17.1	18.8
Private Actors/Populations	43.4	40.0	30.1	29.8
Military/Police	2.8	3.9	2.3	3.4
Religious Groups	5.2	3.0	11.1	10.0
Country Depictions	5.6	7.8	8.3	6.9
others	3.2	3.9	1.4	2.2
Total Number of External Actors	249	230	216	319

²⁶ This quantitatively high visibility of Palestinian actors has also been noted for the U.S context by authors like Zaharna (1995) or for the German context by Hafez (2002).

²⁷ In %, given the proportion of all external actors that can be ascribed to the different actor groups in relation to all occurring external actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

According to this classification, it can be said that Arab and Muslim actors in German and American newspapers are members of political, religious, or terrorist groups, they can be members of governments or political parties, they can be members of the media, of the military, or of cultural institutions, or they come from the private sector. We also find descriptions of whole populations of Arab and Muslim countries as well as depictions of countries in general.

On a quantitative level of occurrence, those different societal branches and the groups of actors that can be formed are focused to different extents.

Table IV.5: Quantitative Occurrence of External Actor Groups²⁸

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Government Actors/Nation States	49.9	61.7	41.9	60.8
Political Groups/Parties	28.6	21.4	9.1	11.7
Terrorist Groups	28.2	19.0	48.9	57.7
Private Actors/Populations	51.4	46.8	27.2	27.8
Military/Police	8.3	10.1	3.8	5.9
Religious Groups	5.3	4.2	11.0	8.2
Country Depictions	12.1	20.8	12.9	18.4
others	7.3	8.3	2.8	2.1
Total Number of Analyzed Articles	206	168	319	376

Government Actors and Nation States

First and foremost, both countries' print media concentrate on the portrayal of government actors, or construct nation states as actors. By using this label I refer not only to representative heads of states like prime ministers and presidents, kings or sheiks, but also to representatives of the legislative branch of a state – such as parliament members etc. In addition to that we often find references to whole nation states as acting units. Newspapers use descriptions such as “Afghanistan, which is harboring him [Osama bin Laden]”²⁹, or a German article states, for instance, that “Iran has denied the USA any support for military operations against terrorism.”³⁰ These statements indicate an active role that is ascribed not to the governments of the respective countries but to the nation states themselves.

As we can see in Table IV.4, before 9/11 government actors and nation states account for about 20.4 % of all actors in U.S. articles and about 15.7 % in German articles, a proportion that changes only slightly after the event to a proportion of now about 21.9 % in American and

²⁸ In %, given the proportion of articles in which external actors of the different groups occur in relation to all analyzed articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

²⁹ USAT-01-09-13: 5Ac

³⁰ Own translation, original quote in German: “Iran hat jegliche Unterstuetzung der USA bei der militaerischen Bekaempfung des Terrorismus abgelehnt.” (SZ-01-09-27: 5)

20.8 % in German print media. Examples for government actors are numerous, the most frequently appearing one before 9/11 being the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat who occurs in 9.7 %³¹ of the analyzed German and 14.3 % of the American articles. Besides that, the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, the Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, Pakistan's president Pervez Musharraf, the Iranian parliament and President Mohammad Khatami, or the governments of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Brunei are described.

German newspapers most frequently construct the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban regime, which occurs in 11.2 % of all analyzed articles before the attacks, compared to only 6.1 % in U.S. discourse. This can be mainly attributed to the Shelter Now affair that has already been mentioned in subchapter IV.2. In contrast to that, U.S. newspapers more frequently focus on the new Indonesian president Megawati, who appears in about 7.0 % of the analyzed articles (compared to only 1.9 % in Germany).

After the attacks, the relevance of certain government actors changes, as now for instance the Taliban regime becomes the centrally focused government actor in both countries' print media. The Taliban now appear in every fifth article of the U.S. as well as the German newspaper set. Even though the Palestinian leader Arafat is still focused on quite regularly, his quantitative occurrence has declined to 4.1 % of all German and 5.1 % of the U.S. articles that have been analyzed. Instead, and besides the Taliban regime, the focus now also shifts to those nation states and government actors that are either direct neighbors of Afghanistan or are regarded as decisive partners in the search for Osama bin Laden. As a result, for example, the Pakistani president Musharraf is given more attention in the articles that are published after the event. He now appears in 3.4 % of the German and 5.3 % of the U.S. articles. A second actor who attracts increasing attention after 9/11, and here especially in German print media, is the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who becomes the second most frequently depicted government actor in the German articles, whereas U.S. print media now also frequently report on the Saudi Arabian rulers.

In combination with these government actors before as well as after the attacks, we also find references to the respective nation states. Before the attacks this mainly includes state references of Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, or Uzbekistan, and after 9/11 also of states like Pakistan, Syria, Afghanistan, or Saudi Arabia. Altogether, the U.S. articles more often refer to nation states as acting units than the German newspapers. Nevertheless, the direct reference to government figures can be found far more often in both print media than this indirect reference.

³¹ For the quantitative significance of those actors that will serve as examples for the different actor groups in the following two subchapters, no detailed tables and figures will be given, since the overall illustration of the large amount of analyzed actors would have gone beyond the scope of this book and would have extended this chapter too much. Numbers will be given only for those actors who have appeared most frequently in the data sample. Whether this quantitative relevance is combined with a qualitative significance of the respective actors for the different articles in which they occur will be looked at more detail in chapter VI.

Thus altogether, government and nation state actors present one of the central and most significant actor groups in German and U.S. newspaper articles about the Arab and Muslim Other. This can also be supported by the fact that over the analyzed time period, they have the strongest quantitative significance before as well as after the event, as I have listed in Table IV.5. Government and nation state actors are focused on in about every second (49.9 %) analyzed German article before the attacks and even 61.7 % of all analyzed U.S. articles. This relevance does only decrease slightly with the attacks, and still 41.9 % of all German articles and 60.8 % of all American articles include government or nation state actors.

Other Political Groups and Parties

Besides government actors, we also find other political actors in both countries' print media. On the one hand, we can subclassify actors that are members or representatives of the different political institutions and institutional levels of the respective countries, like for example political parties. On the other hand, some of the occurring actors and groups may work outside of the political system and may pursue their own political agenda and aims that can also work against the respective political system. Before as well as after the attacks, political groups and parties appear less often than government actors in both countries' print media. Every eighth Arab and Muslim actor in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11 is a political actor (Germany: 12.4 %, USA: 12.2 %). After the attacks, these numbers decrease slightly to about 8.8 % in Germany and 6.9 % in the U.S.

Most political groups thereby appear only once in the print media before as well as after the attacks, i.e. in only one article, and normally are not identified by a proper name or a group name but remain anonymous. Two of the few exceptions before 9/11 are the UÇK³² and the militant Palestinian political organization Fatah, one of the largest organizations in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that both appear also quite frequently. In the German newspapers, the UÇK is focused on in 9.7 % of all articles and in U.S. newspapers we find it in 7.7 % of the articles. Fatah is referred to in 4.4 % of the German and in 2.4 % of the U.S. articles. Other examples that occur in the U.S. newspapers before 9/11 are unnamed groups and political actors in Iran, Uzbekistan, or Afghanistan, parties in Indonesia or the PLO in Palestine as well as the multinational Arab League,³³ the Iraqi National Congress, or the Northern Alliance, an opponent of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Similarly, in German newspapers we also find portrayals of the Arab League, or articles that report on different Indonesian or Turkish political parties like the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Due to the shift in regional focus to Afghanistan and its neighboring countries after the attacks, the Afghan opposition Northern Alliance becomes the most frequently occurring political group

³² For more context information on the group see also IV.2.

³³ This organization of predominately Arab states is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt. The League's charter states that the League shall coordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations, communications, cultural affairs, nationality, passports, and visas, social affairs, and health affairs. See: www.wissen.de/wde/generator/wissen/ressorts/geschichte/index,page=1050944.html, accessed March 4, 2007.

in both countries' newspapers. Reference to this group can be found in nearly 6.0 % of the U.S. and 2.5 % of the German articles after 9/11. Compared to that, the majority of the other depicted political actors only appear once or twice. Those "one-time" political actors stem mainly from Indonesia, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, but also the UÇK appears again in the context of the conflict in Macedonia after 9/11. In German newspapers we find portrayals of political parties from Jordan, Pakistan, and first and foremost from Turkey, which indicates again that the Turkish political system in general seems to be of special interest for the German view on Turkey.

Similar to the government actors, political groups are also quantitatively significant as those actors occur continuously and frequently over the analyzed time period. Before 9/11, we find references to political groups or parties and their members in nearly every fifth U.S. article (21.4 %) and in more than every fourth German article (28.6 %). After the attacks these political actors are replaced to a large extent by a stronger focus on terrorist and religious fundamentalist groups: Their overall occurrence drops slightly and now only every tenth German article (9.1 %) and every eighth U.S. article (11.7 %) includes political actors or parties.

We can summarize, therefore, that compared to the group of government and nation state actors, political parties and groups outside of the political system are quantitatively slightly less significant. Even though they are the third most frequently occurring actor group before the attacks, this is due to the large amount and variety of different political actors that occur only once or twice however. In contrast, the introduced group of government and nation state actors can be characterized as a less diversified and more constant group of continuously recurring actors that serve as identification figures for the discussed regional, political, or other topics and issues.

Terrorist Groups

Besides the political sector, a field that is frequently focused on as well is that of criminal, and here more explicitly of terrorist, activity. As has been outlined in the last subchapter, terrorism in general and Islamic terrorism in particular has strongly moved into the center of attention after 9/11, and with it also the actors who are involved. Under the category of terrorist groups all those actors and groups have been summarized that are referred to by the analyzed media explicitly as *terrorist* organizations or actors, besides the fact that political motifs and orientations are also ascribed to most of the actors in this category. What distinguishes these actors from other political groups is that even though these groups might be perceived as politically or religiously motivated, the newspaper articles also highlight a terrorist facet. This classification is, nevertheless, difficult to maintain over the entire timeframe of the analysis in a number of cases, since some of those groups that were simply described as political or religious before the attacks, are predominantly constructed as terrorist groups after the event. This means that they have also changed their position in the overall classification, since they now would have to be regarded as terrorist groups. For the analysis, these cases were still classified as political or religious groups

after 9/11 even though the main focus of the news coverage might now have shifted to terrorist features.

Before the event, 11.6 % of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers are terrorist actors. In the American newspapers this proportion stands at 8.7 %. Despite this slightly smaller number of occurring terrorist actors, compared to government and other political actors, representatives of terror groups or individual terrorist figures are quantitatively significant insofar as they appear in every fifth article in the U.S. (19.0 %) and in every fourth article in the German print media set (28.2 %). The most frequently occurring terrorist groups can be found in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The Palestinian organization Hamas is, for instance, regarded as a terrorist group and occurs most often in the U.S. articles, namely in 8.3 % of all articles, but can also be found in every sixth article in the German newspaper set. Hamas is accompanied by other groups like Islamic Jihad, Hisbollah, and a number of unnamed actors in the ongoing conflict between the two countries. In addition to that, we already find articles in both countries that focus on Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, some German newspaper articles also refer to the Philippine separatist group Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist group. Apart from the mentioned examples, the majority of occurring terrorist actors in both print media sets only appears in one or two articles, and usually remain unnamed and anonymous.

With the 9/11 attacks, terrorist actors from the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict become less focused in both countries, and are replaced especially by the central figure that is assumed to be behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden. His relevance increases markedly, as he can now be found on average in every third article in both countries' print media sets. His assumed terror network – al Qaeda – receives similar but less dominating attention. The group is the second most frequently occurring terrorist group after 9/11, that is referred to in 9.4 % of all analyzed articles in German newspapers and in even 16.8 % of the U.S. articles.

Nevertheless, also the formerly central terrorist groups of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still frequently appear. Hamas occurs in 6.0 % of the German and 3.7 % of the U.S. articles, accompanied by Islamic Jihad, Abu Sayyaf, and a large variety of other terrorist groups. We can clearly note that in the aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington the media focus has shifted towards Arab and Muslim terrorist actors in both countries. These groups are not only of Palestinian or Afghan origin, but are also located in a number of other countries like Egypt, the Philippines, Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon, and also appear in articles with a European focus.

Altogether, with the attacks the focus on terrorist actors increases tremendously. The number of terrorist actors nearly doubles to a proportion of 17.1 % in the German and 18.8 % in the American newspapers, as measured by the total number of occurring actors. But more than that, those actors now also appear in about every second German article (48.9 %) and even in 57.7 % of all analyzed U.S. articles after the event. This increasing significance makes the group of terrorist actors the quantitatively most relevant actor group in the articles after the attacks, and terrorist actors now even outnumber the government and nation state actors.

Private Actors and Populations

A fourth category of actors can be formed of private actors and constructions of populations. If we take a look at the societal level of the private sphere, we first and foremost have to say that private actors may in most cases not strictly be necessary for the basic information of the political, economic, or other topics or issues that are communicated in the analyzed articles. Nevertheless, and as the analysis has revealed, actors from the private sector play an important role in the everyday news coverage on Arabs and Muslims. Before 9/11, this classified group offers the largest amount in the overall set of identified Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' print media. 43.3 % of all occurring actors in German articles and 40.0 % of Arab and Muslim actors in U.S. articles come from the private sphere. This variety decreases slightly in the aftermath of the attacks, but still every third Arab and Muslim actor comes from the private sphere (Germany: 30.1 %, USA: 29.8 %). Therefore, it can be summarized that private actors form the largest actor group in both countries' analyzed media around the 9/11 attacks.

Representatives from the private sector are, for example, private people that are interviewed on the streets to give their opinion or statement about certain topics or issues. Sometimes these actors are chosen as examples in the context of certain topics or issues to describe a certain lifestyle, or to illustrate certain social or economic problems. In some articles we also find more general descriptions of national facets, when for example the features and views of the Afghan or Turkish population as a whole are portrayed. Regarding their geographical background, private actors before the attacks come predominantly from Palestine, but also from Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. In German articles we also find a number of private actors with Afghan origin or from Yemen, whereas some U.S. articles look at private actors in Pakistan. On the more abstract level of populations, we find a similar focus: in both countries, references to the Palestinian population are most frequent, in Germany in 13.1 % and in the U.S. in 6.0 % of all analyzed articles. This focus, again, is largely due to the strong focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in both countries' newspapers. Besides that, we find portrayals of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq in Germany and of Iranians, Indonesians, or Macedonian Albanians in the U.S. newspapers.

In articles after 9/11, private actors from Palestine are still numerous but are now increasingly replaced by actors from Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the shifting topical and geographical focus in the aftermath of the attacks. This shifting focus can also be observed with reference to Arab and Muslim populations: Now, the Afghan population occurs most frequently in both countries as we find references to it in 6.9 % of the German and 7.2 % of the U.S. articles. Apart from that, we also find an increased focus on the Pakistani population and on Arab and Muslim populations as one unified actor group.

With regard to the overall quantitative relevance of private actors we can say that before the event they form the second most frequently appearing category in U.S. print media after the group of government and nation state actors, and the most frequently occurring actor group in the German data sample. In German as well as in U.S. newspapers, external private actors occur in nearly every second article (Germany: 51.4 %, USA: 46.8 %). After the attacks, their

occurrence drops significantly, but private actors still form the third most frequently occurring group in both countries' print media. 27.8 % of all American and 27.2 % of all German articles include Arab and Muslim private actors.

Even though the majority of private actors appear only in one or two articles at most and therefore only have an insignificant relevance in the overall timeframe, as a group they are significant. Very often a representative of the private sector of society in the newspaper articles gives more insight into the “informal” sectors and the everyday social reality of the respective countries, to create an image of the overall societies in whose context certain political or economic topics and issues are discussed. The same can be observed for populations of Arab and Muslim countries. Even though, for example, the population of Afghanistan is mentioned in more than one article, in most contexts this collective actor does not form the central issue of the respective articles. Instead they serve as a “supporting” actor who reflects the public opinions and societal conditions, for example for the discussion of the politics of the ruling Taliban regime and the consequences of those politics for the Afghan people or the country's infrastructure. What other functions the portrayal of Palestinian (and other) private actors may have in the different articles will be examined more closely in chapter VI.

Members of the Military and Police

Another group of actors that can be classified are members of the executive branch of society, such as military or police forces. The variety of these actors is quite small compared to the other groups that have been introduced so far. Members of the military or the police make up only 2.8 % of all occurring actors in German newspapers and only 3.9 % of actors in U.S. print media before the attacks, numbers that remain nearly stable in the timeframe after the event (Germany: 2.3 %, USA: 3.4 %). The most frequent focus before the attacks is on military and police members in Palestine – again due to the central role of the Israeli-Palestinian focus before 9/11. Apart from that, in U.S. newspapers we also find military actors from Indonesia and Iran, whereas German articles report on military forces of Turkey more frequently. After the attacks, military actors in Pakistan are depicted more frequently and thereby displace the attention that was formerly paid to Palestinian military and police actors.

Altogether, German and U.S. print media before the attacks quite regularly include military actors, as we find them in every twelfth German article (8.3 %) and in every tenth U.S. article (10.1 %). After 9/11 this category loses some of its relevance however and it now only appears in 3.8 % of all German and 5.9 % of all American articles. Thus, we can sum up that the focus on military and police actors is not as complex and recurrent as that of the other groups that have been introduced.

Religious Groups

The last relevant actor category that can be classified summarizes religious figures and groups. In contrast to political groups, these actors are defined mainly according to their religious features, actions, or aims that are focused on in the newspaper articles to describe the respective actors. Before the attacks, neither print media set included a large number of religious actors. In German newspapers only 5.2 % of all occurring actors can be classified as religious actors, and in U.S. articles the number of religious groups accounts for only 3.0 %. However, with the 9/11 attacks the focus on religious actors increases tremendously, which may be explained by the fact that the 9/11 suspects were assumed to be religiously motivated, an assumption that is clearly also reflected in the media debates about religious (and here especially Islamic) fundamentalism in general. This increased significance is also reflected in the risen number of religious actors in both countries: we now find 11.1 % religious actors in German articles and 10.0 % in U.S. print media, which makes the group the fourth largest actor category in both countries' analyzed newspapers.

A number of these religious actors remain anonymous and unnamed. Before 9/11, these more or less nameless or rarely identified actors come mainly from countries like Iran or Palestine, and in German news media also from Egypt or Yemen. One exception in the articles of both discourses is the Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who occurs in four German and three American articles. After the 9/11 attacks, and with the increased focus on Islam, we now find a number of reference to "Islamic fundamentalists" as an unspecific group in German as well as American articles. Geographically, these "fundamentalists" are located mainly in countries like Pakistan or Afghanistan. In German newspapers, they appear in about 4.0 % of all analyzed articles, and in the U.S. context they occur in 1.6 % of the articles. Besides these "fundamentalists" the majority of the other religious actors are also located in Pakistan. Less often, religious groups come from countries like Egypt, Indonesia or Saudi Arabia.

As was the case for most political and terrorist actors, the majority of religious actors only appear in one or two articles at most in the data set. On the basis of individual actors we can therefore say that most religious actors have a relatively small relevance for the analyzed timeframe around the attacks. Altogether, the quantitative relevance of religious actors is less distinctive before 9/11 than that of most of the other mentioned groups but increases significantly in the aftermath of the event. They are only focused on in 5.3 % of all German articles and in only 4.2 % of the U.S. print media sample. However, they nearly double their relevance after the attacks, where they can now be found in 8.2 % of all U.S. articles and 11.0 % of the German articles. This increasing interest in religious actors is closely connected to the fact that the attacks in New York and Washington were assumed to be religiously motivated. This assumption, which was also communicated in the media discourses about the event, may have supported this higher interest for and the increased awareness of religious actors in the context of Arab and Muslim countries.

Country Depictions

A last category that was formed in the course of the media analysis summarizes the depictions of country features that can be found in both German and U.S. print media before as well as after the attacks. Here, all those references are included that do not refer to specific actors but give descriptions of certain country characteristics and peculiarities in connection with the discussed topics, discourses, or issues. Besides the constructions of Arab and Muslim actors these country references also support and shape the overall image of the Oriental Other insofar as they form a background foil of the setting in which the different actors occur. In most cases, the respective countries carry the same features as the actors that can be found in those countries. Before the attacks, we find references to country features in every eighth German (12.1 %) and about every fifth American article (20.8 %). After the event, those numbers change only slightly as we find ascriptions of country features in 12.9 % of the German articles and in now 18.4 % of the analyzed U.S. articles.

In view of the geographical focus of these country references we can say that the focus mainly corresponds with the geographical focus of the articles (see IV.2.1): In U.S. as well as in German articles before the attacks, we mainly find country images of Afghanistan, in the U.S. in 3.6 % and in Germany in 1.9 % of the articles. U.S. articles contain more country descriptions of Indonesia (6.0 %) and Iran (2.4 %), whereas in German articles, we find more country features of Turkey (1.5 %). Even though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central topic before 9/11, country features of the Palestinian territories are quite rare in both sets of analyzed print media articles. This may be due to the fact that with Palestine, the focus lies primarily with Palestinian actors, and articles concentrate more on those. We could assume here that country descriptions of the Palestinian territories can hardly be found because those territories are not perceived primarily as a nation state that carries certain commonly shared country features. What is ascribed however is a commonly shared identity of the Palestinian people, since we find references to and constructions of the Palestinian population as a unit in both countries' print media.

After 9/11, German and U.S. newspapers also reflect the shifting focus of the news coverage in terms of the country portrayals as they now include an increasing number of passages that mention country characteristics of Afghanistan (Germany: 5.6 %, USA: 8.0 %), of Saudi Arabia (Germany: 1.6 %, USA: 1.6 %), or of countries like Syria, Iraq, Egypt, or Iran. In the U.S. data sample, we also find a number of articles which include country characteristics of Pakistan, the country that is regarded as a new central partner of the West in the new anti-terror campaign (see IV.2.2).

We may conclude this section by saying that occurring external actors can be mainly classified according to the actor groups that have been introduced so far. I have also identified a few actors that do not fit into one of these formed categories – which is the case for example for a few cultural artists, sportsmen or a few members of the media systems of the portrayed countries – but the majority of the external Arab and Muslim actors can be formally structured and classified according to the introduced categories. To a large extent, the nationality of the occurring actors

thereby corresponds with the geographical foci of the articles and the societal context of the discussed topics and issues that have been outlined in chapter IV.2. However, so far I have only talked about external actors that appear in the context of articles which focus on foreign news. Internal Arab and Muslim Others, i.e. those actors within Germany or the United States who become increasingly focused on after the attacks with the rising national and Western focus in the analyzed newspapers can also be classified according to the introduced formula. Therefore, in the following section the composition of Arab and Muslim actors that are referred to within the German or American national context will be outlined in more detail.

3.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media

Compared to the overall classification of external Arab and Muslim actors, we find a slightly different focus with regard to the internal actors that have been identified in the German and U.S. print media around the 9/11 attacks.

Table IV.6: Composition of Occurring Internal Actors³⁴

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Political Groups/Parties	12.5		1.9	3.0
Terrorist Groups		50.0	35.8	41.8
Private Actors/Populations	75.0		41.5	37.3
Military/Police	12.5	50.0		6.0
Religious Groups			18.9	11.9
others			1.9	
Total Number of Internal Actors	8	2	53	67

As can be seen in Table IV.6, and as has already been mentioned, before the attacks we find only a few internal Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' newspaper articles. What distinguishes both countries is that in the analyzed American articles the two identified internal actors are (a), a terrorist actor and (b), an Iranian spy (who has been mentioned earlier), whereas six of the eight internal actors in German articles are from the private sector. However, in both media sets, these actors are quantitatively only minor significant since each of them only occurs in one article except from the private actors in the German context who occur in 5 articles which accounts for 2.4 % of all analyzed German articles.

³⁴ In %, given the proportion of all internal actors that can be ascribed to the different actor groups in relation to all occurring internal actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

Table IV.7: Quantitative Occurrence of Internal Actor Groups³⁵

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Political Groups/Parties	0.5		0.3	0.8
Terrorist Groups		0.6	26.3	10.4
Private Actors/Populations	2.4		3.1	4.8
Military/Police	0.5	0.6		0.5
Religious Groups			5.3	2.4
others			0.6	
Total Number of Analyzed Articles	206	168	319	376

As already noted, after the attacks the focus on Arab and Muslim actors within Germany and the United States increases tremendously in the newspaper articles. In the German articles most of these actors – 41.5 % – come from the private sector. In second place, 35.8 % of all internal Arab and Muslim actors in the German news coverage are terrorists, followed by about 18.9 % actors of religious groups. Compared to that distribution, in U.S. articles the internal terrorist actors dominate the news coverage on internal Arab and Muslim actors. 41.8 % of all internal actors in the American articles are terrorists. The second largest group of internal actors in U.S. articles with about 37.3 % comes from the private sector followed by a proportion of 11.9 % for religious actors. Regarding the quantitative occurrence of those internal actors, in both countries' media terrorist actors occur most frequently now, in Germany even in every fourth article (26.3 %) and in the U.S. still in every tenth text (10.4 %). Compared to that, the large number of private actors appears less often, in Germany they can be found in only 3.1 % and in the U.S. in only 4.8 % of the analyzed articles. More often even, we find description of religious actors in the German context (5.3 %, compared to 2.4 % of the analyzed U.S. articles).

The large focus on internal terrorist actors but also on an increasing number of internal religious actors is largely due to the fact that the 9/11 terrorists and their accomplices are also discussed within the national context, i.e. as internal actors, since they were actually living within the national borders for a longer period of time before they carried out the terrorist acts. This factual “threat from within” that is exemplified with those actors is also explicitly communicated in the different articles that deal with the event and the respective actors. Furthermore, it already indicates what will be outlined in more detail in the next two chapters: that this infiltration of hostile terrorists has severely shaken the feeling of national security. And finally, some of the terrorists declared religious motifs as one basis for their attacks against the West.

German articles also strongly reflect upon this internal threat, which may be heightened by the fact that some of the 9/11 culprits stayed in Germany and planned the attacks there, even though

³⁵ In %, given the proportion of articles in which internal actors of the different groups occur in relation to all analyzed articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

they were eventually carried out in another country. Therefore, a strong focus on potential or actual internal terrorist actors can also be traced in the German newspaper articles.

But in addition to that focus on the internal terrorist Other, U.S. and German articles focus on Arab and Muslim actors from the private sector, and discuss these actors and their societal status as immigrants in German and U.S. society. Especially in the German context, the view on these internal private actors is shaped by the overall question of how integrated and ideologically assimilated these people are in German society, and what positions they take up with regard to the central values and principles of this society and with regard to issues like religious fundamentalism and terrorist hostility against the West. A more detailed examination of the actual images of those internal actors in both countries' newspapers and the perspective of the German and U.S. Self that shapes those images will be carried out in more detail in the next two chapters.

4. Conclusion: The Medial Settings for Arabs and Muslims, Their Composition and Their Quantitative Relevance

With regard to the media settings for Arabs and Muslims we can thus sum up that in both Germany and the United States the focus is characterized by a large variety of topics and countries of references. Apart from minor differences, e.g. a stronger German focus on political and societal issues of the potential EU candidate Turkey, or a stronger U.S. focus on the political developments in Indonesia as well as in Pakistan, in both countries, the complexity of topics and countries of references is already broad before the attacks and is nearly congruent. After 9/11, especially the German external focus is broadened to countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Egypt which are now also frequently focused on in U.S. print media. Both countries now especially focus on the political and military positions of those countries with regard to terrorism and the anti-terror coalition. Apart from this increased focus on terrorism, the turn towards an internal Other, i.e. towards actors within national or Western borders indicates another major change in both countries after the 9/11 attacks. Apart from the question of how modern, secular Western societies can prevent terrorism in general and Islamic terrorism in particular within their own geographical boundaries, the national focus also lies on the 9/11 investigations in Germany and the United States, as well as on the search for masterminds and supporters of the attacks. Internal actors are often discussed in the context of future national security measures in both countries as well as the potential threat that emanates from the Arab and Muslim actors within Germany or the U.S.

One difference between German and U.S. print media after 9/11 is the strong German focus on religious topics that cannot be observed in the analyzed U.S. newspapers.³⁶ German articles frequently highlight the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism. This focus indicates a higher significance of religious facets and affiliations in the perception of the Arab and Muslim Other

³⁶ For example, attempts to explain the content and history of Islam.

and consequently also in the concept of the German self-image, an aspect that will become more apparent in the textual construction of Arab and Muslim actors and countries that will be discussed in the following chapters V and V.I. Compared to that, U.S. articles put more emphasis on the positioning of Arab countries in the anti-terror coalition. In addition, U.S. print media more frequently deal with the consequences of terrorism for civil liberties and democratic values in general and for the U.S. society in particular.

Regarding the composition of the appearing actors, it was outlined first of all that the perspective on the Arabs and Muslims before as well as after 9/11 is predominantly characterized by an outward focus on a geographically distant Other. Second, the composition of those external Arabs and Muslims can be best summarized on the basis of different societal branches in which the respective actors appear. According to the introduced classification system, the portrayed Arab and Muslim actors are governmental/nation state actors or members and representatives of other political groups or parties. Other actors were classified as members of the military, the police, or other security forces, or they are (members of) religious or terrorist groups. Last but not least, actors can come from the private sector. Here I have further distinguished between the images of individual private actors or small private groups and the more general construction of whole populations. Apart from those concrete actor portrayals the analysis has also revealed a number of contexts in which Arab and Muslim countries carry certain characteristics and features.

With regard to the amount and quantitative relevance of those different categories of actors I have noted that government and nation state actors account for one of the central and most significant actor groups in both German and U.S. print media. Throughout the analyzed time period, they have the strongest quantitative significance in U.S. print media, which basically means that they appear most often in the analyzed articles. In German print media, they form the second most frequently occurring actor group around 9/11. Political parties and other political groups outside of the political system are quantitatively slightly less significant since they mostly only appear once or twice, whereas certain government figures, e.g. Saddam Hussein or Yassir Arafat, appear regularly in the print news of both countries. Instead, we find a large diversity of different political groups occurring in both countries' print media before and after 9/11.

Actors from the private sector form the most (Germany) or second most (USA) frequently occurring actor category in the analyzed articles before the attacks and rank third with regard to the quantitative significance after 9/11. Furthermore, this classified group also offers the largest amount of different actors in both countries' print media.

Two actor categories that are especially pushed to the fore by the attacks are the groups of terrorist actors and of religious actors. Terrorists become the quantitatively most (Germany) or second most (USA) relevant actor group after the attacks. Similar to that, religious actors increasingly appear in news articles in the aftermath of the event. I have argued here, that this is mainly due to the fact that the attacks in New York and Washington were assumed to be religiously motivated which led to an increased interest in, and Western awareness of, not only

terrorist but also religious actors in the context of Arab and Muslim countries. Like with the political actors, it was noted that the majority of those actors have a relatively small quantitative relevance for the analyzed timeframe around the attacks, since the majority of them only occur in one or two articles at most in the data set.

The overall composition of appearing external Arabs and Muslims in the analyzed German and U.S. print media is therefore shaped by a variety of actor groups and integrates different branches of Arab and Muslim societies. In addition to that, with the attacks Arab and Muslim actors in the national contexts, i.e. within the West, become increasingly focused on. This was explained mainly by the fact that the event is seen as an infiltration of (Arab and Muslim) terrorists into the Western space. The fact that the 9/11 terrorists came were Muslim Arabs (from Saudi Arabia or Egypt) who had furthermore been living in Germany and the U.S. for quite a while before they carried out the attacks, leads to a general critical observation of internal Arabs and Muslims in both countries. Most of the identified internal actors are either from the private sector or are ascribed to terrorist groups that form a potential threat and therefore have to be identified and distanced from the Self – for example in the media.

The introduced formal classification of the appearing Arab and Muslim actors offers a first overview over what actors are primarily focused on and what is meant when we talk about the Arab and Muslim Other in the context of German and U.S. print media. With regard to one of the theoretical assumptions that has been outlined before – namely that collective identities are basically constructed via the demarcation of an outgroup – we can thus already note that one major aspect of differentiation between Arabs and Muslims and the West is based on geographical distance, since the majority of depicted actors comes from abroad. This is also the case after the 9/11 attacks, and despite the fact that after the event the focus of attention shifted strongly towards the national context of both Germany and the U.S.

However, geographical distance is not the only criterion that forms the dividing line between the German, the American, or even a Western concept of belonging and Arabs and Muslims as representatives of the Other. Instead, actors are also regarded as different or distant from the Self on other dimensions; this is reflected, for instance, in the way in which they are portrayed with regard to the features or characteristics they receive and the way they act. Therefore, the next two chapters will step into the content of the newspaper articles to analyze the way in which actors are constructed with regard to their features, characteristics, and actions, and to outline how Arabs and Muslims are observed from the Western point of view.

V. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WEST AND ARABS AND MUSLIMS

To learn not only whom German and U.S. print media look at in the Arab and Muslim world but also what image is formed of those who are observed in both countries' print media, the next chapter will outline the major facets and dimensions of the images that are constructed of Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. newspaper articles. In the following pages, I will summarize the central line of demarcation that is drawn between a German or American self-concept and the concept of what characterizes Arab and Muslim actors in the different medial settings and contexts in which they are referred to. This overall image of the Other is largely derived from the quantitative screening of features that are used in the articles to describe the actors and their behavior, actions, or standpoints on certain issues, topics, or towards other actors.

This overview may help us to understand the major dimensions that are focused on when Arab and Muslim actors are covered, and also enables us to identify the central Western principles that are negotiated when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed. At the same time, we can also derive the subliminal national or Western self-perceptions and evaluations that are reflected in the constructed image of the Other and that sometimes are also explicitly communicated in the analyzed articles. It will be shown how the portrayed external as well as internal actors differ from the Western Self according to the Western (media) perspective and why it also becomes relevant from the German and American perspective to deal more intensively with Arab and Muslim actors within the Western space after the 9/11 attacks. The most relevant features and characteristics of the discussed images will be illustrated with quotes from the analyzed newspapers articles.

Let us, first of all, return to the theoretical assumptions that have been introduced in chapter II.3. If we – in a first and broad step – want to summarize the different features and images that can be found in the newspaper articles we have to note that the overall picture is rather complex. A first step to approach this complexity is by consulting the theoretical thoughts about the Self-Other-dichotomy: As has been theoretically discussed before, the image of an outgroup is closely connected to the way in which a certain ingroup defines itself in relation to that outgroup. In this context, the demarcated outgroup may also serve as a portfolio or constructed counterpart that represents everything that the Self rejects, does not want or is not allowed to be. According to Wagener (1999), this counter-construction is often defined as a hostile stereotype (“Feindbild”) and presents an antithesis, i.e. an exclusively negative counter-version of an exclusively positive self-image (Wagener 1999: 35).

If we adopt this form of relational thinking, we could expect that the Other and the Self mainly have to possess features that oppose each other. Otherwise, a clear distinction between both concepts might be rather difficult since the boundaries between them might blur or become permeable. This would mean that the features that are ascribed to Arab and Muslim actors should be largely negative. By collecting the most frequent features that are used to construct Arab and

Muslim actors we are able to test this assumption. We will see in the following, that actors not exclusively receive a negative image.

But let us start with the most central distinction: As has already been introduced in the last chapter, Arab and Muslim actors first and foremost carry a geographical reference. We learn where the occurring actors live or what countries of origin they have. The geographical reference and classification is in most cases done either via an explicit mentioning of the nationality or via an implicit reference that can be derived from the country reference of the article in which the actor appears. However, this aspect is only a formal category that is used to geographically locate and group the respective actors. In both countries' newspapers, the images of Arab and Muslim actors are far more complex than that. Before as well as after the 9/11 attacks, they not only consist of a number of different geographical references and topics, but also of a variety of other features that describe the occurring actors.

The images of Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' print media can be further described according to five dimensions: a political, a cultural, a social and economic, and a personal dimension (that includes aspects of gender,¹ appearance, or character traits), and the ascription of delinquency (when actors are described, for instance, as *criminal*, *violent*, or as terrorists). The analysis has also revealed a number of explicit references towards German, U.S., or Western identity conceptions, which can be classified according to those five dimensions as well. Especially after the 9/11 attacks we find a permanent reflection upon the Self when Arab and Muslim actors are located and discussed with regard to dominating topics like terrorism, national security, and religious reasons for the conflict between "Occident" and "Orient." Thus, we can say that difference between the concepts of self and otherness can mainly be summarized on the basis of those five central dimensions.

Therefore, in the following subchapters these five dimensions for the construction of Arab and Muslim actors will be outlined in more detail to illustrate the major distinction lines between Self and Other. At the same time, a listing of the most frequently ascribed characteristics and features that can be found in the images of the different actors also aims at illustrating the spectrum of different facets that shape the image of Arabs and Muslims in present day print media. Last but not least, the integration of explicit references towards the self-concept in German and U.S. articles will demonstrate the interplay and interdependence between the portrayal of Arab and Muslim actors and the self-concept and self-perspective from which those images emanate. The adjectives or nouns that are used in the following to describe the features that are most relevant for the different dimensions of the images of Arab and Muslim actors have to be understood as abstract codes that have been derived from the qualitative content analysis. They summarize those terms and linguistic variances which are used in the different articles and

¹ Regarding the identification of the gender of the respective actors, this aspect is only made explicit when female actors are depicted. In general, we can say that the Arab and Muslim Other is not exclusively but predominantly male.

describe the same aspect. As noted before, to indicate that those terms present an abstracted level of the actual media depiction, the abstractly used adjectives and nouns will be written in *italics*.

1. The Political Dimension

The first dimension in which actors are described is the political one. With an overall variety of about forty different characteristics it is a decisive dimension before as well as after the attacks. Political features and attitudes are not only used for the characterization of political or government actors but can be found with the images of all sorts of actors.

Before the 9/11 attacks, actors are for instance frequently described as politically *hostile* – towards Western countries but especially towards Israel – as politically *radical* or *militant*, *conservative*, *undemocratic*, or *repressive*. Other actors are described as *undiplomatic*, politically *isolated*, *unstable*, or *powerless*. However, those rather negative facets are not the exclusive way of characterizing actors politically. Some actors are also referred to as *diplomatic* and politically *committed*, *moderate*, or *reform-oriented*. In both German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11, two basic structures of distinction can be identified, according to which the listed features can be grouped. On the one hand actors are classified on the basis of their political actions which take place in or are directed towards their own country. Here the scale on which the actors' behavior and characteristics are measured runs between the poles of *democratic* versus *undemocratic* actions or features, and actions are directed against or affect mainly other Arab and Muslim actors (i.e. the Other). In this context, both countries' newspapers also critically observe the adherence to or violation of *human rights* on the part of the Other, for example when the new Indonesian government is assessed and the American NY TIMES argues that...

President Megawati must also move forward with prosecutions for human rights violations in East Timor, Papua and Aceh. Nothing she has said or done indicates she has the remotest interest in doing so; indeed, she has publicly defended the East Timorese militia thug Eurico Gutteres. (NYT-01-07-27: 19)

...or when DER SPIEGEL, in the context of the trial against the German Shelter Now workers in Afghanistan, critically remarks that...

Einwände der westlichen Vertreter, die mit internationalem Recht argumentierten und von "Isolationshaft, einer Art Folter" (Landes) sprachen, wischten die Taliban beiseite. In Afghanistan, so wurde den Diplomaten bedeutet, gebe es keine Menschenrechte, wie sie der Westen propagiere, also könne man auch nicht gegen sie verstossen. Nur die Gebote der Scharia zählten – und ein Scharia-Gericht werde womöglich über die Ausländer befinden. (Sp-01-i34: 124-126)

On the other hand, actors can be classified on the basis of the distinction of being either *hostile* or *peaceful* with regard to their actions towards the West. Here the relevance of the features derives from their effects for the Self, since actions are directed – or are perceived to be directed – against the same.

The first scale of evaluation can be identified more often in the images of actors than the second one before the 9/11 attacks. The classification of (*non*)*democratic* actions and developments of

Arab and Muslim actors reflects certain expectations on behalf of the Self with regard to the political criteria that are taken as a standard for the political measurement of the Other. One quote from the NY TIMES that appears in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects some of the abstract principles that play a role here:

As long as there was a peace process that was basically moving forward, it was both a cover and an engine for a lot of other things: It empowered the Arab and Israeli business communities to push for more economic liberalization and integration with the global economy, it provided an impetus for secular, political voices who advocated more openness, modernization and democratization, and it put the most obscurantist religious forces somewhat on the defensive. (NYT-01-07-17: 19)

Political structures, actions, and decisions of Arab and Muslim countries and actors are measured on the basis of Western standards such as democratic structures, political openness, equal rights, or secularity. Nevertheless, what characterizes this focus is that it is directed mainly towards the Other. The reference towards the Self or even the comparison with the same shimmers through only indirectly in the different newspaper contexts in which political features are ascribed.

After the attacks, the second scale of evaluation can now be frequently identified in the actor images. First and foremost, Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media articles are evaluated according to their attitudes towards the West – and in U.S. articles towards the United States in particular. They are either classified as being *anti-western*, *hostile*, and *undiplomatic*, or they are described as being *pro-western*, *peaceable*, and *diplomatic*. This central division of *pro-* versus *anti-western* attitudes indicates skepticism on behalf of the Western observers and with regard to the question whether Arab and Muslim countries take sides with or against the anti-terror coalition after 9/11, i.e. they *oppose* or *support terrorism*. Especially in U.S. media, these two features are the most frequently used characteristics on the political dimension. Furthermore, it is especially with this second evaluation scale of attitudes towards terrorism that explicit comparisons with the Western standards can be found in the newspaper articles. For instance, the motivations for the attacks are explained with the political foundations, standards, and institutions of the Western world that are argued to be threatening for certain terrorist actors like, for example, Osama bin Laden. As the U.S. NEWSWEEK writes:

The West has created a world in which individuals are free to choose how they would like to live their lives – how they work, travel, trade, worship, organize, speak and think. These freedoms are utterly revolutionary in the history of the world. They are also deeply threatening to the world view of men like Osama bin Laden. (NW-01-v138-SpIssue: 46)

And the NY TIMES expresses certain expectations that the Self implicitly communicates towards the Other as follows:

[...] the animating vision of America in the world is the promotion and protection of freedom – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of markets and freedom of politics. And that while America might align itself with all sorts of countries for economic or strategic reasons, in the end it was those who were "basically pro-freedom" whom America would never abandon and with whom America would always share a special bond. (NYT-01-10-09: 25)

At the same time, however, the attacks are also perceived as a threat for the political standards and principles of Western democracies. The German SZ writes:

“Wir alle in Deutschland sind voller Abscheu ueber die terroristischen Anschlaege in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika”, hiess es im Aufruf zur Kundgebung. Die Attentate in New York und Washington seien als “Angriff auf die Grundwerte des menschlichen Zusammenlebens” zu verstehen. “Jetzt muessen alle Demokraten zusammenstehen, um den Frieden und die Freiheit in der Welt zu verteidigen und gemeinsam entschlossen den Terror zu bekaempfen.” (SZ-01-09-15: 9.)

In addition to that, the terror attacks are assumed to have an impact on the political identity, since...

In der Stunde, da die Tuerme des World Trade Center niedersanken, hat Europa sich veraendert: Es unterliegt dem Zwang, Partei zu sein – die Rache kehrt in die Zivilisation zurueck. (SZ-01-09-13: 15)

However, both countries' print media also make clear that this threat for Western political values and principles is taken as an appeal by the Self to defend those standards against *hostile* Others. U.S. President George W. Bush, for instance is frequently quoted in both countries' newspapers after the attacks with his appeal that...

“In every generation,” the 43d president said, “the world has produced enemies of human freedom. They have attacked America because we are freedom's home and defender. And the commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time.” (NW-01-v138-i13: 50)

And in the German context Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is quoted as saying:

“Ich habe immer wieder deutlich gemacht, dass die terroristischen Schläge, die so unsäglich viel Leben gekostet haben, nicht nur Anschläge gegen die Menschen in den Vereinigten Staaten, gegen unsere Freunde in Amerika selbst sind, sondern auch Anschläge gegen die gesamte zivilisierte Welt. Also auch Anschläge gegen unsere eigene Freiheit, gegen unsere eigenen Werte, die wir mit dem amerikanischen Volk teilen.” (Bild-01-09-13: 1)

Altogether, the increasing relevance of this second scale of evaluation after the attacks indicates that the relationship and the interplay of Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other becomes a central focus on the political dimension after the attacks. Even though the political actions within Arab and Muslim countries are still mentioned in the analyzed articles, the importance of internal political features is now to a large extent replaced by the issue of international terrorism and by the evaluation of the actors' attitudes and actions towards to West. Although actors are still classified as *moderate* or *conservative*, *undemocratic*, and *repressive*, those features are now predominantly related to their foreign political actions and valued according to their political attitudes as well as their usefulness for the United States or Germany in international coalitions and military actions against terrorist activities and groups. This observation will become relevant again when I discuss political features of the different actor types in more detail in chapter VI.

2. The Cultural Dimension

“We as Westerners”²

We can identify another scale of evaluation that forms a central dividing line on the cultural dimension. Here, a central distinction can be made between Western *modernity* and Oriental *backwardness* and *underdevelopment*. This cultural dimension becomes especially but not solely emphasized after the 9/11 attacks. In the context of this general distinction, the religious affiliation to Islam is a central trait of demarcation in both countries. The mentioning of Islam seems to happen independently of whether the information is relevant for the content or the message of the article. Even though both countries’ newspapers do not explicitly classify the *affiliation towards Islam* on a developmental scale between *modernity* and *traditionalism* or *conservatism*, the context in which *religious affiliation* is used as a descriptive element for a number of actors is shaped by culturally *underdeveloped* aspects and features – that are compared to a Western standard that is also implicitly or explicitly referred to in the respective articles.³ This can be illustrated with the following three examples which are taken from both German and U.S. newspapers. The German news magazine DER SPIEGEL argues, for instance, that...

Muslime verkünden den Dschihad, den Gotteskrieg gegen alles Böse, das sich vor allem in den “Ungläubigen” der westlichen Welt manifestiert, und kämpfen für die Re-Islamisierung jener Länder, in denen die Lehre Mohammeds über Jahrhunderte Regelwerk für alle Bereiche des gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Lebens war. (Sp-01-i41: 160)

And the American NY TIMES implicitly confronts and compares the developmental stage of Islamic religion with Western cultural standards of emancipation, by arguing that...

A hybrid kind has been forged across that seam between the civilization of Islam and the more emancipated culture of the West. (NYT-01-10-07: 19)

Finally, in yet another context in the NY TIMES the West is argued to present a cultural and political threat for a number of Muslims:

Such historical allusions may well tap into the widespread sense of siege among many Muslims who see themselves threatened by a modern world dominated by the United States and Western secularism. (NYT-01-10-09: 6)

A combination of Islamic belief and *fundamentalist* attitudes, *extremist* actions and a general link of religious beliefs with *violent* tendencies can be found with the images of a large number of Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ newspapers, before as well as after 9/11. This combination of religion and violence creates a negative context in which a neutral aspect like religion becomes negatively tainted. This indicates a certain degree of Western skepticism with regard to Islam in general, which may cause the German SZ to ask, for example:

Im Westen geht die Angst um vor dem Islam. Ist diese Angst berechtigt? (SZ-01-09-21: 6)

² Own translation, original quote in German: “Wir als Abendländer” (Sp-01-i38: 168).

³ Ateş presents a similar result for the perception of Islam in the German local boulevard newspapers KÖLNER EXPRESS after 9/11 (2001, 2003), arguing that the newspaper continuously refers to the religious and cultural differences between the German society and Muslims (see Ateş 2006: 160).

But also independently from religion, the cultural facets of Arab and Muslim actors can be categorized on the basis of an evaluation scale that puts Western *modernity* as a standard principle at the one end and Oriental *backwardness* at the other. The Western self-concept includes such Western parameters as open-mindedness, tolerance, and freedom of thought and expression, as can be illustrated with a quote from USA TODAY:

Fighting such extremism requires understanding that this is a war not between Islam and the West, but between certitude and open-mindedness, dogma and thought, prejudice and tolerance. (USAT-01-10-01: 15Ab)

Actors who do not fulfill these Western standards are frequently described as culturally *conservative, isolated, ignorant, or even uncivilized*. In contrast to that, actors who do reflect a certain level of Western rationalization and institutionalization are described as culturally *modern, enlightened, or secular*. Furthermore, Arab and Muslim countries are marked by cultural or societal *intolerance*, for example when the treatment of homosexuals in Egypt is discussed in an article of the NY TIMES:

The sensational trial is part of a pattern of what gay Egyptians call stepped-up harassment of any homosexual activity in the last 8 to 10 months, much of it related to the Internet. Many believe that the government has acted to try to stamp out what was becoming an increasingly open and vocal gay community. Homosexuality is not specifically outlawed in Egypt, and lawyers and international human rights groups accused the government of President Hosni Mubarak of circumventing the regular judicial system and its appeal process to bring a dubious case to trial. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b)

Here, we can also note that the aspect of intolerance is not only reduced to the cultural and social dimension but also extends over the dimension of political decisions.

In some cases, when *conservative* views are confronted with *modern* ones within Arab and Muslim countries, the opposition of both positions results in *cultural conflicts* in the respective societies, an aspect that is frequently mentioned in the analyzed articles, as well. Nevertheless, in most German and U.S. articles the images of Arab and Muslim actors are dominated by the *underdeveloped* side of this confrontation, whereas the more *developed* actors occur far less frequently. One aspect that is frequently used as an indicator for cultural *underdevelopment* is the unequal status of women in Arab and Muslim societies. Male actors, but also governments or nation states are referred to as *misogynistic*, and articles frequently mention that in Muslim and Arab societies, women are *unequal to men, discriminated against, and oppressed*.

After the 9/11 attacks, the Afghan opposition group Northern Alliance, the central opponent of the Taliban regime in the Northern territories of Afghanistan, becomes an ally of the American military in the course of the latter war against the Taliban regime that starts in October 2001. Despite the group's role as a partner in this military conflict the NY TIMES, for example, points out the cultural deficits of this group that the "Western" observer should recognize:

Here, in territory under the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, 8 young women were allowed to join 300 young men studying at the university for the first time last year. Still, to a Western visitor, a striking feature of alliance territory is that women are seen only occasionally on the street, silently carrying a child or leaving a bazaar with food. (NYT-01-10-03: 6)

Especially the German articles continue to emphasize the opposition of an *uncivilized* East to a *civilized* Western hemisphere after the attacks.⁴ A frequently discussed actor in this context is the Afghan Taliban regime who is perceived not only as culturally *conservative* or religiously *fundamentalist*, but as altogether *uncivilized*. The German DER SPIEGEL, for example, refers to them as “the wild and religious warriors in Afghanistan”⁵ or “the Afghan stone-age Islamists,”⁶ while the Western Self is described as *enlightened*, *secularized*, and *civilized*:

Sie verbannten mit ihren rigiden islamistischen Alltagsregeln – keine Arbeitserlaubnis für Frauen, keine Schulbildung für Mädchen, keine Unterhaltungsmusik – alles, was an westlichen Lebensstil erinnerte. (Sp-01-i39: 14)

But also the American NY TIMES picks up this cultural dichotomy, for example by stating that...

If there are Americans clamoring to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age, they ought to know that this nation does not have so far to go. This is a post-apocalyptic place of felled cities, parched land and downtrodden people. (NYT-01-09-13: 18)

After 9/11, this classification of two clashing cultural areas is broadened and now also includes Muslim and Arab actors within the Western space. The cultural dimension becomes a central element of distinction and evaluation of internal actors in Germany and the United States as well. This is especially the case in the German newspapers. When the German SZ, for example, calls for a stronger dialogue with the Muslims within German society this perspective thereby implicitly draws a distinction line between a culturally Christian West and Muslim Others that are not part of this concept of belonging:

Gerade jetzt muss der Dialog zwischen der christlich-westlich geprägten Mehrheit in Deutschland und den drei Millionen Muslimen im Land weiter gehen, breiter werden. (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

Altogether and measured by the quantitative scale of occurrence, we can say that the cultural dimension of the images of Arab and Muslim actors implicitly reflects and also explicitly expresses a cultural distinction line that labels and thus demarcates Arab and Muslim traditions and religious norms as *medieval* and *backward* and contrasts them with a concept of Christian modernity and traditions that distinguishes the Western Self. Especially German articles explicitly communicate this distinction, for example, when DER SPIEGEL refers to the Self as “we as Westerners”⁷ and the SZ notes that “Western Enlightenment meets Islam.”⁸

⁴ As Weller (2005) has for instance noted in his analysis of the television news coverage on the 9/11 attacks, it was not the Bush administration that – chronologically – first proclaimed that the attacks have to be understood as a declaration of war, but German television. As a consequence, other German journalists and also politicians picked up the term and it was German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who then declared the event to be “a declaration of war against the whole civilized world,” (Weller 2005: 328) thus introducing the term “civilized” in this context to refer to the Self.

⁵ Own translation, original quote in German: “wilden Gotteskrieger in Afghanistan” (Sp-01-i38: 158).

⁶ Own translation, original quote in German: “die Afghanischen Steinzeit-Islamisten” (Sp-01-i39: 148).

⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: “Wir als Abendländer” (Sp-01-i38: 168).

⁸ Own translation, original quote in German: “Westliche Aufklärung trifft Islam” (SZ-01-09-10: 12).

3. The Personal Dimension

Compared to the other dimensions, the category that summarizes the reference to personal features offers the largest variety of different characteristics that shape the images of the occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' print media.⁹ However, personal features to a large extent only have a supporting status in the constructed images of the occurring actors. The analysis has revealed that actors who are described via their personal features almost always also possess other – major – features of one of the other dimensions. Nevertheless, the ascription of personal facets is an integral stylistic element in both countries' newspapers, which makes the personal dimension equally mentionable. In many contexts, the personal features of the depicted Arab and Muslim actors are not inevitably needed for the coverage of the topic or story. However, these features provide the articles with some additional information that forms a more vivid image and background for the communicated story or situation.

In the German as well as the U.S. articles, negative personal features outweigh the positive ones. Before 9/11, those features mainly focus on ways of communication – whether in the context of a communication with other Arab and Muslim actors, or in the communication processes with the Western Self. Some actors are criticized as *disputations*, *choleric*, *backstabbing*, *pigheaded*, or *untruthful*, whereas others are described as *weak* in their ability to assert themselves, for example with regard to political plans and opinions.

After the attacks, the personal focus shifts from features that describe the interaction of actors on a communication level to features that describe the interaction of actors on a more physical level or that refer to the mental state of actors. A large number of actors are now portrayed as being *fanatic*, *hostile*, and *evil* in character, and are thereby evaluated according to a self-standard and self-image that includes characteristics such as being *rational*, *calm*, *good*, *peaceful* and *free*. Especially the confrontation of *good* versus *evil* can be seen as an abstract linguistic dichotomy that is used to demarcate and stigmatize an *aggressive* terrorist Other that not only carries out *violent* actions against the Self and tries to fight Western cultural values and political institutions, but that is *evil* and *bad* in his or her natural character. The German BILD formulates this as follows:

Unsere Erde vereint sich gegen das Böse. Aus dem Zwielficht des Terrors wächst offensiv die neue Kraft unserer Werte. (Bild-01-09-15: 12)

At the same time, the contrast between *good* and *evil* can be seen as a summary of the central reasons for a needed demarcation and distancing of the – in this case basically terrorist – Other, since it presents a threat to the ingroup cohesion and security of the Self.¹⁰ The NY TIMES, for instance, in one article quotes president Bush who says...

⁹ Nearly fifty different personal features and traits can be summarized in the analyzed articles, whereas the variety of the other dimensions ranges from about fifteen to twenty different traits for the social and economic dimension, and about thirty features in the cultural dimension to forty different characteristics in the political dimension, as already mentioned in V.1.

¹⁰ Iversen (2004) conducted an analysis of the depiction of bin Laden in the American news magazines TIME and NEWSWEEK after 9/11, and in this context also emphasizes the relevance of the facet of evilness in the portrayal of the actors, arguing that "evil [...] has throughout history been reserved for industrialization, slavery and communists

“This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail,” Mr. Bush said as he opened a meeting this morning with his national security advisers. (NYT-01-09-13: 16)

...and in another context writes:

The result: We must now fight a war against terrorists who are crazy and evil but who, it grieves me to say, reflect the mood in their home countries more than we might think. (NYT-01-09-21: 35b)

The 9/11 terrorists are even more difficult to fight because they have *inconspicuously* lived among the Self. Therefore, the aspect of being too *inconspicuous* and *reserved* to be recognized as different becomes a frequently mentioned feature in the images of external but even more of internal Arab and Muslim actors in some articles after the attacks. The *inconspicuousness* and seemingly *harmlessness* of some of those actors is thereby emphasized explicitly in both countries' newspapers and is evaluated as a threatening feature of the Other and the internal Other in particular.

Apart from that, a different – and in itself more positive – personal focus does also occur in the aftermath of the attacks. In both countries' print media – but especially in U.S. articles – we now also find a number of actors that are described as *compassionate*, *friendly*, and *helpful*. Similarly to the contrast of *pro-* and *anti-western* political positions, on the personal dimension actors are classified according to their open expression of compassion for the American victims of the 9/11 attacks or their help and support in coping with the event. A number of actors are positively highlighted if they do so, while others are strongly criticized for not doing so, as the following statement about Palestinian demonstrators may illustrate:

Die Unterdrueckten und die Entrechteten der arabischen Welt – die Palaestinenser – liessen sich von den Fernsehbildern zu Freudendemonstrationen und Freudenschuessen aus ihren Maschinengewehren hinreissen. Dieser fatale politische Enthusiasmus erzeugte Fernsehbilder, die wiederum in Europa und Amerika zu Entsetzen fuehrten. (SZ-01-09-13: 21)

Last but not least, and in addition to the introduced character facets, the *appearance* and the *style of clothing* are visual identifiers that make the Other recognizable. In German as well as U.S. articles, when Arab and Muslim actors are introduced in an article their visual appearance often seems worth mentioning: Articles report whether actors, for example, wear headscarves or turbans, or mention that they have beards and dark hair. These features are accentuated even though they might not be relevant for the information of the respective news article. It may be concluded here that this aspect of the image of the Arab and Muslim Other, namely occurring visual distinctions, is seen as a crucial aspect of difference by the observing German and U.S. Self.

Altogether, it can be summarized that the personal dimension is a supporting category which basically means that it almost always occurs in combination with features of other dimensions in the different actor images. With regard to those personal features that are ascribed to actors in

– and now terrorists. When an exceptional act of terror occurs [...] the victim interprets it as evil. The use of the word 'evil' [...] may [...] be interpreted as a central element in American identity discourse, a verbal practice aimed at reminding one and another of what it means to be an American. The practice serves an important cause: It preserves the American collective – it helps to reconstitute the identity of the country” (Iversen 2004: 79-80).

the media images, a demarcation line between Self and Other can be identified in three basic ways. First of all, actors are classified according to their communicational behavior, in the interaction with the Self but also with other Arab and Muslim actors. This aspect is especially focused on before the 9/11 attacks. *Hostility* and *choleric* or *untruthful* behavior are frequently mentioned features here in the images of the analyzed actors. Second, after 9/11 the focus shifts towards a more intensive evaluation of Arab and Muslim actors on a scale of *good* versus *evil* character. *Hostile* actors, who are seen as a threat for Western identity, are also described as *evil*, whereas actors who express their *compassion* with the terror victims can be classified under the label of *good* characters who form the opposition to the *evil* actors and also reflect the preferred Western standard of personal behavior. And finally, the visual distinction forms a third way of constructing difference between self and otherness with regard to Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' newspapers. The *appearance* of Arab and Muslim actors and their *style of clothing* are frequently mentioned features and can be interpreted as a way of constructing a visual difference of the Other.

4. The Social and Economic Dimension

“The gap between the wealthy elite and struggling poor”¹¹

Compared to the other four dimensions, the social and economic dimension is quantitatively less relevant for the portrayal of Arab and Muslim actors. Nevertheless, there are a few features used in the different actor images that are worth mentioning with regard to the overall differentiation of German or U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim Other. On this dimension, actor images predominantly include features that center on economic as well as social crises and conflicts within Arab and Muslim countries. The roots for these conflicts and problems can basically be explained by the confrontation of tremendously *wealthy* actors on the one side and extremely *poor* actors on the other side.

The U.S. newspapers before 9/11 especially concentrate on the social and economic crises in countries like Indonesia or Turkey to contrast the gap between *rich* and *poor* parts of the population. In doing so, some American articles also communicate political expectations towards the respective – mostly political – actors that demand for social or economic features which can be interpreted as Western social and economic standards or principles: The portrayal of the new Indonesian President Megawati in the NY TIMES can serve as an example here. As the newspaper writes:

The first priority is her cabinet. She [Megawati] needs to be inclusive – her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid, was not – so that key political parties receive posts and some of the damage wrought by the power struggle between the legislative and executive branches can be repaired. [...] She needs a justice minister who is committed to legal reform and who can restore respect for the courts and an attorney general willing and able to show that neither army officers nor politicians are above the law. She also needs economic advisers who can

¹¹ NYT-01-07-21: 4

steer the country through its debt crisis, banking problems and decentralization of fiscal authority. [...] Restoring economic health is essential [...] (NYT-01-07-27: 19)

Political elites are furthermore frequently described as economically *wealthy* but are often also described as *extravagant, unscrupulous, or money grubbing*, as can be illustrated with the following quotes. The German news magazine DER SPIEGEL, for instance, describes the lifestyle of Osama bin Laden's family as follows:

Die steinreichen Saudis fahren Rolls-Royce oder Mercedes S-Klasse, sie besitzen riesige Yachten und kleiden sich bei Armani oder Versace ein. Sie schicken ihre Kinder auf Eliteschulen und wohnen in sündhaft teuren Appartements und Villen in London, Paris oder Boston und geniessen das, was Osama Bin Laden wohl am meisten hasst: den American Way of Life. (Sp-01-i39: 112)

Similar to that, the American NY TIMES remarks on the Turkish economy:

But as Turkey ends the fifth month of the worst economic crisis in its modern history, the gap between the wealthy elite and struggling poor is growing wider and more visible. (NYT-01-07-21: 4)

Socially, a number of these *wealthy* actors are also said to having received a good *education* – in many cases from schools and universities in European countries or the United States. Furthermore, we also find facets of the Oriental myth that have been mentioned earlier. As it was noted by authors like Sardar (1999) or Kabbani (1993), some of the actors have an *excessive lifestyle* that ruins not only their own financial budget, but also the countries they govern. This aspect may be quite vividly illustrated with another quote from the NY TIMES that summarizes the facets of the Saudi Arabian society as follows:

History, geography and geology have made Saudi Arabia a fault line between civilizations. It is torn between conservative Islamic traditions and a modern global economy fueled by oil and money and defended by American military power. [...] But for generations, political power in Saudi Arabia has been monopolized by an extended royal family. Saudi kings and princes have been worldly in their foreign policy and business dealings, sometimes ostentatiously corrupt in their personal lives and unyieldingly hostile to political debate and representative institutions. (NYT-01-09-25: 28)

Here, not only the cultural conservatism and the political lack of democratic structures are highlighted but also the economic wealth and the corruption and lavishness that results from it.

After 9/11, we also find *wealthy* actors who do not spend their money on pompous palaces and expensive clothing, but rather finance terrorist groups or use their Western education and influence to logistically support attacks against Western countries. Here, Osama bin Laden or the 9/11 terrorists may serve as examples. For instance, in DER SPIEGEL it is noted that...

Der Saudi-Araber Bin Laden hätte sich als Erbe eines 80-Millionen-Dollar-Baugeschäfts ebenso ein unbeschwert unpolitisches Wohlstandsleben leisten können wie der ägyptische Chirurg Sawahiri. Beide hatten sich aber schon bald dem radikalen Islamismus verschrieben, überzeugt davon, dass Ungläubige mit dem Flammenschwert bestraft werden müssten. (Sp-01-i39: 14)

In opposition to the *wealthy* parts of Arab and Muslim populations German and U.S. articles also refer to the *poor* and *chanceless* populations of Arab and Muslim countries. Those *poor* actors are additionally described as *uneducated*, economically *disadvantaged*, or socially and economically

powerless. They often have to live in conditions that are shaped by a *bad infrastructure*, *poor housing*, or *insufficient healthcare*, and their social or economic problems are not only seen as a negative consequence of missing democratic structures but also of the *extravagant lifestyles* on behalf of the political elites in the respective countries. A depiction of the healthcare situation and the supplying conditions for the Afghan population in an article of the NY TIMES may illustrate that. As the newspaper writes:

Infected clothing, bandages and bedding are burned in a rusty barrel outside the building because the hospital has no proper incinerator. Rather than the full protection suits and headgear common in Western hospitals, doctors and nurses wear only latex gloves, surgical masks and cloth boots. (NYT-01-10-05: 14)

Interestingly enough, the mentioning of these negative conditions could as well be interpreted as an implicit critique of the Western observers in view of the social and economic conditions in the respective countries. At the same time, these negative features indicate a lack of social and economic Western standards, which are not accomplished in these cases.

Apart from the contrast between wealth and poverty in Arab and Muslim countries, both countries' print media also implicitly as well as explicitly compare the levels of development and progress of the Other with that of the own country. This is largely done by depicting the already mentioned lack of good infrastructures in some Arab or Muslim countries, the *bad education* systems, or the *lack of healthcare*, etc. In those contexts, even though no explicit contrasts of the social and economic conditions of Germany or the U.S. can be found, the critical and sometimes also explicit evaluation of those conditions can be interpreted as a devaluation of those features and as a deviation from Western economic or social standards.

However, especially after the attacks both countries' newspapers become more explicit in their comparison. In the context of the looming military conflict that might result from the terrorist attacks, the technological developments of Self and Other come to the fore in some of the analyzed articles. Some U.S. articles name "[...] two of America's greatest strengths – openness and technology"¹² as two Western principles that characterize the American self-image in contrast to the terrorist opponent. Reflecting more insecurity in this technical-developmental point, some German articles see the *technologically developed* West in a disadvantaged position in the context of the fight of *good* versus *evil*, however. Still, in debating this point they also – and explicitly – communicate their national self-perception. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, writes that...

Die vermeintliche Stärke des reichen technologisch hoch gerüsteten Westens erweist sich als Schwäche. Die Industriegesellschaften – zumal die offenen Demokratien – mit ihren Kernreaktoren, hochgiftigen Chemiekomplexen und Riesenstädten sind nicht zu schützen. (Sp-01-i38: 16)

...and in the SZ we find the statement:

Die säkulare, bedenkenlose westliche Spass-, Entertainment- und Kultur-Gesellschaft sieht sich auf einmal der Weltmacht des religiösen und politischen Fundamentalismus – und Fanatismus – gegenüber; sieht andererseits blossliegen bei sich selbst das fein gesponnene Netzwerk einer nervösen technischen Zivilisation. (SZ-01-09-13: 1)

¹² NW-01-v138-i13: 26

The German reference to the own technological standards is expressed in combination with a feeling of insecurity with regard to the superiority of those technologies compared to the technological standards of the Other. Nevertheless, the German self-concept in the analyzed articles – or more generally speaking, the German perception and interpretation of the Western technological standards – coincides to a large part with that communicated in U.S. articles. In both countries, technological development is contrasted with an *underdevelopment* of the – especially *terrorist* – Arab and Muslim Other that is also, but not exclusively, seen in the social and economic dimension. This can be shown, for example, with the following quotation from a NY TIMES article that includes a comparison between the social and economic conditions in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban regime and the United States:

And now we are battling a bunch of atavistic ascetics who hate TV, music, movies, the Internet (except when they're planning atrocities), women and Jews, who live in caves in a country smaller than Texas with a gross domestic product smaller than Bill Gates's. (NYT-01-10-03: 23)

Altogether, the assumption that could be derived from those images is that the elimination of social and economic *crises* and the improvement of *underdeveloped* structures are regarded as one method against the *terrorist threat*. Another idea that is indirectly communicated in this context is that the improvement of the social and economic standards of Arab and Muslim countries and their alignment with the Western principles of prosperity, wealth, and progress, which manifest themselves in aspects like good education, technological progress, and well-established infrastructures, would also improve the relationship of the Arab and Muslim Other with the West, or as the USA TODAY puts it:

How can we fight this scourge, spread around the world in tiny pockets of fury and pain? [...] Education and economic assistance must be part of our arsenal. (USAT-01-10-01: 15Ab)

5. The Aspect of Delinquency

“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”¹³

Last but not least, Arab and Muslim actors frequently carry features of delinquency. Criminal behavior like the *drugs trade*, *corruption*, or *torture*, but especially *terrorism* and *violence* against other actors are features that are used to describe a significant number of the identified actors in both countries' newspapers. But articles not only focus on the committers of *violent*, *corrupt*, or *terrorist* actions; they also mention their victims. Palestinian civilians in the violent conflict between Israel and Palestine, victims of torture practice by the Turkish military, or the population under the *repressive* Taliban regime are only some examples here. In American news media, Arab and Muslim actors within the United States can especially be noticed here as we find a large number of them being constructed as victims of hate crimes and violent assaults after the 9/11 attacks.

¹³ NYT-01-09-21: 1

Before the attacks, the central line of distinction is drawn between a *violence-prone* Other and a Self that does not accept and rejects violent behavior in any form, against its own ingroup members but also against other Muslim and Arab actors. Before the attacks, the depicted *violence* of actors is mainly directed against other Arab and Muslim actors. This distant location of violent behavior changes with the circumstances of the terror attacks in New York and Washington. After 9/11, the specific aspect of *terrorism* becomes the decisive criterion for the differentiation and evaluation of self and otherness in both German and U.S. newspapers and replaces the more general category of *violence*. Terrorist violence is now increasingly perceived and communicated as a threat directed against the Western Self. German articles note, for instance, that...

Das Grauen der terroristischen Attacke hat die zivilisierte Welt bis ins Mark erschüttert.
(Sp-01-i40: 94)

...or argue that...

[...] Deutschland ist wie die anderen Länder der freien Welt vom Terrorismus bedroht.
(Sp-01-i41: 40)

It is even explicitly claimed that the new opponent of the West is terrorism. Most clearly this new line of confrontation is drawn by U.S. President Bush who is cited in several articles with his statement that...

“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make [...] Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” (Here taken from NYT-01-09-21: 1)

With this shift in focus from the more general form of *violence* to the more concrete form of *violent terrorism*, government actors, who were formerly measured according to their active *opposition* and *battle against violence*, are now classified according to their position and actions *in favor of* or *against terrorism*. But also Arab and Muslim populations are classified according to that pattern: Palestinian or Pakistani demonstrators who signaled their approval for the attacks are strongly criticized.

Altogether, this fifth dimension of the images of Arab and Muslim actors – the ascription of delinquency – is quantitatively the most frequently focused on dimension in both countries' print media. Before as well as after the 9/11 attacks, *violent* or *terrorist* features are aspects that are most often mentioned when Arab and Muslim actors are characterized in both countries' articles. Before the attacks, the more general reference to *violence*, *violent disposition*, and *support of violence* attracts the largest attention in the context of occurring actors. After 9/11, the more specific form of *terrorist violence* and *terror support* comes to the fore and determines the media discourses on Arabs and Muslims. Besides the focus on those actors who act *violently* or *support violence* and *terrorism*, Arab and Muslim victims of violence or criminal actions like corruption, etc., are also taken into account.

The scale for the evaluation of actors on this last dimension is therefore clearly dominated by the negative side of deviance and is dominated by features that are disapproved of by the Self because of their destructiveness for the ingroup members as well as – on a more abstract level – for the Western standards and institutions. Whereas before the attacks these destructive features

and actions are largely seen as being directed against the Other itself, e.g. the populations of Arab and Muslim countries, the attacks against the U.S. lead to a shifting focus on *violence* and *terrorism* against the Self.

6. Conclusion: Western Principles and German and U.S. Self-Images That Shape the Images of Arabs and Muslims

In the last chapter, I have given an overview over the five major dimensions that are focused on when Arab and Muslim actors are covered, and have thereby also derived the central Western principles that are negotiated when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed. The introduced features present the major characteristics according to which Arab and Muslim actors are described, differentiated and distanced from the German and American conception of self. The analysis of those five dimensions has also revealed that the demarcation between the German and American self-concept and the Arab and Muslim Other is established on the basis of a number of distinctions, that are – to a large extent – identical in both countries' analyzed print media sets.

The Central Dimensions of Distinction between Self and Other

First and foremost, as already noted in chapter IV, Arab and Muslim actors are demarcated by geographic distance. The majority of the identified actors are external, i.e. they come from countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Northern Africa. Therefore, an implicit difference between Self and Other in the context of this analysis is created by geographic distance. This distance is challenged, however, after the attacks, since not only are the 9/11 terrorists revealed to have planned and carried out the attacks from within the West but also the internal actors, i.e. actors within the German or U.S. national territory, increasingly become the focus of the public and mass medial attention.

Politically, actors before 9/11 are classified mainly according to their political actions and views in the internal political contexts of the respective Arab and Muslim countries. Actors are politically *conservative*, *undemocratic*, and *repressive*, but also *moderate*. This rather distant view of a neutral observer changes with the attacks. After 9/11, the relationship and the interplay of Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other becomes the central focus in the political dimension. The importance of internal political features is now to a large extent replaced by the issue of international terrorism and by the evaluation of the occurring actors' attitudes and actions towards to West, and in U.S. articles towards the United States in particular. Actors are either described as taking an *anti-western* position or they are on the side of the Self and support the Western ambitions, actions, or policies. This central distinction line is closely connected to the opposition of actors being either *pro-terror*, i.e. *supporting* terrorism or *carrying out* terrorist acts, and being *against terrorism*. Here, a large number of the identified Arab and Muslim actors are characterized by deviant traits that result in *violent*, *terrorist*, and *criminal* behavior.

A similar and clear cut dividing line can be found in the cultural dimension. Actors are classified according to the general distinction of being either *civilized* and *modern*, or *uncivilized* and culturally *backward*. On the personal dimension, a central distinction can be identified between *good* and *evil* actors, an opposition that includes personal features such as being *irrational* or *unrestrained*. In the social and economic dimension, we find two basic contrasts. On the one hand, Arab and Muslim actors are sub-classified into *poor* and *wealthy* actors, a distinction that becomes relevant to understand internal dynamics and conflicts within the respective societies. At the same time, both countries' print media implicitly as well as explicitly compare the levels of development and progress of the Other with that of the German, American or more general the Western Self. Both countries media images reflect a distinction between a (*technologically*) *developed* West and an *underdeveloped* Arab and Muslim Other that lacks most of the Western economic or social standards such as a well-established infrastructure, a good educational system, or a good healthcare system.

The Communicated Self-Concepts

The Western standards that are reflected in the images of Arab and Muslim actors, and that after 9/11 are also explicitly communicated in both countries' newspaper articles – as some of the quotes in this chapter have illustrated – are nearly identical in the German as well as in the American context. The self-image of both countries is mainly characterized by such general principles as democracy, openness of society, freedom, equality, justice, rationality and personal self-discipline, tolerance, and progress.

The political principle of democracy is reflected, for instance, in the strong focus on the political dimension of Arab and Muslim actors. Furthermore, the concept also carries a strong cultural connotation, since democratic structures are, for example, equated with cultural modernity and progress, and are thus located at a higher developmental level than non-democratic political systems. The openness of society refers to aspects like social mobility, and here especially hierarchical mobility with regard to economic or social status, and freedom of choice with regard to life planning. In the German and U.S. self-conception, this freedom is expressed in freedom of speech, freedom of religion, or the possibility of open criticism and freedom of choice with regard to political issues and decisions. On a personal dimension, the self-concept is based on an assumed rationality that results from cultural development and a civilized status that is expressed for example in personal self-discipline. Equality refers to aspects like equal participation in political decision-making processes, or equality of economic and educational opportunities for all members of society. At the same time, the self-description is characterized by tolerance towards other political opinions, other religious beliefs, ethnic differences, and different lifestyles. The principle of progress – which is also contained in most of the criteria that have been mentioned so far – is the last central principle that is expressed in the self-images in the analyzed articles of both countries. Progress refers to all dimensions and includes the permanent development and

improvement of political, cultural, economic, scientific, or social conditions and technological standards.

Altogether, in the analyzed articles of both countries those principles are indirectly and explicitly reflected, for instance, when (a), newspaper articles especially emphasize the lack of those principles with the occurring Arab and Muslim actors, or when (b), the articles explicitly emphasize those principles as central facets of the German or American self-concept. The analysis has furthermore confirmed that both countries basically present the Self (and consequently also demarcate the Other) in a more or less identical kind of way. The introduced Western principles can be traced in both countries' print media portrayals – even though the explicit reflections of the German and U.S. self-image only come to the fore largely in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

Therefore, we may summarize that the worldview that can be derived from this German and U.S. observation of Arab and Muslim actors and countries could be described as a two-sided concept: On the one hand, we have the ingroup (in our case this basically refers to the communicated perception of the German or U.S. nation state as a concept of belonging) as part of a “Western” hemisphere that shares a set of central principles, norms, worldviews, and on the other hand, we have the Arab and Muslim Other as an outgroup from which the Self demarcates itself on the basis of those principles, norms, and concepts. Both countries describe themselves more or less equal with regard to their political, cultural, social, economic, and also personal development and institutionalization of the commonly shared Western standards and principles. It is furthermore important to note that this identification with a Western whole does not stem from the 9/11 attacks, but was already verbally expressed before the event, predominantly by referring to the United States or European countries as “the West.” But especially after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, both countries' print media now include a noticeable amount of self-references and explicit descriptions of the American, German, and Western self-image.

However, despite the overall similarities between German and U.S. print media, what has to be noted as well is that we do find quantitative differences in the way in which those different standards are discussed and focused in the context of the occurring actors, which may indicate differing relevancies of those standards for the German and the American self-concept. For instance, and especially in the timeframe after the analyzed event, the two countries ascribe themselves to different levels in the structure of Western countries. The analyzed U.S. articles include a number of self-references that indicate that the United States regards itself not only as one nation state in a union of Western countries that form the already mentioned “Western hemisphere” or “Western world.” Instead, American articles communicate a national self-image that sees the United States as the LEADING ROLE MODEL of modernity, democracy, progress, openness, equality, and rationality. This perception of superiority is also reflected in the following quote from NEWSWEEK that writes:

The United States is the pivot that makes today's globalization go round. If other countries believe in individual liberty, in free enterprise and free trade, in religious freedom, in democracy, then they are eating the fruits of the American order. (NW-01-v138-SpIssue: 46)

Concerning the analyzed media contexts, the United States not only sees itself as making the running for the countries of the West, but in the context of the analyzed articles also and especially for the Arab and Muslim Others. When Arab and Muslim actors are evaluated on the basis of Western principles those principles are first and foremost regarded as American principles. And by comparing the occurring actors with those standards, the American media also openly communicate this American status, as this example from the NY TIMES may illustrate:

And this Third World War does not pit us against another superpower. It pits us – the world’s only superpower and quintessential symbol of liberal, free-market, Western values – against all the super-empowered angry men and women out there. Many of these super-empowered angry people hail from failing states in the Muslim and third world. They do not share our values, they resent America’s influence over their lives, politics and children, not to mention our support for Israel, and they often blame America for the failure of their societies to master modernity. (NYT-01-09-13: 27)

Therefore, we can argue that the U.S. print media reflect a stronger national focus, and only in a second position see the United States as a member of a transnational Western collectivity. At the same time, this self-acclaimed leading position of the United States in the world does also reflect a religious connotation that bases the leading role of the country on a historically given mission, since...

Americans share a faith of the Founders: that democratic destiny will furnish leaders the times require. (NW-01-v138-i14: 24)

Compared to that, Germany rather perceives itself as PART OF THE WESTERN WORLD and German print media communicate a more transnational self-concept and, therefore, more often define a Western concept of belonging than the German newspaper articles.

A second aspect that is much more emphasized in the U.S. print media than in the context of the German articles is the stronger focus on the aspect of technological progress and the demarcation line between a leading technological U.S. and an underdeveloped and technologically weak Other. Both aspects combined form a perception of the Other that can be summarized with the following quote that refers to the 9/11 terrorists:

What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. Think about it: They turned our most advanced civilian planes into human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles - a diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology. Jihad Online. And think of what they hit: The World Trade Center – the beacon of American-led capitalism that both tempts and repels them, and the Pentagon, the embodiment of American military superiority. (NYT-01-09-13: 27)

Compared to that, a German peculiarity is that in the German print media images of Arab and Muslim actors the cultural dimension is quantitatively more emphasized and is consulted more often in German articles to describe difference between Self and Other. German articles thereby often implicitly draw a distinction line between a culturally Christian West and Muslim Others and frequently emphasize the religious affiliation of actors or discuss the religious content, history, and political level of Islam in Arab and Muslim countries than the American articles.

After having outlined the central lines of distinction between Western Self and Oriental Other, we can thus come to the preliminary conclusion that, to a large extent, one theoretical assumption for this analysis that was outlined in II.2 seems to be confirmed with the introduced results of this step of the print media analysis: The Western perspective on the Arab and Muslim Other is also shaped to a significant extent by the myth that those – Oriental – Others represent the opposite counterpart of the Self. The features and characteristics that are used in the newspaper articles to describe Arabs and Muslims predominantly do not meet but contradict the Western standards and principles that are regarded as the cultural account of countries of the West and that are communicated in the articles as well.

However, in the overall image of the occurring Arabs and Muslims we also find a number of facets that can be regarded as favored characteristics for the Self, which indicates that the images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media do not solely reflect a simple contrast of a self-concept with an Other that differs completely in its views, characteristics, and features. Rather, and as the theoretical assumptions in II.1 have suggested,¹⁴ the Self also has to face an Other that is never solely different to the extent that it only possesses features that are not part of the self-concept, i.e. which cannot be found in German or U.S. society, or which are rejected by the Self. The boundary-drawing does not solely seem to work via the devaluation of the Other, since we also find a number of actors in the analyzed articles that are, for instance, constructed as rather similar to the Self, as they possess features or fulfill standards that are also promoted as central for the self-concept. A number of actors are described as *pro-western*, *modern*, *peaceful*, and *compassionate*, or actively condemn or combat violence and terrorism.

Therefore, the simple dichotomy of an Oriental Other and an Occidental Self, and the two-sided opposition of a *good* Self and a *bad* Other does not fully describe the complexity of the image of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. media. This, and a simple summary and description of the different facets and characteristics that can be found in the images of Self and Other would lead to the assumption that Self and Other are not that different after all, since their print media constructions reveal nearly the same features. Thus, to understand how difference is portrayed, we have to further subdivide the overall image of the Other. The next chapter will therefore look more closely at the levels of difference in the images of Arab and Muslim actors and will illustrate, for instance, how the distance between Self and Other is maintained despite possible similarities between both sides. This step of analysis will also show that the Other can be regarded as similar and different or similar and distant at the same time.

¹⁴ Namely that Western principles have institutionalized more and more on a global basis and therefore are institutionalized in Arab and Muslim societies to some extent as well.

VI. HOW DIFFERENT IS THE OTHER? – TYPES OF ACTORS AND LEVELS OF DIFFERENCE

1. Types of Actors and Levels of Difference: An Overview

The first part of the content analysis of the Arab and Muslim actor images has revealed that even though we can identify central lines of difference that demarcate the self-concept from the images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers, not all of the occurring actors are completely different from the German, American, or Western Self. Instead, we have learned that some actors are quite similar to the Self or, to put it in other words, the distance between Self and Other is rather small in some cases in both countries' print media. One lack of distance can occur, for instance, in the geographic dimension, i.e. when we look at Arab and Muslim actors within the national boundaries. But also actors who can be distanced geographically may reveal a certain degree of similarity with the self-concept that is communicated in the newspaper articles, and may fulfill the political, cultural, or other standards of the Self as outlined in chapter V.

Thus, not all of the actors fit into the dichotomy derived from the hypothesis that in order to construct and strengthen in-group identity, the Self needs an out-group Other that is evaluated and described as (a) completely different from the Self, and (b) a negative counterpart to the Self. It was argued in chapter II that an overall difference of the Other that is demarcated and distanced from the Self serves the aim of clearly marking the boundaries of the in-group, and that, furthermore, the negativity of the counterpart image enables the Self to positively enhance the in-group and at the same time set the normative frame for the in-group members. These assumptions have only been confirmed to some extent. Therefore, we will have to look more closely at the differences within the Other, i.e. at the differences and similarities in the images of actors in both countries' print media around 9/11. In the following chapter we will examine how the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other can be subdivided, what forms of images dominate – positive or negative ones – and whether or not the Other is really as different from the Self as the quantitative scanning of the last chapter has suggested.

What can be noted first and foremost is that across the different images outlined in the following chapter, the cultural pattern of Western principles serves as the central pattern according to which the different actors are evaluated: The Self measures the Arab and Muslim Other on the basis of those principles, which results in different images of the respective actors depending on how this evaluation turns out. Furthermore, and depending on the degree to which Western principles can be identified with the Other, different levels of similarity can be derived. High levels of difference are easy to demarcate and the Other can be distanced according to the features that deviate from the Self's own societal norms and principles. In other cases, and with lower levels of difference, a demarcation appears to be less easy. How difference and distance is constructed (or is maybe not constructed) in those different cases will be outlined in the following chapter.

To discuss the different levels of constructed similarity or difference, we can first of all observe in what ways and according to what pattern the occurring actors are combined with the set of features that have been introduced. A typological analysis of all appearing actors has revealed certain overall patterns and structures among the different actor images across the different groups of actors, the diverse character dimensions, and the different analyzed print media. The established actor types that will be introduced in the following enable us to summarize the complexity that results from the large number of actors and the variety of ascribed features in the different images, and to illustrate those overall patterns of actor portrayal. At the same time, a typological analysis allows comparisons between the two countries as well as between the data sets before and after the attacks.

Altogether, the typological analysis has revealed that the about nine hundred different Arab and Muslim actors that have been identified in the analyzed data set can first of all be divided into INTERNAL and EXTERNAL actors, which are distinguished on the basis of either geographical closeness to (internal actors) or geographical distance from (external actors) the observing German and American Self.

Typology of External Arab and Muslim Actors

From the set of identified external actors in both countries' analyzed print media, about twenty-five different forms of actor images can be derived – of which thirteen can be regarded as empirically significant¹, and have therefore been included in the typology of external Arabs and Muslims that will be discussed in the following. The derived actor types are not only quantitatively significant but are also characterized by the same structure of construction, i.e. by a similar combination of features. As will be outlined in the following chapter, some of these actor images may look different at first sight but on looking more carefully they work with the same patterns.²

The established typology of external Arab and Muslim actors can be found in both analyzed print media sets, and the majority of these actor types occur before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. Altogether, this typology reflects four levels of difference that are accompanied with four forms of perceived otherness: External actors can have images that devalue them as solely negative with regard to their features and can therefore be distanced as completely different from the standards of the observing German or American Self. On this level, six empirically relevant actor types have been identified. Other actors are described as similar to some extent: difference between the Self and similar Others on this level is constructed by weakening those actors, either by weakening their similar features or by weakening the whole actor, for instance as a result of the actions of other actors. On a third level of difference, similarities between Self and Arab and

¹ Empirically significant here means that this form of actor depiction has to occur in at least one of the two countries' print media sets (i.e. either German or U.S. newspapers) in at least one of the two analyzed timeframes (i.e. before or after 9/11) with at least five different actors.

² For more methodical details on the formation of the actor typology see chapter III.4.

Muslim Other are neglected, either by constructing them as strategic and by exposing the similarities as pretence, or by revealing the Western ambivalence in dealing with actors who are negative but useful at the same time. The fourth level of difference summarizes types of actors who are portrayed as positive and who carry features that are supported by the Self.

Typology of Internal Arab and Muslim Actors

When we now add to the established typology the identified internal Arab and Muslim actors, a fifth level of difference comes into play when Arab and Muslim actors cross the geographic boundaries of the Self. Whereas the first four levels of difference are additionally marked by a geographic distance and thus only summarize the images of external actors, the images of internal actors are first and foremost marked by a geographic closeness to the observing German and American Self. Whether this similarity is accompanied by a political economic or other similarity as well, and whether these internal Arabs and Muslims can be integrated in the overall actor typology that has been established for the external actors will be examined, as well. Altogether, four different actor types will be discussed here that have been derived from the images of the internal Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media.

In the following subchapters (VI.2-6), these five levels of difference will be introduced as follows: On the basis of the established actor types it will be shown which features are combined in what ways when Arab and Muslim actors are constructed in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers, and how similar or different actors are with regard to the Western standards. For each actor type, different prototypical actor examples will be introduced and will be illustrated with quotations from the different German and U.S. print media.

2. Level 1: The Devaluated Other

As has been mentioned briefly in the introductory section to this chapter, the first level of difference that can be identified for a part of the occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' newspaper articles is shaped by an overall deviation from the Western standards and principles. On this level of difference, actor types are ascribed almost exclusively with negative features. The images that result from these features mostly form the complete opposite to the concept of belonging that is communicated for the German or American Self. These features can be explicitly rejected by the Self in the different articles or they are rejected implicitly by illustrating their negative consequences. This first level of difference therefore can be interpreted as a form of devaluation of the Other.

At this point, we may return to the theoretical considerations about collective identity construction for a minute: In chapter II.3 it was argued that an out-group is chosen for the comparison with the Self and that this comparison between Self and Other is shaped by an evaluation between the two sides that aims at a positive result for the self-image. The boundaries

between Self and Other are drawn via the emphasis of difference between both sides, a difference that is traced, for instance, in different political, cultural, or other features that distinguish both sides. In most cases the Self thereby looks for features that form the opposite to the characteristics of its own group. Furthermore, in-group cohesion and solidarity of a collective group are also strengthened by the construction and demarcation of Arab and Muslim actors that are portrayed as lacking the favored or postulated Western principles, structures and norms.

Following these assumptions, the ascription of negative features and the construction of actors as the complete opposite to the Western self-concept or even as active opponents of the West, therefore, seems to be the first and most logical form of imaging the Arab and Muslim Other. On this level of complete difference, six actor types can be distinguished that are summarized in Table VI.1.

Table VI.1: The Devaluated Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance³

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Type 1: Gunmen, Terrorists, and <i>Hostile</i> Politicians	28.4	28.9	17.8	24.1
Type 2: The Culturally <i>Backward</i> and <i>Fundamentalist</i> Other	12.8	11.6	12.3	8.0
Type 3: The Politically Devaluated Other	5.8	5.2	3.3	3.6
Type 4: The <i>Poor</i> and <i>Underdeveloped</i> Other	1.2	3.9	1.9	2.3
Type 5: The <i>Wealthy</i> Political Elite	5.4	3.0	0.4	0.3
Type 6: The Villain	-	-	2.2	2.3
Other Devaluated Actors	0.4	0.4	1.9	0.5

2.1. Type 1: Gunmen, Terrorists, and *Hostile* Politicians

The first actor type that can be introduced here focuses on features that have already been emphasized in chapter V as two very central aspects of the distinction between Self and Other: actor type 1 summarizes the images of actors that mainly focus on *violent* attitudes and behavior, as well as on political *hostility* and *aggression*. Actors of this type are mainly described as either *violent* or more concretely as *terrorists*. Very often features of violence are accompanied by negative personal features that further intensify the negativity of these actor images. Many of those Type 1 actors only appear in the context of one single event, like for instance a terror attack or violent aggression against other actors or the Self, and therefore do not reach a very high level of complexity with regard to their overall image. In the majority of cases, these actors serve as a background foil that describes the setting in which context the articles discuss, for example, the steps of success and failure in internal as well as foreign political negotiations. Other actors of

this type possess political facets that can be summarized as politically *hostile*. For example, those actors are referred to as *anti-western*, or are said to be *hostile* towards Israel with regard to their views, rhetoric, or political actions.

Altogether, those *violent* and *hostile* actors represent a potential threat – not only for their own countries but also for the Self, especially after the 9/11 attacks. These actors are regarded as different, and the Self has to distance itself from them geographically because they not only present a threat to their own countries but also to the national security of Germany and the United States. In some articles (as already shown in chapter V) this threat is communicated explicitly, in other contexts it is illustrated indirectly by outlining the possible negative consequences of the behavior of these actors. The real motives and personal backgrounds of the violence of the individual actors are not discussed, as these actors are not perceived as autonomous individuals, but instead reflect a certain violent potential in the respective Arab and Muslim countries and their populations. Some of the actors of Type 1 are even said to be worshipped as heroes by the populations, an aspect that is mentioned for example with reference to a Palestinian suicide bomber in the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL.

Therefore, we can say that this first actor type presents an unchallenged negative image of actors that can be characterized by one central message: violence is a normal and every-day event and a central aspect of social reality for a number of the described Arab and Muslim societies. The construction of delinquency and hostility presents the most frequently used way of constructing actors in both countries' analyzed newspapers, before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. Nearly one third of all occurring actors in both print media sets can be assigned to this actor type (Germany: 28.4 %, USA: 28.9 %). Whereas the quantitative relevance of this type decreases significantly to 17.8 % of the appearing actors in the German newspapers after the attacks, its significance drops only slightly in the U.S. newspapers to a proportion of 24.1 %. Thus, Type 1 is the most frequently used way of imaging Muslim and Arab actors, before as well as after the attacks.

Type 1 Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Before 9/11, violent actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the most often appearing examples of Type 1. In both German and U.S. articles, we find a large number of private gunmen, individual terrorists, and members of groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but also members of Palestinian political parties like the PLO and political groups like Fatah or Al-Aksa. In most cases, the unnamed actors only appear once – usually because they are killed by their own suicide attacks or by Israeli military forces. Listed below are just a few examples of how those actors are normally introduced. USA TODAY writes, for instance, that...

A 17-year-old Israeli was killed late Thursday night, presumably by Palestinian gunmen, as he drove with his father along a West Bank road just north of Jerusalem. (USAT-01-07-27: 4b)

³ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

...and in German articles we are informed that...

Einen Tag nach der Toetung von acht ihrer Landsleute haben militante Palaestiner im Westjordanland Vergeltungsanschlaege angekuendigt. Auf einer Beerdigung in Nablus riefen Zehntausende zu einem "heiligen Krieg" gegen Israel und zur Toetung israelischer Politiker auf. (SZ-01-08-02: 1)

...and that...

Auch gestern gab es neue Gewalt! Im Gazastreifen feuerten Palaestiner Moersergranaten auf israelische Siedlungen. (Bild-01-08-02: 2)

This usage of Type 1 actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also maintained after the attacks. In the context of an article on the conflict the German SZ writes that...

Eine israelische Siedlerin war am Donnerstagmorgen suedlich der palaestinensichen Stadt Bethlehem getoetet und ihr Mann schwer verletzt worden. Die Frau war mit ihrem Auto nahe der juedischen Siedlung Tekoa im Westjordanland unterwegs, als Palaestiner auf das Fahrzeug schossen. (SZ-01-09-21: 6c)

...and in the context of another article on this topic reports that...

Ein als israelischer Soldat verkleideter Palaestiner hat am Donnerstagmittag zwei Israelis im zentralen Busbahnhof der israelischen Kleinstadt Afula an der noerdlichen Grenze zum Westjordanland mit einem Maschinengewehr getoetet. Mindestens 15 weitere Israelis wurden bei dem Anschlag zum Teil schwer verletzt. (SZ-01-10-05: 11)

And in the NY TIMES we are also informed that...

Palestinians rioted during the afternoon in southern Gaza, and a bomb exploded near an Israeli convoy near the town of Jenin in the West Bank, the Israeli Army reported. The bomb damaged a jeep but injured no one. (NYT-01-09-23: 15)

As these examples already show, the resulting images of Type 1 actors are not very complex, and the actors usually remain anonymous. In the case of the following actor, this one-sidedness and anonymity does not change even despite the fact that he occurs repeatedly in several different articles in the NY TIMES. On August 12, 2001, we first learn in the NY TIMES that...

[I]n the heart of downtown Jerusalem, a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up in a crowded pizzeria and restaurant, killing 15 people besides himself and wounding 130 others. (NYT-01-08-12: 8)

This topic is picked up again two days later when the newspaper reports that...

On Friday, hours after a Palestinian terrorist bombing had killed 15 people, plus the suicide attacker, in a Jerusalem pizzeria, Israeli forces took over the unofficial Palestinian headquarters in eastern Jerusalem. (NYT-01-08-14: 1)

And also in the third article on this topic, the respective actor remains anonymous and we still only get the information that he is a suicide bomber who has killed 15 civilians:

After a suicide bomber killed 15 Israelis and foreigners at a Jerusalem pizzeria last week, the prime minister, ignoring objections from the United States and other countries, ordered his forces to take over several Palestinian offices in and around Jerusalem. (NYT-01-08-16: 3)

Even if actors of this type are identified by a name, this does not inevitably lead to a more complex and insightful image, as the example from the German tabloid BILD illustrates:

Gaza-Stadt - Er hat das Gesicht eines Engels. Doch seine Familie hat teuflischen Hass in seine Seele getraefelt. Und so spricht Ahmed Masawbi auch - sagt mit seinen erst vier Jahren

Sätze, die die ganze Welt schockierten: “Wenn ich groß bin, will ich ein Selbstmordattentäter werden. Wie mein Onkel Ismail. Ich werde die Juden töten.” (Bild-01-08-24: 1)

Besides the violent gunmen and terrorists, some private Palestinian actors can also be assigned to this actor type: In German as well as U.S. articles we find references to parts of the Palestinian population as *hostile* towards the West, and those images do not only appear after the attacks. The NY TIMES, for example, reports in July 2001 that...

Encircled by a tight cordon of army checkpoints, Bethlehem residents seethed with anger after the killing of the four Palestinians. At a funeral punctuated by bursts of gunfire, mourners vowed to avenge the killings with bombings in Tel Aviv. Thousands gathered near the Church of the Nativity to hear speakers call for holy war and martyrdom in the struggle against Israel. (NYT-01-07-19: 5)

...and USA TODAY writes:

And tens of thousands of Palestinians chanting anti-Israel slogans took to the streets of several towns in the West Bank (of the Jordan River). (USAT-01-08-28: 6A)

Especially after 9/11, the newspapers focus on this facet, for instance, when both countries report on Palestinian demonstrators who – as a reaction to the attacks – take to the streets to demonstrate their pleasure, or at least their support for the attacks. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL writes:

Mit Maschinengewehren feuerten Milizen Salut-Schüsse in die Luft, wie sie sonst blutige Anschläge gegen Israel feiern. Nun drückten sie ihre Freude darüber aus, dass die mächtigen “imperialistischen USA” in die Knie gezwungen wurden. Frauen und Kinder schwenkten palästinensische Fahnen, klatschten, sangen und stießen Freudentriller aus. (Sp-01-i38: 154)

Similarly, the SZ reports that...

Die Unterdrueckten und die Entrechteten der arabischen Welt - die Palaestinenser - liessen sich von den Fernsehbildern zu Freudentemonstrationen und Freudenthuessen aus ihren Maschinengewehren hinreissen. Dieser fatale politische Enthusiasmus erzeugte Fernsehbilder, die wiederum in Europa und Amerika zu Entsetzen fuhrten. (SZ-01-09-13: 21)

But the NY TIMES also reports:

But in Nablus, Palestinians took to the streets joyfully, without cameras to egg them on. (NYT-01-09-13: 18)

The examples show that, in the context of the respective articles, *delinquent* and *hostile* actors are more or less used as pegs on which to hang the main story the article is covering. In the course of the article, the real topic or issue – the political negotiations of Israeli or Palestinian politicians, or the visit of European politicians as negotiators in the peace process in the Middle East – is then discussed. The Type 1 actors in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, therefore, only serve as an element of recognition for the topic that they are embedded in. Type 1 actors here more or less form a background image for the articles and for other actors that are at the center of those articles and the discussed topic.⁴

⁴ This form of depiction is not restricted to actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a more recent context, it can also be found in the mass media coverage of the ongoing conflict in Iraq since 2003. Here, we can find a nearly identical depiction of *anti-western* insurgents fueling the violent conflict with daily terrorist attacks against the U.S.

Only one actor group steps beyond the specific sphere of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Islamic Jihad is now ascribed to a wider radius of international terrorism and therefore now also occurs in the context of other topics besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is mainly due to the assumed alliance of the group with Osama bin Laden, as the quotation from USA TODAY describes:

Al-Jihad: Created in Egypt in the late 1970s, the group is blamed for the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1991. One faction considers Omar Abdel-Rahman, imprisoned in the World Trade Center bombing, as its spiritual leader. Al-Jihad is a key component of bin Laden's broader-based network. (USAT-01-09-25: 3A)

However, this broadened scope can only be found in the U.S. media set and also only after 9/11. Nevertheless, the group remains a one-sided *hostile terrorist* actor. The only difference is that now it is described as acting at an international level, and is therefore perceived as a threat for Western countries' security as well.

The Notorious Agitators,⁵ Moammar Gaddafi⁶ and Saddam Hussein

Besides the significant relevance of actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Type 1 also includes other actors, some of which are, in addition, also not nameless and anonymous like the ones mentioned so far. The most well-know representatives of Type 1 before 9/11 are Iraqi President Saddam Hussein for the U.S. print media set, and the Libyan *de facto* leader, Colonel Moammar Gaddafi⁷, in German newspapers.

In the German newspapers, Gaddafi is labeled for instance as "Washington's Archrival"⁸ and articles focus on the *anti-western* rhetoric of the "Libyan Terror Dictator."⁹ The SZ writes:

Mit scharfen Vorwuerfen an die Adresse der USA hat der libysche Staatschef Muammar el Gaddafi den 32. Jahrestag seiner Revolution gefeiert. In einer zweieinhalbstuendigen Rede vor Abgeordneten des Volkskongresses in Tripolis sagte Gaddafi, das Regierungssystem der USA sei veraltet und gehoere auf den Muell. "Amerika ist keine Demokratie", sagte der 59-Jaehrige, der am 1.September 1969 in einem unblutigen Putsch Koenig Idris gestuerzt hat. [...] Libyen ist einer von sieben Staaten, die nach Einschaeztung Washingtons den Terrorismus unterstuetzen. (SZ-01-09-03: 8d)

The image of Saddam Hussein in the American newspapers is quite similar to that of Gaddafi in the German context. In a NEWSWEEK article, President George W. Bush is quoted as saying:

Between air-strikes, President George W. Bush explained that Saddam was "still a menace, and we need to keep him in check, and will." (NW-01-v138-i08: 26)

army in Iraq (as the counterpart to Israeli soldiers) and against Iraqi and foreign civilians (as a counterpart to the Israeli population).

⁵ Own translation, original quote in German: "die notorischen Scharfmacher" (Sp-01-i30: 106).

⁶ German and U.S. print media use various different transcriptions for the Arabic name ("Gadhafi", "Quadhafi" or "Quaddafi"). In my own text, I will use the transcription "Gaddafi" from now on, but will not change the writing in the original German or U.S. quotes.

⁷ Gaddafi holds no public office or title.

⁸ Own translation, original quote in German: "Washingtons Erzrivale" (Sp-01-i34: 118).

⁹ Own translation, original quote in German: "libyscher Terror-Diktator" (Bild-01-08-10: 1).

Furthermore, Hussein is labeled as a war criminal, and in one article in NEWSWEEK is referred to as the “butcher of Baghdad” who “can still threaten, in part, because he never leaves Iraq, and so can avoid the lengthening reach of international law.”¹⁰ Even though Saddam Hussein here is the central actor of the quoted article, he remains – nevertheless – a very one-sided character who only carries negative political or delinquent features, and therefore can be classified as a *hostile* and *violent* actor. This image changes only slightly after the 9/11 attacks, when Hussein also is suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. USA TODAY writes, for example:

The elder Bush was second-guessed for ending the war without ousting Saddam Hussein, who still is in power and accused of sponsoring terrorism. (USAT-01-09-17: 10A)

This aspect even becomes a given fact in a later depiction of the Iraqi president, when the newspaper writes that...

Some Bush advisers say they believe the scope of the retaliation should be expanded to include Iraq because of President Saddam Hussein’s past support for terrorism. The State Department issued a report in April that identified Iraq as one of the seven leading state sponsors of terrorism. (USAT-01-10-09: 8A)

And the NY TIMES quotes political sources that see Hussein as one of the suspected mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. The newspaper writes:

Mr. Wolfowitz is said to be wedded to the position that Mr. bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network could not have carried out the attack without Saddam Hussein’s help, the officials said. (NYT-01-09-25: 2)

Thus, he remains a representative of Type 1 as his image is only expanded with one more negative element.

Altogether, after the 9/11 attacks the composition of this actor type changes only insofar as the formerly dominating portrayal of actors’ *hostility* towards Israel is now outweighed by the potential *aggression* and *threat* of the terrorist front of *hostile* actors from Pakistan, Europe, or the United States. Even though we still find a significant number of Palestinian actors in both countries’ newspapers, Type 1 is now dominated by other terrorist groups and individual actors of diverse origins. In both countries, we now find a more significant number of *hostile* and *violent* Pakistani terrorists, religious groups, and private actors. German print media also focus on a large variety of internal German or European terror cells and groups, whereas U.S. articles now increasingly refer to Type 1 terrorist actors within America’s national borders.

2.2. Type 2: The Culturally *Backward* and *Fundamentalist* Other

The second form of negative imaging can be found with regard to cultural otherness of Muslim and Arab actors and countries. Like the first type, images of Type 2 actors combine *violent* behavior or attitudes with *hostility* and other negative political features. However, the central facet of the images of Type 2 actors is the dimension of cultural *underdevelopment* that is predominantly reflected in the fact that this second actor type subsumes actors who are described as culturally

¹⁰ NW-01-v138-i08: 26

conservative, or as religiously *fundamentalist* or *fanatic*. As has been indicated in chapter V, those cultural aspects are regarded by the observing German and U.S. Self as cultural *backwardness* to a large extent. Other features that shape this cultural *underdevelopment* are descriptions of actors as being *misogynistic* or *uncivilized*. In some contexts, actors of this type are referred to as *medieval*. As already mentioned, these cultural features are often combined with politically negative characteristics and *violent* features or delinquent activities, and in these contexts, religion is often regarded as the driving force for these activities. Apart from that, Type 2 actors sometimes also possess negative personal features, being described as *superstitious*, *choleric*, *arrogant*, or in the U.S. context, as *evil*. Those personal facets further emphasize their negativity as a person or supposedly explain the roots for delinquent action. In a number of cases, the reference to the actors' *appearance* and their *style of clothing* strengthen the *conservative* or religiously *fundamentalist* image.

Culturally devaluated actors form the second most commonly used form of devaluation in both countries' newspapers to describe Arab and Muslim actors. However, despite the attacks and their religious terrorist background, the occurrence of this actor type only slightly changes in the analyzed data after the attacks. In German articles the proportion slightly decreased from 12.8 % of all occurring actors in the timeframe before the attacks to 12.3 % after the event. In U.S. articles the proportion of Type 2 actors dropped from 11.6 % to 8.0 %. This slightly differing quantitative relevance of Type 2 actors further supports the observation that has already been made in chapter V, namely that the German perception of Arab and Muslim actors is shaped by a stronger quantitative focus on the dimension of cultural difference as an element of demarcating Self from Other than the American perception.

Alongside the anonymous *violent* and *hostile* actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which were examined in the last section, a number of the leading actors in this conflict are representatives of Type 2. In contrast to the Palestinian Type 1 actors, negative cultural features are additionally ascribed to these terrorist groups and they appear repeatedly over the analyzed timeframe. In both countries' print media, for example, the Palestinian organization Hamas dominates news coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the 9/11 attacks. In the German as well as in the U.S. newspapers, the Hamas occurs in nearly every article that focuses on the conflict. Furthermore, and compared to Type 1 actors, groups like Hamas are also provided with a religious facet that guides their political and *violent* actions: both countries' print media regard them not only as *hostile* and *violent* but also as Islamic *fundamentalists*.

Apart from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, before 9/11 this actor type also includes a number of other actor groups. In German newspapers we find a larger number of private actors of Iranian or Palestinian origin. The SZ describes parts of the population of Yemen as "[...] conservative, strictly religious mountain clans that have been completely cut off from the world for centuries."¹¹ U.S. media also describe the country of Yemen as culturally and politically *conservative*

¹¹ Own translation, original quote in German: "den konservativen, streng religiösen, seit Jahrhunderten von der Welt abgeschnitten Bergstämmen" (SZ-01-08-16: 3).

by giving a detailed description of the *cruel* and *inhuman* punishments under the Islamic Sharia law used in Yemeni courts. Furthermore, in German articles, this actor type includes religious groups from Afghanistan, Iran, or Palestine who are referred to as *fanatic*, *fundamentalist*, and *radical*.

The Iranian Religious Conservatives in U.S. Newspapers

Both countries' print media describe the Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the Iranian Guardian Council as culturally and politically *conservative*. German print media, for instance, see Khamenei as the *powerful* Iranian leader, who as the clerical leader has the last word with regard to many religious and political issues, and who opposes the reform course of the *moderate* president Mohammed Khatami. In addition to that, in American print media, the Iranian religious conservatives are quantitatively depicted more frequently before 9/11 than in the German context. The NY TIMES, for example, openly criticizes the Ayatollah by stating that...

Unelected clerical leaders ought not to have arbitrary power to arrest and punish their critics, overrule Parliament and direct intelligence agencies to organize assassinations abroad. Narrow interpretations of Shiite orthodoxy should not be imposed on an unwilling population. (NYT-01-08-10: 18)

In addition to that, the U.S. newspapers describe the rigid rules and consequences that result from the conservative actions of "Iran's conservative clerics who hold the most power and want to maintain it through a strict interpretation of Islamic law."¹² As the NY TIMES reports:

Since the revolution, the government has also enforced obligatory veiling for women and a punishment of 74 lashes for violators. For years, bright colors were considered inappropriate, and women in the government were required to wear a shapeless black head-to-toe cover known as a chador. (NYT-01-07-29: 6)

In combination with the Ayatollah, in both countries the Iranian Guardian Council is described as a symbol of cultural *conservatism*. The image of the institution is strongly shaped by cultural facets and by *violent* and *undemocratic* actions, like the supporting of public beatings and the suppression of women, and in one article, the NY TIMES quotes:

"The whip must cut the skin and smash the flesh, and it is all right if a bone breaks," a reformist newspaper, Norouz, quoted [chief justice] Mr. [Ayatollah Mohammad Mohammadi] Gilani as saying. (NYT-01-09-01: 2).

Altogether, the Iranian religious leaders can be regarded as the prototype actor for cultural devaluation in the analyzed U.S. print media before 9/11.

Turkish Politicians in German Newspapers

Comparable to that prototype in U.S. newspapers, German articles before 9/11 more frequently depict the Turkish government and a number of different political parties in Turkey as culturally *conservative*, *fundamentalist*, and *misogynistic*, as the following passage from the German SZ about the former ruling party in Turkey, the MHP, illustrates:

¹² NYT-01-07-29: 6

Doch bemueht sich derzeit die nationalkonservative Regierungspartei MHP wieder einmal ganz besonders, sich als Waechter angeblich tuerkischer Traditionen zu profilieren. [...] “Unanstaendige Bekleidung” der Schuelerinnen wird danach mit einem Ausschluss aus dem Unterricht von einem bis zu fuef Tagen bestraft. Auch fuer das Aufsuchen “unanstaendiger Orte” drohen Sanktionen, wobei nicht definiert wird, welche Plaetze das sein koennen, was den Moralwaechtern viele Moeglichkeiten gibt. Die schwerste Bestrafung – der Hinauswurf aus der Schule – aber droht bei Verlust der Jungfraeulichkeit. Dann sollen die Schuelerinnen (von den Schuelern ist hier nicht die Rede) auch keine andere staatliche Schule mehr besuchen duerfen. (SZ-01-07-17: 12)

The conservative forces of Turkish culture seem to be highly interesting from the German perspective of observation. This could be explained by Turkey’s negotiations with Europe to join the European Union (EU), as well as by the fact that Germany has a large number of Turkish immigrants. With reference to Turkey’s attempts to become a member of the EU, German print media especially communicate the requirement of a stronger political turn towards Western norms, values, and standards and a stronger process of democratization as a central condition for the entry of the country to the Union. Thus, political and *cultural conflicts* in the country are attentively observed, and especially cultural deviations from the Western standard principles are critically discussed.

At the same time, those Western criteria that are set in the course of the Turkish accession negotiations to the EU are one way of marking difference between the two countries, Germany and Turkey. The newspaper images of Turkish politicians indicate skepticism on behalf of the German Self with regard to the *pro-western* attempts of Turkish politics and the cultural development of the country. One interpretation here could be that the entry of Turkey to the EU might not only neutralize the political and cultural distance but (symbolically) also the geographical distance between the West and the Muslim country.

Type 2 Actors after 9/11

After 9/11, Type 2 is mainly represented by religious groups and terrorist groups from Palestine, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. Altogether, the terms of description become sharper, as the articles now include more devaluating portrayals when referring to those actors. For instance, in DER SPIEGEL Islamic fundamentalists are referred to as “[...] those manic fundamentalists from the Muslim world”¹³ or as “Islamic zealots,”¹⁴ and the cultural *backwardness* of Type 2 actors is described, for example, in an article in the NY TIMES that discusses the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi traditions of *suppression* and *violent* rule:

The telephone, radio broadcasts and public education for women were at one point condemned as innovations wrought by the Devil. [...] There are no movie theaters in Saudi Arabia – they would promote the unhealthy mingling of the sexes – and women are banned from driving. Their Islam is an ascetic one. Men should wear short robes and even avoid the black cords used on head clothes. Mosques should be without decoration. There should be no public holidays other than religious ones, and even the prophet’s birthday should not be

¹³ Own translation, original quote in German: “durchgeknallten Fundamentalisten aus der islamischen Welt” (Sp-01-i38: 168).

¹⁴ Own translation, original quote in German: “islamische Eiferer” (Sp-01-i39: 112).

celebrated. Drinking alcohol is forbidden. Punishment should be meted out as described in the Koran. The right hand should be amputated for theft. Adulterers should be stoned to death. Murder and sexual deviation merit beheading. (NYT-01-10-07: 7)

Especially Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is now frequently mentioned in both countries' newspapers, primarily as an example of religious *fanaticism* and *backwardness*. DER SPIEGEL refers to Pakistani fundamentalists as "Stone Age Islamists" or as "radical and ignorant Mullahs,"¹⁵ and in the NY TIMES we find the following statement:

Like Mullah Omar [the Taliban leader], they [the Pakistani fundamentalists] share a world view born of devotion to the same Deobandi school of Islamic belief. Its roots are in a political and spiritual movement that sprang up in 19th century in the Indian city of Deoband, and which espoused a back-to-basic creed that is regarded as the theological font of contemporary Muslim fundamentalism. (NYT-01-09-29: 6)

In another context, USA TODAY writes:

"It is biologically, religiously and prophetically proven that men are superior to women," said Maulana Adil Siddiqui, spokesman for the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqani school in the northwest Pakistan city of Akora Khattack. It is one of Pakistan's largest Muslim schools. (USAT-01-09-21: 1Ac)

To sum up, we can say that images of Type 2 actors include a combination of political and cultural elements that have been outlined as central features for the difference between Self and Other. Type 2 actors are culturally *conservative*, *backward*, and religiously *fundamentalist*. These indicators of cultural difference from the German and U.S. Self and Western cultural standards can be summarized with a quote from the NY TIMES that discusses the societal role of the Arab broadcasting channel Al Jazeera:

Al Jazeera [...] has focused on subjects considered subversive in most parts of the Arab world: the absence of democratic institutions, the persecution of political dissidents and the inequality of women. (NYT-01-10-09: 6)

2.3. Type 3: The Politically Devaluated Other

A third form of negative portrayal can be found with regard to the political dimension. Images of Type 3 actors can be seen as political anti-images to the political standards and principles like democracy or equality that are emphasized by the Western Self. The emphasis of negative political features is therefore the central line of difference that is drawn between the self-concept and this type of actor. Unlike the first type (see V.2.1.), Type 3 does not include actors who are basically *violent* and politically *hostile* but focuses on other political features that go beyond simple *aggressive hostility*. The observations with regard to these actors focus much more strongly on internal political actions and processes, also with regard to terrorism. Politically devaluated actors are often *inactive* in internal *political* or *violent conflicts* like the one between Israel and Palestine. Therefore, a number of them are described as politically *weak* or *not interested* in active engagement in peace process, etc.

¹⁵ Own translation, original quote in German: "Steinzeit-Islamisten" and "radikaler, weltfremder Mullahs" (Sp-01-i39: 162).

Type 3 actors indirectly reflect the political values and standards that the Self imposes on the Other, for example in the way they are described as the opposite to those values. A number of the actors of this type are described as not *democratic*, not *tolerant*, or not *peaceful*, and instead are referred to as *militant*, *radical*, *intolerant*, or politically *powerless* and *unstable*. Altogether, this type reflects the political disadvantages of the Other and *violence* is seen as part of the overall political agenda. After 9/11, especially *inactiveness against terrorism* or even active *terror support* of some political groups and regimes is a frequently criticized feature in the context of political devaluation. Politically devaluated Arab and Muslim actors can be found in both countries' newspapers, before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. In both countries, however, the number of Type 3 actors decreased slightly after the attacks, from 5.8 % of all occurring actors to 3.3 % in the German articles, and from 5.2 % of all actors in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 to 3.6 % after the attacks.

Before the attacks, the main representatives of this type are political actors like governments, nation states, or other political groups and parties, although we also find private and military actors. The regional origin of these actors is quite diverse and ranges from the governments of Indonesia and Syria, depictions of the Turkish population or of Arab nation states in German articles to the government of Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan in U.S. articles. The Syrian government, for instance, is seen as a *supporter of terrorism* in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As DER SPIEGEL writes:

So unterstützt Damaskus nach israelischen Geheimdienstinformationen – im Schulterschluss mit der iranischen Mullah-Führung – die Hisbollah im Südlibanon, die Grenzposten in Israels Norden angreift. (Sp-01-i30: 106)

Arab nation states as a whole are *quarrelsome* and face permanent internal as well as international *political conflicts*. But also the former Russian republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are negatively depicted since “while the governments claim they are a steadying force, their repression is creating instability.”¹⁶ A German article in the SZ describes the military forces of the Philippines as politically *powerless* because “the hallmark of the Philippine army is that it seems to be unable to defeat the terrorists,”¹⁷ whereas U.S. articles classify Moammar Gaddafi as politically *isolated*.

The Political Incompetence of Abdurrahman Wahid in U.S. Newspapers

A prototype for political as well as personal incompetence in U.S. newspapers is the former Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid. In the analyzed articles his constructed image can be regarded as the negative counterpart to the image of his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri. By illustrating the deficits of Wahid and the political consequences for Indonesian democracy and the country, his image also demonstrates the benefits of his displacement and the change of government. Thus, the central element of Wahid's image is the political dimension that is

¹⁶ NYT-01-08-16: 22

additionally accompanied by a number of negative personal features that have an influence on his political decisions and actions, as can be illustrated with the following quote from the NY TIMES:

Mr. Wahid is a proud and stubborn man, certain of his correctness and ready for a fight. He insists that the Legislature has no right to challenge him or to remove him from office. [...] It is this insouciant style, as much as any substance, that has driven an exasperated nation to seek Mr. Wahid's removal. Over the past 21 months, his unbuttoned lip has succeeded in alienating most of his allies and infuriating his rivals. (NYT-01-07-21: 3)

In another context, his political actions are equated with those of an *undemocratic* dictator who needs to be disempowered to secure the democratic development of the country:

"These are the actions of a dictator," said Andi Mallarangeng, a leading political analyst. "It is time for the people to say goodbye to Wahid. As a citizen of Indonesia, I urge people not to obey this decree. It is treason." (NYT-01-07-23: 1)

Furthermore, his desperate clinging to power is regarded as *power-obsessed* – an aspect that is further emphasized by the fact that Wahid would even use *violence* to stay in power. However, beyond the political and personal dimension U.S. print media also include other dimensions in the image of the president, as can be illustrated with a quote from the NY TIMES that summarizes his major failures as a political leader:

Beginning with a charge of corruption, the process evolved into a general condemnation of Mr. Wahid's term, which has been criticized for its eccentricity, incompetence and drift. As the showdown approached, he found himself increasingly isolated and fell back on what seemed his only option, to declare an emergency and silence his tormentors by shutting down Parliament. The political standoff has all but paralyzed his already disorganized administration. (NYT-01-07-23: 1)

Apart from his political *incompetence*, a quote from another article illustrates that the political image of Wahid is not only a negative one but that the actor can also not be taken seriously as a person – even in his personal views and practices:

Mr. Wahid, who was the most overtly mystical of Indonesia's presidents, is a Muslim cleric who frequently communes with saints and had, as president, parallel groups of political and spiritual advisers. [...] There is the time he went to an all-night shadow-puppet show for spiritual inspiration but fell asleep before the good part. Or the time he prayed tearfully at a tomb, only to discover later that it was the wrong one. (NYT-01-08-20: 3)

The image of Wahid is contrasted in the articles with that of his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri. This change of power in the Indonesian government and the contrasting construction of both political figures also illustrate the consequences of political *incompetence*. With Wahid, those political failures are closely connected to a personal *incompetence* of the respective actor. The former president is seen as an extreme example of political and personal failure not only to explain the political processes in Indonesia, but also as a counter-image to the Western definition of political leadership. Wahid's successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, on the other hand, is constructed as an "improved" version of political leadership and is described somewhat differently. She thus also receives a different image that will be introduced later in the context of another form of difference construction.

¹⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: "Das Markenzeichen der philippinischen Armee ist es, dass es ihr nicht gelingen will, die Terroristen zu bezwingen." (SZ-01-08-06: 4b).

After 9/11, the representatives of political devaluation become more diverse in U.S. articles, whereas their composition becomes more homogeneous in German articles. In U.S. print media, nearly one third of the Type 3 actors are connected to the attacks in the United States, for example as financiers or intellectual supporters. Apart from that, countries like Nigeria, the Russian republic of Chechnya, Lebanon, or political groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF, a Muslim separatist rebel group) in the Philippines, and the government of Algeria are politically devaluated as *instable* and struggling with inner *political conflicts*. In contrast to that, actors that are solely politically devaluated in German articles are almost exclusively governments, for example, in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, or the Iranian parliament. These government actors are mainly described as supporting forces behind the increasing threat caused by international terrorist groups, as this quote from the German SZ shows:

Um die Mitte der Neunzigerjahre (des vorigen Jahrhunderts) lenkte eine Reihe von selbstmoerderischen Bombenanschlaegen [...] die Aufmerksamkeit auf die wachsende Bedrohung durch den von anderen Staaten gefoerderten Terrorismus. In der Folgezeit ersetzte dieses Phaenomen die Theorien von der kommunistischen Verschwörung als dem wichtigsten Zusammenhang, in dem der Terrorismus zu sehen sei. Danach waren an der Finanzierung terroristischer Handlungen verschiedene abtruennige, auslaendische Regierungen wie die Regime im Iran, Irak, Libyen und Syrien aktiv beteiligt oder erteilten den Auftrag zu deren Durchfuehrung. (SZ-01-09-15: I)

Therefore, it can be summarized that the qualitative construction of Type 3 actors after the attacks is largely reduced to the question whether those actors are *supporting terrorism* or actively *oppose* and *fight terrorist activities* and terror groups within their national borders. Furthermore, before as well as after the attacks, political devaluation takes place mainly in the image of political actors, and here, mostly with the portrayal of governments or nation states that do not fulfill the Western political standards.

2.4. Type 4: The *Poor* and *Underdeveloped* Other

With regard to social and economic features a fourth form of devaluation can be identified in both countries' newspapers that is illustrated by the fourth actor type I would like to introduce here. This actor type is shaped by a main focus on social and economic features that are, however, often complemented by political features. The images that are constructed here reflect the social and economic *conflicts* and *instabilities* that may be caused for example by political *incompetence* or *corruption* in the Arab and Muslim countries that are covered. In another context the negative social and economic features and conditions are seen as the consequences of *undemocratic* structures for the economy of the Arab and Muslim countries in focus. Predominantly, this type summarizes the images of several Arab and Muslim countries.

Before the 9/11 attacks, this type is represented mainly by country portrayals of Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran. *Drug addiction* and *poverty* are features that are used, for instance, to portray private actors in Iran who are referred to as living in a country that “for years [...] tried to hide drug abuse,” a strategy that is regarded as “the standard reactions to social problems in a country

that promotes Islamic government as the key to an earthly Eden.”¹⁸ In the German SZ, referring to parts of the population of the Yemeni city of Aden, people are described as “beggars, tattered children who offer you tissues, bottles of water, cigarettes [...] Half of these people cannot find a regular job.”¹⁹ And BILD reports on a small village in southern Anatolia where the *poor infrastructure* and, more specifically, the lack of an adequate water supply system have led to a sex boycott by the women of the village.²⁰

Before 9/11, in U.S. articles 3.9 % of all occurring actors can be labeled as Type 4 actors, whereas in German articles this actor type is barely significant: only 1.2 % of all occurring actors here can be classified as solely devaluated with regard to social or economic features. After the attacks, this form of actor portrayal changes only slightly with regard to its quantitative significance in both print media sets: 1.9 % of all actors in the German articles and 2.3 % of those in the U.S. articles can be identified as Type 4 actors. Despite this small quantitative significance compared to the other actors types that have been introduced so far, the images of Type 4 actors reflect a number of aspects that can be regarded as crucial social and economic differences between Self and Other.

The Social and Economic Problems of Indonesia in U.S. Newspapers

As already mentioned, in U.S. newspapers before 9/11, the national and economic situation of Indonesia is frequently discussed. The resulting image of the country can be seen as one crucial example for social and economic devaluation. In U.S. articles, Indonesia is described as facing “enormous problems – economic collapse, political turmoil, social instability, debilitating corruption and, yes, widespread violence and local wars.”²¹ The social and economic crisis in Indonesia is the major aspect that is discussed in this context. The NY TIMES, for instance, mentions the *badly developed infrastructure* of the country that leads to negative consequences such as train accidents:

Indonesia has had a string of fatal train crashes recently. Officials blamed signal failures for most of the accidents. Last month, a passenger train plowed into a crowded bus, killing at least 13 people on Java. That accident happened because the bus failed to stop at a railway crossing. [...] With the nation in its worst economic crisis in a generation, budgets to maintain railway lines and other equipment have been severely cut. (NYT-01-09-03: 4b)

In another context, the newspaper reports on the environmental destruction that causes *natural disasters*:

After days of torrential rains, floods and landslides poured down mountainsides early this morning on Nias, an Indonesian island 60 miles off the coast of Sumatra, sweeping away entire villages and causing at least 60 deaths, local officials said. [...] “So it’s really a sign of the environmental destruction of Indonesia,” said Longgena Ginting, the campaign director of Walhi. “Deforestation has become a serious problem, along with bad forest

¹⁸ NYT-01-08-18: 1

¹⁹ Own translation, original quote in German: “Bettler, zerlumpte Kinder, die Taschentuecher, Wasserflaschen, Zigaretten anbieten, sind allgegenwaertig. Die Haelfte der Leute findet keine geregeltte Arbeit.” (SZ-01-08-16: 3).

²⁰ Bild-01-08-16: 7

²¹ NYT-01-07-29: 6

management.” [...] Much of the problem is caused by illegal logging, one symptom of economic hardship, Mr. Ginting said. (NYT-01-08-02: 10b)

The social and economic problems of Indonesia are thereby also linked to the political situation – an issue that has already been touched in the context of the media image of former Indonesian president Wahid (see VI.2.3), and this mainly refers to the change of political power during the timeframe of the analysis. The references to the economic crisis of the country implicitly see one of the reasons for the crisis in the past political failures, as can be exemplified with the following quotation from the NY TIMES:

Foreign companies have shunned Indonesia since Mr. Suharto resigned in 1998 during a tumult of demonstrations, political defections and military feuds. Those who have stayed, like Exxon Mobil, have ridden a roller coaster as Mr. Wahid presided over mounting strife in separatist provinces like Aceh. Other companies have been mired in the corrupt legal system. (NYT-01-07-25: 1)

Moreover, we also find implicit Western expectations that ask for an intervention of the political leaders, i.e. the future Indonesian president. The NY TIMES writes for example that...

Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia's new president, has a mess on her hands. The economy is in tatters, regions are in revolt and the government has almost broken down. (NYT-01-07-27: 19)

...and in another article it is argued that...

In her announcement today, the president asked for a wide base of support in her attempts to address Indonesia's economic and social crises. Mrs. Megawati inherits from Mr. Wahid a country torn by violence, political infighting and continuing instability. (NYT-01-08-10: 4)

Therefore, the change in power is also commented on by the observing U.S. Self with implicit expectations that are directed towards the new head of the government. Those expectations – in turn – can be regarded as implicit social and economic, but also political standards that the American Self expresses. To get this assumption across more precisely we can look at the last quotation I would like to mention and that refers to Indonesia. The NY TIMES writes that...

The Bush administration plans to renew some American ties to the Indonesian military, the most powerful institution in the sprawling Southeast Asian country but one fraught with human rights abuses. The decision is part of an effort to cement stronger ties with Indonesia, one of the most important but unstable countries in the region, after the relatively smooth coming to power of the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose ascent was supported by the military. [...] In re-establishing military ties, the Bush administration says it would like to help ensure the stability of the country, a vast archipelago that has been riven by separatist movements. (NYT-01-08-12: 11)

In this quote we find pretty explicit expectations of the U.S. Self with regard to the political and economic actions of the new Indonesian government and, at the same time, criticism of the negative political and economic features of the country like *human rights violations*, and political as well as economic *instability*.

The Socially and Economically Dilapidated Afghanistan

After the 9/11 attacks, the geographical focus shifts slightly and representatives of Type 4 now predominantly come from Pakistan or Afghanistan. In the German articles, we now find a larger

number of Pakistani or Afghan private actors whose poverty is especially emphasized. Afghanistan is described as a *starving* and “poor, Islamic country,”²² and is described as “politically and economically oppressed.”²³ Pakistan is also regarded as a nation state that is economically *run-down*, this being mainly traced back to the economic sanctions that the United States imposed on India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests of 1998. In another context, U.S. media refer to Afghanistan as a country that is “suffering its worst drought in decades, famine is imminent and U.N. sanctions imposed earlier this year,”²⁴ and that is dramatically described as “a post-apocalyptic place of felled cities, parched land and downtrodden people.”²⁵ This social and economic *underdevelopment* is also regarded as one consequence of the political conflicts in the region, as can be illustrated with the following quote from DER SPIEGEL:

Herrscher in Afghanistan werden in der Regel gestürzt, und oft werden sie dabei auch gleich umgebracht. So ist es Sitte in Asiens Herzland, dessen Geschichte eine breite Bluts pur gewaltsamer Umbrüche durchzieht. Allein im Bürgerkriegschaos der vergangenen 23 Jahre verloren am Hindukusch gut eine Million Afghanen ihr Leben, wurden vier der Präsidenten erschossen oder abgeschlachtet. (Sp-01-i39: 166)

As was the case before the attacks, those *social* and *economic conflicts* and the general *underdevelopment* are regarded as a potential threat to the national political stability and peace. As the NY TIMES writes:

The countries most concerned are Indonesia, a nation with 210 million people; the Philippines, with an intractable separatist insurgency in its partly Muslim southern islands, and Malaysia, where radical Muslim groups are taking advantage of a time of political flux. [...] Most worrisome to diplomats and security experts is Indonesia, where poverty has spawned widespread discontent, new political openness has given latitude to extremist groups and disarray in the security forces has weakened law enforcement. (NYT-01-09-21: 7)

What becomes obvious with the images of Type 4 actors is that the social and economic deficiencies are predominantly connected to the political and social consequences that result from those deficiencies. Predominantly, these negative features lead to national or even international political *conflicts* and *instability* as the following quote about the future developments in Indonesia shows:

Indonesia is seen as pivotal for the stability of Southeast Asia and, administration officials say, has assumed new significance as the broader region stumbles through an unexpected period of economic downturn and political uncertainty. (NYT-01-08-12: 11)

In another context, a similar statement is made about the future of Turkey in the context of its current economic problems:

Though Turkey is not prone to mass demonstrations, concerns have increased among political leaders about the potential for a social explosion as the poor watch the rich glide along seemingly unscathed, particularly in the country's showcase city. (NYT-01-07-21: 4)

Again, the construction of socially and economically devaluated actors can be interpreted as also implicitly reflecting the economic and social standards that the observing U.S. or German Self

²² Own translation, original quote in German: “das arme islamische Land” (Sp-01-i39: 148).

²³ Own translation, original quote in German: “dem politisch und wirtschaftlich zerschundenen Afghanistan” (SZ-09-19: 28).

²⁴ NW-01-v138-i14: 30

applies when it observes the Other. Especially in the U.S. newspapers we find very explicit suggestions for the Other as well. Thus, in the NY TIMES we find the following one – directed towards the Iranian government:

[Iranian president] Khatami needs to press ahead with limited but attainable changes. These should include revitalizing Iran's sluggish economy, professionalizing public institutions and further loosening the grip of the morals police on daily life. [...] Corruption and bureaucratic inertia have put a drag on employment and incomes. Even some of the more farsighted clerical conservatives recognize that to survive, the Islamic Republic needs to produce better economic results. (NYT-01-08-10: 18)

This statement not only lists the major deficiencies of the Iranian economy like *corruption* or *low income* and *employment rates*, but also implicitly calls upon the political leaders to act, and to tackle those problems and improve the economic situation.

2.5. Type 5: The *Wealthy* Political Elite

In addition to the actor type described above, the analysis has revealed a second form of actor devaluation that focuses on the economic dimension. At first glance, this portrayal does not concentrate on negative economic or social aspects but rather focuses on those actors who own the money but spend it incorrectly: Actors of this type are described, for example, as *wealthy* or *money-grubbing* persons, who lead an *extravagant, lavish* lifestyle. In a way, their image forms the opposite to the image of Type 4 actors. This two-sided classification of Arab and Muslim actors in the dimension of social and economic features distinguishes between actors who are either tremendously *wealthy, extravagant, unscrupulous*, and *money grubbing*, or extremely *poor, uneducated*, and economically *powerless* has already been noted in chapter V as one of the major lines of distinction between Self and Other.²⁶

In a way, actors of Type 5 thereby represent one of the causes for the negative situation of Type 4 actors, i.e. especially of the respective countries in which those Type 5 actors are situated. Some government actors, for example, are illustrated as *lavish, money grubbing* actors who, at the same time, enforce *undemocratic* structures and are held responsible for *social* and *economic crises* in their countries. Other *wealthy* actors even have to face *bankruptcy* because of their *lavishness*. Here, we may say that the constructed images implicitly contrast the lavishness and recklessness of the Other with a Western view that asks for thrift, generosity, and responsibility, and a certain discipline that the Other does not fulfill. Even though those actors are *rich*, this financial *wealth* is devaluated by their *corruptive, lavish, or arrogant* behavior. Some of these Type 5 actors are additionally devaluated in another dimension, for example, as being *violent*, politically *hostile* towards internal political opponents or Western countries, or as being *undemocratic* political leaders.

²⁵ NYT-01-09-13: 18

²⁶ Karim (1997) refers to those kinds of actors as “cruel, barbaric, and lascivious but fabulously wealthy sheiks” (Karim 1997: 158), which summarizes the major facets of this actor type rather well, even though the author is not exclusively referring to print media.

In the German print media before the 9/11 attacks, Type 5 actors appears with a proportion of 5.4 % of all occurring actors. Compared to that, these images are less relevant in U.S articles, where only 3.0 % of all appearing actors in Arab and Muslim countries can be assigned to this type. Geographically, these actors mainly come from countries like Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, or Iran. In both German and U.S. newspapers, the type is mainly represented by private and government actors. After 9/11, this actor type nearly disappears completely from both countries' constructed print media reality (Germany: 0.4 %, USA: 0.3 %). The dimension of social and economic features, in general, becomes less relevant and is more or less ruled out by the issues of terrorism and cultural fundamentalism that become the center of focus after the event.

Representatives of Type 5 in U.S. articles are, for example, the former Iranian Shah who is portrayed as *lavish*, *extravagant*, and culturally *unworldly*. An article from the NY TIMES mentions that “the ordinary Iranians see the shah as a despot.”²⁷ In German articles, a similar image is ascribed, for instance, to the Palestinian government who is described as *corrupt* and politically *unstable*. In this context, the German SZ writes about the Palestinian National Authority:

Dort ist er [Jassir Arafat] den Leiden seines Volkes so fern wie seine ganze korrupte Autonomiebehoerde, deren Minister in schmucken Villen in Gaza und Ramallah logieren, wo sie den Laerm der Kaempfe eher als Feuerwerk wahrnehmen. (SZ-01-08-24: 4)

And both countries' print media communicate a devaluated image of a member of the Brunei royal family, Prince Jefri Bolkiah, “who has squandered billions of dollars of government money in the oil-rich sultanate,”²⁸ and who “snatched up everything just as long as it was expensive enough – from luxurious real estate to jewelry of dubious taste.”²⁹ As the article outlines, the lifestyle of the prince is said to have completely ruined the financial budget of his country.

But also non-political actors from the private sector can be classified as Type 5 actors. The German tabloid BILD, for example, states that “Saudi Arabian women are addicted to clothes,”³⁰ in an article that solely concentrates on this shopping addiction of Saudi Arabian women. This facet could be contrasted with a statement from the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL which reports about the “ultra-conservative kingdom” claims that...

Reformen aber sind mehr als überfällig. In Saudi-Arabien sind weder Parteien erlaubt, noch gibt es freie Wahlen. Frauen dürfen bei Ihnen noch nicht einmal Auto fahren. (Sp-01-i30: 108)

And in the NY TIMES, Saudi Arabian men are constructed as *vain*, *extravagant* and *lazy*, especially in terms of their work ethic. The newspaper writes here that...

Hiring Saudis is one thing; getting them to show up is another. [...] One Saudi man objected to wearing overalls, embarrassed when acquaintances rolled down their car windows and joked that he should avoid police patrols looking for illegal immigrants. Another disliked the job title of laborer assigned to the roughly \$6,000 per year entry job, wanting to tell his new

²⁷ NYT-01-09-07: 4

²⁸ NYT-01-08-18: 6

²⁹ Own translation, original quote in German: “Der hatte alles zusammengerafft, was nur teuer genug war – von Luxusimmobilien bis zu Edelstein besetzten Schmuckstücken von zweifelhaftem Geschmack.” (Sp-01-i34: 128).

³⁰ Own translation, original quote in German: “Saudi-arabische Frauen sind kleidersüchtig” (Bild-01-07-17: 12).

bride he was a technician. A third insisted that he belonged in management, not production. (NYT-01-08-26: 1)

Finally, in an article in the German SZ we are given the example of an Egyptian father who is not only described as culturally *conservative* but also as *lavish* and *money-grubbing*: He gambles and loses all his money and, as a consequence, tries to marry his daughter to a *rich* Saudi in order to receive new money and assets like jewelry and other presents that would help him to compensate for the financial loss.³¹

To sum, we can say that even though Type 5 actors, on the one hand, carry somewhat positive features since they are described as *wealthy* and sometimes also as *educated*, their image is, on the other hand, devaluated by other political, cultural, or personal features. The type reflects a Western perception of the respective actors as being unable to manage their economic wealth. This indicates that the Western observer implicitly criticizes the observed actors with regard to the way in which they spend their money. This critical perception is further emphasized in some articles by illustrating the negative consequences of this behavior, for example, by contrasting these actors with the poverty and deficiencies of their surrounding environment, i.e. the countries that they rule or live in.

2.6. Type 6: The Villain

The last actor type that reflects a form of devaluation of Arab and Muslim actors can be labeled as “villains” since it presents the prototype of the devaluated Other, and actors of this type may be seen as the most different and thus the most distant actors with regard to the Western principles and self-concept. Compared to the other negative actor types, images of Villain actors are usually very complex and carry negative features on all of the five central dimensions that were introduced in chapter V. In most cases actors of this type are regarded as the key sources, the roots, and the driving forces for the conflicts, violent incidents, or other negative events that are discussed in the analyzed articles. Even though these Villain actors may also possess positive features such as being *moderate* or being culturally *modern* in some articles they appear in, those aspects are simply outweighed in their overall image by the strong dominance of negative features.

These Villain type actors mostly form the leading actors for certain topics and articles, therefore, this actor type does not gain its relevance from its quantitative occurrence in the different analyzed timeframes, compared to the other negative actor types whose representatives do not necessarily have to be central for an article and can also appear only once or as one example among many others in the respective articles. But they can also be quantitatively significant, for example if they dominate the different timeframes of analysis because they appear in nearly every article on certain topics or events. In the timeframe before the 9/11 attacks, we do not find actors in both countries’ newspapers that this definition would apply to. This is mainly due to the

³¹ SZ-01-07-17: 3

fact that the villain is primarily used to openly construct the negative counterpart in a conflict or situation that seems to threaten the in-group identity. Such conflicts or events did not appear in the phase before the event. This can be taken as an explanation for the fact that even such (verbally) *hostile* and *anti-western* actors like the Taliban regime or Saddam Hussein are not regarded as a crucial threat by the observing Self and are therefore not described as *evil* and as negative as they might have been in the context of conflicts like the Gulf War in 1990/91. This changes after 9/11, an event that clearly shocked and unsettled the German and U.S. feeling of security. In the aftermath of 9/11, 2.2 % of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and 2.3 % of those identified in the U.S. newspapers can be labeled as Villain type actors. As mentioned earlier, this might seem quantitatively insignificant but the majority of those actors occur in more than one article and presents central figures in the news coverage over the analyzed time period.

The Taliban Regime

One prototype example for a Villain type actor in both countries' print media sets after 9/11 is the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, the image of this actor is mainly culturally devaluated (Type 2) and the Taliban are mainly said to be culturally *backward*, *misogynistic*, *conservative*, and *uncivilized*, religiously *fundamentalist*, politically *hostile* towards the West, or politically *repressive* and *undemocratic*. Both countries' images of the Taliban distance the regime by describing it as politically and culturally *isolated*. The SZ writes for instance, that...

Seit 1996 regiert in Afghanistan die international geächtete radikal-islamische Taliban-Miliz. Sie kontrolliert inzwischen etwa 90 Prozent des Landes. (SZ-01-08-08: 8)

...and the NY TIMES mentions that...

The three countries [USA, Australia, Germany] do not maintain embassies in Afghanistan because they do not recognize the Taliban government, which seized Kabul in 1996 and imposed a puritanical brand of Islamic law. (NYT-01-08-12: 15)

This isolation is not only seen with regard to the West but also with regard to other Arab and Muslim countries, as the quote from the German SZ mentions:

Mit ihrer Auslegung des Islam, die in der muslimischen Welt weithin abgelehnt wird, wollen die Taliban Afghanistan zu einem Gottesstaat machen. (SZ-01-08-08: 8)

Another SZ article talks about the Taliban as "a regime that is seen as reprehensible from a Western perspective but also from a moderate Islamic perspective."³² Especially in German newspapers, these negative cultural facets have to be embedded in the context of the Shelter Now affair. The seriousness of this issue is demonstrated mainly by the cultural otherness of the Taliban and the threat that this otherness causes for the imprisoned German citizens. This perceived threat is expressed for example in a quote from BILD which asks:

Tun sie es wirklich? Steinigen die fanatischen Taliban-Krieger in Afghanistan die vier inhaftierten Deutschen (drei Frauen aus Niedersachsen, ein Mann aus Bayern)? (Bild-01-08-08: 7)

³² Own translation, original quote in German: "ein aus westlicher und auch aus gemässigt islamischer Sicht verwerfliches Regime." (SZ-01-08-08: 4).

But especially after 9/11, the Taliban regime becomes one of THE central actors that both countries' newspapers focus on. This is largely due to the fact that in the context of the prosecution of Osama bin Laden the Taliban regime also becomes the focus of attention as a host of bin Laden.³³ In both German and U.S. newspapers this connection leads to an image of the Taliban that portrays them as a key *supporter* of *terrorism* even though the regime might try to distance itself from terror attacks and bin Laden after 9/11, as USA TODAY indicates in the following quote:

Taliban officials have condemned the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and insist bin Laden could not have been involved. [...] In fact, the Taliban has tried to separate itself from bin Laden, saying it does not support terrorism. But analysts say the militia's basic views mirror those of bin Laden and his terrorist cell: that Western democracy, and the United States in particular, is a threat to the purity of Islam. (USAT-01-09-13: 8Ac)

Besides this new facet, the image of the Taliban in both countries is still shaped by the cultural criteria listed above. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL continues to talk of the "medieval rule of the Taliban,"³⁴ and refers to them as the "fundamentalist devil."³⁵ Similar to that, the U.S. NEWSWEEK continues to point out that besides their *support for terror*, the cultural *backwardness* of these "bad guys"³⁶ is still one of the central features of the regime. And USA TODAY argues:

But it is not just the Taliban's decision to harbor bin Laden that has isolated it from the world. A series of edicts to the Afghan people, based on what Taliban officials see as a strict reading of Islamic law, has drawn international ire. [...] Women have been forbidden from working, even for United Nations relief agencies, and must be covered from head to toe when outside their homes. Women also face health care restrictions. (USAT-01-09-13: 8Ac)

In addition to that, we now also find a stronger focus on personal features and devaluation on the personal dimension. In the German SZ, for instance, we find references to the emotional state of the regime...

Die afghanischen Taliban, denen man einen unmittelbaren Bezug zur archaischen Gefuehlswelt unterstellen darf [...]. (SZ-01-09-13: 15)

...or, in another context, a cultural reference to the Taliban as "Islamic barefoot warriors."³⁷ And the NY TIMES devaluates the regime's educational level by writing:

The average talib, educated in a religious school, can quote passages from the Koran, but it is a good bet that he will not know which countries fought in World War II, that man has landed on the moon, that not all Jews live in Israel. (NYT-01-09-19: 6)

But especially the *violent* dimension of the actor is now explicitly highlighted and put to the fore. The SZ, for example, points out...

Jene fuer den Westen so schockierenden Praktiken der Taliban-Regierung wie die Blutrache gegen andere Muslime oder die Behandlung von Frauen [...] (SZ-01-09-17: 16c).

³³ In fact, we already find this information in a NY TIMES article before the attacks where it says: "[T]he United Nations has imposed economic sanctions, insisting that Afghanistan no longer play host to the accused terrorist Osama bin Laden" (NYT-01-09-07: 1).

³⁴ Own translation, original quote in German: "Die mittelalterliche Herrschaft der Taliban" (Sp-01-i41: 128).

³⁵ Own translation, original quote in German: "dem fundamentalistischen Teufel" (Sp-01-i39: 14).

³⁶ NW-01-v138-i15: 30

³⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: "islamischen Barfusskrieger" (SZ-01-10-1: 5b).

Furthermore, and especially in the U.S. newspapers, we also learn about the *drugs trade* as one central economic source for the regime, or are frequently informed about the *dilapidated infrastructure* and *poverty* that is caused by the political rule of the Taliban (see Type 4). It can be said that altogether, both countries' media images of the Taliban after 9/11 draw a demarcation line between a developed and progressive self-concept and the cultural, political, social, economic, and personal *underdevelopment* and *backwardness* of the Taliban regime. This difference is not only regarded as negative for the population of Afghanistan but also as one of the central roots for the growth of Islamic terrorism and the threat for the Western world that results from this development. The 9/11 attacks are thereby taken as the perfect proof for this perception.

Before the attacks, the living conditions of the Afghan people under the Taliban were only of minor importance, and were only perceived as relevant for German or Western contexts insofar as German or Western aid workers were threatened in Afghanistan. Now, and due to the perceived threat that the attacks created, the scope and the influence of the regime are regarded as much wider and seem to reach to the boundaries of the Western Self. As BILD writes:

Nie zuvor sah Afghanistan ein derart brutales Regime von Stammeskriegern, die Frauen die Ausbildung untersagen, Kunst, Musik und Tanz als Teufelswerk verbieten, Ehebrecherinnen im Fussball-Stadion erschießen oder steinigen. (Bild-01-09-15: 5c)

Similar to that, an article in USA TODAY evaluates the regime as follows:

Their edicts – forbidding women to attend school, banning everything from makeup to kite flying – are infamous. So are their punishments, ranging from amputation to public stoning. In five years, Afghanistan's ruling Taliban militia has become one of the best-known and most-hated regimes in the world. (USAT-01-09-21: 1Ac)

Therefore the image of the Taliban reaches a new and much more negative level than before 9/11. On all dimensions of actor characterization, negative features are emphasized that form an image that can be regarded as the anti-image to everything that the Self regards as central and achievable in the own concept of belonging.

Osama bin Laden – The “Wealthy Saudi”³⁸ and Terror Symbol

The second prototype for a villain construction of Arab and Muslim actors is the portrayal of Osama bin Laden in German and U.S. newspapers after 9/11. Even though bin Laden is almost non-existent in the news coverage before the attacks, he becomes one of the central actors after 9/11. Before the attacks, his image can basically be summarized as that of a one-dimensional terrorist actor of Type 1 that the NY TIMES refers to as “Osama bin Laden, the militant who the United States says plotted the bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.”³⁹ After the attacks, this rather simple image becomes more complex, but it maintains its overall negativity. This negativity is mainly outlined on the political dimension, where his role as the leader of a global terror network and his fight against political actors like the Russian military in Afghanistan or the Saudi Arabian government is mentioned. In the German and U.S.

³⁸ NW-01-v138-i13: 44

newspapers the Villain type status of bin Laden can be especially exemplified with articles that refer to him as the “most dangerous international terrorist,”⁴⁰ and label him as “Public Enemy No. 1”⁴¹ or as “America's most-wanted man.”⁴² This title almost seems to stylize the actor as a “symbolic” leading villain figure and the phrase “Public Enemy No. 1” thereby picks up the already mentioned verbal construction of “a monumental struggle between good and evil,”⁴³ which would place bin Laden as one central representative of this *evil*.

Besides this focus on political and terrorist facets, bin Laden is also devaluated culturally, personally, and with regard to economic features. In the cultural dimension, articles mention, for instance, that he has more than one wife, an aspect that is legally forbidden in Germany and the United States and that, moreover, reveals facets of the classical Oriental image of the harem and the idea that polygamy is a traditional institution in Arab and Muslim countries. Personally, bin Laden's *charismatic* appearance is explicitly contrasted with his *hostile terrorist* activities to indicate how his *charisma* and his positive appearance have helped him to convince others of his political ideas. In an article about the actors, NEWSWEEK writes for instance that...

Osama bin Laden likes to pose with an AK-47, yet he seems a bit awkward with a gun. He's a thin reed of a man – roughly 6 feet 5 and just 160 pounds, according to FBI Wanted posters – soft-spoken, languid in his movements, almost effeminate. His eyes twinkle. His immense charisma, in fact, derives not simply from his capacity for violence, but for the gentle manner in which he comports himself. (NW-01-v138-i13: 44)

And finally, on the economic dimension both countries' articles emphasize the financial *wealth* of bin Laden, for instance in the following quote from NEWSWEEK:

Osama bin Laden, their spiritual leader and financier, comes from a privileged background himself. One of more than 50 children of Yemeni billionaire parents who got rich off construction contracts in Saudi Arabia, Osama, for a time, made money on those most Western of beverages, Coke and Pepsi. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26)

However, and as is indicated in this quote, especially the American newspapers emphasize that even though he is a “the Saudi multimillionaire,”⁴⁴ this positive aspect has to be evaluated as negative since with this money he *finances terrorist activities*. But even though both countries' media draw such negative villain images of bin Laden or the Taliban, it is also emphasized continually that even this *evil* actor cannot or must not destroy the Western principles and identity. Thus, DER SPIEGEL also explicitly says that:

Wir werden unsere Art zu leben nicht ändern. Und erst recht nicht, wenn uns ein paar mittelalterliche Fundamentalisten, die ihre Frauen verschleiern und zu Hause einsperren und die auf ihren Videorecordern zu viele Schwarzenegger-Filme gesehen haben, dazu zwingen wollen. (Sp-01-i38: 146)

In some articles these suggestions also include solutions for the Self on how to disarm those villain actors and it is explicitly emphasized that the Self will not surrender but regards the own

³⁹ NYT-01-07-31: 11

⁴⁰ NYT-01-09-13: 26

⁴¹ NW-01-v138-i14: 38

⁴² NW-01-v138-i13: 36

⁴³ NYT-01-09-13: 1c

⁴⁴ NYT-01-09-13: 18b

Western life style, standards and group as stronger and more desirable. USA TODAY summarizes this perspective as follows:

Islamic fundamentalists don't want America to change; they want America to die. That's why they strike out with no goals in mind, with no lists of demands, with no suggestions of how and when they and their colleagues might be placated. In responding to such unfocused but ferocious hatred, we must provide a demonstration of moral combat, pursued with clearly articulated purposes and with levels of force commensurate to achieving them. (USAT-01-10-03: 13A)

Therefore we can say that it is these leading villains that enable the Self to most effectively draw the dividing line between the self-concept and those principles, characteristics, and views that are rejected in this concept. The images of Villain type actors thereby integrate (nearly) all dimensions on which actor features have been grouped, and can thus be seen as the most complex and most distant portrayal of the Other in the context of the analyzed print media. Following the findings of Artz and Pollock (1995) for the *uncivilized* and *irrational barbarian* image of Saddam Hussein in the context of the Gulf War in 1991, the actions and motives of these villain actors could be interpreted as being completely outside of the realm of normal behavior, and they do not understand or accept the basic rules of normal behavior. As Artz and Pollock (1995) noted for the timeframe before 9/11, Villain type actors usually present no threat to the West, which changes, however, when they come to power or should use their power to act against the Self, because then they become dangerous for the West. The Taliban regime present a good example here. Being mainly devaluated before 9/11 for their cultural *backwardness*, the regime after 9/11 becomes one of the central Villain type actors in both German and U.S. articles because it supports and harbors Osama bin Laden who, for his part, has attacked the West.

Summary: The Devaluated Other

To sum up the first level of difference, it can be said that the largest distance between Self and Other is created by devaluating the features of Arab and Muslim actors. The images of those devaluated actors possess features that are mainly rejected by the Self or that are not up to the Western standards that the German or American Self regards as crucial for its own national or even transnational concept of belonging. The devaluated Other therefore can be seen as the negative counterpart to the self-image, i.e. as everything that the Self defines as deviant from its own standard.

As the preceding subchapter has outlined, actors in both countries' analyzed newspapers are thereby devaluated in six different ways that can be summarized in six different types of devaluated actors. On a quantitative level, the devaluation of political, violent, delinquent, and cultural features is most significant in U.S. and German print media articles around 9/11.

Quantitatively, thereby the most relevant actors are the gunmen, terrorists, and *hostile* politicians who make up one third of all devaluated actors⁴⁵.

On a qualitative level, Villain type actors present the most significant form of actor devaluation. Villains receive negatively features in (nearly) all the dimensions of character and the images of these actors can be seen as the most complex and also the clearest construction of distance between a *good* Self and an *evil* Other in the context of the analyzed print media. Compared to the other negative actor types whose representatives are often not necessarily central for an article and can also appear only once or as one example among many others in the respective articles, Villain type actors are mostly central for an article or dominate the discourses on certain topics or events. However, in both countries this actor type cannot not be found in the timeframe before the 9/11 attacks. The main explanation that was given here was that the villain is mainly used to openly construct the negative counterpart in a conflict or situation that seems to threaten in-group identity and it is argued here that such conflicts or events did not appear in the phase before the event.

One observed difference between German and U.S. newspapers is the quantitatively more frequently occurring portrayal of culturally devaluated actors (Type 2). This differing quantitative relevance of Type 2 actors further supports the observation of previous chapters that the German perception of Arab and Muslim actors is shaped by a stronger (quantitative) focus on the dimension of cultural difference as an element of demarcating Self from Other than the American perception.

However, besides the negative imaging of Arab and Muslim actors, both countries' newspapers also reveal other forms of images of Arab and Muslim actors that, for instance, include features and facets that cannot simply be classified as non-Western. The images of those actors cannot as easily be classified as completely different from the German or American self-concept that is communicated in the different articles. Whereas the devaluation of the Other fathoms the negative dimensions and facets of the Other, other forms of difference construction also integrate similarities and the interplay between the Arab and Muslim Other and the Western Self, as will be outlined, for instance, in the next subchapter.

⁴⁵ Again, Hashem (1995) comes to similar results in his study. His analysis of the two American news magazines TIME and NEWSWEEK reveals that the news coverage of Arabs between 1990 and 1993 is mostly negative. In most cases, he reports, the magazines focus on attacks, crises, invasions, kidnappings, killings, or wars – which could be compared with our finding that the largest group of actors in German and U.S. news media before 9/11 is devaluated as *violent* and *hostile*, and occurs in the same contexts as have been listed by Hashem (1995: 154-161).

3. Level 2: The *Weak Other*

The second level of difference that has been identified in the images of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media can be derived from images that show a certain degree of similarity to the Self. On this second level, the difference between the self-concept and similar Arabs and Muslims is constructed by weakening these actors, either by weakening their similar features or by weakening the whole actor. Each way is represented by one actor type; those two actor types are summarized in Table VI.2 and will be described in the following two sections.

Table VI.2: The *Weak Other* – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance⁴⁶

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Type 7: The Victim	20.2	24.1	10.8	9.6
Type 8: The Weakened Similar Other	6.6	10.8	9.3	10.6

3.1. Type 7: The Victim

The first actor type that can be formed here comprises portrayals of external Arab and Muslim actors as victims. Portraying these actors as victims could as well be seen as another form of actor portrayal that devaluates features and certain aspects of the Other. However, in the case of the Victim type, this devaluation takes place without the devaluation of the respective actors. Victim type actors are mostly combined with negative features, they appear in the context of negative circumstances and situations, or they occur with other actors who inherit those negative features or are responsible for the depicted situations and who are therefore, directly or indirectly, also responsible for the victim status of Type 7 actors. Thus, in a way, Victim type actors can be seen as supporting actors for the images of those actors who are actually devaluated.

Furthermore, and with regard to the evaluation pattern of Western principles that the Self is assumed to apply to the Other, we can also say that the Victim type can be interpreted as the living illustration of the consequences that result from a lack of Western standards and principles in Arab and Muslim societies. The situations or problems of Type 7 actors reflect the deficiencies that are caused by a lack of democratic structures, freedom, or economic progress, and by political misgovernment.

Therefore, on the one hand, the images of those Type 7 actors are not solely negative since those actors are only the victims of negative features and actions. On the other hand, the images are not very similar to the Self either. Overlap with the German or American Self could – when viewed from outside – merely be seen with regard to one aspect: both the observing Self and the victim disapprove of the lack of Western standards, the latter mainly because they have to face and bear the political, social, or other consequences that result from this lack of progress,

⁴⁶ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

democracy etc. Some Victim type actors “flee” from this negativity. Especially after the attacks, this group of refugees comes to the fore, in particular in the context of the communicated argument of humanitarian relevance that is put forward in support of a political-military intervention in Afghanistan.

To illustrate the actor type more clearly we will take a closer look at the different ways in which actors become victims in the context of the analyzed newspaper articles. In German and U.S. print media the negative conditions that victim actors have to face are manifold and pick up again some of the major facets of the Other that have been outlined before.

Victims of Violence and Terror

The largest number of actors of Type 7 is portrayed as victims of violence, violent assaults, or terrorist attacks, or has to live in contexts of ongoing military or other violent conflicts. Especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we find a number of Palestinian actors who suffer from the everyday violence that is covered in the German and U.S. news, before as well as after 9/11. In a large number of these articles in both countries, victim actors appear together with *violent* and *hostile* Type 1 actors (see VI.2.1). In these contexts, Victim type actors present the object against which the violence of Type 1 actors is directed, as can be illustrated by a quote from the NY TIMES:

On both sides, victims have been ample, including a 3-month-old Palestinian boy, who may be the youngest victim in a 10-month siege of despair in which other infants have been killed. (NYT-01-07-21: 1)

A similar situation is reported on in the SZ...

In der Nacht zum Montag drangen israelische Panzer voruebergehend in palaestinensische Abschnitte der geteilten Stadt Hebron im Westjordanland ein. Nach Krankenhausangaben wurden dabei fuenf Palaestinenser verletzt. (SZ-01-07-17: 8b)

...as well as in BILD which reports on another Palestinian child killed in the conflict:

Dort ein totes Palästiner-Mädchen (8). Es wurde am Sonntag in einem Gefecht zwischen palästinerischen Heckenschützen und israelischen Soldaten versehentlich getroffen. (Bild-01-08-14: 2)

As the examples show, these Victim type actors remain as anonymous and one-dimensional as the Type 1 actors, apart from a few exceptions (like in the quoted BILD article). This form of occurrence remains largely the same after 9/11. The SZ summarizes the Palestinian victims of the violence in Palestine by simply saying that...

Seit Beginn der israelischen Offensive im Westjordanland vor einer Woche wurden mindestens 17 Palaestinenser getoetet. (SZ-01-09-15: 11)

...without going into much detail about the personal details of the mentioned victims. Compared to that, slightly more information is provided in the NY TIMES which writes...

But war and the need to live a normal life still mixed. Even amid gunfire, Emmad Najar, 28, went shopping this morning with his three young sons in Rafah. The boys were talking about

lunch, then a bullet struck their father in the forehead, several hundred yards from the fighting. (NYT-01-09-29: 5)

But victims of violence and terrorist attacks are not only found among Palestinian private actors; they appear in the context of other conflicts and violent assaults as well. The NY TIMES, for example, reports on the civilian victims of a terrorist attack in Pakistan, where...

A powerful bomb ripped through a school van in the eastern province of Punjab today, killing at least seven people, including a husband and wife and their three sons, the police said. Seven others, mostly children, were wounded. (NYT-01-08-12: 15)

And DER SPIEGEL publishes an article that deals with torture in Turkey where we learn that:

Für die moderne junge Frau aus der Mittelschicht, die Missbrauch und Folter bis dahin nur aus Büchern und Filmen kannte, wurden es zehn Tage wie aus dem Türkei-Schocker "Midnight Express" des Regisseurs Alan Parker. (Sp-01-i32: 127)

After 9/11, and the geographical shift of focus to countries like Afghanistan that accompanies it, we find a more frequent portrayal of victims of violence of Afghan origin. USA TODAY, for example, reports on the living conditions of the Afghan population, and here especially the women, under the rule of the Taliban regime. In an article it is said that...

With school and work forbidden, women are unable to leave home unless accompanied by a man, and are beaten, even killed, for infractions of Taliban law. (USAT-01-09-27: 2d)

Political Victims in U.S. Newspapers

Besides those victims of *violence, torture, or terrorist* attacks we also find other victims in both countries' analyzed print media, even though these other forms of Victim type actors occur less often. For instance, actors can also appear as victims of political structures or decisions, or they suffer from political conflicts either within Arab and Muslim countries or with the West. U.S. newspapers also frequently focus on these political victims. In the NY TIMES, for example, the populations of several former Russian republics are described as victims of their political regimes, since...

The people of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have always lived under despots. Their history is so dismal that Communism for them was a time of relative prosperity. Now, 10 years after they became independent nations, they have once again become sultanates, ruled by tyrants who maintain tight control of political and economic activity. (NYT-01-08-16: 22)

In another article in the newspaper, the politically instable and conflict-laden situation in Iran is discussed, and in this context the Iranian people are regarded as victims of this situation:

In 1971, Iran was just beginning to grow rich off oil and the population was less than half the current 70 million. Since the revolution, per capita income has sunk to \$150 from \$600, and Iranians suffered through a nearly decade-long war with Iraq and two decades of almost constant political upheaval. (NYT-01-09-07: 4)

But political victims are not mentioned only before 9/11. A NY TIMES article picks up the story again about the fate of over six hundred Kuwaiti civilians who were arrested and sent to prison in Iraq during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and have disappeared. As the NY TIMES writes,

these civilians, and the Kuwaiti population in general, can be regarded as a victim of *hostile* Iraqi politics in this conflict:

Most of them were civilians who refused to cooperate with the occupying Iraqi forces. More than 120 were students, 50 were teenagers and three were nurses whose crime was to have treated wounded Kuwaitis. [...] Kuwait has succeeded in rebuilding its torched and looted capital city since the seven-month Iraqi occupation, which ended in February, 1991. It has restored its oilfields that were set on fire by the departing Iraqis and rid the Persian Gulf of the enormous oil slick that Mr. Hussein turned loose to try to kill fish and plant life and poison the desalinated water that gulf states depend upon. (NYT-01-10-03: 10)

In all of these examples the political victims are, to a large extent, from the private sector. But especially after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. print media also explicitly reflect upon the connections and interplay between Western foreign policies and the deficits of the political situation that those policies might have led to in Arab or Muslim countries. This perspective comes especially to the fore in articles that focus on the roots of the increased terrorist threat (that the attacks are argued to have revealed). In the United States as a direct victim of the attacks, politicians, experts, and also the mass media expressed their shock about the fact that there are people who reject the Western values and institutions in such a way that they even enter the country to destroy them. The attack on the national territory is thereby seen as a new form of threat for a country that so far has not been the object of any larger form of external aggression and military conflict,⁴⁷ at least not within its own national borders.⁴⁸

In the course of this examination of the causes of the *hostile* motivations of the Other, U.S. articles also look at mistakes that America itself might have made when dealing with Arab and Muslim countries. One cause that is identified here is the idea that Arab and Muslim actors may feel threatened by the first steps of an institutionalization of Western values and standards in their societies. In the NY TIMES we find the following statement:

Such historical allusions may well tap into the widespread sense of siege among many Muslims who see themselves threatened by a modern world dominated by the United States and Western secularism. (NYT-01-10-09: 6c)

Overall however, political victims are mainly seen as being weakened by the political situations within their own national contexts. And even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and political misgovernment to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, the principles and values of the Self are thereby not called

⁴⁷ Apart from single incidents like the Japanese military attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941 that brought the United States into the Second World War. In the aftermath of the 9/11 this incident was frequently referred to as a comparison for the national trauma and the shock to the national feeling of security.

⁴⁸ American citizens, and especially the military, have, of course, been the victims of violent attacks before, but mainly abroad. As Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) argue, the connection of Muslims and Arabs with violence and especially terrorism were magnified by a long series of anti-American terrorist acts. Apart from the internal incident of the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993, examples for terrorist attacks against the U.S. include, for instance, the Iranian hostage crisis (1979-81), the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000, or the attacks against the U.S. diplomatic missions in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 (see also Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 137-138). After the 9/11 attacks, those attacks are frequently mentioned in U.S. articles as examples for the increased terrorist threat for the U.S. Self but also to illustrate the huge impact of the attacks in New York and Washington compared to earlier attacks.

into question. The only thing that might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been conveyed to the Other.

Victims of Social and Economic Conditions

Closely connected to the political sphere are social and economic conditions and situations which affect the populations of Arab or Muslim countries. In the U.S. newspapers, for example, the Palestinian population is – among other aspects – seen also as being socially and economically affected by on-going *political* and *violent conflict* with Israel. USA TODAY writes for instance:

The closures also have devastated the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza. More than 100,000 people have been blocked from getting to their jobs in Israel. And local farmers and merchants such as Abu Aysheh have been prevented from using tractors and cars to harvest and distribute their produce. (USAT-01-09-07: 6A)

Other actors suffer from conditions they have to face in the context of *under-developed* economic systems and *poor infrastructure*: From the German SZ we learn about the fate of an Egyptian family that suffers from the bad medical situation in the country:

Ihre Mutter gebar acht Kinder, Fauseia war das juengste. Als die Mutter starb, lautete die offizielle Ursache Kindbettfieber. Doch letztlich waren die unhygienischen Verhaeltnisse schuld, die mangelhafte Ernaehrung – und der Zwang, staendig Kinder gebaeren zu muessen. (SZ-01-07-17: 3)

And in yet another case, the NY TIMES discusses the social and economic problems in Turkish society and here specifically highlights the problem of poverty among the Turkish population that the newspaper attributes to a mixture of cultural traditions and structural changes in Turkish society:

“Turks live more intimately than people in the United States,” said Faruk Birtek, chairman of the sociology department at Bosphorus University. “The poor are much more visible because they live around the corner.” [...] Ostentatious displays of wealth were once taboo in Turkey, so the differences were less obvious. Close-knit families also served as a safety net and psychological buffer against poverty. But many people left extended families behind when they moved to Istanbul, and the grinding poverty has brought new strains. [...] Distrust of the government is high. If elections were held today, no established party, including the three that make up the current government, would get enough votes to sit in Parliament, according to a recent nationwide poll. “You have extreme lack of trust in the state about anything getting better, and the economic insecurity for an overwhelming majority of society,” said Hale Boratav, chairman of the psychology department at Istanbul’s Bilgi University. “It’s hard for people to be optimistic.” (NYT-01-07-21: 4)

Especially after 9/11 we also find contexts in both countries’ newspapers in which actors are seen as indirect victims of Western behavior. An article in USA TODAY, for instance, mentions that the economic problems that the Iraqi people currently have to face are also a consequence of American foreign policy:⁴⁹

The long-distance missile strikes on Iraq, in particular, have caused resentment. “President Bush calls [the] attacks on the United States cowardly, but from the Mid-East viewpoint

⁴⁹ Currently refers here to the timeframe of the analysis of course, but as we know, this self-criticism will become even more relevant two years later with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 that – is also carried out by the U.S. administration under the mission to bring democracy and progress to the country.

surgical long distance bombing is cowardly,” says Mary Kaldor of the London School of Economics. To many Iraqis, the death of civilians and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure, from bombing during the 1991 Gulf War and attacks since then – as well as from economic sanctions by Western countries – constitute terrorism. “It’s not just that Muslims are offended. They are humiliated by American policy,” Falk [professor of international law at Princeton University] says. (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

The consequence is that “nourishing these grievances are extremist, fundamentalist groups such as bin Laden’s.”⁵⁰ This critical observation about U.S. behavior can also be found in some German articles after 9/11. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, writes that:

Die USA dehnen ihre Macht bis in den letzten Winkel der Erde aus und zwingen entlegenen Völkern ihr Wirtschaftssystem auf. Ohne Rücksicht auf Schäden, die sie damit anrichten. Selbst unsere Bündnisstaaten aus den Zeiten des Kalten Kriegs behandeln wir noch immer wie Protektorate. (Sp-01-i38: 164)

And the SZ also broadens this criticism to the European Self:

Die Todesflieger von New York und Washington waren auch das Produkt von Jahrzehnten einäugiger Nahostpolitik der USA, von europäischer Resignation, von beispielloser Nachsicht der Weltmeinung fuer die dauernde Verletzung der Wuerde und des Lebensrechtes vieler Millionen. Es gibt eine Milliarde Muslime auf Erden. Die Mehrzahl ist arm und ohne Perspektiven. (SZ-01-09-27: 24)

Victims of Cultural Conditions

Finally, Victim type actors also face cultural discrimination or are confronted with cultural rules and *conservative* values that suppress peoples’ life styles or choices. In the NY TIMES, for example, an article looks at homosexuals in Egypt who face a legal trial because of their sexuality:

In a high-profile crackdown on suspected homosexual activity that has been condemned by some legal activists and human rights groups, 52 men were charged today in a state security court with engaging in immoral acts or religious offenses. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b)

But not only is their sexuality regarded as deviant and therefore criminal in Egypt, they are also reported to have been humiliated psychologically as well as physically since...

Lawyers and human rights groups said the accused had undergone humiliating medical examinations in prison to determine whether they had recently engaged in anal intercourse. In addition, they said, the men were apparently beaten until they confessed to having a preference for homosexual acts. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b)

And in yet another article, the Iranian youth is said to suffer under the rigid and strict conservative rule of the country’s conservative religious leaders. The newspaper writes:

Iran’s young people and women, who have been among the reform movement’s strongest and most loyal supporters, have keenly felt the pressure of the Islamic morals police intruding on their daily lives. (NYT-01-08-10: 18)

In Germany, BILD reports on a woman in Nigeria who faces a strict enforcement of Islamic Sharia law:

Ein islamischer Gerichtshof in der Provinz Zamfara (Nigeria) hat eine Frau (20) zu 100 Peitschenhieben verurteilt. Grund: Sie soll eine sexuelle Affäre mit einem verheirateten Mann

⁵⁰ USAT-01-09-19: 1A

gehabt haben. Das Opfer soll in der Öffentlichkeit mit dem Rohrstock geschlagen werden (Bild-01-08-14: 12)

In this quote we not only learn about the physical consequences of this form of jurisdiction but are also informed about the cultural rules that this woman has violated. In another article in BILD, we are informed about the fate of a Saudi Arabian girl who tried to commit suicide after being forced into a marriage. Here, the tabloid writes:

Ein Mädchen (16) hat im Süden von Saudi-Arabien versucht, sich in einem Brunnen zu ertränken, weil sein Vater es gegen seinen Willen mit einem impotenten Greis verheiratet hatte. Dem Mädchen war es zwar einige Monate nach der Hochzeit gelungen, den 90 Jahre alten Ehemann zur Scheidung zu bewegen. Bei ihrer Rückkehr ins Elternhaus wurde die Geschiedene jedoch vom Vater mit wütenden Beschimpfungen empfangen. Verzweifelt lief sie zu dem nahe gelegenen Brunnen, doch ihre Mutter verhinderte den Selbstmord in letzter Minute. (Bild-01-08-20: 14b)

So altogether, actors of Type 7 in both German and U.S. newspapers face a large variety of cultural, political, or other deficits or even oppression in their countries or under their political regimes. Some actors thereby only face negativity on one of those dimensions, whereas others are confronted with it on several dimensions. Before the 9/11 attacks, Type 7 actors form the second largest group after Type 1 actors in both countries' analyzed articles. More than every fifth actor (20.2 %) in Germany and nearly every fourth actor (24.1 %) in the U.S. before 9/11 can be classified as a Victim type actor. After 9/11, this quantitative relevance of victims drops significantly. Compared to the large number of Victim type actors before 9/11, now only 10.8 % of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and only 9.6 % of all actors in U.S. articles can be labeled as victims. Furthermore, the actor type does not have a central role for the different topics and issues discussed either. Most Victim type actors only appear in the context of one or two articles, and can therefore be regarded as supporting actors as well. There are, however, a few victims in the newspapers that occur more than once or twice and are, instead, quite regularly depicted in the context of certain topics. One country where we find all kinds of victims is Afghanistan:

The Afghan Population

Before as well as after the attacks, the Afghan population is one of the actors portrayed regularly in the analyzed newspapers of both countries. The image of the Afghan population combines a number of different negative effects from the deficits that have already been introduced, and thereby exemplifies the lack of Western principles and standards in Afghanistan. The political leadership of the Taliban was never recognized by the West, not only because they took over power without any democratic election, but also because their fundamentalist rules isolated the country and its population more and more from the international arena. The consequences of the strict Islamic laws for the population of the country are an aspect to which Western observers pay a lot of attention, but the social and economic conditions in Afghanistan are also frequently highlighted in German and U.S. newspapers. Before the attacks, DER SPIEGEL writes, for instance:

Dabei braucht Afghanistan dringend Hilfe von außen. Dürreperioden, Hunger und die wohl rigidesten Gesetze der Welt peinigen das 26-Millionen-Volk. (Sp-01-i33: 122)

And the NY TIMES writes in an article on the Shelter Now affair:

Shelter Now is among dozens of aid groups in Afghanistan, a woebegone nation that has suffered 22 straight years of war and four of cataclysmic drought. Nearly one million people have fled their homes during the last year in search of food and water. (NYT-01-08-28: 3b)

The social and economic aspects remain relevant after 9/11 as well and are now communicated in more forthright terms, as can be illustrated with another quote from the NY TIMES:

At the same time, the Afghan people are imprisoned in their own country with no possibility for assistance for many who are starving. (NYT-01-09-23: 7)

The most central reason for the suffering of the Afghan population is thereby seen in the politics of the Taliban regime. As BILD summarizes:

Kein Volk der Welt lebt in schrecklicheren Verhältnissen. Jahrzehntelanger Krieg, Dürre und Hungersnot haben das Land verwüstet, Millionen von Afghanen sind auf der Flucht. (Bild-01-09-17: 4f)

Consequently, in the context of the American plans to invade Afghanistan after 9/11 (see IV.2.2) DER SPIEGEL reports that:

Vorrangiges Ziel soll es dabei sein, die leidende afghanische Bevölkerung von der Taliban-Diktatur zu erlösen. (Sp-01-i39: 148)

Also with reference to those Afghans who fled the region and the ruling regime, both countries' newspapers attribute the motivations of those refugees to the cultural, social and economic conditions and the violence in the country. According to DER SPIEGEL...

Wo sie herkommen, sagen sie, sind die Menschen krank vom Mangel, krank an der Tuberkulose. Kinder sterben, kaum geboren. Sie leiden an Würmern, und die Not schlägt ihnen aufs Augenlicht. Es gibt nicht viel trinkbares Wasser. Keine Arznei. Keine Schulen für Mädchen, keine Arbeit für Frauen. Fernsehgeräte werden öffentlich zerschlagen. Männer bei Freudenfesten gehenkt. (Sp-01-i40: 112)

And USA TODAY introduces the fate of an Afghan doctor who fled to Pakistan due to the upcoming U.S. military operation:

The Afghan doctor and his family now live with his brother, who also is a doctor. [...] Nasim is convinced he would have paid a price if he had been caught leaving. "The Taliban have forbidden me to leave because I'm a doctor. But I have money problems and a large family," he says. But he feels it's his duty to take care of Afghans if they are injured in any conflict. "So I will leave my family and go back soon," he says. (USAT-01-09-25: 6Ab)

But cultural oppression is also frequently mentioned in both countries, as already been described in chapter V.2. In the NY TIMES it is said, for example, that...

In Taliban-ruled areas, girls older than 8 are barred from attending school, women cannot leave home unless accompanied by a male relative and then must be veiled from head to toe, and they are barred from most jobs, among other restrictions. (NYT-01-10-03: 6)

...and that...

With school and work forbidden, women are unable to leave home unless accompanied by a man, and are beaten, even killed, for infractions of Taliban law. (USAT-01-09-27: 2D)

Therefore, the image of the Afghan population has to be seen in combination with the images of the Taliban regime in the analyzed data. Together with those negative images, what can be derived is an implicitly communicated criticism of the situation in Afghanistan and of the lack of Western standards and principles. Even more than that, the focus on the country is also shaped by the idea that the military operation will bring an improvement of the situation in all dimensions. With regard to this improvement, the last quote here is taken from DER SPIEGEL. The article compares the current situation in Afghanistan with an era before the Taliban regime took over power, and thereby may also indicate the future expectations that should result from a possible overthrow of the regime by the Western alliance:

Vor den Straßencafés flanierten junge Frauen in Jeans und Miniröcken, die Restaurants schenkten Bier und Hochprozentiges aus, die Kinos zeigten Actionfilme aus Hollywood oder zuckersüße Erotik-Epen aus Bombay: Kabul, die Hauptstadt Afghanistans, war nicht nur die Traum-Destination Haschisch kiffender Hippies, sondern galt einst unter jungen Muslimen im benachbarten Pakistan wegen der freien Sitten als geschätzte Hochburg des Liberalismus. (Sp-01-i40: 166)

We can sum up this section by saying that the images of victims are manifold, and that Victim type actors not only have to face *violent* behavior or *violent* conflicts like in Israel and Palestine, but they also suffer from *repressive* regimes like the Taliban, from cultural *conservatism* like in Iran, or from social and economic problems like *not education, bad infrastructure, poverty* and *drug addiction* as in Afghanistan and Iran. In U.S. articles we find a stronger focus on political victims than in the German ones, but in both countries, actors of the Victim type are predominantly private actors of Palestinian origin. Apart from that, other private Victim type actors come from a diversity of national backgrounds like Albania, Bosnia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, or Turkey – to name only a few. U.S. articles thereby also see whole populations of diverse other countries like Iran or former Russian republics like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan as victims, either of their *undemocratic* regimes or of the social and economic situations and cultural norms (or the lack of Western cultural and economic standards) in the respective countries.

After the attacks, the Victim type remains the third most frequently occurring form of actor portrayal even though its quantitative proportion decreases significantly compared to some of the types of devaluation (see VI.2). It is still represented predominantly by private actors, but those actors now come from a different geographical background. Besides the Palestinian victims that are still quantitatively relevant, both countries' print media now also frequently report on private actors from Afghanistan as political, cultural, social or economic victims. Afghan victims are accompanied by actors like the Macedonian Albanians, the Algerian Berbers, or actors from countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, or Pakistan who are portrayed as victims of *cruel, undemocratic, and terror-supporting* regimes.

Actors of Type 7 could be mainly regarded as a constructed victim background for the different articles against which the negativity of the respective governments and political elite can be displayed. In a way, those actors form a warning image. They illustrate the reasons why the Other should become more like the Self, i.e. why it should institutionalize Western principles and adopt Western values because the situation of those victims shows what happens without those

standards. At the same time, the difference between the Self and the weak Other is also constructed at this point by implicitly communicating that due to the lack of Western standards and achievements in Arab and Muslim countries, the Self is better off than the Other. The concept of the Victim type Other therefore can still be regarded as solely different from the German or U.S. self-concept.

This is slightly different with the second form of weak images of Arabs and Muslims that can be identified in both countries' newspapers for the analyzed timeframe:

3.2. Type 8: The Weakened *Western-Oriented* Other

What distinguishes the Victim type actors from the second type in this category of the actor typology is that with the former Type 7, the whole actor as one entity is described as *weak* because he or she is made a victim by other (negative) Arab and Muslim actors or, as has also been indicated, by the Self. Compared to that, in the images of Type 8 actors, only individual features are weakened, either by other features or by the circumstances in which those actors appear.

First and foremost, it has to be noted that the images of Type 8 actors – compared to the Victim type actors – show a certain degree of similarity with the Self, as these portrayals include features that are also central for the self-concept of belonging. In both countries' newspapers, actors of this type are described, for example, as *pro-western*, *reform-oriented*, *moderate*, *peaceful*, or *compassionate*, which means that they possess features that are judged positively by the Self as they reflect the Western principles that the Self promotes. Some of these actors could be labeled as “dissidents,” as they take oppositional positions with regard to a wide range of issues. These actors can, for instance, oppose *undemocratic* structures, *conservative* and *fundamentalist* traditions, or *terrorism* and *violent* conflicts. Others speak out against or actively combat *corruption*, *violence*, or *terrorism*.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Type 8 actors become indistinguishable from the Self. What also characterizes their images is that, for example, an actor who is described as politically *pro-western* and *moderate* can at the same time be described as politically *weak* or *powerless*. One example of this kind can be found in the NY TIMES where an Iranian filmmaker is described as follows:

The filmmaker, Tahmineh Milani, 41, was the first prominent liberal intellectual detained this year. Her arrest and the charges against her were widely seen as another attack on President Mohammad Khatami and his efforts to use his second term to expand personal freedom and democracy in Iran. [...] In her film, a love story, Ms. Milani throws a sympathetic light on leftist students who contributed to the victory of the 1979 revolution but were later jailed or executed by the Islamic authorities. (NYT-01-09-01: 2)

As the quote shows, the politically *moderate* views of the filmmaker are of little help to her as it leads to political suppression by the conservative forces of the country. What results from this suppression is that the actor is not able to fully realize her attempts to communicate her *liberal* views.

In another article, the SZ looks at emancipated female journalists in Arab and Muslim countries. The newspaper describes the example of the Palestinian journalist who is described as emancipated and independent in her job but is on the other hand also weakened in those features by the fact that her visual appearance is described as *traditional*. In this context, the article indirectly compares the actor with the Western concept of emancipation:

Mit der Stimme am Telefon assoziierte die Pressesprecherin, die heute diese Rezension schreibt, sofort den Typ der modernen Palaestinerin: im Westen ausgebildet, Jeans und offen getragene Haare. Welche Ueberraschung, als diese Journalistin eines Tages vor ihr stand: in traditionellem Gewand, Haupt und Haar von einem Schal bedeckt, gehuellt in einen knoehellangen Mantel. Von wegen, professionelle und emanzipierte Frauen in islamisch gepraeigten Laendern koennen nur saekular sein! (SZ-01-08-20: 11)

Despite her Western education and emancipated views, she still has to be differentiated from the “Western” concept of an *emancipated* woman. Furthermore, we learn that emancipated Arab and Muslim journalists distance themselves from Western feminist positions:

Emanzipierte Journalistinnen, wie etwa die parlamentarische Vizepraesidentin Massoumeh Ebtekar, grenzen sich vom westlichen Feminismus deutlich ab: Sie halten ihn weder fuer erstrebenswert, noch fuer uebertragbar auf die iranische Gesellschaft. Stattdessen fordern sie einen reformierten Islam, der Demokratie, soziale Gerechtigkeit, freie Meinungsaeusserung, individuelle und buergerliche Rechte bietet. (SZ-01-08-20: 11)

Therefore, even though those actors also support and demand Western principles for their societies, they are, at the same time, implicitly weakened in their positions by having culturally *conservative non-secular views* and a visual appearance that indicates a persisting otherness despite the increasing similarity with the Western self-conception. These actors explicitly distance themselves from the West and Western standards.

Due to the fact that this actor type to a large extent concentrates on political features as well as on attitudes of actors towards violence and terror, in both German and U.S. articles the major representatives of Type 8 are political actors. Before 9/11, in the U.S. newspapers the images of the nation states and governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also of private actors from Israel and Saudi Arabia, or of the military of Indonesia are weakened in the political dimension.

Yassir Arafat in German Newspapers

In the analyzed German print media before the attacks, the Palestinian president Yassir Arafat can serve as a prototype example for Type 8. In DER SPIEGEL, Arafat is described, for instance, as follows:

Arafat hingegen könnte noch so guten Willens sein, es gibt genug Selbstmordattentäter, die das Land unsicher machen. [...] Arafat, auch er nicht mehr der Jüngste und Gesundeste, hat so gut wie keinen Einfluß auf radikale Gruppen, in deren Mitte sich immer ein Kamikaze-Attentäter finden wird. (Sp-01-i35: 35)

Similarly, the SZ also argues that even though Arafat might have positive ambitions to fight terrorist groups in the Palestinian territories and stop the violent conflict with Israel, he is actually too *weak* to enforce his political aims:

Dem Palaestinenserpraesidenten schwinden zunehmend die Mittel, die Intifada im Zaum zu halten und seine Machtbasis zu sichern. [...] Seine mehrmaligen Appelle zum Stopp der Angriffe auf juedische Siedlungen mit Moersergranaten sind ungehoert verhallt. (SZ-01-08-06: 6b)

Even though the Palestinian leader continuously speaks up against violent rioting and terror attacks in the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian territories and Israel, he is weakened by the fact that he no longer seems to have the political will and power, or the physical ability to do so.

The Reform-Oriented but Powerless Iranian President

In both German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11, the images of the Iranian parliament under the rule of the Iranian president Mohammed Khatami can be regarded as a second prototype example for the weakening of positive political features. On the one hand, both countries' newspapers construct the Iranian parliament and the president as *moderate*, *reform-oriented*, and therefore oriented towards Western political standards. The German SZ writes, for example, that...

Der als moderat geltende Chatami wurde im Juni mit 77 Prozent der Stimmen wiedergewaehlt. (SZ-01-08-06: 1b)

Similarly, NEWSWEEK reports:

But the government of reformist President Mohammed Khatami, first elected in 1997, was supposed to end all that. Khatami promised more freedoms and an end to the regime's own lawlessness. (NW-01-v138-i08: 28)

On the other hand, those positive features are weakened by the observation that the president and the Iranian parliament *lack* the political *influence* and power to carry out most of their reform attempts under the *powerful* rule of the conservative Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei. The SZ notes, for instance:

Doch der Praesident bleibt vorsichtig, wie immer. Chatami will nicht die Orthodoxie herausfordern, die ihm erst vor wenigen Tagen die Zaehne gezeigt hatte. (SZ-01-08-14: 4)

...and NEWSWEEK mentions:

But Khatami, despite his landslide re-election in June, has looked ever weaker in battles with hard-liners. (NW-01-v138-i08: 28)

Thus, the positive ambitions of the Iranian parliament and president, who are also regarded as *western-oriented*, are weakened and are said to cause internal political conflicts with a political opponent – the religious conservative forces – that is more powerful.⁵¹ On the one hand, this image implicitly reflects a certain degree of approval and support from the observing German and U.S. Self for the ambitions of parliament and the president to institutionalize Western

⁵¹ Again, Hashem's study (1995) emphasizes that in TIME and NEWSWEEK between 1990 and 1993, we find *moderate*, *pro-western*, and *reform-oriented* Arab politicians who are weakened by the fact that they are without political influence, and not able to fight corruption, and are confronted with radical forces in the respective countries that weaken them (Hashem 1995: 157).

political standards and carry out reforms. On the other hand, the conflict with the conservative political forces in Iran also allows the Self to criticize their conservative agenda.

The Political Supporters in the "War on Terrorism"

After the 9/11 attacks, Type 8 is predominantly represented by some of those political and other actors who offer their help in the "war on terrorism." In German newspapers after the 9/11 attacks, actors such as representatives of the Arab League, or the Iranian president and Ayatollah Khamenei are predominantly weakened with regard to their *pro-western* rhetoric, their expressed condemnation of the attacks and their condolences for the American victims. The SZ for example, reports in one article that...

Ueberraschend positive Signale kamen dabei aus Teheran. Dort verurteilten sowohl die konservativen Geistlichen um Religionsfuehrer Ali Chamenei als auch der gemaessigte Praesident Mohammed Chatami die Anschlaege. Erstmals seit dem Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen vor mehr als 20 Jahren schlossen die Freitagspredigten auf Anweisung Chameneis nicht mehr mit dem Ruf "Tod Amerika". Es gibt Anzeichen dafuer, dass sich Iran bei einem Angriff der USA auf die Taliban und bin Laden in Afghanistan zumindest neutral verhalten wird. (SZ-01-09-19: 1)

However, just one week later the newspaper has quite a different message, namely that...

Iran hat jegliche Unterstuetzung der USA bei der militaerischen Bekaempfung des Terrorismus abgelehnt. Iran werde den Vereingten Staaten und ihren Verbuendeten bei Militaerangriffen gegen Afghanistan "keinerlei Hilfe" leisten, sagte der Geistliche Fuehrer, Ayatollah Ali Chamenei, in einer Rundfunkansprache. (SZ-01-09-27: 5)

Similarly, in U.S. newspapers actors like the late King Hussein of Jordan and Iranian politicians are also weakened despite their politically supportive statements, especially because of their criticism for the West: The NY TIMES, for instance, quotes the Iranian diplomat Mohammad-Javad Zarif who, on the one hand, says...

"The magnitude of this attack has been unprecedented," he said. "It is difficult for the world to comprehend that in a few seconds so many people have been lost. Certainly in Iran we understand the trauma that the American people are suffering and will continue to suffer for many years to come." (NYT-01-10-01: 3)

...but who, on the other hand, also criticizes the United States:

While expressing sympathy for the victims of the attacks, Mr. Zarif criticized statements by Secretary of State Colin L. Powell about Iran's possible inclusion in an American-led coalition. "For Secretary Powell to state that we may be considering whether Iran can be part of the coalition but that Iran has to behave and clean up its act is considered an insult, not a favour," he said. (NYT-01-10-01: 3)

Additionally, and just like in the German SZ, the Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei is quoted in the USA TODAY with his statement of refusal with respect to an Iranian participation in the anti-terror coalition that is said to be due to the country's dislike for Israel:

Khamenei said his country does not support terrorism but cannot be part of any effort led by the United States because of its friendship with Israel. (USAT-01-09-27: 1A)

Weakened Cultural, Social and Economic Similarities with the Self

Despite those political facets, in both countries we can also find Type 8 actors who are weakened with regard to their cultural, social or economic similarities. Those actors are, for example, described as culturally *developed*, *secular*, and *modern*, and modernity and secularism are principles that are seen as central for the German and U.S. self-concept as well. At the same time, those similarities with the Self are however weakened, by other information, for example, as these actors may be culturally *modern* but personally negative and politically *conservative*. Other Type 8 actors may have enjoyed a Western *education* and are culturally *modern*. Before 9/11, the image of the Moroccan King Mohammed VI in the German SZ can serve as an example here. At first sight, the actors could be regarded as positive and by all means “Western-like”:

Mohammed VI. gibt sich modern [...] Wer sich im Einklang fuehlt mit den Vorlieben des Koenigs fuer modische Kleidung und Pop-Kultur, wer in Marokko weiter auf Reformen hofft, nennt Mohammed VI. wohlwollend “M6”. (SZ-01-08-08: 10b)

He is described a culturally *modern* and leads a Western-influenced lifestyle. Yet, on closer inspection the actor is also described as politically *greedy* for power, religiously *immoderate* and *ineffectual* in his political action:

Andere sehen, entweder mit Erleichterung oder mit wachsender Enttaeuschung, dass sich an den gewohnten Machtstrukturen nichts geaendert hat. Mohammed selber will beides sein: M6 und Koenig von Gottes Gnaden. Durch seinen Titel Befehlshaber der Glaebigen (Amir al-Muminin) erhebt er den Anspruch, eine Art sakraler Figur zu sein. (SZ-01-08-08: 10b)

In U.S. print media before 9/11, the same pattern can be found in the image of Saudi Arabia: The government’s engagement in diplomatic policies to improve the peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine as well as the economic *wealth* of the country are weakened by the mentioning of *unequal* living conditions for the population and by the strict cultural rules in the country. The NY TIMES contrasts:

It is an affliction that permeates Saudi society, rooted in the impression that a country with seemingly bottomless oil reserves would always be rich. [...] But the relaxed life is slowly vanishing. Saudi Arabia faces problems more typical of any other developing country, and young Saudis are confronting the fact that they will have to work at real jobs – if they can find them. (NYT-01-08-26: 1)

Furthermore, the wealth of the country is contrasted with the internal deficits such as the *lack* of *democratic structures*, economic *extravagancies* of the ruling elite, and a certain skepticism about Western standards:

Saudi Arabia has managed to lift virtually everyone out of poverty. But today, even with lofty oil prices, the petrodollars do not stretch as far, not least because they are being spread among more Saudi citizens. [...] As a result, the kingdom is an anxious country unsure how to open itself to the world at large, especially the West. Suddenly, it must find ways to relax its rigid traditions in order to make the economy grow. It needs jobs for a new generation whose parents napped contentedly beside the public trough. [...] The kingdom is rapidly outstripping the fabled infrastructure it bought with oil largess. (NYT-01-08-26: 1)

The People in Northern Afghanistan in U.S. Newspapers

A slightly different prototypical image of a Type 8 actor can be identified in the U.S. newspapers after 9/11. Here, the image of the Afghan population in the north of Afghanistan that was not under Taliban rule reflects some facets of a weakened actor of Type 8. The northern regions of Afghanistan – in 2001 – are under the political and military control of the Northern Alliance (NA) who also positions itself as a *pro-western* alliance in the anti-terror coalition after 9/11.⁵² Thus, the population of Northern Afghanistan not only lived under the rule of a political actor that fights against the restrictive Taliban regime, but was also assumed to be politically and especially culturally more *open* and *free*. The NY TIMES positively highlights that...

Here, at least, they [women] can ride in the back of trucks if a man deigns to let them. They can shop in the market, although they are allowed to speak to male shopkeepers only if it is absolutely necessary. And they can go to school, even if the list of professions they can choose from is small – teacher, for instance, or midwife. (NYT-01-10-03: 6)

In addition, an Afghan woman is quoted, saying:

“I am very happy if the Americans come to Afghanistan,” she said, displaying the optimism that is running rampant here, “especially if they eliminate the Taliban.” (NYT-01-10-03: 6)

Compared to the Afghan population in the rest of the country, actors in the north enjoyed much better living conditions. However, the image of those people is weakened, at the same time, by the fact that despite these improvements for an open and liberal cultural and political situation these structures and views were limited and had not yet fully achieved a Western level because...

Life for women here in rebel-held northern Afghanistan is not without its constraints. Some of the strict Muslim dictates rigidly enforced by the Taliban government that controls most of the country also apply here. But generally the Islam practiced here is far more permissive. [...] The women are almost always covered by a light blue cotton burkah, a veil that extends from head to ankle. They rarely speak to men in public and almost never interact with foreigners. [...] Family pressure still plays a major role in marriage, but women in larger towns generally choose their own husbands. (NYT-01-10-03: 6)

And the woman been quoted above is also described as dreaming of “becoming a doctor one day, though that seems unlikely. Like 85 % of Afghan women, she is illiterate. And by local custom, she is barred from remarrying.”⁵³

On a quantitative scale, we finally have to note that altogether, Type 8 actors already appear quite frequently before 9/11. In the timeframe before the attacks, about 6.6 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in the selected German print media articles can be classified as Type 8 actors, compared to a slightly higher proportion of 10.8 % in the U.S. newspapers. This quantitative significance increases in German articles after the attacks to a proportion of now 9.3 % of all occurring actors, whereas the number of Type 8 actors remains nearly stable in U.S. articles, with a proportion of 10.6 %.

⁵² The Northern Alliance was a military and political union of different Afghan groups that opposed and fought the Taliban regime until 2001. The Alliance was recognized by most foreign nations as the legal government, even though it only controlled about 30% of Afghanistan.

⁵³ NYT-01-10-03: 6

Summary: The *Weak* Other

The second level of difference outlined in the last subchapter refers to images of Arab and Muslim actors that show a certain degree of similarity with the Self. The difference between the self-concept and the similar Other is constructed by weakening those actors, either by weakening their similar features or by weakening the whole actor.

Portraying Arab and Muslim actors as victims is a form of weakening that classifies certain actors as victims of negative conditions in Arab and Muslim countries or of negative behavior by other Arab and Muslim actors who may also be responsible for the negative societal conditions. Type 7 summarizes this form of portrayal. Thereby, to some extent the victim status of Victim type actors can be seen as another form of actor portrayal that devaluates features and certain aspects of the Other. However, not the Type 7 actors are devaluated, but the negative actors or conditions that they suffer from and that are, directly or indirectly, seen to be responsible for the victim status of Type 7 actors. So, in a way, victim actors can be seen as supporting actors for the images of those actors who are actually devaluated.

With regard to the point of view of the observing Self, the Victim type is interpreted as an exemplification of the consequences that result from a lack of Western standards and principles like democratic structures, freedom, and economic progress in Arab and Muslim societies. Therefore, those Type 7 actors are not completely different from the Self. The overlap with the German or American Self could merely be seen with regard to one aspect: both the observing Self and the victim implicitly criticize the lack of Western standards in Arab and Muslim countries, the latter mainly because they have to face and bear the political, social, or other consequences that result from this lack of progress, democracy, etc.

Especially after the 9/11 attacks, the Self thereby also explicitly reflects upon the connections and the interplay between Western foreign policies and the negative consequences of those policies for the Arab and Muslim Other. Specifically in the context of the increased focus on the roots of terrorism in Arab and Muslim countries, both German and U.S. newspapers search for the motivations of the aggressions against the West and thereby also critically observe and reflect upon their own actions and behavior. However, even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and political misdeeds to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, the principles and values of the Self are thereby not called into question. The only thing that might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been conveyed to the Other.

Before the attacks, Type 7 actors form the second largest actor type group in both countries' analyzed articles and every fifth actor can be labeled as a Victim type actor. After 9/11, this quantitative relevance of victims drops significantly to about one in ten occurring actors. For the discussed topics most Type 7 actors only appear in the context of one or two articles, and can therefore be regarded as supporting actors as well. There are, however, a few victims in the

newspapers that occur more than once or twice and are quite regularly depicted in the context of certain topics, like for instance the Afghan population.

Other actor images on level 2 are weakened insofar as the similarities of the respective actors with the German or U.S. self-concept are devaluated by other features that are regarded as non-western. Type 8 summarizes those actors. As was outlined in section VI.3.2, Type 8 actors possess features that can also be regarded as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or they support Western principles or even try to institutionalize them – or have already done so – in their own Arab or Muslim countries. Some of those actors could be labeled as “dissidents,” as they hold oppositional positions with regard to a wide range of issues and oppose, for example, *undemocratic* structures, *conservative* and *fundamentalist* traditions, or *terrorism* and *violent* conflicts, and speak out against or actively combat corruption, violence, or terrorism in their own countries of origin.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Type 8 actors become indistinguishable from the Self, because those positive aspects are contrasted with negative aspects that weaken the positive image of those actors. Type 8 actors are also described as politically *undemocratic*, culturally *conservative*, or economically *extravagant*. Other representatives of this type *lack* the political *power* to institutionalize Western principles and standards, or the level of institutionalization is regarded by the Self as only half-hearted or not good enough. Thus the overall similarity to the Self is diminished and the respective actors receive an image that still reflects a large degree of difference and distance from the German and U.S. self-concept. Type 8 actors are therefore different from the Self DESPITE their similar features and they can be distanced without (a) having to deny that they also carry positive features or (b) devaluating those features.

4. Level 3: The *Strategic* Other

The third level of difference that can be identified with regard to the images of Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media refers to actors who can be labeled as *strategic* Others. In this context, two central actor types can be derived from the material:

Table VI.3: The *Strategic* Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance⁵⁴

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Type 9: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	2.7	3.4	6.3	6.2
Type 10: The Strategically Used Other	-	1.3	4.8	3.6

The actor images that are summarized in those two types appear at first sight to be rather contradictory. Similar to level 2, the images of these actors show a certain degree of similarity

⁵⁴ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

with the Self. However, at level 3 the difference between the self-concept and the similar Arab and Muslim Other is constructed by neglecting this similarity. Type 9 comprises the images of actors whose similarity is neglected by constructing them as *strategic* and by exposing the similarities as pretence. The second actor type (Type 10) summarizes the images of those actors who are described as negative but useful for the Western Self at the same time. In the following two sections both actor types are introduced in more detail.

4.1. Type 9: The *Strategic* Other

As already mentioned before, images of Type 9 actors, on the one hand, reveal a certain degree of similarity with the Self insofar as actors of this type carry positive features that are also communicated as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or as these actors support Western principles or standards. On the other hand, these similarities are contrasted by other features that are rejected by the Self and often contradict the positive features. Implicitly and explicitly, these actors are thus referred to as *strategic*, and their similarities with the Self are, for instance, unmasked as pretence. Compared to Type 8, the similarities between Self and Other are therefore not evaluated as positive but are challenged.

The most frequently dimensions on which these similar features of Type 9 actors are challenged are the political dimension and the dimension of delinquent and violent features. Actors of this type are generally described as *inconsistent* or even *contradictory* with regard to their political positions, views, or actions on certain topics and issues, for example, when discussing terrorism. Especially in the portrayal of some government actors we find references to an ambivalent self-representation of these actors, for example, in their political statements in the context of international debates and negotiations. In some articles, these statements are contrasted with the “outside” perspective of the observing German or American Self. This combination of two perspectives can lead to a contradictory image of the respective actors.⁵⁵ In other cases, the contradiction between the actor’s rhetoric and his or her (political) actions is even explicitly ascribed to a strategic motivation, as for example, an *anti-western* view may be concealed to avoid political or military conflict with the West.

Before 9/11, this form of actor portrayal is of only minor relevance in both countries’ analyzed print media. About 2.7 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German articles and 3.4 % of actors in U.S. articles can be ascribed to this actor type. As the character dimensions focused upon have already shown, the majority of Type 9 representatives before the attacks are government and political actors. To exemplify the construction of Type 9 actors more vividly, some prototype examples are described in the following. For the analyzed timeframe before the attacks, two actors in the analyzed U.S. newspapers stand out as politically *contradictory*: the

⁵⁵ These contradictory images of Type 9 actors thereby do not have to result from only one article, but can be formed by the contradictory depictions in different articles of the newspapers in one of the analyzed countries during the different time periods around 9/11.

Albanian rebels of the UÇK and the successor of the Indonesian President Wahid, Megawati Sukarnoputri.

The Albanian UÇK in U.S. Newspapers

The UÇK is measured predominantly according to its political rhetoric and cooperation with NATO in the ongoing peace negotiations in Kosovo. On the one hand, the NY TIMES for example highlights the political cooperation and the *peaceful* talk of the group and quotes NATO representatives who describe the leader of the group as a *reliable* partner:

NATO representatives and diplomats who have had contacts with Mr. Ahmeti and his commanders appear confident that the rebels will accept a political deal negotiated by Mr. Xhaferi and give up their arms. "From what we have seen so far Ali Ahmeti is a reliable partner who honors his word," said Hans-Jorg Eiff, the NATO representative in Skopje. (NYT-01-07-23: 6)

Yet, on the other hand, this rhetoric is contrasted with their breaking political agreements and their continuous *violent* actions:

Yet on the ground the rebels appear to be positioning themselves to grab more territory and to raise the stakes should the peace talks break down and fighting resume. [...] International monitors say the rebels are the source of the disquiet here, and list incidents from cease-fire violations and improvised checkpoints, to the detention and beating of local Macedonian Slavs. (NYT-01-07-23: 6)

The UÇK is said to strategically take advantage of the negotiated cease-fire to seize new territories in the northern parts of Macedonia which borders the Kosovo region:

Ethnic Albanian rebels have taken advantage of a NATO-brokered cease-fire in Macedonia to move into this town [Tetovo] and a few villages in this mainly Albanian-populated area of western Macedonia, right under the noses of government forces. Dozens of heavily armed Macedonian Albanian fighters, in camouflage fatigues and T-shirts emblazoned with the badge of the rebel National Liberation Army, have occupied the outer districts of Tetovo, and stand just 300 yards from the nearest police checkpoint. (NYT-01-07-23: 6)

A few days later, the *violent* attacks of the group have not stopped, and the NY TIMES again reports violent incidents:

A human rights group released detailed interviews today it conducted with road workers kidnapped by Albanian guerrillas this week in which the workers say they were tortured, forced to perform sexual acts on each other and had initials carved into their backs. [...] Peter Bouckaert, a senior researcher with the New York-based Human Rights Watch, said that the kidnapping of the five road workers represented "an increasing pattern of illegal detentions and kidnappings" by the rebels. (NYT-01-08-12: 8b)

Thus, the group is especially regarded as an *unreliable* partner because it breaks the arrangement to disarm its troops, as the NY TIMES reports a couple of days later:

Only two of the six brigades that make up the rebel movement, which calls itself the National Liberation Army, carried out their disarmament today. [...] The ethnic Albanians – rebels and civilians – have so far voiced widespread support for the disarmament and NATO's involvement. (NYT-01-08-28: 3)

Thus, the UÇK receives an overall image that unmasks it as seemingly *cooperative* and *peaceful* on the one hand but *violent*, *unreliable*, and *backstabbing* with regard to its political actions and

agreements with Western actors like NATO on the other, because the UÇK did not uphold the negotiated ceasefire and the promised disarmament.

Indonesian President Megawati in U.S. Newspapers

With the portrayal of the second prototype example for U.S. newspapers before 9/11, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the major contradiction occurs with regard to her political orientation. What is mainly challenged is whether or not the new president is able and willing to implement more *democratic* structures in the political system and to improve the internal political *instabilities* and the social and economic situation of the country. On the one hand, U.S. newspapers regard the new president as an improvement compared to her predecessor Wahid (see VI.2.3), and describe her as politically *competent* and *committed*. The NY TIMES argues that...

Among the I.M.F.'s biggest concerns has been Jakarta's deficit, which has ballooned to \$8 billion, or about 6 percent of gross domestic product. Analysts note that as vice president, Mrs. Megawati led efforts to reduce the gap – supporting painful steps like reducing fuel subsidies. (NYT-01-07-25: 1)

...and in another article positively notes that...

In her first step to define her new presidency, Megawati Sukarnoputri chose a cabinet today in Jakarta, winning immediate praise for her selection of an economic team and for the overall professionalism of her choices. [...] Economic analysts generally praised Mrs. Megawati's key appointments, led by an economist who has been the ambassador to the United States, Dorodjatun Kuntoro-Jakti, as the overall economic coordinator. The new finance minister is Boediono, the former chief of national economic planning. [...] Mrs. Megawati indicated that stability and consistency were a priority by selecting Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono as her chief political and security minister. (NYT-01-08-10: 4)

Regarding the settlement of political conflicts we furthermore learn that...

Indonesia's new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, visited the troubled province of Aceh today and said she was sorry for mistakes by past governments in the region's separatist war that has left thousands dead. "The central government in the past has made many mistakes and there have been shortcomings," Mrs. Megawati said. "For that, on behalf of myself and the government, I, as the president of the Republic of Indonesia, offer my greatest apologies to the people of Aceh." (NYT-01-09-09: 8)

On the other hand, these positive aspects of her image are, at the same time, contrasted with statements that construct her as politically *incompetent*, *conservative*, and *inactive* against human rights violations. With reference to her political views, the NY TIMES argues, for instance, that...

Some experts noted that Mrs. Megawati is an ardent nationalist. That could chill any willingness to sell assets to foreigners – a necessity in reviving the country's banks. It could also affect trade relations. (NYT-01-07-25: 1)

And concerning the guarantee of human rights, the newspaper also skeptically notes in another article that...

President Megawati must also move forward with prosecutions for human rights violations in East Timor, Papua and Aceh. Nothing she has said or done indicates she has the remotest interest in doing so; indeed, she has publicly defended the East Timorese militia thug Eurico Gutteres. (NYT-01-07-27: 19)

Megawati is even expected to support *repressive* actions:

The new president is not seen as a stickler for civil liberties and she is expected to welcome the military's eagerness to use aggressive tactics to quell separatist movements and other disturbances. (NYT-01-07-29: 3)

Her *moderate* political attempts are thus seen as an attempt to secure her own political status and power, a perspective that may be illustrated with this last quote concerning Megawati:

Andi Mallarangeng, a political scientist, said the inclusiveness of Mrs. Megawati's cabinet could invite problems. "First, everyone is in the cabinet and almost no one is in the opposition, which is not good for democracy," he said. "Second, the more parties there are in the coalition, the more fragile the coalition is." Budiarto Shambazy, a journalist and political scientist, noted, however, that for the most part the political appointees were not given influential posts. In addition, he said, they mostly excluded the prominent names that many analysts had expected to be named. "This is an indication of her independence," he said. "She showed her good will to party leaders while refusing to be pushed around by them." (NYT-01-08-10: 4)

The Turkish AKP Leader Erdogan in German Newspapers

For the German newspapers before 9/11, the leader of the Turkish AKP can serve as a prototype example for a Type 9 actor.⁵⁶ The party of the former mayor of Istanbul and later Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, receives skeptical attention in German newspapers before the 9/11 attacks because of the *Islamic fundamentalist* views of its leading figure. Thus the party is regarded as religiously *fundamentalist* and is mainly described with reference to the *conservative* and *anti-western* political rhetoric of Erdogan who is, for example, quoted in DER SPIEGEL saying:

Die islamische Welt, so Erdogan, erwarte, "dass die türkische Nation sich erhebt." Er selbst werde sich bemühen, die Türkei von der Europäischen Union, "diesem Bund katholischer Staaten," fern zu halten. (Sp-01-i35: 132)

In the article, Erdogan is said to have supported this view openly until he was convicted of sedition in 1998 and was given a life-long ban from political office. This ban was annulled, however, and Erdogan was rehabilitated in the course of a political amnesty. Since then is said to have changed his rhetoric and now presents himself as more *moderate* now, but implicitly his political "turn" is regarded as a strategy to re-enter the political arena. The following quotes show this particularly well. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, notes that...

Seither distanzierte sich Erdogan von seiner alten Rhetorik und bemühte sich um die Bildung einer angeblich nur noch religiös inspirierten Partei nach dem Muster der europäischen Christdemokraten. (Sp-01-i35: 132)

The SZ says about his new political ambitions:

Erdogan, so heisst es, habe sich juengst bemueht, die Militaers davon zu ueberzeugen, dass er kein religioeses Regime wolle und ein ueberzeugter Demokrat geworden sei. (SZ-01-07-21: 6)

And another article in the same newspaper mentions that...

⁵⁶ For more information on the AKP see also chapter IV.2.1.

Die "Erneuerer" unter der Fuehrung des fruheren Istanbuler Buergermeisters Recep Tayyip Erdogan betonen seit Wochen, ihre Partei solle keine religioes orientierte Organisation sein, sondern eine demokratische Partei im westlichen Sinne. (SZ-01-08-08: 7d)

Those quotes, on the one hand, take notice of the political rhetoric and the new moderate agenda of the politician but, on the other hand, they also reflect skepticism on behalf of the German Self with respect to the seriousness of this agenda. Indefinite phrases like "he has tried to convince the military" or "he tried to form an allegedly religiously inspired party" indicate that the moderate political course of Erdogan is not seen as seriously intended. After the attacks, German newspapers stick to this image of the "Islamist Erdogan"⁵⁷ and his political image remains opaque.

The main difference between the Turkish politician, the Indonesian president, and the UCK is that the latter behaves in a *contradictory* way in its interactions with the West, whereas Megawati and Erdogan are described as acting in a *contradictory* way with reference to their own countries. This is important to mention because after 9/11 Type 9 is now predominantly represented by actors who are focused on with regard to their interaction with the West and who mainly come from countries like Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Iran. As a result, for example the *contradictory* image of the Indonesian president in U.S. newspapers is replaced after 9/11 by an image that sees Megawati as increasingly politically *powerless*, and weakens her positive political features by confronting them with the growing *radical* religious and conservative forces in the Indonesian government. In addition, Indonesia loses most of its political relevance as now the focus of U.S. newspapers shifts from internal political, social or economic issues to the topic of "terrorism" and the international political relations of Arab and Muslim countries, as has already been mentioned before. Therefore, the internal political issues of Indonesia (just like those of Turkey in the German media context) become less relevant for the U.S. Self and are replaced by observation of the growing power of Indonesian religious extremist groups.

After 9/11, the number of challenged Type 9 actors more than doubles in both German and U.S. print media. Now, 6.3 % of all occurring actors in German articles and 6.2 % of all actors in U.S. newspapers can be ascribed to this type. One reason for this increased significance may be that in the aftermath of the attacks and in the course of the formation of the anti-terror coalition, a number of Arab and Muslim countries took sides with the United States and the West. They therefore have to be rearranged along the dividing line between Self and Other, since these Arab and Muslim countries and actors not only expressed their condolences and guaranteed their support for the "war on terrorism." In addition, they also explicitly supported Western principles and values such as more *tolerance*, *democracy*, and a *free and open* society without religious restrictions, to demonstrate their *pro-western* stance in the new terrorist conflict that the attacks had created.

⁵⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: "der Islamist Erdogan" (SZ-01-10-5: 8d).

Yassir Arafat

One example of this changing perception is the imaging of the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat: Before 9/11, German newspapers do not explicitly allege that Arafat acts *strategically* with regard to his political attempts or unmask him as a negative actor, but simply construct an image that weakens his positive features by undermining his overall political status (see also VI.3.2). Compared to that, before 9/11 the political actions of Arafat in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are already regarded as *contradictory* in U.S. newspapers and are even seen as *strategic*. The NY TIMES, for example, argues that...

Many Israelis are understandably frustrated with Yassir Arafat. After spurning a politically courageous Israeli peace offer last summer, the Palestinian leader has broken his pledge of nonviolence and for the past 10 months has repeatedly endorsed an armed Palestinian uprising. Wary of trusting him again as a “peace partner,” some prominent Israelis, including former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, are calling on the world to turn “a cold shoulder” [...] Mr. Arafat's miscalculations are manifest. [...] His renewed embrace of violence has been inexcusable and has damaged prospects for future diplomatic advances. Mr. Arafat has been happier to see these groups fight Israel than challenge his own power. Thus he has done little to discourage their anti-Israel violence. (NYT-01-08-08: 16)

Arafat is assumed to use foul play to please not only the radical forces of the Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation (basically groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad) but also the Western negotiating partners in the peace process with Israel. His *strategic* action is further revealed when we look at the next passage from an article published only a few days later, where the newspaper argues that...

Apparently fearing a strong Israeli reprisal, Mr. Arafat, condemned the attack on Thursday and urged Israel to join him in a “joint declaration for a cease-fire” leading to a cooling-off period “under international supervision.” His appeals was swiftly dismissed as a ploy by a spokesman for the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, who noted that Mr. Arafat had called for a cease-fire after the disco bombing in Tel Aviv. A truce was then arranged. But it never took hold. (NYT-01-08-10: 1)

And similarly, USA TODAY also sees this ambivalence. Referring to Arafat's *strategic* and two-sided behavior in the peace process, Barak is quoted as follows:

Barak believes Arafat “deliberately returned to violence to regain the moral high ground” after rejecting the Camp David agreement. (USAT-01-08-24: 9A)

After the 9/11 attacks, this *contradictory* image can be found in both countries' newspapers. Now German articles no longer weaken Arafat on the political level but challenge his positive political positions – just like the U.S. newspapers did before 9/11 and continue to do so after the attacks. In a number of articles in both German and U.S. newspapers, Arafat is, on the one hand, said to position himself *against terrorism* and on the side of the West and is described to express his condolences and *compassion* with the terror victims. NEWSWEEK reports, for instance, that...

In Palestine, Yassir Arafat insisted that he was “shocked” by the attack. (NW-01-v138-Sonder: 22)

And the NY TIMES writes:

Mr. Arafat, who spoke from Gaza City, emphasized that Palestinians had reason to feel compassion for Americans. “As Palestinians, we too have experienced the tragic loss of

innocent civilians, who suffer from violence on a daily basis,” he said. “Our hearts go out to the people of the United States during this tragedy, our prayers are with them.” He paused, then, spacing the words out for emphasis, repeated three times, “God bless them.” (NYT-01-09-13: 18)

This kind of portrayal can also be found in the German articles even though the German newspapers do not focus as much on Arafat as the U.S. newspapers after 9/11. The SZ reports that “today, Yassir Arafat is with the Americans,”⁵⁸ and DER SPIEGEL quotes Arafat saying:

“Wir sind völlig geschockt. Es ist unglaublich.” Um seinen Worten Nachdruck zu verleihen, begab sich der Palästinenserchef am Mittwochabend in Gaza-Stadt ins Schifa-Krankenhaus und meldete sich zum Blutspenden. (Sp-01-i38: 154)

On the other hand, Arafat’s image is challenged by contrasting his *compassionate* and *pro-western* agitation and behavior with the note that he is also regarded as a potential *terror supporter*. As USA TODAY writes:

Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, blamed for complicity in suicide bombings against Israelis, donated blood for U.S. victims. (USAT-01-09-13: 5Ac)

And also an article in the NY TIMES writes that...

Mr. Sharon warned that such a meeting now would “legitimize Arafat as a good guy” while the Palestinian leader is “using terrorism at its fullest possible strength.” (NYT-01-09-17: 1b)

And a few days later, USA TODAY picks up this issue again:

And there is an opportunity for Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat to try to ingratiate himself with the Bush administration by rethinking his tacit support for terrorism, Kemp says. (USAT-01-09-17: 1Ab)

Arafat’s hidden motivations are also explicitly emphasized, for example, when the SZ writes that...

Arafat jedenfalls ist anzusehen, unter welchem Druck er nun steht. Er weiss, dass er fast nirgends auf der Welt noch einen Funken Toleranz findet bei Terrorakten gegen Israel. Es wird nun von ihm erwartet, diesen Terror endlich zu stoppen. (SZ-01-09-13: 4b)

Especially in the U.S. articles we find rather explicit ascriptions of *strategic* behavior. The NY TIMES argues, for instance that...

Mr. Arafat, who condemned the attacks on Washington and New York, has been working overtime to repair the damage done by images broadcast internationally of some Palestinians celebrating the violence. But even as those images set back his cause, he found new influence with the Americans intent on rallying Arab support. (NYT-01-09-19: 1)

Similar to that, USA TODAY mentions that...

Arafat sided with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. But this time, experts say, he recognized quickly that tacit support for suicide bomb attacks on Israelis would no longer be acceptable after the carnage in New York and Washington. (USAT-01-09-19: 8A)

And very clearly referring to the Western perspective, the NY TIMES, a few days later, again mentions that...

⁵⁸ Own translation, original quote in German: “Jassir Arafat steht heute auf der amerikanischen Seite.” (SZ-01-09-21: 4).

Mr. Arafat has his own worries. In the diplomatic community here, he is widely seen as fearing a return to pariah status if he is lumped together with the terrorists whom Mr. Bush wants to eradicate. “The hypothesis we’re working on,” the Western diplomat said, “is that he understood this has got to change or he’s going to be seen as part of the problem.” (NYT-01-09-21: 10)

Other Contradictory Alliances in the “War on Terrorism”

Besides the *contradictory* image of Arafat, there are also other actors who can be seen as representatives of Type 9 and who only become prominent in the course of the 9/11 attacks – attracting attention with reference to their possible roles as friends or enemies in the anti-terror coalition. In both countries’ print media, the geostrategic relevance of countries like Syria, Iran, or Libya and the positions of their governments becomes an important issue after the terror attacks. At the same time, the Western perception of those countries and actors reflects a certain skepticism:

On the one hand, a number of those nation states and their governments take up a *pro-western* and *anti-terrorist* position with regard to international terrorism. DER SPIEGEL argues, for example, that...

Syrien reagierte schon mal mit vorausseilender Unterwerfung und setzte bei einem nächtlichen Handstreich alle palästinensischen Extremisten fest, die in dem Verdacht standen, Terroraktionen gegen die USA auszuhecken. (Sp-01-i38: 154)

Similarly, the NY TIMES reports:

In public statements in recent days, the Syrian government has said it regrets the attacks on American civilians. It has said it is willing to join others in the anti-terror fight. (NYT-01-10-09: 8)

Furthermore, the government of Sudan is mentioned as taking sides with the West after the attacks. Here, NEWSWEEK writes that...

Even Sudan, attacked by U.S. cruise missiles in 1998 for allegedly backing bin Laden, has made terrorist arrests in recent days. (NW-01-v138-i14: 26)

...and DER SPIEGEL notes that...

Der einst so radikale Sudan hat eine amerikanische Vermittlung im Bürgerkrieg akzeptiert und sich der Anti-Terror-Koalition Washingtons angenähert. (Sp-01-i40: 174)

In an article in the NY TIMES, the *pro-western* reaction of Jordan, “the most supportive Arab country,”⁵⁹ is also emphasized:

Jordan – which has provided important intelligence to Washington about terrorists in the past several years but has been quietly critical of the administration’s approach to the Middle East crisis – was ready to “lend support in any way,” said the Jordanian ambassador to the United States, Marwan Muasher. (NYT-01-09-13: 17)

And last but not least, in both countries the newspapers mention the *moderate* and *supportive* reactions of former “antagonists” like Libya or Iran. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL writes:

⁵⁹ NYT-01-09-27: 3

Doch selbst manche der schlimmsten Feinde der USA, die Führer der von Washington so genannten Schurkenstaaten, zeigten sich fassungslos: Die Angriffe auf New York und Washington seien "erschütternd," so Libyens Revolutionsführer Muammar al-Gaddafi. (Sp-01-i38: 154)

And the SZ reports that...

Ueberraschend positive Signale kamen dabei aus Teheran. Dort verurteilten sowohl die konservativen Geistlichen um Religionsfuehrer Ali Chamenei als auch der gemaessigte Praesident Mohammed Chatami die Anschlaege. [...] Es gibt Anzeichen dafuer, dass sich Iran bei einem Angriff der USA auf die Taliban und bin Laden in Afghanistan zumindest neutral verhalten wird. (SZ-01-09-19: 1)

In the United States, the NY TIMES mentions that:

Iran is not normally given to sympathizing with the United States, but last week's terror attacks have drawn rare public condolences and a pledge to join an international effort to root out terrorism. (NYT-01-09-21: 2)

And USA TODAY also reports that...

Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi condemned the attacks and urged Muslim aid agencies to assist the victims. (USAT-01-09-19: 8Ab)

On the other hand, however, this *pro-western* agitation of the listed nation states and their governments is not only seen as a positive development. The NY TIMES, for instance, contrasts the *anti-terrorist* rhetoric of the mentioned countries with their *terrorist* history and argues:

Around the world, America's allies and even many nominal foes voiced revulsion at the attack, and condolences for families of the casualties. North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan and Iran, which have been accused by the United States of abetting terrorism, joined the condemnations. (NYT-01-09-13: 1c)

This point is also picked up again in another article of the same edition:

A different kind of problem is posed by the handful of governments that sponsor or aid international terrorist groups. These include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea. Several of those nations now seek to rebuild ties with the international community. (NYT-01-09-13: 26)

This skepticism of the observing German and U.S. Self can be further elaborated by looking at the arguments that are listed to challenge the *pro-western* agitation of the potential anti-terror allies: To unmask them as *strategic* actors, both German and U.S. articles dwell especially on the *terrorist* history of those countries and their governments, and emphasize the potential terror *threat* that is assumed to come from them. NEWSWEEK here especially refers to a "list of terror sponsors" that is published by the U.S. government:

The administration is seeking to target other "state sponsors," including Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan and, more tangentially, Iraq and Iran. [...] A good example is Iran. "Iran is the single largest source of finance and material for terrorism," says one intelligence source in Washington. "Their legislature actually appropriates money for this thing." (NW-01-v138-i13: 36)

This list is also referred to in DER SPIEGEL:

Die in Washington kursierende Liste jener Länder, die Terrororganisationen wie der Bin Ladens Zuflucht, finanzielle oder logistische Unterstützung gewähren, ist aber ziemlich lang: Iran und Irak, Syrien, Libyen und Sudan, Kuba und Nordkorea. (Sp-01-i39: 148)

The countries on this list are perceived as a general *terrorist threat* despite the fact that they have actually spoken out *against terrorism* before, as can be illustrated with a quotation from the SZ:

Um die Mitte der Neunzigerjahre (des vorigen Jahrhunderts) lenkte eine Reihe von selbstmoerderischen Bombenanschlaegen, die hauptsaechlich gegen amerikanische Ziele im Nahen und Mittleren Osten gerichtet waren, die Aufmerksamkeit auf die wachsende Bedrohung durch den von anderen Staaten gefoerderten Terrorismus. In der Folgezeit ersetzte dieses Phaenomen die Theorien von der kommunistischen Verschwuerung als dem wichtigsten Zusammenhang, in dem der Terrorismus zu sehen sei. Danach waren an der Finanzierung terroristischer Handlungen verschiedene abtruennige, auslaendische Regierungen wie die Regime im Iran, Irak, Libyen und Syrien aktiv beteiligt oder erteilten den Auftrag zu deren Durchfuehrung. (SZ-01-09-15: 1)

Thus, both countries' newspapers construct an image of these actors that is shaped by their *ambivalent* behavior and a *strategic* ambition. In the SZ, we learn about the potential Western "ally" Jordan...

Koenig Abdullah von Jordanien beispielsweise wand sich fuerchterlich, als er von amerikanischen Fernsehsendern gefragt wurde, welchen Beitrag sein Land zum gemeinsamen Kampf gegen den Terror leisten koennte. Jordanien, so meinte er gequaelt, sei ein kleines und schwaches Land. Aber sein Geheimdienst sei stets dazu bereit, die Kollegen der CIA mit Informationen zu versorgen (SZ-01-09-15: 2)

USA TODAY offers a possible reason for the political behavior of some of the countries and government:

Whether out of fear or opportunism, Libya, Syria, Iran and the Palestinian Authority have all denounced the atrocities of Sept. 11. Pakistan has joined the coalition. Sudan is cooperating. (USAT-01-09-27: 15A)

The NY TIMES argues that some of those regimes try to secure their own political power and status and therefore not only support the West but, at the same time, are working against it because...

Some Arab regimes, most of which are corrupt dictatorships afraid of their own people, made a devil's pact with the fundamentalists. They allowed the Islamists' domestic supporters to continue raising money, ostensibly for Muslim welfare groups, and to funnel it to the Osama bin Ladens – on the condition that the Islamic extremists not attack these regimes. [...] These Arab regimes, feeling defensive about their Islamic crackdowns, allowed their own press and intellectuals total freedom to attack America and Israel, as a way of deflecting criticism from themselves. (NYT-01-09-21: 35b)

The motivations of the respective actors do not only have to be of a political nature but can also result from economic demands. Concerning Iran, for example, the NY TIMES writes:

Iran is listed by the State Department as the world's most active state sponsor of terrorism, largely because of its support for anti-Israeli groups, particularly the Lebanese Hezbollah. [...] He [Mohammad-Javad Zarif, diplomat and deputy foreign minister] said the Bush administration had neither asked Iran for any specific help in its war against terrorism nor offered any inducements. Among Iran's longstanding demands are a lifting of economic sanctions and the resolution of financial claims dating from the 1979 revolution. (NYT-01-10-01: 3)

Both countries' newspapers frequently quote American President Bush' statement that "from this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the

United States as a hostile regime,”⁶⁰ which especially addresses those countries and actors listed above. When these actors position themselves *against terrorism* and take sides with the West and the United States in particular, the skepticism against them dominates the Western perception. The images that result from this skepticism indicate that despite the fact that these actors support the West against a terrorist threat, they are not LIKE the West. So in a way, and also quite similar to the next actor type that will be introduced, these Type 9 actors not only act *strategically* but are also perceived as a strategic partner by the Self, as the following quote from the NY TIMES quite vividly illustrates:

The Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians are not, and will not be, members of this coalition in any equal sense – not because they don’t have military power to contribute, but because deep down these Arab regimes do not share the values that we’re trying to defend. [...] they cannot openly tell their people they are on our side. Because our side is out for the defense of freedom, and their goal is not the preservation of freedom – for their own societies or for others. Their goal is self-preservation. [...] “Regimes such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the Palestinian Authority have a legitimate fear of democracy – they fear that free elections would be exploited by Islamist extremists who are basically undemocratic,” said the Mideast specialist Stephen P. Cohen. [...] “But these Arab leaders have to understand that if we root out these extremists – who’ve been produced by their own bad governance – we are not doing it so these regimes can keep their countries free of democracy for everyone else. We want to make the world safe for democracy, and they want to make the Arab world safe from democracy.” (NYT-01-10-09: 25)

To sum up, we can say that the images of Type 9 actors also emphasize that they actually do not share the majority of Western principles and that they actually behave in an *anti-western* way and have a *terrorist* history themselves. The overall images of those actors challenge their positive features by indicating that those features or the behavior of those actors may have to be regarded as a strategic method to secure a certain political, economic or social status, or to reach certain aims. Thus, these actors are distanced by emphasizing their *contradictions*. As the last quote indicates, Type 9 actors are not seen as equal partners or as equal to the self-concept of belonging but remain different as long as they do not really and *honestly* strive for the institutionalization and internalization of Western principles like democracy or freedom. Compared to the politically weakened actors of Type 8 (see VI.3.2) who are not challenged and whose similar (Western) features are not neglected, the similar facets of Type 9 actors are either neglected or questioned.

4.2. Type 10: The Strategically Used Other and the Western Ambivalence

The second actor type that can be positioned on the level of a strategic Other comprises the images of those actors who are described as negative but useful for the Western Self at the same time. When these actors are referred to in the articles, they are explicitly perceived as a strategic partner by the observing German or American Self. Actors of Type 10 are described as negative with respect to their main features but at the same time, it is remarked that they are politically or economically *profitable* or *useful* for the West. Therefore, Type 10 actors are not regarded as similar to the Self. They deviate quite significantly from the demanded German or American standards,

⁶⁰ NYT-01-09-21: 1

and their features are, to a large extent, not accepted or favored by the Self. However, the negativity of those actors is somewhat downgraded because they are politically, economically, or otherwise helpful and useful for certain aims of the Western Self. This ambivalence on the part of the Self – to reject the negative characteristics of the respective Other and at the same time to need the Other – are expressed in the different articles.

Before the 9/11 attacks, this form of portrayal of Arab and Muslim actors is rather insignificant. In German articles it does not appear, and in the analyzed U.S. newspapers only 1.3 % of all occurring actors can be ascribed to this category. One image that can be introduced as an example for Type 10 is that of Uzbekistan. In the American NY TIMES, Uzbekistan is, on the one hand, regarded as a state that carries out political repression against certain independent religious branches of Islam to put them under state control:

Uzbekistan is leading a regionwide crackdown on all forms of Islam that are not state-controlled – repression that is driving entire villages into opposition and forcing religion underground. (NYT-01-08-16: 22)

On the other hand, the article also notes the ambivalence of the U.S. government in the political dialogue with this state that is basically attributed to the American economic interest in the deposits of gas and oil in Uzbekistan. As the newspaper writes:

While American officials talk about human rights when they meet with their Central Asian counterparts, Washington's interest in the region's oil and gas reserves and fear of another Afghanistan limit American criticism. Washington has never counted Uzbekistan among the nations that violate religious freedom. (NYT-01-08-16: 22)

A similar view can be identified in the image of Sudan before the attacks. In an article about the U.S. engagement in peace negotiations with the war-torn country published in the NY TIMES, President Bush is quoted right in the beginning:

President Bush today denounced the Sudanese government's "brutal and shameful war against its own people" and appointed former Senator John C. Danforth as a special envoy to seek peace in the African nation. (NYT-01-09-07: 9)

Thus, the country is seen as *repressive* against its own population. However, the next sentence immediately reveals the interests of the U.S. economy, since...

Mr. Bush, who is under pressure from American oil interests and religious groups to become more active on Sudan, said he was under "no illusions" that Mr. Danforth, a Missouri Republican, would be able to ease a political and religious conflict that has killed two million people in 18 years. (NYT-01-09-07: 9)

At the end of the article, this contradictory U.S. position is picked up again when the newspaper notes that American ambivalence leads to a different form of treatment of an obviously *terrorist* actor:

American companies are barred from doing business with Sudan, which is on the State Department's list of terrorist nations, but oil companies are pressing the administration to ease the embargo, saying they are losing out to competition. (NYT-01-09-07: 9)

Especially with Sudan, this American perception changes with the attacks and the increased relevance of the terror aspect. Due to the attacks, the terrorist activities of the country can no longer be put aside for economic interests and it is now solely seen as *strategic* and as a terrorist

threat (see VI.4.1). Both outlined Type 10 images express a strategy – not on the part of the actors but pursued by the observing Self, and here the United States in particular. The negativity of the actors, their political oppression and violence, are mentioned but are said to be put aside to some extent for the economic interests of the American Self.

After the attacks, the reflections upon the ambivalence of the Western Self in the interplay with the Arab and Muslim Other become a more relevant issue. Now, 4.8 % of all occurring actors in the German articles and 3.6 % of those in the American articles are seen as Type 10 actors. In both countries' analyzed newspapers, three major representatives of Western ambivalence can be highlighted: the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the Pakistani President Musharraf, and the Saudi Arabian government.

The Northern Alliance Against the Taliban

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Northern Alliance (NA) becomes a strategic Western partner in the context of a possible overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the search for Osama bin Laden (see also V.2), and both German and U.S. newspapers pick up the political debates about military and financial support for the NA. In the context of those articles, the NA is described as a strategic partner with crucial insight and knowledge of Afghanistan and its political system that the West cannot call upon itself. DER SPIEGEL writes for instance:

Im Kampf gegen Bin Laden, hat er [Mohammed Fahim Khan⁶¹] über Uno-Botschafter Ravan Farhadi in New York erklären lassen, stünde die Nordallianz an der Seite der Amerikaner, 15 000 Soldaten könne sie dafür bereitstellen [...]. (Sp-01-i39: 166)

And USA TODAY quotes U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld:

[...] Rumsfeld, on NBC's *Meet the Press*, reached out to rebel forces in Afghanistan, including the Northern Alliance. "We need to recognize the value they bring to this anti-terrorist, anti-Taliban effort and, where appropriate, find ways to assist them," he said. (USAT-01-10-01: 2A)

However, the perception of the NA is not free of doubt. At the same time as this group is praised for its military and political knowledge in the region, both countries' print media also frequently mention the group's negative sides. The NY TIMES, for example, emphasizes its military *weakness* and that the NA lacks the support of large parts of the Afghan population:

The United States could use the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance as a proxy ground force, but the group is not widely supported throughout Afghanistan, and has no more than 12,000 fighters under a command that is in flux. (NYT-01-09-19: 1b)

This aspect is also mentioned in USA TODAY, that writes:

But the insurgents always had one serious political strike against them: They lacked the support of the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in the country. (USAT-01-09-25: 6A)

And another NY TIMES article reports that...

⁶¹ According to the news magazine, Khan is the new leader of the NA, and thus successor of Massoud who had been killed in September 2001.

While alliance officials here put on a brave face, doubts exist about its military abilities. The group claims to field 15,000 soldiers, but Russian officials say the number is closer to 5,000. They claim to control 15 percent of northwest Afghanistan; Russian officials put the figure at 5 percent. (NYT-01-09-25: 1b)

The assassination of the military leader of the group, Ahmed Shah Massoud, shortly before the 9/11 attacks is regarded as a further crucial weakening factor, since...

It's not even clear how helpful the Northern Alliance will be, since its charismatic leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, was assassinated, allegedly by bin Laden operatives, two days before the attacks on America. (NW-01-v138-i14: 26)

Similarly, DER SPIEGEL argues that...

Die Nordallianz gilt allerdings als militärisch und politisch enthauptet. Die Ermordung ihres Kommandanten Massud durch arabische Attentäter kurz vor den Anschlägen in New York und Washington sei ein weiterer Hinweis auf die strategischen Fähigkeiten der Hintermänner des Terrors. (Sp-01-i39: 148)

But especially the technological and military *underdevelopment* of the NA – compared to the Taliban – is viewed with skepticism: DER SPIEGEL argues here that...

Auch die Ausrüstung der Fußtruppen war bisher marode: Die 15000 Soldaten tragen oft sowjetische Uralt-Maschinenpistolen, Koppelschlösser mit Hammer und Sichel und dazu Turnschuhe. Nur die wenigen Berufssoldaten werden bezahlt – mit 250000 Afghani pro Monat, gut zwei Dollar. Der Rest sind Bauernburschen. Sie werden von den Familien aus den Heimatdörfern versorgt. (Sp-01-i40: 152)

...and the NY TIMES writes:

Even if the troops are supplied, they are outnumbered. Across Afghanistan, the alliance says it has 15,000 fighters squared off against Taliban forces, including foreign volunteers. The Taliban, who govern the country, boast of having 300,000 troops, but more reliable estimates range from 45,000 to 60,000. [...] The general and his frozen front line represent the reality of the Northern Alliance. It would take months as well as money and equipment for the alliance to transform itself into an effective offensive threat, according to military analysts. (NYT-01-09-29: 1c)

But despite this skepticism with regard to the military skills and economic resources of the NA, what really makes the coalition of Western countries with it critical from the perspective of the observing Self is the group's *violent* and *criminal* history and its personal attitudes. Both German and U.S. articles reflect upon those negative features. The NY TIMES, for instance, writes:

But in past years the alliance itself has been accused of shelling civilians, carrying out summary executions, and engaging in opium and weapons trafficking, according to human rights groups. The groups say the alliance has also burned and looted the houses of suspected Taliban sympathizers. [...] A report released by Human Rights Watch this spring found that all of the factions "engaged in rape, summary executions, arbitrary arrests, torture and 'disappearances'." (NYT-01-10-07: 1e)

Especially in U.S. articles the actor is also described as *criminal* because the NA earned some of its revenue in the past by cultivating and trafficking drugs. As the NY TIMES emphasizes:

The alliance has also been accused of drug and gun-running and human rights violations, including summary executions, the burning of houses and looting. (NYT-01-09-25: 1b)

New data collected by the United Nations indicates that most opium grown in Afghanistan this year was in areas controlled by the Northern Alliance [...]. (NYT-01-10-05: 5)

And in DER SPIEGEL, the NA is described as *arrogant* and *presumptuous* when it comes to the realistic estimation of their military power in the region:

Bei solcher Unterstützung sieht die Nordallianz ihre große Stunde gekommen: Sie stellt die Fußsoldaten, die großen USA die Luftwaffe, die Russen liefern mindestens neue Waffen, das wär's doch. "Wir kontrollieren bereits mehr als ein Viertel Afghanistans," feierte Dr. Abdullah, Außenminister der Nordallianz, vorige Woche vollmundig die ersten Erfolge. (Sp-01-i40: 152)

Nevertheless, as the NY TIMES concludes, the alliance is regarded as a crucial Western partner in the war against the Afghan Taliban regime:

In any case the alliance stands to play a powerful role in any future government, a position strengthened by its warming relationship with Washington. Another reason for its influence is sheer power: it can threaten to keep doing what it has been doing for two decades – using its soldiers, now 15,000, to keep up the fight. (NYT-01-10-07: 1e)

...even though it might not form a future government because, as BILD argues:

Die Nordallianz könnte sich in Afghanistan auf Dauer nicht halten. Aus Sicht der afghanischen Paschtunen sind die Nordallianz-Kämpfer feindselige Fremdvölker – Perser, Türken, Mongolen. (Bild-01-10-09: 2b)

What can be said in summary, therefore, is that even though the NA is seen as a strategic military partner for the West it is not regarded as an equal partner, because it is regarded as *underdeveloped* and deviant from the Western standards that the Self regards as relevant. This may be illustrated once more with a last example, taken from USA TODAY which writes:

Charles Dunbar, who was in charge of our embassy in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion in the early 1980s, points out that the Northern Alliance "has some pretty nasty characters involved with them, even by the standards of that part of the world." (USAT-01-10-05: 9A)

Altogether, we can say that the NA is constructed as *helpful* for the Self DESPITE its deficiencies. Both countries' newspapers after 9/11 emphasize the group's *lack of power*, technological *underdevelopment*, and personal shortcomings, but on the other hand also point out the NA's strategic relevance in the military operation against the Taliban regime. Especially the U.S. articles in this context also emphasize the *criminal* negativity of the *ambivalent* partner and frequently point out the *violent* character and the *drug trade* of the group.

Pakistan and President Musharraf: The Inscrutable Partner in the "War on Terrorism"

The second prototype example for a Type 10 actor after 9/11 in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers is the state of Pakistan and its President Musharraf.

Before 9/11, we already find portrayals of the president that indicate certain *contradictions*. His *reformist*, *anti-fundamentalist*, and *democratic* initiatives are challenged by the fact that he reached political power via a military coup in October 1999. Furthermore, the president is also described as *lacking* the *political power* to realize his proclaimed *democratic* initiatives and actions in opposition to the religious and political *fundamentalist* forces in Pakistan. In the German SZ his political decisions and his *moderate* actions are also indicated to be forced by court rulings of the highest

court of Pakistan. Thus, both German and U.S. print media already communicate a two-sided image of the actor who is, to some extent, also described as *strategic* and *contradictory*, when the events of 9/11 take place and Musharraf becomes a focus of Western foreign political attention.

After the attacks, in both German and U.S. newspapers, the *contradictions* of the president continue to be relevant for the image of the actor, and also the nation state in general is seen as rather ambivalent. However, this *contradictory* image becomes increasingly relevant insofar as Pakistan now becomes a crucial military and political partner in the “war on terrorism,” especially because the country is a geographical neighbor of Afghanistan. What is added to this image is an increased implicit skepticism on behalf of the observing Western Self with reference to the nation state and its president due to this increased military and political relevance.

But to start with the first aspect, we can say that since Pakistan is now seen as a strategic military partner because of its geographical position on the frontline of the “war on terrorism,” the West has to approach a country and a government that – so far – have not been in the closer radius of political relations but now has to be involved in the coalition.⁶² Thus, on the one hand, the newspapers mention the relevance and the strategic *usefulness* of Pakistan for the planned military operations. The SZ, for example, argues that...

Eine Schlusselfolle scheint Pakistan zuzufallen, das einerseits grossen Einfluss auf das Taliban-Regime in Kabul besitzt und andererseits geografisch guenstig nahe den vermuteten Stuetzpunkten Osama bin Ladens liegt. Das ist insofern wichtig, als das Pentagon erstmals den Einsatz von Bodentruppen gegen die Terrorlager erwaegt. (SZ-01-09-15: 2b)

In another article the same day, this military relevance of the Pakistanis is again picked up...

Die Pakistaner sollen der US Air Force den Luftraum oeffnen und Basen zur Verfuegung stellen. Sie sollen die Grenze nach Afghanistan abriegeln. Sie sollen den Waffennachschub an die Taliban unterbrechen – es ist ein offenes Geheimnis, dass diese ihre beherrschende Stellung im afghanischen Buergerkrieg nur mit Waffen und Logistik aus dem Nachbarland sowie dank mitkaempfernder pakistanischer Offiziere halten koennen. Vor allem aber wird Washington auf Geheimdienstinformationen aus Pakistan bestehen: Wie sind bin Ladens Trainingslager und Stuetzpunkte gesichert? Wo kann der Araber noch untertauchen? Ueber welche Waffen verfuegen die Taliban? (SZ-01-09-15: 6)

In the American newspapers we find a similar image: Musharraf and his government are described as taking sides with the West, and the relevance of the country for the military operations against the Taliban regime is specifically highlighted. NEWSWEEK writes:

In Islamabad, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said Pakistan would comply with all U.N. Security Council resolutions to combat terrorism and “discharge its responsibilities under international law.” (NW-01-v138-i13: 36)

And the NY TIMES reports that...

Mr. Bush emphasized his discussions with three nations: Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia. He noted that the general who took over in Pakistan not long ago, Pervez Musharraf, has

⁶² As already mentioned this is mainly due to the fact that Pakistan has more inside and knowledge about Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, the Pakistani secret service is said to have direct links to the regime, just as the Pakistani government is said to have good relations with the Taliban. In addition to that, Pakistan is regarded as a *useful* partner for the coalition, for example, because airspace was needed as well for the planned military operation against the Taliban etc.

been particularly helpful, and administration officials say that a delegation is being sent to Pakistan with a list of specific requests. (NYT-01-09-17: 2b)

...and in another article points out that...

With his [Musharraf's] permission, American and British bombers and cruise missiles have flown through Pakistan's airspace in the last two days on their way to targets in Afghanistan. (NYT-01-10-09: 24)

The strategic *usefulness* of Pakistan is accompanied by the emphasis of positive actions that have been carried out by the state and the Pakistani president in the aftermath of the attacks. The newspapers, for example, highlight the government's active attempts to combat *radical fundamentalist* groups as one assumed source for *terrorist* activity, and NEWSWEEK emphasizes the image of Musharraf as a *modern* and *moderate* actor. As the magazine writes:

Musharraf, 58, stands squarely on the side of secularism. [...] In Pakistan's long battle between religious extremism and modern secularism, Musharraf had staked out his ground, and it wasn't in the middle – he was a modern man. But now, with war looming, he may face a backlash in his own land. (NW-01-v138-i14: 33)

DER SPIEGEL reports that Musharraf has taken serious and also *courageous* steps to control or even bar radical Pakistani *fundamentalist* groups:

In Pakistan, wo nach Meinung von Landeskeennern immerhin jeder dritte Geheimdienstler und etwa jeder fünfte Militär mit islamistischen Strömungen sympathisiert, hat sich der Präsident und Militärherrscher Pervez Musharraf in den vergangenen Wochen weit vorgewagt. Er hat mehrere gewaltbereite Muslim-Gruppierungen wie etwa die Bin Laden nahe stehende Lashkar-i-Jangvi verboten. (Sp-01-i38: 132)

On the other hand, both countries' newspapers also notice a number of negative aspects and features with regard to the crucial alliance in the "war on terrorism." As USA TODAY notes:

Pakistan and Iran, which border Afghanistan and could help capture bin Laden and defeat his Afghan allies, are themselves supporters of terrorist groups. (USAT-01-09-25: 10Ad)

In addition to that, the positive political attempts of the country and the *moderate* image of the president are contrasted with the fact that Musharraf is not regarded as a *democratically* elected leader. DER SPIEGEL writes for instance:

Dabei betreibt Musharraf ein durchaus diktatorisches Regime, das mit den Menschenrechten betont unzimperlich verfährt und asketisch auf den Luxus einer Volksvertretung verzichtet. (Sp-01-i40: 166)

Also the SZ emphasizes that...

1999 schliesslich putschte sich Pakistans derzeitiger Staatschef General Parvez Musharraf an die Macht. Es folgten neue US/G-8 Sanktionen – wegen der "undemokratischen Entwicklung" des Landes, wie es zur Begründung hiess. (SZ-01-09-25: 25)

Thus, the president's approaches to the West in his foreign political course are diminished by his internal political deficits, and this leads to a skeptical view on the actor. Furthermore, Musharraf is also regarded to be politically *weak* because of his *pro-western* initiatives and in an *unstable* position because of the *fundamentalist forces* in the country. USA TODAY critically notes here:

But siding with the United States is risky for the government of Pervez Musharraf. Pakistani hardliners who support the Taliban's fundamentalist interpretation of Islam demonstrated

against Musharraf on Sunday, burning U.S. flags and shouting support for bin Laden. (USAT-01-09-17: 10Ac)

And the NY TIMES argues that...

Although Pakistan's army and police are almost certainly powerful enough to suppress street protests, influential Pakistanis say, General Musharraf, who took power in a coup nearly two years ago, cannot be sure that some of his fellow army commanders might not topple him if he fails to carry them with him. (NYT-01-09-17: 1d)

At this point, strategic motivation is ascribed to the Pakistani government and state when it is argued that Musharraf takes sides with the West mainly for economic reasons. The NY TIMES argues, for instance, that...

An influential Pakistani who attended some of the Sunday briefings said General Musharraf had already assured President Bush in a telephone call on Saturday that Pakistan would allow the use of its airspace and airfields, if needed, as well as full access to Pakistani intelligence on Mr. bin Laden. [...] But those who took part in the meetings said General Musharraf had given the impression that he had driven a hard bargain. Among other things, the general was said to have demanded an end to economic sanctions imposed by Washington after Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and the lifting of an American ban on weapons sales. [...] Also on the list, participants said, was a pledge that Washington would assist Pakistan's battered economy by encouraging generous treatment by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank [...]. (NYT-01-09-17: 1d)

This economic dimension of Pakistan's alliance in the anti-terror coalition is also picked up by the USA TODAY, which argues that...

Pakistan symbolizes the complicated crosscurrents in the Muslim world. President Pervez Musharraf, a Western-educated general who wants foreign investment for his poor nation, has condemned the terrorist attacks and vowed to support the United States. (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

... and in another article reports that...

Debt is Pakistan's curse. The country is a ward of international lenders, drowning in \$ 35 billion in foreign obligations. Interest payments eat up 57% of the annual budget. Military spending consumes 34%. That leaves just 9% for education, health care, law enforcement, infrastructure and other needs. [...] Pakistan, with a population of 144 million, generates annual economic output of about \$ 64 billion, about the same as Mississippi, which has 2.8 million people. Adult unemployment is at least five times higher than the 5.9% official rate, economists say. (USAT-01-10-05: 1B)

What distinguishes Pakistan and its president from the other contradictory alliances that have been outlined before (see VI.4.1) is that with reference to the Pakistani Type 10 actors, both countries' newspaper images not only highlight the strategic motivations of the Pakistani government to co-operate with the West. We also find implicit as well as explicit references to the ambivalence of the Self. From the analysis of the articles that focus on Pakistan and its leader it seems that the U.S. and German Self not only know about those strategic actions of the Other but also accepts them because of their own strategic intentions. Thus, the images of those actors are also shaped by the strategic scale of measurement of the Western Self. Therefore, USA TODAY also quotes U.S. government officials...

But they also say President Pervez Musharraf must be rewarded for his gamble or risk losing public support to the angry mullahs. (USAT-01-10-05: 1B)

Even more than in the U.S. newspapers, this aspect of the Western strategy is especially pointed out in the German newspapers, where articles reflect explicitly upon a certain Western ambivalence in the context of cooperation with Pakistan. German newspapers – in this context – emphasize the strategic *usefulness* but they do so largely with a focus on the United States. The strategic relevance is observed from a somewhat neutral position when the SZ writes, for instance, that...

Offenbar bahnt sich zwischen Pakistan und den USA eine Allianz auf Gegenseitigkeit an: Waehrend Pakistan den USA Ueberflugrechte und geheimdienstliche Unterstuetzung zusagte, will Amerika dem Land oekonomisch und bei der Bewaeltigung der Fluechtlingsstroeme helfen. (SZ-01-09-17: 2b)

...and in another article argues that...

Das von US-Sanktionen und einer jahrelangen Schuldenkrise geplagte Pakistan findet sich ploetzlich in einer wirtschaftlich ueberaus Erfolg versprechenden Situation wieder: Die Vereinigten Staaten brauchen das suedasiatische Land als unabdingbaren Partner im Kampf gegen Osama bin Ladens Terrorbasen in Afghanistan. (SZ-01-09-25: 25)

What results from this perspective is not only a contradictory image of the Other but also an implicit indication of the Self's own ambivalence. Like the perception of the strategic roles of the Northern Alliance, the role of Musharraf and the Pakistani state are critically judged from both countries' perspectives. We may assume that the (German and U.S.) Self is aware of the deficits as well as the positive facets of the Other, and also knows about the contradictions that occur with the political actions of Musharraf and the Pakistani nation state in reference to *terrorist* and *pro-western* activities. At the same time, the quotes have revealed that the Self also knows about the *usefulness* of the actor. The image that results from these two sides not only reflects the contradictions of the Other but also gives reasons for the cooperation with it despite those contradictions.

Contradictory Alliance and Economic Partner: Saudi Arabia

The last example I would like to introduce in the section on Type 10 actors is the nation state and government image of Saudi Arabia. The images of these actors are constructed in a pretty similar way. However, one basic difference to the last two examples is that the *usefulness* of those actors is predominantly seen on the economic dimension. We may start this section with a quotation from DER SPIEGEL that describes Saudi Arabia as “home of the most sacred sanctuaries of Islam, place of the oil: Saudi Arabia is said to be the partner of the West”⁶³ and with another one from the American NEWSWEEK that calls the country one of “the allies who made our foes.”⁶⁴

As the first quotation indicates, Saudi Arabia is seen as a Western partner on a different level compared to the previous two Type 10 actors discussed. With Saudi Arabia, economic relations are of central relevance and shape the perception of the Other. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the

⁶³ Own translation, original quote in German: “Heimat der heiligsten Staetten des Islam, Reich des Erdoel: Saudi-Arabien gilt als Partner des Westens” (Sp-01-i40: 174).

⁶⁴ NW-01-v138-i14: 34

cooperation of the Self with this actor attracts particular attention after the 9/11 attacks, and the most critical aspect of the relationship between Western Self and Saudi Arabian Other becomes the issue of “terrorism.” As has been noted for the Western perception of the majority of occurring Arab and Muslim actors in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks so far, this point is a central criterion for differentiation and evaluation. And like many other Arab and Muslim actors that have been introduced for Type 9 and Type 10, Saudi Arabia is also reported to proclaim its *pro-western* alliance and to express its *compassion* for the terror victims after the attacks. Both German and U.S. newspapers mentioned that the political leaders of Saudi Arabia condemn the attacks and assure political and military help and support in the search for the mastermind of the attacks.

Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and its government are regarded as contradictory because the military support for U.S. interventions is contrasted with the Western belief that the government, at the same time, ignores or even actively *supports* and *finances terrorist* activities and maintains ties to diverse terrorist groups. This was already indicated in the NEWSWEEK quote in the first paragraph of this section but can also be illustrated with other quotes. The German SZ, for example, describes a certain inconsistency in the political actions of the country:

In Saudi-Arabien spricht man dafür das heikle Kapitel “Finanzierung des Terrorismus” an. Westliche Beobachter werfen Saudi-Arabien ein Doppelspiel vor: Einerseits, so heisst es in einem Papier der Europäischen Union, gelte die Regierung als Verbündeter der USA und verurteile offiziell den Terrorismus. Andererseits gebe es Anzeichen dafür, dass Mitglieder der königlichen Familie und wichtige Regierungsbeamte das Netzwerk des mutmasslichen Terroristenchefs Osama bin Laden finanziell unterstützen. (SZ-01-09-27: 6)

Similar to that, DER SPIEGEL also points to the assumed *terrorist* potential that emanates from the country:

Es stellt sich heraus, dass dort, wo der Glaube sein Zentrum hat, auch der Terrorismus zu Hause ist. Man weiß um dessen Schlüsselrolle, wird aber nicht mehr lange um die Erkenntnis herumkommen, dass Riad Teil des islamistischen Terrorproblems ist. (Sp-01-i40: 174)

Furthermore, the country and its government are still regarded as politically *undemocratic*, *repressive*, and culturally *backward* – despite their *pro-western* policies. DER SPIEGEL reports that...

Saudi-Arabien, das bislang nicht der Hauch einer Demokratisierung gestreift und das massiv die Entwicklung extremistischer Terrorbewegungen wie zum Beispiel die Taliban unterstützt hat [...] (Sp-01-i39: 176)

...and the NY TIMES argues that...

The American concerns also highlight the tortuous and ambivalent relationship that law enforcement officials have long had with Saudi Arabia, which has failed to be as cooperative as promised in other high-profile terrorism cases. [...] They said that law enforcement officials believed that the Saudi government knew far more about Al Qaeda, Mr. bin Laden’s terrorist network, and its presence in the kingdom than they had been willing to share with the United States. (NYT-01-09-19: 4)

This quote also reflects a first reference to the assumed ambivalence with regard to the relationship of the U.S. Self with this actor. On the one hand, the country and its leaders position themselves on the side of the Western anti-terror coalition, but on the other hand, they are part

of the terrorist problem. As the quotes from the observing German and American newspapers illustrate, the Self knows that but to some extent ignores this aspect or at least downgrades this terrorist involvement in the political interaction because the country is a needed oil supplier and important economic partner. Both countries' print media discuss this ambivalence in the context of the Saudi Arabian regime and observe the own strategic behavior rather self-critically. For example, DER SPIEGEL, on the one hand, criticizes the cultural *conservatism*, a lack of *democratic* structures and *secularism*, the *discrimination* of women in Saudi Arabia, and other features of the country, as the following quote illustrates:

Saudi-Arabien kennt keine politischen Parteien, keine Gewerkschaften, keine freie Presse – das Zugeständnis an westliche Demokratievorstellungen erschöpft sich in einer “Beratenden Versammlung” [...] deren 90 Mitglieder der König ernannt und deren Beschlüsse von ihm abgesegnet werden müssen. [...] Frauen haben weit weniger Rechte als etwa in Iran und dürfen nicht einmal ein Auto steuern. [...] Das Praktizieren anderer Religionen neben dem Islam wird nicht geduldet, selbst nicht der verwandten monotheistischen wie Christentum und Judentum. [...] Die Strafen für Verbrechen sind mittelalterlich-fundamentalistisch, nach der rigidesten Auslegung der Scharia-Gesetzgebung: Hand-Amputation bei Dieben, öffentliches Köpfen, Peitschenschläge und für Ehebruch auch Steinigen. (Sp-01-i40: 174)

On the other hand, in the same article we find a critical reflection on the West's economic relationship with the country:

Wäre Saudi-Arabien nicht das Land mit den größten Erdölreserven (rund 25 Prozent), würde es wohl vom Westen wegen seiner Menschenrechtsverletzungen geächtet. Und wären diese Ressourcen für den Westen nicht so wichtig, müsste Saudi-Arabien im Licht der neuesten Ermittler-Erkenntnisse fürchten, in die Liste der geächteten “Schurkenstaaten” aufgenommen zu werden: als Brutstätte des Terrors. [...] Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg begann das Schwarze Gold zu sprudeln und Milliarden in die Staatskasse zu spülen. Die “besondere Beziehung” zu den USA war geboren, 1945 durften die Amerikaner in Dhahran einen ersten Militärstützpunkt auf saudischem Boden errichten. (Sp-01-i40: 174)

This example not only refers to a contradiction in the Western interaction with Saudi Arabia but especially points out the special relationship between this country and the United States. This special relationship is also observed in the U.S. newspapers after the attacks. The American NEWSWEEK, for example, skeptically asks:

But what are we going to do about countries that are the real source of modern Islamic terrorism – our faithful allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt? [...] These countries have been the fertile ground on which radical Islamic terrorism has grown. [...] Saudi Arabia's connection to these terrorists is particularly illuminating. Embracing Wahhabism, a rigid, puritanical version of Islam, the Saudi regime has tried to bolster its faltering legitimacy in the past two decades by fueling a religious revival in the Arab world. [...] It is clear that Saudi Arabia now exports two products around the globe – oil and religious fanaticism. [...] We think of our allies in the Middle East as “moderates.” And certainly compared with the barbarians of Al Qaeda, they are cautious, conservative rulers. But for decades now the governments in Riyadh and Cairo have resisted economic and political modernization with disastrous results. (NW-01-v138-i14: 34)

The same critical reflection we find in a NY TIMES article that discusses the new “fragile” status of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia after the 9/11 attacks. In this article it is said that...

Saudi Arabia's track record in previous terrorism investigations has been one of keeping its distance from the United States. [...] It is a distance that illustrates a challenge: how does

Washington square Saudi Arabia, the loyal ally and vital oil supplier, with Saudi Arabia, the guardian of Islam, a power of the Arab world and birthplace of suspected terrorists? [...] In past cases when it has been called upon to investigate terrorism, Saudi Arabia seemed less concerned with finding the killers than with making sure it did not stir up radical opponents at home who might paint members of the royal dynasty as American lackeys. (NYT-01-09-15: 17c)

And USA TODAY most explicitly points out the strategic motivation of the Self by arguing that...

For fear of alienating strategic allies, the United States often ignores human rights abuses in countries such as Saudi Arabia, some say. (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

...and in another article openly lists the most central reasons for this ambivalence (as already cited from the German media). First of all, the ambivalence results from the economic *usefulness* of the country, because...

What largely binds the United States and Saudi Arabia is oil. Saudi Arabia has one quarter of the world's known oil reserves and provides 17% of U.S. crude oil imports. Protecting the kingdom is a top U.S. priority. (USAT-01-09-21: 8A)

Second, the country is needed as a military and political partner in the campaign against terrorism:

This time, collaboration is more sensitive. The birthplace of the Muslim religion, Saudi Arabia is a necessary anchor for any global coalition that targets Muslim extremists. The United States also needs Saudi permission to fly over the country to attack Afghanistan from the west without entering Iranian airspace. (USAT-01-09-21: 8A)

The newspaper article thus concludes that...

Despite official displays of sympathy – including full-page ads by the Saudi government in U.S. newspapers – sentiment back home is ambivalent. [...] “It’s an ambivalent relationship [...] inexorably bound by many interests,” says David Long, a Saudi expert. (USAT-01-09-21: 8A)

We can, therefore, say that more than with the other Type 10 examples introduced in this subchapter, the image of Saudi Arabia and its government is clearly marked by the ambivalence of the observing Self: The economic and military *usefulness* of the country clash with Saudi Arabia's own *terrorist* involvements and the inner political and cultural *repressions* and deficits, which clearly deviate from the standards and principles the West demands and supports. Nevertheless, and especially for the U.S., Saudi Arabia is a crucial partner and the economic relations are of central relevance. Especially after 9/11, this leads to a conflict situation for the Self when “terrorism” becomes the central criterion for differentiation and evaluation. Thus, the contradictory role of Saudi Arabia is frequently discussed in both German and U.S. newspapers after the attacks. In this context we can also find attempts by the Self to justify the Western relationship with a contradictory Other like Saudi Arabia. As the NY TIMES argues:

By its actions, it [Saudi Arabia] can demonstrate to other Muslim nations that Washington is leading an international campaign against terrorism, not, as some wrongly claim, a Western battle against the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia feels especially vulnerable to the strains of this crisis. But it is also particularly well placed to help build the broadest possible coalition against terror. (NYT-01-09-25: 28)

Altogether, Type 10 actors illustrate that the observation of Arab and Muslim actors in Western print media is also accompanied by a self-observation: German and U.S. media not only evaluate

the Other on the basis of its own set of principles and standards but also critically focus on the own ambivalences in the interaction with the Other. As the examples have illustrated, the Self can be aware of the negative or contradictory features of the Other but still grant this Other a different position and status than other negative actors, as the articles also provide relevant reasons for cooperation. This strategy allows the Western Self to demarcate the Other and still cooperate with it for its own – strategic – reasons.

Summary: The *Strategic* Other

As outline in this subchapter, the third level of difference comprises images of Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media who can be labeled as *strategic* others. The images of the two actor types that were introduced on this level appear to be rather contradictory. Like level 2, the images of these actors show a certain degree of similarity with the Self. However, on level 3, difference between the self-concept and the similar Arab and Muslim Other is constructed by neglecting those similarities.

Actor images of Type 9 actors, on the one hand, reveal a certain degree of similarity with the Self insofar as actors of this type possess positive features that can also be regarded as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or these actors support Western principles or standards. On the other hand, those similarities are contrasted by other features that are rejected by the Self and often contradict the positive features. The respective actors appear to be *strategic* and their similarities with the Self are, for instance, unmasked as *pretence*. Thus, the overall images of Type 9 actors show that they actually do not share the majority of Western principles and that these actors are distanced by emphasizing their contradictions. They are not seen as equal partners of the Self or as equal to the (German or U.S.) self-concept of belonging but remain different as long as they do not really and *honestly* strive for the institutionalization and internalization of Western principles like democracy or freedom. The similar features of Type 9 actors are therefore mostly neglected or at least questioned. Type 9 becomes frequently relevant after the 9/11 attacks; most of these actors are questioned with regard to their *pro-western* and *anti-terrorist* positions and rhetoric in the course of the formation of the anti-terror coalition, since they are, at the same time, described as politically or culturally *conservative*, *terror supporters*, and not *trustworthy*.

The second introduced actor type (Type 10) comprises the images of actors who are described as negative but *useful* for the Western Self. Type 10 actors are rather insignificant before the 9/11 attacks but become a relevant issue after the attacks. When these actors are referred to in the different articles, they are explicitly perceived as strategic partners by the observing German or American Self. The ambivalence arises from the contradictory images of those Type 10 actors. On the one hand, actors of Type 10 possess negative features and deviate quite significantly from the expected German or American standards, since their features are, to a large extent, not accepted or favored by the Self. Furthermore, they are sometimes even unmasked as strategic or false as they proclaim themselves to be *pro-western*, *democratic*, or *against terrorism*, when they actually

support terror groups themselves or carry out *undemocratic* policies, like the Type 9 actors do. On the other hand, the negativity of these actors is somewhat downgraded because they are politically, economically, or otherwise *helpful* and *useful* for certain aims of the Western Self. This ambivalence on the part of the Self – rejecting the negative characteristics of the respective Other but at the same time needing the Other – is expressed in the different articles. The (German and American) Self is aware of the deficits and contradictions of the Other but suppresses them due to the strategic *usefulness* of the respective actors.

Especially Type 10 has illustrated that the observation of Arab and Muslim actors in Western print media is also accompanied by a self-observation: German and U.S. media not only evaluate the Other on the basis of their own set of principles and standards but also critically focus on the their own ambivalences in interaction with the Other. In this context, the Self is aware of the negative or contradictory features of the Other but still grants this Other a different position and status than other negative actors. This strategy allows the Western Self to demarcate the Other and still cooperate with it for its own – strategic – reasons.

Thus, what unifies the two actor types on level 3 is that *strategic* behavior is a central facet of their images; but whereas with Type 9 actors the *strategic* facet is ascribed to and critically observed in the Other, in the context of Type 10, strategy and ambivalence are critically observed in the Self. The *strategic* Other reflects the Western assumption that especially Arab and Muslim governments permanently oscillate between two sides. They lack Western standards in their internal political actions and they adopt these standards when interacting with the West. The newspaper articles reflect the assumption that this strategy is pursued by the respective actors to avoid, for instance, political conflict (internal as well as with the West) or economic sanctions by the West. At the same time, the *strategic* Other also reflects the strategic behavior of the Self, which again has an influence on the evaluation of the Other.

5. Level 4: The Self Within the Other

The first three levels of difference between Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other that have been outlined so far, summarize actor images that are predominantly characterized by the ascription of characteristics and features that can be classified as non-Self characteristics. Those features are, for example, deviations from those principles and standards that the observing print media regard as central for the own (German, American or Western) concept of belonging. The images of Arab and Muslims on two of those three levels (level 2 and level 3) did also bear different degrees of similarity with the communicated self-concepts, but, at the same time, differed from this concept since they also included a number of non-western features. In addition to those more or less different actors, the analysis also identified a small but in no way unimportant number of actors in German and U.S. print media before as well as after 9/11 that solely possess features that the Self regards as preferable and desirable. Thus, we can distinguish a

fourth level with regard to the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims, that can be summarized as “the Self within the Other.”

On a quantitative scale, images of solely positive actors from Arab and Muslim countries are not found very often in the analyzed print media sets around 9/11 compared to the other ways of portrayal that have been outlined so far. After 9/11, the number of positive images of external actors nearly doubles in both countries’ print media, but still, positive images form the least frequently used portrayal of external Arab and Muslim actors. Nevertheless, for the analysis of the (German, American, or Western) self-perception and the construction of Arab and Muslim otherness as well as for the construction of difference and a demarcation line between those two concepts of belonging, these positive portrayals of the Other present a particular relevance. Literally, these positive actors CROSS the demarcation line between both concepts of belonging, because they seem to merge with the Self insofar as they are implicitly evaluated by the Self as equal, as “the Self within the Other.” The only aspect that still distinguishes them from the Western Self is the geographical distance. Apart from that, those positive actors are, for example, *peaceable* in their political action, politically *moderate* and *democratic*, personally *committed*, *educated*, *intelligent*, and culturally *modern*. The analysis has revealed that the majority of these actors can be categorized in three central types that reflect three different ways of integrating positive actors in the overall concepts of Self and Other:

Table VI.4: The Self Within the Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance⁶⁵

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Type 11: The Role Model Other	3.9	3.0	3.0	1.3
Type 12: The Unchallenged Alliance After 9/11	-	-	2.6	3.9
Type 13: The Political Critic of the West	-	0.9	-	1.3
Other Positive Actors	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8

In the following subchapter, those types of external actors that can be regarded as representatives of the Self within the geographical space of the Arab and Muslim Other are further outlined and discussed.

5.1. Type 11: The Role Model Other

The first actor type that can be identified on this fourth level is that of the “role model.” This image can be found in U.S. and German articles before as well as after 9/11. Before the event, 3.9 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers can be ascribed to Type 11, compared to 3.0 % in the analyzed U.S. articles. These numbers drop after 9/11, when Type 11 actors make up 3.0 % in German and only 1.3 % of all actors in U.S. print media. With role

⁶⁵ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

model actors, positive features and ambitions are especially highlighted. These positive features are mainly political, but we can also find cultural or positive personal attributes ascribed to these actors. In an article in the German SZ that reports on the cultural conflict between *conservative* and more *liberal, western-oriented* lifestyles in Yemeni society, we find the example of a businesswoman who is described as follows:

Eine, die das weiss, ist Intissar. Intissar, die Unternehmerin. "Ich bin eine selbststaendige Frau. Ich bin Sozialistin. Ich bin Muslima. [...] Islam," sagt Intissar, "bedeute Liebe, fordere Hilfsbereitschaft, foerdere Selbststaendigkeit und Bildung." [...] Da nahm sie ihr Erspartes, ging nach Indien, belegte Computer- und Englischkurse, kam nach Aden zurueck und gruendete eine Firma. (SZ-01-08-16: 3)

Her portrayal is regarded as representative for the positive attempts of some parts of the Yemeni population to bring *liberal* thoughts, *emancipated* ideas, and economic self-realization to a country that is generally regarded as culturally, socially or economically *underdeveloped* and *backward*.

Another example of this type is the portrayal of Iraqi opposition groups. By contrasting them with an actor like Saddam Hussein who is described as solely negative, *hostile*, and *violent* in U.S. print media (see also VI.2.1), they are portrayed not only as a positive counter-image to the former Iraqi leader but are also seen as a crucial spearhead of the West in the fight against this actor. The NY TIMES writes:

Iraqi opposition groups will open a new front in their battle to topple Saddam Hussein when a satellite television program financed by the United States goes on the air in a few days to beam news, political profiles and even call-in shows and music videos throughout the region. (NYT-01-08-28: 6)

Role model figures or positive counter-examples can also be found after the attacks. In DER SPIEGEL, for example, the *social engagement* and cooperation of an Afghan worker for a UN reconstruction group in Afghanistan is emphasized. In the context of an article published in late September 2001 shortly before the offensive against the Taliban, and that deals with the humanitarian and political situation in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and the reconstruction of the country after the possible disempowerment of the Taliban regime, we learn that...

Die afghanischen Helfer der Uno berichten, dass sie trotz der Wirren weiterarbeiten, so gut es geht. Das Kinderhilfswerk Unicef etwa nehme noch immer Impfungen vor. Und Mohammed Jan, der eine Wiederaufbaugruppe leitet, kuummert sich um die Wasserversorgung für zahlreiche Dörfer. "Wir säubern den Zugang zu unseren Quellen und erhöhen so die Wasserzufuhr," teilt er mit. (Sp-01-i40: 158)

The news magazine adds here that "Jan is a good example for the willpower of the Afghan people."⁶⁶ Actors like the Afghan UN worker are described as positive counter-figures in the context of articles that discuss negative issues like cultural or political *conflicts*, *deficits* or – especially after 9/11 – terrorism and focus on negative actors like the Taliban. In those contexts, Type 11 actors serve as examples for the way in which things "should run."

⁶⁶ Own translation, original quote in German: "Jan ist ein gutes Beispiel für die Willenskraft der Afghanen" (Sp-01-i40: 158).

Political Leaders of the Past

In some cases, these positively highlighted actors are political figures from the past, i.e. former presidents or political leaders who no longer actively influence and control political decisions. In the NY TIMES, for instance, the images of former Indonesian president Habibie and the former Egyptian and Jordanian leaders, president Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat and King Abdallah Hussein, can serve as examples. Habibie is described as a political leader who advocates the institutionalization of Western standards like political freedom, democratic structures, and respect for human rights. As the newspaper argues...

It was under his successor, B. J. Habibie, that the press, political parties, labor unions, student activists and human rights groups were set free. (NYT-01-07-25: 3)

In this article, the positive political initiatives of Habibie are referred to for comparison and to highlight the deficits of the outgoing Indonesian President Wahid (see VI.2.3), and to indicate the political expectations that are addressed to his successor Megawati (see VI.4.1).

Similar to that, in another context, former King Hussein of Jordan and the former president of Egypt, el-Sadat, are praised for their peace negotiations with Israel in an article that discusses the difficulties of a political peace process with Palestinian President Arafat, who is regarded as an ambivalent figure when it comes to the practical realization of political agreements and cease-fires (see also VI.4.1). In the article, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak positively highlights the two former political leaders as follows:

“I feel very confident that at a certain point a leader will come with the character of Sadat or King Hussein,” a reference to President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of Jordan, who during their periods of leadership each signed peace treaties with Israel. (NYT-01-08-06: 3)

Thus, we can say that those positive political figures “from the past” are referred to to indicate what political actions are regarded as adequate in the respective conflicts or situations.

Last but not least, in BILD we find a third way of highlighting a Type 11 actor. The Jordanian King Abdullah II is positively referred to as a *modern* “man of the people” who uses unorthodox methods to fight *corruption* and *mismanagement* in his country. As the tabloid writes...

Bemerkenswert, wie Jordaniens König Abdullah II. (39) sein Volk verblüfft. Der Herrscher zog sich ein abgenutztes, arabisches Gewand an, Kopfbedeckung und Sonnenbrille und fuhr zum Finanzamt. Dort stellte er sich brav in die Schlange wartender Menschen. Dann bat er um die Überprüfung eines Antrags auf Steuerrückzahlung, den zuvor sein Bruder unter falschem Namen eingereicht hatte. (Bild-01-07-31: 7)

This portrayal of the Jordanian king as an *ambitious* and *clever* politician and a “man of the people” changes after 9/11, however, when he becomes one of the *strategic* and *contradictory* Type 9 actors who take sides with the West in the anti-terror coalition (see also VI.4.1).

The Former Afghan King Zahir Shah

One actor that can be introduced here as a prototype example for a Type 11 actor in both countries’ newspapers after 9/11 is the former Afghan king Zahir Shah, who gets into the

Western focus after the attacks as one potential successor of the Taliban regime. In this context, he is regarded as a positive counter-image to the Taliban: His *pro-western* orientation, his cooperation with the West after the attacks, and his interviews with Western media in which he publicly supports a military overthrow of the Taliban regime and the search for Osama bin Laden give him the image of a positive role model and the ideal successor for Afghanistan. Although it is also mentioned that Zahir Shah has one central deficit – his old age – DER SPIEGEL, for instance, positively highlights the actor as follows:

Ein greiser Aristokrat offeriert sich als “Vater der Nation”: Ex-Regent Zahir Schah organisiert aus dem römischen Exil den Neuanfang Afghanistans. Dort ist er eine Legende. [...] 40 Jahre lang hatte er in dem bettelarmen Land amtiert und im Dauerkonflikt mit den alten Feudalherren sich an vorsichtige Reformen gewagt, mit Grundrechten für jedermann – selbst für Frauen. (Sp-01-i41: 152)

We can say that the news magazine here indirectly contrasts, for example, his reform initiatives for more equality and social and economic improvement with the repressions of the Taliban regime that are outlined in other articles in the same issue of the magazine. The king is described as a possible liberator from the oppression and negativity that the Taliban have caused in the country and “for a whole generation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan Zahir Shah presents the last hope”⁶⁷ to return to their home country. Similar to that, U.S. newspapers also portray the former king as a crucial figure for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. NEWSWEEK, for example, headlines an interview with Shah with the question: “The once and future King?”⁶⁸ And in another article the magazine writes that...

Some influential Afghans believe that Mohamad Zahir Shah, who hasn’t lived in Afghanistan since he was deposed in 1973, could be a unifying symbol and consensus-builder. (NW-01-v138-i15: 40)

The NY TIMES quotes a member of an American Congressional Delegation who met with the former King in Rome and afterwards stated that...

“We think that perhaps he is the person that can rally those against the Taliban most effectively.” (NYT-01-10-01: 2)

...and in another article on this topic argues:

The king, himself a Pashtun from Kandahar – although his mother tongue is Persian – plausibly represents the continuity of the Afghan nation. That continuity, through decades of conflict and devastation, has all but disappeared from the Afghan scene; the king may well be the only means of bringing it back. (NYT-01-10-07: 13)

However, in contrast to the German image, in American newspapers the former king is not specifically emphasized in his former political attempts but is instead rather seen as a crucial factor to stabilize and unify a post-Taliban country. In contrast to the analyzed timeframe before 9/11 other significant examples of Type 11 actors could not be identified in the two countries’ newspapers after the attacks.

⁶⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: “Für eine ganze Generation afghanischer Flüchtlinge in Pakistan ist Zahir Schah die letzte Hoffnung.” (Sp-01-i41: 152).

⁶⁸ NW-01-v138-i15: 46

Altogether, we can say that the Type 11 actors are usually less relevant in the context of the articles in which they appear, which basically means that the major focus in the respective articles lies on other Arab or Muslim actors. Furthermore, as has already been noted, the quantitative significance of this actor type decreases after 9/11. We do find a number of actors who carry positive features after the attacks, however, those actors often also carry weakening or even contradicting features which limit their potential to be regarded as role models (see VI.3.2 and VI.4.1). If solely positive role models of Type 11 occur, they appear in contrast to negative or *ambivalent* actors and can be seen as an antithesis to those figures. In the respective contexts, they reflect the political, cultural, personal, social, or economic features that the Self applies as a standard to evaluate the Other.

Thus, Type 11 actors could be regarded as a constructed “ideal” image of what the Other could look like according to the evaluation of the Western observer. However, these role model actors are rare individual figures who are highlighted in an environment that forms the complete opposite to them. They implicitly reflect the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the Other with regard to the expected standards and principles that are involved in this ideal. We could conclude by saying that Type 11 actors represent the “pioneers” for the institutionalization of Western principles and standards in Arab and Muslim countries. Those actors are allies of the Self that are differentiated from the Self only by their geographical distance, as they act within Arab and Muslim countries.

5.2. Type 12: The Unchallenged Alliance after 9/11

A second actor type that was identified in the German and U.S. print media is again closely connected with the event around which this analysis is based – the 9/11 attacks. Type 12 is characterized by the fact that it summarizes actors who are all of the same opinion, or express one and the same standpoint. Actors of this type all *condemn terrorism* and speak out against the 9/11 attacks. In addition a number of those actors also express their *sorrow* and *compassion* for the victims of the event. These actors often only occur once and their image is basically built around these two aspects. As they condemn the attacks they are positively highlighted in both countries’ newspapers as part of the anti-terror coalition. Thus, this actor type is only part of the post-9/11 actor typologies of both countries’ print media sets. In this post-9/11 timeframe, Type 12 forms the second-largest group on this fourth level of actor portrayal and encompasses 2.6 % of all occurring actors in German articles. In the U.S. newspapers, it forms the largest group on this level of difference, with a proportion of 3.9 %.

Type 12 actors round off the overall image of actors in Arab and Muslim countries with those parts of the Other that condemn the attacks and “really mean it” – since their expressed *anti-terror* position is not challenged or weakened in a certain way in the analyzed articles. At the same time, their images again reflect the Western standpoint that demands a condemnation of the attacks and compassion for the victims as the only appropriate reaction. Thus, Type 12 actors are not

only another form of “the Self within the Other’s space” but they also form a positive counter-image to those Arab and Muslim actors that supported or even carried out the 9/11 attacks, such as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban or the cheering Palestinian demonstrators (see also VI.2.1) and are therefore denounced by the Self.

Examples for Type 12 actors are to a large extent from the private sector, which may also be one explanation for the fact that their positions are not as much challenged or at least critically observed as those of the diverse political actors that have been introduced so far. In BILD, for instance, we find the example of a Jordanian princess who expresses her disapproval of terrorist actions:

Prinzessin Haya von Jordanien (27, Springreiterin, trainierte jahrelang in Deutschland): “Ein guter Moslem zu sein heißt vor allem, ein guter Mensch zu sein. Aggression hat keinen Glauben, keine Religion.” (Bild-01-09-19: 12)

In the NY TIMES, we find Palestinian private actors that are contrasted with the already mentioned group of *anti-western* demonstrators that took to the streets after the attacks to cheer for the 9/11 terrorists:

Some in Nablus condemned any violence against civilians. Amin Amira, a 43-year-old fruit vendor, said he was dismayed by Tuesday’s demonstration. “I don’t believe that this reflects the feeling of the Palestinian people,” he said. (NYT-01-09-13: 18)

But also Arab and Muslim actors of other countries express their *compassion* and *support* for the United States. The NY TIMES, for example, reports that many Pakistanis expressed their condolence:

On Islamabad’s streets today, many Pakistanis offered sympathy for the United States. “Not good,” said a 40-year-old minivan driver, Ejaz Hussain, when asked about the attacks. “Not good for New York, not good for America, not good for Pakistan.” American reporters were greeted with handshakes in malls and hotels. (NYT-01-09-15: 17b)

This is again mentioned in another article that contrasts the different opinions in the Pakistani population with reference to the attacks and the planned military operation in Afghanistan. Here, a number of different people are quoted, most of them expressing rather *anti-western* opinions. However, we also learn of some *pro-western* positions. As the article reports, “one man proudly says he has visited 27 American states,”⁶⁹ and a Pakistani woman from Karachi is quoted as follows:

A woman says she loves New York, and was there when the attack came and it broke her heart. (NYT-01-10-01: 1b)

In yet another article, two Iranian politicians are positively highlighted for the letter of condolence that they addressed to the NY mayor Guiliani:

In Iran, Tehran’s mayor, Morteza Alviri, and Mohammad Atrianfar, the head of Tehran’s city council, sent a letter of condolence to Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York, the first government-to-government communique in two decades, a gesture that hinted of possible Iranian cooperation against terrorism. (NYT-01-09-17: 2b)

⁶⁹ NYT-01-10-01: 1b

In addition to those individual figures, after 9/11 some countries are also regarded as solely positive and unchallenged strategic partners in the *anti-terror* policy of the U.S. government. One of those countries – Oman – is seen as one of the forefronts for possible military actions, but differs in this role from other strategic partners of the U.S. insofar as the countries' image is not contrasted with any negative facets but remains solely positive. As the NY TIMES writes:

Thanks to geography and a long history of quiet military cooperation with Washington and London, Oman has emerged as a critical staging ground for the United States' war against Osama bin Laden. [...] Oman has been a far more willing partner. [...] Now the Bush administration is looking to mobilize political support and to secure a crucial logistics base. (NYT-01-10-05: 2)

We can say that like Type 10 actors, which comprises actors that are regarded as strategically important for the Self but at the same time have negative facets that the Self accepts only reluctantly because of the political or other *usefulness* of the respective actors (see also VI.4.2), Oman is also regarded as a strategic partner by the Self. But compared to Type 10 actors, this actor is not *contradictory* but is presented as *reliable*.

In more general terms, and again just like the role model actors of Type 11, Type 12 actors are portrayed rather like those of Type 8 and Type 9 (see VI.3.2 and VI.4.1) who position themselves on the *pro-western* side of the anti-terror coalition after 9/11. But compared to those types, the “alliances” of Type 12 are not weakened or challenged in their *pro-western* positioning. Compared to the expressed condolences of the contradictory or weakened governments and nation states or other political actors, the compassionate remarks of the predominantly private Type 12 actors or of politically less important and less well-known actors like the mayor of Teheran are not critically observed or even questioned.

Nonetheless, these “unchallenged alliances” are also part of the overall Other, since they can be geographically distanced from the West, they appear relatively rarely and are highlighted in an environment that forms the complete opposite to them. Their *pro-western* position is mostly contrasted with the *anti-western* positions of other Arab and Muslim actors in the articles in which they appear, and like the actors of Type 11, we could assume that the image of Type 12 actors implicitly reflects the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the Other with regard to this ideal, since the majority of Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. newspaper articles does not clearly and undoubtedly condemn the 9/11 attacks and terrorism. So, just like the former Type 11, actor images of Type 12 also reflect an “ideal” image of what the Other could look like according to the Western observer.

5.3. Type 13: The Political Critic of the West

The third actor type that can be identified is to some extent quite similar to Type 12, since especially after 9/11 actors of this type are portrayed in the context of that event and are also described according to their position with reference to the attacks. This actor type can be labeled as the “political critic of the West,” and actors of this type can be summarized as politically

positive (*pro-western, reform-oriented, or diplomatic*) but also *critical* with reference to Western political actions and viewpoints. Even though these actors carry political features and fulfill or support standards that the Western observer may regard as central and relevant for its own self-concept, they distance themselves from the West at the same time by criticizing the same. Images of Type 13 actors can only be found in U.S. print media and here especially after 9/11 when this actor type becomes slightly relevant with 1.3 % of the occurring actors being described as politically positive critics of the West.

Type 13 actors in U.S. newspapers criticize, for instance, the policies of the U.S. government toward certain Arab and Muslim countries, or more specifically, the U.S. role in the peace negotiations in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before 9/11, in the NY TIMES, for example, the Egyptian government on the one hand is regarded as a *moderate* and *loyal* ally of the U.S. government, but on the other hand is also reported criticizing the political strategy of the U.S. in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In one article the newspaper reports that...

Egypt's top foreign policy official warned that the Bush administration's "inaction" in the Middle East could allow extremists to take hold in moderate Arab countries. This would be a consequence far graver than the administration's apparent fear of risking its prestige with an Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative, said Osama el-Baz, President Hosni Mubarak's national security adviser. [...] In addition to its effect on Arab states, Mr. Baz said in an interview, the United States' approach in the region was helping to weaken the forces of moderation in Israel, where many people were hoping that the Bush administration would take what he called "a clear-cut position to check the mad spiral of violence." (NYT-01-08-16: 1)

In another article, the newspaper takes up this issue again by reporting that...

Egypt pressed the Bush administration today to take a more active role in the Middle East and to consider sending American monitors as soon as possible to defuse the violence between Israelis and Palestinians, officials said. [...] "We need a drastic change of the present situation," Mr. Baz told reporters after he met with Secretary Powell. "We need peace and quiet in the region. And unless this is done, the interests of all parties are going to be damaged and hurt." (NYT-01-08-18: 3b)

Clearly promoting a positive vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Other in this case is presented as the driving force, leaving the criticized American Self in the position of the passive and even inactive actor.

After 9/11, we find an article in USA TODAY that summarizes some of the mass media reactions of Arab and Muslim print media to the attacks. In this context, the Indonesian newspaper KORAN TEMPO is quoted saying:

We condemn the (World Trade Center) bombing [...] but an inaccurate stereotype is a mistake that would only worsen future relations for the American people. (USAT-01-09-19: 15A)

The newspaper thus holds a position that, on the one hand, *condemns* the attacks and the violent deaths of people but, on the other, also warns the American Self not to overreact and categorize Arabs and Muslims identically. In another article in USA TODAY, a representative of a German-based organization that fights for the national liberation of Afghanistan is quoted. The newspaper writes here:

At the Islamic-Afghani Cultural Center and Mosque, Abdul Hai Zakarwal, who represents the Afghan National Liberation Front in Hamburg, said both bin Laden and the Americans are wrong because violence in any form is not the solution. "Our people have had enough suffering," Zakarwal said. "For 20 years, we have been engaged in war. We believe there must be a political solution." (USAT-01-10-09: 11Ae)

What again becomes obvious with these examples – and this is especially the case with the American newspapers – is that the event also causes a shift of perspective of the Self: Western (and here mainly U.S.) media after the attacks now increasingly look at the country's own actions and positions when discussing Arab and Muslim topics. As mentioned before (see VI.3 or VI.4) this implication of Western deficits or at least consideration of the idea that the attacks might also have been caused by Western mistakes in interaction with the Arab and Muslim Other can be found in a number of the analyzed articles. Thus, with Type 13 actors, the Self is also examined. For example, in one article in USA TODAY, which has already been referred to in previous subchapters, the roots of Islamic and terrorist extremism in the Arab and Muslim countries are highlighted. In this context, Yahia Said, an Iraqi lecturer on globalization at the London School of Economics is quoted, who criticizes that...

"The level of wealth (elsewhere) is so much more visible in poor countries now, through television, movies [...] There is this profound sense of being left out. These are people who don't have a hope of ever getting out of this poverty, and so they are willing to do something desperate." (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

Another passage from the same article illustrates that this criticism is taken seriously by the observing American media; the newspaper explicitly reflects upon this criticism and comes to the following conclusion:

But beyond that, say scholars and other experts, the reason hatred, resentment or deep dislike exists in one degree or another among many Muslims in the Arab world, lies in a complicated web of U.S. policy, repressive foreign regimes, poverty, religious fundamentalism and, even, American naivete. There's resentment over U.S. economic, military and political power. There's disgust from many in the male-dominated Muslim world over the strong role women play in America and the "suggestive" way they dress. Then add on top of all that the way U.S. culture dominates the world, often steamrolling religious and cultural institutions that have existed for thousands of years, and there is fertile ground for anti-American fervor to take root. [...] "America is seen as this very glittery place, and it's easy to portray it as a kind of Sodom and Gomorrah," Falk says. "It's a very powerful mobilizing message." And one that plays well to a generation of Muslims growing up with few civil rights or comforts and yet aware of the free sexuality and material wealth of the West. Frustrated by inept or repressive leadership in their own countries and facing a hopeless future, many buy into anti-American sentiment, and some buy into the extremist groups themselves." (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

As the examples indicate, the perspective of the Arab and Muslim Other is critically observed by the American media, and the arguments of these actors are also critically discussed. At the same time, however, the statement above also reveals that the Self in this context still perceives itself as a role model and does not question its own principles. Again, as has been argued before, what is basically reflected by the imaging of Type 13 actors is a certain self-criticism with regard to the way in which the Self has treated the Other or has interacted with Arab and Muslim countries and actors. But the quote also reveals that this wrong treatment is not regarded as the one and only reason for conflict between Self and Other, since it is argued as well that the people of Arab

and Muslim countries are frustrated with their own lives and the political, cultural, social, or economic conditions in their countries. This argument again indicates that the cause for upheaval, violence and conflict in Arab and Muslim countries – or even against the West as is the case with 9/11 – lies mainly with the Other.

However, we could say that actors of Type 13 are mediators in the interaction between Self and Arab and Muslim Other – and here mainly on the level of a dialogue. With their criticism of Western political actions these actors also present the perspective of the Other: The arguments that are reported on in the articles inform the Self about the opinions and views about the West (and the United States in particular) that are prevalent and common among Arab and Muslim actors. What can be concluded therefore is that even though Type 13 actors, on the one hand, support Western principles and reveal a certain degree of similarity with the self-concept of belonging, on the other hand, they also distance themselves from the Self by criticizing the United States or the West in general. In the case of Type 13 actors we could argue therefore that the demarcation line between Self and Other is not constituted via a differentiating image of the counterpart actor but via the distance between views that is reflected in the communication process between the two sides.

Summary: The Self within the Other

Level four illustrates that some Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed newspapers are by all means positively depicted. As was outlined in VI.5, both German and U.S. print media also identify actors in Arab and Muslim countries that carry or support Western principles and standards in Arab and Muslim societies and are not weakened or evaluated in those features and views. These actors could be labeled as the “Self within the Other”; they are identified before as well as after the 9/11 attacks and they are highlighted as positive counter images to other negative actors in the respective articles. However, the introduced actor types are usually less relevant in the context of the articles in which they occur, which basically means that other Arab or Muslim actors receive the major focus in the respective articles. Actors of the “Self within the Other” mainly appear in contrast to negative or *ambivalent* actors (see VI.2 and VI.3) and thus can be seen as a counterpart to those figures.

In both countries’ analyzed print media, the most frequently ascribed images thereby are role model actors of Type 11. Those actors as a constructed “ideal” image of what the Other could look like according to the Western observer. These role model actors are mostly individual figures who are highlighted in an environment that forms the complete opposite to them, or they present positive examples of the past that are consulted as a comparison for the present situation.

After the attacks, the second most frequently constructed image on this level is that of the “unchallenged Western alliances” in the anti-terror coalition. Those actors all hold the same opinion, or express one and the same standpoint: they *condemn terrorism* and particularly speak out against the 9/11 attacks and they express their *sorrow* and *compassion* for the victims. Type 12

rounds off the overall image of actors in Arab and Muslim countries with those parts of the Other that condemn the attacks and “really mean it” – since their expressed *anti-terror* position is not challenged or weakened in the analyzed articles. At the same time, their image again also reflects the Western standpoint that demands condemnation of the attacks and compassion for the victims as the only appropriate reaction.

The third actor type – Type 13 – is similar to Type 12 insofar as actors of this type also take sides with Western views and positions on certain issues or conflicts. The “political critic of the West” is described as politically positive (*pro-western, reform-oriented, or diplomatic*) but, on the other hand, is also referred to as *critical* with reference to Western political actions and viewpoints. Images of Type 13 actors were only found in U.S. print media. Like other actor types before, they also reflect the increasing self-observation and self-criticism of the United States with regard to its political, economic, or military interplay with Arab and Muslim actors and countries. With their criticism of Western political actions these Type 13 actors present the perspective of the Other. The arguments that are depicted here also inform the Self about the opinions and views that are prevalent and common with Arab and Muslim actors, and confront the Self with its own deficits and behavior.

Altogether, the three actor types implicitly reflect the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the Other with regard to the expected standards and principles that are involved in this ideal that shapes the German or American concept of belonging. We could say that these mainly individual actors reflect the behavior and attitudes that the Western observer expects from the Other. Role model actors are the “pioneers” for the institutionalization of Western principles and standards in Arab and Muslim countries, and actors like the “unchallenged alliances” after 9/11 reflect the expectations that are indirectly communicated to all Arab and Muslim actors. At the same time, all three actor types are nevertheless part of the overall Other. They can be distanced because they are external actors from geographically distant Arab and Muslim countries, and they are role models for approved Western features, values, and behavior compared to the rest of the Arab and Muslim Other. If they are politically *developed, democracy-oriented, or committed* to solving political conflicts like in Israel/Palestine etc., they distance themselves from the Self by criticizing the West from outside, i.e. from within the Other.

Therefore, the “Self within the Other” implicitly reflects the German or American concept of belonging as it is mirrored by some actors within the Other’s space. Level four indicates that both German and U.S. print media reflect upon the fact that the (external) Arab and Muslim Other is not completely different from the German or U.S. Self, even though it might be dominated by difference. The print media note and emphasize identified similarities like institutionalized Western principles in Arab and Muslim countries as well. However, on a quantitative scale, unchallenged similarity or even sameness between Western Self and external Arab and Muslim Other is still rare, and solely positive actors form a minority in the analyzed data sample. The representatives of the “Self within the Other” are internal opponents or individual voices that are

actually drowned out by other, more powerful or quantitatively more dominating negative or *ambivalent* actors in Arab and Muslim countries.

6. Level 5: When the Other Enters the Western Space

The actor types that have been outlined in the last four subchapters summarize the different ways in which external Arab and Muslim actors, i.e. actors from Arab and Muslim countries, are portrayed in the analyzed U.S. and German newspapers around 9/11. Even though the images of these different actors reveal different degrees of similarity with the German or American self-concept of belonging, the discussed actors so far all share one common feature that distinguishes them from the Self. They are demarcated from the West by their geographical origin and by the geographical distance between them and the observing Self. When we now add the identified internal Arab and Muslim actors to the established typology, a fifth level of difference comes into play when Arab and Muslim actors cross the national boundaries of the Self.⁷⁰ Thus, the portrayal of internal actors is marked first and foremost by a geographical closeness to the Self.

As already outlined in chapter IV.2 and IV.3, Arab and Muslim actors within the United States or Germany are only marginally focused on before 9/11. In the analyzed American newspapers we only find two internal actors, one of them being a Libyan spy and the other one being Ahmed Ressam, a terror suspect who was caught in 1999 as he was trying to smuggle explosives from Canada into the United States to bomb Los Angeles airport. In German newspapers only eight internal Muslim and Arab actors were identified, the majority of them in the tabloid BILD. The significance of internal actors changes with the attacks, however, and we now also find a much larger variety of images of internal actors after the event in both countries' print media.

Internal Arabs and Muslims in both German and U.S. print media can be identified and differentiated according to the following criteria: First and foremost, they are explicitly referred to as being Arabs or Muslims, so what identifies them as an internal Other is either their country of origin (as immigrants), their ethnicity (as Arabs) or their religion (as Muslims). Apart from that, internal Arab and Muslim actors also carry a large variety of different features just like the occurring external actors. These features were already broadly summarized in chapter V. In the following subchapter, the relevance of these features will be surveyed with regard to their occurrence with the images of internal Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed newspapers. At first sight, the overall image of internal actors is less complex than that of the external actors, but when we take a closer look at the images of Arabs and Muslims in the Western space we see that they reveal a number of similarities with the external actor images as well. In the following, it will be shown that before as well as after 9/11, the images of internal Others resemble those for the identified external Arabs and Muslims. Thereby, the lack of geographical distance is compensated for by the heightened emphasis on features of the other character dimensions, e.g. the emphasis

⁷⁰ The term "internal Arab and Muslim actors" refers to those actors that are identified as Arab or Muslim of origin or religion but who, at the same time, live in or come from either the United States or Germany.

on certain cultural, political, or personal characteristics of the respective actors. Altogether, four different empirically significant types of actors can be formed from the set of identified internal actors in both countries' analyzed print media:

Table VI.5: The Internal Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance⁷¹

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Type 14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other	1.6	-	2.2	0.8
Type 15: The <i>Peaceful</i> Arab and Muslim Communities	0.4	-	6.7	3.1
Type 16: The Murderers Among Us	1.2	0.9	8.6	7.8
Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West	-	-	1.5	5.2
Other Internal Actors	-	-	0.7	0.5

6.1. Type 14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other

The first actor type that can be introduced with reference to the portrayal of internal actors summarizes the images of half of the occurring internal actors in German media before 9/11 (overall proportion: 1.6 %) and about 2.2 % of all actors in the German newspaper articles in the timeframe after the attacks: Those actors are mainly described according to their cultural features. Thereby, Type 14 illustrates one significant difference between the images of internal actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media, because in U.S. articles this type of actors is rather insignificant in the U.S. context: in American articles before 9/11, this actor type cannot be found at all, and after the event it is only minor relevant with a proportion of 0.8 % of all occurring internal actors.

Compared to that, German articles reflect a stronger emphasis on an observed cultural distance between internal Arab and Muslim actors and their German host society. Especially before 9/11 when Arabs and Muslims within the West are not yet regarded as a potential threat for the Self and the national security, German newspapers – and here predominantly the tabloid BILD – frequently use cultural features or religious affiliation and traditions when internal actors are described. In BILD, for example, we find a story about the fate of a young German woman who is shot dead by her Turkish-German boyfriend. In this article, the boyfriend is described as follows:

Kurtulus D. (24) schwieg, als er auf der Anklagebank saß. [...] Der junge Döner-Verkäufer hatte seine schöne Freundin Mandy R. (21) erschossen, weil sie keinen Sex wollte. In einer Kneipe hatten sie sich zum ersten Mal gesehen. Sie fand ihn attraktiv, er machte ihr Komplimente. Mandy verliebte sich in den Türken. Aber der zunächst zärtliche Geliebte wurde zum Tyrann. Die Anklage beschreibt das Leiden der schönen Verkäuferin: Mandy

⁷¹ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

durfte keinen Schmuck mehr tragen, keine Männer ansehen. Ihre schönen, langen Haare musste sie zu einem Zopf knoten. Ging sie allein aus, prügelte er sie nach Hause. Dann erfuhr sie: Ihr Geliebter war längst verheiratet, Vater eines Kindes. Sie wollte ihn verlassen. Die Staatsanwältin: "Zwei Mal wollte Mandy Schluss machen. Zwei Mal hielt ihr Kurtulus eine Pistole an den Kopf, drohte: 'Wenn du gehst, erschieße ich dich!'" (Bild-01-08-24: 5)

The story may be classified as one of the sensational tabloid stories about a family drama that are reported on frequently in newspapers. However, in this specific context, we learn that the murderer is of Turkish origin. In addition to that the article describes him as culturally *narrow-minded*, *conservative*, *repressive*, and *violent*, and outlines in great detail how he forces his girlfriend into a lifestyle that is guided by his patriarchal views. To top it off, we even learn that the man was *untruthful* to his partner since he is already married.

In another context, the SZ reports on the lawsuit of a Muslim woman to be allowed to wear a headscarf at her workplace. In this article, the newspaper also mentions the frictions that are caused by this legal case in the German public discussion and that revolve around the question of whether or not Muslim women should generally be allowed to wear a headscarf in public institutions or at work. As the SZ writes:

Ein Arbeitgeber darf einer bei ihm beschaeftigten Muslimin verbieten, ein Kopftuch zu tragen. [...] Die Richter wiesen die Klage einer tuerkischen Verkaeufnerin gegen ein Kaufhaus in einer hessischen Kleinstadt zurueck und erklaerten die personenbedingt ausgesprochene Kuendigung fuer zulaessig. Nachdem die Frau mehrere Jahre ohne Kopftuch in "westlicher Kleidung" in dem Kaufhaus taetig gewesen war, bestand sie nach einem Erziehungsurlaub auf der Kopfbedeckung waehrend der Arbeit. (SZ-01-08-08: 6)

Both introduced examples concentrate on different cultural facets, but in both cases the cultural dimension of these actors or, in other words, the cultural views of these actors lead to a conflict with German society, either because of delinquent actions of the one actor against his German girlfriend or because of the legal protest of the Muslim woman who is not allowed to wear a headscarf at work. And in both cases, the image of the respective actor reflects a cultural distance between the actor and the German Self.

After the attacks, the focus of the German newspapers shifts largely to the religious context of internal actors of Type 14. Especially Islamic *fundamentalist* groups within Germany are now not only frequently described as *fanatical*, but in addition to that are also regarded as a security *threat* for the German Self. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, warns that...

Seit Jahren rufen in einzelnen Moscheen und Islamischen Zentren fanatische Prediger zum "Dschihad" auf. (Sp-01-i39: 20)

In another article, the news magazine reports that...

Die "Front der islamischen Kämpfer" ist in Hessen für brutale Erpressungen verantwortlich. [...] Die Gangster waren allerdings keine gewöhnlichen Schwerverbrecher, sondern Anhänger der religiös-fundamentalistischen "Front der islamischen Kämpfer des Großen Ostens" (IBDA-C), die mitten in Deutschland mit einer Entführung ihren Glaubenskrieg finanzieren wollten. [...] Schon 1992 wollten gewaltbereite Muslime Geld für die in der Türkei wegen mehrerer Mordanschläge verfolgte Gruppe eintreiben. (Sp-01-i40: 52.)

Another actor that is mainly focused on with regard to its *fundamentalist* facets is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that is already before 9/11 described as "the most significant of all militant

Islamist movements in the Arab world.”⁷² Even though the organization is largely based in Egypt, after the attacks it becomes relevant to mention because it also has members in Germany, since “also Al-Khalifa from Munich is a charismatic representative of Islam. But, on the other hand, he appears as a Muslim brother in the annual report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.”⁷³ Therefore, the organization also presents an internal threat now.

It has to be noted here that – in the same article – the newspaper also highlights positive examples of Islamic groups in Germany and writes, for example, that...

Es gibt hervorragende islamische Gesprächspartner: Nadeem Elyas, der Vorsitzende des Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland, Hossein Fatimi, ein gebürtiger Afghane, der die beispielhafte christlich-islamische Gesellschaft in Pforzheim mit ins Leben gerufen hat, Scheich Bashir Dultz und andere. (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

At the same time, however, it is skeptically remarked that “Muslim partners for dialogue are rare – and often hard to evaluate.”⁷⁴ As the SZ writes:

Bei einigen Dialogpartnern ist die Einordnung aber schwierig: Amir Zaidan, ein intelligenter junger islamischer Theologe, hat die “Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen” (IRH) gegründet; dort bekennen sich muslimische Gruppen bis hin zu Milli Goerues ausdruecklich zum Grundgesetz. Ein ehrenwertes Anliegen: Vertreter moeglichst vieler Muslime werden zum Gesprächspartner des Staates. Doch Amir Zaidan war Mitglied der Muslim Studenten Vereinigung (MSV) gewesen. Die steht laut Verfassungsschutz mit der in Aegypten und Syrien beheimateten islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft in Verbindung; in der Satzung vom Maerz 1994 ist Zaidan noch als MSV-Sekretaer aufgefuehrt. Zaidan hat eine Zweitfrau nach muslimischem Recht geheiratet. Von ihm stammt auch die “Kamel-Fatwa”, dass Frauen nicht mehr als 81 Kilometer weit unbegleitet reisen koennen – so weit, wie eine Kamelkarawane in 24 Stunden kommt; deshalb durften Maedchen nicht mit auf einen Schulausflug. (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

Especially the Turkish organization Millî Görüş is frequently mentioned as one religious/political group in Germany that presents a potential threat due to its political and cultural aims. As DER SPIEGEL writes, Millî Görüş is an “Islamistic Turkish organization with 27,000 members and more than 100,000 followers in Deutschland,”⁷⁵ and is furthermore regarded as *dangerous* and *hypocritical* because...

“Auf die Terroranschläge in den USA reagierte die IGMG nach außen mit Betroffenheit”, heißt es in dem Papier. “Im inneren Zirkel jedoch konnte eine unverhohlene Freude über die Anschläge gegen den Erzfeind USA festgestellt werden.” (Sp-01-i40: 46)

Similarly, the SZ also notes that...

Nach dem 11. September haben alle wichtigen Vertreter des Islam die Terror-Akte konsequent als Terror-Akte bezeichnet. Doch in den Milli Goerues nahe stehenden Zeitungen Milli Gazete und Akit ist von “Heimzahlung” die Rede. (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

⁷² Own translation, original quote in German: “die bedeutendste aller militant-islamistischen Bewegungen in der arabischen Welt” (Sp-01-i30: 106).

⁷³ Own translation, original quote in German: “Auch Al-Khalifa aus Muenchen ist ein charismatischer Islam-Vertreter. Andererseits taucht er im Verfassungsschutzbericht als Muslimbruder auf” (SZ-01-10-9: 12).

⁷⁴ Own translation, original quote in German: “Muslimische Dialogpartner sind selten - und oft schwer einzuschuetzen.” (SZ-01-10-09: 12)

⁷⁵ Own translation, original quote in German: “islamistische Türkenorganisation mit 27 000 Mitgliedern und über 100 000 Anhängern in Deutschland” (Sp-01-i40: 46).

But apart from this potential *terrorist threat* that may emanate from the group, the German SZ also determines a cultural *threat*, since...

Die islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goerues ist die deutsche Filiale der tuerkisch-islamistischen Partei von Necmettin Erbakan. Der nordrhein-westfaelische Verfassungsschutz wirft der Organisation mit 27000 Mitgliedern vor, fuer Muslime "auf der Scharia basierende Minderheitenrechte" durchsetzen zu wollen, die aber faktisch bedeuteten, dass "im Wege des Gruppenzwangs Muslime Pflichten auferlegt werden, die sowohl eine Einschraenkung der Grundrechte bedeuten, als auch eine Ausgrenzung der Muslime aus der pluralistischen Gesellschaftsordnung bezwecken." (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

Therefore, the religious differentiation – and here especially a negative portrayal of religious *fanaticism* – can be classified as a central dimension of difference that is ascribed to the images of internal Muslim and Arab actors in the German newspapers. This cultural difference is also critically observed in connection with the level of integration of the Muslim community in German society. Especially after 9/11, it is discussed how far cultural tolerance for Islamic fundamentalism and cultural difference of the internal Other should go. The societal integration of Muslim rules and practices are observed here rather skeptically as the following quotation from the SZ may illustrate:

Vor zwanzig Jahren galt die Existenz von Muslimen in Deutschland als voruebergehend; da erlaubt die Scharia bis zu einem gewissen Grad die Anpassung an die Regeln des Gastlandes. Nun, wo klar ist, dass Muslime dauerhaft in Deutschland leben werden, hat die Auffassung an Bedeutung gewonnen, dass es in Deutschland Raeume geben muesse, in denen glaeubige Muslime nach ihren Regeln leben koennen. Bereits jetzt gibt es Fiqh-Raete, die Schiedssprueche – Fatwas – aussprechen, die sich an der Scharia orientieren. Innerhalb der Gemeinden mag das sinnvoll sein; die Scharia ist pragmatischer als meist angenommen. Schwierig wird es, wenn die Empfehlungen mit Grundrechten kollidieren: Darf man Frauen eine Reise von mehr als 81 Kilometern ohne maennliche Begleitung untersagen? Darf eine Frau nur den halben Erbteil eines Mannes erhalten? Darf es in Deutschland Zweitfrauen nach muslimischem Recht geben? (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

The focus on cultural facets of the internal Other is not solely a German way of actor portrayal; we also find references to cultural features and religious *fanaticism* in U.S. newspapers after 9/11. Nevertheless, this aspect is altogether less relevant for the discussion of internal actors in the American print media. This difference between the German and the American actor portrayals has already been noted in previous chapters (see V.2 for instance), and was also outlined in the context of the images of the external actors of Type 2 (see also VI.2.2). Just like with those actors, with the example of Type 14 we can show once again that the focus on cultural and especially religious features of Arab and Muslim actors is a crucial element of the image of the Other in German newspapers. Before the attacks, the cultural dimension dominates the image and thus Type 14 can also mainly be found in the analyzed German articles.

Compared to that, the next actor type that can be identified with internal actors is relevant in both countries' newspapers and here predominantly after 9/11.

6.2. Type 15: The *Peaceful* Arab and Muslim Communities

After 9/11, as frequently mentioned throughout this work, the close linkage of *violence*, and here especially of *terrorism*, and Islam not only becomes a central topic but it also shapes the German and U.S. perspective on Arab and Muslim actors. Thus, the attacks in New York and Washington also put all Muslims and Arabs in Germany and the United States under a stronger focus and under general suspicion, since the attackers are not only assumed to be religiously motivated but also crossed the national borders to plan and carry out their action. To draw a picture of these suspicious internal Others, the print media in Germany as well as in the U.S. thus frequently focus on the reactions of the internal Arabs and Muslims towards the attacks, and those internal Others are implicitly as well as explicitly expected to distance themselves from the attacks and the perpetrators that are behind them. Type 15 summarizes those parts of the Arab and Muslim communities in Germany and the U.S. that both countries' newspapers identify as *peaceful* and *non-terrorist*.

On a quantitative scale, Type 15 forms the second most relevant actor type of the occurring internal actors in German newspapers after the attacks; altogether the significance of this type increases from a pre-9/11 proportion of 0.4 % to a proportion of 6.7 % of all occurring actors. In the U.S. newspapers before the event we do not find any representatives of this type; after 9/11 it presents the third largest form of internal actor portrayal and can be found with 3.1 % of all appearing actors.

The *peacefulness* of Type 15 actors is contrasted in some articles with Type 14 actors that also exist within those communities. We learn of Muslim organizations and individual private actors that explicitly and publicly speak out *against terrorism*. The German SZ, for example, reports right after the attacks that...

Der Islamrat fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat die Anschlaege in den USA aufs Schaerfste verurteilt. Dieser "barbarische Akt der Unmenschlichkeit" sei durch nichts zu rechtfertigen, hiess es in einer Erklaerung. "Wer immer die Drahtzieher sein moegen – ihr moerderisches Handeln kann niemals mit den Grundsuetzen jeglicher Religionen vereinbart werden." (SZ-01-09-13: 11b)

Similarly, BILD reports that...

Der Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland unterstuetzt die Bundesregierung im Kampf gegen den Terror, sagte der Vorsitzende Nadeem Elyas. Er begrueßte die geplante Streichung des Religionprivilegs fuer extremistische Organisationen. (Bild-01-09-19: 2)

In an article in the SZ the *peaceful* image even includes the overall majority of the German Muslim community that is said to *reject terrorism* and that emphasizes the *peacefulness* of Islam:

In den Moscheen der ganzen Republik beteten am Freitag Glaeubige fuer die Anschlagsopfer und ihre Angehoerigen. Vertreter muslimischer Organisationen erklaeerten, Terroristen duerften sich nicht auf den Islam berufen. "Die Bestuerung ist gross, viele haben bei uns angerufen und gefragt, wie sie helfen koennen", sagte Eren Uensal, Sprecherin des Tuerkischen Bundes Berlin-Brandenburg. Wie zahlreiche andere Verbaende der Hauptstadt habe man zur Kundgebung aufgerufen, "weil es ungeachtet der Community oder Ethnie wichtig ist, Anteilnahme zu zeigen." (SZ-01-09-15: 9)

This positive overall image of the German Muslim community is also referred to by BILD, which emphasizes that...

Die Muslime im heutigen Deutschland sind in der überwältigenden Mehrheit rechtschaffene und gesetzzestreue Bürger der Bundesrepublik. (Bild-01-10-01: 2)

Especially BILD quotes a wealth of statements of condolence from private individuals expressing their *disapproval* of the attacks and their *compassion* for the victims as well as the United States, as the example of a young German Muslima may illustrate:

Ayse (22), Bürokauffrau-Azubi: "Als europäische Muslima kann ich den Terror genau so wenig nachvollziehen, wie eine europäische Christin. Der Islam ist eine friedliche Religion." (Bild-01-09-19: 12)

Also U.S. newspapers emphasize the *peacefulness* of the majority of the internal Muslims and Arabs after the attacks. NEWSWEEK, for example, reports that...

Hossam Mohamad, a 30-year-old computer consultant from Egypt, e-mailed friends, urging them to go. "I feel as if my own house is burning," he said. "Muslims have made a conscious decision to make America our home. We are part of the community as much as anyone else. We just hope to be part of the rebuilding." (NW-01-v138-i13: 18)

Similarly, in the NY TIMES we find the *pro-American* statement of a Pakistani immigrant:

Lt. Col. Anwar K. Malik, an Army doctor who emigrated from Pakistan 22 years ago, said he had no hesitation about the American military mission. "I have very strong feelings," he said. "We should do everything we can to recompense for the attacks." (NYT-01-10-07: 1b)

And in USA TODAY we find the example of Imam Yahya Hendi, the Muslim chaplain at Georgetown University who is quoted saying that...

"The Koran does not in any fashion promote violence. Actually, in the Koran, you find the opposite. It is very clear. God made lives sacred, and no one has the right to take them," Imam Hendi says. "Muslims deplore this kind of violence, and we do not want this to happen again to America, our nation." (USAT-01-09-19: 1A)

Thus, what can be noted as well is that Type 15 actors in both German and U.S. newspapers themselves frequently emphasize the *peacefulness* of Islam and very often argue that they are *against terrorist attacks* especially because violence and terrorism are irreconcilable with their religion. Therefore, Type 15 constructs an image not only of political but also and especially of religious *peacefulness* for the majority of the Arab and Muslim communities. Indirectly, especially those statements that come from private actors who speak out against the attacks reflect a perspective that the Self strongly favors itself. By increasingly emphasizing those views and statements in the portrayal of internal Arab and Muslim actors after the attacks the media implicitly reflect the reactions and views that the Self expects from the Arab and Muslim communities in the West: namely to *disapprove of terrorism*, especially against the West. If we compare this portrayal with the images of external Arab and Muslim actors we can see that Type 15 actors strongly resemble the way in which the "unchallenged alliances" of Type 12 are described (see VI.5.2). Just like Type 12 actors, the majority of the introduced Type 15 actors receive their main relevance from the fact that in the articles they are directly confronted with a negative group of actors that weaken the positive image of these *peaceful* Type 15 figures. At the same time as German and U.S. articles emphasize the *peacefulness* of their Arab and Muslim communities, they confront this positive

group with the potential *threat* that emanates from parts of it. The SZ explicitly refers to that problem by stating that...

Das Bekenntnis, man achte die deutsche Gesellschaftsordnung, ist – bis auf extreme Ausnahmen – allgemein. Doch wenn Tuerkischkundige das Freitagsgebet besuchen, sind sie oft entsetzt ueber Imame, die den Westen pauschal verdammen, die Aufklaerung als Ursache von Drogensucht und Sittenlosigkeit sehen. (SZ-01-10-9: 12)

Thus, the *peacefulness* and, more generally speaking, the acceptance and the adoption of the Western principles and standards of the host societies are an implicitly communicated precondition that the Self demands from the internal Other for an integration of the same. If the focused internal actors want to remain within the Western space – it is communicated – they have to fulfill those mentioned criteria. For Type 15, these conditions are assumed to be fulfilled, however, the images of the next actor type indicate, that the *pro-western*, *anti-terror* positions of some parts of the internal Other are also called into question.

6.3. Type 16: The Murderers among Us⁷⁶

As already noted with the portrayal of external actors, the 9/11 attacks caused huge uncertainty in both German and U.S. society with reference to the perception of internal security. This shattered confidence is also reflected in the way in which the internal Arab and Muslim actors are looked at. One way of portrayal that reflects the uncertainty and skepticism towards the internal Other after 9/11 can be formed of actors that are assumed to intend to “destroy the Self from within.” In both countries’ analyzed newspapers, the 9/11 terrorists as well as a number of other *terrorist* or politically *hostile* actors fit into this category of actors that have crossed the geographical boundaries between Self and Other and now present an internal *threat* to the Self.

Already before the attacks, those negative and *hostile* actors within the national boundaries are noticed. In the German newspapers, three actors (1.2 %) of all identified actors can be ascribed to Type 16 before the attacks. In the American newspapers both internal actors (0.9 %) that are occur in timeframe are Type 16 actors. One of them, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian terrorist suspect who was accused of having planned a terrorist attack on Los Angeles International Airport is especially focused on after the attacks, but before 9/11 is already referred to in the American NEWSWEEK as...

Ahmed Ressam, the would-be bomber who was caught in late '99 trying to smuggle explosives from Canada into the United States, recently turned government witness and confessed he had plotted to bomb the Los Angeles airport. (NW-01-v138-i05: 6)

With the 9/11 attacks as a shocking illustration of the consequences that the infiltration of *hostile* Others can have for Western societies, Type 16 becomes the most frequently used form of actor portrayal in both countries’ newspapers. Almost every second occurring internal actor in the German and U.S. articles is regarded as an internal *threat* (overall relevance in Germany: 8.6 %, in

⁷⁶ Indirect quote and own translation; original quote in German: “Die Mörder sind unter uns” (Bild-01-09-15: 4c).

USA: 7.8 %). Actors of Type 16 are now not only described as a *threat* to the political institutions of the West, but also to public safety and to Western principles and values.

The 9/11 Terrorist

One prototype example for Type 16 are the 9/11 terrorists. Besides the most frequently occurring external terrorist actor, Osama bin Laden, the 9/11 terrorists dominate the news coverage in both countries' newspapers after the attacks. The impact that those terrorists have had on the Western Self may be illustrated, first of all, with a quote from the American NEWSWEEK that asks:

How could a small band of religious zealots knock down the World Trade Center, the most visible symbol of capitalism, killing thousands in lower Manhattan, and come so close to destroying the executive mansion of the most powerful nation on earth? (NW-01-v138-i13: 26.)

To describe these *terrorist* infiltrators as a *threat* to the Self seems reasonable since these actors are *murderers* who killed innocent people in their self-proclaimed war against the West and the United States in particular. Thus, DER SPIEGEL writes that...

[D]ie Terroristen, die in der Weltmacht USA den "Satan," den Inbegriff der "Ungläubigen" oder auch - etwas irdischer - die verhasste Garantiemacht für Israels Existenz sehen. (Sp-01-i40: 152)

...and NEWSWEEK argues that...

Nothing like this has ever happened to America before. With chilling skill, terrorists struck at our heart last Tuesday, hijacking commercial jets, then crashing into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – cold-blooded murder on a mass scale. (NW-01-v138-Sonder: 2)

Furthermore, these terrorists are not only *hostile* towards the Self, but they are also portrayed as enemies of the – *peaceful* – internal and external Other, because they see themselves as "[...] self-claimed disciples of Allah, who not only hijacked four airplanes but also a whole world religion."⁷⁷ However, what makes these terrorists most threatening for the Self is the fact that they did not carry out their negative plans in a distant place but operated from within the West. More than that, they not only carried out the attacks within the national boundaries of the Self but also planned them within Germany and the U.S. Both countries' print media strongly emphasize this aspect. DER SPIEGEL, thereby, mainly focuses on the terrorist network within Germany and reports that...

Mindestens drei der Hijacker, womöglich Piloten, hatten zeitweise in Hamburg gelebt. Zwei der Araber waren eingeschrieben als Elektrotechnik-Studenten an der Technischen Universität Hamburg-Harburg, ein vierter Mann wurde Donnerstagnacht noch gesucht – eine krude Spur in die islamisch-fundamentalistische Szene in Deutschland. (Sp-01-i38: 16)

In another article, the news magazine even talks about a national terrorist network in Germany because...

⁷⁷ Own translation, original quote in German: "[...] selbst ernannter Jünger Allahs, die nicht nur vier Passagiermaschinen gehijackt hatten – sondern auch eine ganze Weltreligion." (Sp-01-i40: 174).

Um die drei Entführer herum haben die Ermittler zudem ein Geflecht aus mehreren Dutzend Verbindungen aufgedeckt, das quer über Deutschland liegt. [...] Eine weitere Spur führt von der Hamburger Zelle ins Münsterland zu Osama A. (Sp-01-i39: 20)

But also the NY TIMES mentions the German terrorist network that is assumed to have planned and coordinated the attacks in the United States:

But German officials now say a third man who studied in Hamburg was involved. He was Ziad Jarrahi, 27, born in Lebanon, a Sunni Muslim from the village of Al Marj in the Bekaa Valley. He took courses here in flight engineering and aircraft construction and had a Hamburg pilot's license. [...] Mr. Shehhi was at the Harburg university just a year, and rarely attended courses, but was inseparable from Mr. Atta here and later in Florida, where both took flight training courses and shared an apartment. (NYT-01-09-17: 4)

Apart from that, U.S. newspapers also frequently mention that a number of the 9/11 suspects already seem to have been in the United States long before they carried out the attacks. USA TODAY reports, for instance, that...

Al Midhar and an accomplice, Salem Alhamzi, who also was on the Pentagon flight, already had entered the USA in late August. [...] Another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, who authorities say piloted the jet that hit the Pentagon, lived in Arizona for the past 5 years. (USAT-01-09-17: 3A)

Another aspect that is frequently emphasized in German and U.S. articles is that from the Western perspective those actors are, on the one hand, obviously different from the Self because they are *hostile*, *fanatical*, and religiously *fundamentalist* but, on the other hand, are to some extent difficult to demarcate because they *seem* to be like the Self. As DER SPIEGEL puts it:

Terroristen fliegen die gleichen Flugzeuge wie wir und telefonieren mit den gleichen Handys. So gesehen sind sie Menschen wie wir. Mit dem kleinen Unterschied, dass sie an den sofortigen Einzug ins Paradies glauben, wenn sie sich opfern. (Sp-01-i38: 168)

Similar to that, the NY TIMES argues that it is rather difficult to identify these *hostile* Others within the own national boundaries since they present themselves as *unobtrusive* and *polite*. As the newspaper writes:

"These were not people who made themselves conspicuous," said Hannelore Haase, who owns a nearby kiosk where she sells newspapers and snacks. Their neighbors said they were very quiet and polite. (NYT-01-09-15: 1b)

This observation can also be found in the German news coverage. The SZ reports that...

Die 19 jungen Maenner kamen mit offenem Visier ins Land, mit ordentlichen Papieren, sogar mit Visa. Sie stellten sich als Studenten, Piloten oder Mechaniker vor und lebten Tuer an Tuer mit amerikanischen oder deutschen Nachbarn – friedlich, freundlich, unauffaellig. Manche waren Singles, andere hatten Familien mit bis zu vier Kindern, die mit Maedchen und Jungen in der Nachbarschaft spielten. Einige lebten wie glaeubige Muslime, fromm, doch ohne Eifer oder gar Fanatismus. Andere fuehrten das Leben des Westens, gingen in Discos, tranken Alkohol. (SZ-01-09-17: 2)

And BILD reports that...

Sie tarnten sich als Autohaendler – Sie wohnten unauffaellig zur Miete – Einer heiratete sogar (Bild-01-09-15: 1b)

As the last quotes illustrate, both countries' newspapers frequently highlight the seemingly *Western lifestyle* of the terrorists. In both countries' newspapers, we find whole articles that

elaborate on the lives of the terrorists, their preparations for the attacks, and their cultural and personal backgrounds to learn more about their motivations. Those actors are not only *unobtrusive* and *friendly*, but also seem culturally, socially and economically *assimilated* and *Westernized* and they use the technical tools of the West. The NY TIMES argues, for example, that...

What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. Think about it: They turned our most advanced civilian planes into human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles – a diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology. (NYT-01-09-13: 27)

And the SZ emphasizes that...

Ein Duzend Terroristen haben vier Passagierflugzeuge gekapert. Sie haben das offenbar mit Messern getan, die als Waffen nur wenig juenger sind als die Faustkeile der Steinzeit. Die Klinge in der Hand, die Opferbereitschaft des Fanatikers im Herzen und das Wissen des 21. Jahrhunderts im Kopf haben die Verbrecher die Jets zu fliegenden Bomben umfunktioniert. (SZ-01-09-13: 4d)

One actor who is especially highlighted in this context is the assumed leader of the group of 9/11 terrorists, Mohammed Atta. NEWSWEEK remarks on him that...

Mohamed Atta was, according to investigators, the perfect soldier in bin Laden's army. He was a citizen of the world. Traveling on a passport from the United Arab Emirates, he lived in Germany for a time, studying at the Technical University in Hamburg. He frequented a nightspot named Sharky's Billiard Bar [...] wore black jeans, and rented – but failed to return – a video of John Carpenter's "Vampire." At the same time, he requested and received a prayer room at the university for himself and about 20 other Muslim students. In the last two years, he began to wear Muslim dress. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26)

Those quotes implicitly reflect that the main *threat* that emanates from the 9/11 terrorists arises from the fact that they cannot be distinguished from the image of the Self, and become seemingly assimilated with it. But the seemingly positive and Western features of those actors can be unmasked as false and as adapted for strategic reasons – namely to infiltrate the Self and destroy it from within. As the NY TIMES notes...

They were adults with education and skill, not hopeless young zealots. At least one left behind a wife and young children. They mingled in secular society, even drinking forbidden alcohol, hardly typical of Islamic militants. [...] Those suspected of perpetrating Tuesday's destruction had, in some cases, spent years studying and training in the United States, collecting valuable commercial skills and facing many opportunities to change their minds. (NYT-01-09-15: 2d)

Those Type 16 actors reflect the disturbance, the shock and the concern of the German and U.S. Self about the fact that these *evil* Others were able to become part of the Western collectivity, that not all of those terrorists were simply *naïve* and *poor* but rather *educated* and *inconspicuous* persons, and that they *pretended* to identify with the Western concept of belonging and to share Western principles and values of the Self. As NEWSWEEK writes:

It is very difficult for a free and open society to defend against terrorists who are at once patient, smart and willing to die. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26)

This disturbance is also reflected in another context when the NY TIMES writes:

We are chilled as we learn more about how the Middle East terrorists mad with murder breached our walls and lived brazenly among us for years, mocking our hospitality, exploiting our freedoms. (NYT-01-09-19: 27b)

Thus, we can say that the *inconspicuousness* and “Western” appearance of the terrorists seem to make them even more dreadful than the “villain” Osama bin Laden (see also VI.2.6) who is regarded as the mastermind of the attacks and who is still at large. In contrast to Osama bin Laden, special focus is on the personal lifestyles of the 9/11 terrorists and their borderline status between Western world and Arab/Muslim origin.

In a way, the images of the 9/11 terrorists resemble those of the “strategic” Type 9 actors introduced in subchapter VI.4.1. Their seeming similarities with the Self are unmasked as false and are described as being strategically adopted by the actors to cover their true intentions and remain *inconspicuous*, and to find access to those Western societies that they actually disapprove of and want to destroy. The overall image of the 9/11 terrorists is thus clearly negative and these actors are assumed to be different from the Self despite their seeming similarities. Apart from that, the portrayal of the 9/11 terrorists also reflects the insecurity and uncertainty that these actors and the attacks have produced within the West and with reference to the internal but also the external Arab and Muslim Other. This insecurity is also reflected in the fact that Arab and Muslim communities are observed more skeptically after the attacks, and that parts of these communities are frequently referred to as identified or suspected “hidden extremists.”

The Hidden Extremists within the West and Their Accomplices

Both German and American newspapers not only mention the *evil* 9/11 terrorists or the *peaceful* majority of the internal Arab and Muslim communities but also contrast those communities with a more or less undefined group of *militant*, Islamic *extremists* among them. Especially in the German newspapers those “sleepers of Islamic terrorism”⁷⁸ within the country are argued to be a subliminal *threat* for German society and the West in general, and are suspected to be involved in subversive, *anti-western* activities and *support terrorists* like those behind the 9/11 attacks. As a reaction to the attacks, DER SPIEGEL, for example, reports that...

“Freudig erregt” und geradezu “euphorisch” hätten militante Islamisten in Deutschland den Anschlag aufgenommen. (Sp-01-i38: 26)

...whereas the SZ announces that...

Deutsche Fahnder kamen im Fruehjahr einer Gruppe algerischer Terroristen auf die Spur, die einen Anschlag in Strassburg planten. (SZ-01-09-13: 6)

All three analyzed German newspapers also give quantitative numbers of potential *hostile* actors that are assumed to be *hidden* within the country. In this context, BILD reports that...

In Deutschland sind derzeit 58 000 Ausländer als politische Extremisten aktiv. Hasserfüllte, lebende Brandbomben. Diese Personen müssen ausnahmslos ausgewiesen und von jetzt bis zur Ausreise überwacht werden. (Bild-01-09-17: 6f)

⁷⁸ Own translation, original quote in German: “Schläfer des islamischen Terrorismus” (Sp-01-i39: 28).

In DER SPIEGEL we learn that...

Potenzielle Rekruten für den Heiligen Krieg gibt es dennoch genug. 20 islamistische Organisationen mit rund 31 000 Mitgliedern werden vom Verfassungsschutz beobachtet. Zumeist leben sie als Asylbewerber in Deutschland, weil ihnen – paradox genug – die Zugehörigkeit zu einer terroristischen Gruppierung in ihren Heimatländern die Abschiebung erspart. (Sp-01-i38: 32)

In another article the magazine emphasizes that...

[...] mindestens 3000 Muslime seien zu Gewalttaten bereit. [...] Einige beschränken sich auf religiöse und politische Aktivitäten, andere hingegen propagieren Gewalt oder unterstützen gar terroristische Aktionen in ihren Heimatländern (Sp-01-i39: 28)

This threatening scenario is also picked up by the SZ that reports that...

Diese radikalen Islamisten, die zumeist eine militärische Ausbildung in Afghanistan absolviert hätten, stünden vermutlich auf Abruf für einen neuen Anschlag oder Kampfeinsatz bereit, meinte Behrens. Nach jüngsten Erkenntnissen lebten diese "Schläfer" völlig unauffällig. (SZ-01-09-21: 9b)

This general assumption of a wider network of *hidden extremists* within the West that moreover represent a potential *threat* for the Self can also be found in the U.S. newspapers. NEWSWEEK, for example, in one article looks at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, N.Y and reports that...

Bonded by combat, full of religious zeal, the diaspora of young Arab men willing to die for Allah congregated at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, N.Y., a dreary inner-city building that doubled as a recruiting post for the CIA seeking to steer fresh troops to the mujahedin. The dominant figures at the center in the late '80s were a gloomy New York City engineer named El Sayyid Nosair, who took Prozac for his blues, and his sidekick, Mahmud Abouhalima, who had been a human minesweeper in the Afghan war (his only tool was a thin reed, which he used as a crude probe). The new immigrants were filled not with gratitude toward their new nation, but by implacable hatred toward America, symbol of Western modernity that threatened to engulf Muslim fundamentalism in a tide of blue jeans and Hollywood videos. (NW-01-v138-i14: 38)

Similarly, the NY TIMES reports on a Somali immigrant who is said to be connected with the 9/11 terrorists:

The intensified scrutiny of hazardous-material licenses came as federal prosecutors increased the pressure on a Virginia man whose name and phone number were found in a car registered to one of the hijackers of the jet that slammed into the Pentagon. That man, Mohamed Abdi, 44, a naturalized citizen from Somalia, was ordered jailed without bond today by a federal magistrate judge who said Mr. Abdi might otherwise flee the United States. (NYT-01-09-27: 5)

Here, we learn that some Arab immigrants in the U.S. are not *grateful* for finding refuge in the country but instead have an antipathy for their host country due to its cultural modernity and openness. In more general terms, the NY TIMES quotes the American Secretary of State Collin Powell who argues that this new conflict that arises from the attacks cannot be compared to other previous military conflicts since it is a war that will take place on a global scale and thus will be fought with enemies that cannot be easily located in one single place:

This is different. The enemy is in many places. The enemy is not looking to be found. The enemy is hidden. The enemy is, very often, right here within our own country. And so you have to design a campaign plan that goes after that kind of enemy, and it isn't always blunt-force military, although that is certainly an option. It may well be that the diplomatic efforts,

political efforts, legal, financial, other efforts, may be just as effective against that kind of an enemy as would military force be. (NYT-01-09-15: 16)

As the examples above may indicate, not only the *hidden extremists* are seen as a potential *threat* but in both German and U.S. articles after the attacks also individual private persons are frequently mentioned because they have supported, for instance, the 9/11 terrorists or simply express their approval of the attacks. Especially BILD frequently reports on private actors among the Arab and Muslim immigrants in the country that are regarded as a potential danger or at least are described as *hostile* towards their host society or the West. We learn, for example, that after the 9/11 attacks...

Abgeschoben werden soll eine palästinensische Familie aus Hannover, die vor Kameras in Jubel ausbrach. [...] Der Taxifahrer, der mich gestern zum Bahnhof brachte, bekundete klammheimliche Freude über den Schmerz der Amerikaner. Ein Mitläufer Osama bin Ladens? Oder nur ein armer Irrer? Soll ich mit ihm diskutieren? Dafür ist sein Deutsch zu schlecht. (Bild-01-09-15: 4)

...and in another article, the newspaper reports that...

Die Deutschland-Zentrale von Terroristenführer bin Laden soll sich nach den Informationen eines ausländischen Geheimdienstes im Raum Frankfurt/M. befinden, berichtet "Die Welt". Ein libanesischer Autohändler besorge Wohnungen, Papiere, Fahrzeuge und halte Kontakt mit dem Irak. (Bild-01-09-19: 2d)

In DER SPIEGEL we find the example of a religious preacher in Münster, Germany who is reported to have had contact with the 9/11 suicide attackers who came from Hamburg. As the magazine writes:

Noch ein zweiter alter Kunde der Staatsschützer spielt jetzt in den Ermittlungen eine Rolle: der ägyptische Prediger Osama A., 35, Vorsitzender des Islamischen Zentrums Münster e. V. Der Verdächtige, der den Verfassungsschützern als radikaler Prediger gilt, soll über Mittelsmänner Kontakte zu den Selbstmördern aus der Hansestadt gehabt haben. (Sp-01-i39: 20)

For the American context, NEWSWEEK reports on a Boston taxi driver who is suspected of having financially supported the 9/11 terrorists:

Nabil al-Marabh, a former Boston taxi driver of Kuwaiti descent, is suspected of funneling thousands of dollars in wire transfer through Fleet Bank to the Middle East. [...] Al-Marabh, who like a number of terrorists seems to have used Canada as a sometime sanctuary, was hard to track down. (NW-01-v138-i14: 38)

And USA TODAY mentions another suspect in San Diego:

FBI agents have arrested a San Diego man authorities suspect of giving money to at least two hijackers and teaching them to use the Internet, a key method of communication for the terrorists. Omer Bakarbashat, 26, was taken to New York for questioning by the FBI. (USAT-01-09-21: 1Ab)

Altogether, we can thus say that the occurrence of Type 16 actors in the analyzed articles of both countries is closely connected with the previous Type 15 in the aftermath of the attacks. The *peaceful* Arab and Muslim communities are contrasted with the new *threat* for the Self that arises from the "sleepers" and potential or actual *terrorists* and *terror supporters* who live among those Others within the West. Especially in the German newspapers, Type 16 actors are frequently consulted to illustrate this new *threat*. Those actors thus also reflect the shock that the event has

caused with reference to the German security perception, despite the fact that the attacks actually took place on U.S. territory, and largely due to the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists had lived in Germany before the event. At the same time, the combination of Type 15 and Type 16 actors indicates the skepticism that is communicated in German newspapers with respect to the internal Other in general, a skepticism that cannot be found to this extent in the U.S. media images and that reflects a German perception of Arab and mainly Muslim immigrants as culturally different and unwilling to integrate in German society, adopt Western standards and share the Western principles that the German Self regards as central for its own concept of belonging. This perception indicates that the internal Other is still predominantly regarded as an out-group, an assumption that seems to have been proved by the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists lived within in the country for years.

Compared to that, we find slight attempts to take a more integrating perspective in the U.S. articles after the attacks. However, this perspective is slightly weakened by the last actor type that will be introduced in this subchapter and that – compared to the quantitative relevance of Type 15 actors in German newspapers after 9/11 – dominate the U.S. news coverage after the attacks besides the 9/11 terrorists:

6.4. Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West

As McAlister (2005) has also emphasized, despite President Bush's calls for tolerance in the aftermath of 9/11, there were more than one thousand registered incidents of violence against Arab and Muslim Americans in the U.S. during the weeks after the attacks (McAlister 2005: 275-276), incidents that are also discussed in the analyzed print media articles, and here specifically in the American ones. Type 17 comprises the images of Arab and Muslim Americans who became victims of rage and hate crimes in the aftermath of 9/11. Compared to the German newspapers, in the U.S. articles we find a significant focus on those members of the Arab and Muslim communities who became victims of angry reactions by other American citizens in the aftermath of the attacks. On a quantitative scale, nearly one third of all identified internal actors in U.S. newspapers after 9/11 can be ascribed to Type 17 (overall relevance: 5.2 %).⁷⁹ Victims of violent assaults are also mentioned in the analyzed German newspapers, but here they are much less relevant with a proportion of only 1.5 %.

⁷⁹ This observation was also made by Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003): In their data set, of four American newspapers (NY TIMES, NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, and USA TODAY) analyzed over a time period of six months after the attacks, civil rights issues and the violation of those rights, and here especially physical attacks against Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, are the most frequently addressed topic as well with one-third of all themes (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 145). And Weston (2003) emphasized in her analysis that after 9/11 Arab Americans turned out to be depicted much more positively and sympathetically, either as loyal and patriotic citizens of the American nation, or as victims of harassment by other citizens as well government detention (see Weston 2003).

All analyzed U.S. print media frequently discuss such negative occurrences as verbal accusations, ascriptions of guilt, or even violent assaults and hate crimes that took place against Arab and Muslim actors within the country after the attacks. NEWSWEEK, for example, reports that...

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks there were scattered reports of tauntings, even beatings, of Arab-American children by schoolmates. (NW-01-v138-i13: 18)

...and in another article reports on a whole series of violent assaults against Arab and Muslim actors:

As America reels from last week's deadly terrorist attacks, Muslims and Arab-Americans are experiencing an isolating terror all their own. In Washington, D.C., Muslim women have had hijab scarves snatched from their heads. A mosque in San Francisco was splattered with pig's blood. A bomb threat at a mostly Arab school in Dearborn, Mich., sent frightened teens running into the streets. (NW-01-v138-i13: 69)

Similar incidents are mentioned in the NY TIMES which reports, for example, that...

Some mosques closed their doors out of fear. The Islamic Center of Irving, a mosque in suburban Dallas, had its windows shattered by gunshots. One mosque in San Francisco found on its doorsteps a bag of what appeared to be blood. And in Alexandria, Va., a vandal threw two bricks through the windows of an Islamic bookstore; handwritten notes with anti-Muslim sentiments were found attached to the bricks. (NYT-01-09-13: 24)

In another article a few days later, the newspaper furthermore writes:

In Mesa, Ariz., in what appeared to be an attempt at revenge for the Trade Center attack, an unidentified assailant shot and killed a man who had moved to the U.S. from India 10 years ago. Other reports of physical and verbal harassment of people believed to be Middle Eastern are coming in from all parts of the country, including reports of firebombings and the cruel harassment of schoolchildren. (NYT-01-09-17: 15b)

Finally – and just to name one of a number of examples – USA TODAY writes that...

In Laramie, Wyo., a Muslim woman and her children were chased from a Wal-Mart by angry shoppers, and a Pakistani woman was nearly run over in a shopping-mall parking lot by an enraged 75-year-old man. (USAT-01-09-19: 15A)

All of the newspapers also explicitly object to these violent attacks, and strongly emphasize that the victims be regarded as part of the national Self. Nevertheless, these incidents also reflect the gap in U.S. society that seems to exist between the discursively proclaimed disapproval of these verbal and violent attacks against Arab and Muslims as part of U.S. society and identity, and the fact that those hostilities do take place nevertheless. In a way, this violent behavior on behalf of the Self seems to indicate that the ideal of the integration of Arab and Muslim Americans does not fully work or is not fully adopted by all parts of U.S. society.

On the other hand, the frequent portrayal of those victims, the explicit disapproval of the violence against those actors, and the emphasis that the internal Other (to large parts) is seen as part of the American Self also reveals a stronger ideological and conceptual integration of the internal Other in the U.S. self-concept, despite the fact that this ideal might still not be fulfilled. The images of Arab and Muslim American victims in U.S. newspapers also seem to reflect a request to society to re-strengthen its own principles like tolerance and peacefulness despite the violation of those principles by some parts of the internal Other. Therefore – and similar to the self-criticism that was already identified in the context of the images of external Arab and Muslim

victims (see VI.3.1) – this shift in focus towards the Self can again be found with the portrayal of Type 17 actors.

Summary: When the Other Enters the Western Space

The typology of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 is less complex than that of the external actors. As outlined, four different actor types can be identified:

Type 14 comprises the images of internal actors that are mainly described according to their cultural features, and also illustrates one difference between the images of internal actors in German and U.S. print media that is worth mentioning: German articles reflect a stronger emphasis on an observed cultural distance between internal Arab and Muslim actors and their German host society, an aspect that is altogether less relevant for the portrayal of internal actors in the analyzed American print media. As outlined, this difference between the German and the American actor portrayals can also be found in the context of external actor types like Type 2. Therefore, we may say that the emphasis of cultural and especially religious features of Arab and Muslim actors is a crucial element of the image of the Other in German newspapers.

Type 15 summarizes the images of large parts of the Arab and Muslim communities in Germany and the U.S. that receive a stronger focus and are under general suspicion after 9/11. On a quantitative scale, Type 15 forms the second most relevant internal actor type in German newspapers after the attacks and the third most relevant form of internal actor portrayal in the U.S. articles. Both countries' print media focus on the reactions of these actors to the attacks and emphasize the overall *peacefulness* of the Muslim and Arab communities not only on a political but also on a religious dimension. The actor type implicitly reflects the expectations and demands that the Self has towards the Arab and Muslim communities in the West: namely to *disapprove of terrorism*, especially against the West. *Peacefulness* and, more generally speaking, the acceptance and the adoption of the Western principles and standards of the host societies are an implicitly communicated precondition that the Self demands from the internal Other to integrate them in this collectivity. Here, Type 15 is similar to the external “unchallenged alliances” of Type 12.

At the same time, the *peacefulness* of their Arab and Muslim communities is confronted with the *threat* that arises from parts of it. The shattered feeling of national security that was caused by the attacks is also reflected in the third actor type that was identified in the newspapers, Type 16. Those predominantly *terrorist* or politically *hostile* actors have crossed the geographical boundaries between Self and Other and now present an internal *threat* to the Self. We also find representatives of this type before 9/11, but Type 16 is THE central form of portrayal of internal actors after the attacks, where nearly every second actor can be ascribed to this category. Actors of Type 16 are not only described as a *threat* to the political institutions of the West, but also to the public safety and to the Western principles and values. These actors are furthermore closely connected with Type 15, since the group of positive *peaceful* internal Others is frequently

contrasted with the newly perceived threat for the Self that arises from the “sleepers” and potential or actual terrorists and terror supporters that live among those *peaceful* Others within the West. Here, Type 16 actors also reflect the shock that the event caused with reference to the German security perception, despite the fact that the attacks actually took place on U.S. territory, mainly because some of the 9/11 terrorists lived in Germany for years. However, the combination of Type 15 and Type 16 actors also indicates a stronger skepticism of the German Self with respect to the internal Other in general than of the U.S. Self. Arab and mainly Muslim immigrants in Germany are not only predominantly regarded as culturally different, but are also regarded as lacking the will to integrate in the German society, adopt Western standards, and share the Western principles that the German Self regards as central for its own concept of belonging.

In contrast to that, U.S. newspapers reflect a more integrative perspective that is weakened however to some extent by the last actor type that was introduced in this subchapter. Type 17 summarizes the images of Arab and Muslim Americans who became victims of rage and hate crimes in the aftermath of the event. Compared to the German context, in the U.S. articles these victims make up one third of all identified internal actors after 9/11. The analyzed newspapers explicitly object to these violent attacks, and in the U.S. context also strongly emphasize that the victims are regarded as part of the national Self. However, this violent behavior on the part of the Self also seems to indicate that the ideal of the integration of the internal Other is not yet fully achieved in U.S. society. Nevertheless, U.S. newspapers explicitly disapprove the violence against those actors, and emphasize that the internal Other is seen as part of the American Self. Therefore, Type 17 also reflects a request to the Self to re-strengthen its own principles like tolerance and peacefulness, and again reveals the increased self-criticism on behalf of the Self that has already been identified in the context of the images of external Arab and Muslim victims of Type 7.

Altogether, the images of the internal Others in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 are therefore to a large extent similar to those of the external actors. The only difference is that they lack the geographical distance that is the common element of distinction with the four other levels of actor construction. Thus, this distance does not present the crucial factor for the demarcation of Arabs and Muslims, and the internal actor types can also be classified according to the four other levels of difference, as Table VI.6 summarizes:

Table VI.6: Levels of Difference of the Internal Actor Types

Levels of Difference	Internal Actor Types
Level 1: The Devaluated Other	Type 14: The Culturally Distant Evaluated Other
Level 2: The <i>Weak</i> Other	Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West
Level 3: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	Type 16: The Murderers Among Us
Level 4: The Self Within the Other	Type 15: The <i>Peaceful</i> Arab and Muslim Communities

The images of Type 14 actors reflect a significant difference to and distance to the German or American self-concepts of belonging that are communicated in the analyzed media mainly by devaluating the features of those actors or the actors as a whole. Type 17 actors could be classified on the level of *weak* otherness (even though actors here do not directly suffer from the negative behavior of other Arab and Muslim actors but of the aggression and violence of members of the Self). Type 16 actors could be located on the level of *strategic* otherness, especially because some of those actors have been argued to strategically blend into their Western host society. Finally, Type 15 presents the largest similarity between Self and Other, therefore, actors of Type 15, i.e. the *peaceful* Arab and Muslim communities in Germany and the United States, could also be seen as another representative of “the Self within the (internal) Other.”

7. Conclusion: Distance and Similarities between Self and Other

The analysis of the German and U.S. print media articles around the 9/11 event has revealed that Arab and Muslim actors – those abroad as well as those located within the German or American national boundaries – receive quite a large variety of different images. The quantitatively most frequently used characteristics and features for the portrayal of these actors in both countries’ newspapers were outlined in chapter V. However, as was argued at the beginning of chapter VI, to simply collect the most frequently used features and lump them together to one overall image would not grasp the variety of different kinds of actor portrayals. As outlined, the appearing actors do not only possess adverse features that the Self disapproves of or does not tolerate. Instead, we also find actors that appear to be rather similar to the way in which the German or American Self perceives itself in the analyzed articles of both countries.

Thus, it was also crucial to look at the way in which characteristics and features are ascribed to the individual actors and how those actors are connected with each other in the respective articles to learn more about the qualitative relevancies of the ascribed features or images and the respective actors. To recapitulate, the first distinction made in this chapter was between internal and external actors, on the basis of geographical closeness to or distance from the observing German and American Self. In a second step, we looked at the different images that those external and internal actors receive in the analyzed print media of both countries before and after the focused event, in order to illustrate the similarities and construction patterns that can be identified. In Table VI.7, the overall typology is summarized that was established from the occurring set of internal and external actors in German and U.S. print media before and after 9/11.

Table VI.7: Overall Typology of Internal and External Actors⁸⁰

Actor Type	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
1: Gunmen, Terrorists And <i>Hostile</i> Politicians	28.4	28.9	17.8	24.1
2: The Culturally <i>Backward</i> and <i>Fundamentalist</i> Other	12.8	11.6	12.3	8.0
3: The Politically Devaluated Other	5.8	5.2	3.3	3.6
4: The <i>Poor</i> and <i>Underdeveloped</i> Other	1.2	3.9	1.9	2.3
5: The <i>Wealthy</i> Political Elite	5.4	3.0	0.4	0.3
6: The Villain	-	-	2.2	2.3
7: The Victim	20.2	24.1	10.8	9.6
8: The Weakened Similar Other	6.6	10.8	9.3	10.6
9: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	2.7	3.4	6.3	6.2
10: The Strategically Used Other	-	1.3	4.8	3.6
11: The Role Model Other	3.9	3.0	3.0	1.3
12: The Unchallenged Alliance after 9/11	-	-	2.6	3.9
13: The Political Critic of the West	-	0.9	-	1.3
14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other	1.6	-	2.2	0.8
15: The <i>Peaceful</i> Arab and Muslim Communities	0.4	-	6.7	3.1
16: The Murderers Among Us	1.2	0.9	8.6	7.8
17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West	-	-	1.5	5.2
other Actors	9.7	3.0	6.3	6.0
Total Number of Actors	257	232	269	386

External Others

13 types of external actor images have been derived from the analysis and introduced as empirically significant forms of actor images. As was outlined, these 13 actor types are of varying significance in both countries' newspapers, or they are of varying relevance before and after the analyzed event.

The largest actor type that was identified among the occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both countries' newspapers before as well as after 9/11 is that of *violent* actors, terrorists, or *hostile* politicians of Type 1 (see VI.2.1). The devaluation of *violence* and *hostility* is one of the most frequently focused on aspects in the context of external Arab and Muslim actors. At the same time, this focus reflects a Western disapproval of violence and terrorism, and the demand for a more *peaceful* political interaction within Arab and Muslim countries but also, and especially after 9/11, with the Self. Less often, actors are also devaluated on other dimensions, for example, for

⁸⁰ In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

their economic *lavishness*, in their social and economic development or with regard to their political actions.

The second largest actor type before 9/11 in both countries consists of victims (see VI.3.1). Victimized Arab and Muslim actors mostly suffer from the negative conditions in their Arab and Muslim home countries or have to bear the negative behavior by other Arab and Muslim actors who may also be responsible for the negative societal conditions. Type 7 summarizes this form of portrayal. This actor type indirectly also criticizes certain negative aspects of the Other, not by devaluating the victims, but rather by devaluating the conditions that are, directly or indirectly, seen to be responsible for the victims' situation. Thus, especially before 9/11 but also after the attacks, the Victim type is another central way of exemplifying the consequences that result from a lack of Western standards and principles like democratic structures, freedom, and economic progress in Arab and Muslim societies. However, compared to the solely negative Type 1 actors, Type 7 actors are not completely different from the Self. Both the observing Self and the victim implicitly criticize the lack of Western standards in Arab and Muslim countries, the latter mainly because they have to face and bear the negative consequences that may result from this lack of Western standards and principles.

The ranking in Table VI.7 also shows that before the attacks we find a rather similar quantitative relevance of the different actor types in German and U.S. newspapers. This changes slightly after the attacks. In the German context, Arab and Muslim actors are now described more strongly with regard to their cultural *backwardness* and religious *fundamentalist* views or actions (see VI.2.2). Culturally devaluated actors of Type 2 form the second largest actor group in the German print media after the 9/11.

Compared to that, U.S. newspapers more often describe actors who bear a certain degree of similarity with the Self, to the extent that they possess features that can also be regarded as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or that they support Western views and principles. Those Type 8 actors (see VI.3.2), for instance, stand up for the improvement of *democratic* structures, have *modern* cultural views, and especially after 9/11 speak out or take action against *terrorism* and take sides with the West in the anti-terror coalition. However, at the same time, they are weakened in their positive or similar images with certain negative aspects, because they are also politically *undemocratic*, culturally *conservative*, or economically *extravagant*. Their level of institutionalization of Western standards is limited, or they *lack* the political *power* to accomplish their attempts. Those *weak* external Arab and Muslim actors indicate an increased skepticism on behalf of the Self with some of the focused on Arab and Muslim actors, especially after 9/11. The positive involvement of some of those actors in the coalition against terrorism, or their political and military alliance with the West in the effort to fight terrorism and find the supporters and masterminds of the attacks in New York and Washington does not automatically make them equal partners of the Self. This perception seems to be especially crucial for the American perspective on the Other after 9/11, since the proclaimed "war on terrorism" is also combined with the professed aim to bring more *democratic* structures to the Other in order to prevent the

spread of terrorist structures and tendencies, religious extremism, and violent upheaval in the Muslim and Arab countries.

Apart from this quantitative ranking, some of the introduced actor types are relevant in both countries' print media on the qualitative level, i.e. for the different issues and topics with which they appear. According to this criterion, actor types like Type 6 ("the Villain," see VI.2.6) or the strategic Others of Type 9 or 10 (see VI.4.1 and VI.4.2) are most relevant for the respective articles in both countries' newspapers. Compared to other actors types (such as Type 1), whose representatives do not necessarily have to be central for an article and may also appear only once or as one example among many others in the respective articles, actors of Type 6 or the *strategic* Others of Type 9 or 10 are often central for an article or dominate the news coverage of certain topics or events. Actors like Osama bin Laden, the Taliban regime, the strategic partners of the West in the post-9/11 anti-terror coalition or the *contradictory* but *useful* allies like Saudi Arabia are discussed in great detail in the context of a few articles in both countries' analyzed media sets after 9/11, and thus form qualitatively central actor figures in the timeframe of analysis.

In conclusion we can stress that despite slight quantitative differences, the types of external Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are nearly identical before as well as after 9/11, and that both German and American Self evaluated the Other quite similarly (for instance, with regard to the institutionalization of Western principles).

Internal Others

The analysis of internal Arab and Muslim actors has revealed that despite their geographical closeness to the observing Self they are described and distinguished from the same according to similar patterns as the external Other. Internal actors also vacillate between similarity and distance to the Self, and sometimes the constellations between different internal actors are crucial for the resulting images of these Others within the national boundaries of the Self. Four ways of portrayal were derived from the occurring images of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media.

One notable difference between German and U.S. print media is that especially before 9/11 internal Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers are mainly distanced according to their cultural features (see VI.6.1). Type 14 summarizes those actors who are mainly described according to negative cultural features, and are described, for instance, as culturally *conservative*, *backward*, *misogynistic*, or religiously *fundamentalist*, and those features often lead to a conflict with the actor's host society. Thus, the cultural dimension is also a central focus of demarcation with regard to Arab and mainly Muslim actors within Germany.

One correspondence between the German and U.S. portrayals of internal actors is that after the attacks the overall shift of focus to issues like "terrorism" and "Islamic fundamentalism" also affects the images of internal actors. In both German and U.S. newspapers, nearly half of the actors within the national contexts after 9/11 are described as potentially or actually *violent*, *hostile*,

or *supportive of terrorist actions*. These actors are summarized in Type 16 (see VI.6.3). Type 16 actors also reflect the potential *threat* that both countries' media assume to emanate not only from parts of the external but also of the internal Arab and Muslim Other, an aspect that is explicitly communicated in the articles, as well. As mentioned before, some of those actors even strategically blend into their host societies as well and adapt Western features, which even increases the Western skepticism for those actors.

Hostile Type 16 actors are explicitly distinguished from and contrasted with the *peaceful* Arab and Muslim communities in both countries that form the third type of occurring internal actors (Type 15, see VI.6.2). On a quantitative scale, type 16 actors thereby outdo these *peaceful* actors. Especially for the German context, the confrontation of *pro-terror* and *anti-terror* positions among the Arab and Muslim actors within Germany after 9/11 indicates that the internal Other is still predominantly regarded as an out-group that differs from its host society in its basic political or cultural features, and is not regarded as an integrated part of the German society and the concept of belonging that this society is assumed to share. Instead, the *peacefulness* of the majority of Muslim actors communities in Germany is continuously confronted with the minor but decisive group of *militant* Islamic extremists (Type 16). In this confrontation, the *peaceful* communities are repeatedly asked to distance themselves from the aforementioned extremists and their *hostile* and *fundamentalist* views. Even though only the extremists are explicitly constructed as a subliminal *threat* to the German society and the West in general, the fact that most of them are *hidden WITHIN* the *peaceful* communities also increases the skepticism against those Type 15 actors. Thus, in German print media after the attacks internal Arab and Muslim actors are, on the one hand, expected to choose sides and follow the norms, standards, and principles and values of their host society. On the other hand, the communicated skepticism in the different articles also reflects that these internal actors are regarded as *not equal*, nevertheless. Even the *peaceful* and assimilated internal Other is still regarded as different by the observing Self.

In contrast to that, in U.S. print media Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. are predominantly asked to decide whether or not they see themselves as Americans and as part of the Self after the attacks. This is also reflected in the second largest internal actor type in U.S. articles – Arab and Muslim victims of the 9/11 attacks (Type 17), even though on a different level than the direct victims of the attacks. Every third internal actor in U.S. media after 9/11 is described as a victim – mainly of violent assaults and negative reactions by other U.S. citizens who put some of the blame for the event on those Arabs and Muslims who live in the United States.

U.S. newspapers frequently emphasize their disapproval of these violent reactions since those Arab and Muslim victims are seen as PART of the American nation (at least the *peaceful* American Arabs and Muslims), whereas the German Self still distances those internal Others within its national boundaries even when they present themselves as *peaceful* and assimilated. So, at least for the Type 15 and Type 17 actors in the analyzed U.S. newspapers after 9/11, we can say that they are regarded as part of the Self rather than of the Other, at least on an ideological level and

despite the fact that this ideal might still not be fulfilled completely as the attacks of internal Arabs and Muslims by members of the American society indicates.

The Overall Distance and Similarities between Self and Other

Altogether, the images of internal and external actors in both countries' print media around 9/11 reflect nearly the same structures of portrayal. Thus, the geographical distance does not present the crucial factor for the demarcation of an Arab and Muslim Other. The occurring internal actors in the newspaper articles are also distinguishable from the Self on one of the other four levels of difference that have been derived for the images of external actors in German and U.S. print media.

Type 14 actors reflect a significant difference from and distance to the German or American self-concepts of belonging that are communicated in the analyzed media mainly by devaluating the features of those actors or the actors as a whole. Type 17 actors are *weak* Others, even though they do not directly suffer from the negative behavior of other Arab and Muslim actors but of the aggression and violence of members of the Self. Type 16 actors present a form of *strategic* otherness, especially because some of those actors have been argued to strategically blend into their Western host society. And actors of Type 15, i.e. the *peaceful* Arab and Muslim communities in Germany and the United States, could also be seen as another representative of "the Self within the (internal) Other."

Therefore we can sum up that the images of the Arab and Muslim Other in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 reflect four central levels of difference from the German and American Self: (1) Actors are either completely different from the Self and are devaluated with regard to their features. (2) They are similar to some extent but are weakened in their similar features or their overall status. (3) Actors are similar to some extent but their similarity is neglected since the similar features are adopted to reap certain benefits of this approach towards the Self, or certain actors who are actually not regarded as similar to the Self are approached nevertheless since they are assumed to be *useful* for the Self despite their negative facets. (4) Or, actors present a "mirror" of the Self, i.e. they are solely described as positive and carry features, or support standards and principles that the Self regards as part of its own agenda, as well. Those four levels of difference and distance between Self and Other differ in their quantitative significance in both countries' newspapers around 9/11, as is summarized in Table VI.8:

Table VI.8: Quantitative Significance of the Levels of Difference⁸¹

	Before 9/11		After 9/11	
	Germany	USA	Germany	USA
Level 1: The Devaluated Other	55.6	53.5	42.0	42.0
Level 2: The <i>Weak</i> Other	26.8	35.2	20.4	25.4
Level 3: The <i>Strategic</i> Other	3.9	5.6	19.7	17.6
Level 4: The Self Within the Other	4.7	4.3	12.6	10.4
Occurring Actors – total	257	232	269	386

As can see in the table, the majority of Arab and Muslim actors in both German and U.S. newspapers are devaluated with regard to their features and actions. Before 9/11, more than half of the occurring actors in both countries' print media (55.6 % in German media and 53.5 % in U.S. media) are devaluated. With the event the numbers of devaluated Arabs and Muslims drop slightly, but still 42.0 % of all occurring actors in both countries' newspapers receive a devaluated image. Thus, the perception of the Other as the negative counterpart of the Self can be seen as the most central form of portrayal.

The second most frequently used way in which Arab and Muslim actors are described is that of a *weak* otherness. Before the attacks, every fourth actor in German newspapers (26.8 %) and more than one third (35.2 %) of all occurring actors in U.S. newspapers receive a weakening image. After 9/11, this form of portrayal decreases and actors who are seen as similar but are at the same time weakened in their similar features or in their position and status now make up a proportion of 20.4 % in German newspapers and 25.4 % in U.S. newspapers.

One reason why those first two levels of difference become slightly less relevant after 9/11 is the third level of difference construction in both countries' print media. Before the attacks, actors who possess (similar) features to the Self but who are either mistrusted in their "Western appearance" because they are unmasked as *strategic* and *false*, or whose *contradictions* and *deficits* are ignored because they are regarded as strategically useful for the Self, are only of minor relevance. Only 3.9 % of all occurring actors in the German newspapers before 9/11 and 5.6 % of those in the U.S. articles of this timeframe are denied their similarities as strategic. After 9/11 however, this perspective on the Other becomes much more frequent; now 19.7 % of all actors in Germany and 17.6 % of those in the U.S. print media are viewed as *strategic*, *contradictory* or *useful*. The increased relevance of this level of difference and similarity reflects the uncertainty and skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks and with regard to the Arab and Muslim Other – not only in the U.S. as a direct victim of those acts but also in Germany.

The fourth form of actor portrayal is the detection of the "Self within the Other." Only 4.7 % of all occurring actors in German newspapers and only 4.3 % of those in the U.S. print media

⁸¹ In %, given the proportion of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to this level in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country.

before the attacks are evaluated as positive or, in other words, as reflections of the Self who possess features or support views and standards that the Self favors. After 9/11, the observing German and U.S. Self identifies more actors in the Other who it regards as unchallenged similar or as unchallenged partners, for instance in the confrontation of terrorism: Now, 12.6 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and 10.4 % of those in U.S. articles can be seen as representatives of the “Self within the Other.” Even though, these actors still present the smallest group in both countries, we can say that besides the increasing skepticism against the Other another result of the attacks seems to be that the stronger focus on the Other has also revealed a larger number of actors that are evaluated as positive and equal.

To recapitulate, we can say that Arabs and Muslims are seen as mainly different from the Self. A large number of them are devaluated as negative counter-examples to the standards and principles that the Self proclaims as crucial and central for its own society. They possess negative features that not only affect the societies in which they are embedded but also have consequences for the Self. Especially this latter aspect mainly becomes relevant for the observing German and U.S. print media after the attacks. However, the analysis has also revealed that when the Self evaluates Arab and Muslim actors it also identifies and highlights similarities between Other and Self. We find a number of actors in both countries’ analyzed print media around 9/11 who promote Western principles like democracy, freedom, or progress, and explicitly take sides with the Self on certain issues. At the same time, however, these actors are often distanced from the Self by weakening the similarities or even neglecting them. Only a small number of Arab and Muslim actors are actually regarded as similar without challenging their “Western” features.

Thus, we also have to say that not all Arab and Muslim actors are portrayed as *evil*, negative, and completely different from the Self. The media reality does integrate similarities of the Other in the overall conception of the counterpart and does not solely regard the Other as completely different from their own concept of belonging. However, when we look at the interplay between the different types of actors that have been introduced in this last chapter we also have to note that the overall tendency in both countries’ print media, before as well as after 9/11, is to perceive Arab and Muslim actors as solely or predominantly negative. Positive actors who could be seen as mirror images of the Self are simply eclipsed by the dominating quantitative occurrence of the negative or ambivalent and weakened actors types, and are furthermore less relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for the different topics and issues that are discussed in the articles in which they appear.

Self-observation after 9/11

The last thing that can be noted with regard to the construction of actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media is that especially after the 9/11 attacks, the focus on the Arab and Muslim Other involves an increasing reflection upon the German, American or even Western Self as well. This has already been noted in the last two chapters, but in the analysis of the different actor types we were able to illustrate in what contexts this self-reflection becomes relevant:

First of all, in the context of the portrayal of Type 10 actors (see VI.4.2) we find explicit references to these actors as being negative or at least contradictory in their views, behavior, or features but *useful* for the Self at the same time.⁸² Their explicitly communicated role as strategic partners is thereby often connected with a critical discussion of this ambivalence on behalf of the Self who rejects the negative characteristics of the respective Other but nevertheless needs this Other for various reasons and therefore cooperates with it and somewhat downgrades the negativity of the actors. German and U.S. newspapers after 9/11 frequently focus on this Western ambivalence and reflect the awareness of the (German and U.S.) Self of its own strategic perspective that also distorts the evaluation of the Other.

Second, we find a more critical self-reflection in the context of the portrayal of Type 7 actors as well. After 9/11, the Self also increasingly reflects upon the Western responsibility for deficits in Arab and Muslim countries (e.g. due to foreign policies, exploitation with regard to economic resources, humanitarian deficiencies, etc.). Whereas U.S. print media in this context are also self-critical, German print media concentrate more on the responsibilities and mistakes of the United States, especially as one cause and explanation for the 9/11 attacks, and do not really focus on their country's own role in the interplay with the Other as much as the U.S. newspapers do.

Nevertheless, even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and political misbehavior to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, its own principles and values are thereby not called into question. The only thing that might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been conveyed to the Other.

⁸² Hashem (1995) made a similar observation for news magazines in the timeframe between 1990 and 1993. He noticed a rise of more neutral or even more positive images of Arabs and argues that this increase may result from the new alliances of many Arab nations with the United States since the Gulf War – a situation that can be regarded as similar to the new anti-terror alliance formed by the West with Arab and Muslim countries after 9/11. As in our case, Hashem (1995) also notes that “even though few Arab ‘villains’ still support international terrorism [...] the number of moderate Arabs has increased over the years, which may account for the changing view of Arabs in the media” (Hashem 1995: 154-155).

VII. FINAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

Throughout the last pages we have looked at the way in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11. The main questions I wanted to answer in this book were (a), how Arabs and Muslims are portrayed and why they are constructed that way, and (b), how the German and American national self-concepts shape the perception and the images of Arabs and Muslims. This combination of two sides – an observed object and an observing subject – was supposed to give us an idea of how different and distant from the German and American Self Arabs and Muslims are regarded to be.

To answer those questions, the analysis has looked at the one platform from which we learn most about Arabs and Muslims, the mass media, as it was assumed that people predominantly rely on mass media when they gather information about the world. Thus, the topics, the actors, and the stories that are communicated by mass media are very central in our perception of the environment that surrounds us and that forms our reality.

The analysis was guided by three basic theoretical assumptions: First of all, I have assumed that the German and U.S. perspective on Arabs and Muslims and the evaluation of the same is guided by Western cultural patterns, i.e. a set of Western principles, norms, values, and myths, etc. that not only define and structure the social life but also and especially become relevant when Western countries like Germany and the United States observe and evaluate their environment. Arab and Muslim countries and actors have been chosen as one representative of this perceived environment and have been looked at in this book in more detail. Secondly, I have argued that one crucial aspect of the Western perspective on Arabs and Muslims is the Oriental myth which provides the taken for granted knowledge that Arabs and Muslims are part of an overall Oriental Other that presents the antithesis to Western culture and standard values. This taken-for-granted and commonly shared societal myth I have assumed to be reflected in the images of Arabs and Muslim in both countries' mass media as well. Thirdly, I have assumed that collective (national) groups need a certain outgroup to construct national collectivity which supports the impression that in the analysis of the image of Arabs and Muslims, the self-perceptions of Germany and the United States also have to be taken into account. In this context I have expected that the process of collectivity construction mainly works via the demarcation of an outside Other that is not only demarcated but also mainly devaluated by the Self to enhance the own national ingroup concept and strengthen ingroup coherence.

The chapters IV, V, and VI have outlined the results of the print media analysis. In chapter IV, I looked at the relevance of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. newspaper before and after the event. It was outlined in how many articles Arab and Muslim actors are referred to, what topics and issues those articles focus and discuss, and what kinds of actors occur in the contexts of those topics and issues.

In chapter V, we took a more detailed look at the perception of those occurring actors as it is reflected in the respective articles of both countries and have gathered the most frequently used

characteristics and features that can be found to describe Arabs and Muslims in the analyzed German and U.S. print media around 9/11. At the same time, we contrasted and compared those features with the characteristics and perceptions that can be derived and are – to some extent – even explicitly communicated as crucial for the German and American self-concept. In doing so we were able to draw out the general, overall boundaries that are communicated between the German or American Self and the Arab and Muslim Other.

Subsequently, in chapter VI, we looked more closely at the internal composition of those overall images of the Other and elaborated how the Other is evaluated and subclassified on the basis of the Self's own standards and principles. On the basis of different types of actors it was shown how complex the images of Arab and Muslim actors are. Furthermore, the degrees of difference and similarity of the Arab and Muslim Other and the Western Self that results from this evaluation process were described.

This final seventh chapter will summarize the basic findings of the study and will discuss the methodical and theoretical implications of the research results.

1. The German and U.S. Worldview and Self-perception

With regard to the first research aim – to learn more about the basis on which Arabs and Muslims are observed and evaluated in German and U.S. print media – we can come to the following results:

German and American Self-perceptions in the Mass Media

The analysis has revealed that both German and U.S. print media not only report on Arabs and Muslims, but in this context derive the criteria for the evaluation of these Others from the own national or even transnational self-conceptions. In addition to that, we have seen that both countries' print media sometimes even explicitly compare Arab and Muslim actors with the Self.

Altogether, the worldview that forms the basic pattern for the German and U.S. observation of Arab and Muslim actors and countries can be summarized as a two-sided concept that – on the one side – regards the (German or American) ingroup as part of a Western hemisphere that shares a set of central principles, norms, institutions, and views.¹ The self-references that were found in German and U.S. print media before as well as after the 9/11 attacks clearly reflect a self-perception of both countries as part of a Western collectivity. We find references to the United States or European countries as “the West” when contrasting or comparing the German or American positions, views, or political, cultural, social, or economic situations with those of Arab and Muslim countries or actors. Both countries thereby reflect the perception that they are

¹ As noted in the beginning of this book, in our case “ingroup” basically refers to the communicated perception of the German or U.S. nation state as a collective concept of belonging.

more or less equal with regard to their political, cultural, social, economic, or personal development, as well as with regard to the institutionalization of certain standards and values.

It was shown furthermore that – on a quantitative scale – the number of explicit self-references increases tremendously with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Those self-references reflect a shattered feeling of security which is mainly done by redefining and emphasizing self-identity, and the values, ideals, and self-conception as a country or a Western nation. This strong shift of focus towards the Self was not only observed for the American news media but also for the analyzed German newspapers. Here, Germany is regarded as an indirect victim of the attacks as well, not only because some of the terrorists had lived in the country before the attacks and had planned the attacks here, but also because the country perceives itself as part of the Western community whose values, institutions and ideals have been attacked by those terrorists as well. Thus, the event is not only perceived as an attack in a physical dimension (with the airplanes being navigated into the three buildings in New York City and Washington). It is also perceived as a symbolical attack against those institutions that are seen to represent Western achievements and values that go beyond the national borders of the United States. The 9/11 attacks thereby can be seen as a catalyst that pushed the Arab and Muslim Other to the center of Western attention and, at the same time, increased the ambition on behalf of the German and U.S. Self to re-emphasize and strengthen its own collectivity to cope with the event. Therefore, we now also find an increased explicit reference to the Self.

The Communicated Western Principles

Apart from this emphasis of an overall Western unity, those references to the Self also include concrete definitions of what this Western collectivity is about or, in other words, what Occidental rational principles define the German, American, and Western identity. The different features and characteristics on the basis of which the occurring Arabs and Muslims are evaluated reflect a rather abstract set of Western principles, values, or standards that define, structure and guide the social life of German and U.S. society and shape the self-concept of belonging in both societies. The analysis has revealed that those principles form the basic cultural pattern in both countries' print media to define the national or Western self-concept and to evaluate and demarcate the Arab and Muslim Other. The self-image of both countries is largely identical and can be mainly characterized by abstract principles such as democracy, openness of society, freedom, equality, equity, rationality, and personal self-discipline, tolerance, and progress.

The principle of democracy – as a political concept – is not only explicitly referred to when the German or American Self is described, but is also implicitly reflected by the strong focus that is put in the political dimension of Arab and Muslim actors and countries. The concept of democracy thereby also carries a strong cultural connotation, since *democratic* structures are, for example, equated with cultural modernity and progress, and are thus located on a higher developmental scale than *undemocratic* political systems.

The principle of an open society – reflected for instance in the degree of social mobility and here especially hierarchical mobility with regard to economic or social status – is consulted in the analyzed media to emphasize for instance the importance of freedom of choice with regard to the different concepts of living of its members. In the German and U.S. self-conception, this openness is expressed in the demand for such as aspects as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and the call for tolerance of other religions besides the dominating Christian tradition that especially refers to tolerance of Islam after the 9/11 attacks. Both the German and the American self-portrayals are characterized by the emphasis of tolerance that should be exercised with respect to other political opinions, other religious beliefs, ethnic differences, and different lifestyles.

In a personal as well as in a cultural dimension, the communicated self-concepts include the assumption that the members of the ingroup inherit a certain degree of rationality that is the result of the Western cultural development, the Western Enlightenment and a certain degree of civilization that is expressed for instance in personal self-discipline. Both countries' print media frequently stress that the West is *modern, secular, and civilized*. Furthermore, both the German and U.S. media communicate the self-conception of being equal with regard to the possibilities for their members to participate, for instance, in political decision processes. In addition, German and U.S. media also communicate the view that a society has to offer its members a certain degree of equality with regard to economic or educational opportunities.

Last but not least, both countries' newspapers emphasize the aspect of progress as a crucial principles of the German, American, or even Western Self. The concept of progress thereby is contained to some extent in most of the criteria that have been mentioned so far. It refers to all dimensions and includes the permanent development and improvement of political, cultural, economic, scientific, or social conditions and technological standards. What is communicated here is that the German and American or, more generally, the Western Self is characterized by the permanent striving for progress and rationalization.

Those abstract principles that have been listed here can either be derived from the special emphasis of the lack of features that represent those principles with the focused on Arab and Muslim actors or from the explicit emphasis of features that represent those principles in the communicated reference towards the own German or U.S. society. The analysis has confirmed that both countries basically present the Self – and consequently also demarcate the Other – quite similarly. Both countries are very much alike with regard to their self-perception as far as the analyzed media around 9/11 are concerned.

Differences between the German and the U.S. Self-concept

However, following the world polity approach of Meyer et al. (2005) I expected that the German and U.S. self-concepts may emphasize those outlined principles somewhat differently due to underlying historic, cultural, or political differences or to different geographical foci has been

confirmed only to some extent. This assumption was only corroborated to some extent. Both countries' analyzed media focus on and emphasize a similar set of values and principles. Especially after the 9/11 attacks both explicitly emphasize that Germany and the United States are part of an overall Western unity that shares the same common values, ideals, and principles. The analysis has illustrated that the application of Western principles for the comparison and classification of the respective non-German, non-American, or simply non-Western environment is a provable condition.

What is different however, is the role that both countries ascribe to themselves when it comes to the distribution and institutionalization of those principles on a global scale and when both countries locate themselves in the collectivity of a Western hemisphere. What can be noted especially for the timeframe after the event is that both countries ascribe themselves to different levels in the overall Western collectivity and indicate a different level of institutionalization and relevance of the different Western standards and principles for the own collectivity:

The analyzed U.S. media indicate that the United States regards itself not only as a nation or one state in the Western collectivity. Instead, American articles reflect and communicate a national self-image that sees the United States as the LEADING ROLE MODEL of modernity, democracy, progress, openness, equality and rationality. These findings coincide to some extent with the studies on American national identity that have been introduced in chapter II.1.² This self-conception indicates that the United States perceives itself as superior to other nations. As noted in chapter II.1, this self-perception of superiority is shaped by the notion of exceptionalism as well as by the notion of an American civil religion according to which the United States claim to be a role model for the world. The image that is communicated here is that of a so-called "city upon the hill," a virtuous community that forms a counterpart to the countries of the "Old World," i.e. of Europe that emigrants originally left behind when they traveled to the American continent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But this role model position can also be seen in the context of the rest of the World, if we apply this perception to the present day context and the focus on Arab and Muslim countries. This religious symbolism strongly shapes the American self-perception and the rhetoric of the country's role in the world.

Especially after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. articles consult those religious connotations to describe its own role in the global context, for instance, when U.S. media try to grasp the dimensions of the impact that the event has had on the American nation. These religious conceptions come to the fore as well when – in this context – the reactions and consequences are discussed that have to result from the event – nationally and internationally – as the following quote from the American USA TODAY may once more illustrate:

America today is about God and country, but then it always has been. We just lost track. We lost track when we evicted God from our public institutions and when we stopped honoring our nation with the songs and rituals that defined American childhood until a few decades ago. (USAT-01-10-01: 15A)

² See, for instance, Bellah (2005; reprint), or Dittmer (2005), Maidment and McGrew (1991), Schirmer (1998), or Vorländer (2001).

Based on this believed virtue, the American destiny after 9/11 now also includes the mission to spread the American ideals, principles, and values to those countries and areas where the 9/11 terrorists and their accomplices come from. One of the new proclaimed aims that is discussed in the analyzed media and that also presents the driving force for the soon to be formed anti-terror coalition and the initiated “war on terrorism” is to fight the “enemies” of democracy, tolerance, and freedom and to change the political and social situations of countries like Iraq or Afghanistan that are argued to be the hotbed of terrorism and of the *evil* that *threatens* the West. The American exemplary status as a “city upon the hill” is now explicitly and predominantly directed towards Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, when Arabs and Muslims are evaluated on the basis of Western principles the American newspapers reflect the perspective that those principles are first and foremost regarded as American principles. By comparing the occurring actors with those standards, the American media also openly communicate this American status – implicitly but after the attacks also explicitly as some quotations have illustrated. We may thus argue that U.S. print media reflect a stronger national focus in the way in which the Self is perceived and defined, and only after that place the United States in the concept of a transnational Western identity concept.

In contrast to that, Germany regards itself as PART of the Western world and German print media predominantly refer to German membership in a Western collectivity. As I have outlined on the basis of other studies in chapter II.1,³ this result reflects a German national self-definition that is shaped by a stronger integration into transnational political and other alliances. The strong identification and self-conception as part of a Western collectivity reflects this substitution of national collectivity to a significant extent.

In addition to that, German print media reveal a different perspective on internal Others, i.e. on Arabs and Muslims within the German national context. The national status of the internal Arab and Muslim Other is a central aspect in the communication of the German self-image in the analyzed media. In the analyzed German media, the internal Other is frequently asked for an identification with the greater good of the overall society, and only when this identification with the Self and, more concretely, with the principles, standards, values, and guidelines of the Self has been internalized, is the individual actor accepted or, in other words, permitted to stay within the German territory and society. Arabs and Muslim within Germany are thus (implicitly or explicitly) criticized for not assimilating into the German society and for not accepting, adopting, or supporting German values and standards. Furthermore, with the 9/11 attacks the internal Other becomes centrally focused on as a potential *terrorist threat*, as well, because some of the terrorists behind the attacks came from Germany and had lived there as part of the communities, *invisible* and *seemingly* assimilated. As the analysis has shown, this fact has extremely raised the skepticism towards ALL internal Others in Germany, and caused the increasing attempt on behalf of the German Self to re-emphasize the boundaries between Arab and Muslim Others and the Self within the national territory. In the analyzed media this is reflected for example by the

³ See, for instance, Piper (1998) or Schirmer (1998).

fact that internal Arabs and Muslims are now repeatedly asked to distance themselves from terrorism, and are basically classified as *good* or *bad* on the basis of this position towards terrorism.

Compared to that, U.S. print media emphasize the perception that sees internal Arabs and Muslims as part of the American national Self, at least on an ideological level and despite the fact that this ideal might still not be fulfilled completely. The analyzed newspapers strongly communicate the idea of a “cultural pluralism” and the American self-perception of being a “nation of people of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins and variety”⁴ in those contexts in which internal Arabs and Muslims are focused on.

2. The Perception of the Arab and Muslim Other

A second aim of the analysis was to redraw the German and American perception of Arabs and Muslims as it is reflected, for example, in mass media contents. I assumed in the beginning of the book that the German and American self-conceptions (and the Western principles that are central criteria of those concepts of belonging) form the German and American worldview and provide the framework for the observation, structuring, and categorization of social reality and the everyday events, issues, and actors that are identified in this reality. Thus, they also become relevant when Germany and the United States look at Arab and Muslim countries and actors, and they shape the images of those actors and countries in the mass media. According to the analyzed print media, the overall image of Arabs and Muslims in both countries’ print media contexts can be summarized as follows:

Who is the Arab and Muslim Other in German and U.S. Mass Media?

The observed Arabs and Muslims are to a large extent similar if not identical in German and U.S. print media. Even though the diversity of occurring actors may differ to some extent in both countries’ media sets (and to some extent also internally, i.e. between the different print media in one country) the overall perspective on the Other is shaped by rather similar geographical and topical foci, before as well as after the attacks.

First of all, Arabs and Muslims are focused in the internal and the external news coverage, but in both countries the overall focus lies on external Arab and Muslim actors in the context of the foreign news coverage. Before as well as after 9/11, this external focus is characterized by a large variety of topics and a geographical focus that ranges from countries in Southwest, Southeast or Central Asia, to North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and even Europe. Despite minor quantitative differences in the geographical focus, the overall map for external Arabs and Muslims is rather similar in both German and U.S. newspapers. Similar to that, the topics in which context external Arabs and Muslims occur are predominantly identical. Both countries focus mainly on political conflicts, social and economic problems, or cultural clashes between

modern and *conservative* views in the focused on countries. German and U.S. print media frequently discuss the lack of democratic structures, the deficits and disputes of the political elites, or economic mismanagement.

Especially after 9/11, both countries shift their focus to the political dimension of the Other, and especially U.S. articles now increasingly discuss the political, social or economic *usefulness* of certain Arab and Muslim countries. They measure the advantage and disadvantages of political relations with certain external Others mainly in the context of a new form of alliance of Self and Other in an international anti-terror coalition. Furthermore, the issue of terrorism now dominates the news coverage and forms the central frame in which Arabs and Muslim are discussed. Terrorism determines not only the selection of issues, events, and actors in the two countries' newspapers, but also shapes the images of the observed actors.

In addition to that, both countries' media now frequently turn their attention towards actors within the national or Western boundaries after the attacks. Before 9/11, Arabs and Muslims within Germany or the U.S. are only marginally referred to. In Germany, they mainly appear in the contexts of articles that discuss the status of immigrants and their degree of integration in and conflicts with the host society. After 9/11, internal Arabs and Muslims become significantly relevant, and here especially in the context of terrorism. This focus is shaped by questions about (a) the interrelation between terrorism and Islam, (b) how a modern, secular Western society can prevent terrorist and fundamentalist tendencies not only in Arab and Muslim countries but also within its own boundaries, and (c) what threat emanates from the internal Other for the own (German and U.S.) society and the West. As has been outlined, the infiltration of Arab and Muslim terrorists into the Western space is regarded as a development that is perceived to clearly threaten the national ingroup in both countries. This puts also internal Arabs and Muslims on trial and thus pushes them into the arena of public attention.

As noted, German print media – in this context – put a stronger focus on religious topics and more frequently discuss the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism than the analyzed U.S. newspapers. By comparison, U.S. articles put more emphasis on the new foreign relations with the external Arab and Muslim Other after the attacks, and focus on the pursue of terrorist groups abroad. With regard to the introspection, U.S. media especially discuss the consequences of the attacks and of terrorism in general for civil liberties, democratic values, and the American self-concept.

Secondly, the image of Arabs and Muslims encompasses the whole society. Both countries' print media report on actors of all branches of society, and do not solely look at governments, political elites, or other state representatives, despite the strong focus of political topics. The constructed Other therefore embraces the totality of the focused societies, the resulting media reality is quantitatively complex, multifaceted, and by no means one-dimensional. We learn about political parties and organizations, terrorist groups, members of the police and the military, or are

⁴ See also Han (2000): 289-292.

introduced to private people. On a quantitative scale, mainly actors in Palestine, Iran, Afghanistan, and after the attacks also in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are focused on. The internal Others that are observed in German and U.S. media come mainly from the private sector or, especially after 9/11, are (potential) members of terrorist groups.

Thus, we can say that the introduced Arabs and Muslims are largely identical in German and U.S. print media discourses. This is of course also due to the fact that certain events and issues find greater attention in both countries – the attacks themselves are the best example here. But also issues that may include a differing geographical focus are looked at for similar reasons,⁵ like for instance economic relationships with the respective Arab or Muslim country, or political changes within the respective country.

The Images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media around 9/11

The second question that was raised in the beginning of this work with regard to the perception of Arab and Muslim actors was: how are Arabs and Muslims portrayed? Here we can summarize that the boundary between the German and American self-concept and the Arab and Muslim Other is constructed and emphasized in a number of different dimensions, and a distinction between both sides is made on the basis of a number of observed characteristics.

First and foremost, the majority of Arabs and Muslims that appear in both countries' print media are geographically DISTANT since they are located in countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or North Africa. The national origin of Arab and Muslim actors is almost always identifiable, either because they occur in the context of articles on Arab and Muslim countries or because their nationality is explicitly mentioned. The latter geographical location is especially used to point out the national origin of actors within Germany and the United States.

The geographical origin of Arab and Muslim actors is accompanied by a large set of political, cultural, social, economic, and personal features, or ascriptions of delinquency. These features are to a significant extent derived from the German and U.S. national or Western self-concepts. They reflect implicit or even explicit comparisons of the features of the Other with the standards and values of the Self. Here, German and U.S. print media images of Arabs and Muslims reveal nearly the same criteria to classify and evaluate the observed characteristics of the Other.

The introduced study reinforces but at the same time extends the results of the other studies that have been introduced in the beginning of this book (see I.2.1),⁶ by showing that a large proportion of the identified Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are described as *violent*, *terrorists*, or *criminals*, construction a dividing line between a *violent* Other and a *non-violent* Self. A similar and clear cut dividing line can be identified in the cultural dimension.

⁵ Like the political and economic situation in Indonesia as it is focused in the American newspapers and the political and economic events in Turkey as they are focused in the German print media

⁶ See, for instance, El-Farra (1996), Ghareeb (1983), Hafez (2002b), Hashem (1995), Kliche (1998, 1999), or Shaheen (1984, 2001).

Actors are classified according to the central distinction of being either *civilized* and *modern*, or *uncivilized* and culturally *backward*. In the personal dimension, the boundary between Self and Other is constructed between *good* and *evil* actors, a distinction that also includes personal features that shape the actors as *irrational* or *unrestrained*.

Additionally, the study has revealed social and economical boundaries. Here, we find two basic contrasts. One is made between *wealth* and *poverty*, a contrast that is however not constructed mainly between self and otherness, but more among Arabs and Muslims. It becomes relevant in contexts in which internal dynamics and conflicts within the respective societies of the Other are focused. The other contrast is drawn between a (*technologically*) *developed* West and an *underdeveloped* Arab and Muslim Other that lacks most of the Western economic or social standards like a well-established infrastructure, a good educational system, or a good health care system.

Last but not least, after 9/11 Arabs and Muslims are most frequently classified according to their attitudes towards the West – and in U.S. articles towards the United States in particular. Actors and countries either take an *anti-western* position by implicitly or explicitly supporting views and actions that deviate from the German or American positions, e.g. political agendas, or military strategies like the “war on terrorism.” Or they take sides with the Self as they explicitly support Western ambitions, actions, and policies. This distinction is especially made with regard to the issue of “terrorism,” which is clearly disapproved of by the German and American Self.

The study has revealed that in German and U.S. print media Arabs and Muslims are by no means reduced to dimensions that would be sufficient to cover the political, social, economic or other issues and topics of the news coverage. The overall image of Arabs and Muslims is much more complex and includes a large variety of features and peculiarities. Nevertheless, we often find implicit or even explicit comparisons of the Others with the German and American Self, for instance when the political, social, or economic situations of both Self and Other are compared. Altogether, the images of the diverse actors and societies to a large extent oppose the national self-concepts of Germany and the United States.

Differences between the overall German and American perception of the focused Other are few. One aspect that is much more emphasized in the U.S. print media than in the German context is the comparison of the technological progress of American Self and Arab and Muslim Other. Here, U.S. media frequently distinguish between the leading technological progress and achievements of the United States and the *underdevelopment* and technological *weakness* of the Other. Compared to that, German media more often focus on the cultural dimension of difference between German or Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other. German articles more often (implicitly and explicitly) draw a boundary between a culturally Christian West and a Muslim Other and more frequently emphasize the religious affiliation of occurring actors. Furthermore, in German media we more often find discussions about religious matters and the history and political level of Islam in Arab and Muslim countries than in the American context. In this context, before as well as after 9/11, the internal Other in Germany is also predominantly regarded as different and deviating from the national self-concept, especially with regard to its

central cultural difference from the German Christian tradition – its religion, Islam – a constructed difference that the internal Other is not really able to overcome. We could explain this stronger emphasis of religious facets in German print media discourses with the fact that in the United States – due to the proclaimed separation of state and church – religious affiliation is primarily seen as a private matter. We could assume here, that this aspect does also have an effect on communication processes: When U.S. print media look at actors of foreign origin or ethnic minorities within the country, religious affiliations are not primarily consulted to describe and classify actors.

However, and apart from this dichotomy that forms the basic pattern according to which actors are perceived and evaluated, the analysis has revealed that the comparison between self and otherness on the basis of Western principles and standards can lead to various different results. One important result of this study is that the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other in U.S. and German print media around 9/11 is by no means only shaped by negative features and does not result in an image of Arabs and Muslims that forms the complete opposite to the Western self-perception.⁷ Instead, the analysis was able to show that the perceived difference between a collective group and an outside Other that is demarcated from this collectivity can be constructed in different ways and can also integrate similarities between ingroup and outgroup, Self and Other. This result also reveals that the German and American perception of Arabs and Muslims is not solely negative, which leads us to the third aim of the study:

3. The Boundary between Self and Other: How Difference Is Constructed

In order to attain the third aim – finding out how difference between the German or American self-concept and Arabs and Muslims is constructed – and to learn how fixed the boundary between both sides is perceived to be from the German and U.S. perspective, we have looked more closely for similarities between the self-concepts and the images of the Other as well.

How Different Is the Other?

The study has revealed first of all that the Arab and Muslim Other is not a homogenous group. Instead, different degrees of similarity or difference and distance are constructed in both countries' print media. The typological analysis of the identified Arab and Muslim actors and their images in both German and U.S. print media over the analyzed time period has shown that actors can be basically sorted on the basis of five levels of difference.

As can be derived from the quantitative number of occurring actors, the Arab and Muslim Other before as well as after 9/11 is basically perceived as geographically DISTANT. That this distance is a crucial criterion of distinction becomes especially obvious when in the course of the 9/11 attacks it is revealed that some of those Arabs and Muslims who live within the geographical

boundaries of the Self turn out to be a potential or even actual *threat* for the Self due to their *hostility* and *violent* potential. Those actors cannot be geographically distanced from the Self, therefore they have to be distanced on the basis of other features and levels of difference. But also those actors, who can be distanced geographically, are evaluated in other dimensions as well:

Apart from geographical distance, the majority of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media are thereby regarded as completely different from the Self since they are devaluated. They possess features and characteristics that the Self disapproves of or regards as deviant from the own standards and principles. Thus, and as other studies have also noted (see I.2), the perception of Arabs and Muslims as the negative counterpart of the Self can be seen as the most central form of portrayal.

The second most frequently ascribed image is that of WEAKNESS. Some of these *weak* actors are similar to the Self to a certain extent but are weakened in their similarity. Others share the position of the Self that certain aspects about their own societies or certain Arab and Muslim governments are negative and destructive for their own country or for the Self. Yet another group of weak Others have to face and physically bear the negative actions and characteristics of other Arab and Muslim actors and, in so doing, further emphasize and illustrate the negativity of some parts of the Arab and Muslim Other. These *weak* Others reveal a certain degree of similarity with the Self – either by possessing similar features or by sharing the positions and views of the Self and by also disapproving of certain features of their own Arab and Muslim countries or actors. However, *weak* actors are not able to accomplish their views and features in their own societies or communities. They are not able to change the criticized negative conditions, behaviors and structures that they face and disapprove, and in a way they all suffer from this situation, either implicitly or explicitly by being depicted as victims.

A third level of difference comprises Arabs and Muslims who are, on the one hand, similar to the Self to some extent but who, on the other hand, are also questioned with regard to this similarity by the Self. Some of these CONTRADICTIONARY actors are assumed to adopt and support the views or the ideals of the Self to reap certain benefits of this approach towards the Self. They reflect skepticism and mistrust on behalf of the observing Self who unmasks their “Western appearance” as *strategic* and *false*. Other actors who are actually not regarded as similar to the Self are approached by the same nevertheless since they are assumed to be USEFUL despite their negative facets. Here, the contradictions and deficits of the Other are ignored by Self because of the Self’s own strategic motives. Especially after 9/11, this perspective on Arab and Muslim actors becomes increasingly relevant. The focus on contradictions of the Other and of the Self reflects the uncertainty and skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks and with respect to the Arab and Muslim Other – not only in the United States but also in Germany. The *contradictory* Other is only apparently similar to the Self, which makes it especially difficult to classify from the perspective of the Self with regard to the actual distance from the Self’s own national concept. The boundary between Self and Other seems to blur because either the Other or the Self

⁷ As most of the media studies introduced in chapter II.2 have argued

strategically conceals the difference between itself and the respective counterpart.

Last but not least, the Other appears as a MIRROR image of the Self. Some actors in German and U.S. print media are described as positive and only possess or support standards and principles that the Self regards as central for its own society as well. After 9/11, both Germany and the U.S. identify an increasing number of these mirror images of themselves within the Other, and here especially in those actors who are identified as partners of the Self in the confrontation with terrorism. Even though these actors appear less frequently in both countries, we can say that besides the increasing skepticism against the Other another effect of the attacks is that the stronger focus on the Other has also led to the increased realization that not all Arabs and Muslims are as different as one might have expected. Nevertheless, in the overall composition of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media these Others who are like the Self (or as phrased throughout the analysis, the “Self within the Other”) are still eclipsed by the quantitative dominance of the devaluated, *ambivalent* and *weakened* Others. Furthermore, they appear to be less relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for the different topics and issues that are discussed in German and U.S. media.

With regard to Arabs and Muslims WITHIN the national boundaries, the study has shown that apart from the lack of geographical distance, which is the common element of distinction for the external Other, the majority of internal actors is evaluated quite similarly to the external Others in German and U.S. print media. Thus, on a qualitative level the geographical distance does not represent the only factor for the demarcation of an Arab and Muslim Other. As the analysis has revealed, internal actors in both countries’ newspapers can also be distinguished according to different degrees of similarity with the Self. Some internal Others present a large difference and distance to the German or American self-concepts of belonging and are, for instance, devaluated with regard to their cultural features. Some actors are weakened as victims after the 9/11 attacks. Some internal Arabs and Muslims are described as ambivalent and are perceived as a potential (or actual) “threat from within.” Others are regarded as rather similar by the Self, if not even as part of the Self already, which is especially the case for some actors in the American media. In the German context, internal Others are observed much more skeptically and are still largely regarded as different, mainly due to their religion and cultural facets, but especially after 9/11 also due to the presumed terror connection or support of those actors. The assumption of a potential terror threat that may emanate from some of the internal Arabs and Muslims is also expressed in the American print media, but here, a significant part of the internal Others is still seen as PART of the national ingroup, or is referred to as victims of the 9/11 attacks as well.⁸

To recapitulate, Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media are predominantly regarded as different from the Self, but the Self also appreciates and integrates similarities between Self and Other in its own perspective. Arabs and Muslims are to large extent observed, evaluated and, if

⁸ Even though they suffered from the event on a different level than the “direct” victims of the attacks, since they became victims of hate crimes and discrimination on behalf of the members of the ingroup in the aftermath of the event – behavior that is explicitly disapproved of the observing American media.

relevant, distanced from the German and American Self on the basis of the Western principles, values, and ideals that have been outlined before and that shape the national self-concepts of both Germany and the United States. Thus, the overall image of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media also reflects what was assumed in chapter II, namely that Western rational principles have become increasingly institutionalized on a global scale and therefore are institutionalized in Arab and Muslim societies to some extent as well.

The analysis has furthermore shown that the evaluation of Arabs and Muslims on the basis of the Self's own (Western) principles and standards does not consequently lead to the denial of Western standards with those actors. From the perspective of collectivity identity construction, we may therefore conclude that the construction of national collectivity does not consequently lead to devaluation of an observed outgroup in order to strengthen the national coherence and positively evaluate the national Self (as was assumed on the basis of the social identity approach in chapter II. 3). Instead, German and U.S. media images of Arabs and Muslims reveal that the complexity of an outgroup as well as the possible sameness of Self and Other is definitely reflected upon by the Self. However, this does not necessarily mean that the boundary between both sides is diminished, but the degree of difference and thus the geographical, cultural, political, economic, or personal distance between Self and Other may differ. Arabs and Muslims in both German and U.S. newspapers are perceived as both different and similar, even though – on quantitative scale – actors are predominantly regarded as different and as unequal with respect to the institutionalization of Western principles and standards. Arab and Muslim countries and actors are not excluded Others. They can rather be seen as incomplete but nevertheless integrated parts of a world society. Most of them lack the full institutionalization and realization of the Western norms and values. On the basis of these incomplete Others, the Western observer (in our case, German and U.S. mass media) can illustrate to itself (in our case, German and U.S. society) for what reasons the Other societies do not work or face certain conflicts, which also strengthens the legitimacy of the Western cultural account.

The study has shown that the construction and definition of a national concept of belonging is not only a permanent but also a multifaceted process. A large variety of persons and features have to be either integrated in the self-concept or distinguished from it. Sometimes the boundaries between ingroup and outgroup even seem to blur, and a clear-cut definition and classification of difference becomes difficult to make. Thus, the Self always has to have a concept in mind about its own national collectivity to distinguish those actors that are not regarded as part of this collectivity. Even though before 9/11 explicit references to the German or U.S. self-concept can rarely be found in the media communication processes, the national self-concept is permanently reflected in the way in which the Others is perceived and portrayed. We can conclude that the demarcation process of the Other – in itself – presents a central element of German and U.S. national identity.

The Impact of the 9/11 Attacks

One question that was raised in the beginning of the book was whether the images of Arabs and Muslims predominantly result from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I assumed that the event has not only changed the Western focus on Arabs and Muslims but has also increased the perception that this group presents a *threat* to the own national collectivity and the central values, standards and institutions, and that as a consequence of that, both Germany and the United States have started to emphasize the national or even transnational collectivity and the difference of the *threatening* Other from the same to distance it.

The analysis has shown that, first of all, the event has caused a geographical shift of focus in German and U.S. print media, since after the attacks countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan become the focus of attention, and are accompanied by an increasing focus on those countries where the 9/11 terrorists were assumed to come from like Saudi Arabia. The perspective on the Other has also shifted from the external Other to Arab and Muslim actors within the national or Western boundaries.

Second, the focus on Arabs and Muslims now strongly concentrates on a new confrontation line that increasingly ignores the internal political or cultural conflicts within the different Arab and Muslim countries and instead basically classifies Arabs and Muslims according to their position on terrorism and their cooperation with the West. This classification of *good* versus *evil* actors may be explained with the fact that the event has shattered the feeling of national security, not only in the United States, but also in Germany. As the American NEWSWEEK phrased it:

The change in the nation's collective psyche will be even more profound. The attacks have broken the illusion, deeply embedded in the American mind, "that we are more protected, and safer, than other countries," says trauma specialist Terrence Real of Massachusetts' Family Institute of Cambridge. (NW-01-v138-SpIss: 40)

The event seems to have threatened both societies especially because the national or Western territory was infiltrated. One reaction that was observed in this study is that group boundaries are drawn now on a much broader level and create a larger distances between the Self and the *threatening, evil* Other. As already noted, especially internal Arabs and Muslims are now observed much more critically than before the attacks since they cannot be distanced geographically. In the German context, this skepticism and suspiciousness towards the Muslim and Arab communities reflects that those communities are also regarded as distant – even though they might be geographically close.⁹ We may suggest, however, that this skepticism was already part of the

⁹ It has to be noted however, that even though the introduced analysis has not revealed such results for the American media, later analyses have revealed that the skepticism against the Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. has also increased tremendously since 9/11. McAlister (2005) has pointed out that in the aftermath of the attacks, hundreds of Arab and Muslim men were arrested or people who appeared to be Arab and Muslim were profiled at airports and other public places. Furthermore, in November 2001, the American Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which limited certain civil and rights for both citizens and noncitizens (McAlister 2005: 275-276).

A conference at the CAAS in Dearborn, Michigan, in May 2006 looked among other things at the changed political and societal status of Arab and Muslim Americans in the United States since 9/11, and has presented a number of alarming developments with regard to this issue. Saliba (2006) from Evergreen State College, WA, USA, for instance presented a paper on "Diasporas in Detention in the Pacific Northwest," where the author reports on the numerous detentions of Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, for instance in the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, WA, that

German or U.S. perspective before the attacks, but the event has provoked the Self to openly express those sentiments. Events like the 9/11 attacks did not create images of Arabs and Muslims but they have strengthened certain assumptions and myths that were already part of the image before the attacks. The attacks can thus rather be seen as a catalyst that sharpened the focus on Arabs and Muslims and intensified the attempts of the German and U.S. Self to distance and demarcate itself from large parts of this focused group.

A third effect of the event is the increased effort in both countries' print media to emphasize those Arabs and Muslims who present no threat to the Self, who are *peaceful*, and who take sides with the Self after the attacks and express their compassion. It can be interpreted here that by also emphasizing those Others, the Self reassures itself that not all the Others are *evil* and that not all of them present a *threat* for the Self. The existence of *good* Others makes the overall Other less threatening; it weakens the impact of the *hostile* and negative parts of it, and plays down the perceived *threat* that is assumed to emanate from the Other.

Fourthly, the analysis has shown that both German and U.S. print media communicate the perception that the event was an attack on the Western world as a cultural and political unity, and therefore also presents a threat to the German and American or, more general, to the Western, values, principles, and institutions. Reflected in the media discourses, the attacks on the World Trade Center are, for instance, perceived as an attack against the symbols of national modernity and progress, and also the attack against the Pentagon are described as a symbolic attack, this time against the authority of the government of the leading nation of the Western world. We can argue, therefore, that this emphasis of the central national or even transnational Western principles is also done in order to strengthen the own group's self-esteem, security, and identity. As was noted for the last aspect already, we may say that by bringing to mind that also within Arab and Muslim countries or communities we find actors who support Western principles and values, the potential strength and perceived threat of the Other can be weakened.

Last but not least, the event has not only caused a stronger reflection upon the German, American, or Western Self but has led to self-criticism as well. Especially U.S. newspapers reflect upon the American's own guilt in the interplay with the Arab and Muslim Other that might have caused such negative backlashes like the 9/11 attacks. We now also find a more intensive examination of the own German, American, or Western weaknesses and the ambivalence of the Self in the interaction with the Other. Even though the Self rejects the negative characteristics of some Others, the *usefulness* (e.g. possible economic or military resources) of certain actors leads to cooperation with the outgroup and causes the Self to somewhat downgrade the negativity of the respective actors. After 9/11 these ambivalences of the Self become increasingly relevant and the

was opened under the head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2004. As Saliba argues, the case studies show a tremendous negative impact on Arab diaspora communities in terms of threat, intimidation, and insecurities, and the author criticizes that the America government has frequently used immigration courts after 9/11 to conduct terrorist and other criminal investigations in ways that "strip Arabs and Muslims of their constitutional protections on the basis of ethnicity or religion." However, for the analyzed timeframe we cannot say that U.S. media focus as strongly on the potential *threat* that may emanate from the overall Arab and Muslim communities as the analyzed German newspapers.

Self looks more carefully and also more skeptically at the reciprocal relationship with the Arab and Muslim Other. Both countries' media now increasingly reflect upon the Western responsibility for certain conditions, conflicts, or deficits in Arab and Muslim countries, and critically discuss the own foreign policies, exploitations in economic relations, or Western humanitarian failures. Whereas U.S. print media are rather self-critical in these contexts, German print media concentrate more on the responsibilities and mistakes of the United States, especially as one cause and explanation for the 9/11 attacks instead of discussing Germany's own national deficits and behavior in the interaction with the Other.

Thus, the German Self does not distinguish between Germany and the United States when referring to its own victim status after the attacks, but clearly distinguishes between itself and the United States when it comes to the causes of those attacks against the Western Self. Here, German media mainly reflect the assumption that those causes have to be looked for in the American Self. In a way, the German Self – by doing so – puts itself in a double-victimized position. As part of the Western Self, the country regards itself as a symbolic victim of the attacks of some parts of the Arab and Muslim Other. As a national unity it also sees itself as an indirect victim of American foreign policy.¹⁰

Nevertheless, for both countries we can sum up that even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and political misbehavior to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, its own principles and values are thereby not called into question. What might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been conveyed to the Other.

The Relevance of the Oriental Myth

I also assumed in the beginning of the book that the taken-for-granted myth of an Oriental Otherness has a decisive influence on the way in which difference between the German and U.S. self-concept and Arabs and Muslims is perceived and constructed. As was outlined in chapter II.2, a number of studies already before 9/11 have shown that this taken-for-granted myth of an Orient that forms a counter-image to the Occidental hemisphere is crucial for the perception of Arabs and Muslims in Germany and the United States.¹¹ The perception that results from this myth is that of two units, the Orient and the West, that are predominantly different and distant from each other, not only geographically, but also in a political, economic, personal and especially cultural dimension. I have argued here, that in the specific context of Arab and Muslim actors,

¹⁰ However, and in contrast to our results, other authors have also critically remarked the lack of self-criticism for the U.S. context. McAlister (2005), for instance, argues that in the long run (i.e. beyond the timeframe of our introduced analysis) the larger questions about the relationship between U.S. Middle East policy and terrorist acts were effectively marginalized, and which “framed the attacks as an act of ‘evildoers’ who hated something as broad and vague as ‘freedom’ – rather than [...] something as concrete and specific as U.S. foreign policy” (McAlister 2005: 279). This leads to a narrative that centers around the central question “Why do they hate us?” which is basically answered, “They hate liberty and freedom,” (McAlister 2005: 303) two central Western principles, but which largely omits the political or cultural roots of terrorism and conflict with the West.

¹¹ See, for instance, Hafez (1997, 2002, 2002b), Kamalipour (1995), Sardar (1999) or Shaheen (2001).

the classification and evaluation of these actors according to the raster of Western principles is centrally guided by the ideological myth of a basic difference between a Western and an Oriental hemisphere.

As the analysis has confirmed, the German or U.S. media perspectives on Arabs and Muslims are shaped by the facets that characterize this Oriental myth as it was outlined in chapter II.2. This myth has, for instance, an influence on the way in which the observed Arab and Muslim actors are evaluated but in equal parts also how the Self is perceived and defined. Especially the predominant negativity of actors – despite the fact that similarities are also identified in both countries' print media – can be explained with this taken-for-granted myth. Both German and U.S. newspapers reflect subliminal perceptions and stereotypical assumptions that are accompanied with a classification of the majority of Arab and Muslim countries as a cultural and political (Oriental) unit and as an anti-thesis to the West. Especially in the direct aftermath of the analyzed event a number of quotes have been identified that fall into this two-sided construction: Newspaper articles talk about a “Western hemisphere” or “the Arab and Muslim world,” refer to the Arab and Muslim Other as “Oriental” or use the contrast of a “battle of *good* versus *evil*.”

At the same time, the 9/11 attacks seem to have reinforced some elements of this myth. For instance, the taken-for-granted assumption that the Oriental Other is *violent*, *hostile*, and culturally *underdeveloped* with regard to the Western standard of secularism and enlightenment has been clearly reinforced by the attacks. The attacks have thus strengthened assumptions about the Other that already existed before the attacks, because also before the event the *violent threat* that – according to this Oriental myth – emanates from the Oriental Other and that is strongly tied to religious *fanaticism* and cultural *backwardness* was increasingly used to describe Arabs and Muslims in the analyzed media before 9/11 as well.

However, and unlike other studies have argued that have focused on the Western perception of the Orient or the interplay between Occident and Orient so far,¹² the analysis has also shown that even though this two-sided concept is central for the German and U.S. perspective on and evaluation of Arabs and Muslims, it does not consequently and solely lead to an evaluation and portrayal of those Others as one homogenous negative counterpart of the Self, just as the Oriental myth does not solely include negative facets but is characterized by an ambivalent otherness. The images of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are multi-faceted – geographically, culturally, politically, economically, personally, as well as socially – and the occurring actors present a cross-section through society. We do find Arab and Muslim actors that are evaluated as similar to the Self, and not all actors are regarded as *underdeveloped* or *medieval*, even though a large number of Arabs and Muslims in both countries' print media are described as culturally *underdeveloped*, *irrational*, *unrestrained*, and *violent* – features that reflect some of the central facets that shape the Oriental myth. Events like 9/11 threaten the ingroup security, which leads to a stronger emphasis of the boundaries between the own collectivity and an outside Other that is represented here by Arabs and Muslims. This also and especially leads to an increasing

¹² See, for instance, Hippler and Lueg (1995) or Kliche et al. (1998, 1999).

identification with and strengthening of a transnational concept of collectivity after the attacks – namely that of a Western world that confronts an Oriental Other.

To come to a final conclusion, we can say that Western principles and standards form a crucial frame of reference for the observation and evaluation of events, processes, and actors. The German and U.S. concept of belonging is shaped by this fixed set of principles and standards that are not questioned but are permanently consulted by the Self to observe and structure its environment and Arabs and Muslims, who are regarded as one potential outgroup in this context. The Self constantly reflects upon its own evaluation process of the Other and is conscious of the fact that its own interests and needs may be more relevant than moral considerations for the institutionalization of its own standards with the Other. Thus, the observation of Arabs and Muslims is not an objective process, because the observing (German and American) Self is regarded as the ideal. Furthermore, the observation and evaluation of events and actors is influenced and distorted not only by the Self's own (political, cultural etc.) standards and principles, but also by certain myths (here especially the Oriental myth). Events like the 9/11 attacks can reinforce those myths – in the way of a self-fulfilling prophecy – and they can increase an ingroup's demand to strengthen the ingroup boundaries by explicitly emphasizing those principles, standards and myths.

Comparing Germany and the United States, we can conclude that both countries not only reveal rather similar self-perceptions but also – as a result of that – evaluate and portray Arabs and Muslims in a similar way. The approach towards Arabs and Muslims is predominantly but not solely shaped by an assumed difference between both sides. However, the analysis was able to show that this does not solely result in an overall negative image of Arabs and Muslims. The Self also emphasizes and integrates similarities in its overall perception of the Other. The analysis has revealed that Arabs and Muslims can even form a mirror reflection of the Self, even though those representatives of the Other only form a minor proportion in the overall set of focused Arab and Muslim actors and countries. Nevertheless, both completely different and more or less similar Others reflect crucial aspects of the German and U.S. self-image nevertheless, either by deviating from those self-conceptions or by fulfilling the criteria that the Self regards as central for its own concept of belonging. And either way, we can conclude that Arabs and Muslims are crucial for the German and American self-perception. Thus, to understand the way in which Arabs and Muslims are perceived in German and U.S. media we have to understand how Germany and the United States perceive themselves.

4. Benefits and Limits of the Study

I have argued in the beginning of this book, that Arabs and Muslims have a difficult stand in the West today: They are observed skeptically by the populations of Western countries like Germany and the United States due to such tremendously shocking incidents like the 9/11 attacks and the terror wave that many people in the West perceive to have swept over Europe in the aftermath of this event, reflected in attacks such as the those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). However, as the introduced analysis has shown, the assumption of a (terrorist, cultural or other) *threat* that emanates from Arabs and Muslims has already existed before the 9/11 attacks, and the perceptions of Arabs and Muslims as they are reflected in Western mass media today do not only result from such incidents as the mentioned terrorist attacks. The critical observation and the predominant focus on negative aspects of Arab and Muslim countries, for instance, with regard to their economic development, certain cultural features, or political structures and actions have shaped the image of Arabs and Muslims already before the attacks. In addition to that, with regard to Arab and Muslim immigrants and communities in the West, I have illustrated that those actors are also largely observed as different and geographically, politically, culturally etc. distant from their (German or U.S.) host society and the respective national self-concept – even though with those internal Others this distance becomes only explicitly obvious in the mass media after the attacks. And it is especially after 9/11, that (internal as well as external) Arabs and Muslims are observed more carefully not only with regard to their opinions on terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism or modernity, but also with regard to their loyalty or attitudes towards the West.

Theoretical Remarks

Theoretically, this book has introduced one specific perspective on this critical relationship between Arabs and Muslims and the West and has offered one possible way in which the Western perception of the other side could be understood. This explanation was shaped by the crucial assumption that (a), the images of Arabs and Muslims are centrally shaped by the Western self-perception, that (b), the self-perception and the perception of Arabs and Muslims in Germany and the United States is shaped by a Western cultural account, and that (c), due to social group-formation processes and the construction of national collectivity, the image of a hypothetical Other has to deviate from the own national self-concept to draw a boundary between Self and Other. We were able to test those assumptions on two comparative levels, as well: On one level, we compared two Western countries (i.e. Germany and the United States) and on a second level, we analyzed whether the 9/11 attacks have had an influence on the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims.

Based on the assumption that a set of Western principles, standards and myths (such as the Oriental myth) shapes the every day observation and the process of structuring of reality as it is done by actors in Germany and the United States, we were not only able to integrate the fact that similarities exist between Arab and Muslim Other and Western Self on a structural level (in

political, economic or other institutions). We were also able to define the central pattern according to which the West (here: Western mass media) observes and evaluates Arabs and Muslims. The study has shown that the theoretical concept of Western principles (of the world polity approach¹³) provides a useful framework to analyze and interpret the way in which Arabs and Muslims are perceived and portrayed in Western mass media. Furthermore, this theoretical concept allows for the integration of the Self (i.e. the German and U.S. self-perceptions) in the analysis of the images of the Arab and Muslim Other, since Western principles are not only used by the Self to observe the Other but also to define the own (national) concept of belonging. The study provides findings about how Western countries define the relevance of those Western principles and standards. By illustrating, for instance, the lack of those principles and standards in Arab and Muslim countries or with certain Arab and Muslim actors, the observing media also exemplify the consequences of a lack of Western principles and thereby also illustrate why those principles and standards are relevant for the Self AND for the Other. At the same time, the book provides more concrete findings about conception of those Western principles and standards, and has shown that the national self-concepts of both Germany and the United States are very similar and can be summarized as concepts of a transnational Western collectivity, that was not merely derived from the 9/11 attacks.

With regard to the theoretical conceptions of collective identity construction, we were able to show that this construction is based on the central assumption of difference and distance. However, the demarcation of actors as nonmembers of a certain collective concept of belonging is not solely marked by a devaluation of these actors. We were able to show that the Other is not solely negative and not solely constructed as different from the Self. I have illustrated in this book that even though both German and U.S. mass media, to a large extent, regard (internal and external) Arabs and Muslims as different and distant from the own national self-concept, they also see a certain degree of similarity and closeness between both sides. By collecting and analyzing the totality of occurring Arab and Muslim actors we have not only seen that the images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media are quite complex and multifaceted and comprise a large variety of nationalities and societal levels. We can also say that German and U.S. mass media reflect a large interest in the Other, i.e. in Arabs and Muslim countries' politics, culture and economic or other issues. As the study has shown, both countries perceive those actors and countries rather similar, since we have found similar structures and patterns in the actor images in both countries media.

Further studies could concentrate on the question whether we can trace the identified structures of collectivity construction and construction of otherness in other time contexts or in the context of other events as well. Those studies could also analyze whether the forms of perception and evaluation can also be found with regard to other countries, ethnic groups, religions or certain actor groups, to find out whether the levels of difference and distance that have been derived

¹³ Adopting largely the approach of the Stanford School (see, for instance, Meyer et al. 1994 and 2005, but see also Dierkes and Koenig 2006).

from the introduced analysis are general forms of social structuring and difference construction. Studies could furthermore concentrate on the question, whether Western countries are also as similar in their perception of the focused group in other contexts – especially in the context of the Iraq War which started with a United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and which has disunited the West in its position towards the country – and here especially Germany and the United States. It may be possible that the Western principles but also the observed Arab and Muslim Other are weight and evaluated slightly different – especially when we look at those contexts in which the Western Self enters the space of the Other. Those studies could also show whether the self-reflections are similar or different when other ethnic groups, countries or religions are observed.

Methodical Remarks

Methodically, with the used methodical approach of a quantifying qualitative content analysis we were able to first gather ALL Arab and Muslim actors of the selected media set over a defined timeframe and trace the basic structures of perception and evaluation for this entire set of occurring actors. The study thus presents a detailed description and summary of the image of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media. I have captured the WHOLE spectrum of the image of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media, and can thus make quantitative statements about the relevance of certain actors or certain ways of actor portrayal as well. In doing so, the study provides merely a quantifying qualitative description of the media images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media that mainly focuses on the linguistic level of the text and summarizes the words and images with which actors are described. Such a research perspective does not fully take into account the individual articles as separate independent units but regards them as part of overall communication processes about Arabs and Muslims, and about the perceptions of a German or American national collectivity that are reflected in these communication processes.

Only in a second step I have specified the quantitatively found patterns of actor images on the basis of selective qualitative text analyses. From the perspective of a more case-focused in-depth analysis it has thus to be admitted that a detailed qualitative analysis of all occurring actors could not be provided, because this detailed analysis would have gone beyond the scope of the project, as it would have taken too much time to do so. Only selected (prototype) actors have been analyzed more closely in a second step in the context of the articles in which they occur, to qualitatively re-construct and further elaborate the structures and patterns that have been found in the images of Arabs and Muslims in the first step of the analysis, and to trace the interplay of different actors and actors types in the contexts of the articles. In contrast to in-depth analysis methods, the analysis thus has not reconstructed the patterns of the media images of Arabs and Muslims from only a few actor cases but from a broad description of all occurring images in a broad spectrum of different data over a certain timeframe. The results of this study may be used as a basis for further analyses that look more closely at the roles of individual actors in the

context of certain topics, or carry out a more detailed analysis of linguistic varieties and semantic peculiarities in the images of actors in different media.

The Production of Mass Media Contents

Furthermore, the introduced research project has only looked at the product of mass media production processes, i.e. the constructed media reality in the newspaper article. The question of intentions, attitudes or views of the actors who produce the analyzed media reality was of no interest here, mainly because I have argued that these processes and factors are not relevant when a reader consumes an article. I have only focused on HOW actors are portrayed in this media reality and what images those actors receive, and can only assume but not prove WHY certain actors are focused on in the analyzed mass media, or to what extent and why they receive certain images. The study has only captured mass media contents as a collective set of knowledge that reflects the perceptions and views of the German and U.S. society and at the same time also shapes the views and perceptions of the same with regard to Arabs and Muslims. I have not looked at the concrete selection circumstances and the selection criteria that become relevant in the production process of newspapers and print media in general. Furthermore, the introduced study has not analyzed how relevant the identified worldviews and German and U.S. self-concepts in the media contents are for those actors who produce news about and images of Arabs and Muslims, an aspect that could be focused on more closely in further studies as well.

Impact on Attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims

The results of the introduced analysis may also provide the basis for further studies that look on the question, what impact the mass media images of Arabs and Muslims have on the members of the (German and U.S.) society in which those images are produced and communicated. This book has concentrated on print media, since we assumed that mass media are a crucial platform in modern societies for the communication of basic information and knowledge about the world, events and actors, and therefore also present a central source of knowledge about Arabs and Muslims on the basis of which the German and U.S. public forms its opinion about events, issues and actors. Surveys and studies that look at public opinions about (external but also internal) Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. society, or analyze political relationships and conflicts between Arab and Muslim countries and the West, could stronger take into account the media realities in those societies that not only reflect public perceptions but may also shape the very same.

Impact on Arabs and Muslims

But even more than that, further studies should also include the examination of the impacts of the outlined images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media on the Arab and Muslim communities in Western countries, because those images are consumed by the same as well. On the basis of the introduced print media analysis we may analyze, for example, how the predominantly negative, weakening or skeptical images and distancing features of Muslims and Arabs in countries like Germany or the United States are perceived by the distanced and devaluated Arabs and Muslims, and how those images thus also shape those people's perception of Germany and the United States.

One research project that has taken up those questions already is the ethnographic study of Ostermann (2007) who has looked, among other things, at the way in which Moroccan immigrants in Germany cope with the attitudes, perceptions and the resulting living conditions in their host society. As the author has found out, for example, the Moroccan community (in Frankfurt, Germany) is generally uninformed about current political developments, but Moroccan immigrants do take notice of German media. Even though they do not regularly read German newspapers, Ostermann (2007) reports that her informants often stated that they have heard about what is written in German print media about Arabs and Muslims. They reported that they know what newspapers write and they were clear about their dislike of the articles' contents. Those internal Arabs and Muslims feel that they are not accepted in the country they are living in, an impression that is further intensified by the experienced attitudes of Germans in the everyday interaction with the host society (in hospitals, civil services etc.).

This feeling of demarcation and distance can have consequences for the behavior of those minorities in their host societies, as well. As Ostermann (2007) indicates, some of the Moroccan immigrants strengthen their ties to their home countries or retreat to their ethnic communities and thus distance themselves from the host society (besides being distanced or at least ignored by the same as well). Others adopt features that are used by the West to distance Arabs and Muslims and turn them into features that foster their own group and thus adopt some of the images that are ascribed to them by the German and U.S. media and society. They use markers of difference like religious symbols (e.g. the headscarf) to distance themselves from a society that proclaims standards and values that those features do not fulfill. Here, those actors turn themselves from distanced Others into separated but autonomous persons who themselves emphasize their otherness to a society that demarcates them. What is problematic about this reaction on behalf of the internal Other is their behavior may again be picked up by the (German and U.S.) host society (and mass media) as an indicator for the unwillingness of the Other to integrate and as a confirmation for the Self of the difference that was assumed between Self and Other in the first place. This falseness of respective perceptions leads to a constant circle of wrong imaging.

WHY WE ARE NOT ABLE TO UNMAKE DIFFERENCE

If we ask for a more positive imaging of Arabs and Muslims, for an more well-balanced image of the ethnic groups in mass media, and thus for a greater awareness of the rating scales that we apply to portray and evaluate other countries, political systems, cultures and actors, the question that arises from this book is: How do we unmake difference and reduce negative images of Arabs and Muslims when the counter image of a (different or even negative) Other is crucial for the definition of self?

As was outlined in this book, the concept of community or, in other words, the construction of collectivity, mainly rests on the assumption of DIFFERENCE and DISTANCE. Even though Weller (2000) argues that, in the world society, states increasingly lose their significance for collective identity formation because perceptions of international relations are increasingly affected by other institutions that offer alternative categorizations and alternative collective identity concepts (Weller 2000: 67), national collectivities are still relevant. The nationality of actors may become less relevant on the global stage, but for certain contexts (for instance, when Arabs and Muslims are observed) it is still a relevant level of difference besides other larger transnational community concepts like that of the European Union, a community of *democratic* states or a “Western hemisphere” that was also discussed in the introduced study.

The definition of a (national) concept of belonging always works via a differentiation between two sides, an ingroup and outgroup, on the basis of which individuals position themselves in the social contexts in which they act. The assumption and construction of difference is crucial for the construction and structuring of reality. It helps to integrate the complexity of life, define the own position in the world, and evaluate other actors that are perceived as part of this reality. Due to this basic relevance of differentiation, a universal “world community” or a community concept without a conception of boundary, difference and actors that are excluded is hard to achieve, since the community formation rests on the demarcation of an outside Other. Therefore, even if we observe collective concepts on a transnational level, an out-group seems inevitably to be part of this concept of belonging. We can thus say that to ask for an unmaking of difference is a claim that might be rather difficult to achieve. Rottenburg (2006) summarizes this unpromising attempt as follows:

We should not regard difference as something to be avoided as much as possible, but rather accept it as a precondition for saying anything at all about the world. For this reason, any statement necessarily includes difference within itself [...] that cannot be overcome. The desire to overcome such difference remains an aporia. (Rottenburg 2006: 11)

If we ask for a change of the current imaging of Arabs and Muslims, or more generally speaking, a change in the German and American perception of Arabs and Muslims, one step could be that the Self becomes more aware of the own presumption or taken-for-granted myths that shape the negative, contradictory or even the positive images of the observed Other. Of course, Arabs and Muslims can appear to be different simply because they ARE different (for example because the 9/11 terrorists have indeed been *violent* and *hostile*). However, the observing Self should also look

more differentiated at the actions and facets of the Other, and it should take into account to what extent the own views, principles and value systems shape and guide the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims. One should ask oneself, what facets are actually observed and highlighted with other people, and what facets are ignored. The facets that German and U.S. media notice and highlight when they observe Arabs and Muslims do not have to be the only features of the observed counterpart.

This claim for more awareness is not reduced to mass media, but is directed towards all societal branches. We should become more aware of the fact that our own perspective creates only ONE of many possible realities. Our own perspective may fail to see, or ignore other facets due to certain presumptions and evaluation patterns that shape the own perception. To dissolve this distortion, one crucial step is to overcome the distance towards the Other, for instance, by improving the communication not ABOUT but WITH the Other, or by listening to those groups, actors or countries when they criticize negative or one-sided images of themselves. This request does not consequently mean that we have to unmake the differences between our own national self-image and Arab and Muslim otherness completely, but rather asks for a reduction of the assumed or actual distance between both sides, not only on the geographical level, but also in the other dimensions that have been outlined in this book.

It may only cause further alienation and distance between Self and Other, if we ask for more integration of Arab and Muslim communities within the West, demand more democratization from Arab countries, or simply claim that the other side does not meet the own standards and expectations without knowing and trying to understand the perspective of the other side. This distance and lack of dialogue and knowledge again may cause further misperceptions, not only on behalf of the Self but also among Arabs and Muslims, because they also create their own myths and construct their own distorted images about the “distant Western Other.” A Moroccan immigrant from Germany who was interviewed by Ostermann (2007) during the author’s fieldwork may be presented here as a final example, to close this book and to illustrate this distorted perception on behalf of the Arab and Muslim Other. Just like the quotation of a German woman talking about “the Arabs” that was presented in the very beginning of this book, this statement of a Moroccan woman who lives in Frankfurt/Main, Germany, illustrates that not only Germans do have distorted perceptions of Arabs and Muslims, but that also those Others may develop a distorted image of “the Germans” due to non-communication and lack of knowledge. The Moroccan woman describes this image as follows:

“Real Germans are rich, they own houses, drive expansive cars and they don't like us, the 'Ausländer'.” (Ostermann 2007)

As this quotation indicates, the lack of real contact between Self and Other can lead to a constant circle of misperception that is hard to resolve. The daily interaction of Self and Other needs to be recognized as a platform for potential change. Thus the first step to unmake difference is to unmake distance.

REFERENCES

- ABRAMS, Dominic (Editor) (1990): *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- ANDERSON, Benedict (2005): *Die Erfindung der Nation: Zur Karriere eines folgenreichen Konzepts*, second, extended edition of 1996. Frankfurt [et al.]: Campus.
- ARTZ, Lee W.; POLLOCK, Mark A. (1995): "Limiting the Options: Anti-Arab Images in U.S. Media Coverage of the Persian Gulf Crisis." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 119-135.
- ATEŞ, Şeref (2006): "Das Islambild in den Medien nach dem 11. September 2001." In *Massenmedien, Migration und Integration. Herausforderungen für Journalismus und politische Bildung*. Edited by Christoph Butterwegge and Gudrun Hentges. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 151-170.
- BADE, Klaus J. (Editor) (1992): *Deutsche im Ausland - Fremde in Deutschland: Migration in Geschichte und Gegenwart*. München: Beck.
- BALIBAR, Etienne; WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1990): *Rasse, Klasse, Nation: ambivalente Identitäten*, first edition. Hamburg [et al.]: Argument.
- BARTH, Fredrik (Editor) (1969): "Introduction." In *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Cultural Difference*. Bergen/Oslo/London: Universitetsforlaget/Allen & Unwin, pp. 9-38.
- BECKER, Howard S. (1973): *Outsiders. Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. London/New York: The Free Press.
- BELKAOUI, Janice M. (1978): "Images of Arabs and Israelis in the Prestige Press, 1966-74." In *Journalism Quarterly* 55, volume 4, pp. 732-738.
- BELLAH, Robert N. (2005, reprint): "Civil Religion in America (1967)." In *Daedalus*, volume 134, issue 4, pp. 40-55.
- BELLAH, Robert N.; HAMMOND, Phillip E. (1980): *Varieties of Civil Religion*. Cambridge [et al.]: Harper & Row.
- BENNETT, Lance W.; PALETZ, David L. (Editors) (1991): *Taken by Storm. The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War*. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.
- BERNARD, William S. (1998): "Immigration: History of U.S. Policy." In *The Immigration Reader: America in a Multidisciplinary Perspective*. Editor: David Jacobson. Malden, MA/Oxford, UK: Blackwell, pp. 48-71.
- BIEBER-ROBERTS, Peggy (1995): "America Looks at the Turks: Analysis of Major U.S. Newsmagazines' Coverage." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 163-174.
- BIELEFELD, Uli (Editor) (1991): *Das Eigene und das Fremde: neuer Rassismus in der Alten Welt?* Hamburg: Junius [Hamburger Institut für Sozialforschung].
- BILLIG, Michael (1995): *Banal Nationalism*. London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: SAGE.
- BOHN, Cornelia; HAHN, Alois (2002): "Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion: Property, Nation and Religion." In *Soziale Systeme. Zeitschrift für Soziologische Theorie*, volume 8, issue 1, pp. 8-26.
- BONACKER, Thorsten; WELLER, Christoph (Editors) (2006): *Konflikte der Weltgesellschaft. Akteure, Strukturen, Dynamiken*. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus.

- BONFADELLI, Heinz (2002): *Medieninhaltsforschung. Grundlagen, Methoden, Anwendungen*. Konstanz: UVK.
- BÖS, Mathias; ZIMMER, Kerstin (2005): "Die Freiheit zu reisen: Zur Umsetzung der Norm der Reisefreiheit in der Weltgesellschaft." In *Konflikte der Weltgesellschaft. Akteure, Strukturen, Dynamiken*. Edited by Thorsten Bonacker and Christoph Weller. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 221-250.
- BROSIUS, Hans-Bernd; KOSCHEL, Friederike (2001): *Methoden der Empirischen Kommunikationsforschung. Eine Einführung*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher.
- BRÜGGEN, Willi; JÄGER, Michael (Editors) (2003): *Brauchen wir Feinde? Feindbildkonstruktionen nach dem 11. September 2001 in sozialpsychologischer und diskursanalytischer Sicht*. Berlin: Edition Freitag.
- BUTTERWEGGE, Christoph (1999): "Massenmedien, Migrant(inn)en und Rassismus." In *Medien und Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Edited by Christoph Butterwegge, Gudrun Hentges and Fatma Sarigöz. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 64-89.
- BUTTERWEGGE, Christoph; HENTGES, Gudrun; SARIGÖZ, Fatma (Editors) (1999): *Medien und Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- CAMPBELL, Jane (1995): "Portrayal of Iranians in U.S. Motion Pictures." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 177-186.
- CHÁVEZ, Leo R. (2001): *Covering Immigration. Popular Images and the Politics of the Nation*. Berkeley, CA: California UP.
- COHEN, Anthony P. (Editor) (1982): "Belonging: the experience of culture." In *Belonging. Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures*. Manchester: UP, pp. 1-17.
- COHEN, Anthony P. (Editor) (1986): "Of symbols and boundaries, or, does Ertie's greatcoat hold the key?" In *Symbolising Boundaries. Identity and Diversity in British Cultures*. Manchester: UP, pp. 1-19.
- COLLINS, Randall (1980): "Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization." In *American Sociological Review* 47, pp. 1-27.
- DANIEL, Norman (1960): *Islam and the West: the Making of an Image*. Edinburgh: UP.
- SIBLEY, David (1995): *Geographies of Exclusion: Society and Difference in the West*. London/New York: Routledge.
- DELGADO, J. Manuel (1972): *Die Gastarbeiter in der deutschen Presse: Eine inhaltsanalytische Studie*. Opladen: Leske.
- DIERKES, Julian; KOENIG, Matthias (2006): "Zur Ambivalenz der universalistischen Weltkultur – Konfliktbearbeitung und Konfliktodynamik aus Sicht des neuen soziologischen Institutionalismus." In *Konflikte der Weltgesellschaft. Akteure, Strukturen, Dynamiken*. Edited by Thorsten Bonacker and Christoph Weller. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 127-148.
- DIEZ, Thomas (2006): "Weltgesellschaft kontra internationale Gesellschaft? Anmerkungen zur Konflikthaftigkeit und Unterwanderung von Grenzen." In *Konflikte der Weltgesellschaft. Akteure, Strukturen, Dynamiken*. Edited by Thorsten Bonacker and Christoph Weller. Frankfurt a. M.: Campus, pp. 175-195.
- DITTMER, Jason (2005): "Captain America's Empire: Reflections on Identity, Popular Culture, and Post-9/11 Geopolitics." In *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, volume 95, issue 3, pp. 626-643.

- DONNAN, Hastings/WILSON, Thomas M. (2001): *Borders. Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*. Oxford/New York: Berg.
- DURKHEIM, Emile (1976; reprint): *Die Regeln der soziologischen Methode*, fifth edition. Edited by René König. Darmstadt/Neuwied: Hermann Luchterhand.
- DURKHEIM, Emile (1992; reprint): *Über soziale Arbeitsteilung: Studie über die Organisation höherer Gesellschaften*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- ESPOSITO, John L. (1992): *The Islamic Threat. Myth or Reality?* New York/Oxford: Oxford UP.
- FARROKHZAD, Schahrzad (2006): "Exotin, Unterdrückte und Fundamentalistin. Konstruktionen der 'fremden Frau' in deutschen Medien." In *Massenmedien, Migration und Integration. Herausforderungen für Journalismus und politische Bildung*. Edited by Christoph Butterwegge and Gudrun Hentges. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 53-84.
- FRIEDMAN, Lester D. (Editor) (1991): *Unspeakable Images: Ethnicity and the American Cinema*. Urbana/Chicago: University of Illinois.
- FRÜH, Werner (2001): *Inhaltsanalyse: Theorie und Praxis*, fifth, revised edition. Konstanz: UVK.
- FUCHS, Dieter; GERHARDS, Jürgen; ROLLER, Edeltraud (1995): "Nationalism versus Eurocentrism? The Construction of Collective Identities in Western Europe." In *Migration, Citizenship and Ethno-National Identities in the European Union*. Edited by Marco Martiniello. Aldershot/Brookfield, USA: Avebury/Ashgate, pp. 165-178.
- FULLER, Linda K. (1995): "Hollywood Holding Us Hostage: Or, Why Are Terrorists in the Movies Middle Easterners?" In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 187-197.
- FUNK, Peter; WEISS, Hans-Jürgen (1995): "Ausländer als Medienproblem? Thematisierungseffekte der Medienberichterstattung über Ausländer, Asyl und Rechtsextremismus in Deutschland." In *Media Perspektiven 1*, pp. 21-29.
- GALTUNG, Johan; RUGE, Marie H. (1965): "The Structure of Foreign News. The Presentation of the Congo, Cuba and Cyprus Crises in Four Norwegian Newspapers." In *Journal of Peace Research 2*, pp. 64-91.
- GAUGER, Jörg-Dieter (1984): "Nation, Nationalbewußtsein und Nationwerdung in der deutschen Geschichte." In *Heimat und Nation. Zur Geschichte und Identität der Deutschen*. Edited by Klaus Weigelt. Mainz: Hase & Koehler, pp. 26-44.
- GERHARDS, Jürgen (2004): "Diskursanalyse als systematische Inhaltsanalyse. Die öffentliche Debatte über Abtreibungen in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Vergleich." In *Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse. Band 2: Forschungspraxis*, second edition. Edited by Reiner Keller, Andreas Hirsland [et al.] Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 299-324.
- GHAREEB, Edmund (Editor) (1983): *Split Vision: The portrayal of Arabs in the American Media*. Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council.
- GREENFELD, Liah (1992): *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge [et al.]: Harvard UP.
- GÜR, Gürsel (1998): *Das Türkei-Bild in der deutschen Presse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der EU-Türkei-Beziehungen. Eine Inhaltsanalyse für den Zeitraum 1987-1995*. Frankfurt a. M. [et al.]: Lang.
- HADDAD, Yvonne Y. (Editor) (1991): *The Muslims of America*. New York [et al.]: Oxford UP.
- HAFEZ, Kai (1999): "Antisemitismus, Philosemitismus und Islamfeindlichkeit: Ein Vergleich ethnisch-religiöser Medienbilder." In *Medien und Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Edited by

- Christoph Butterwegge, Gudrun Hentges and Fatma Sarigöz. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 122-135.
- HAFEZ, Kai (2002): *Die politische Dimension der Auslandsberichterstattung. Band 2: Das Nahost- und Islambild der deutschen überregionalen Presse*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- HAFEZ, Kai (2002b): "Die irrationale Fehlwahrnehmung des 'anderen.' Deutsche und arabische Öffentlichkeitsreaktionen auf den 11. September." In *Ein Tag im September: 11.9.2001 – Hintergründe, Folgen, Perspektiven*. Edited by Georg Stein and Volkhard Windfuhr. Heidelberg: Palmyra, pp. 221-245.
- HAN, Petrus (2000): *Soziologie der Migration. Erklärungsmodelle, Fakten, Politische Konsequenzen, Perspektiven*. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius/ UTB.
- HAQUE, Mazharul (1995): "Elements of Cross-Cultural Communication and the Middle East." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 16-24.
- HASHEM, Mahboub (1995): "Coverage of Arabs in Two Leading U.S. Newsmagazines: *Time* and *Newsweek*." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 151-162.
- HECKMANN, Friedrich (1992): *Ethnische Minderheiten, Volk und Nation. Soziologie inter-ethnischer Beziehungen*. Stuttgart: Enke.
- HEINE, Peter (1996): *Konflikt der Kulturen oder Feindbild Islam. Alte Vorurteile – neue Klischees – reale Gefahren*. Freiburg: Herder.
- HEITMEYER, Wilhelm (Editor) (2003-2007): *Deutsche Zustände, Folge 1-5*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- HENTSCH, Thierry (1992): *Imagining the Middle East*. Montreal: Black Rose.
- HERB, Guntram H. (2004): "Double Vision: Territorial strategies in the construction of national identities in Germany, 1949-1979." In *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, volume 94, pp. 140-164.
- HIPPLER, Jochen; LUEG, Andrea (Editors) (1995): *The Next Threat: Western Perceptions of Islam*. London [et al.]: Pluto.
- HÖMBERG, Walter; SCHLEMMER, Sabine (1995): "Fremde als Objekt. Asylberichterstattung in deutschen Tageszeitungen." In *Media Perspektiven* 1, pp. 11-20.
- HUNTINGTON, Samuel (1996): *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Simon & Schuster.
- IMBUSCH, Peter (1990): *'Das moderne Weltsystem': Eine Kritik der Weltsystemtheorie Immanuel Wallersteins*. Marburg: Arbeit & Gesellschaft.
- IVERSEN, Ivar A. (2004): "Portraits of Evil: Timothy McVeigh and Osama bin Laden in *Time* and *Newsweek*." In *U.S. and the Others. Global Media Images on "The War on Terror"*. Edited by Stig A. Nohrstedt and Rune Ottosen. Goeteborg: Nordicom, pp. 77-91.
- JACKSON, Nancybeth (2001): "Mediterranean Migrations and Arab-American Stereotypes." In *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, volume 11, issue 1, pp. 103-113.
- JÄGER, Margret (1999): "Inländische und ausländische Straftäter in deutschen Printmedien: Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung und Vorschläge zur Verbesserung der Berichterstattung." In *Medien und Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Edited by Christoph Butterwegge, Gudrun Hentges and Fatma Sarigöz. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 109-121.

- KABBANI, Rana (1993): *Mythos Morgenland. Wie Vorurteile und Klischees unser Bild vom Orient bis heute prägen*. München: Drömersche Verlagsanstalt Th. Knaur Nachf.
- KALBERG, Stephen (2004): "The Past and Present Influence of World Views: Max Weber on a Neglected Sociological Concept." In *Journal of Classical Sociology*, volume 4, pp. 139-163.
- KAMALIPOUR, Yahya R. (Editor) (1995): *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
- KARIM, Karim H. (1997): "The Historical Resilience of Primary Stereotypes: Core Images of the Muslim Other." In *The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse*. Edited by Stephen H. Riggins. Thousand Oaks: SAGE, pp. 153-182.
- KEPPLINGER, Hans M. (1989): "Instrumentelle Aktualisierung. Grundlagen einer Theorie publizistischer Konflikte." In *Massenkommunikation*. Edited by Max Kaase and Winfried Schulz. Opladen: Westdeutscher, pp. 199-220.
- KLEMM, Verena; HÖRNER, Karin (Editors) (1993): *Das Schwert des 'Experten'. Peter Scholl-Latour's verzerrtes Araber- und Islambild*. Heidelberg: Palmyra.
- KLICHE, Thomas; ADAM, Suzanne; JANNINK, Helge (1999): "'Wirklich die Hölle.' Diskursanalysen zur Konstruktion von 'Islam' in einem deutschen Printmedium." In *Politische Psychologie der Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Opfer – Täter – Mittäter*. Edited by Rainer Dollase, Thomas Kliche and Helmut Moser. Weinheim/München: Juventa, pp. 307-324.
- KLICHE, Thomas; ADAM, Suzanne; JANNINK, Helge (1998): "'Der Marsch hat begonnen.' Diskursanalysen zur Konstruktion von 'Islam' in deutschen Printmedien." In *Krieg, Nationalismus, Rassismus und die Medien*. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf and Irena Schmidt-Regener. Münster: LIT, pp. 97-107.
- KLIMA, Rolf (1994): "Selbstbild." In *Lexikon zur Soziologie*, third revised and extended edition. Edited by Werner Fuch-Heinritz, Rüdiger Lautmann, Otthein Rammstedt [et al.] Opladen: Westdeutscher, p. 592.
- KLUGE, Susann (1999): *Empirisch begründete Typenbildung. Zur Konstruktion von Typen und Typologien in der qualitativen Sozialforschung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- KNISCHEWSKI, Gerd (1996): "Post-War National Identity in Germany." In *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. Edited by Brian Jenkins and Spyros A. Sofos. London/New York: Routledge, pp. 125-152.
- KOLB, A. (1962): "Die Geographie und die Kulturerdteile." In *Hermann-von-Wissmann-Festschrift*. Edited by A. Leidlmair. Tübingen, pp. 42-49.
- KRECH, Volkhard (1994): "Mythos." In *Lexikon zur Soziologie*, third revised and extended edition. Edited by Werner Fuch-Heinritz, Rüdiger Lautmann, Otthein Rammstedt [et al.] Opladen: Westdeutscher, p. 457.
- KRÜCKEN, Georg (Editor) (2005): "Einleitung." In *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen*. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- KUCKARTZ, Udo (1988): *Computer und verbale Daten: Chancen zur Innovation sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschungstechniken*. Frankfurt am Main [et al.]: Lang.
- KUCKARTZ, Udo (1995): "Case-Oriented Quantification." In *Computer-Aided Qualitative Data Analysis. Theory, Methods, and Practice*. Edited by Udo Kelle. London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: Sage, pp. 158-166.
- KUCKARTZ, Udo (1999): *Computergestützte Analyse qualitativer Daten. Eine Einführung in Methoden und Arbeitstechniken*. Opladen: Westdeutscher.

- LEIBOLD, Jürgen; KÜHNEL, Steffen (2006): "Islamophobie. Differenzierung tut not." In *Deutsche Zustände, Folge 4*. Edited by Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 135-155.
- LEONARD, Karen I. (2003): *Muslims in the United States. The State of Research*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- LIEBES, Tamar (1992): "Our War/Their War: Comparing the Intifadah and the Gulf War on U.S. and Israeli Television." In *Critical Studies of Mass Communication* 9, pp. 44-55.
- LLOBERA, Joseph R. (1994): *The god of modernity: the development of nationalism in Western Europe*. Oxford [et al.]: Berg.
- LUHMANN, Niklas (1996): *Die Realität der Massenmedien*, second, extended edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
- MAIDMENT, Richard; MCGREW, Anthony (Editors) (1991): *The American Political Process*, second edition. London/Newbury Park/New Dehli: SAGE & The Open University.
- MANN, Michael (1992): "The emergence of modern European nationalism." In *Transition to Modernity. Essays on power, wealth and belief*. Edited by John A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie. Cambridge [et al.]: Cambridge UP, pp. 137-165.
- MARCINKOWSKI, Frank (2002): "Massenmedien und die Integration der Gesellschaft aus Sicht der autopoietischen Systemtheorie: Steigern die Medien das Reflexionspotential sozialer Systeme?" In *Integration und Medien. Mediensymposium Luzern, Volume 7*. Edited by Kurt Imhof, Otfried Jarren and Roger Blum. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher, pp. 110-121.
- MARGER, Martin (1991): *Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives*. Second Edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- MAYRING, Philipp (2003): *Qualitative Inhaltsanalyse: Grundlagen und Techniken*, eighth edition. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz.
- MAYRING, Philipp (2005): "Neuere Entwicklungen in der qualitativen Forschung und der Qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse." In *Die Praxis der Qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse*. Edited by Philipp Mayring and Michaela Glaeser-Zikuda. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz, pp. 7-20.
- MCALISTER, Melanie (2005): *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945*, updated edition with a post-9/11 chapter. Berkeley: University of California.
- MCDAVID, Mary C. (1983): "Media Myths on the Middle East: The U.S. Press on the War in Lebanon." In *Split vision: The portrayal of Arabs in the American Media*. Edited by Edmund Ghareeb. Washington, DC: American-Arab Affairs Council, pp. 299-313.
- MEIER, Frank (2004): "Der Akteur, der Agent und der Andere – Elemente einer neo-institutionalistischen Theorie der Beratung." In *Die beratene Gesellschaft. Zur gesellschaftlichen Bedeutung von Beratung*. Edited by Rainer Schützeichel, Thomas Brüsemeister. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 221-238.
- MERTEN, Klaus (1995): *Inhaltsanalyse. Einführung in Theorie, Methode und Praxis*, second, improved edition. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
- MERTEN, Klaus; RUHRMANN, Georg (1986): *Das Bild des Ausländers in der deutschen Presse. Ergebnisse einer systematischen Inhaltsanalyse*. Frankfurt a. M.
- MEYER, John W. (1980): "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State." In *Studies of the Modern World System*. Edited by Albert Bergesen. New York: Academic Press, pp. 109-137.
- MEYER, John W. (2005): "Der sich wandelnde kulturelle Gehalt des Nationalstaats." In *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen*. Edited by Georg Krücken. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 133-162.

- MEYER, John W. (2005): *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen*. Edited by Georg Krücken. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- MEYER, John W.; BOLI, John; THOMAS, George M. (1994): "Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account." In *Institutional Environments and Organizations. Structural Complexity and Individualism*. Edited by W. Richard Scott, John W. Meyer [et al.] Thousand Oaks/CA: Sage, pp. 9-27.
- MEYER, John W.; BOLI, John; THOMAS, George M. (2005a): "Onotologie und Rationalisierung im Zurechnungssystem der westlichen Kultur." In *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen*. Edited by Georg Krücken. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 17-46.
- MEYER, John W.; BOLI, John; THOMAS, George M.; RAMIREZ, Francisco O. (2005b): "Die Weltgesellschaft und der Nationalstaat." In *Weltkultur. Wie die westlichen Prinzipien die Welt durchdringen*. Edited by Georg Krücken. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 85-132.
- MEYER, John W.; HANNAN, Michel T. (Editors) (1979): "Issues for Further Comparative Research." In *National Development and the World System. Educational, Economic, and Political Change, 1950-1970*. Chicago, IL/London: University of Chicago, pp. 297-308.
- MILLER, Randall M. (Editor) (1980): *The Kaleidoscope Lens: How Hollywood Views Ethnic Groups*. Englewood, NJ: Jerome S. Ozer.
- MINTZEL, Alf (1997): *Multikulturelle Gesellschaften in Europa und Nordamerika: Konzepte, Streitfragen, Analysen, Befunde*, first edition. Passau: Rothe.
- MÖLLER, Renate; SANDER, Uwe (1997): "Die Vertrautheit der Fremden in den Medien." In *Medien und Fremdenfeindlichkeit. Alltägliche Paradoxien, Dilemmata, Absurditäten und Zynismen*. Edited by Bernd Scheffer. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 159-191.
- MOUSA, Issam S. (1984): *The Arab image in the U.S. press*. New York: Peter Lang.
- MÜNKLER, Herfried (Editor in collaboration with Bernd Ladwig) (1997): *Furcht und Faszination: Facetten der Fremdheit*. Berlin: Akademie.
- MUMMENDEY, Amelie; OTTEN, S. (1992): "Theorien intergruppalen Verhaltens." In *Theorien der Sozialpsychologie, Band II: Gruppen-, Interaktions- und Lerntheorien*. Edited by D. Frey and M. Irle. Bern: Huber, pp. 98-104.
- MUMMENDEY, Amelie; SIMON, Bernd (Editors) (1997): "Nationale Identifikation und die Abwertung von Fremdgruppen." In *Identität und Verschiedenheit. Zur Sozialpsychologie der Identität in komplexen Gesellschaften*. Bern [et al.]: Huber, pp. 175-193.
- NABER, Nadine (2000): "Ambiguous Insiders: An investigation of Arab American invisibility." In *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, volume 23, number 1, pp. 37-61.
- NACOS, Brigitte L.; TORRES-REYNA, Oscar (2003): "Framing Muslim-Americans Before and After 9/11." In *Framing Terrorism. The News Media, the Government and the Public*. Edited by Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion Just. New York/London: Routledge, pp. 133-157.
- NAFICY, Hamid (1995): "Mediating the Other: American Pop Culture Representation of Postrevolutionary Iran." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 73-90.
- PALMBACH, Ute; KEMPF, Wilhelm (1994): "Die Konstruktion des Feindbildes Saddam." In *Manipulierte Wirklichkeiten. Medienpsychologische Untersuchungen der bundesdeutschen Presseberichterstattung im Golfkrieg*. Edited by Wilhelm Kempf. Münster: LIT.
- PANAGOPOULOS, Costas (2006): "The Polls-Trends: Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 9/11." In *Public Opinion Quarterly*, volume 70, number 4, pp. 608-624.

- PFOHL, Stephen J. (1985): *Images of Deviance and Social Control. A Sociological History*. New York [et al.]: McGraw-Hill.
- PIPER, Nicola (1998): *Racism, Nationalism and Citizenship: Ethnic Minorities in Britain and Germany*. Aldershot [et al.]: Ashgate.
- PÖRKSEN, Bernhard (2000): *Die Konstruktion von Feindbildern. Zum Sprachgebrauch in neonazistischen Medien*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher.
- POOLE, Ross (1999): *Nation and Identity*. London: Routledge.
- PREDELLI, Ulrich (1995): *Wie fremd sind uns Fremde? Das Ausländerbild in der deutschen Tagespresse*, Vistascript volume 10. Berlin: Vistas.
- QUANDT, Siegfried (1995): *Die Darstellung der Türkei, der Türken und Kurden in deutschen Massenmedien. Die Berichterstattung der Printmedien und Fernsehsender im März/April 1995*. Gießen: ???
- QUATTRONE, G.A. (1986): "On the perception of a group's variability." In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Edited by S. Worchel and W.G. Austin. Chicago: Nelson Hall.
- RODINSON, Maxime (1988): *Europe and the mystique of Islam*. London: Tauris.
- ROTTENBURG, Richard; SCHNEPEL, Burkhard; SHIMADA, Shingo (Editors) (2006): *The Making and Unmaking of Differences. Anthropological, Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives*. Bielefeld: transcript.
- ROTTER, Gernot (1993): "Europa und der Orient: Geschichte und Wiedergeburt eines alten Feindbildes." In *Das Schwert des "Experten": Peter Scholl-Latours verzerrtes Araber- und Islambild*. Edited by Verena Klemm and Karin Hörner. Heidelberg: Palmyra, pp. 44-58.
- RUHRMANN, Georg (1999): "Medienberichterstattung ueber Auslaender: Befunde – Perspektiven – Empfehlungen." In *Medien und Multikulturelle Gesellschaft*. Edited by Christoph Butterwege, Gudrun Hentges and Fatma Sarigöz. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 95-108.
- RUHRMANN, Georg; DEMREN, S. (2000): "Wie Medien über Migranten berichten." In *Migranten und Medien*. Edited by H. Schatz, C. Holtz-Bacha and J.-U. Nieland. Opladen: Westdeutscher, pp. 69-81.
- RUHRMANN, Georg; KOLLMER, Jochen (1987): *Ausländerberichterstattung in der Kommune. Inhaltsanalyse Bielefelder Tageszeitungen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ausländerfeindlicher Alltagstheorien*. Opladen: Westdeutscher.
- SAID, Edward (1981): *Covering Islam. How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world*. New York: Vintage.
- SAID, Edward W. (1978): *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon.
- SALAZAR, Jose Miguel (1998): "Social Identity and National Identity." In *Social Identity. International Perspectives*. Edited by Stephen Worchel, J. Francisco Morales [et al.] London/Thousand Oaks/New Dehli: Sage, pp. 114-123.
- SALIBA, Therese (2006): "Diasporas in Detention in the Pacific Northwest." [Unpublished paper, presented at the Conference on 'Mapping Arab Diasporas: Border Crossings, Exile and Displacement' at the Center for Arab American Studies, University of Michigan, Dearborn USA, April 27-29, 2006]
- SARDAR, Ziauddin (1999): *Orientalism*. Buckingham/Philadelphia: Open UP.
- SCHEUFELE, Dietram (1999): "Framing as a Theory of Media Effects." In *Journal of Communication*, volume 49(1), pp. 103-122.

- SCHIFFER, Sabine (2005): *Die Darstellung des Islam in der Presse. Sprache, Bilder, Suggestionen. Eine Auswahl von Techniken und Beispielen*. Würzburg: Ergon.
- SCHIMANK, Uwe (1996): *Theorien gesellschaftlicher Differenzierung*. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- SCHIRMER, Dietmar (1998): "Integration and Fragmentation Discourses. Demanding and Supplying 'Identity' in Diverse Societies." In *Identity and Tolerance. Nationalism, Racism, and Xenophobia in Germany and the United States*. Edited by Norbert Finzsch and Dietmar Schirmer. Cambridge, UK [et al.]: Cambridge UP, pp. 97-134.
- SCHMIDT, Siegfried J. (1994): *Kognitive Autonomie und soziale Ordnung. Konstruktivistische Bemerkungen zum Zusammenhang von Kognition, Kommunikation, Medien und Kultur*, first edition. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp.
- SCHÜTZ, Alfred (1971): "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology." In *Collected Papers II: Studies in Social Theory*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 91-105.
- SHAHEEN, Jack G. (1984): *The TV Arab*. Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green State University Popular Press.
- SHAHEEN, Jack G. (2001): *Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People*. New York [et al.]: Olive Branch.
- SHIMADA, Shingo (2006): "Cultural Differences and the Problem of Translation." In *The Making and Unmaking of Differences. Anthropological, Sociological and Philosophical Perspectives*. Edited by Richard Rottenburg, Burkhard Schnepel and Shingo Shimada. Bielefeld: transcript, pp. 83-95.
- SHOEMAKER, Pamela; REESE, Stephen D. (1996): *Mediating the Message. Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*. New York: White Plains.
- SIMMEL, Georg (1968): "Exkurs über den Fremden." In *Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung*, fifth edition. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, pp. 509-512.
- STÄHEL, Urs; STICHWEH, Rudolf (2002): "Inclusion/Exclusion – Systems Theoretical and Poststructuralist Perspectives." In *Soziale Systeme. Zeitschrift für Soziologische Theorie*, volume 8, issue 1, pp. 3-7.
- STAUD, Toralf (2006): "Die Araber, also ehrlich, die sind ganz anders: Ein Gespräch mit drei Frauen aus Sachsen über Politik, soziale Gerechtigkeit und Ausländer." In *Deutsche Zustände, Folge 4*. Edited by Wilhelm Heitmeyer. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, pp. 228-240.
- STICHWEH, Rudolf (1997): "Der Fremde – Zur Soziologie der Indifferenz." In *Furcht und Faszination: Facetten der Fremdheit*. Edited by Herfried Münkler (in collaboration with Bernd Ladwig). Berlin: Akademie, pp. 45-64.
- STICHWEH, Rudolf (2002): "Strangers, Inclusions, and Identities." In *Soziale Systeme. Zeitschrift für Soziologische Theorie*, volume 8, issue 1, pp. 101-109.
- SULEIMAN, Michael W. (1988): *The Arabs in the mind of America*. Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books.
- SULEIMAN, Michael W. (1989): "America and the Arabs: Negative Images and the Feasibility of Dialogue." In *Arab Studies Quarterly* 11, pp. 251-269.
- SULEIMAN, Michael (Editor) (1999): *Arabs in America. Building a New Future*. Philadelphia: Temple UP.
- TAJFEL, Henri (Editor) (1982): *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- TERKESSIDIS, Mark (2002): "Der lange Abschied von der Fremdheit. Kulturelle Globalisierung und Migration." In *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, volume 12, pp. 31-38.

- THOFERN, Detlef (1998): *Darstellungen des Islam in Der Spiegel. Eine inhaltsanalytische Untersuchung über Themen und Bilder der Berichterstattung von 1950 bis 1989*. Hamburg: Kovac.
- TURNER, John C. (1987): *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- VORLÄNDER, Hans (2001): "Der Kampf um die Deutungsmacht: Nationale Identität und Multikulturalismus in den USA." In *Nationale Identität und Staatsbürgerschaft in den USA: Der Kampf um Einwanderung, Bürgerrechte und Bildung in einer multikulturellen Gesellschaft*. Edited by Hans Vorländer and Dietrich Herrmann. Opladen: Leske + Budrich, pp. 15-54.
- WAGENER, Sybil (1999): *Feindbilder. Wie kollektiver Hass entsteht*. Berlin: Quadriga.
- WALLERSTEIN, Immanuel (1986): *Das moderne Weltsystem: kapitalistische Landwirtschaft und die Entstehung der europäischen Weltwirtschaft im 16. Jahrhundert*. Frankfurt a. M.: Syndikat.
- WALTZ, James Calvin (1963): *Western European Attitudes toward the Muslims before the Crusades*. [Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University.]
- WEBER, Max (1972, reprint): *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie*, fifth, revised edition. Edited by Johannes Winckelmann. Tübingen: Mohr.
- WEBER, Max (1988; reprint, originally 1920): "Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus." In *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie 1*. Tübingen: Mohr, pp. 17-206.
- WEBER, Stefan (Editor) (2003): *Theorien der Medien: Von der Kulturkritik bis zum Konstruktivismus*. Konstanz: UVK.
- WEIDENFELD, Werner; KORTE, Karl-Rudolf (1991): *Die Deutschen. Profil einer Nation*. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.
- WEIGELT, Klaus (Editor) (1984): *Heimat und Nation. Zur Geschichte und Identität der Deutschen*. Mainz: Hase & Koehler.
- WELLER, Christoph (2000): "Collective Identities in World Society." In *Civilizing World Politics. Society and Community beyond the State*. Edited by Mathias Albert, Lothar Brock and Klaus Dieter Wolf. Lanham, Maryland/Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 45-68.
- WELLER, Christoph (2005): "Massenmediale Konstruktionen im aussenpolitischen Entscheidungsprozess. Die öffentliche Meinung und die deutsche Fernsehberichterstattung am 11. September 2001." In *Konstruktivistische Analysen der internationalen Politik*. Edited by Cornelia Ulbert and Christoph Weller. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 313-346.
- WENNING, Norbert (1996): *Migration in Deutschland: ein Überblick*. Münster [et al.]: Waxmann.
- WIEGAND, Krista E. (2000): "Islam as an Ethnicity? The Media's Impact on Misperceptions in the West." In *Islam and the West in the Mass Media. Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*. Edited by Kai Hafez. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, pp. 235-251.
- WIEGAND, Krista E.; MALEK, Abbas (1995): "Islam and the West: Cultural Encounters." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 201-211.
- WOBBE, Theresa (2000): *Weltgesellschaft*. Bielefeld: transcript.
- WÖHLERT, Romy (2004): "Terroristen, Ölscheichs und Despoten: Zur medialen Konstruktion des arabisch Anderen im amerikanischen Film." In *Zeitschrift für Politische Psychologie*, volume 12, issue 1+2, pp. 209-225.
- YOUNG, Jock (2006): *The exclusive society: social exclusion, crime and difference in late modernity*, reprint. London [et al.]: Sage.

- YOUNIS, Adele (1995): *The Coming of the Arabic Peoples to the United States*. New York: Center for Migration Studies.
- ZAHARNA, R.S. (1995): "The Palestinian Leadership and the American Media: Changing Images, Conflicting Results." In *The U.S. Media and the Middle East. Image and Perception*. Edited by Yahya R. Kamalipour. Westport, CT: Greenwood, pp. 37-49.
- ZOGBY, John (1990): *Arab American Today: A Demographic Profile of Arab Americans*. Washington, DC: Arab American Institute.

Internet References

- EL-FARRA, Narmeen (1996): "Arabs and the Media." In *Journal of Media Psychology*, volume 1, number 2. URL: www.calstatela.edu/faculty/sfisco/Arabs.html, accessed March 8, 2007.
- HANSEN, Imke (2004): "Mazedonien – Bewaffneter Konflikt." URL: http://www.sozialwiss.uni-hamburg.de/publish/Ipw/Akuf/kriege/275bk_mazedonien.htm, accessed February 2, 2006.
- OSTERMANN, Christine (2007): "Das Eigene und das Fremde. Die marokkanische Diaspora in Frankfurt am Main" [unpublished Ph.D. project, will be submitted until the end of 2007] URL: <http://www.uni-marburg.de/menschenfeindlichkeit/beteiligte/KollegiatInnen/Christine%20Ostermann>.
- PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2007): "Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream." URL: <http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf>, accessed June 3, 2007.
- PICK, Kathrin (2004): "Vergleich der Berichterstattung in deutschen und amerikanischen Printmedien am Beispiel der Irak-Krise 2003." [Unpublished Diplomarbeit. Submitted to the Fachhochschule Stuttgart, Hochschule der Medien, Studiengang Werbung und Marktkommunikation, March 2004] URL: <http://digbib.iuk.hdm-stuttgart.de/epub/volltexte/2004/424/pdf/Diplomarbeit.pdf>, accessed March 2, 2006.
- STONE, Robert P. (2006): "Race, Faith and Fear: General press and black press coverage of Arabs, Muslims and the stigma of terrorism in the United States." [Masters Thesis] URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/2104/3906>, accessed April 11, 2007.
- WESTON, Mary A. (2003): "Post 9/11 Arab American coverage avoids stereotypes." In *Newspaper Research Journal*, volume 24, issue 1. URL: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3677/is_200301/ai_n9224266, accessed May 16, 2007.
- URL: <http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/14/14187.pdf>, accessed June 4, 2007.
- URL: www.bamf.de, accessed June 5, 2007.
- URL: www.bild.t-online.de
- URL: www.bpb.de/themen/G1RPNN,0,0,Was_ist_Islam.html, accessed June 5, 2007.
- URL: www.census.gov/population/www/ancestry.html, accessed June 4, 2007.
- URL: www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html, accessed June 4, 2007.
- URL: www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race.html, accessed Jun 4, 2007.
- URL: www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bevoelk.php, accessed June 5, 2007.
- URL: www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/home/home.do
- URL: www.mediapilot.de

URL: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032542/site/newsweek/

URL: www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007

URL: www.spiegel.de

URL: www.usatoday.com

URL: www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, accessed June 5, 2007.

URL: www.wissen.de/wde/generator/wissen/ressorts/geschichte/index,page=1050944.html,
accessed March 4, 2007.

Other References

LEE, Harper (1960): *To Kill a Mockingbird*. New York/Boston: Warner Books, pp.280-281.

Lyric Excerpt from NINE INCH NAILS (2005): "Right Where It Belongs" Album: *With Teeth*,
written by Trent Reznor. Label: Interscope Records.

Eidesstattliche Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Dissertation selbständig verfasst und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel verwendet habe.

Die Arbeit ist bisher keiner anderen Fakultät vorgelegt worden und wurde in keinem früheren Promotionsverfahren angenommen oder abgelehnt.

Bielefeld, August 2007

Unterschrift

