

„Zeitgenössische Vorurteile –Erfassung, Erklärung und Reduktion“

Dissertation

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

Doctor rerum naturalium (rer. nat.)

Vorgelegt der Fakultät für Psychologie und Sportwissenschaft
der Universität Bielefeld

von Dipl.-Psych. Kirsten Heitland

im Oktober 2009

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Gerd Bohner

Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Ulrich Wagner

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Für meine Familie und unglaublichen Omas.

Für Thomas.

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I. Synopsis

“Zeitgenössische Vorurteile – Erfassung, Erklärung und Reduktion“

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1 Zusammenfassung

Die vorliegende kumulative Dissertation widmet sich in drei aufeinander folgenden Studien dem großen Themenkomplex zeitgenössischer Vorurteile. Ziel der ersten Studie war die Validierung einer Skala zur Erfassung zeitgenössischer Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen. In der zweiten Studie wurde die Induktion von kognitiver Dissonanz genutzt, um Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen zu reduzieren. Die dafür notwendigen Bedingungen wurden in diesem Rahmen untersucht. Die erwarteten Effekte konnten nur bei Personen beobachtet werden, welche stark nach Konsistenz strebten. Der Zusammenhang diese Persönlichkeitsvariable „Preference for consistency“ (PFC, Cialdini, Trost & Newsom, 1995) mit Vorurteilen und Autoritarismus wurde in der dritten Studie untersucht.

Im ersten Artikel werden die Charakteristika zeitgenössischer Vorurteile in Abgrenzung von früheren Konzeptionen offensichtlicher Vorurteilsäußerung erarbeitet. In diesem Zusammenhang wird herausgestellt, dass es im deutschsprachigen Raum kein (publiziertes) Maß zur expliziten Erfassung von Vorurteilen gibt, welches über gute psychometrische Eigenschaften verfügt. Diese Analyse bietet den Ausgangspunkt für die Entwicklung einer deutschen Version der Racial Argument Scale (RAS, Saucier & Miller, 2003), mit der auf indirekte Weise zeitgenössische Vorurteile erfasst werden können. Die deutsche Version RAS-G wurde an Skalen zur Erfassung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen validiert. Weiter wurden die Einstellungsdimensionen Right-Wing-Authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) und Soziale Dominanzorientierung (SDO, Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994) herangezogen, welche Vorurteilen zugrunde liegen (z.B. Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). Die Fragebogenstudie mit $N = 195$ Personen mit unter-

schiedlichen Bildungsabschlüssen stützte die konvergente Validität der RAS-G. Die RAS-G zeigte keinen Zusammenhang mit sozial erwünschtem Antwortverhalten.

Durch die Forschung im Rahmen des ersten Artikels hatten wir Kenntnis über Skalen, mit denen zeitgenössische Vorurteile valide erfasst werden können. Ziel der darauf folgenden Dissonanzstudie war eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen. Demnach sollte ein freiwillig gezeigtes „pro-türkisches“ Verhalten zum Auftreten von Dissonanz führen. Eine Reduktion der Dissonanz sollte durch Hinzunahme zusätzlicher konsonanter Kognitionen zu einer Einstellungsänderung im Sinne einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen führen. Zur Messung dieses Effektes aggregierten wir die Items der RAS-G wie auch der anderen im ersten Artikel verwendeten Skalen zur Messung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen zu einem generalisierten Vorurteilsmaß. In dieser Studie wurden die ProbandInnen ($N = 202$) zuerst einem Screening unterzogen, so dass nur Personen an der Studie teilnahmen, die tendenziell über Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen verfügten. Die ProbandInnen generierten Argumente für die Integration von TürkInnen in Deutschland und sprachen diese daraufhin in ein Mikrofon. Aufgrund des Screenings sollte dieses Verhalten eine einstellungsdiskrepante Argumentation darstellen, die bei den ProbandInnen unter bestimmten Bedingungen Dissonanz auslösen sollte. Experimentell variiert wurde die Wahlfreiheit, mit welcher die Personen das einstellungsdiskrepante Verhalten ausführten (hoch vs. niedrig). Weiter wurde die persönliche Relevanz des Themas variiert (hoch vs. niedrig). Bei hoher (vs. niedriger) Wahlfreiheit und hoher (vs. niedriger) persönlicher Relevanz des Themas erwarteten wir das Auftreten von Dissonanz. Die Personen wurden randomisiert einer dieser 4 Bedingungen oder der Kontrollgruppe zugeordnet. In der Kontrollgruppe generierten die ProbandInnen Argumente für ein neutrales Thema (grünere Städte). Bei hoher Wahlfreiheit oder hoher persönlicher

Relevanz sollte das Generieren der einstellungskonträren Position zum Auftreten von Dissonanz führen. Eine Dissonanzreduktion sollte in Form einer Einstellungsänderung zu einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen bei der konkret von den ProbandInnen vertretenen Einstellung wie auch bei deren generalisierten Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen führen.

Allerdings zeigten Cialdini et al. (1995), dass nur Personen mit hoher Preference for Consistency (PFC) die typischen Dissonanzeffekte zeigten. Somit erwarteten wir eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen als Folge der Dissonanzinduktion nur für Personen mit hohem Konsistenzstreben. Zusätzliches Ziel dieser Arbeit war folglich auch die Validierung der deutschen PFC-Skala. Unsere Annahmen konnten bestätigt werden: Personen mit hohem Konsistenzstreben wiesen bei hoher (vs. niedriger) Wahlfreiheit oder hoher (vs. niedriger) persönlicher Relevanz des Themas ein deutlich niedrigeres Vorurteilniveau auf dem generalisierten Vorurteilsmaß auf wie auch bei der konkret vertretenen Position (Integration von TürkInnen) als die Kontrollgruppe. Dieser Effekt war auch in einem Nachtest, 4 Wochen nach der Dissonanzinduktion, deutlich erkennbar.

In der oben zusammengefassten zweiten Arbeit konnte gezeigt werden, dass eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen auf Basis der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz (Festinger, 1957) erfolgreich war. Allerdings konnte eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen als Folge der Dissonanzinduktion nur für Personen mit hohem Konsistenzstreben festgestellt werden. Die Persönlichkeitsvariable PFC wurde daraufhin in der letzten Arbeit weiter beleuchtet. Es wurde untersucht, inwieweit PFC mit Vorurteilen und diesen zugrunde liegenden Einstellungen Autoritarismus und Soziale Dominanzorientierung zusammenhängt. Forschung zu Autoritarismus hat gezeigt, dass autoritäre Personen zu simplem Schwarz-Weiß-Denken sowie zur Missachtung ambivalenter, inkonsistenter Informationen

neigen (z.B. Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949; Miller & Rokeach, 1968). Weiter fand sich ein Zusammenhang zwischen Autoritarismus und der Persönlichkeitsvariable „Ambiguitätstoleranz“ (z.B. Harvey, 1962; Steiner & Johnson, 1963). Daneben stellen auch Vorurteile eine Möglichkeit dar, die Welt kognitiv zu vereinfachen. SDO wird definiert als Befürwortung von Hierarchien zwischen Gruppen (Sidanius, Pratto & Levin, 1996). Diese Konzeption von SDO lässt keine inhaltlichen Überlappungen zum Konzept PFC erkennen. Wir nahmen somit einen Zusammenhang zwischen PFC, Vorurteilen und Autoritarismus, nicht aber SDO an. Die Analyse des Datensatzes aus der ersten Studie mit verschiedenen Strukturgleichungsmodellen bestätigte unsere Annahmen. Ein Teil der Varianzaufklärung von Autoritarismus an Vorurteilen wurde durch PFC vermittelt. Diese Ergebnisse stellen eine konzeptionelle Erweiterung des Konstrukts Preference for Consistency dar. Die Implikationen der vorgestellten Ergebnisse werden im Folgenden ausführlich diskutiert.

Zusammenfassend widmet sich diese Arbeit unter Anwendung verschiedener methodischer Zugänge dem großen Themenkomplex zeitgenössischer Vorurteile, deren Erfassung, Reduktion und Zusammenhang mit anderen Persönlichkeitsvariablen.

2 Ziel der Arbeit: Vorurteile erfassen, reduzieren und erklären

Diese Synopse stützt sich auf eine Vorurteilsdefinition von Gordon Allport (1954). Er versteht ethnische Vorurteile als Abneigung, welche auf fehlerhaften und unflexiblen Generalisierungen beruhten. Vorurteile können gefühlt oder benannt werden und können sich gegen eine Gruppe als Ganzes oder auf bestimmte Individuen richten, weil diese Mitglieder einer bestimmten Gruppe sind (Allport, 1954, S. 9). Die Diskriminierung der Fremdgruppe ist dabei keine notwendige Folge von Vorurteilen, sie kann aber aus diesen resultieren (Simpson & Yinger, 1985).

Übergeordnetes Ziel dieser Arbeit ist eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen sowie die Analyse der zugrunde liegenden Prozesse bei der Wirkung von Dissonanz (Manuskript 2). Wir entschieden uns für die Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen, weil diese in Deutschland den größten Anteil an Personen mit Migrationshintergrund darstellen (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2009, S. 211) und häufig zum Opfer von Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung werden (Pettigrew et al., 1998; Wagner & Zick, 1997). Gleichzeitig wurde überprüft, ob die Effekte auch auf Vorurteile gegenüber Frauen (Sexismus) generalisieren. Um diese Ziele statistisch erfassen zu können, werden Messinstrumente benötigt, die eine reliable und valide Erfassung von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen ermöglichen. Bis heute wurde für den deutschsprachigen Raum nur ein Instrument vorgestellt: Die deutsche Version (Pettigrew et al., 1998; Quillian, 1995; Zick, 1997) der „subtle and blatant prejudice scale“ (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Dieses Instrument weist jedoch problematische psychometrische Kennwerte auf: Die Reliabilität der Teilskalen zur Erfassung subtiler Vorurteile ist mit Werten zwischen .58 und .60 als kritisch anzusehen. Auch die theoretisch angenommene faktorielle Struktur in die zwei Komponenten „subtle“ und „blatant“ sowie die Subdimensionen der „subtle“-Skala

konnte nicht bestätigt werden (Ganter, 2001)¹. Folglich wurde im ersten Schritt (Manuskript 1) ein Verfahren entwickelt und validiert, mit dem zeitgenössische Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen in Deutschland erfasst werden können. Darauf folgt eine experimentelle Studie, in welcher unter Erzeugung von kognitiver Dissonanz Vorurteile reduziert werden sollten. In dieser Studie wird die moderierende Funktion der Persönlichkeitsvariable Preference for Consistency (PFC, Cialdini et al., 1995) betrachtet. In der letzten Studie (Manuskript 3) wird der Zusammenhang von PFC mit Vorurteilen und Vorurteilen zugrunde liegenden Einstellungsdimensionen untersucht. Anschließend werden die Ergebnisse dieser Analyse im Zusammenhang mit vorhergehenden Befunden kritisch diskutiert.

3 Zeitgenössische Vorurteile und ihre Erfassung

Bei der Entwicklung eines Verfahrens zur Erfassung von Vorurteilen sind die Charakteristika zeitgenössischer Vorurteile zu beachten. Früher wurden Vorurteile offensichtlich und direkt geäußert (vgl. "old-fashioned racism", Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; "dominative form of racism", Kovel, 1970; "blatant prejudice", Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). Diese offensichtliche Vorurteilsform wird ausgelöst durch eine wahrgenommene Bedrohung, die von der Fremdgruppe ausgeht, und beinhaltet sowohl formale wie auch persönliche Ablehnung und Unterdrückung der Fremdgruppe (Meertens & Pettigrew, 1997). In den 1970er Jahren verzeichneten vor allem große amerikanische Umfragestudien einen Rückgang dieser rassistischen² Einstellungen (z.B. Campbell, 1971; Greeley & Sheatsley, 1971). Der augenscheinliche Rückgang rassistischer Ein-

¹ Stattdessen wies ein Modell den besten Fit zu den Daten auf, dem fünf unterschiedliche Faktoren zugrunde lagen, die wiederum das übergeordnete Konstrukt „Vorurteile“ (zweiter Ordnung) erklärten.

² In diesem Text verwenden wir die Begriffe Rassismus und Fremdenfeindlichkeit synonym. Bei Studien aus dem amerikanischen Sprachraum wird üblicherweise Rassismus zur Beschreibung der Abwertung von Schwarzen verwendet, während in Deutschland eher der Begriff Fremdenfeindlichkeit zur Beschreibung der Abwertung von TürkInnen oder anderen Gruppen mit Migrationshintergrund verwandt wird. Das deutsche Wort „Rassismus“ bezieht sich dagegen stärker auf die biologische Komponente, die der Abwertung zu Grunde liegt (s. Heitmeyer, 2002, S. 8).

stellungen wurde aber alsbald identifiziert als Veränderung des Ausdrucks rassistischer Einstellungen. Die traditionelle Ausdrucksform wurde weitestgehend durch eine subtilere, indirekte Form abgelöst. Ansätze wie der moderne Rassismus (McConahay, 1986), der symbolische Rassismus (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears & Kinder, 1971), der aversive Rassismus (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, 1998; Dovidio, Mann & Gaertner, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986) oder der subtile Rassismus (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) versuchen dieser Veränderung gerecht zu werden. Allen Ansätzen ist gemeinsam, dass Personen den offenen Ausdruck von Vorurteilen aufgrund von bestehenden Normen bewusst vermeiden. So wird z.B. beim aversiven Rassismus angenommen, dass vorurteilsbehaftete Personen negative Gefühle einer Fremdgruppe gegenüber haben, aber gleichzeitig ein egalitäres Wertesystem besitzen. Dieses Wertesystem führt dazu, dass vorurteilsbehaftete Personen sich selbst als vorurteilsfrei sehen und beschreiben (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Der beschriebene Wandel in der Ausdrucksform von Vorurteilen führt gleichzeitig zu Schwierigkeiten bei der Erfassung. Entsprechend wurden parallel mit der Beschreibung der veränderten Vorurteilsäußerung auch Messinstrumente zu deren validen Erfassung vorgeschlagen (z.B. McConahay, 1986; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Wie oben beschrieben, wurde jedoch nur ein Instrument an den deutschen Sprachraum adaptiert, welches über nicht ausreichende psychometrische Charakteristiken verfügt.

3.1 Entwicklung und Validierung eines Instruments zur indirekten Erfassung von Vorurteilen

In einem ersten Schritt (siehe Manuskript 1) haben wir ein geeignetes englischsprachiges Messinstrument gesucht und dieses an den deutschen Kontext adaptiert. Besonders geeignet schien uns die Racial Argument Scale (RAS, Saucier & Miller, 2003). Merkmal dieser Skala ist, dass die ProbandInnen nicht direkt nach ihren

Vorurteilen befragt werden. Stattdessen beurteilen sie, inwieweit jeweils ein vorausgehendes Argument durch eine darauf folgende Schlussfolgerung gestützt wird. Sowohl die Argumente als auch die Schlussfolgerungen weisen entweder jeweils eine Pro-Fremdgruppen-Ausrichtung oder eine Contra-Fremdgruppen-Ausrichtung auf (z.B. „It has been shown that White Americans score 15 points higher on IQ tests than African Americans. This difference in IQ scores has even been shown when other variables such as education levels and economic status are taken into account.” Conclusion: “Whites are more intelligent than African Americans.”; Saucier & Miller, 2003, S. 1313-1314). Saucier und Miller (2003) gehen davon aus, dass die Bewertungen der Argument-Schlussfolgerung-Konstellationen durch das Vorurteilsniveau der ProbandInnen verzerrt werden (vgl. Thistlethwaite, 1950). Demnach sollten in Deutschland Personen mit hohem Vorurteilsniveau dazu neigen, contra-türkische Konstellationen als besonders schlüssig, pro-türkische Konstellationen dagegen als weniger schlüssig zu beurteilen als Personen mit einem niedrigen Vorurteilsniveau.

In einer Fragebogenstudie zur Validierung der deutschen Racial Argument Scale (RAS-G) mit $N = 201$ Personen mit heterogenem Bildungsniveau untersuchten wir die psychometrische Qualität der Skala sowie ihren Zusammenhang mit anderen Maßen zur Erfassung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensweisen. Da es für den deutschen Sprachraum keine (publizierten) Verfahren mit guten psychometrischen Eigenschaften gibt, übersetzten wir englischsprachige, etablierte Skalen und griffen auf Items aus jährlich durchgeführten, repräsentativen Surveys bzw. Panels zum Thema „Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit“ zurück (GMF-Surveys, s. Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007). Weiter entwickelten wir, angelehnt an englischsprachige Skalen (z.B. Byrnes & Kiger, 1988; Crandall, 1991), eine Skala zur Messung der sozialen Distanz zwischen Eigen- und Fremdgruppe. Daneben erfassten wir die beiden

generalisierten Einstellungsdimensionen Soziale Dominanzorientierung (SDO; Version von Cohrs, Kielmann, Moschner & Maes, 2002; amerikanisches Original von Pratto et al., 1994) und die Right-Wing-Authoritarianism-Skala (RWA; Version von Cohrs et al., 2002; amerikanisches Original von Altemeyer, 1981, 1988), welche als Vorurteilen zugrunde liegend angesehen werden (z.B. Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). Wir erwarteten hohe Korrelationen mit allen vorher erwähnten Skalen.

Zur Untermauerung der diskriminanten Validität wurden Items zur Messung von Vorurteilen gegenüber Frauen vorgegeben: Eine Skala zur Erfassung des Modernen Sexismus von Eckes und Six-Materna (1998; basierend auf; Swim, Aikin, Hall & Hunter, 1995) und eine zur Erfassung des klassischen Sexismus (s. GMF-Surveys, Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007). Forschung zum Syndrom Gruppenbezogene Menschenfeindlichkeit (Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008) weist darauf hin, dass Vorurteile gegenüber verschiedenen Gruppen einen gemeinsamen Kern besitzen und deshalb miteinander korrelieren (vgl. auch Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003). Folglich erwarten wir eine Korrelation zwischen RAS-G und Sexismus, die jedoch nur moderat sein sollte und nicht so hoch liegen sollte wie die mit Skalen zur Messung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen gegenüber TürkInnen. Im Rahmen der diskriminanten Validität sollten die Antworten auf der RAS-G nicht durch soziale Erwünschtheit verzerrt werden. Deshalb sollten keine signifikante Korrelation zwischen einer Fremdtäuschungsskala (Musch, Brockhaus & Bröder, 2002) und der RAS-G auftreten.

Insgesamt zeigte sich, dass die RAS-G über gute psychometrische Charakteristiken verfügt. Hohe Korrelationen mit den Skalen zur Messung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen

und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen sowie mit den Dimensionen SDO und RWA stützen die konvergente Validität der RAS-G. Die Korrelation der RAS-G mit den beiden Sexismus-Skalen fiel hypothesenkonform deutlich geringer aus als die mit den Skalen zur Messung von Fremdenfeindlichkeit gegenüber TürkInnen, was die diskriminante Validität der RAS-G stützte. Zwar gibt es eine Überlappung zwischen z.B. Vorurteilen gegenüber Ausländern (TürkInnen) und Frauen (cf. Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008). Dieser Zusammenhang ist aber geringer als der zwischen den verschiedenen Skalen zur Messung von Stereotypen, diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen und Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen. Somit misst die RAS-G vor allem Fremdenfeindlichkeit gegenüber TürkInnen und nur moderat Vorurteile gegenüber Frauen. Die nicht signifikante Korrelation mit der Fremdtäuschungsskala zeigt, dass die Antworten auf der RAS-G nicht durch sozial erwünschte Tendenzen verzerrt werden.

Weitere Forschung sollte überprüfen, in welchen Bereichen die RAS-G Vorurteile, diskriminierende Verhaltensintentionen oder -weisen besser vorhersagt als die englischsprachigen expliziten Fragebögen zur Erfassung von Vorurteilen. Da in dieser Studie neben der RAS-G auch die anderen Skalen zur Messung von Stereotypen, diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen und Vorurteilen nur sehr geringe, meist nicht signifikante Korrelationen mit der Fremdtäuschungsskala aufwiesen, stellt die Rolle sozial erwünschten Antwortverhaltens in Deutschland zur Diskussion. Stellen verzerrte Antworten bei Fragen zu Vorurteilen und Fremdenfeindlichkeit gegenüber Fremdgruppen tatsächlich eine Gefahr für die Validität der eingesetzten Verfahren dar (s. Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Weigel & Howes, 1985)? Und braucht man folglich Verfahren, die diese Verzerrung durch indirekte

Messung des Konzepts umgehen? Diese Fragen sollten separat für verschiedene Länder von zukünftiger Forschung weiter untersucht werden.

Daneben sollte die eingesetzten Verfahren in der Güte ihrer Vorhersagbarkeit weiter unterschieden werden. Sind Skalen, die z.B. stärker auf affektive Komponenten von Vorurteilen fokussieren (wie die Skala zur Messung der sozialen Distanz) besser geeignet, diskriminierendes Verhalten vorherzusagen oder eher z.B. indirekte Maße wie die RAS-G? So könnte ein Verfahren zur Messung der affektiven Komponente von Vorurteilen eher der Identifikation aversiver Rassisten (z.B. Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, 1998) dienen und deren Verhalten besser vorhersagen. Demgegenüber könnte die RAS-G Personen identifizieren, welche zeitgenössische Vorurteile kognitiv repräsentiert haben, diese aber aufgrund von sozialen Normen nicht offen äußern würden. Somit würden im letzteren Fall mehr Personen mit Vorurteilen identifiziert werden können. Diese Argumentation legt nahe, dass verschiedene Verfahren besser zur Bestimmung bestimmter Gruppen von Personen wie z.B. von aversiven Rassisten geeignet sein könnten. Eine detaillierte Untersuchung dieser Frage scheint aufgrund der Vielfalt von Skalen zur Messung von Vorurteilen und Fremdenfeindlichkeit sinnvoll.

4 Die Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz als Instrument zur Reduktion von Vorurteilen

Die Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz (Festinger, 1957) besagt, dass zwei oder mehr Kognitionen (bzw. Verhalten) dann zum Auftreten von Dissonanz führen, wenn diese psychologisch oder logisch inkonsistent sind. Dissonanz wird von den Personen als ein unangenehmer Zustand (vergleichbar mit Hunger) empfunden, dem Personen entgehen wollen. Eine Dissonanzreduktion kann auf verschiedene Arten erfolgen. Entweder die

Person fügt konsonante Kognitionen³ hinzu, sie reduziert oder eliminiert dissonante Kognitionen⁴ oder sie ersetzt dissonante Kognitionen durch konsonante. Folglich sollten Personen mit Vorurteilen gegenüber einer Fremdgruppe bei der Befürwortung von Integration dieser Fremdgruppe Dissonanz empfinden. Voraussetzung für das Entstehen von Dissonanz wäre, dass dieses einstellungskonträre Verhalten nicht auf andere Ursachen attribuiert werden kann (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), und die Person das Gefühl hat, dieses Verhalten frei auszuführen (Review siehe Cooper & Fazio, 1984, S. 236-237).

In zwei Studien konnte bereits erfolgreich gezeigt werden, dass sich diese Theorie auf die Reduktion von Vorurteilen anwenden lässt. Son Hing, Li und Zanna (2002) verwandten ein „Heuchelei“-Paradigma, um kognitive Dissonanz bei aversiven Rassisten (versus Personen ohne Vorurteile) hervorzurufen. Die Versuchspersonen sollten einen persuasiven Aufsatz darüber schreiben, warum StudentInnen einer Minderheitsgruppe ihrer Meinung nach auf dem Campus gerecht behandelt werden sollten. In der Heuchelei-Bedingung sollten die TeilnehmerInnen dann zwei Situationen schildern, in denen sie selbst dieses faire Verhalten nicht gezeigt hatten. Diese Argumentation führte den Teilnehmern vor Augen, dass sie selbst ihre egalitären Vorgaben nicht erfüllten und sollte Dissonanz hervorrufen. Im Anschluss an die experimentelle Manipulation sollten die TeilnehmerInnen angeben, welche studentische Gruppe finanzielle Einschnitte treffen sollte⁵. In der Heuchelei-Bedingung reduzierten aversive Rassisten im Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe das Budget einer Minderheitenorganisation („Asian Students’

³ Konsonante Kognitionen sind solche, die logisch aufeinander folgen (Festinger, 1957).

⁴ Dissonante Kognitionen sind solche, die nicht logisch aufeinander folgen (Festinger, 1957).

⁵ Bei der Abstimmung sollten 20 % finanzielle Einschnitte (\$ 1,000) auf verschiedene studentische Gruppen durch die FEDS (University’s Federation of Students) verteilt werden. Die Teilnehmer sollten diese Angaben anonym machen.

Association“) deutlich weniger als Personen ohne Vorurteile und deutlich weniger als aversive Rassisten in der Kontrollbedingung.

In einer anderen Studie konnten mit Hilfe der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz Vorurteile reduziert werden (Leippe & Eistenstadt, 1994). In diesem Fall wurde ein „induced-compliance“ Paradigma verwendet. Weiße Studierende generierten in zwei Experimenten Argumente dafür, dass die universitäre Administration über die Hälfte der zu vergebenden Stipendien an bedürftige Schwarze verteilen sollte. Im ersten Experiment wurden die Wahlfreiheit (hoch versus niedrig) und die Öffentlichkeit des Verhaltens (öffentlich versus anonym⁶) manipuliert. Ausgehend davon, dass die ProbandInnen Vorurteile gegenüber Schwarzen hatten, sollte das Generieren der persuasiven Botschaft bei hoher Wahlfreiheit und/oder Öffentlichkeit des Verhaltens Dissonanz bei den Teilnehmern hervorrufen. Die Ergebnisse bestätigten, dass bei hoher Wahlfreiheit oder Öffentlichkeit des Verhaltens die Einstellung der weißen Teilnehmer gegenüber Schwarzen positiver wurde. Die Autoren interpretierten die Effekte von Wahlfreiheit und Öffentlichkeit als additiv.

Problematisch an der Studie von Son Hing et al. (Son Hing, Li & Zanna, 2002) ist, dass keine Effekte von Dissonanz auf die Einstellung der ProbandInnen untersucht wurden. Stattdessen konnten Veränderungen nur auf der Verhaltensebene nachgewiesen werden. Wir wollten in unserem Dissonanz-Paradigma die Einstellungsänderung gegenüber der Fremdgruppe TürkInnen erfassen und weiter überprüfen, inwieweit die Einstellungsänderung auf andere Vorurteilsdimensionen generalisiert (siehe Manuskript 2).

⁶ In Exp. 2 wurde die Öffentlichkeit konstant gehalten und alle Versuchspersonen wurden der Bedingung mit „hoher“ Öffentlichkeit zugeordnet.

4.1 Generalisierung der Dissonanzeffekte auf Sexismus

Aus anderen Forschungsbereichen ist bereits bekannt, dass sich z.B. der Kontakt mit einer Fremdgruppe nicht nur positiv auf Vorurteile gegenüber dieser Fremdgruppe auswirkt, sondern auch auf Vorurteile gegenüber Mitgliedern anderer Fremdgruppen, die der Targetgruppe ähnlich sind (s. Pettigrew, 2009; vgl. Befunde aus der Minoritätenforschung, Moscovici & Personnaz, 1991).

McGuire (1960a) führte Generalisierungseffekte darauf zurück, dass eine induzierte Einstellungsänderung bei einem expliziten Thema dazu tendiert, auch Veränderungen bei einem logisch damit zusammenhängenden (ungenannten) Thema zu erzeugen. Die Ursache für die Generalisierung soll im Bestreben der Personen liegen, Konsistenz zwischen ihren Kognitionen zu erreichen. Die Stärke der Generalisierung wird dabei als Funktion der Verwandtheit der Targeteinstellung zu der benachbarten Einstellung gesehen.

Hardyck und Kardush (1968) spezifizierten bezogen auf die Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz Bedingungen, unter denen Dissonanzeffekte zu einer Generalisierung der Einstellungsänderung auf andere Dimensionen führen sollten. Die Targeteinstellung sollte demnach (1) Teil eines großen Wissens-, Glaubens- und Gefühlsnetzwerkes sein, (2) für das Individuum bedeutsam sein, und (3) die Inkonsistenzen sollten nicht einfach ignoriert oder in einer oberflächlichen Art und Weise geändert werden können. In unserer Dissonanzstudie wollten wir Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen reduzieren. Da sich Vorurteile auf die Einstellungen gegenüber der Fremdgruppe wie auch auf das eigene Verhalten gegenüber der Fremdgruppe – über verschiedene Situationen hinweg – auswirken, sollten sich Vorurteile auf ein breites Kognitionsnetzwerk erstrecken. Indizien für einen Zusammenhang zwischen Vorurteilen gegenüber verschiedenen

Fremdgruppen zeigen z.B. Ausführungen zum Syndrom Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit (vgl. Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008). Entsprechend dem Syndrom Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit sollten folglich Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen und Frauen (Sexismus) einen gemeinsamen Kern haben und beide Teil desselben Wissens-, Glaubens- und Gefühlsnetzwerkes sein. Vorurteile scheinen weiter für das Individuum von starker Bedeutung zu sein, da sie sich z.B. auf die Wahl der Nachbarschaft oder der Schule für die Kinder auswirken (z.B. Bobo, 2001). Um zu garantieren, dass die dissonanten Kognitionen in unserer Studie für das Individuum bedeutsam sind, manipulierten wir auch die persönliche Relevanz des Themas in unserer Studie. Dissonanzeffekte treten nur auf, wenn eine Person die Dissonanz zwischen Kognitionen nicht einfach ignorieren oder ihr dissonantes Verhalten durch andere Quellen rechtfertigen kann (Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). Deshalb manipulierten wir in unserer Studie die Wahlfreiheit. Wenn Personen das dissonante Verhalten unter hoher Wahlfreiheit ausführten, sollte auch die letzte Bedingung von Hardyck und Kardush erfüllt sein. Folglich erwarteten wir, dass sich eine durch Dissonanz induzierte Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen auch auf Vorurteile gegenüber anderen Gruppen auswirkt, wenn das dissonante Verhalten hohe persönliche Relevanz für die Versuchspersonen hat und sie dieses freiwillig ausführen (hohe Wahlfreiheit). Wir erwarteten, dass sich eine Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen generalisiert auf die Dimension Sexismus zeigt, und dass sich diese Generalisierungseffekte erst nach einer zeitlichen Verzögerung nachweisen lassen (s. McGuire, 1960a, 1960b; Ranganath & Nosek, 2008; Rokeach, 1971; Watts & Holt, 1970). So zeigten Befunde aus der Minoritäten Forschung, dass eine von der Minderheit vertretene Meinung (z.B. Abtreibung von Kindern) erst nach einer zeitlichen Verzögerung zu einer Einstellungsänderung auf einer benachbarten Einstellungsdimension (z.B. Sterbehilfe)

führte (Martin, Hewstone & Martin, 2008; siehe auch Alvaro & Crano, 1997; Crano & Alvaro, 1998).

4.2 Preference for Consistency als Moderator in Konsistenzparadigmen

Konsistenztheorien wie der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz (Festinger, 1957) oder der Balancetheorie (Heider, 1946, 1958) liegt die Annahme zugrunde, dass Personen nach Konsistenz zwischen ihren Kognitionen streben. Wenngleich Evidenz für solche Konsistenzeffekte geliefert wurde (Review siehe Harmon-Jones, 2007), kommt es doch häufiger zu Problemen bei der Erzeugung und Replikation von Konsistenzeffekten (Cialdini et al., 1995). Cialdini et al. (1995) schlugen vor, dass eine Persönlichkeitsvariable „Streben nach Konsistenz“ die Fehlervarianz in Konsistenzparadigmen verringern kann. „Preference for consistency“ (PFC) besteht laut diesen Autoren aus drei Komponenten: Der Präferenz, sich selbst gegenüber konsistent zu verhalten; der Präferenz, anderen gegenüber konsistent zu erscheinen und der Präferenz, dass andere sich konsistent verhalten.

In drei Studien zeigten Cialdini et al. (1995), dass Personen, die hohe Werte auf der PFC-Skala hatten, die typischen Konsistenzeffekte zeigten. Z.B. haben die Autoren ein Paradigma der Balancetheorie untersucht (Exp. 1): das „anticipated-interaction“ Paradigma (s. Darley & Berscheid, 1967). In der Balancetheorie wird angenommen, dass eine erwartete Interaktion von Personen eine wahrgenommene Beziehung („unit“) zwischen diesen Personen schafft. Dem Paradigma liegt somit die Annahme zugrunde, dass Personen eine andere Person positiver einschätzen, wenn sie annehmen, in der Zukunft mit dieser Person zu interagieren. Den ProbandInnen wurden zwei Persönlichkeitsprofile von angeblich anderen TeilnehmerInnen der Studie vorgelegt. Daraufhin wurde ihnen mitgeteilt, dass eine der beiden Personen ihr Diskussionspartner bei einer

darauf folgenden Studie sei, mit der anderen Person würden sie keinen Kontakt mehr haben. Bei der Beurteilung der beiden imaginären Personen zeigten Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten die erwarteten Effekte. Sie schätzten ihren angeblichen Diskussionspartner positiver ein als die Person, mit der sie keinen Kontakt mehr haben würden. Dieser Unterschied trat bei Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten nicht auf.

Neben diesem Paradigma verwenden Cialdini et al. (1995, Exp. 3) auch ein Paradigma, welches häufig in der Forschung zur Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz eingesetzt wird. Im „induced-compliance“ Paradigma vertreten die Versuchspersonen eine Position mit einem persuasiven Aufsatz, welche ihrer eigenen Meinung widerspricht. Hypothesenkonform veränderten bei hoher (versus niedriger) Wahlfreiheit nur Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten ihre Meinung in Richtung der vertretenen Position (einer Erhöhung der Studienbeiträge). Beide Studien unterstreichen, dass Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten ihr Verhalten stärker an vorhergehenden Informationen ausrichten und diese Informationen stärker berücksichtigen als Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten.

Bei genauerer Betrachtung der von Cialdini et al. (1995) berichteten Ergebnisse fällt jedoch auf, dass die Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten jeweils Einstellungswerte aufweisen, die von den Autoren nicht theoretisch schlüssig erklärt werden. Zwar unterscheiden sich Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten hypothesenkonform nicht in der Einschätzung des zukünftigen Diskussionspartners (unabhängig von einer noch zu erwartenden Interaktion mit diesem, Exp. 1) oder zeigen dieselbe Einstellung zu der zuvor vertretenen Position (unabhängig von ihrer Wahlfreiheit, Exp. 3). Aber das Niveau der Einstellung ist in allen Studien der Autoren genauso hoch wie die Einstellung der Personen mit hohem PFC unter der jeweils kritischen Konsistenzbedingung (Diskussionspartner bzw. hohe Wahlfreiheit). Somit scheinen Personen mit

niedrigem PFC unabhängig davon, ob die Annahmen der Konsistenztheorien erfüllt sind oder nicht, ihre Einstellung zu den anderen Versuchsteilnehmern zu verbessern (Exp. 1) bzw. hin zu der vorher vertretenen Position zu verändern (Exp. 3). Die Autoren geben hierfür jedoch keine schlüssige Erklärung. Ihrer Aussage nach berücksichtigen Personen mit niedrigem Konsistenzstreben Implikationen vorhergehenden Verhaltens weniger als Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten.

Die vorgestellten Ergebnisse weisen zum einen darauf hin, dass Dissonanzeffekte in unserer Studie nur für Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten auftreten sollten. Weiter machen sie deutlich, dass eine genauere Untersuchung der Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten sinnvoll erscheint. Deshalb überprüften wir, ob auch in unserer Studie Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten eine Einstellungsänderung hin zu der einstellungskonträren Position zeigen.

Für den Einsatz der PFC-Skala in unserem Dissonanz-Paradigma modifizierten wir eine deutsche, unveröffentlichte Version der Skala (Felser & Wolfradt, 2002a). Ein Beispielitem der deutschen Skala ist „Es ist mir wichtig, dass mein Verhalten mit meinen Überzeugungen übereinstimmt“. Die Skala erwies sich als reliabel. In einem Vortest fanden wir keinen Zusammenhang zu der Fremdtäuschungsskala von Musch et al. (2002).

4.3 Kognitive Dissonanz und die Reduktion von Vorurteilen

Wir konzipierten eine Studie, die zusätzliche Evidenz für die erfolgreiche Anwendung der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz auf die Reduktion von Vorurteilen liefern sollte und gleichzeitig die moderierende Wirkung von PFC in Dissonanzexperimenten weiter beleuchten sollte (Manuskript 2). Dabei griffen wir auf das u.a. von Cialdini et al.

(1995) und Leippe und Eisenstadt (1994) verwendete „induced-compliance“ Paradigma zurück.

Ziel unserer Forschungsarbeit war es, Bedingungen zu spezifizieren, unter denen Dissonanz zu einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen führt: Wir erwarteten das Auftreten von Dissonanz und eine darauf folgende Einstellungsänderung, wenn das einstellungskonträre Verhalten bei hoher (vs. niedriger) Wahlfreiheit ausgeführt wurde und das einstellungskonträre Thema selbst eine hohe (vs. niedrige) persönlichen Relevanz hatte. Außerdem wollten wir klare a-priori-Annahmen treffen, bei welchen Versuchspersonen die Dissonanzinduktion greift und zu einer Einstellungsänderung führt. Wie von Cialdini (1995) postuliert, sollten Dissonanzeffekte nur bei Personen auftreten, die stark nach Konsistenz streben. Bei Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten sollte keine Einstellungsänderung als Folge der Dissonanzinduktion auftreten. Neben diesen Hypothesen nahmen wir an, dass die vorhergesagten Effekte zeitlich stabil sind (s. Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009) und überprüften, ob eine zeitlich verzögerte Generalisierung der Effekte auf eine andere Vorurteilsdimension (Sexismus) auftritt.

Um eine erfolgreiche Reduktion von Vorurteilen zu gewährleisten, selektierten wir vorab Versuchspersonen hinsichtlich ihres Vorurteilslevels. Dafür verwendeten wir eine 1-Item Skala: Es nahmen nur Personen an der Studie teil, die TürkInnen nicht sehr sympathisch einschätzten (< 7 auf einer Skala von 1 = gar nicht sympathisch bis 9 = sehr sympathisch). Die resultierenden 202 Versuchspersonen wurden randomisiert den Versuchsbedingungen (hohe vs. niedrige Wahlfreiheit; hohe vs. niedrige persönliche Relevanz; Kontrollgruppe) zugeordnet und nahmen im Folgenden an der Studie teil. In den Experimentalbedingungen generierten die Versuchspersonen Argumente für die Integration von TürkInnen; in der Kontrollbedingung Argumente für grünere Städte.

Daraufhin sprachen die ProbandInnen die Argumente in ein Mikrofon, welches die Verbindlichkeit des Verhaltens erhöhen sollte (Joule, 1991). Ähnlich wie Leippe und Eisenstadt (1994) manipulierten wir die Wahlfreiheit (hoch vs. niedrig). Bei hoher Wahlfreiheit wurden die ProbandInnen auf die Freiwilligkeit ihrer Teilnahme hingewiesen und konnten (scheinbar) selbst das Thema ihrer Argumentation aus einer Schachtel ziehen. Bei niedriger Wahlfreiheit gab es keinen Hinweis auf die Freiwilligkeit der Teilnahme, und das Thema der Argumentation wurde den ProbandInnen vorgegeben. Zusätzlich manipulierten wir die persönliche Relevanz des Argumentationsthemas. Bei hoher persönlicher Relevanz sollten die ProbandInnen Vorteile für die Integration von TürkInnen in ihrer direkten Nachbarschaft finden. Folglich stellten wir einen starken persönlichen Bezug zu den Versuchspersonen her. Bei niedriger persönlicher Relevanz sollten die Versuchspersonen Argumente für die Integration in den Niederlanden finden. Somit war in dieser Bedingung der Bezug zu den Versuchspersonen gering, was auch in einem Manipulations-Check bestätigt wurde. Die PFC-Werte wie auch die konkret vertretene Position (Integration von TürkInnen) und verschiedene Skalen zur Messung von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen wurden direkt nach der experimentellen Manipulation wie auch in einem Nachtest ca. 4 Wochen nach der Studie erfasst.

Wir erwarteten, dass diejenigen Versuchspersonen eine Einstellungsänderung zeigten, die freiwillig Argumente für die Integration von TürkInnen generierten (hohe Wahlfreiheit) oder die Argumente für die Integration in ihrer räumlichen Nähe generierten (hohe persönliche Relevanz). Die Effekte dieser beiden Faktoren auf die Einstellungsänderung sollten additiv zusammenwirken. Wir erwarteten, dass Dissonanzeffekte (operationalisiert als Einstellungsänderung) nur bei Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten

auftreten. Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten sollten keine Einstellungsänderung als Reaktion auf die experimentelle Manipulation zeigen.

Die Ergebnisse waren äquivalent für die Einstellung auf der tatsächlich vertretenen Position (Integration von TürkInnen) wie auch auf dem aggregierten Vorurteilsmaß⁷ und bestätigten unsere Hypothesen. Direkt nach der experimentellen Manipulation war das Vorurteilsniveau der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten bei hoher Wahlfreiheit geringer als das der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten bei niedriger Wahlfreiheit oder der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten der Kontrollgruppe. Weiter war das Vorurteilsniveau der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten bei hoher persönlicher Relevanz geringer als das der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten bei niedriger persönlicher Relevanz des Themas oder der Kontrollbedingung. Die nicht signifikante Interaktion der beiden Prädiktoren bestätigte die Annahme des additiven Zusammenwirkens der beiden Variablen. Die höchsten Effektstärken resultierten somit für die Gruppe hohe Wahlfreiheit / hohe persönliche Relevanz im Vergleich mit der Kontrollgruppe. Die beschriebenen Effekte fanden sich tendenziell auch noch im Nachtest. Eine Rücklaufquote von 48 % ist eine mögliche Ursache dafür, dass die Effekte im Nachtest keine Signifikanz mehr erreichten. Die Effektstärken waren jedoch immer noch fast genauso hoch wie direkt nach der experimentellen Manipulation und können z.B. für den Vergleich der Bedingung, die die stärkste Dissonanz erzeugen sollte (hohe Wahlfreiheit und hohe persönliche Relevanz) mit der Kontrollgruppe für beide Zeitpunkte als starke Effekte nach Cohen (1988) eingestuft werden. Folglich hat die Dissonanzinduktion bei Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten in den kritischen Bedingungen (hohe Wahlfreiheit / hohe persönliche Relevanz) zu einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen geführt, die auch nach 4 Wochen noch nachweisbar war. Zu betonen ist, dass sich die Dissonanzeffekte sowohl

⁷ Aus diesem Grund berichten wir hier die Ergebnisse zusammengefasst für die konkret vertretene Position und die generalisierte Einstellung gegenüber TürkInnen.

auf der konkret vertretenen Position (Integration von TürkInnen) wie auch auf den generalisierten Maßen zur Messung von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen zeigten. Somit hat die Dissonanzinduktion auch generelle Vorurteile, stereotype Überzeugungen und diskriminierende Verhaltensintentionen gegenüber TürkInnen (bei hoher Wahlfreiheit / hoher persönlicher Relevanz) reduziert.

Die Dissonanzinduktion hatte zu keinem der beiden Messzeitpunkte einen Einfluss auf das Vorurteilniveau der Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten. Und anders als in den Studien von Cialdini et al. (1995) schwankten die Werte der Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten direkt nach der experimentellen Manipulation um den Mittelwert und lagen nicht auf dem Niveau der Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten in der Bedingung mit der höchsten kognitiven Dissonanz. Folglich konnte unsere Studie (anders als die von Cialdini et al, 1995) zeigen, dass Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten keine Konsistenz zwischen ihren Kognitionen anstrebten, sondern ihr Verhalten relativ unabhängig von vorherigem Verhalten ausübten: Unabhängig von der experimentellen Bedingung zeigten sie keine Einstellungsänderung hin zu der zuvor vertretenen Position.

Weiter fanden wir eine Generalisierung der Effekte auf Sexismus, welche sich wie erwartet erst im Nachtest zeigte. Anders als die Effekte bei der Einstellung „Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen“ wurde dieser Effekt jedoch weder durch die experimentellen Bedingungen (Wahlfreiheit und/oder persönliche Relevanz) noch durch PFC moderiert. Wir fanden geringere Sexismus-Werte in den Experimentalgruppen im Vergleich zur Kontrollgruppe. Diese Befunde legen nahe, dass der Generalisierungseffekt auf Sexismus kein direktes Resultat der Dissonanzinduktion ist. Damit würde die induzierte Dissonanz die Einstellungsänderung auf der Dimension hervorrufen, die Gegenstand des einstellungskonträren Verhaltens war. Ein anderer kognitiver Prozess wäre für das

„Weitersprühen“ der Einstellungsänderung auf benachbarte Einstellungsdimensionen verantwortlich – ähnlich der Prozesse, die z.B. beim Minderheiteneinfluss auf die der Targeteinstellung benachbarten Dimensionen wirken. Welche Charakteristika einer Dimension notwendig sind, damit der beobachtete Generalisierungseffekt als sekundäre Folge einer Dissonanzinduktion auftreten kann, sollte in zukünftiger Forschung weiter exploriert werden. Ebenfalls sollte eine genauere Untersuchung der Prozesse, die dem Generalisierungseffekt zugrunde liegen, durch weitere Forschung erfolgen (siehe vertieft S. 33-34).

5 Der Zusammenhang zwischen PFC und Vorurteilen sowie diesen zugrunde liegenden Dimensionen

Bei der Analyse der Daten zur Dissonanzstudie zeigte sich, dass Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten tendenziell auch ein höheres Vorurteilsniveau aufwiesen. Dass dieser Effekt nicht signifikant war, könnte an der vorselektierten Stichprobe liegen. Die Selektion der Stichprobe hatte eine Einschränkung der Varianz zur Folge. Eine Überlappung von PFC und Vorurteilen bzw. Stereotypen liegt nahe, da Vorurteile und Stereotype eine Möglichkeit darstellen, individuelle Differenzen zu ignorieren und dadurch die stetige Informationsflut zu strukturieren und zu vereinfachen (z.B. Brewer, 2007; Hornsey, 2008). Diese Generalisierung führt zu einer konsistenteren Wahrnehmung der Welt. Um den Zusammenhang zwischen PFC und Vorurteilen sowie diesen zugrunde liegenden generalisierten Einstellungsdimensionen genauer zu betrachten, analysierten wir die Daten aus der nicht vorselektierten ersten Studie zur Entwicklung der RAS-G erneut und unter anderen Gesichtspunkten (siehe Manuskript 3).

Im Folgenden werden die beiden Einstellungsdimensionen SDO (Pratto et al., 1994) sowie Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998)

vorgestellt. Beide werden als starke Prädiktoren von Vorurteilen gesehen (z.B. Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008; Van Hiel, Pandelaere & Duriez, 2004).

Deshalb bezogen wir die beiden Dimensionen in die Erforschung des Zusammenhangs von PFC und Vorurteilen mit ein. Wir wenden uns Hinweisen aus der Literatur zu, um einen möglichen Zusammenhang zwischen RWA, SDO und PFC zu untersuchen.

Das Konstrukt Autoritarismus wurde ursprünglich von Adorno et al. (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson & Sanford, 1950) entwickelt und durch die „California F-scale“ gemessen. Da die California F-scale jedoch zweifelhafte psychometrische Kennwerte aufwies und auch die Definition des Autoritarismuskonstrukts selbst häufig kritisiert wurde (z.B. Altemeyer, 1981), hat Bob Altemeyer das Konstrukt methodisch und konzeptuell weiterentwickelt und die Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale zur Erfassung von Autoritarismus vorgestellt (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998). Nach seiner Definition besteht Autoritarismus aus den drei Komponenten (1) autoritäre Unterwürfigkeit, die den Grad der Unterwürfigkeit gegenüber gesellschaftlich anerkannten Autoritäten beschreibt, (2) autoritäre Aggression, welche sich gegen Personen richtet, die von gesellschaftlich geteilten und von den Autoritäten unterstützten Normen abweichen und (3) Konventionalismus, welcher das Ausmaß der Akzeptanz traditioneller Normen angibt.

In der wissenschaftlichen Literatur fanden wir Hinweise für einen Überlappungsbereich der Konzepte RWA und PFC. Autoritäre Personen tendieren z.B. zu simplem Schwarz-Weiß-Denken, welches zu einer Leugnung von existierenden emotionalen Ambiguitäten und Ambivalenzen führt (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949). Sie weisen inkonsistente Stimuli zurück, ignorieren oder leugnen diese (Miller & Rokeach, 1968). Folglich neigen autoritäre Personen zu simplifiziertem Denken (Rokeach, 1960) und versuchen


Situationen in kognitiv konsistenter und simplifizierender Art und Weise zu strukturieren (Miller & Rokeach, 1968). In einer neueren Studie fanden Duriez und van Hiel (2002) positive Korrelationen zwischen Autoritarismus und den Werten Tradition, Konformität und Sicherheit. Demnach scheint Autoritarismus auch eine bestimmte Wahrnehmung der Welt zu implizieren. Autoritäre Personen simplifizieren die Realität, um diese zu verstehen und wieder kognitive Kontrolle über die Welt zu erlangen (Van Hiel et al., 2004). Der häufig bestätigte negative Zusammenhang zwischen Autoritarismus und Ambiguitätstoleranz (z.B. Harvey, 1962; Miller & Rokeach, 1968; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Steiner & Johnson, 1963) deutet weiter darauf hin, dass autoritäre Personen nach Konsistenz streben. Daneben korrelieren sowohl Autoritarismus (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje & Zakrisson, 2004) als auch PFC (Cialdini et al. 1995) negativ und ähnlich stark mit der Big-Five Persönlichkeitsdimension „Offenheit für neue Erfahrungen“. Auch diese negative Korrelation weist darauf hin, dass sowohl autoritäre Personen als auch Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten sich neuen Erfahrungen entziehen möchten, um eine bestehende Konsistenz zu erhalten.

Demgegenüber fanden sich keine konzeptuellen Überschneidungspunkte von PFC und dem Konzept der SDO. SDO wird definiert als Bedürfnis nach ungleichen und dominanten / übergeordneten Beziehungen zwischen salienten sozialen Gruppen – unabhängig davon, ob dies die Unterordnung oder Dominanz der Eigengruppe beinhaltet (Sidanius, Levin, Federico & Pratto, 2001, S. 312; Sidanius et al., 1996). So haben Duckitt und Kollegen (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis & Birum, 2002) untersucht, durch welche Variablen SDO beeinflusst wird. Sie sehen das Konzept dabei als generalisierte Einstellungsdimension, die durch die motivationalen Ziele Macht, Übergeordnetheit und Dominanz bedingt wird. Diesen motivationalen Zielen wiederum liegt die Weltanschauung von „toughmindedness“ zugrunde, die sich durch eine harte und

rücksichtslose Haltung gegenüber anderen - ohne sich in deren Position hinein zu versetzen - beschreiben lässt. Die Weltanschauung „toughmindedness“ führt dazu, dass Personen die Welt als Dschungel wahrnehmen, in dem fortwährend Konkurrenz herrscht und in dem der Starke gewinnt und der Schwache verliert (Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 77; cf. Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Folglich führen auf SDO basierende Vorurteile zu einer Verachtung und Schädigung der Fremdgruppe, weil diese als unterlegen, inkompetent und wertlos angesehen wird. Weder in der Konzeption von SDO noch in den der SDO zugrunde liegenden Konstrukten wird ein Zusammenhang zu einem dispositionalen Konsistenzstreben deutlich.

Folglich nehmen wir einen Zusammenhang zwischen RWA, Vorurteilen und PFC an, nicht aber zwischen SDO und PFC. Wir überprüften diese Annahmen in Strukturgleichungsmodellen und untersuchten dabei auch die Wirkrichtung von RWA und PFC. Zur Messung von Vorurteilen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen verwendeten wir – wie schon in der Dissonanzstudie – ein aggregiertes Vorurteilsmaß, um möglichst viele Facetten von Vorurteilen, Stereotypen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen abzubilden. Der Vergleich verschiedener Modelle stützte unsere Hypothesen. PFC erwies sich als ein signifikanter Prädiktor von Vorurteilen und diskriminierenden Verhaltensintentionen. Weiter fanden wir einen direkten Effekt von RWA auf PFC. Neben dem direkten Einfluss von RWA auf PFC gab es einen indirekten Pfad von RWA auf Vorurteile, der durch PFC vermittelt wurde. PFC und SDO beeinflussten sich nicht (siehe Abbildung 1).

Abbildung 1. Der Zusammenhang von PFC mit Vorurteilen und RWA.



$\chi^2(95) = 146.44, p < .001$
 $RMSEA = 0.039$
 $SRMR = 0.052$
 $CFI = 0.985$
 $AIC = 8195.809$

*** $p < .001$; * $p < .05$

Allerdings muss einschränkend zu diesen Ergebnissen angemerkt werden, dass anhand von Strukturgleichungsmodellen allein keine Aussagen über die kausale Richtung von Effekten getroffen werden können. So konstatierten z.B. Cornelis und van Hiel (2006), dass die Subskala „Order and Predictability“ der Need for Closure Scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) in einem Strukturgleichungsmodell auf die Dimensionen RWA und SDO wirkte, welche wiederum auf Konservatismus und Rassismus wirkten. Dieser Befund widerspricht der in unserem Strukturgleichungsmodell gefunden Wirkrichtung. Es wäre somit sinnvoll, in zukünftiger Forschung das Autoritarismus-Level (z.B. durch einen bedrohlichen Kontext) zu erhöhen (s. Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 89-92) und zu erfassen, ob dies ebenfalls zu einer Erhöhung der PFC- bzw. „Order and Predictability“-Werte führt. Alternativ könnte das Konsistenzmotiv experimentell aktiviert werden, um dann eine Veränderung der Autoritarismuswerte zu überprüfen.

6 Faktorielle Betrachtung der PFC-Skala

Cialdini et al. (1995) haben das Konzept PFC als eine Persönlichkeitsvariable vorgestellt, welche aus drei Faktoren besteht (Konsistenz gegenüber sich selbst, nach außen und die Präferenz konsistenten Verhaltens von anderen). Die Skala zur Messung von PFC misst allerdings nur das übergeordnete Konstrukt. Es wurde keine empirische Trennung in die drei Komponenten nachgewiesen. Bei der faktoriellen Betrachtung der deutschen Skala zeigten sich jedoch in der Parallelanalyse (Horn, 1965), dass unsere Skala am besten durch 2 Faktoren erklärt wurde, die moderat miteinander korrelierten: „Externe und interne Konsistenz“ und „Vorhersagbarkeit“. Neben der inhaltlichen Distinktheit der Faktoren unterscheiden sich diese auch hinsichtlich ihrer Kontrollierbarkeit. Der Konsistenz-Faktor lässt sich durch das Individuum selbst kontrollieren: Die Person kann ihr eigenes Verhalten daran ausrichten bzw. eigene Kognitionen entsprechend verändern. Der Vorhersagbarkeits-Faktor bezieht sich dagegen auf den Wunsch, dass das Verhalten Anderer konsistent und damit vorhersagbar ist. Dieser Wunsch ist durch das Individuum relativ unbeeinflussbar.

Der erste Faktor „externe und interne Konsistenz“ hat sich sowohl bei Reanalysen der Daten der Dissonanzstudie als auch bei dem Zusammenhang von PFC mit Vorurteilen und RWA als besserer Prädiktor als der Vorhersagefaktor herausgestellt: Der Faktor sagte besser das additive Zusammenwirken der Variablen Wahlfreiheit (hoch vs. niedrig) und persönliche Relevanz (hoch vs. niedrig) vorher. Weiter war dieser Faktor ein besserer Prädiktor von Vorurteilen und stand in einem stärkeren Zusammenhang mit RWA.

Vor allem in der Dissonanzstudie scheint die bessere Prädiktivität des Konsistenz-Faktors plausibel zu sein. In den Bedingungen mit hoher Dissonanz sollte es nach der

einstellungskonträren Argumentation vor allem bei den ProbandInnen zu einer Einstellungsänderung kommen, die Konsistenz mit ihrem vorherigen Verhalten (interne Konsistenz) präferieren bzw. nach außen zum Versuchsleiter hin konsistent erscheinen möchten (externe Konsistenz). In diesem Fall spielt die Vorhersagbarkeit des Verhaltens anderer Personen keine oder nur eine untergeordnete Rolle. Ähnlich kann man auch bei dem stärker ausgeprägten Zusammenhang des Konsistenzfaktors mit RWA und Vorurteilen spekulieren, dass auch hier das persönliche Konsistenzstreben, welches unabhängig vom Kontext ist, einen großen Einfluss auf das Vorurteils- und Autoritarismusriveau haben sollte. Die beiden PFC-Faktoren könnten sich auch in ihrer Kontextabhängigkeit unterscheiden: Während der „externe und interne Konsistenz“-Faktor stärkere „trait“-Züge enthält, könnte der „Vorhersagbarkeits“-Faktor stärker durch den Kontext bestimmt werden. Folglich wäre ein stärkerer Zusammenhang des ersten Faktors mit RWA zu erwarten. Zusammenfassend sollten weitere Forschungsarbeiten die Eigenschaften der beiden Faktoren in anderen Bereichen explorieren sowie empirische Untermauerungen für die oben vorgestellten Annahmen bringen. Es bleibt auch zu überprüfen, inwieweit die englischsprachige Originalskala ebenfalls eine 2-faktorielle Lösung hervorbringt.

Insgesamt scheint das Konstrukt Preference for consistency zwei gegenläufige Tendenzen zu vereinen, welche jedoch weiter empirisch zu prüfen wären: Im Kontext von Vorurteilen und Autoritarismus scheint PFC dazu zu führen, dass Ambiguitäten und Inkonsistenzen gemieden werden. Wenn eine Person diesen aber z.B. in einer Dissonanzstudie nicht mehr entgehen kann, sind Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten diejenigen, die später Dissonanzeffekte zeigen. Das heißt, wenn Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten Inkonsistenzen nicht mehr entgehen können, führen diese Inkonsistenzen nur bei dieser Personengruppe zu einem inneren Konflikt, damit zur Veränderung von

Kognitionen und wie in unserem Fall zu einer Einstellungsänderung. Weitere Forschung sollte diese Überlegungen weiter untermauern.

7 Zusammenfassende Diskussion und Ausblick

Das übergeordnete Thema der vorliegenden Dissertation war die Reduktion von Vorurteilen. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, war die Entwicklung eines Instrumentes zur Erfassung von zeitgenössischen Vorurteilen notwendig. Aufbauend auf diesem Instrument haben wir eine Studie auf Basis der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz durchgeführt, in der Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen reduziert wurden. Target dieser Studie waren nur Personen, die hohe PFC-Werte aufwiesen. Da diese Variable im Kontext der Dissonanzstudie kritisch war, haben wir weiter die Eigenschaften des Konstrukts PFC beleuchtet und einen Zusammenhang mit Vorurteilen und Autoritarismus zeigen können. Interessant ist, dass Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten das Target der Dissonanzstudie waren und diese Personen gleichzeitig auch über ein höheres Vorurteilsniveau verfügen. Somit war unsere Intervention bei den Personen erfolgreich, bei denen eine Intervention auch am sinnvollsten ist.

In der Dissonanzstudie konnte gezeigt werden, dass unter bestimmten Bedingungen (hohe Wahlfreiheit, hohe persönliche Relevanz, hohe PFC) Vorurteile gegenüber TürkInnen reduziert werden konnten. Diese Reduktion war auch einen Monat nach der Studie noch vorhanden und eine Generalisierung hin zu einer Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber Frauen war beobachtbar. Ähnliche Generalisierungseffekte sind auch aus der Forschung im Rahmen der Kontakthypothese bekannt (Pettigrew, 2009). In zukünftiger Forschung könnte folglich untersucht werden, ob das hier vorgestellte Paradigma auch in Interventionsprogrammen zur Reduktion von Vorurteilen angewendet werden kann. Weiter kann überprüft werden, ob z.B. aus einer Kombination aus

dissonanz-theoretischen Ansätzen mit denen aus der Kontakthypothese bessere Interventionserfolge resultieren. So könnten unter Rückgriff auf die Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz Vorurteile soweit reduziert werden, dass ein Kontakt mit der Fremdgruppe ermöglicht wird und dieser nicht von vornherein vermieden wird. Interessant wäre auch eine Untersuchung der Prozesse, die der Kontakthypothese zugrunde liegen. Könnten hier ähnliche Prozesse wirken wie auch bei der Theorie der kognitiven Dissonanz angenommen werden? So könnte z.B. die Zusammenarbeit mit einem Fremdgruppenmitglied bei gemeinsamer Zielsetzung für eine vorurteilsbehaftete Person ein einstellungskonträres Verhalten darstellen. Dies könnte zum Auftreten von Dissonanz führen, welche durch eine Einstellungsänderung (Reduktion von Vorurteilen) abgebaut wird. Damit würde der Kontakt das einstellungskonträre Verhalten darstellen, welches zum Auftreten von Dissonanz führt. An dieser Stelle ist weitere Forschung sinnvoll.

Die Daten der Studie im Rahmen der kognitiven Dissonanztheorie (Festinger, 1957) zeigten eine Generalisierung der Einstellungsänderung (Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen) auf Sexismus – einer anderen Dimension Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit (Heitmeyer, 2002). In zukünftiger Forschung könnte überprüft werden, welche Prozesse für diesen Generalisierungseffekt verantwortlich sind. Wie viel Zeit muss zwischen der Einstellungsänderung auf einer Dimension und Generalisierung auf eine andere Dimension liegen? Welche Charakteristika sind entscheidend, damit eine Generalisierung auf eine /mehrere andere Einstellungs-Dimension(en) stattfindet? Was kennzeichnet die Ähnlichkeit solcher Dimensionen? Eine Möglichkeit, sich diesen Fragen zu nähern, ist die Reanalyse der GMF-Panel Daten. Es könnte untersucht werden, ob z.B. ein politisch bedingter Anstieg der Islamophobie auch einen Anstieg auf anderen Elementen Gruppenbezogener Menschenfeindlichkeit zur Folge hat

bzw. welche Charakteristika der Elemente für solche Generalisierungen verantwortlich sind. Daneben sollte überprüft werden, ob unter bestimmten Bedingungen auch ein Überspringen von Vorurteilen von einer Dimension auf eine andere auftreten kann (z.B. könnte es aufgrund stärkerer Gleichstellungsnormen von Mann und Frau weniger akzeptiert sein, sexistische Äußerungen bzw. sexistisches Verhalten zu zeigen. Dies könnte durch die Abwertung anderer Gruppen kompensiert werden). Zur kausalen Testung dieser Effekte wären experimentelle Anordnungen wie in der beschriebenen Dissonanzstudie zu empfehlen. Im Fall des „Überspringens“ von Vorurteilen könnte in einem Experiment zuerst die Abwertung der Fremdgruppe und Vorurteile gegenüber verschiedenen Syndrom-Elementen gemessen werden und dann eine egalitäre Norm gegen die Äußerung von Vorurteilen gegenüber einem Element aus der GMF-Gruppe aktivieren. Die daraufhin gemessenen Vorurteilswerte könnten mit den a-priori Werten verglichen werden und man könnte das „Überspringen“ von Vorurteilen von einer auf andere Gruppen untersuchen.

Wir haben erstmalig einen Zusammenhang zwischen PFC und Vorurteilen bzw. RWA gefunden. Unsere Daten legen nahe, dass RWA auf PFC bzw. über PFC auf Vorurteile wirkt. Um die Richtung dieses Effektes abzusichern, könnte man in experimentellen Studien überprüfen, ob eine Verringerung des Strebens nach Konsistenz sich positiv auf die Vorurteils- oder Autoritarismus-Werte von ProbandInnen auswirkt oder vice versa. Eventuell könnten diese Ergebnisse dann auch für Interventionen zur Reduktion von Vorurteilen angewendet werden.

Die Wirkungsweise von PFC sollte abhängig vom Kontext weiter kritisch beleuchtet werden. Unsere Untersuchungen legen nahe, dass hohes Konsistenzstreben im Kontext von Vorurteilen und Diskriminierung zur Leugnung und Vermeidung von Inkonsis-

tenzen führt. In der Dissonanzstudie waren es aber Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten, die auf die Inkonsistenzen zwischen ihrem vorherigen Verhalten und ihrer Einstellung (Dissonanz) mit einer Einstellungsänderung reagiert haben. Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten scheinen somit Inkonsistenzen so lange zu verhindern, wie dies möglich ist. Wenn sie diesen aber nicht mehr entgehen können, reagieren sie auf die daraus folgende Dissonanz mit einer Einstellungsänderung. Folglich scheint bei Personen mit hohen PFC-Werten der Umgang mit Inkonsistenzen nicht linear zu sein. Diese Eigenschaften von Personen mit hohem Konsistenzstreben sollten zukünftig weiter untersucht werden. Weiter sollte exploriert werden, wie Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten mit Inkonsistenzen umgehen. Diese Personengruppe zeigte in unserer Dissonanzstudie keine Einstellungsänderung (Reduktion von Vorurteilen gegenüber TürkInnen). Es bleibt jedoch offen, ob Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten eine andere Möglichkeit der Dissonanzreduktion präferieren oder aber Inkonsistenzen besser tolerieren können als Personen mit niedrigen PFC-Werten. Zur Untersuchung dieser Forschungsfragen könnte man zum Beispiel wieder das „induced compliance“ Paradigma als ein häufig in der Dissonanzforschung angewendetes Paradigma verwenden. Wieder würden die Versuchspersonen eine einstellungskonträre Position vertreten. Jedoch könnte man in diesem Fall die Wahlfreiheit auf drei Stufen realisieren (sehr hoch vs. hoch vs. niedrig). Bei sehr hoher Wahlfreiheit wird den ProbandInnen die (realistische) Möglichkeit gegeben, das einstellungskonträre Verhalten nicht auszuführen. Bei hoher Wahlfreiheit, wird den ProbandInnen zwar Wahlfreiheit *suggestiert*, diese werden aber trotzdem dazu gebracht, das einstellungskonträre Verhalten auszuführen (ähnlich dem von uns verwendeten Dissonanzparadigma). Und in der dritten Bedingung würde den ProbandInnen keine Wahlfreiheit eingeräumt. Entsprechend der Ausführungen oben, würden wir bei sehr hoher Wahlfreiheit erwarten, dass Personen mit hohen (vs. niedrigen) PFC-Werten häufiger das einstellungskonträre Verhalten nicht ausführen: Solange sie die Möglich-

keit haben, sich konsistent mit ihren Einstellungen zu verhalten, präferieren sie dieses Verhalten. Bei suggerierter Wahlfreiheit wird angenommen, dass alle ProbandInnen das einstellungskonträre Verhalten ausführen. In diesem Fall würden wir Dissonanzeffekte nur bei Personen mit hohen (vs. niedrigen) PFC-Werten erwarten. Bei niedriger Wahlfreiheit sollten alle ProbandInnen das einstellungskonträre Verhalten ausführen. Weiter sollten bei niedriger Wahlfreiheit keine Dissonanzeffekte auftreten (weder bei Personen mit hohen noch mit niedrigen PFC-Werten).

Zusammenfassend hat die hier vorliegende Arbeit einen praktischen Beitrag zur Reduktion von Vorurteilen geleistet. Auf konzeptueller Ebene wurden Bedingungen spezifiziert, die für den Erfolg einer solchen Intervention erfüllt sein müssen (z.B. hohe Wahlfreiheit / hohes Konsistenzstreben). Daneben wurde eine Möglichkeit zur indirekten Erfassung von Vorurteilen in Deutschland vorgeschlagen sowie Dimensionen untersucht, die Vorurteilen zugrunde liegen. Neben den hier vorgestellten Ergebnissen wurden vielfache weiterführende Fragen aufgezeigt, die in zukünftiger Forschung betrachtet werden sollten.

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II. Manuskript 1

“An indirect Paper-and-Pencil Measure of Prejudice: A German Version of the Racial Argument Scale”

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Dear Dr. Schaler,

I have just talked on your answering machine. I hope you got my message. I would like to
However, as I have already pointed out on your answering machine, I would like to finish

Many thanks in advance.
Kind regards
Kirsten Heitland

--

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Running Head: A GERMAN VERSION OF THE RACIAL ARGUMENT SCALE

An indirect Paper-and-Pencil Measure of Prejudice:
A German Version of the Racial Argument Scale

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An indirect Paper-and-Pencil Measure of Prejudice:

A German Version of the Racial Argument Scale

Abstract

Prejudices against minorities are still a cause of inter-ethnic conflict and violence, although their expression has changed from blatant to more subtle forms. There has been a shortage of valid and reliable German-language scales for the measurement of contemporary racial prejudices. The Racial Argument Scale (RAS; Saucier & Miller, 2003) measures contemporary prejudice indirectly by asking respondents to judge how well given arguments support a conclusion. This scale was adapted to the German context with Turks as the target group. A validation study using a diverse sample of adults ($N = 194$) provides evidence for good reliability and construct validity of the German RAS (RAS-G). The adapted instrument is thus suitable for the indirect measurement of prejudice in German-speaking samples.

120 words

Keywords: indirect measurement, nonreactive measures, Racial Argument Scale, scale development, prejudice

An indirect paper-and-pencil measure of prejudice:

A German version of the Racial Argument Scale

Prejudice forms the core of ideologies that support inequality and exploitation (e.g., Jones, 1997). Prejudice may thus cause the toleration of inter-ethnic violence and even the perpetration of violence (e.g., Salame, 2004): Research has shown substantial correlations between xenophobic attitudes on the one hand and discrimination (meta analysis Schütz & Six, 1996) as well as the toleration or preparedness for violence (Wagner, Christ, & Kühnel, 2002) on the other. To further study these relationships and to evaluate the success of interventions, valid measures of prejudice are needed which should be able to capture contemporary contents of prejudiced beliefs. The latter aspect is important because the expression of prejudice has changed from overt prejudice and its blatant behavioral expression to more subtle expression forms (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sears & Henry, 2003). In an experimental study, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) investigated the change in prejudice over a period of 10 years (from 1988/89 to 1998/99). Undergraduates evaluated the qualification of fictitious job candidates. Besides the candidates' qualification for a given job (weak vs. ambiguous vs. high), the candidates' skin color was manipulated (White vs. Black). Whereas participants' overt expression of prejudice decreased, the strength of recommendations remained similar over time: In the 1988/89 and 1998/99 sample undergraduates recommended Black candidates with ambiguous qualifications less than they did for White candidates. This study demonstrates that unequal treatment of ethnic minorities persists, although the overt expression of prejudice decreases.

Further, this study indicates three characteristics of contemporary racism: First, results demonstrate the divergence between cognitive and affective components of

racism as stated in current approaches like symbolic racism (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Sears & Henry, 2003; Sears & Kinder, 1971), modern racism (McConahay, 1986), and aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991, 1998; Dovidio, Mann, & Gaertner, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Accordingly, people deny prejudice on a cognitive level – in fact prejudice is not apparent to them consciously – but associate the outgroup with negative affect. Consequently, only the level of the overt expression of prejudice has decreased over the years (Bobo, 2001; Schuman et al., 1997), whereas the level of discrimination has not (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Hacker, 1995).

Second, results by Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) show that contemporary forms of prejudice emerge particularly in ambiguous situations (Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Rogers & Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Under these circumstances people can attribute their discriminatory behavior to aspects of the situation and thus express prejudice in a socially accepted way (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Pearson, 2005).

Finally, the biased recommendations of Black in contrast to White candidates with ambiguous qualifications imply that the consequences of contemporary prejudice are comparable to its prior overt expression (Quillian, 1996). Negative consequences of discrimination can be observed for different target groups in Germany as well (e.g. Frindte, Funke, & Waldzus, 1996; Ganter, 2001; Klink & Wagner, 1999). For example, a German government report reveals that criminal offences in the area of “politically motivated delinquency – right-wing” have increased from 15.914 in 2005 to 18.142 in 2006; of these, 1.115 (in 2005: 1.034) can be classified as acts of violence (Bundesministerium des Inneren, 2006).

These characteristics of contemporary prejudice and discrimination make an adequate measurement difficult. Especially respondents may distort their answers in questionnaires for the measurement of prejudice into a less racist direction based on

perceived fairness norms or self-presentational concerns (Dunton & Fazio, 1997; Plant & Devine, 1998). Therefore, numerous methods were developed to capture contemporary racism. However, only few were adapted and validated for the German context. The popular *Subtle and Blatant Prejudice Scale* (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) was developed for and used in the German language area (e.g. Pettigrew et al., 1998; Quillian, 1995; Zick, 1997), but its psychometric characteristics are problematic. The reliability of its subtle prejudice subscales range from .58 to .60, which can be seen as unsatisfactory. Further, the assumed factorial structure of the scale could not be established empirically (Ganter, 2001, for the English version see; Coenders, Scheepers, Sniderman, & Verberk, 2001). Consequently, there is a need for adequate methods in Germany which possess good psychometric qualities and are able to capture contemporary prejudice.

Indirect, unobtrusive measurement of prejudice

To overcome the problems outlined, indirect methods of measuring contemporary racism were developed. Their main characteristic is that participants are not aware that their attitudes are being measured (see Bohnet & Wänke, 2002). Some of these nonreactive methods are based on behavioral observation in natural settings. Participants' reactions toward outgroup members are compared to their reactions toward ingroup members. Any observed discrepancy is assumed to indicate the person's prejudice level (review, Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). Such naturalistic paradigms are limited, however, in many respects. For example, they often do not allow to relate the observed behavior to any other characteristics of the observed person at the individual level. Also, their construct validity is often difficult to assess (see Webb, Capbell, Schwartz, Sechrest, & Belew Grove, 1981).

Other recent research methods take a different approach and focus on the

measurement of reaction times in the laboratory to capture implicit attitudes toward an outgroup. Predominantly, variations of the implicit association test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and the affective priming technique (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) have been used. These instruments measure the strength of the evaluative association between social categories and claim to be free of biases based on social desirability. Besides ongoing discussions concerning the construct validity of these measures (see Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Klauer & Mierke, 2005; Rothermund & Wentura, 2004), one of their disadvantages is that they involve higher technical effort than paper-and-pencil measures.

In consideration of the advantages of indirect methods and economic aspects, Saucier and Miller (2003) developed an indirect paper-and-pencil method to capture contemporary prejudice. They incorporated Thistlethwaite's (1950) insight that a persons' attitude may evoke mistakes in the evaluation of the logical consistency of syllogisms. Participants were more likely to evaluate logically invalid conclusions as valid if these were consistent with their attitudes than if they were not. Building on these findings, Saucier and Miller (2003) constructed the *Racial Argument Scale* (RAS): In this questionnaire participants evaluate how well different arguments support certain conclusions. The conclusions themselves express or imply negative or positive evaluations of Blacks. The underlying assumption is that participants evaluate the relationship between argument and conclusion not only on objective criteria but also on the basis of their attitudes and beliefs.

Because of this argument-conclusion structure, one advantage of the RAS is that it creates an ambiguous judgment context, which allows an affirmation of prejudice in a socially accepted way (see Fiske, 1998). Characteristic for contemporary racism is that people discriminate more in situations in which their discriminatory behavior is less obvious (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1986).

Consequently, they should agree to items if their negative reactions toward an outgroup can be justified by factors other than the ethnicity of a group, so they can maintain an unprejudiced self-image (Dovidio et al., 2005). This attribution process to other factors independent of ethnicity is provided by the RAS, because people can justify their prejudiced answers by the ostensible correctness or incorrectness of the logical structures they are supposed to judge.

We adopted the RAS (Saucier & Miller, 2003) as a scale for the indirect measurement of contemporary prejudice to the German context. We focused the content of the items on Turks because they are the largest migrant group in Germany (2.495.000 people, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006) and are often victims of prejudice, discrimination and violence (Pettigrew et al., 1998; Wagner & Zick, 1997). For example, a representative survey revealed that in Germany 2.9 % of the Muslims (among the 966 interviewees, 78 % were of Turkish origin) have been hit, kicked or assaulted intentionally on the street within the last year (Brettfeld & Wetzels, 2007).

We chose statements on prevailing, ambiguous topics; from these statements, we deduced conclusions that reflected either negatively or positively on Turks (e.g., argument: “In Germany even today Turkish women are sometimes married to Turkish men before they are 18 (and sometimes even against their own will). Further, in some traditional Turkish families a good education is not regarded as necessary for women”; conclusion: “Traditional Muslims have a picture of women that is out of tune with German values.”). On this basis we developed a German scale for the indirect measurement of prejudice against Turks in Germany: The *Racial Argument Scale – German* (RAS-G).

Construction of the RAS-G scale

The aim of the adoption of the RAS (Saucier & Miller, 2003) was the generation

of items whose content fitted the German context and which were comprehensible for the general population. Based on informal interviews, 15 controversial topics were collected (e.g., high unemployment among migrants in comparison to Germans). The item format corresponded with the English original: Each item consisted of a detailed argument, which was followed by a shorter conclusion (see appendix). Participants evaluated on a 7-point Likert scale how strongly the arguments supported the conclusion (1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly). Similar to Saucier and Miller's version (2003), items were roughly balanced according to their valence: 6 items featured "pro-Turkish" conclusions, 9 items "anti-Turkish" conclusions.

Validation of the RAS-G

To examine the convergent validity of the RAS-G, we used translations of other measures of prejudice toward Turks, most of which also had not been validated yet with German-speaking respondents. To assess cognitive elements of prejudice (Hilton & van Hippiel, 1996; Sears & Henry, 2003), we employed a measure of stereotypic beliefs. We predicted substantial correlations of the RAS-G with other prejudice measures and moderate correlations with the scale for stereotypic beliefs.

Further, we explored the connection of the RAS-G with right-wing-authoritarianism (RWA, Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) and social dominance orientation (SDO, Sidanius, 1993). In several studies, strong correlations between these generalized attitude dimensions and prejudice were reported (e.g., Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). Hence, we predicted high correlations of the RAS-G with RWA and SDO, respectively. We also expected lower prejudice levels for participants with higher educational levels (Quillian, 1996; Wagner & Zick, 1995). The correlation between the RAS-G and modern sexism was predicted to be small to moderate (cf. Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et

al., 2008). In line with research showing a lower prejudice level for people who had more contact with the target group (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) we predicted that the RAS-G would be negatively correlated with contact. Especially the quality of contact should be a good negative predictor for prejudice level on the RAS-G. To establish discriminant validity, we predicted that the RAS-G would be uncorrelated with a social desirability scale.

Method

5.1 Sample. Two hundred and one citizens of a mid-sized German town participated. The data of 6 people were excluded from analyses because they had at least one parent of Turkish origin. Of the remaining 195 participants, 94 were male and 101 were female. Their average age was 32.31 years ($SD = 11.99$, range: 14 to 78). Participants' educational levels varied widely¹.

5.2 Procedure. From April 24, 2007 to May 6, 2007, people were randomly recruited at a citizens' advice bureau in a German middle-sized city while they were waiting for their appointments. Participants learned that they would be taking part in a study about attitudes toward different aspects of society and completed the questionnaire individually in a separate room. At the end of the study they received 5 EUR for their participation and were debriefed.

5.3 Measures. Besides the RAS-G, four scales for the measurement of prejudice were employed: The items of the *Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale* (McConahay, 1986) were translated by the author and adapted to the context of discrimination against Turks (a consequence was that one item of each subscale was deleted). Further, the item "Generally, do you feel Blacks are smarter, not as smart or about as smart as Whites" was not used, because its content was already mentioned in a different scale (see explanations about the *Prejudice Index* below). The item format was

changed to a 7-point Likert scale uniformly (1 = do not agree at all, 7 = agree completely). A factor analysis² did not support the theoretically proposed separation of modern and old fashioned racism into two factors. Therefore, we merged these items into a single 9-item scale (modern and old-fashioned racism, $M = 3.06$, $SD = 0.96$), which provided a satisfactory reliability, $\alpha = .76$.

In line with different versions of scales to measure social distance (e.g., Byrnes & Kiger, 1988; Crandall, 1991), we developed two subscales, which contained 8 items each. Participants were asked to indicate how much it would bother them if their neighbor (general practitioner, nurse, colleague at work, supervisor, babysitter, new flame, son-in-law/daughter-in-law) were a Turkish woman or man. The same evaluations were made for German women and men. The differences between the mean judgments for Turks and the respective judgments for Germans were calculated and their mean used as a measure of social distance ($M = 1.20$, $SD = 1.53$). A factor analysis of the social distance difference scores indicated a one-factor solution. The internal consistency in our sample was very good, $\alpha = .95$.

These prejudice measures were supplemented by survey items from the project „Group-focused enmity“ (GMF-Surveys, see Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007). 8 items from the area xenophobia were used (e.g., “Too many Turks are living in Germany”) and 4 items from the area discriminatory behavior (e.g., “I would never buy a car from a Turkish person”). The word “foreigner” was replaced by “Turk”. A factor analysis supported a single-factor solution for both scales. The mean of the scales were 2.89 and 2.52 ($SD = 1.38$ and $SD = 1.23$) and their internal consistencies were $\alpha = .90$ and $\alpha = .69$, respectively.

In a scale to capture stereotypic beliefs (see Prejudice Index, Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) participants judged stereotypes about Turks and Germans on 5 dimensions (hard-working vs. lazy; violent vs. non-violent; not intelligent vs. intelligent; financially

independent vs. welfare recipient; not patriotic vs. patriotic). Again, the difference between item scores related to Turks versus Germans was used as a measure of *stereotypic beliefs*. For the stereotypic beliefs ($M = 0.76$, $SD = 1.15$) we found a one-factor solution, $\alpha = .76$.

Further, 4 items about contact frequency with Turks and 2 items about contact quality were adopted from the GMF-Surveys (e.g., “How often have you got contact to Turks in your neighborhood” or “How often have you made positive experiences with Turks”). The items measuring contact frequency and quality loaded on separate factors as intended. The correlation between the contact frequency factor and the contact quality factor was moderate ($r = .44$). Internal consistencies were $\alpha = .72$ and $\alpha = .57$ ($M = 3.33$ and $M = 4.32$, $SD = 1.40$ and $SD = 1.42$).

To measure social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) a German version of the scale was employed (Cohrs, Kielmann, Moschner, & Maes, 2002; based on Six, Wolfradt, & Zick, 2001), $\alpha = .72$, $M = 3.34$, $SD = 0.94$. Right-wing-authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) was measured with a German version of the scale by Cohrs and colleagues (2002; based on Petzel, Wagner, Nicolai, & van Dick, 1997; Schneider, 1997), $\alpha = .80$, $M = 2.65$, $SD = 0.88$.

In addition, a German version (Eckes & Six-Materna, 1998) of the modern sexism scale was used (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). The mean of the modern sexism scale was 3.59 ($SD = 1.08$), $\alpha = .82$. Old-fashioned sexism was assessed by 2 items of the GMF-Survey (see Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007), which have shown to be reliable and valid over four years of survey research (e.g., “Women should again become aware of their role as a wife and mother”), $\alpha = .54$, $M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.41$.

All items except the RAS-G, the social distance scale and the scale for stereotypic beliefs were presented in a mixed random order³. Next, the 6 items with item-total correlations $> .32$ of the impression management scale (Musch, Brockhaus, & Bröder,

2002) were used as a measure of social desirability (e.g., “Sometimes I lie, if I have to”). With a mean of $M = 3.61$ ($SD = 1.27$) the scale had a satisfactory internal consistency of $\alpha = .64$, which is similar to the internal consistency of the original 10-item scale reported by Musch and colleagues (2002).

Results

Properties of the RAS-G

First, “Pro-Turkish” items were reverse coded. Then the sum of item scores was formed. The empirical range of the scale was from 26 to 88 points (possible range from 14 to 98) suggesting a good potential to differentiate between people with high versus low prejudice. The mean of the scale was 3.74 ($SD = 0.94$), and the distribution of scores approached normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov- $Z(195) = 1.05$, $p = .23$ (for item statistics, see Table 1). No sex differences were found, $t(193) = -.14$, $p = .89$, and the reliability of the entire scale (Cronbach’s alpha = .73) was satisfactory for the use in empirical research⁴. Item-to-total correlations ranged from .12 to .60. Because some of these item-to-total correlations can be seen as unsatisfactory, we also generated an 8-item short version of the RAS-G with all item-to-total correlations above .32. The short version’s internal consistency was similar to that of the whole form, $\alpha = .73$, and the empirical range covered 10 to 53 points (possible range from 8 to 56). A factor analysis (ML, Promax rotation) of the 8-items short version revealed two factors with an eigenvalue greater 1, which accounted for 52.31% of the variance. Only “Anti-Turkish” items loaded on the first factor ($> .52$), whereas the second factor was determined by “Pro-Turkish” items only ($> .36$). The correlation between the “Anti-Turkish factor” and the “Pro-Turkish factor” was moderate, $r = .49$.

„Insert Table 1 somewhere here“

Convergent validity

Correlation of the RAS-G with other prejudice measures. The correlation of the well-established *Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale* (McConahay, 1986) with the RAS-G was $r = .58, p < .001$ (see Table 2). This large effect implies that prejudice can be measured with the RAS-G. Further, the correlation of the *social distance scale* with the RAS-G was $r = .62, p < .001$. These results support the convergent validity of the RAS-G. The xenophobia items of the GMF-Survey shared the highest correlation of the other prejudice measures with the RAS-G, $r = .73, p < .001^5$. The RAS-G also proved to be a predictor of discriminatory intentions and behavior as its correlation with this scale was $r = .63, p < .001$.

Correlation between the RAS-G and stereotypic beliefs. The correlation of the modified prejudice index (see Bobo & Kluegel, 1993) with the RAS-G, $r = .59, p < .001$, indicated that the RAS-G also was related to stereotypic beliefs, as predicted.

Correlation of the RAS-G and contact frequency and quality. Like research that underlines the negative association between contact and prejudice level (for a meta-analysis, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006), we found a negative correlation of the RAS-G with contact frequency, $r = -.21, p < .01$. However, the correlation was significantly greater for contact quality and RAS-G, $r = -.44, p < .001$ ($z = 2.90, p < .01$, for the difference of correlations; see Meng, Rosenthal, & Rubin, 1992). Thus, the more positive experiences people had with Turks, the lower were their values on the RAS-G. Therefore, contact frequency, but in particular the quality of contact may affect the RAS-G scores (cf. Cook, 1962; 1990; Hamberger & Hewstone, 1997; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).

„Insert Table 2 somewhere here“

Correlation of the RAS-G and prejudice-related concepts. The correlation of SDO and

RAS-G was almost as high as that of other prejudice measures and the RAS-G, $r = .53$, $p < .001$, thus supporting the theoretically assumed correlation between prejudice and social dominance orientation (e.g., Akrami, Ekehammar, & Araya, 2000; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996).

The adapted Right-Wing-Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, German version: Funke, 2002) correlated with the RAS-G at $r = .61$, $p < .001$. These findings supported the current research status, according to which authoritarianism is highly correlated with prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammar et al., 2004; Heaven & St. Quintin, 2003; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998; Whitley, 1999).

Level of education as a predictor for prejudice. Education level was divided into three categories (low = no graduation from school or graduation from Hauptschule; medium = graduation from Realschule or Fachhochschulreife; high = earned the German Abitur; for school definitions see Footnote 2). RAS-G scores were submitted to a oneway analysis of variance with education level (low, medium, high) as the single between-subjects factor. This analysis yielded a significant effect of education level, $F(2, 188) = 16.02$, $p < .001$. Respondents with low education level had the highest RAS-G scores ($M = 4.32$), followed by respondents with medium education level ($M = 4.04$) and those with high education level ($M = 3.39$). Planned comparisons further showed that a significant linear trend, $t(20.99)^6 = 3.73$, $p < .002$, captured most of the between-condition variance. These results are in line with findings of higher prejudice level in lower educational levels (e.g., Quillian, 1996; Wagner & Zick, 1995).

Discriminant validity

Correlation of the RAS-G and sexism. As expected, correlations of the RAS-G with the modern and old-fashioned sexism scales were moderately positive, $r = .29$ and $r = .28$, $p < .001$, respectively. The moderate correlation is in line with research that assumes

prejudice against different target groups to be part of one syndrome and therefore correlate with each other (e.g., Zick et al., 2008). However, the correlation is not as high as with other prejudice measures which focus on the same target group (Turks) as the RAS-G.

Correlation of the RAS-G with social desirability. Surprisingly, correlations of all prejudice and stereotype measures with the reduced impression management scale were low. Only the social distance scale was significantly correlated with the impression management scale, $r = -.15$, $p < .05$. However, the lowest correlations with impression management were found for contact quality and xenophobia, as well as for the RAS-G and its short form ($r = .04$, $r = -.05$, $r = -.05$, $r = -.08$, *n.s.*), see Table 3. In line with the findings by Saucier and Miller (2003), the RAS-G thus proved to be unsusceptible to the influence of social desirability.

„Insert Table 3 somewhere here“

Discussion

The intention of this work was to provide a scale for the indirect measurement of contemporary prejudice in German language which was based on the validated *Racial Argument Scale* (Saucier & Miller, 2003). Results indicate that the RAS-G as well as its short form provide reliable and valid measures for the use in empirical research.

Construct validity

The RAS-G showed robust correlations with relevant external criteria: The construct validity is supported by significant correlations between .57 and .73 with German versions of different well-established prejudice and stereotypic belief measures. An interesting aspect is the higher negative correlation of the RAS-G with contact quality in comparison to its significantly lower correlation with contact frequency. This

result indicates that quality of contact may be a better predictor of prejudice than mere frequency of contact.

Furthermore, the generalized attitude dimensions Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing-Authoritarianism are seen as important predictors of prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997). As expected, both showed substantial correlations with the RAS-G (r between .53 and .61). These findings also hold for the short form of the scale. It is noticeable that these correlations are nearly as high as the ones with prejudice measures with Turks as a target group. One explanation might be that the content of these scales also touches the content of immigration, as they deal with marginalized minorities. Indeed, correlations of SDO and RWA with the modern sexism scale are smaller (r between .32 and .44), because the content of sexist prejudice is different from that of prejudice toward immigrants.

Additionally and in line with other work (e.g., Wagner & Zick, 1995), in our sample higher prejudice levels on the RAS-G were associated with a lower education level. Wagner and Zick (1995) could show that a similar correlation in their data was not due to less socially desirable answers by higher-educated people but was mediated in a meaningful way by social psychological variables like relative group deprivation, perceived belief incongruency, political conservatism, and acceptance of inter-ethnic contact. Therefore, our finding of lower prejudice in more highly educated respondents further supports the construct validity of the RAS-G with an important external criterion.

Discriminant validity

The discriminant validity of the scale was supported by the predicted moderate correlations of the RAS-G with modern and old-fashioned sexism. These moderate correlations indicate that prejudices against different groups share a common portion of

variance (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2003; Zick et al., 2008). Compared to its correlations with sexism scales, however, the RAS-G has stronger correlations with scales for measuring xenophobic prejudice and stereotypes about Turks. This demonstrates that – apart from its capability to measure common prejudices – the RAS-G and its short form are specifically suited for measuring prejudice against Turks.

A particular goal of the RAS-G was to demonstrate its immunity to social desirability response biases. Results show that the RAS-G scores are not subject to distortions by a tendency toward socially desirable responding.

Application and research perspectives

In sum, results show that the RAS-G as well as its short form are suitable for the indirect measurement of prejudice toward Turks in Germany and that responses are not biased by social desirability. Further, the construct validity was confirmed for a diverse sample of German citizens with a wide range of education levels. Because the short form of the RAS-G is more efficient and provides similar psychometric properties as the original scale, we recommend using the short form. As attitudes are assumed to be a good predictor of behavioral intentions and, ultimately, of behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977), prejudice measures are important instruments not only for assessing the current prejudice level in a society, but also for the evaluation of interventions aimed at reducing prejudice, discrimination, and violence against the outgroup. The probabilities of the RAS-G make its application in this context worthwhile, especially because it is a paper-and-pencil measure which can be used easily.

Further, it may be noted that the structure of the RAS-G provides the possibility to adapt the scale specifically to different target groups (e.g., prejudice against Russians, women, etc.). Future research may further examine the properties of the scale for

different target groups and also provide additional evidence for the benefits of the scale as an indirect measurement of prejudice.

Some authors have doubts about the nature of contemporary prejudice. They wonder whether the ostensibly new, subtle forms really have replaced the old, overt forms (Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Leach, 2005; McConahay & Hough, 1976). In our study the separation of the *Modern and Traditional Racism Scale* in its two components (modern, subtle racism and traditional, overt racism) was empirically not justifiable. Accordingly, it remains questionable how far a separation into these racism forms is reasonable in a general population sample. Similar to Saucier and Miller (2003), we were not able to provide evidence for the subtle nature of prejudice measured with the RAS-G, as compared to other measures. Consequently, providing such evidence is a challenge for future research.

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Captions for illustrations

Table 1. *Means, Standard Deviations and Corrected Item-Total Correlations of the RAS-G Items.*

Table 2. *Means, Standard Deviation and Correlations of All Scales With the RAS-G.*

Table 3. *Correlations of Scales Measuring Prejudice, Stereotypical Beliefs, and Contact to the Outgroup With the Reduced Impression Management Scale (Musch et al., 2002).*

Table 1.

Means, Standard Deviations and Corrected Item-Total Correlations of the RAS-G Items.

| Items RAS-G | | | | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | Corrected item-total correlations |
|-------------|---|---|---|----------|-----------|---|
| 1 | N | S | Turkish classes | 4.28 | 1.90 | .36 |
| 2 | N | S | Muslim headscarf in schools | 3.68 | 2.31 | .32 |
| 3 | N | | Policemen with Turkish origin | 3.34 | 1.79 | .12 |
| 4 | N | | Culinary variety | 2.00 | 1.37 | .30 |
| 5 | N | | Settle down | 3.50 | 1.79 | .19 |
| 6 | N | S | Turks rescue the pensions | 4.05 | 1.87 | .33 |
| 7 | | S | Expel from the country if unemployed | 3.32 | 1.99 | .60 |
| 8 | | | Honor killing | 5.22 | 2.04 | .27 |
| 9 | | S | No property | 3.03 | 2.13 | .57 |
| 10 | | | Islam as a dangerous religion | 3.72 | 2.15 | .20 |
| 11 | | | Picture of women | 5.38 | 1.83 | .31 |
| 12 | | S | Language differences and PISA | 3.27 | 2.07 | .44 |
| 13 | | S | Unemployment rate | 3.30 | 2.13 | .50 |
| 14 | | S | Education of adolescents | 4.31 | 2.07 | .36 |

Note. *N* = negative coding; *S* = short form; *M* = mean; *SD* = standard deviation. All values are calculated for reverse coded items, if necessary – higher values displayed a higher level of prejudice. The complete item formulations in German can be seen in the appendix.

Table 2.

Means, Standard Deviation and Correlations of All Scales With the RAS-G.

| | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | <i>Cronbach's</i> <i>alpha</i> | <i>r</i> with RAS-G | <i>r</i> with RAS-G short form |
|---|----------|-----------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| RAS-G | 3.77 | 0.91 | .73 | --- | --- |
| RAS-G short form | 3.64 | 1.20 | .73 | --- | --- |
| MaTRS | 3.06 | 0.96 | .76 | .58*** | .58*** |
| Social Distance | 1.20 | 1.53 | .95 | .62*** | .62*** |
| Xenophobia | 2.89 | 1.38 | .90 | .73*** | .74*** |
| Discriminatory behavioral intentions | 2.52 | 1.23 | .69 | .63*** | .63*** |
| Contact frequency | 3.33 | 1.40 | .73 | -.21** | -.25** |
| Contact quality | 4.33 | 1.42 | .55 | -.44*** | -.46*** |
| Stereotypical beliefs | 0.76 | 1.15 | .76 | .59*** | .57*** |
| SDO | 2.65 | 0.88 | .81 | .54*** | .53*** |
| RWA | 3.34 | 0.94 | .72 | .60*** | .61*** |
| Modern sexism | 3.59 | 1.08 | .82 | .30*** | .33*** |
| Old-fashioned sexism | 2.29 | 1.41 | .54 | .28*** | .31*** |

Note. MaTRS = Modern and Traditional Racism Scale; SDO = Social Dominance Orientation; RWA = Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale;

** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

[$N = 195$]

Table 3.

Correlations of Scales Measuring Prejudice, Stereotypical Beliefs, and Contact to the Outgroup With the Reduced Impression Management Scale (Musch et al., 2002).

| Scales | Correlations with impression management |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| RAS-G | -.05 |
| RAS-G short form | -.08 |
| MaTRS | -.12 |
| Social Distance | -.15* |
| Xenophobia | -.05 |
| Discriminatory behavioral intentions | -.09 |
| Contact frequency | .11 |
| Contact quality | .04 |
| Stereotypical beliefs | -.11 |

Note. RAS-G = Racial Argument Scale-German, MaTRS = Modern and Traditional Racism Scale;

* $p < .05$

Appendix

Items of the German Racial Argument Scale (RAS-G)

English translation

Positive arguments:

1. At German schools education is strongly limited. Secondary schools normally only teach “English“, “Spanish“, and “French“. Even PISA has not led to any changes in this regard. In order to additionally supply the needs of Turkish fellow citizens in Germany, courses of Turkish should also be offered by the schools.

Conclusion: This extension of the curriculum is also an enrichment for German children.

2. The German constitution (paragraph 4, basic rights) states that untroubled exercise of one’s religion is assured. As part of a free exercise of religion, Turkish women should also be allowed to wear a headscarf if their religion demands it.

Conclusion: Turkish women should also be allowed to wear a headscarf in their function as teachers at public schools.

3. In Germany several thousand police officers are of Turkish origin. The hiring of policemen of different origin has several advantages: These policemen can talk to criminals who do not speak German, and are often employed as translators. Furthermore, orders by Turkish policemen toward Turkish criminals are respected by the criminals more, because they are more likely to feel understood by someone with the same origin.

Conclusion: The proportion of foreign policemen should be comparable to the proportion of foreign residents in Germany (e.g. more policemen of Turkish origin in Berlin).

4. The immigration of people with different origin has notably enlarged the variety of food in Germany: In every city we find pizzerias (Italian influence), snack bars that sell „Döner Kebab“ (Turkish influence), but also numerous Arabian, Chinese, Indian, or Thai restaurants.

Conclusion: The immigration of people from different countries to Germany has positively influenced the culinary variety.

5. In recent years, Turkish property has increased strongly and Turks have also signed more savings contracts aimed of property purchase than before. These factors document that residents of Turkish origin now regard Germany more as their homeland and like to settle down here more.

Conclusion: This behavior of Turks in Germany is an important precondition for successful integration.

6. Whereas the human population on earth increases, birth rates in Germany decrease. These low birth rates negatively affect e.g. the security of pensions. Among the residents of Germany Turkish families have especially many children. Also, Turkish people are still moving to Germany. Thereby, the number of Muslims in Germany has clearly risen: In 2000, 3.04 million Muslims were living in Germany, whereas in 2005, their numbers have increased to 4.44 million.

Conclusion: The increase of residents with Turkish origin in Germany may positively affect the demographic development in Germany in the long run and, thereby, save our pensions.

Negative arguments

7. For several years, the unemployment rate of foreigners in Germany has been twice as high as the unemployment rate of Germans: In 2005, for example, the unemployment rate of Germans was 12.1 %, whereas it was 25.2 % for foreigners. Because of the higher unemployment rate, foreigners receive more social welfare than Germans do.

Conclusion: If foreigners do not have a job over a longer period of time, they should be expelled from the country.

8. In Germany as well, offences happen from time to time that are called “crimes of honor”. A crime of honor means that a Turkish husband kills his wife, because in

his view she has behaved dishonorably (e.g. she has cheated on him). For a long time, such behavior was not penalized as severely as other murders in Turkey. In Germany, crimes of honor are obvious violations of the German laws.

Conclusion: Foreign perpetrators of crimes of honor should be severely penalized, and after having served the sentence, they should be expelled from the country immediately.

9. Again and again one finds that e.g. Turkish foreigners wear gold necklaces, drive ritzy cars, and get special conditions if they buy property. The same Turks, however, are also unemployed and do not contribute to our welfare state.

Conclusion: Unemployed Turks should not be allowed to buy property in Germany (this means neither houses nor freehold apartments).

10. The Islam must be regarded as a dangerous religion for the Western world. One threat lies in the following notion: It is the obligation of a devoted Muslim to “proselytize everyone to Islam – either by conviction or by force” (Abdel Rahman ibn Khaldun).

Conclusion: The Islam should no longer be tolerated in Germany.

11. In Germany, even nowadays women from Turkish families are married to a man before their 18th birthday (partly against their own will). A good school education of Muslim women is not seen as essential in traditional families.

Conclusion: Religious Muslims have a picture of women that cannot be reconciled with German values.

12. Germany did relatively poorly in the PISA study. One reason might be the poor language knowledge of foreign children: If these children cannot understand the teacher, they certainly cannot learn anything. Instead they disturb other pupils, and less content can be conveyed by the teacher.

Conclusion: Foreign children with language difficulties should not be admitted to German schools.

13. Even though the employment situation has relaxed a little within the last months, there are still a lot of people in Germany who are looking for a job but cannot find one: In the year 2006, 3,432 million people in Germany were unemployed (the whole German population at this point of time was 82,365 million people).

Conclusion: If there were not so many people who immigrated to Germany from other countries, we would not have such a high unemployment rate.

14. Mainly Turkish youngsters are the ones who molest women and whistle after women in public places. On trams and subways as well, foreign youngster often do not behave in an appropriate way: They are loud and are not respectful of other passengers.

Conclusion: Foreign youngsters are not raised appropriately by their parents.

Items of the German Racial Argument Scale (RAS-G)

German version

Positive Argumente:

1. Der Unterricht an deutschen Schulen ist sehr stark begrenzt: An Weiterführenden Schulen werden meistens nur die Sprachen „Englisch“, „Spanisch“ und „Französisch“ angeboten. Auch PISA hat diesbezüglich zu keinen Änderungen geführt. Um auch die Bedürfnisse der türkischen Mitbürger in Deutschland zu beachten, sollte ebenfalls Türkisch-Unterricht an Schulen angeboten werden.

Schlussfolgerung: Diese Ausweitung des Angebots stellt auch für deutsche Kinder eine Bereicherung dar.

2. Im Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Artikel 4 der Grundrechte) steht unter anderem: „Die ungestörte Religionsausübung wird gewährleistet“. Zur freien Religionsausübung zählt auch, dass türkische Frauen ein Kopftuch tragen können, wenn Ihre Religion dieses von ihnen verlangt.

Schlussfolgerung: Türkische Frauen sollten auch als Lehrerinnen an öffentlichen Schulen ein Kopftuch tragen dürfen

3. In Deutschland sind einige tausend Polizisten türkischer Abstammung. Die Besetzung der Polizei mit Polizisten unterschiedlicher Abstammung hat einige Vorteile: Diese Polizisten können mit Straftätern reden, die kein Deutsch verstehen, und werden häufig als Übersetzer angefordert. Außerdem werden z.B. die Aufforderungen eines türkischen Polizisten an einen türkischen Straftäter von diesem eher respektiert – der Straftäter fühlt sich von jemandem mit derselben Abstammung eher verstanden.

Schlussfolgerung: Der Anteil „ausländischer“ Polizisten sollte vergleichbar sein mit dem Anteil ausländischer Einwohner in Deutschland (z.B. mehr türkischstämmige Polizisten in Berlin).

4. Durch die Einwanderung von Menschen mit unterschiedlicher Herkunft hat sich die Vielfalt des Essens in Deutschland deutlich vergrößert: Im Stadtbild finden wir überall Pizzerien (italienischer Einfluss), Imbiss-Stände, die Döner Kebab

verkaufen (türkischer Einfluss) aber auch viele arabische, chinesische, indische oder thailändische Restaurants.

Schlussfolgerung: Die Einwanderung von Menschen aus unterschiedlichen Ländern nach Deutschland wirkt sich positiv auf unsere kulinarische Vielfalt aus.

5. In den letzten Jahren hat der Grundbesitz bei Türken stärker zugenommen und sie haben ebenfalls mehr Bausparverträge abgeschlossen als früher. Diese Fakten belegen, dass türkisch-stämmige Mitbewohner Deutschland in den letzten Jahren stärker als ihre Heimat betrachten und hier sesshaft werden möchten.

Schlussfolgerung: Dieses Verhalten der Türken in Deutschland ist eine wichtige Voraussetzung für eine erfolgreiche Integration.

6. Während die Bevölkerung auf der Erde insgesamt zunimmt, findet man in Deutschland abnehmende Geburtenraten. Diese niedrigen Geburtenzahlen wirken sich z.B. negativ auf die Sicherstellung der Rente aus. Von den deutschen Einwohnern haben dabei vor allem türkische Familien besonders viele Kinder. Zudem ziehen immer noch türkische Personen nach Deutschland. Dadurch hat sich die Zahl der Muslime in Deutschland deutlich erhöht: Waren es im Jahr 2000 noch 3,04 Millionen Muslime in Deutschland, sind es im Jahr 2006 schon 4,44 Millionen Muslime.

Schlussfolgerung: Der Anstieg an türkisch-stämmigen Einwohnern in Deutschland könnte sich langfristig positiv auf die Bevölkerungs-Entwicklung Deutschlands auswirken und somit unsere Rente retten.

Negative Argumente

7. Die Arbeitslosenquote von Ausländern in Deutschland ist schon seit mehreren Jahren konstant doppelt so hoch wie die Arbeitslosenquote von Deutschen: So betrug im Jahr 2005 die Arbeitslosenquote 12,1 % bei Deutschen, bei Ausländern aber 25,2 %. Durch diese hohe Arbeitslosenquote beziehen Ausländer mehr Sozialleistungen als Deutsche.

Schlussfolgerung: Wenn Ausländer über einen längeren Zeitraum keine

Beschäftigung haben, sollten sie aus dem Land ausgewiesen werden.

8. Unter dem Begriff „Ehrendelikte“ geschehen auch in Deutschland von Zeit zu Zeit Straftaten: Ehrendelikte liegen dann vor, wenn ein türkischer Ehemann seine Frau umbringt, weil sie sich in seinen Augen unehrenhaft verhalten hat (z.B. hat sie ihn mit einem anderen Mann betrogen). Dieses Verhalten wurde lange Zeit in der Türkei nicht so hart bestraft wie andere Morde. In Deutschland sind Ehrendelikte klar eine Verletzung der deutschen Gesetze.

Schlussfolgerung: Ausländische Täter solcher „Ehrendelikte“ sollten hart bestraft und nach Abbußen der Strafe sofort aus dem Land verwiesen werden.

9. Immer wieder muss man feststellen, dass z. B. türkische Ausländer Goldketten tragen, mit protzigen Autos durch die Stadt fahren und vergünstigte Konditionen für den Kauf von Grundstücken erhalten. Dieselben Türken sind aber auch arbeitslos und tragen nichts zu unserem Sozialstaat bei.

Schlussfolgerung: Arbeitslose Türken sollten in Deutschland keinen Grundbesitz erwerben dürfen (d.h. sie dürfen keine Häuser oder Eigentumswohnungen kaufen).

10. Der Islam ist als eine für die westliche Welt gefährliche Religion zu betrachten. Eine Gefahr liegt in folgender Auffassung: Es ist die Pflicht eines jeden gläubigen Muslimen „Jeden zum Islam zu bekehren, entweder durch Überzeugung oder durch Gewalt“ (Abdel Rahman ibn Khaldun).

Schlussfolgerung: Der Islam sollte in Deutschland nicht länger toleriert werden.

11. In Deutschland werden auch heute noch Frauen aus einigen türkischen Familien vor Ihrem 18. Lebensjahr (z.T. gegen ihren eigenen Willen) mit einem Mann verheiratet. Eine gute Schulbildung muslimischer Frauen wird in traditionell geprägten Familien als nicht notwendig erachtet.

Schlussfolgerung: Gläubige Muslime haben ein Bild von Frauen, welches mit unseren deutschen Werten nicht in Einklang zu bringen ist.

12. Deutschland hat in der PISA-Studie relativ schlecht abgeschnitten. Eine Ursache wird in den schlechten Sprachkenntnissen ausländischer Kinder gesehen: Wenn die Kinder den Lehrer/die Lehrerin nicht verstehen können, können sie natürlich auch nichts lernen. Stattdessen stören sie die anderen Schüler, und es können weniger Lerninhalte vermittelt werden.

Schlussfolgerung: Ausländische Kinder mit sprachlichen Schwierigkeiten sollten nicht in deutschen Schulen zugelassen werden.

13. Auch wenn sich in den letzten Monaten die Arbeitsplatzsituation leicht entspannt hat, gibt es immer noch viele Menschen in Deutschland, die einen Arbeitsplatz suchen, aber nicht finden: Im Jahr 2006 waren noch 3,432 Millionen Menschen in Deutschland arbeitslos (die Gesamtbevölkerung betrug zu diesem Zeitpunkt 82,365 Millionen Menschen).

Schlussfolgerung: Gäbe es nicht so viele Menschen, die aus anderen Ländern nach Deutschland immigriert sind, hätten wir auch nicht so eine hohe Arbeitslosenquote.

14. Es sind besonders häufig türkische Jugendliche, die an öffentlichen Plätzen Frauen hinterher pfeifen und diese belästigen. Und auch in Straßen- bzw. U-Bahnen benehmen sich ausländische Jugendliche oft unangemessen: Sie sind laut und nehmen keine Rücksicht auf andere Fahrgäste.

Schlussfolgerung: Ausländische Jugendliche werden von ihren Eltern nicht richtig erzogen.

¹ 2.1 % of the participants had not completed school, 7.2 % graduated from the German Hauptschule (the school with the lowest education standards), 19.1 % graduated from the German Realschule (comparable to the British secondary modern school or junior high in the USA), 19.1 % had earned the German Fachhochschulreife (which is an advanced technical college entrance qualification), and 51% had earned the German Abitur (a general qualification for university entrance). Three people were still attending school (1.5 %).

² Following suggestions of Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan (1999), this and all subsequent factor analyses used maximum likelihood extraction and Promax rotation, to allow for correlated factors.

³ The randomisation of the items of the RAS-G, social distance and prejudice index was not possible, because their item format differed from the other scales.

⁴ For all analyses, outliers were truncated to the item's mean plus two standard deviations and missing values were replaced on the basis of the *expectation maximization* method (EM), (Field, 2005).

⁵ A confirmatory factor analysis (ML, promax rotation) supported that the RAS-G and xenophobia scale measured two different constructs: All xenophobia items loaded on the first factor only (this factor accounted for 31.41 % of the variance). The RAS-G items loaded on factors 2 to 5, which jointly accounted for 25.57 % of the variance. The correlations between the first and the other factors ranged from $r = .32$ to $.62$.

⁶ Based on separate variance estimates because homogeneity of variances was in doubt.

III. Manuskript 2

”Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy”

Special Issue: Individual Differences and Social Influence
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Tuesday, September 08, 2009

RE: Manuscript SIF IDS 03.09RR
'Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy'

Authors: Kirsten Heitland & Gerd Bohner

Dear Dr Heitland,

Thank you for the quick revision of your manuscript, "Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy" (SIF IDS 03.09RR). I am pleased to accept the paper for publication in the special issue of *Social Influence*.

Congratulations on a nice piece of research. I think the paper will make a strong contribution to the issue.

Yours sincerely,

Jerry Burger
Special Issue Guest Editor
Social Influence

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Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for
Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy

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Kirsten Heitland, Universität Bielefeld, Institut für Interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung. Gerd Bohner, Universität Bielefeld, Abteilung für Psychologie. The reported research was conducted by Kirsten Heitland as part of her doctoral dissertation in psychology, which was supervised by Gerd Bohner. It was supported by a graduate stipend from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft as part of the graduate school grant GRK 844/2 and GRK 844/3. We would like to thank Uli Wagner for helpful discussions and comments on a previous draft, as well as Georg Felser and Uwe Wolfradt for providing a German translation of the Preference for Consistency Scale. Special thanks go to the citizens' advice bureau of the city Bielefeld for their help to realize this study with a heterogeneous sample.

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Abstract

Individual differences in preference for consistency (PFC) and their interplay with situational variables were studied in relation to effects of counterattitudinal advocacy on prejudice. German adults ($N = 202$) who initially had relatively high prejudice toward Turks generated counterattitudinal arguments favoring integrated housing of Turks and Germans. Freedom of choice (low, high) and self-threat (low, high) were manipulated; PFC (low, high) was measured and used as a third independent variable. Control participants generated arguments on a neutral topic. Dependent variables were discomfort at integrated housing and generalized prejudice toward Turks. Results showed that PFC moderated effects of choice and self-threat: Discomfort and prejudice were lowest for high-PFC participants who had generated counterattitudinal arguments under high choice and high self-threat.

119 words

Keywords: PFC; preference for consistency; cognitive dissonance; prejudice reduction; induced compliance;

Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy

Prejudice and discriminatory behavior are major problems of society. Hence, various interventions have been developed and applied in order to reduce prejudice (meta-analysis, see Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). In our study we examined an intervention strategy based on the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; 1964). The theory's basic idea is that cognitions lead to the arousal of dissonance if they are psychologically or logically inconsistent with other cognitions. Because dissonance is an unpleasant state (Festinger, 1957), people are assumed to reduce dissonance by adding consonant cognitions, eliminating dissonant cognitions, or replacing dissonant cognitions with consonant ones. Among many other things, dissonance theory can explain how a person's attitude may change after the person has engaged in counterattitudinal advocacy. In one pertinent study, students were asked to write an essay favoring a law that restricted freedom of speech at their university. Because most students were against this law, writing the essay was inconsistent with their initial attitudes. Students were either led to believe that they voluntarily wrote the essay (high choice) or were told nothing about voluntariness (low choice). Results showed that students changed their attitude toward the law in the direction of their essay only in the high choice condition, presumably because the strongest dissonance between initial attitude and behavior was aroused in that condition (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967).

Preference for Consistency as a Moderator of Dissonance Effects

Recently, Cialdini et al. (1995) discussed difficulties in producing and replicating dissonance effects. They ascribed these problems to individual differences in preference for consistency (PFC). This personality trait is composed of (1) the motive to be consistent with one's own responses, (2) the desire to appear consistent to others, and

(3) the desire that others appear consistent. Thus, attitude change effects in cognitive consistency paradigms should be stronger for people who score high on a scale measuring PFC. To date, only few experiments have tested this moderating role of PFC. In two studies, it was shown that the classic foot-in-the-door tactic generated increased compliance only in high- (versus low-) PFC people (Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, & Cialdini, 2001). In another study (Nail et al., 2001), high-PFC participants showed a greater preference for others to appear consistent: After imagining that they had been stood-up by a friend, they derogated the friend more when the friend's behavior was insufficiently justified. In sum, PFC has been shown to moderate social influence processes.

The only studies that addressed the role of PFC in a classic dissonance paradigm were provided by Cialdini (Cialdini et al., 1995; Bator & Cialdini, 2006). In both studies, the authors showed that under conditions of high (vs. low) choice, high-PFC students changed their attitudes toward an advocated position, e.g., by favoring a tuition increase they had argued for (Cialdini et al., 1995), whereas low-PFC students did not. In our research, we extended this approach in two ways: First, we examined an attitude domain of high societal relevance by studying the moderating role of PFC in a dissonance experiment designed to reduce intergroup prejudice. Secondly, in addition to freedom of choice, we varied the personal threat of a counterattitudinal advocacy. We expected to observe facilitating effects of both choice and personal threat only for high-PFC people.

Freedom of Choice and Personal Threat as Variables Affecting Dissonance Arousal

Revisions of dissonance theory (for a review, see Harmon-Jones, 2007) have added potentially necessary conditions for dissonance arousal to Festinger's (1957) original conception. In their "new look formulation", Cooper and Fazio (1984) claim that dissonance arises if a person's counterattitudinal behavior causes an aversive,

unintentional result that the person could anticipate and feel responsible for. If the person can attribute the aversive consequence to situational factors, dissonance will not arise because the behavior is no longer a threat to the person's self. This revision thus emphasizes the behavioral element of free choice (Linder, Cooper, & Jones, 1967) which was repeatedly shown to facilitate the occurrence of dissonance (Cooper & Fazio, 1984, pp. 236-237).

Similarly, according to self-affirmation theory (Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, 1988), inconsistent cognitions are not sufficient for the arousal of dissonance. Instead, the theory emphasizes the importance of the self. The "dissonance-provoking aspect of an inconsistency is its self-threat" rather than its inconsistency per se (Steele & Liu, 1983, p. 17; cf. Aronson, 1968). It was shown that individuals could tolerate a specific inconsistency between attitude and behavior as long as they were allowed to affirm a value that was important to them and thereby sustain their self as good, powerful, and stable at a more general level (Steele & Liu, 1983). Thus, self-affirmation theory maintains that dissonance arises if the global image of self-integrity is threatened. In a typical dissonance paradigm (like induced compliance) this might be the case if a person is strongly involved in the issues of the study and important aspects of his/her self-concept are touched. In our study, we relied on the insights of the self-affirmation approach and assumed that dissonance should be greater if an issue is personally threatening for a person. We thus incorporated both freedom of choice and amount of self-threat as factors in our research on the role of PFC in reducing German's prejudice against Turks.

Application of Cognitive Dissonance in Reducing Prejudice

Prejudice may be regarded as a central attitude domain as it affects cognitions and behavior in various areas, including policy preferences (Sears, von Laar, Carillo, & Kosterman, 1997) as well as friendly and derogatory behaviors toward outgroups (e.g.,

Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). Although central attitudes were often resistant to attitude change in cognitive dissonance experiments (e.g., Cooper & Mackie, 1983; Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), at least two studies show that prejudice may be reduced through the arousal of dissonance. Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) studied the reduction of discriminatory behavior in aversive-racist students. These students wrote a persuasive essay advocating the fair treatment of minority students on campus. Afterwards, participants in a "hypocrisy" condition were reminded of their own prior prejudiced behavior, which showed them quite plainly that they had preached what they did not practice. After this hypocrisy induction aversive racists showed less discrimination of Asians. Unfortunately, Son Hing and colleagues did not assess attitude change. This was done only by Leippe and Eisenstadt (1994), who showed in two induced-compliance experiments that the reduction of prejudice was a result of both freedom of choice and publicity of the behavior. Furthermore, the authors observed a generalization of attitude change beyond the advocated topic. Above, we have pointed to prejudice as being strongly connected within the cognitive network as it affects emotion and behavior in various parts of life. A generalization of dissonance-aroused attitude change might occur if the attitude "is connected to a wider integrated attitude system [and] the new changed attitude is inconsistent with aspects of that system" (Eisenstadt, Leippe, Stambush, Rauch, & Rivers, 2005, p. 135; cf. Hardyck & Kardush, 1968). Consequently, these studies indicate that prejudice may be reduced via dissonance induction and that a generalization of attitude change beyond the specific advocated topic is likely. Therefore, we designed a study that included attitude assessment on the advocated position as well as on a more general level and made a clear prediction about the people who should experience dissonance.

Stability of Dissonance-induced Attitude Change and Preference for Consistency

We have argued that prejudicial attitudes can be characterized as central to the self, and central attitudes are relatively resistant to change (e.g., Tetlock & Suedfeld, 1976; Zuwerink & Devine, 1996). Whereas these characteristics might be one reason for the difficulties in reducing prejudice (Amodio & Devine, 2005), a successful change of prejudiced attitudes might also be temporally stable because attitude change based on dissonance reduction was shown to be durable over time (c.f. Sénémeaud & Somat, 2009). We therefore hypothesized that a change in prejudiced attitudes as a function of cognitive dissonance would persist after a delay of several weeks.

Hypotheses of the Present Research

German participants generated either arguments for the integrated housing of Germans and Turks, or arguments on the unrelated topic of greener cities (control condition). Before the experimental intervention, we used a one-item screening question to exclude participants who held positive attitudes toward Turks to begin with. Both directly after the experimental intervention (T1) and in a posttest about four weeks later (T2), prejudicial attitudes toward Turks were assessed with multi-item scales. For participants with counterattitudinal-arguments, we manipulated self-threat (low vs. high) and perceived choice (low vs. high) of the argument-generation task. The inclusion of participants' PFC (low vs. high) as a third factor resulted in a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design plus two (low vs. high PFC) control groups. Following Cialdini et al. (1995), we predicted that high choice and high self-threat would lead to dissonance-based attitude change only for high-PFC people. Our predictions are summarized in four hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: After generating counterattitudinal arguments (T1), high-PFC participants will have a lower prejudice level on the target attitude “discomfort at integrated housing” and on generalized prejudice in the high choice conditions

compared to the low choice and control conditions. For low-PFC participants, this will not be the case.

Hypothesis 2: At the posttest (T2), high-PFC participants' prejudice level (target attitude and generalized prejudice) will still be lower in the high choice conditions than in the low choice and control conditions. For low-PFC participants, this will not be the case.

Hypothesis 3: After generating counterattitudinal arguments (T1), high-PFC participants will have a lower prejudice level on the target attitude “discomfort at integrated housing” and on generalized prejudice in the high self-threat conditions compared to the low self-threat and control conditions. For low-PFC participants, this will not be the case.

Hypothesis 4: At the posttest (T2), high-PFC participants' prejudice level (target attitude and generalized prejudice) will still be lower in the high self-threat conditions than in the low self-threat and control conditions. For low-PFC participants, this will not be the case.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited in Bielefeld, Germany, during office hours in the city hall's public service area, where people came to apply for identity cards and other issues. After an initial screening (see below for detail), 202 German citizens (100 females, 102 males) participated. Their mean age was 31.78 years ($SD = 12.36$ years; range 13 to 75 years). None of the participants had a Turkish migration background, and all strata of education were included. The data of three participants were excluded from analyses because they did not follow instructions in the argument-generation task.

Procedure

Participants were led to a separate office, where they completed a screening questionnaire (ostensibly for an unrelated study). Embedded in four distractor items was the critical item “How likable do you rate Turkish people” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). Due to practical and theoretical considerations, only people who marked a value of 6 or less were included in the main study, all others were thanked and dismissed at this point.

The purpose of the "first study" (the dissonance induction part) was described to participants as analyzing the structure of argumentations. Participants' task would be to generate advantages for a particular topic and to give a little speech, thereby arguing convincingly as if the position they took was their own. At this point, participants were randomly assigned either to one of four experimental conditions (low vs. high choice by low vs. high self-threat) or to a control condition. They were then given five minutes to take notes on their assigned topic and another five minutes to speak their arguments into a microphone for tape recording. The combination of both methods had been shown to increase the dissonance aroused as compared to writing a counterattitudinal essay only (Joule, 1991). The tape recording was assumed to enhance participants' identification with the behavior.

Then participants returned to the lobby to proceed with "the second study", which involved the completion of a questionnaire – ostensibly to check the comprehensibility of questions. This questionnaire contained the dependent variables – integrated housing attitudes as well as generalized prejudice toward Turks – and the PFC scale. Finally, participants were thanked and received 5 Euros.

Three weeks after the experiment, an identical questionnaire was mailed to participants. Instructions stated that the aim of this second questionnaire was to see whether participants' opinions had changed or persisted over time. Participants were asked to indicate the date when they completed the questionnaire and to return it

anonymously in a prepaid envelope. Those participants who had indicated their interest in further information received a detailed written debriefing.

Independent Variables

Choice. In the high-choice condition, the experimenter pointed out to participants that their participation was fully voluntary and that they could leave anytime they liked without losing their reward. Furthermore, participants themselves were asked to draw the topic for their speech from a box. In the low-choice condition, participants were not reminded that their participation was voluntary and received their assigned topic from the experimenter.

Self-threat. In the high self-threat condition, participants read that in order to increase the integration of Turks, segregated housing of Germans and Turks should be reduced. They were asked to imagine that they lived in an apartment building where the apartment next to their own was going to be let to a Turkish family. In the low self-threat condition, participants learned that the Netherlands were considering a law supporting integrated housing. Specifically, apartment buildings should be shared by families of different origins, so that Turkish people would live next to Dutch people. In both the high and low self-threat conditions, participants' task was to produce a convincing speech pointing out the advantages of the respective measure.

Control condition. Participants in the control condition were informed about an initiative to plant more greenery in cities. For example, more parks should be created and more trees planted at roadsides. Control participants were asked to generate a convincing speech arguing for the described initiative.

Preference for consistency. PFC was assessed along with the dependent variables. To keep the number of items manageable, we pretested all items (Heitland & Bohner, 2009) and employed only those items with the highest item-to-total correlations (all > .32) in our main study. Based on a German translation of the 18-item PFC Scale

(Cialdini et al., 1995), we thus used 15 items, scale from 1, *do not agree at all*, to 7, *agree completely*. The overall scale mean was 5.13 ($SD = 0.82$); $\alpha = .84$. Participants' PFC scores were independent of conditions, as shown by a oneway ANOVA across the four conditions of the factorial design plus the control condition, $F(4, 195) = 1.162$, $p > .33$. High versus low levels of PFC could thus be used as an additional independent variable for further analyses. A median split ($Mdn = 5.18$) yielded a low-PFC group ($M = 4.50$, $SD = 0.54$) and a high-PFC group ($M = 5.76$, $SD = 0.44$).

Dependent Variables

Target attitude: Discomfort at integrated housing. On a 7-point scale ranging from 1, *do not agree at all*, to 7, *agree completely*, three items measured attitude change on the target attitude (e.g., "Turks as neighbours are comfortable for me"). Two items stem from the modern and traditional racism scale ((McConahay, 1986) and one item from the xenophobia items of the GMF surveys (see below for details about these scales). A factor analysis confirmed a one-factor solution which accounted for 65 % of the variance. Therefore, we merged the three items into one scale to measure attitude change on the target attitude discomfort at integrated housing ($M = 2.54$, $SD = 1.16$, $\alpha = 0.74$).

Prejudice against Turks. To cover different forms and contents of generalized prejudice against Turks, we used and later aggregated five measures. Where necessary, items were translated and adapted to the German context and the target group of Turks. On the basis of a pretest (Heitland & Bohner, 2009) we used seven items of the Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale (McConahay, 1986); scale from 1, *do not agree at all*, to 7, *agree completely*. These were averaged to form an index of *racism* ($M = 2.78$, $SD = 0.92$; Cronbach's $\alpha = .72$).

Based on different versions of scales measuring social distance (e.g. Byrnes & Kiger, 1988; Crandall, 1991), we developed two scales composed of 8 items each.

Participants indicated on 7-point scales how much it would bother them if, for example, their neighbor were Turkish. The same evaluations were made for German targets. The differences between the mean judgments for Turks versus Germans were averaged to create an index of *social distance* (possible range of the difference score -6 to +6, with positive values indicating greater distance toward Turks; $M = +1.25$, $SD = 1.49$; $\alpha = .89$).

Items designed to measure xenophobia and discriminatory behavior, respectively, were taken from representative survey studies (Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006; GMF-Survey, see Heitmeyer, 2007). Seven items (e.g., “Too many Turks live in Germany”) were averaged to form an index of *xenophobia* ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.14$; $\alpha = .84$), and four items (e.g., “I would never buy a car from a Turkish person”) were averaged to form an index of *discriminatory behavior* ($M = 2.93$, $SD = 1.29$; $\alpha = .69$); scales from 1, *do not agree at all*, to 7, *agree completely*.

To address the cognitive side of prejudice (on the basis of the Prejudice Index, s. Bobo & Kluegel, 1993), we asked participants to rate Turks and Germans, respectively, on 5 dimensions (e.g., hard-working vs. lazy). The mean difference between item scores related to Turks versus Germans was used as an index of *stereotypic beliefs* ($M = 0.83$, $SD = 0.94$; $\alpha = .63$). The items of all scales were presented in a random order, except for the items assessing social distance and stereotypic beliefs. In these cases, the items were presented together because of their different format. Only data from participants who answered at least half of the items of each scale were included in further analyses. This criterion led to the exclusion of one case from the PFC scale, and one case from the racism scale. We used listwise deletion of cases to cope with missing data.

For further analysis, each of the five scales, reduced by the three items that were used to measure the target attitude, was z -standardized and then averaged to form an index of *generalized prejudice* against Turks ($M = 0.00$, $SD = 0.78$; $\alpha = .84$).

Results

Preliminary Analyses of Participants' Written Notes and Audiotaped Speeches

The content of the audiotaped speeches was rated by two independent judges who were blind to condition. Effective interjudge reliabilities were satisfactory, ranging from $\alpha = .59$ to $\alpha = .82$; therefore judge's ratings were averaged. As expected, participants in the high self-threat conditions referred to their own personal situation more ($M = 2.10$) than did participants in the low self-threat conditions ($M = 1.15$), scale from 1, *does not apply at all*, to 7, *applies completely*, $F(1,153) = 36.19$, $p < .001$, whereas the choice manipulation did not affect participants' references to their own situation, $F(1,153) = 0.21$, $p = .65$. Conversely, participants in the low self-threat conditions referred to the Netherlands more ($M = 2.60$) than did participants in the high self-threat conditions ($M = 1.00$), $F(1,153) = 108.47$, $p < .001$, whereas the choice manipulation again had no effect, $F(1,153) = 1.03$, $p = .31$. In sum, judges' assessments of the tape recordings suggest that the manipulation of self-threat was successful and that participants followed instructions.

There were no differences between conditions in participants' initial liking of Turks based on the screening item ($M = 4.52$, $SD = 1.18$) in a oneway ANOVA, $F(4, 197) = 0.92$, $p = .45$. Also, initial prejudice level was uncorrelated with PFC, $r = -0.06$, $p = .38$ ($N = 200$).

Main Analyses

In $2 \times 2 \times 2$ ANOVAs, we examined the main effects and interactions of choice, self-threat, and PFC on the target attitude "discomfort at integrated housing" as well as on generalized prejudice¹. We complement these analyses with focused comparisons between specific experimental conditions and the control conditions. Where homogeneity of variances was in doubt ($p < .05$, Levene test), t -tests were computed based on separate variance estimates. As appropriate to the hypotheses, separate

analyses were computed for the dependent variables assessed immediately after the experimental manipulations (T1) and assessed at the posttest (T2). At T2, 97 participants (47 males, 50 females) returned completed questionnaires, and did so on average 28 days after the experiment ($SD = 7.54$, $Mdn = 24.00$, mode = 22). The means and standard deviations at T1 and T2 of discomfort at integrated housing and generalized prejudice, respectively, are shown in Tables 1 and 2.

(Tables 1 and 2 about here)

Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2: Prejudice reduction as a result of high choice.

Regarding the choice manipulation, we had predicted greater dissonance and, thus, greater attitude change for high-PFC participants in the high-choice conditions (Hypothesis 1). At T1, the predicted interaction between choice and PFC was marginally significant on the target attitude, $F(1, 151) = 3.59$, $p = 0.06$, as well as on the generalized prejudice scale, $F(1, 153) = 2.79$, $p = 0.10$, indicating a somewhat lower prejudice level in the high choice conditions ($M_{\text{target attitude}} = 2.09$ and $M_{\text{generalized prejudice}} = -.15$) than the low choice conditions ($M_{\text{target attitude}} = 2.50$ and $M_{\text{generalized prejudice}} = .16$) for high-PFC participants, $t(81.42) = 1.85$, $p = .07$ and $t(77.81) = 1.79$, $p = .08$, respectively. Low-PFC people's prejudice level was similar in the high choice ($M_{\text{target attitude}} = 2.68$ and $M_{\text{generalized prejudice}} = -.01$) and low choice ($M_{\text{target attitude}} = 2.42$ and $M_{\text{generalized prejudice}} = -.14$) conditions, $t(73) = 0.95$, $p = .35$ and $t(74) = 0.74$, $p = .46$, respectively. Neither on the target attitude nor on generalized prejudice did a main effect of choice emerge for T2, $ps > .50$. Also, no main effect of PFC occurred, $ps > .16$. At T2, contrary to Hypothesis 2, the ANOVA did not indicate any main or PFC x choice interaction effect, $ps > .20$.

In planned comparisons we further investigated the difference between high choice and the control conditions. We will first report results for the target attitude and will turn to generalized prejudice next. In line with Hypothesis 1, directly after the experimental manipulation (T1) high-PFC participants in the high-choice conditions reported lower discomfort at integrated housing (target attitude, $M = 2.09$) than did high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = 3.22$), $t(94) = 3.49$, $p = .001$, $d = 1.10$. At T2, the effect was still in the same direction but not significant, $t(47) = 1.56$, $p = .13$, $d = 0.63$, with high-PFC participants in the high-choice conditions reporting lower discomfort ($M = 2.18$) than high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = 3.00$); see *Table 1*.

On the generalized prejudice measure focused comparisons again showed that at T1 high-PFC participants in the high-choice conditions reported marginally lower generalized prejudice ($M = -.15$) than did high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = .32$), $t(21.5) = 1.91$, $p = .07$, $d = 0.66$. At T2, an effect of similar magnitude and in the same direction was still present, with high-PFC participants in the high-choice conditions reporting lower generalized prejudice ($M = -.20$) than high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = .26$); see *Table 2*. However, the effect at T2 was not significant, $t(11.0) = 1.46$, $p = .17$, $d = 0.63$, which may be due to a lack of power, given the much smaller sample size and the fact that the two effect sizes at T1 ($d = 0.66$) and T2 ($d = 0.63$) are almost identical. Hypothesis 2 thus received only qualified support.

Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4: Prejudice reduction as a result of high self-threat.

At T1, the ANOVA indicated an interaction effect of self-threat and PFC only for generalized prejudice, $F(1, 153) = 3.84$, $p = 0.05$, whereas this effect did not reach significance on the target attitude “discomfort at integrated housing”, $F(1, 151) = 1.83$, $p = .019$: In line with Hypothesis 3, high-PFC participants showed lower generalized prejudice in the high self-threat conditions ($M = -.16$) than in the low self-threat

conditions ($M = .20$), $t(83) = 2.01$, $p = .05$, whereas low-PFC participants' prejudice level did not differ between the high self-threat conditions ($M = .01$) and the low self-threat conditions ($M = -.14$), $t(74) = 0.81$, $p = .42$. No main effect of self-threat emerged at T1, $p > .45$. At T2, contrary to Hypothesis 4, no effects on generalized prejudice involving self-threat were found, all $ps > .21$.

At T2, a direct effect of self-threat occurred on the target attitude, $F(1, 64) = 6.71$, $p = .001$, which was qualified by a marginal 3-way interaction of self-threat, choice and PFC, $F(1, 64) = 3.05$, $p = .009$. Regarding high-PFC participants, effects of the dissonance induction were strongest in the high choice, high self-threat condition ($M = 1.78$), followed by high choice, low self-threat ($M = 2.52$) and low choice, high self-threat conditions ($M = 2.60$) and least strong in the low choice, low self-threat condition ($M = 2.82$). In the low-PFC group means seem to randomly differ between conditions, showing the lowest discomfort at integrated housing for the low choice, high self-threat condition ($M = 1.83$), followed by high choice, high self-threat ($M = 2.47$), high choice, low self-threat ($M = 2.71$) and least by low choice, low self-threat ($M = 3.45$), see *Table 1*. This effect was not in line with our hypothesis, therefore, we explore effects in focused comparisons against the control group.

In planned comparisons we examined the contrast between the high self-threat and control conditions for high-PFC people on the target attitude: At T1, high-PFC participants in the high self-threat conditions reported lower discomfort at integrated housing ($M = 2.13$) than did high-PFC people in the control condition ($M = 3.22$), $t(94) = 3.46$, $p = .001$, $d = 1.01$. At T2, the direction of this effect was in the same direction, with high PFC-people in the high self-threat conditions still reporting less discomfort at integrated housing ($M = 2.21$) than high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = 3.00$), $t(47) = 1.47$, $p = .15$, $d = 0.53$.

Planned contrasts of high-PFC participants on the generalized prejudice measure at T1 yielded that high-PFC participants in the high self-threat conditions reported a marginally lower generalized prejudice ($M = -.16$) than did high-PFC people in the control condition ($M = .32$), $t(23.4) = 1.96$, $p = .06$, $d = 0.60$. At T2, the direction of this effect was the same and similar in magnitude, with high PFC-people in the high self-threat conditions still reporting lower generalized prejudice ($M = -.29$) than high-PFC participants in the control condition ($M = .26$); see *Table 2*. However, the effect was not significant, $t(15.1) = 1.52$, $p = .15$, $d = 0.60$, possibly due to the smaller sample size. Hypothesis 4 thus received only qualified support.

Prejudice reduction as a result of high self-threat and high choice. We explored the way in which choice, self-threat and PFC interacted. On the target attitude “discomfort at integrated housing” a marginal 3-way interaction occurred (see above). There was no 3-way interaction on generalized prejudice, $F(1,153) = 0.04$, $p = .84$, which indicates that the effects of choice and self-threat were additive on the level of generalized prejudice. This finding leads us to expect the highest dissonance and thus highest attitude change for high-PFC people in the high choice, high self-threat condition and therefore the greatest attitudinal difference if we compare this condition with the control condition. As expected, we found the lowest generalized prejudice level for high-PFC people in the high self-threat / high choice condition ($M = -.32$) compared to high-PFC people in the control condition ($M = .32$), $t(22.0) = 2.68$, $p = .01$, $d = 0.96$. The observed effect size was large (Cohen, 1988) and thus important for interventions. As a tendency, this effect was still present at T2, $t(11.3) = 2.06$, $p = .07$, $d = 0.97$, showing that high-PFC people in the high choice / high self-threat condition tended to have a lower prejudice level ($M = -.43$) than high-PFC people in the control condition ($M = .26$).

Discussion

We studied the effectiveness of an experimental dissonance paradigm in reducing specific prejudice (in line with the advocated position) and more generalized prejudice at different levels of PFC. Results indicated that when high-PFC participants argued for a counterattitudinal position under high choice or high self-threat, they changed their attitude in the advocated direction. We observed this change on the target attitude (discomfort at integrated housing) as well as on an aggregated measure of generalized prejudice, stereotypes, and discriminatory behavior intentions against Turks. Hence, effects on the target attitude show that dissonance was reduced by replacing dissonant cognitions with consonant ones, which allowed participants to reduce the inconsistency between their prior attitude and their subsequent acting (favoring multicultural living situations). On the other hand, the effects on generalized prejudice indicate that additional cognitive restructuring (cf. Hardyck & Kardush, 1968) led to a change in prejudicial attitudes that were more remote from the topic of the counterattitudinal speech.

However, effects on the target attitude as well as on generalized prejudice emerged for high-PFC participants only. Our study thus provides strong evidence for the moderating role of preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995) in a typical dissonance paradigm (induced compliance). Therefore, this study extends the range of individual-difference variables that have been shown to moderate social influence processes (e.g., need for cognition, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; personal need for structure, Neberg & Newsom, 1993; need for cognitive closure, Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Whereas there might be an overlap between PFC and some of these constructs, PFC enhances the predictability of processes that are driven by cognitive consistency mechanisms.

Because assessment of the PFC values before the experiment might have primed consistent acting in participants, we assessed PFC directly after the dissonance induction task. This involved the risk of PFC values being affected by the experimental conditions. Although analyses showed that this was not the case in our data, an optimal strategy might be to assess PFC in a separate session before the experiment (cf. Cialdini et al., 1995).

In addition, although not present in the current data, we discovered in a different study that high PFC was also associated with a higher prejudice level on our generalized prejudice measure (Heitland, Bohner, & Reinecke, 2009). In the current study high-PFC and low-PFC people in the control condition did not differ, $F(1, 39) = 2.10, p = .16$, presumably because of the pre-selection of participants based on their prejudice level. Whereas this side of PFC should be examined in future research, it has important practical implications for the current study. High-PFC people also had a higher prejudice level and were the prime targets for our dissonance-based intervention. People who are high in PFC are thus not only more likely to change their prejudiced attitudes as a means of reducing dissonance, they are also more likely to hold prejudiced attitudes to begin with. Although this is a fortunate constellation from an applied perspective, future basic research is needed to disentangle the relative contributions of PFC versus higher prejudice levels per se on the extent of attitude change.

Furthermore, we manipulated choice and self-threat of the topic. Whereas the importance of choice has been demonstrated in numerous dissonance studies (review, see Cooper & Fazio, 1984, pp. 236-237), the importance of self-threat was not examined as thoroughly. Participants in our high self-threat conditions imagined that they would live next to a Turkish family in an apartment building, and although they were at least moderately prejudiced, they presented advantages of such integrated housing. This behavior and the imagination of this situation might not only affect a

participant's self-concept (cf. Steele & Liu, 1983; Steele, 1988) but might also be threatening to participants, because in the imagined situation the aversive contact with the outgroup is very close. Whereas threat in prejudice research is normally seen as a factor that increases prejudice (cf. integrated threat theory; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), in our study the imagination of a situation that might include symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes combined with the subsequent generation of arguments advocating integration led to a decrease in prejudice.

Stability and Size of Effects

The delayed posttest enabled us to test the temporal stability of dissonance-induced change in prejudiced attitudes. A remarkable finding was that most effects of counterattitudinal advocacy under high choice or high self-threat on high-PFC people's attitudes (target attitude and generalized prejudice) were still present after 4 weeks to about the same extent as immediately after the experimental treatment. Because of the smaller sample size at T2 (response rate was only about 50 %) these results failed to reach significance. However, for high-PFC people the effect sizes of high choice, high self-threat compared to the control condition were large (Cohen, 1988) and similar in size at T1 and T2. Also, effect sizes were comparably high for the target attitude and for generalized prejudice. Hence, the current study provides suggestive evidence that the application of dissonance theory can lead to a lasting and generalized reduction of prejudice under suitable conditions (choice, self-threat) and for certain people (high PFC).

A methodological limitation for the interpretation of the posttest responses might be seen in the way we explained the purpose of the posttest to participants. We stated that we investigated if participants' attitudes would change over time or be consistent. This might have led high-PFC people to answer consistently with their previous answers. However, as our questionnaire contained 112 questions overall and

participants responded to it about 4 weeks after the experiment, it appears unlikely that high-PFC people would have been able to remember their initial answers. Nonetheless, using more neutral instructions would be preferable in future studies.

Practical Implications for Prejudice Reduction

The current study demonstrates that a reduction of prejudice is possible through the application of cognitive dissonance interventions and that effects are empirically meaningful. Results indicate that the effects of counterattitudinal advocacy worked only under certain conditions (high choice and high self-threat) and for certain people (those who score high on PFC). In addition, high-PFC people have been shown to be higher in prejudice in a follow-up experiment (Heitland et al., 2009), and may thus be more suitable targets for applied interventions aimed at reducing prejudice. Our results and previous research thus indicate that intervention programs considering a dissonance-based approach may be able to maximize their effectiveness by applying the right situational conditions (e.g., high choice), but more importantly by pre-screening their target population for high levels of PFC.

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¹ We also calculated a regression analysis with choice and self-threat as categorical and PFC as a continuous predictors. Results were similar but weaker. The reason for this discrepancy in results may be that the dissonance-arousing effects of counterattitudinal advocacy are not linearly increasing from very low to very high levels of PFC (as assumed in a linear regression approach); instead, our hypothesis is that effects are generally absent at low levels of PFC, whereas a relatively high level of PFC is necessary for these effects to emerge. A median-split approach thus seems to be more congenial to our hypothesis. Further the median-split approach is consistent and enhances comparability with the analysis strategies reported in previous research on PFC (e.g., Cialdini et al., 1995; Nail et al., 2001).

Table 1

Mean values on the target attitude, "discomfort at integrated housing", for high-PFC and low-PFC participants, standard deviations (*SD*) in brackets, below participants per cell (*N*).

| | High choice, high self- threat | High choice, low self- threat | Low choice, high self- threat | Low choice, low self- threat | Control condition |
|----------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| T1: | 1.97 ^a | 2.24 ^{ab} | 2.29 ^{ab} | 2.71 ^{bc} | 3.22 ^c |
| High-PFC | (.86) | (1.00) | (1.14) | (1.05) | (1.27) |
| | 22 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 15 |
| T2: | 1.78 | 2.52 | 2.60 | 2.82 | 3.00 |
| High-PFC | (.53) | (1.11) | (1.66) | (1.30) | (1.84) |
| | 9 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 9 |
| T1: | 2.78 | 2.59 | 2.45 | 2.39 | 2.87 |
| Low-PFC | (1.14) | (1.19) | (1.27) | (1.12) | (1.28) |
| | 17 | 23 | 17 | 18 | 26 |
| T2: | 2.47 ^a | 2.71 ^{ab} | 1.83 ^a | 3.45 ^b | 2.60 ^{ab} |
| Low-PFC | (0.84) | (.59) | (.79) | (0.79) | (.86) |
| | 5 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 14 |

Note. Higher values indicate a higher prejudice level. Means not sharing a superscript differ at $p < .05$ (Duncan test).

Table 2

Mean values on the generalized prejudice measure for high-PFC and low-PFC participants, standard deviations (*SD*) in brackets, below participants per cell (*N*).

| | High choice, high self- threat | High choice, low self- threat | Low choice, high self- threat | Low choice, low self- threat | Control condition |
|----------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|----------------------|
| T1: | -.32 ^a | .06 ^{ab} | .01 ^{ab} | .31 ^b | .32 ^b |
| High-PFC | (.54) | (.77) | (.99) | (.89) | (.89) |
| | 23 | 18 | 22 | 22 | 15 |
| T2: | -.42 | -.01 | -.17 | .21 | .26 |
| High-PFC | (.42) | (.71) | (1.25) | (1.03) | (.90) |
| | 9 | 11 | 10 | 13 | 9 |
| T1: | .02 | -.04 | -.02 | -.26 | -.01 |
| Low-PFC | (.59) | (.94) | (.77) | (.65) | (.67) |
| | 17 | 23 | 17 | 19 | 26 |
| T2: | .31 | -.12 | -.39 | .29 | -.16 |
| Low-PFC | (.39) | (.74) | (.29) | (1.16) | (.72) |
| | 5 | 13 | 4 | 7 | 14 |

Note. Higher values indicate a higher prejudice level. Means not sharing a superscript differ at $p < .05$ (Duncan test).

IV. Manuskript 3

”Preference for Consistency, Prejudice and Right-wing authoritarianism”

Betreff: European Journal of Personality - Manuscript # EJP-09-778

Von: marcoperugini.ejp@gmail.com

Datum: Fri, 02 Oct 2009 05:46:31 -0400 (EDT)

An: kirsten.heitland@uni-bielefeld.de

CC: marcoperugini.ejp@gmail.com

Dear Mrs. Heitland:

Your manuscript entitled "Preference for consistency, prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism" has been successfully submitted online and is presently being given full consideration for publication in the European Journal of Personality.

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
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Running title: PFC, PREJUDICE AND RIGHT-WING AUTHORITARIANISM

Preference for Consistency, Prejudice and Right-wing authoritarianism

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Abstract

Preference for consistency (PFC) is a personality variable that represents people's susceptibility to consistency effects. The present research extends this perspective by investigating the role of PFC in prejudice and its underlying dimensions right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). Authoritarians avoid inconsistent and ambiguous information. Furthermore, prejudice and stereotypes serve to simplify social perception. Therefore, RWA and prejudice were predicted to be positively related to PFC, whereas no relation between PFC and SDO was predicted. In a correlational study ($N = 195$), PFC was positively related to prejudice and RWA but not to SDO. Furthermore, PFC partially mediated the relationship between RWA and prejudice. Implications for the conceptualization of PFC and prospects for future research are discussed.

119 words

Keywords: PFC; preference for consistency; RWA; right-wing authoritarianism; tolerance for ambiguity; consistency;

Preference for Consistency, Prejudice and Right-wing authoritarianism

Theories of cognitive consistency have a history of more than 50 years. The most prominent ones are cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957, 1964) and balance theory (Heider, 1946, 1958). Their common assumption is that people strive for consistency among their cognitions. Although numerous studies have supported this assumption, consistency effects often cannot be robustly replicated (Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995). In order to account for these difficulties, researchers have proposed that people may vary in the extent to which they strive for cognitive consistency (Cohen, 1960). This personality trait – a need for cognitive consistency – should characterize individuals who are especially susceptible to the experimental consistency paradigms used.

Recently, in order to resolve the ongoing problems in demonstrating consistency effects, Cialdini et al. (1995) introduced the personality trait Preference for Consistency (PFC, Cialdini et al., 1995) and a scale for its measurement which should account for error variance in consistency paradigms. Items of the PFC scale address three kinds of consistency: the preference to be consistent, the preference to appear consistent, and the preference for others to be consistent. However, this theoretical distinction between three consistency motivations was not empirically investigated further. Instead, Cialdini et al. (1995) treated PFC as a unidimensional construct and showed in three typical consistency paradigms (the anticipated-interaction paradigm, the foot-in-the-door technique, and the counterattitudinal advocacy paradigm) that consistency effects arose only for people who scored high on the entire PFC scale. More recently, the role of PFC as a moderator variable in the reduction of prejudice based on the induction of cognitive dissonance was investigated (Heitland & Bohner, 2009). German participants who indicated relatively low liking for Turks wrote a counterattitudinal

argumentation favoring the integration of Turks and later spoke their arguments into a microphone. In the conditions where participants performed this behavior under high (vs. low) choice and where the topic integration of Turks had high (vs. low) personal relevance, participants' prejudice level was decreased. Importantly, however, these effects were observed only for people with high (vs. low) preference for consistency (Heitland & Bohner, 2009), attesting once more to the role of PFC as a moderator of dissonance effects.

In this study we will present a German version of the PFC scale and further investigate its convergent validity. Specifically, we explore whether PFC is associated with prejudice and some of its underlying dimensions: social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and / or right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998). First, we give a short overview of both concepts, RWA and SDO, and report some empirical findings about their relationship with prejudice, before turning to theoretical considerations of their relatedness with PFC.

SDO, RWA, and prejudice

Social dominance orientation is conceptualized as a generalized orientation toward and desire for unequal and dominant/subordinate relations among salient social groups, regardless of whether this implies ingroup subordination or domination (Sidanius, Levin, Federico, & Pratto, 2001, p. 312). High SDO causes people to endorse stereotypes of outgroups which in turn lead to negative attitudes toward members of those groups.

Whereas SDO focuses on hierarchical relations among groups independent of the view of ingroup authority figures (Pratto et al., 1994), these authorities play a crucial role in the conception of authoritarianism. Authoritarianism was originally developed by Adorno (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) who conceived the California F-scale for its measurement. Later the construct was methodologically as well as conceptually advanced by Altemeyer (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) who renamed the concept

“right-wing authoritarianism” and developed the RWA Scale for its measurement.

Authoritarianism is composed of three attitudinal clusters: (1) authoritarian submission, (2) authoritarian aggression, and (3) conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1981).

RWA and SDO can be regarded as strong predictors of racism (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). For example, RWA and SDO equally predicted blatant prejudice, biological racism, symbolic racism, aversive racism, and ethnocentrism in a heterogeneous Flemish sample, whereas subtle prejudice was positively related to RWA only (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2005). Hence, both independently contribute to the prediction of prejudice (e.g., Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008; Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004). Further, both constructs have been shown to correlate only weakly (e.g., Altemeyer, 1988, 1998; McFarland, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996)¹. Compared to North America, the relationship between SDO and RWA was found to be higher in Europe (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002).

Relatedness of RWA and PFC

The research findings cited above suggest that RWA and SDO are powerful predictors of prejudice. But how are they associated with PFC?

There are some hints in the research literature that suggest a relationship between PFC and authoritarianism: For example, a major characteristic of authoritarian people is their tendency to engage in simple, black-and-white thinking which leads to a denial of existing emotional ambiguity and ambivalence (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949). High RWA should lead to the rejection, distortion, or denial of inconsistent stimuli (Miller & Rokeach, 1968).

Authoritarians engage in simplistic thinking (Rokeach, 1960) and should thus seek to structure situations in cognitively consistent and simple ways (Miller & Rokeach, 1968).

Duriez and van Hiel (2002) found a positive correlation between authoritarianism and the values tradition, conformity, and security (Pratto et al., 1994). Hence, high RWA-people and

high-PFC people share a preference for consistency in situations because consistent situations facilitate simplistic thinking and ambiguous or ambivalent stimuli do not have to be denied. Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez (2004, p. 825) argue that authoritarians have this need to simplify reality in order to be able to understand it and have cognitive control over it.

In their dual-process model, Duckitt and colleagues (2002) analyzed on which level RWA and SDO are situated and how they are influenced by underlying dimensions. Duckitt et al. regard both constructs as social attitudes or ideological belief dimensions which predict ideological and intergroup phenomena (Duckitt et al., 2002; McFarland, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). RWA and SDO are influenced by underlying motivational goals which are, in turn, affected by generalized world views. Following Duckitt et al. (2002), RWA is affected by the motivational goal of stability, security and social control. This motivational goal is, however, activated by the view of the world as threatening and dangerous, which is influenced by a high dispositional social conformity. This world view leads high RWA people to dislike and fear the outgroup because the outgroup threatens the social or group order and security. The dual-process model was supported in the context of ethnic persecution: Authoritarians persecute immigrants who refuse to assimilate into the dominant culture, because this threatens ingroup conformity (Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008). Stability, security, and social control as the motivational goals underlying RWA are closely connected to a dispositional preference for consistency: If someone is acting in a consistent way and he/she can also predict other people's behavior, the individual perceives the social world as stable. Therefore, we expect a positive relation between the constructs preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995) and authoritarianism. However, there are no indicators for the causal direction of effects: Does PFC affect RWA or vice versa? By the means of structural equation modeling we will explore how these variables affect each other.

Authoritarianism, tolerance of ambiguity and PFC. Intolerance of ambiguity can be defined as “the tendency to perceive (i.e. interpret) ambiguous situations as sources of threat”;

whereas tolerance of ambiguity can be defined as “the tendency to perceive ambiguous situations as desirable” (Budner, 1962, p. 29). Ambiguous situations are characterized by novelty, complexity, or insolubility.

Several researchers found an association between tolerance of ambiguity and authoritarianism (Harvey, 1962; Miller & Rokeach, 1968; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Steiner & Johnson, 1963). For example, Steiner and Johnson (1963) investigated how high versus low authoritarians (California F-scale) dealt with inconsistent behavior. Participants were confronted with two confederates. Both confederates were presented in a favorable light initially, which was supported by results from a pretest. One confederate then interacted with each participant in a favorable way, which was consistent with the previous impression. The other confederate acted in a negative way that conflicted with the earlier impression. In posttest ratings participants with high scores on the California F-scale did not change their ratings of either confederate, whereas participants with low values on the California F-scale significantly lowered their ratings of the second confederate who acted inconsistently. Thus, authoritarians did not include the later inconsistent behavioral information in their judgment of the second confederate but disregarded the inconsistent information.

This effect was also found in the perception of inconsistencies in self-descriptions (Harvey, 1962): Participants with high and low scores on the California F-scale were provided with two fictitious ratings of themselves (like friendliness and sincerity) which were inconsistent. One allegedly was provided by a friend and the other one by a stranger. After participants had received the two ostensible ratings of their personality, they rated themselves again. A negative correlation between authoritarianism and change in self-ratings indicated that the higher the authoritarianism scores the less change was found in self-ratings. Furthermore, authoritarians reported a lowered estimation of how well participants knew the source; they also denied that the source was angry with participants and that the source had made the negative ratings. Therefore, people high in authoritarianism held off threatening

aspects of the inconsistent information to maintain their initial rating of themselves. These studies show that authoritarians possess a lower tolerance of ambiguity and inconsistency if this information is needed to assess themselves and others (Miller & Rokeach, 1968; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973). A study by Feather (1969) further indicates that high intolerant and high dogmatic participants prefer to receive familiar and consistent information over novel and inconsistent information.

Authoritarianism, PFC and prejudice. The studies cited above underline the theoretical relatedness of authoritarianism, intolerance of ambiguity, and PFC: Both intolerance of ambiguity and PFC imply that people high on these dimensions strive for consistent information and avoid inconsistent, ambiguous information. These attributes make a relationship to prejudice and stereotypes obvious because prejudice and stereotypes are a means to understand the world more easily and in consistent patterns. Stereotypes prevent an overload and disorientation as a cause of the constant gush of information (e.g., Hornsey, 2008). Prejudice and stereotypes in the form of discrete social categories allow people to make generalized evaluations that do not take individual differences into account and thus structure and simplify the interaction with people from a different group (cf. Brewer, 2007). Further, it was shown that stereotypes based expectancies can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies (Hamilton, Sherman, & Ruvolo, 1990). Self-fulfilling prophecies, in turn, represent events which are consistent with one's expectancies – feeding one's motive for consistency. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship of PFC with prejudice and stereotypes.

Relatedness of SDO and PFC

We assumed a positive relationship between PFC and prejudice and have therefore already elaborated on RWA and SDO as important predictors for prejudice. We found theoretical indicators of a relationship between PFC and RWA. Consequently, we turn to the relationship between PFC and SDO next. We found no hints in the current social

psychological literature which make an association between SDO and PFC reasonable: Getting back to the dual-process model (Duckitt et al., 2002) in which RWA and SDO are influenced by underlying motivational goals, SDO is affected by the motivational goal of power, superiority and dominance over others. The underlying worldview of toughmindedness is characterized by being hard, ruthless and unfeeling for others. This worldview leads people with high scores on toughmindedness to perceive the world as a competitive jungle “in which the strong wins and the weak loses” (Duckitt et al., 2002, p. 77; cf. Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Therefore, prejudice based on SDO leads to the contempt and impairment of outgroups because they are perceived as being subordinate, incompetent and worthless. Neither the concept of social dominance orientation nor the dimensions underlying SDO share components with PFC in terms of its content. Hence we assume that PFC is not related to SDO.

In sum, our theoretical reasoning leads to the following assumptions: Authoritarianism is a predictor of prejudice and is further related to a preference for consistency. Therefore a positive relationship between PFC and RWA as well as prejudice is to be assumed. Although SDO is a predictor of prejudice, however, we do not predict a connection between PFC and SDO.

Construction of the German preference for consistency scale

We build on a German version of the PFC-scale provided by Felser and Wolfradt (2002a). We modified two formulations because they were ambiguous or too restricted: we added “behavior” in the formulation of item 14 (“I would like *the behavior* of my close friends to be predictable”) and replaced the words “two contradictory” into “mutually contradictory” in the formulation of item 17 (“I dislike having *mutually contradictory* convictions”), see Appendix.

Scale validation

To assess the construct validity of the PFC scale, we analyzed its social desirability bias and its association with other constructs. In line with Cialdini et al. (1995) we expected no significant relation with social desirability. Further, previous investigations in our lab suggest a positive relationship between PFC and prejudice. In the current study the content of the items to measure prejudice focused on Turks because they are the largest migrant group in Germany (2.495.000 people, Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006) and are often victims of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Pettigrew et al., 1998; Wagner & Zick, 1997). We will explore the relationship between PFC and prejudice and also consider the generalized attitude dimensions RWA and SDO as constructs underlying prejudice. We assumed PFC to be related to RWA and prejudice but not to SDO.

Method

Sample. 195 citizens (94 male, 101 female) of a mid-sized German town participated. Their average age was 32.31 years (SD = 11.99, range: 14 to 78), none indicated that their parents were of Turkish origin. Participants' educational levels varied widely² with a bias toward higher education levels.

Procedure. From April 24, 2007, to May 6, 2007, participants were randomly recruited in a German mid-size town, during office hours in the city hall's public service area, where people came to apply for identity cards and other issues. Participants learned that they would be taking part in a study about attitudes toward different aspects of society and completed the questionnaire individually in a separate room. At the end of each study participants received 5,- Euros and were debriefed.

Measures

PFC. The German preference for consistency scale (on the basis of Felser & Wolfradt, 2002a) consisted of 18 items paralleling the English original. Item 18 was reverse coded. Item wordings are displayed in the appendix.

Social desirability. Six items of the impression management scale (Musch, Brockhaus, & Bröder, 2002) were used as a measure of social desirability (e.g., “Sometimes I lie, if I have to”), $M = 3.61$ ($SD = 1.27$). The scale had a satisfactory internal consistency of $\alpha = .64$, which is similar to the internal consistency of the original 10-item scale reported by Musch et al. (2002). In different studies Musch et al. yielded an internal consistency between .67 to .69.

Prejudice. Four scales for the measurement of prejudice were employed. The items of the *Modern and Old Fashioned Racism Scale* (McConahay, 1986) were translated by the authors and adapted to the context of discrimination against Turks (a consequence was that one item of each subscale was deleted). Further, the item “Generally, do you feel Blacks are smarter, not as smart or about as smart as Whites” was not used, because its content was already mentioned in a different scale³. A factor analysis⁴ did not support the theoretically proposed separation of modern and old fashioned racism into two factors. Therefore, we merged these items into a single 9-item *racism* scale, $M = 3.06$, $SD = 0.96$), which provided a satisfactory reliability, $\alpha = .76$.

In line with different versions of scales to measure social distance (e.g., Byrnes & Kiger, 1988; Crandall, 1991), we developed two subscales that contained 8 items each. Participants were asked to indicate how much it would bother them if their neighbor (general practitioner, nurse, colleague at work, supervisor, babysitter, new flame, son-in-law/daughter-in-law) were a Turkish woman or man, 7-point scale (1 = it does not bother me at all, 7 = bothers me very much). The same evaluations were made for German women and men. The differences between the mean judgments for Turks and the respective judgments for Germans were calculated and their mean used as a measure of social distance ($M = 1.20$, $SD = 1.53$). A

factor analysis of the social distance difference scores indicated a one-factor solution, $\alpha = .95$.

These prejudice measures were supplemented by survey items assessing general prejudice toward foreigners in Germany (Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007), where the word “foreigner” was replaced by “Turk”. Eight items from the area xenophobia were used (e.g., “Too many Turks are living in Germany”) and four items from the area discriminatory behavioral intentions (e.g., “I would never buy a car from a Turkish person”). A factor analysis supported a single-factor solution for each scale. The mean of the scales were 2.89 and 2.52 ($SD = 1.38$ and $SD = 1.23$) and their internal consistencies were $\alpha = .90$ and $\alpha = .69$, respectively.

SDO and RWA. To measure social dominance orientation (Pratto et al., 1994), a German version of the SDO scale was employed (Cohrs, Kielmann, Moschner, & Maes, 2002), $M = 3.34$ ($SD = 0.94$), $\alpha = .72$. Right-wing-authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) was measured with a German version of the scale by Cohrs and colleagues (2002), $M = 2.65$ ($SD = 0.88$), $\alpha = .80$.

Unless reported otherwise, participants were asked to indicate their agreement to each item on a scale that ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).

Results

Properties of the German Preference for Consistency Scale

First, item 18 “it doesn’t bother me much if my actions are inconsistent” was reverse coded. The empirical range of the scale was from 2.06 to 6.78 (possible range from 1 to 7) suggesting a good potential to differentiate between people with high versus low preference for consistency. The mean of the scale was 4.84 ($SD = 0.79$), and the distribution of scores approached normality, Kolmogorov-Smirnov-Z (195) = 0.79, $p = .56$. No sex differences were found, $t(193) = 0.11$, $p = .91$, and the reliability of the entire scale was good for the use in empirical research, $\alpha = .82$. Item-to-total correlations ranged from .21 to .56, see Table 1.

Factor Structure of the Scale

To detect the optimal number of interpretable factors, we conducted a factor analysis of the 18 items (ML, promax rotation⁵). This analysis yielded a six-factor solution with eigenvalues 4.54, 2.13, 1.30, 1.17, 1.13, 1.01. In order to get more precise quantitative estimates of the number of factors to extract, we conducted a parallel analysis (Horn, 1965) and retained components as long as their empirical eigenvalue were greater than the 95th percentile of the distribution of corresponding random data eigenvalues (e.g., Turner, 1998; SPSS macro: O'Connor, 2000). This analysis yielded 2 components with eigenvalues higher than the ones generated by random data sets (number of random data sets generated = 2000). Based on these findings we repeated the factor analysis (ML, promax rotation) forcing 2 factors. The resulting 2-factor solution accounted for 37 % of the variance and was good to interpret. The first factor “internal and external consistency” included 13 items ($M = 5.18$, $SD = 0.84$), whereas the second factor “predictability” included the 5 remaining items ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.19$) with factor loadings $> .30$, see Table 1. Both subscales had good internal reliability, $\alpha = 0.81$ and $\alpha = .71$, respectively. The correlation between the factors was moderate to high, $r = .42$.

Construct validity: Relationship with social desirability

Cialdini and colleagues (1995) found that responses on the *PFC Scale* were not affected by social desirability. Replicating these findings, in our sample the correlation between the entire PFC scale and the impression management scale (Musch et al., 2002) was close to zero, $r = .09$, $p = .23$ ($N = 194$). Separate analysis of each factor confirmed this finding: Both the consistency factor, $r = .09$, $p = .22$ ($N = 194$), and the predictability factor were unrelated to social desirability, $r = .05$, $p = .47$ ($N = 194$).

Construct validity: Relationship of PFC with SDO, RWA and prejudice

In order to explore the relationship between prejudice, SDO, RWA, and PFC, we use structural equation modeling. In a first step we evaluated two measurement models, one for prejudice and its components, the other for the two generalized attitude dimensions that are supposed to underlie prejudice: social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Then, we included PFC in the model. We investigated whether PFC affects prejudice via RWA or vice versa and whether, as assumed, SDO is unrelated to PFC.

Structural Equation Modeling (SEM). For model analyses we used MPlus 4.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2007). We created parcels that were composed of the raw data of the items of each scale (see Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998). We applied maximum likelihood as the estimation method throughout.

For each scale we created either two or three parcels that measured the underlying construct: First, we conducted a factor analysis with SPSS⁶ forcing a one-factor solution. Next, in the subsequent analysis we only considered items that had factor loadings greater than .32. These items were partitioned into two or three parcels with similar overall factor loadings, following a procedure suggested by Little et al. (cf. Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002). This procedure led to two parcels for racism, social distance, xenophobic attitudes, discriminatory behavioral intentions, and RWA; it led to three parcels for SDO and PFC, respectively. We further tested a model in which PFC is differentiated into its two components "internal and external consistency" and "predictability" (see study 1). For the first component we defined 3 parcels, for the second component 2 parcels⁷.

In a first step, we evaluated two measurement models⁸: The first model included the four prejudice measures of modern and traditional racism (McConahay, 1986), social distance, xenophobic attitudes, and discriminatory behavioral intentions (Heitmeyer, 2005, 2006, 2007). Because we assume that the four scales measure prejudice and the resulting discriminatory behavioral intentions, we implemented a general second order factor

“prejudice and discriminatory behavior”, see Figure 1. The measurement model showed a very good model fit ($\chi^2 (16) = 16.844, p = 0.40, RMSEA = 0.00; SRMR = 0.01; CFI = 1.00$)⁹.

In order to examine the relationship of PFC with SDO and RWA, we examined the fit of another measurement model. We incorporated SDO and RWA in this model and allowed the variables to correlate on the latent dimension, see Figure 2. The model showed a very good model fit ($\chi^2 (4) = 3.27, p = 0.51, RMSEA = 0.02; SRMR = 0.02; CFI = 0.99$). In sum, both measurement models yielded very good model fit. Therefore, we combined these models and included PFC as well. In the course of analysis we compared models in which PFC was represented by one factor with those in which PFC was represented by the two factors found in the factor analysis (see above). The examination of the correlations of the PFC indicators with the other variables clearly supported the two-factor solution: The indicator variables of the first PFC factor (internal and external consistency) had stronger correlations with the prejudice indicators as well as with RWA. Furthermore, the fit indices of models with two PFC factors were better than those with one PFC factor¹⁰. Therefore, we report results for PFC represented by two factors: the internal and external consistency factor (3 indicator variables) and the predictability factor (2 indicator variables).

We assumed that RWA and SDO would be correlated and have direct effects on prejudice (see Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Feather & McKee, 2008; Van Hiel et al., 2004). Further, we assumed a relationship between RWA and PFC, but no relationship between SDO and PFC. We explored the direction of effects and empirically investigated whether RWA or SDO affected PFC.

Results of SEM

The complete model in which we have direct effects from the two PFC factors on SDO and RWA yielded an acceptable model fit ($\chi^2 (122) = 215.57, p < 0.001, RMSEA = 0.051; SRMR = 0.114; CFI = 0.967; AIC = 9464.228$). When we changed the direction of

effects, modeling effects from SDO and RWA on PFC, model fit increased significantly ($\chi^2(121) = 164.30, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.028; SRMR = 0.046; CFI = 0.99; AIC = 9414.937$), see Table 2. The smaller AIC as well as the significant $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 596.136^{11}, p < .001$, indicated a better fit of the second model. Therefore, PFC is affected by the generalized attitude dimensions RWA and SDO and not vice versa.

Next, and in line with our assumptions, we deleted effects of SDO on PFC. This modification did not affect model fit ($\chi^2(123) = 166.38, p < 0.01, RMSEA = 0.027; SRMR = 0.049; CFI = 0.99; AIC = 9413.038$). The second and third model did not differ from each other ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = -1.758, p = .14$) and both represented the data adequately. Based on the principle of parsimony, we kept the third model in which the two PFC factors are affected by RWA only, and all variables directly affect prejudice. Path coefficients for the final model (3) are presented in Figure 3. The model estimated covariance between RWA and the consistency PFC factor was 0.16, $r = 0.20$, the covariance between RWA and the predictability factor was 0.16, $r = 0.15$.

We further examined indirect effects: As a tendency, the consistency factor mediated the relationship between RWA and prejudice, regression coefficient $\beta = 0.015$ ($z = 1.265$, one-tailed $p = .10$)¹², whereas there was no indirect effect from RWA via the predictability factor on prejudice ($z = 0.002$, one-tailed $p = .50$).

In sum, the model provides additional evidence for the important role of SDO and RWA as predictors of prejudice. Moreover, RWA functions as a predictor of both factors of preference for consistency. There is a tendency showing that part of the predictive path of RWA on prejudice is further mediated through preference for consistency¹³.

Discussion

Results indicate that the German version of the PFC scale showed good internal consistency. We found no correlation of PFC with social desirability (independently from the two factors).

Cialdini and colleagues (1995) presented PFC as one construct that consisted of three theoretically assumed facets. They did not report results of a factor analysis, nor did they provide empirical evidence for the three facets. We computed a factor analysis and found 2 factors: “external and internal consistency” and “predictability”. Whereas this distinction was not relevant for the susceptibility of the scale toward social desirability, the two factors differed in their relationship with prejudice and RWA.

Structural equation modeling showed that PFC is related to prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism but not to SDO. Furthermore, parts of the effects of RWA on prejudice are (marginally) mediated through PFC. These observations are in line with our theoretical reasoning. On the one hand, characteristics of authoritarian people like simple black-and-white thinking (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949) point to higher preference for consistent information and thus an association with the construct PFC. On the other hand, results from the use of prejudice and stereotypes as means to see the world in an easier to understand and consistent way pointed to an association of PFC and prejudice.

Besides, the comparison of different models indicates that a separation of PFC into its two factors “external and internal consistency” as well as “predictability” is reasonable in our structural equation models: The consistency factor is more strongly connected to prejudice and RWA. The factor “external and internal consistency” differs from the “predictability” factor on a control dimension. Whereas a person is able to control his/her own acting and appearance to other people, the behavior of others cannot be influenced by a person. Following this reasoning, the “external and internal consistency” factor should be tied to the individual feeling of self-efficacy more strongly. High RWA people’s view of the world

focuses on authorities, however, the RWA scale addresses the person's own attitudes toward the world and its authorities. Again, this underlies the individuals' control. Therefore, future studies focusing on PFC and its role in prejudice and discrimination or authoritarianism might include only items of the first PFC factor (external and internal consistency). Further, it may be investigated if the "predictability" factor predominantly taps the expectancy that the ingroup behaves consistently. This point is suggested by the content of some items (e.g., items 4 and 14).

Comparing our results to the ones by Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006), a strong discrepancy becomes obvious. Whereas our model supports a mediation effect of RWA via PFC to prejudice and discriminatory behavior, Cornelis and Van Hiel found an effect of the cognitive style "order and predictability" – a subscale of the need for closure scale – on racism and conservatism, and this effect was mediated by RWA and SDO. A possible explanation why the model with RWA and SDO as mediators of the effect of "order and predictability" on racism and conservatism yielded better model fit than a model with "order and predictability" as the mediator may be that in the latter model no direct effects of RWA and SDO on racism and conservatism (cultural and economic) were allowed whereas it was in the model with RWA and SDO as mediators. And RWA and SDO as predictors of prejudice have already been supported by several researchers (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002). The model with "order and predictability" as a mediator might also have fitted the data better if additional direct paths from RWA and SDO to racism and conservatism had been allowed. The item content of the order and predictability measure resembles the content of the PFC scale, as it emphasizes certainty in situations, structure in life, and predictability of situations and people (e.g., "I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life", "I dislike unpredictable situations"). Although this item content shows some overlap with PFC, however, the PFC concept seems to be narrower, because it is focused more on the social context. This difference might be an alternative reason why Cornelis and Van Hiel (2006)

found order and predictability to affect RWA and SDO, whereas our results support a marginal impact of RWA on prejudice via PFC. In their research the cognitive style variables affected SDO and RWA, whereas our model tests pointed to RWA affecting PFC. Future research might clarify by which variables RWA and SDO are affected and which direction of effects exist.

The reasoning above also points to limitations of the method used: structural equation modeling allows to compare the fit of several different hypothesized models to the data, but clear-cut conclusions about causality or effects over time can only be drawn by conducting experimental or longitudinal studies, respectively (MacCallum & Austin, 2000). In order to provide additional support for the causality of the relationship between RWA and PFC, future research might investigate whether an experimental manipulation of RWA or other context factors affect the individual PFC level.

As proposed by different researchers (e.g., Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Vernon, 1973), a factor analytical inspection of different cognitive style dimensions and PFC would clarify which constructs are distinct and where an overlap between cognitive style dimensions exists. Future research might investigate additional characteristics of the PFC construct and its relatedness to other constructs like need for closure (especially its components “order and predictability”, see above) and tolerance of ambiguity. Tolerance of ambiguity was shown to generalize to the individual’s cognitive style, belief, and attitude systems and thus to influence interpersonal and social behavior (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, 1951). Yet, it was not examined whether tolerance of ambiguity is connected to preference for consistency. How strong is the overlap between both constructs and is it reasonable to distinguish between these? And if there is an overlap – might not preference for consistency be a better alternative to apply it in social psychological research (especially consistency paradigms) because the difficulties in measuring tolerance of ambiguity have not been solved yet (Furnham & Ribchester, 1995). Further, Felser and

Wolfradt (2002b) found PFC to be highly correlated with the Personal Need for Structure scale (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Conclusively, it seems reasonable to differentiate between related concepts and compare their ability in predicting different effects, thereby determining their discriminant validity.

However, one empirical finding does not seem to fit to our results: Altemeyer (1998) found that high-RWA people often hold contradictory ideas or antithetical beliefs. According to him, they are able to do so because their thinking is supposed to be highly compartmentalized. They contradict themselves more often than do low-RWA people and do not even notice it even when the contradiction occurs within a minute. This compartmentalization allows them to have double standards about concerns like religion or separatist rights. It is difficult to reconcile these seemingly opposing tendencies of high-RWA people: striving for consistency, but also being able to hold compartmentalized standards which are inconsistent with each other. Future research should therefore examine under which circumstances or in which contexts high RWA people strive for consistencies, as there might be exceptions to this general tendency.

Furthermore, we observed a high path coefficient between RWA and SDO. Whereas SDO and RWA were found to be unrelated or only weakly related in North American studies (Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland, 1998; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Whitley, 1999), the relationship between SDO and RWA was found to be higher in Europe (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Ekehammar et al., 2004; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). This is in line with the strong correlation we found in our structural equation model.

Implications for future research

Since the publication of the scale measuring preference for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995), research has focused on the predictive power of this construct to explain consistency effects only. Whereas we replicated such effects for the German version of the scale in a

previous study (Heitland & Bohner, 2009), the present study enlarged this perspective by showing the relatedness of PFC to right-wing authoritarianism and prejudice. PFC might be seen as an information processing strategy that characterizes authoritarian people. Results further indicate that in some research fields a separation of PFC in its two factors internal and external consistency as well as predictability is reasonable. In the context of prejudice and discrimination as well as subordination to authorities, the consistency factor shows greater predictive power. The reanalysis of the previously mentioned dissonance study (Heitland & Bohner, 2009) also suggested the greater predictive power of the consistency factor in explaining dissonance effects. In future studies on the construct validity of PFC using other validation constructs, it should be further examined whether a distinction between two PFC factors is useful. Does this separation hold for the English original PFC scale, too? Or is the theoretically assumed structure of three components (consistency of oneself, consistency toward others, and preference for other's consistent behavior) as proposed by Cialdini et al. (1995) useful? What is the additional explanatory power of these factors?

Besides these questions, future research may untangle the role that the personality trait PFC plays in different settings. Whereas the current research finds high-PFC people to ignore or avoid inconsistencies and ambiguities, these people were shown to be the ones that act consistently with their prior behavior in consistency paradigms like induced compliance (Cialdini et al., 1995; Heitland & Bohner, 2009). It seems as if high-PFC people avoid inconsistencies. But once they are not able to avoid these any more and perform a counterattitudinal behavior (as, for example, in an induced compliance paradigm), they stick to the implications of their behavior and change their attitude toward the advocated position. On the other hand, low-PFC people seem to have a greater tolerance of ambiguities, which enables them to encounter inconsistent information and incorporate their implications. This may also be the reason for low-PFC people not being susceptible to effects in consistency paradigms.

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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Corrected Item-Total Correlations of the PFC-Items.

| | Abbreviated Items PFC | <i>M</i> | <i>SD</i> | Correc. i-t corr. | 1 st factor: Correc. i-t corr | 2 nd factor: Correc. i-t corr |
|----|--|----------|-----------|----------------------|--|--|
| 1 | P Anticipation of reactions of others | 4.28 | 1.68 | .43 | | .60 |
| 2 | C Consistency between actions and attitudes | 5.59 | 1.26 | .46 | .51 | |
| 3 | C Consistency of attitudes and actions in the eyes of others | 5.08 | 1.54 | .33 | .42 | |
| 4 | P Friends should be able to predict my behavior | 3.67 | 1.75 | .41 | | .56 |
| 5 | C Stable and predictable person in the eyes of others | 5.33 | 1.44 | .56 | .57 | |
| 6 | C Admirable people are consistent and predictable | 4.59 | 1.61 | .47 | .41 | |
| 7 | C Consistent appearance | 5.68 | 1.34 | .40 | .40 | |
| 8 | P Depend upon someone unpredictable | 5.20 | 1.65 | .29 | | .34 |
| 9 | C I like to appear consistent | 4.52 | 1.79 | .44 | .42 | |
| 10 | C Contradiction between my actions and attitudes | 5.43 | 1.63 | .34 | .42 | |
| 11 | C Friends should keep to what they have told | 5.73 | 1.31 | .36 | .43 | |
| 12 | P Prefer to do things the same way | 2.96 | 1.73 | .21 | | .30 |
| 13 | C People who constantly change their mind | 5.47 | 1.47 | .41 | .42 | |
| 14 | P Behavior of my friends ought to be predictable | 3.94 | 1.73 | .45 | | .61 |
| 15 | C Appear as a stable person | 6.16 | 1.17 | .44 | .43 | |
| 16 | C Try to appear as a consistent person | 4.20 | 1.68 | .53 | .47 | |
| 17 | C Holding inconsistent beliefs | 4.43 | 1.76 | .49 | .51 | |

| | | | | | | | |
|----|---|---|--------------------------|------|------|-----|-----|
| 18 | N | C | Actions are inconsistent | 5.15 | 1.77 | .23 | .34 |
|----|---|---|--------------------------|------|------|-----|-----|


Note. *N* = negative coding; *C* = factor 1, internal and external consistency; *P* = factor 2, predictability; *S* = short form; *M* = mean; *SD* = standard deviation; *corrected i-t corr* = corrected item-total correlations. All values are calculated for reverse coded items, if necessary – higher values displayed a higher level of prejudice. Factor loadings of items below .30 are not shown. The complete item formulations in German can be seen in the appendix.

Table 2. Comparison of nested structural equation models.

| Model | Compared model | χ^2 (df) | $\Delta\chi^2$ (Δ df) | CFI | SRMR | RMSEA | AIC |
|-------|--|--|-------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|---------|
| 1 | Direct effects of the two PFC factors on SDO and RWA | 183.462 (122), $p = .0003$ Sc.-f.: 1.175 | | 0.967 | 0.114 | 0.051 | 9464.23 |
| 2 | Direct effects of SDO and RWA on the two PFC factors | 138.767 (121), $p = .1286$ Sc.-f.: 1.184 | 596.136 (1), $p < .001$ | 0.990 | 0.046 | 0.028 | 9414.94 |
| 3 | Direct effects of RWA on the two PFC factors | 140.525 (123), $p = .13$ Sc.-f.: 1.184 | -1.785 (2), $p = 0.1139$ | 0.990 | 0.049 | 0.027 | 9413.04 |

Note. Sc. f. = scaling factor, CFI = Comparative Fit Index; SRMR = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; AIC = Akaike Information Criteria.


Figure 1. Measurement model for prejudice and discriminatory behavior with standardized factor loadings.



Note. Race = racism scale; DisB = discriminatory behavioral intentions; Xeno = xenophobic attitudes; SocDis = social distance.

*** $p < .001$ for one-tailed testing


Figure 2. Measurement model for SDO and RWA with standardised factor loadings.



Note. SDO = social dominance orientation; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism.
 *** $p < .001$ for one-tailed testing

$\chi^2(4) = 4.342, p = .3617$; scaling correction factor = 0.977
 CFI = 0.999
 TLI = 0.998
 AIC = 2727.225
 RMSEA = 0.021
 SRMR = 0.017

Figure 3. Final model with standardized factor loadings.



Note. Race = racism scale; DisB = discriminatory behavioural intentions; Xeno = xenophobic attitudes; SocDis = social distance; SDO = social dominance orientation; RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; PFC1C = preference for consistency, 1st factor; PFC2P = preference for consistency, 2nd factor. *** $p < .001$; ** $p < .01$; * $p < .05$; ^m $p < .10$ for one-tailed testing

Appendix

| | German PFC scale | Original PFC scale (Cialdini et al., 1995) |
|-----|---|---|
| 1. | Mir ist es lieber, wenn ich die Reaktionen meiner Mitmenschen voraussehen kann. | I prefer to be around people whose reactions I can anticipate. |
| 2. | Es ist mir wichtig, dass mein Verhalten mit meinen Überzeugungen übereinstimmt. | It is important to me that my actions are consistent with my beliefs. |
| 3. | Es stört mich, wenn andere glauben, mein Verhalten stimme nicht mit meinen Überzeugungen überein. | Even if my attitudes and actions seemed consistent with one another to me, it would bother me, if they did not seem consistent in the eyes of others. |
| 4. | Es ist mir wichtig, dass meine Freunde mein Verhalten voraussagen können. | It is important to me that those who know me can predict what I will do. |
| 5. | Ich möchte durch andere als verlässlich und einschätzbar angesehen werden. | I want to be described by others as a stable, predictable person. |
| 6. | Personen, die ich hoch achte, verhalten sich konsequent und einschätzbar. | Admirable people are consistent and predictable. |
| 7. | Es ist mir sehr wichtig, ein überzeugendes, klares Auftreten zu zeigen. | The appearance of consistency is an important part of the image I present to the world. |
| 8. | Es stört mich, wenn ich von jemandem abhängig bin, dessen Verhalten ich nicht vorhersehen kann. | It bothers me when someone I depend upon is unpredictable. |
| 9. | Ich möchte auf jeden Fall meiner Umwelt gegenüber stimmig erscheinen. | I don't like to appear as if I am inconsistent. |
| 10. | Ich fühle mich unwohl, wenn mein Verhalten meinen Überzeugungen widerspricht. | I get uncomfortable when I find my behavior contradicts my beliefs. |
| 11. | Mir ist es wichtig, dass meine Freunde zu dem stehen, was sie einmal gesagt haben. | An important requirement for any friends of mine is personal consistency. |
| 12. | Ich ziehe es vor, Dinge immer auf die gleiche Art zu machen. | I typically prefer to do things the same way. |
| 13. | Ich mag keine Menschen, die ständig ihre Meinungen ändern. | I dislike people who are constantly changing their opinions. |
| 14. | Ich möchte, dass <i>das Verhalten</i> meiner engen Freunde vorhersagbar ist. | I want my close friends to be predictable. |
| 15. | Es ist mir wichtig, dass andere mich als eine verlässliche Person betrachten. | It is important to me that others view me as a stable person. |
| 16. | Ich nehme auch Anstrengungen auf mich, um gegenüber anderen stimmig zu erscheinen. | I make an effort to appear consistent to others. |
| 17. | Es ist mir unangenehm, <i>einander widersprechende</i> Überzeugungen zu haben. | I'm uncomfortable holding two beliefs that are inconsistent. |
| 18. | Es stört mich nicht besonders, wenn meine Handlungen sich widersprechen. ^r | It doesn't bother me much if my actions are inconsistent. ^r |

^r = reverse coded; *highlightend* = changes from the version of Felser & Wolfradt (2002a)

¹ Roccato & Ricolfi (2005) found that the correlation between RWA and SDO was dependent on the ideological contrast of a country: It was greater in countries with strong contrast and smaller in countries with weak ideological contrast.

² 2.1 % of the participants had not completed school, 7.2 % graduated from the German Hauptschule (the school with the lowest education standards), 19.1 % graduated from the German Realschule (comparable to the British secondary modern school or junior high in the USA), 19.1 % had earned the German Fachhochschulreife (which is an advanced technical college entrance qualification), and 51% had earned the German Abitur (a general qualification for university entrance). Three people were still attending school (1.5 %).

³ This scale was later dropped from analysis because its variance was strongly related to the social distance scale and did not have additional explanatory power.

⁴ Following suggestions of Fabrigar, Wegener, MacCallum, & Strahan (1999), this and all subsequent factor analyses used maximum likelihood extraction and Promax rotation, to allow for correlated factors.

⁵ See footnote 4.

⁶ See footnote 4.

⁷ The consistency-PFC-factor was represented by 3 parcels because of it included more items (13 versus 5 items for the predictability-PFC -actor).

⁸ Throughout the paper we will report the ML corrected Chi-Square value which is corrected by the scaling factor given in Mplus.

⁹ According to Hu and Bentler (1999) the cutoff value for a good model fit is beyond .06 for the root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) and beyond .09 for the standardised root mean squared residual (SRMR)

¹⁰ Because these models were not nested we do not report results of the Chi-Square difference test.

¹¹ Chi-Square difference tests can be used to compare models within a nested model structure. In this case the Chi-Square values first have to be ML corrected based on the scaling factor before calculating the difference between the two indices and their degree of freedom.

¹² If we treated PFC as one factor, the indirect effect of RWA via PFC on prejudice reached significance ($\beta = 0.027$, $z = 1.90$, one-tailed $p = 0.03$).

¹³ Indeed a regression analysis supported the significant effects of PFC on discriminatory behavior, xenophobic attitudes and social distance, $p < .05$.

V. Erklärungen über Urheberschaft

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Bielefeld, 06.10.2009

Erklärung

Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die Manuskripte zum Dissertationsthema „Zeitgenössische Vorurteile – Erfassung, Erklärung und Reduktion“ selbstständig erarbeitet habe und diese weder in der gegenwärtigen noch in einer anderen Fassung einer anderen Fakultät vorgelegt habe. Ich versichere, dass keine anderen als die in der Dissertation angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt wurden.



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Bielefeld, 20.09.2009

**Erklärung über Urheberschaft
(kumulative Dissertation Kirsten Heitland)**

- Hiermit bestätige ich, dass Kirsten Heitland (Erstautorin) die ursprünglichen und federführenden Beiträge zu folgenden Manuskripten geleistet hat:

An indirect paper-and-pencil measure of prejudice: A German version of the Racial Argument Scale

Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency Moderate the Effects of Counterattitudinal Advocacy

Preference for consistency: The scale, its properties in a German sample, its connection to prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism

Mit der Reihenfolge der Autorschaft erkläre ich mich einverstanden.



Prof. Dr. Gerd Bohner



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Seite 1 von 1

**Erklärung über Urheberschaft
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Hiermit bestätige ich, dass Kirsten Heitland (Erstautorin) die ursprünglichen und federführenden Beiträge an dem Manuskript

Preference for consistency: The scale, its properties in a German sample, its connection to prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism

geleistet hat.

Mit der Reihenfolge der Autorschaft erkläre ich mich einverstanden.



Prof. Dr. Jost Reinecke

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Education

| | |
|--------------|--|
| From 03/2007 | Dissertation, Graduate School Group-Focused Enmity, University Bielefeld Title of Phd thesis: "Contemporary prejudice – instruments for its measurement and reduction on the basis of cognitive dissonance theory", supervised by Prof. Dr. Gerd Bohner, University Bielefeld |
| 08/2006 | Diploma in Psychology, University Bielefeld Title of master thesis "mood effects on the generation of persuasive messages" |

Scholarships

| | |
|-------------------|--|
| 03/2007 – 02/2010 | graduate school "group-focused enmity" |
| 02/2004 – 08/2006 | scholarship "Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes" |

Employment History

| | |
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| 09/2006 – 02/2007 | Institut für Management-Entwicklung: project manager (Conception and realization of a new training field: trainings, which are designed for secretaries only) |
| Since 10/2002 | Course instructor for the University of Bielefeld (In-house trainings for Microsoft Power Point, Word and Excel; participants were secretaries of the University as well as students) |
| 01/2002 – 08/2006 | Institut für Management-Entwicklung: temporary employee (Main occupational activity was the improvement and the sustainable actualisation of the online presence of the institute; project works) |
| 10/2002 – 08/2004 | Student assistant in the faculty of General Psychology II (Programming psychological experiments and supervising students who were about to take their diploma) |
| 02/2001 – 09/2001 | MediaLog (subsidiary company of Bertelsmanns): Clerk (customer service and accounting) |
| 08/1998 - 02/2001 | Apprenticeship as a merchandising-executive at Bertelsmann, Gütersloh |

Stays abroad

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 09/2008 – 10/2008 | University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB): scientific exchange and research about the effects of affirmation on the perception of the presidential debates for the election in November 2008 |
| 09/2005 – 12/2005 | Period of scientific research at the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in Australia, Sydney |
| 09/2001 | New Zealand: 3 weeks in a language school in Auckland, (Advanced class: English) |
| 05/1996 | Student exchange with Israel (2 weeks) |
| 05/1994 | Student exchange with France (1 week) |

Further Training

| | |
|-------------------|---|
| 10/2009 – 11/2009 | “Train-the-trainer – training for advisors and instructors of tutors” in 3 modules, University Bielefeld |
| 10/2009 | DFG career day |
| 06/2007 – 07/2009 | Participation in 3 Mplus-Workshops: Introduction into the analyses of cross-sectional, longitudinal, and multilevel modelling |
| 06/2009 | Missing Data (and planned missingness designs) by John Graham, Penn State University |
| 06 – 07/2007 | „Academic writing“ |
| 04 – 07/2007 | Oral communication skills (English) |

Research Interests

Prejudice
Intervention methods
Cognitive dissonance theory
Attitudes and attitude change
Preference for consistency

Publications

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2009). Reducing Prejudice via Cognitive Dissonance: The Impact of Choice, Self-relevance, and Preference for Consistency. *Social Influence*, accepted for publication.

Under Review

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2009). An indirect paper-and-pencil measure of prejudice: A German version of the Racial Argument Scale.

Heitland, K., Bohner, G., & Reinecke, J. (2009). Preference for consistency: The scale, its properties in a German sample, its connection to prejudice and right-wing authoritarianism.

Binning, K. R., Sherman, D. K., Cohen, G. L., & Heitland, K. (2009). Seeing the other side: Reducing political partisanship via self-affirmation in the 2008 Presidential Election.

Organized Symposia

Heitland, K., Bohner, G., & Zick, A. (2009, September). *Die ganz normale Abwertung*. 12. Fachgruppe Sozialpsychologie at the Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg.

Presentations

Conference Papers and Presentations

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2009, September). *Preference for consistency: Die deutsche Skala und ihr Zusammenhang mit Vorurteilen und diesen zugrunde liegenden Konstrukten*. Presentation at the 12. Fachgruppe Sozialpsychologie at the Université du Luxembourg, Luxembourg.

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2008, June). *Reducing prejudice via arousal of cognitive dissonance: The interplay of choice, threat, and preference for consistency*. Presented at the 15th General Meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social Psychology (EAESP), Opatija, Croatia.

Invited Presentations & Colloquia

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2008, October). *Reducing prejudice via arousal of cognitive dissonance: The interplay of choice, threat, and preference for consistency*. Social area meeting (SPAM) at the UCSB, California, US.

Heitland, K. (2008, March). *Dissonanztheorie und ihre Anwendung auf Interventionen bei Vorurteilen gegen TürkInnen*. Bürgerberatung Bielefeld.

Heitland, K., & Bohner, G. (2007). *Dissonanztheorie und ihre Anwendung auf Interventionen bei gruppenbezogenen, menschenfeindlichen Einstellungen*. Zentralkolloquium, Marburg.

Presentations

Conference Poster Presentations

Heitland, K., & Böhner, G. (2008, July). *A subtle measure of prejudice: Development and validation of a German version of the Racial Argument Scale*. Poster submitted for presentation at the 29th International Congress of Psychology (ICP), Berlin, Germany, July, 20 – 25, 2008.

Heitland, K., & Böhner, G. (2006). *Der Einfluss von Stimmungen auf die Generierung persuasiver Botschaften: Die Bedeutung des Adressaten*. In F. Lösel & D. Bender (Hrsg.), 45. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie: Humane Zukunft gestalten, Nürnberg, 17.-21. September 2006 (S. 131). Lengerich: Pabst Science Publishers.

Teaching

WS 2007/2008

Seminar with the title "Racism: Still a problem in our society?" – in cooperation with Marie Marekwica

Activities

01/2008 – 09/2008

Organization of the SoDoc2008 at the University Bielefeld (September 11 – September 14, 2008)
in cooperation with: Nina Dickel, Rene Kopietz, Marie Marekwica, Nina Vanselow

Membership

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Society of Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP)