Perspectives on Policy Transfer: "Dropping Stones, Making Waves"

How International Organizations Promote "Social Cash Transfer Programs" in the Global South

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Preface

This research is part of the FLOOR Project, which is a multidisciplinary research group funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG – Deutsche Forschungsgesellschaft). FLOOR includes researchers from the law and the sociology department of Bielefeld University, and the spacial planning department of the TU Dortmund corresponding to three aspects of 'social security as a human right': **F**inancial Assistance, **L**and Policy, and Gl**o**bal S**o**cial **R**ights (FLOOR). The sociology branch of FLOOR deals with "Financial Assistance" and includes several research projects on social cash transfers within the Global South and in global politics. The principal investigator of "Financial Assistance" is Prof. Lutz Leisering PhD, Bielefeld University.

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Contents

Abbreviations

AAA	Analytical and Advisory Assistance
ADA	Age Demands Action
ADB	Asian Development Bank
AU	African Union
CAS	Country Assistance Strategies
CsocD	Commission for Social Development
DFID	Department for International Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN
GIZ	Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
GSP	Global Social Policy
HAI	HelpAge International
HDN	Human Development Network
HtA	Help the Aged
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IDB / IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC-IG	International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth
ILO	International Labour Office
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IO	International (Governmental) Organization
KHW	Kinderhilfswerk Global-Care
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MIPAA	Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing
NDA	National Development Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPA	Older People Association
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RPS	*Red de Protectión Social*
SCT	Social Cash Transfer
SPF-I	Social Protection Floor – Initiative
UN	United Nations
UNCEB	United Nations Chief Executives Board
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCO	United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Populations Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
USP	Universal Social Pension
WCSDG	World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization
WFP	World Food Programme

Introduction

International Organizations and the Rise of
Social Cash Transfer Programs in the Global South

The idea of international organizations as facilitators of global communication is not a new one. It started approximately two decades ago and has increased since (e.g. Finnemore 1993; Deacon et al. 1997; Willets 2001; Iriye 2002). The globe becomes more and more connected and information flows from one part of the world to another. From a global perspective international organizations (IOs) appear to be hubs where knowledge concentrates and then spreads further.

Another observation is that policies of countries converge and become similar. Some policy models win through and spread around the world, with more and more countries reforming their policies or implementing new ones according to role models from other countries (e.g. Leisering and Liu 2010). It is remarkable that certain policies spread globally and become an observable global trend. One of the more recent waves of policy diffusion relates to Social Cash Transfer (SCTs) policies, which have been spreading in the Global South since the last decade (i.a. Sugiyama 2011).

What are the drivers of such a diffusion wave? Since IOs connect countries and transport ideas from a global to the national level. We may assume that IOs often play a part in the global spread of policies and function like a transmission belt. While the causal weight of IO activities in diffusion processes is difficult to ascertain with very few analyses in the field of social protection, this study addresses the no less important but under-researched question, *how* IOs are involved in such processes. How can IOs act as transmission belts? What are their tools and instruments?

Thus, this study focuses on the question: **What are the means and tools of international organizations to influence policy-making in developing countries?** Usually regarded as powerful and influential are organizations, which can impose sanctions and/or have large amounts of money at hand. Are these the main instruments international organizations rely on? In order to identify the variety of instruments used by IOs to influence developing countries, this study has

investigated in a comprehensive way the activities of international organizations that accompany global policy diffusion. The diffusion of social cash transfer policies in the Global South is of particular interest for the discipline of Global Social Policy (GSP). This study found that IOs use a broad variety of instruments. Most of them are knowledge-based and target the way countries learn, think and evaluate themselves. The instruments can be categorized along three categories: *advocacy, advice* and *incentives*. This study provides detailed insights into the case of social cash transfer (SCT) diffusion by showing how these instruments have been established.

The study shows that IOs not only use money and power, but primarily use norms and knowledge in order to influence policy-making at national level. The study elaborates on how IOs function to be a transmission belt that transports policy ideas from the global to the national level. Two of the main modes of influencing are "advocacy", that is norm production and norm distribution through conferences and other channels, and, second, "advice", which comes in form of technical advice, workshops and continuing country dialogues. Both tools are extensively used by IOs to change the way policy-makers think about their social problems and the policy options available to them. This form of influencing via knowledge is a 'soft power' complementing IOs 'hard power' instruments. The hypothesis substantiated in this study is that **"International Organizations have been actively involved in the wave of SCT policy diffusion in the Global South by promoting policy models via norm-based and knowledge-based instruments: advocacy and advice"**.

The study of the instruments of IOs is not an impact evaluation. The instruments of IOs are capable of impacting policy-making directly and may result in the implementation of policies, yet it is beyond the scope of this analysis to investigate how far global actors' activities actually trigger national policy-making. While it can be assumed that in one way or another the activities of IOs have impacted national policy-making, it is also clear that not in all cases those activities led to a policy implementation at national level. The reactions to IOs' activities can be manifold: policies could be implemented directly and more or less following the policies advocated by IOs; or already existing programs could be reformed as a reaction to the new input given by IOs; or IO activities could trigger discussions within the society which not lead to a change in national policy in the first place, but might set the path for future reforms; or advocacy could meet with ignorance resulting in no change at all; or, finally, IOs inputs could lead to a rejection of the given input so that policy makers purposefully choose different policy options than those which have been promoted. While subsequent studies might deeper investigate the reactions of

policy-makers at national level, this study conceptualizes in a first step the variety of global actors' activities, and then analyses empirically in how far international organizations act as transmission belts in global-to-national interactions.

SCT Diffusion: The Background of this Analysis

In the mid 1990s several developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia (defined as 'Global South') began to implement social policies which provide people in poverty with an income of last resort (often called social cash transfers [SCTs]). It is puzzling why SCT programs have spread so massively in the Global South in the last two decades. Among many possible explanations, this study investigates in the activities of international organizations as one potential influence that could have contributed to the diffusion of SCTs in the Global South.

All countries in Latin America introduced non-contributory social programs for their citizens, and also in Africa and Asia many countries began to introduce new social programs. These policy implementations represent a remarkable trend in a developing country context, even though this diffusion is in some cases difficult to identify and can appear to be rather scattered.[1] It is a wave of social policies spreading in the Global South that might be considered as puzzling and require some explanations, because traditional concepts based on modernization theory or functional approaches cannot account for those policy innovations (Leisering and Liu 2010:176).

Functional theory would tend to see SCTs implemented because the political system responds to social problems within the society with policy solutions which are functional to solve these problems. That would presuppose an immense increase in poverty levels in developing countries within the last two decades. Instead poverty levels have been already high for a much longer period of time and SCTs have rarely been considered as a solution before. That makes functional theory not the first choice for an explanation of this phenomenon of SCT policy diffusion.

Modernization theory would regard the implementation of SCTs as a result of a country's developmental stage where the next logical step in the countries'

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1   The quality and degree of institutionalization of programs in the Global South is in many cases quite questionable, and in some cases SCT policies have been implemented earlier than in those two decades. Yet, a closer look reveals that in countries with a longer tradition fundamental reforms of these policies have been made in accordance with global trends. The trend towards SCT policy development is significant and already a matter of quantitative studies (e.g. Böger forthcoming).

development is the introduction of several policy packages appropriate to their social-economic conditions. Yet, social-economic levels of countries in the Global South vary to a large extent. Middle-income countries have introduced SCTs just as low-income countries. This makes it difficult to see the introduction of SCTs as a result of a developmental stage. Many countries lack the developmental preconditions yet to implement such demanding programs and introduced them nevertheless.

Moreover, rational choice theories would have difficulties to identify SCT implementation as a rational act in view of political instruments and possibilities at hand at the current time. In many developing countries social programs may be considered difficult to implement because redistributive programs rely on stable tax revenues. Such revenues cannot be taken for granted in developing countries because the majority of the population works in informal work-relationships and does not pay taxes. Thus, the introduction of social security programs would lack particular prerequisites that make SCT introduction a rational option to choose. Why one might doubt SCTs to be a rational option becomes even clearer when social-economic situations of developing countries are contrasted with the social-economic conditions in OECD countries. Whereas social assistance in OECD countries is some kind of safety-net of last resort for a rather small percentage of the society, the fraction of the society living in poverty is incomparably higher in developing countries. With countries where up to 50% of the population who live below the international poverty line of USD 1.25 a day ('purchasing power parity' as measured by the World Bank) social protection programs would become rather costly. Even if taxation revenues in developing countries were higher it is questionable if they would be sufficient to fully finance programs which would subsidies the majority of the population.

A final point argues for SCT adoption as an unlikely event by considering the cultural background of many developing countries where social safety nets are based on a tradition counteracting social programs based on cash transfers. Developing countries have a tradition of fighting poverty by focusing on food-security. This is done by direct food delivery or by subsidies for farming or gas, which is quite a different approach than the provision of cash via SCTs. Moreover, self-help systems in families are another common safety-net mechanism. Social security is not provided by the government, but through private relationships.

Summed up, unfavorable social-economic levels and a lack of a welfare-state culture make it unlikely that so many countries in the Global South have introduced or reformed SCT. But why have they? While many theories have problems explaining this trend, this analysis seeks to find new explanations. A main prerequisite to

consider international organizations as a potential cause is to identify the instruments IOs use to influence policy-making in the Global South.

What are different approaches to explain this SCT policy diffusion wave? Taking a look at a comprehensive analysis of social policies within the countries throughout the Global South indicates that the identification of cases and drivers of this diffusion wave is not a mono-causal story (cf. Weible, *forthcoming*). Too much variation among the policies can be found to make a single explanation responsible for this policy development. Moreover, policy development at national level is a complex process with many influential factors (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000: 10).

Which factors have been influential in the end is almost impossible to say without an in-depth analysis of single case studies at national level. Yet, with such an analysis of country cases it is quite difficult to generalize the results and to identify explanatory approaches for the trend of SCTs in general. Thus, I look at factors, which might be of a broader explanatory value for policy processes in the Global South. With an interest in such more general approaches to account for policy diffusion I had to narrow down the number of variables that might have been influential in this SCT diffusion wave. For two reasons IOs have been chosen as a potential influential factor for SCT diffusion.

At first, there has been a vibrant discussion on the role of international organizations within policy diffusion for years (e.g. Usui 1994; Stone 2004; Weyland 2005; Dion 2008; Jacobi 2009; Niño-Zarazúa, Barrientos, Hickey and Hulme 2011). While traditional realist perspectives emphasize the impact of 'hard power' (e.g. sanctions or money), more recent approaches discuss the influence of knowledge and norms as 'soft powers'. Yet, the effectiveness of soft power instruments of IOs is contested and difficult to measure.

> "[a] handful of recent studies suggest that IOs have *not* had a significant impact on social policy outcomes since the 1980s [Brooks, 2005; Hunter and Brown, 2000]. This article contends that IOs *do* influence social policy, though not in ways likely to be measured by cross-national comparisons of program lending and policy outcomes. Seldom is IO influence on social policy a matter of a gross display of influence through loan conditionality or the imposition of simple policy models. Rather, the influence of IOs on social policy, though significant, has been more nuanced than many characterizations indicate. […] The comparison of social insurance policy formation in Mexico during the 1940s and 1990s illustrates both these commonalities and differences. In neither period did IOs decisively *create* the policy outcomes, but in

both times they provided technical advice and established international norms that *influenced* the types of policies ultimately adopted. [… studies] too often focus on a narrow concept of hard power. [...] This tendency is especially pronounced in quantitative studies that attempt to measure IO influence through the size of loans or the presence of institutionalized reform agreements, such as IMF Structural Adjustment Programs [Brooks, 2005; Hunter and Brown, 2000]" (Dion 2008: 26-7).

By applying an institutionalist perspective (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 2008) this investigation focuses on 'soft power', highlighting the range of activities and influences one might miss out when IOs' influence is solely measured by money and power. Especially if policy diffusion is understood as *information* that has spread worldwide, so that it might have fed into national policies, it might be useful to investigate the channels and methods through which this information spreads. This study on IOs as an influential factor emphasizes the importance of knowledge-based influencing. In addition to a traditional 'hard power' approach, which is rooted in the classic 'realist perspective' of International Relations of Political Science, this study identifies two 'soft power' approaches that have been dominant in the scientific literature on policy diffusion in recent years. Yet, soft and hard power influencing are not understood to be mutually exclusive. Rather, these approaches might complement each other. This study finds that both modes apply in this case of SCT diffusion and both modes strengthen the role of IOs as an active promotional factor for policy change at national level. The tools of how global actors promote particular policies, is matter of this study.

A second reason to chose IOs as a potential explanatory variable for the global diffusion of SCT policies is that IOs and other global actors have been very active at the discursive level and have accompanied the process of policy diffusion with concepts and ideas for the development of new policy ideas and policy instruments to be implemented at national level (cf. Gliszczynski 2015). What has been missing so far is an analysis of the activities and instruments used by global actors to influence national policy-makers. The analysis of the instruments and modes of IOs serves two scientific interests: first, to uncover the range of activities which IOs have used in this specific policy diffusion wave and, second, to substantiate two further perspectives based on 'soft power' in order to broaden the 'realist perspective' based on 'hard power instruments' (e.g. money and sanctions).

With this study we learn more about the instruments used by global actors to become a transmission belt for global ideas. Extant research on how global actors

influence national policy-making identifies some instruments, but rarely provides insights on how those instruments are used. Through intensive research on literature about policy diffusion, I identified two complementing perspectives that capture two different aspects of 'soft power influencing'.

Soft Power: The Research Perspective

This study understands global actors as entities that carry global norms to the national level. Thus, this study uses an institutionalist (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 2008) and World Society perspective (Meyer et al. 1997) and develops a research design that captures the global actors' activities on influencing in three categories. These categories represent modes of influencing and have been developed as a result of the analysis of instruments used by global actors. Operating foremost with knowledge in the form of norms and expertise, 'soft power' instruments seem to represent an important aspect of global actors' influencing. In a nutshell, my research framework consists of three modes: advocacy, advice and incentives. While *advocacy-based influencing* for the most part refers to the establishment and promotion of norms and models, *advice-based influencing* refers to technical expertise, which is in most cases directly delivered at national level. To test if global actors have further means to reinforce the uptake of knowledge at national level with 'hard power' instruments, a third category is *incentive-based influencing*.

World Bank & HelpAge International: The Case Studies

My case studies are on the World Bank and HelpAge International, which where chosen based on two criteria: First, what are the most active and most present global actors that have been involved in this SCT diffusion? Second, how can different types of actors be chosen according to a most-different-research design? Traditionally, different types of actors are associated with being equipped with very different instruments and strategies on how to influence. Such a variety is interesting for case studies selected according to a most-different design. This study chooses an international governmental organization (IGO), which often are considered to be particularly influential actors in the global sphere, and an international non-

governmental organization (INGO), which in most cases has fewer resources and, thus, tries to be influential in other ways.

The most recognizable SCT models that have spread globally include non-contributory pensions and conditional cash transfers, that is, child benefit for families affected by extreme poverty. Even though many actors talk about and work with those models, each models has a key proponent. On the one hand, non-contributory pensions are particularly advocated by HelpAge International, an INGO which is the only global actor that promotes the rights and needs of older persons globally. On the other hand, conditional cash transfers are mainly associated with the World Bank, which is an IGO with a long history in development cooperation. Despite the focus on just two major players the analysis covers the key instruments that matter in most SCT diffusion process. Moreover, this study provides an overview about other actors that are active in SCT diffusion.

Structure of the Study

Chapter 1 provides an understanding on the role global actors play according to institutionalism, world society theory and policy diffusion research. Based on the literature on policy diffusion, the research framework is developed, to be applied in Part II to the the case studies of the World Bank (Chapter 2) and HelpAge International (Chapter 3). Part II also provides a brief overview on contributions by other global actors, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), DFID (Department for International Development, UK), GIZ (*Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit, Germany*) and regional development banks (Chapter 4).

Part III discusses the findings of the empirical analysis. Chapter 5 identifies repercussions for the development of a research design and tries to identify in how far IOs' activities might have led to policy change at national level by using a global policy-cycle concept. Moreover, Chapter 5 took quantitative data about how fast particular policy models have spread among world regions into account in order to see, if the global actors' activities on influencing correlate with activities on policy-making at national level. The Conclusion of the study sums up the empirical results of the study in order to highlight the *interplay* of global actors' activities and to conclude with a general take-away lesson.

The General Observation

Finally, the conclusion points out that all empirical findings indicate that global actors have been heavily involved in this SCT diffusion process, promoting particular policy models. Among the factors that can impact on national policy-making, it is hard to ignore international organizations; although, the prominent role of knowledge-based influencing makes it difficult to measure IOs' influence because the effect is indirect. Yet, it is difficult to neglect IOs' influence, because the *advocacy* of policy models increases the attractiveness of models so that countries might intend to follow a trend or adapt to global norms/models; and the technical *advice* delivered by IOs continuously streams knowledge on policy implementation into the policy-making process. This can create a demand at national level which makes policy-makers request further assistance from global actors. Global knowledge and norms at global level can *indirectly* influence and can impact on multiple countries across the globe without the direct involvement of global actors, but global actors can also *directly* engage nationally and function as amplifiers of knowledge diffusion by stimulating local policy learning.

Both, direct and indirect influencing take time until they become effective. The stimulation of *learning-effects* is demanding, requiring the development of knowledge (policy models), the diffusion among IOs and the spread of models to states. This study shows that both, the World Bank and HelpAge International, promote SCTs on the global and national levels and engage in a *long and steady* manner in order to stimulate learning-effects.

The results of this study have led me to a picture of international organizations' activities as "dropping stones and making waves". The metaphor of policy diffusion waves is often used to describe a trend-pattern: several countries implement similar studies in a narrow time frame. But what is the driver of such a wave? How do waves of policy diffusion emerge? A policy official from the World Bank told me that they are 'riding a wave' because they observe trends, pick up those trends and facilitate its further spread. Instead, this study suggests that the agency of IOs is stronger: While IOs are also inspired by policies of single countries, they decide what model to pick up, they craft their own models and coin terms. Due to the dominant role of knowledge and the continuing long-term interactions between global actors and nation states, IOs *induce* learning effects. It is like IOs are constantly sending incentives and learning lessons to the national level until national governments give it a try. IOs appear to drop stones and make waves.

Part I
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Chapter 1: Research-Design to Analyze the Contribution of International Organizations to Policy Transfer

This chapter provides in 'Section 1.1.' an understanding on how international organizations are global actors in a world society. Moreover, it is described how IOs in such a role are carriers of norms and ideas. Finally, it is also highlighted that IOs play on the global as well as on the national table, and thus, they are an active link between those spheres, calls world society links. Based on these theoretical considerations I review the state of the art of policy diffusion research in 'Section 1.2.'. This section outlines the differences between policy diffusion (macro perspective) and policy transfer (meso perspective) and shows that the involvement of global actors in national policy-making is one of the main observations in the last decades. As a result, this section explains why *mediated policy transfer* is matter of this study. 'Section 1.3.' explains the analytical perspective, which is an x-centered analysis focused on international organizations. Moreover, I present a research design that focuses on global actors and reflects a *qualitative* approach to policy transfer. Based on theoretical considerations, I introduce three analytical categories: advocacy, advice and incentives. Finally, in 'Section 1.4.' I briefly describe how the data for the empirical analysis were collected.

1.1. Theoretical Approach:
Global Actors and Policy Models

In the last centuries, globalization has been the force embedding nation-states in global structures and communicative systems. Thus, it has been argued that national policy-making is also influenced by factors, such as global actors and global events, global institutions and regimes, and global normative and cognitive cultures. This perspective is relevant for the analysis of diffusion of social policies:

> "[...] no modern State exists in splendid isolation, independent of the international community that surrounds it, the study of factors which influence the establishment of

social insurance in a country will necessarily have to go beyond the frontiers of a national community and be considered also at the international level" (Rys 1964).

Furthermore, globalization has made mutual observations between states much easier than ever before ('global horizon for observations and comparisons' / '*Beobachtungs- und Vergleichshorizont',* cf. Heintz 2008) enabling states to learn from each other (Rose 1991). Research about policy diffusion has shown that it is valuable to take international factors ('exogenous forces') into account to get meaningful insights on national policy making which would have been difficult to get by just relying on national factors ('endogenous forces') (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). One remarkable conclusion has been that international governmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) have gained more influence in domains of national policy making (Hasse and Krücken 2005).

The perspective of Global Social Policy (GSP) acknowledges international actors per definition by stating that GSP is about "supranational and global actors [which] are actors in the emerging processes of influencing national policy and engaging in transnational *redistribution*, supranational *regulation* and supranational global *provision*" (Deacon et al. 1997: 22; original emphasis). Beyond such a broad recognition of international actors, the empirical evidence for IGO- and INGO influence on social policies differs a lot.

On the one hand, studies about the diffusion of the 'new pension reform' in the 1990s showed an influence of ideas of the World Bank, which worked to spread its policy around the world. As a result this policy diffusion was a 'global policy process' with a minor influence of national conditions and actors (Orenstein, 2005).

On the other hand, researchers emphasize that the final decision-making is always done at the nation state level and, thus, the final result is always expression of national processes as well (Dion 2008). Global influences on policy diffusion are in general understood as follows: "national forces determine the timing and specifics of the adoption in cases of both policy learning and policy emulation, while the global forces provide basic ideas without determining the specifics of adoption" (Hu & Manning 2010:129). This study adopts a similar understanding of nation states as embedded in a global communicative system where global actors are influential factors on national policy-making. In the following, I develop an understanding of global actors from the perspective of institutionalism and world society theory, which emphasize the delivery of knowledge as means to influence national policy-making.

In principle, I understand every actor as a 'global actor', which regards its field of activity not restricted to a certain country or region, but operates in view of many countries and on a genuine global level. Because the observational horizon ('Beobachtungshorizont') of global actors is global in scope, such actors may react to incidents happening in distant locations around the globe. In this sense, national governmental organizations for international cooperation can be global actors in the same way as international organizations, or individual consultants. In the following, I stress the importance of norms and knowledge for global actors. This is of particular importance for conceptualizing the instruments of global actors which can be used to influence national policies. The contribution of global actors to the spread of a policy is the main criteria to define a 'global policy': "Global policies are those that are developed, diffused, and implemented with the direct involvement of global policy actors and coalitions at or across the international, national, or local levels of governance" (Orenstein 2005: 177).

Institutionalist approaches have conceptualized global actors as constituted and legitimized by the current world culture, which the international system is built upon (Meyer & Rowan 1977; Meyer 1980; DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Nation-states are social constructs as are international organizations (Meyer et al. 1997). Neither of them is thinkable without the rules, norms and culture of their social environment which construct and define them (Jepperson 1991; Hasse & Krücken 2009). In order to be recognized as a proper nation-states several structures, norms and rules have to be implemented. The development of ministries, the design of a flag and composition of a hymn, and a membership at the United Nations are described as rituals and ceremonies that constitute and legitimize nation-states as actors.

Similarly, to be a legitimate actor, international organizations have to follow what is enshrined in world culture as a proper, adequate, rational and necessary organization (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Both, nation-states and organizations are legitimate global actors. When trying to pursue their interests, both kinds of actors need to respect the world culture in order to remain legitimate. For example, there is no global cultural frame for aggressive warfare to extend the territory, but there is a legitimate cultural frame for self-defense. Due to those cultural frames wars of aggression have disappeared and, instead, the meaning of 'self-defense' has been increasingly overstretched. Even attacks on a foreign sovereign territory are re-labeled as 'preemptive strikes' for the sake of 'self-defense'. This example should show that nation-states or organizations depend on a cultural frame to pursue their goals.

New frames for development policy regarding poverty, development, risk and human rights emerged in the 1990s (von Gliszczynski 2015). Against this background of the new frames, in the 2000s, all major IOs came to espouse the idea of SCT as a global model, and basic submodels were devised (von Gliszczynski 2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016).

Having embedded its aims in established cultural frames allows an organization to craft its mandate and to understand it as guidance for its actions. By doing so, global actors represent more than just a self-interested unit; instead they can become "agents of principle" as 'agentic actors'. Those are actors which transport and promote world cultural principles:

> "The proper modern actor assumes responsibility to act as agent of the imagined natural and moral law. Otherwise the actor risks either incompetence or corruption. At the extreme, agentic actors represent not any recognized entity or interest, but instead become purely agents of principle" (Meyer & Jepperson 2000).

Thus, the development of a mandate is essential to legitimize the organization's ongoing activities. Taking the cases of this study as an example, the World Bank follows its mandate to eradicate poverty in each corner of the world, and HelpAge International aspires the proper and adequate realization of human rights for older people. Both, human rights and the eradication of poverty, are highly legitimized concepts in the current world culture, and by incorporating those values into their mandate the organizations reconfirm and strengthen them through their activities.

However, neither the acquisition of legitimacy through the embedding of the mandate in cultural norms, nor the enactment of those cultural norms must necessarily be seen as a strategic action of organizations. The more cultural values and norms are institutionalized, the more they become 'taken-for-granted' for global actors who adjust their mandate accordingly (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Yet, world culture is described as highly dynamical with cultural material changing constantly (Meyer et al. 1997). Even though very basic principles remain established, much more variation appears for rationalized social models which are more concrete and closer to policy models than being abstract background principles. For example, while education and health in general are regarded as important features of modern societies, some more concrete models about what is most common and, thus, most legitimate exist as well, like models of primary and secondary education (Meyer et al. 1977; 1992). These models can be well institutionalized and, hence, strong and

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influential models, or the models are newly created by global actors and are more contested. 'Success' of diffusion depends on how well specific cultural models are embedded in more general cultural norms and principles and to what degree this policy model has become institutionalized (Strang & Meyer 1993).

Global actors may be the innovators in world culture; they actively draw on, select from, and modify shared cultural models, principles, and identities (Swindler 1986).

> "In the work of Peter Berger, these global structures are maintained and transformed by the actors they constitute. World culture defines modern actors not as cultural dopes but as creative innovators who are the one and only source of change, adaptation, and restructuring in response to situational contingencies" (Boli & Thomas 1999b:4).

Swindler refers to an actor-centered perspective on institutionalism, which emphasizes the agency of actors and their ability to innovate. Institutions may be both the independent and the dependent variable (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995). As suggested above, I would differentiate a little between abstract principles which are fundamental institutions and rather unquestioned premises, and policies, which are more specific social models and comparably more likely subject to global actors' active editing. The development of policy models as well can impact and change more general principles and craft new ones. In consequence global actors and global cultural structures interact with each other. Policy area specific principles and in particular policy models can change over time (Boli & Thomas 1999b). Accordingly, this study pays attention to the activities of global actors of how they attempt to innovate new cultural models by bringing them from an idea to implemented policies at national level (Policy Diffusion).

The next step for this diffusion study would be to analyze what global actors do with certain cultural elements which they have either crafted or 'borrowed' somewhere else at global, national or local levels. The definition of policy diffusion used here goes back to the most prominent and classic definition saying that „diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system" (Rogers 1965/2003:5). Hence, 'policy innovation' is used here as one of the basic terms for this study with particular attention to the mechanisms of how this policy innovation is communicated. Characterizing 'communication' as the fundamental principle of policy diffusion

emphasizes the importance of knowledge and knowledge distribution.

In this regard, world society assumes that global actors may influence national structures and policies by means of knowledge transfer. This is already emphasized in the classic example of the discovery of a previously unknown island, which would quickly adapt to all the cultural models at global level because numerous global actors would be active advising and educating the inhabitants of this island, and because the inhabitants observe the customs and practices of other countries and may adapt accordingly (Meyer et al. 1997:145). Knowledge can flow vertically to this island stemming from IOs or horizontally flowing from one country to another. Global actors can be involved as *'transfer agents'*, which drive this process or facilitate the knowledge exchange (Stone 2004). Yet, not every policy innovation is due to direct global actors' influence. *Policy diffusion can also be driven by the countries themselves, which aim to 'rise' up to global standards and most legitimate models.* This kind of learning can be outlined as an *indirect effect* stemming from global norms. Especially in developing countries institutionalized 'best practices' are considered for national policy-making based on the cultural norms development and social progress.

> "The world is an extraordinarily unequal place, and filled with distinctive cultures, but models of the good society are strikingly isomorphic. And changes in these models flow around the world with great rapidity: adopted often on an enthusiastic and voluntaristic basis by societies eager to progress" (Meyer 2007:263).

Yet, the scientific literature is not clear about the models and instruments of diffusing policies. Weyland (2005) contrasts normative and cognitive-psychological influences, reflecting different theoretical approaches (cf. Weyland 2005) I hold that policy models can act in both ways. On the one hand, 'best practices' can have a normative influence because a model describes what 'proper behavior' looks like at a certain point of time. On the other hand, 'best practices' which are carefully designed with regard to established world cultural principles are also discussed among global actors, with IOs as 'transfer agents' delivered to the national level. Thus, 'best practices' can have a 'cognitive-psychological influence' which biases the perception of policy-makers towards certain policy blueprints or 'cognitive heuristics' (Weyland 2005). "The process underlying diffusion can be seen as an inherently sense-making one, where actors jointly construct an understanding of the appropriateness and worth of some practice" (Strang & Meyer 1993: 489). In this process of 'sense-

making' global actors fulfill a doublefunction. First, they appear to be the 'teacher of norms' and inform national actors about how a legitimate policy would look like; second, they draw attention to particular models, which increase the salience of those models. The second aspect might be more important when a policy model is rather newly developed and not yet fully institutionalized, but in principle global actors often act in both ways.

In sum, I have argued to understand global actors as active elements carrying and developing world cultural elements, norms and principles. Their agency encompasses activities that can be conceptualized in a way similar to Finnemore and Sikkink's 'two-level-game' of increasingly linked domestic and international forums (/norm tables) (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). On the international table, global actors appear to be **'norm entrepreneurs'** which have the ability to establish new policy models as 'best practices' (*advocacy*). On the domestic table they are the **'transfer agents'**, which teach global norms to national policy-makers and increase recognition and availability of global models (*advice*).

What instruments might global actors use for normative influencing? This mode of advocacy includes the publication of documents and studies about a policy innovation and/or the ideas supporting this policy innovation. Publications allow global actors to establish their policy models as 'best practice'. Moreover, other instruments to advocate are global events such as global summits and global conferences (Lechner & Boli 2005). In my analytical design I pay particularly attention to instruments of normative influencing. Additionally, I look for instruments and strategies global actors might use to anchor their policy model nationally, because "international norms must always work their influence through the filter of domestic structures and domestic norms" (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:893). Thirdly, the institutionalist emphasis on influencing through knowledge as soft power should not rule out influencing by means of hard power emphasized in a "realist" perspective. That is, influencing by 'carrot and stick' mechanisms (Keohane & Nye 1998) do play a role and are taken into account in the analysis. The three categories advocacy, advice and incentives will guide the empirical analysis.

1.2. State of the Art in Policy Diffusion Research:
The Perspective of Mediated Policy Transfer

Designing a study about policy diffusion research requires developing an understanding of the particular terms and theories I use. This is even more important because the literature on policy diffusion entails diverging understandings even on basic terms (Elkins & Simmons 2005: 38). I concentrate on the literature on diffusion in the field of global social policy. Only a few studies, which have analyzed the diffusion of SCT. Taking stock of these studies, I point out the aspects that have been under-researched so far.

Two Perspectives: Policy Diffusion & Policy Transfer

Policy diffusion research consists of basically two approaches that explain the same phenomenon, namely policy convergence among states (Tews 2002; Lütz 2007). It is the main goal of both approaches to identify potential explanations of the observable phenomenon that many states have adopted similar policies within a relatively short time frame.

The general approach to policy diffusion originated in the 1960s in the USA and analyzed the spread of policy innovations among the federal states (Walker 1969; Gray 1973). This discipline observes the phenomenon from the macro-level with the *spread* of policies within a region, and the *speed* of this spread as the main variable. In most cases quantitative approaches are utilized, such as event-history analyses. While such analyses have turned out to be effective in testing different approaches against each other, the main causalities explaining the policy diffusion remain unclear. As an answer the British research tradition developed in the 1990s the policy transfer perspective mainly established by Rose (1991, 1993), and Dolowitz and Marsh (1996, 2000). The analysis of policy transfers is about qualitative approaches to zoom into the process of policy diffusion either in order to unfold all the complexity involved in individual processes, or in order to test the validity of one particular variable. In the following I will sketch both perspectives briefly to clarify what it means for this study that I used the policy transfer perspective.

Policy diffusion research observes the convergence of policies from the macro-level. Although from such a perspective many individual processes are black-boxed, the findings from policy diffusion research have revealed interesting hypotheses which can contribute to the analysis of policy transfer processes as valuable hypotheses. In general, the policy diffusion approach is rather focused on the results of the diffusion process. The two key variables are the spread and the speed of the diffusion.

Just analyzing the *spread,* such approaches often confirmed that regional cluster emerge and speak of 'neighborhood effects'. Based on the thesis that neighbor-countries observe each other more thoroughly and are more open-minded towards policy innovations because countries from the same region tend to share a certain cultural background, the concept of 'availability' became important. National policy-making rarely has to start from scratch. Instead countries can recognize policy innovations in their environment and take them into consideration. It is up to the country how much the received information is modified in order to fit its national conditions. Processes of syncretism (briefly defined as the alteration of a policy innovation through national influences) are the expression of high internal dynamics stemming for example from path dependencies or strong interests groups within the country. Such national influences leading to a thorough reflection on the received information are connected the term 'policy learning' (Rose 1991), while countries could also take over more or less information in a rather unreflected way, which is called 'policy adaptation' (Elkins & Simmons 2005). Syncretism as well as negative lesson-drawing, which is an informed rejection of knowledge, are difficult to analyze from such a macro-perspective because the process of policy-making is not analyzed.

Analyzing the *speed* of diffusion results in spread-curves, which often show that policy diffusion occurs in waves often visualized as a bell-shaped curve in which the diffusion process is introduced by some innovators, then quickly adds up becoming a trend and ultimately fades out by laggard countries adopting the policy considerably later (Rogers 1965, 2003). The diffusion literature basically has three explanations for such a global trend: cultural norms, support groups and competition (Elkins & Simmons 2005, Dobbin et al. 2007). These explanations show a strong link to world society theory by putting either the cultural norm or the global actors involved in the delivery of expertise at national level in the foreground. The third explanation, competition, is appealing as well but, may be less valid for social policy diffusion, which is rather discussed in terms of a 'race to the bottom'. Countries do

not generally compete to have the best and most encompassing social protection system. Instead, such programs are under constant risk to be subject to budget cuts, especially in times of recession. World Society Theory emphasizes 'world society links' (Meyer 2009) a country holds with the global level; measured e.g. in terms of membership of a country in international organizations or the number of ratified international covenants. Research in this tradition (e.g. Jakobi 2009) provides strong evidence that world society links matter, but it is not entirely clear *how* they matter, which is part of the focus of this study on instruments.

Yet, an analysis of the speed of diffusion can also indicate that such processes can be even more complicated, calling for complex explanations. Abbott and DeViney (1992) analyzed the diffusion of a vast variety of welfare state institutions. Instead of just one bell-shaped curve they found humped curves where a smaller bell-shaped curve comes before and after the main curve. The authors called it the "wait and see" model where a non-adoption (waiting and analyzing) wave can be as contagious as a policy adoption. Explanations of policy diffusion are difficult just knowing the spread and speed of a diffusion process. Similarly, analyses of diffusion processes from a world society perspective are powerful ways of detecting diffusion (for social policy see e.g. Adu Sharkh 2010), but the precise mechanisms of diffusion remain elusive, due to the macro-approach. This study seeks to contribute to filling this gap by investigating the modes and instruments diffusion actors use.

Research from a policy transfer perspective can reveal more of the dynamics involved in policy diffusion and can show what mechanisms underlie macro-effects. This perspective "[operates] at the meso level, below more general studies of convergence and diffusion but above more specific treatments of local applications of ideas and instruments" (Freeman 1999:3, Tews 2002:2). The perspective focuses on the intentional exchange of knowledge with a bias towards voluntary transfer. Studies on policy transfer are focused on 'action-oriented intentional activities' rather than only on the result but the process of diffusion (Evans & Davies 1999:366) and are actor-centered (Stone 2004). The actor-centered perspective extends beyond transfer processes between states to include "vertical" diffusion processes between IOs and states.

"The literature has focused on lessons and policy transfers between nation-states with an implicit tendency to assume a bilateral relationship. The policy transfer metaphor implies a direct exchange process between exporting and importing countries. However, there can be transfer agents that are not based in or identified with either

the importing or exporting jurisdiction but which facilitate the exchange between a number of polities. Rather than bilateral horizontal transfers between states, policy transfers can occur vertically between states and international organizations or between transnational non-state actors. [...] The objective has been to shift the focus from institutions and policies at the nation-state level, and to address how policy transfer not only takes place in international domains but can also be considered as one constitutive element of transnational governance" (Stone 2004: 549/561).

However, this emphasis on vertical diffusion and the role of global actors does not say which side drives the process. The policy transfer could be driven by countries actively seeking policy innovations (import or demand driven) or by global actors who want to disseminate their policy prescriptions (export or supply driven). Even though, in any case countries would not learn in a normative vacuum or *tabula rasa* but rather a bounded-rationality would drive their actions.

In both cases, domestic factors shape the transfer process or may block it. Path-dependencies, fiscal constraints or national interest groups come in. Policy transfer research just emphasizes that transnational influences can be relevant and in certain cases even more dominant than national influences. How these processes are linked with each other is hard to tell and can only be discovered through single case studies. Depending on the focus of the policy transfer studies, transnational influences can be the dependent or the independent variable according to the focus of the study, which can be either on the effectiveness of transnational influences or the policy-making process at national level (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000).

However this study focuses on the mechanisms and instruments used by global actors, analyzed qualitatively, rather than analyzing influence in a causal sense. Moreover, this study is not confined to cases of 'successful influencing' leading to actual policy adoptions and domestic implementations. The interactions and the exchange of knowledge between the national and global level are of major importance for my analysis. In policy transfer research there is still much to be done regarding the measurement of global actors' activities in terms of concrete strategies and instruments (Tews 2002: 4). In response, this study seeks to develop a research design that captures these strategies and instruments of global actors, revealing *how* global actors seek to exert influence.

Policy Diffusion in the Field of Social Security

Early studies on the global diffusion of social security programs focused on some basic social security programs, which were dealing with the hardships of workers' injury, illness, old age, unemployment, and low income (Collier & Messick 1975). Those programs were considered to secure a minimum standard of living representing core institutions of a welfare state. It is a classic diffusion study taking into account the spread and the speed of the spread. This study found regional clusters indicating 'spatial diffusion', and center-periphery dynamics called 'hierarchical diffusion'. Without revealing the reasons behind these dynamics, the study presents those forms of diffusion as the main findings.

> "Within this overall pattern, three striking subpatterns clearly emerged. Among the earliest adopters, social security actually diffuses up a hierarchy of nations rather than down a hierarchy. In the middle group of adopters, a pattern of spatial diffusion is present in which social security is rapidly diffused among countries at widely differing levels of modernization. Finally, a combination of hierarchical diffusion and a prerequisites explanation appear to be the most satisfactory means of accounting for the pattern of adoption among the latest adopters" (Collier & Messick 1975:1314).

The authors of this study come to the conclusion that it is difficult to explain the spread of social security programs solely with endogenous factors as posited by modernization theory, which explains policy innovations by the level of socio-economic development of a country, which practically makes the implementation of new programs a necessity. But diffusion studies have shown that states implement similar policies with very different socio-economic levels. Still, regarding basic social protection in the Global South better-off countries tend to have more substantial welfare programs (Leisering et al. 2006).

The policy diffusion study by Weyland analyzed the spread of the privatization of pensions in Latin America and Eastern Europe. This spread started in Latin America in the 1980s and continued well into the 2000s. The starting observation of Weyland's study was that

"[...] these waves of diffusion affect countries that are at very different levels of economic, social, and political development. This variety suggests that domestic functional needs alone cannot account for the rapid spread of innovations; external factors make a major contribution" (Weyland 2005:262).

The study confronted several theoretical approaches with three basic observations on the speed and spread: first, policy diffusion occurs in a wave, second, the diffusion shows geographical clusters, and, third, a similar policy framework was adopted in different national settings. While Weyland's study acknowledges external influences, it dismisses both, the 'external pressure approach' (powerful IGO motivating a country to implement a policy) and the 'normative imitation approach' (countries following global trends). Rather, Weyland emphasizes horizontal policy diffusion, with countries observing and learning from each other. Moreover, the low degree of syncretism (all of the countries have basically implemented a very similar policy model) in Weyland's view suggests an bounded-rationalities. This leaves the question open where the impulse or the incentive to look for a policy innovation stemmed from in the first place. Such answers are difficult to be provided by diffusion studies from a macro-level, but by research approaches, which analyze the policy transfer on a qualitative basis from a meso-level.

Research on welfare state development in Europe highlights an important factor that might help to account for policy diffusion: "In a political environment the advocates of reform need to employ strategies to overcome the skepticism of others and persuade them of the importance of reform" (Cox 2001: 475). While global actors can persuade and motivate national actors to take action, global norms serve as an orientation and can further motivate by being in particularly attractive for policy reform. These policy norms are attractive by being portrayed best practice, "modern" and scientific as they are based on scientific evidence e.g. the effectiveness of poverty reduction policies.

Orenstein (2005, 2008) analyzed the dissemination of pension privatization as Weyland, but on a world-wide scale. He made a policy transfer analysis in order to test if this diffusion was influenced by global actors. Orenstein found that the World Bank as the main driver was involved in every step of policy-making, as e.g. described in the policy-cycle model. The study highlighted the involvement of global actors in particular in the implementation of the policy rather than only in policy advocacy:

"Global policy actors [...] may help to implement similar policies in many countries simultaneously and may continue to influence policy as it undergoes further modifications and adaptations over time. Global policy actors may offer ongoing technical assistance to policy regulators or actively carry out policy in different settings" (Orenstein 2005: 180).

Orenstein's study showed that the World Bank not just persuaded the country to consider policy innovations, but that the ongoing advice and technical assistance fed into the country's learning process. This implies that learning was biased by a bounded-rationality. Moreover, spatial diffusion cannot be regarded as just contradicting vertical diffusion, but it can be also be a result of global actors' focus on particular world regions. Some global actors, like the regional development banks which support policy-making, are by definition focused on world regions. In this case, the World Bank, among others, intentionally focused on Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Yet, how can "influence" with regard to global actors be understood? Dion analyzed the development of social insurance programs in Mexico. This is again a qualitative perspective on policy transfer. Dion confirms the influence of global actors. She points out that other studies might dismiss global actors' influence because they are too much focused on hard power mechanisms (as described by Keohane and Nye (1998) as carrot and stick influencing), like the World Bank's ability to set strong incentives via loans (carrot) or to impose sanctions by withholding loans (stick). Such hard power mechanisms do not figure prominently in the field of social security; rather a more nuanced analysis reveals that global actors may exert influence via the delivery of technical assistance and policy networks (Dion 2008). While the impact of global actors on a country's preferences is strong, domestic factors remain strong as well and determine the timing of the policy adoption and specify how the received information about a policy innovation is adapted to the national context. This implies that soft power means are essential. Global actors can also be identified as influential with qualitative analysis, when on the macro-level is less or no policy convergence recognizable. As mentioned before, an analysis of policy transfer is much more about the process of how a policy innovation is communicated among members of a social system (Rogers 1965, 2003) and less about the outcome.

Most recent studies on welfare state research reconfirm the distinction between a policy diffusion and policy transfer perspective. Moreover, they highlight the relevance of Meyer's world society approach, emphasize that learning and

lesson-drawing at national level can be influenced quite a lot by cognitive shortcuts, and reaffirm that the 'methodological nationalism', which dominated social policy research for a long time by emphasizing the importance of external influences (Obinger et al. 2013).

Most studies on global social security diffusion investigate countries mostly by case studies of one or few countries. By contrast, this study focusses on IO instruments and therefore takes IOs as points of observation, investigating strategies and instruments adopted by IOs in view of all countries.

The Diffusion of Social Cash Transfers: Approaches & Results

Social Cash Transfer (SCT) have spread to 75% of countries of the Global South (Katrin Weible, *forthcoming*; s.a. Barrientos 2013). Implementation varies a lot, suggesting that the same program idea was modified and adapted a lot at domestic level.

> "At least 45 countries in the Global South now give cash transfers to more than 110 million families. [...] Every program is different and there are huge variations, from universal child benefits in Mongolia to pensions in Africa to family grants in Latin America. Some grants are tiny - only $3 per month - whereas others give families mote than $100 per month; some cover more than one-third of the population, and others aim only for the very poorest. The size of public spending also varies enormously, from as little as 0.1% of GDP up to 4% of GDP, although most programs fall in the range of 0.4% to 1.5%. Six countries took the lead and still have the biggest programs - Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, India, Indonesia, and China - and several countries (including Mongolia, Ecuador, Peru, and Ghana) are introducing cash transfers that will reach a large portion of their population. The huge variation in cash transfers reflects significant differences in local politics, history, resources, and goals." (Hanlon et al. 2010:47)

While sovereign states obviously turn program ideas into national programs according to their preferences of budget constraints, it is still puzzling where all these activities stem from. The regional effects, which are present in this SCT diffusion (Weible, *forthcoming*) indicate that countries might mutually observe and learn from

each other. Moreover, South-South-Cooperation is a new mechanism where countries pass their experiences on to other Southern countries.

In addition, there is evidence that IOs influence this diffusion. One program which diffused in Latin America, is conditional cash transfers (CCT). The World Bank is the strongest and most prominent actor advocating this policy (von Gliszczynski 2015). Most studies refer to countries, often only case studies (but for large-n studies see Böger 2013, Brooks 2015), and therefore do not generally analyse IO instruments (which are the topic of this study), but they provide useful hints. Sugiyama (2011) took a mixed-methods approach to test which influences may have driven the policy diffusion of CCT. She took a *quantitative* approach by using an event history analysis, and found out that neither the ideology (left/right) of the government, nor the different development levels (Human Development Index), nor the government's capacities (as measured by the World Bank) had a significant influence on whether a country adopt a CCT program or not.

Having disproved all domestic variables and being left just with a neighborhood effect, she took a qualitative approach to test for external influence. Based on the assumption that just looking at loan conditionality is not enough, she finishes her article with a brief overview on World Bank's activities that go beyond lending. She describes that CCTs also can be considered a norm developed by the World Bank and distributed through meetings and conferences which played a significant role in connecting policy-makers from various countries (Sugiyama 2011:263).

Sugiyama comes to a similar explanation to what Weyland (2005) describes as biased-learning because IOs' advocacy causes policy-making under bounded-rationalities. Vertical and horizontal diffusion are linked. Sugiyama saw the 'soft influencing' of the World Bank as influential on these learning processes, but additionally, the World Bank's loans represented strong incentives as well.

Franzoni and Voorend (2011) looked into the spread of CCTs from a policy transfer perspective, investigating, in how expert-driven international ideas entered the domestic policy process in three Latin American countries. The authors found that the World Bank is also influential via expert and learning communities. Subsequently, this influence was 'filtered' by domestic actors (Franzoni & Voorend 2011:290). However, the impulse for those policy innovations came 'top down' from "policy experts rather than grassroots organizations of the poor themselves" (ibid.). Though this was a study based on a small sample, this qualitative policy transfer

analysis substantially contributed and deepened the insights into the policy diffusion process Sugiyama provided an overview on.

What is missing, is a *qualitative* policy transfer study, which is not centered at the national level with countries as cases, but centered at the global level with *global actors as cases*. My study intends to make exactly this contribution. Moreover, most studies on external influences are focused on governmental organizations (IGOs), ignoring the potential influence of *non-governmental organizations (INGOs)*. Also, the focus mostly is on IFIs, which are considered to be influential due to their ability to access financial resources. But the recent studies presented above draw attention to the fact that also for big IFIs like the World Bank, *'soft influencing'* via expertise seems to play a role as well.

Stubbs (2003) argues that in the course of the proliferation of INGOS since the 1990s, many of the INGOs stuck in short-term projects and competition for financial resources. This situation changed with new aid and development regimes emerging, adopting more coordinated approaches to poverty reduction. With more financial resources, which became concentrated in a few INGOs, these actors could form alliances and became more important. According to Stubbs, it is likely that the importance of INGOs will increase in the future.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) were among the first to investigate the role of INGOs in more depth, conceptualizing them as norm entrepreneurs with the ability to develop new norms and inject them in the international system. Their role as transfer agents active in 'advocacy networks' (Stone 2004) is rarely analyzed in studies on policy transfer, and almost absent in policy diffusion studies.

*A*rticles taking stock of the NGO literature often find that INGOs are under-represented. This is puzzling since most of the INGOs are active in the field of human rights, and social policies and development (Kruse & Martens [forthcoming]). Although INGOs are seen to be of central interest for studies on global social policy (GSP), Kruse and Martin are silent about the role of INGOs in policy diffusion. By contrast this study seeks to ascertain the role of INGOs in the diffusion and how INGOs compare to IGOs in this respect.

1.3. X-oriented Research Design:
A *Qualitative Approach to the Analysis of Policy Transfer*

The literature on methods and research design distinguishes between x-centered and y-centered approaches (Blatter & Haverland 2012). Y is the phenomenon of interest, in our case the observation here that many countries around the world have implemented certain SCT programs in a relative short time frame of sometime more than a decade. X are the potential variables influencing policy diffusion. Theoretical there can be numerous x-variables, but usually it is possible to identify the few most likely variables based on an analysis of former studies and analyses. Y-centered studies are interested in explaining the phenomenon by taking multiple x-variables into account, either quantitative or qualitative.

Good examples of quantitative y-centered studies are multivariate event-history analyses, which are trying to identify which x-variables can be considered as significant influences on the observed phenomenon. As stated above, partly such studies already exist and indicate external influences as responsible for policy diffusion because internal factors have turned out to be insignificant for the adoption of SCT policy innovations.

A qualitative way to set up a y-centered study are country-case studies. At national level all the different influences merge and, thus, such approaches would do a good job in showing the actual influence of external influences on policy-making and how national influences absorb, modify or reject those influences coming from the global level. However, a country case study would shrink the perspective down to one particular setting and the global outlook would get lost.

I chose with this study a x-centered approach, and to investigate in external influences focusing on global actors which seem to be among the most promising x-variable. From world society theory, as my theoretical perspective, global norms individually are also a promising factor with the potential to unfold its effects rather indirectly. Yet, I see global actors as being heavily involved in the process of norm production. As described in my theoretical chapter, global actors actively work with norms, edit them or even develop new normative content. Thus, I intend to develop a more comprehensive perspective on global actors and their means to influence, and include a normative perspective as one of three analytical dimensions, as well.

This x-centered study takes a qualitative approach to zoom into the policy diffusion of SCTs in the Global South, and investigates in the policy transfer process, which focuses on global actors' activities to influence national policy-making. Global social policy (GSP) considers global actors as potentially being involved in the *development*, the *diffusion*, and the *domestic implementation* of global policies (Orenstein 2005). I analyze the diffusion aspect and proof according to my GSP perspective this SCT policy diffusion is a matter of GSP, or not. With my comprehensive analysis of the activities of global actors in this policy diffusion process I will qualify the assumption that global actors had an impact on national level by influencing policy-making. This is not to say that national influences don't play a role. Political constellations, veto-players and path-dependencies may all be factors that play a role for the adoption and implementation of policy models. Of particular interest here is how much global actors try to influence. According to a sender-receiver model, I do not intend to investigate in how the receiver interprets the arriving signal. Instead, I want to investigate how strong and which strategies the sender is using to send a signal for policy change. This perspective is much more focused on revealing the global actors' involvement in policy-making rather than on holistically explaining the causes for the spread of SCT programs. Yet, in the final part I reflect on the global actors' activities, on the one hand, and the quantitative data about the policy diffusion, on the other hand, in order to evaluate how influential global actors could have been and what further influential variables beyond global actors' activities can be considered for further investigations.

In the following, I present my methodology to analyze the contribution of global actors, which includes the case selection and the analytical framework designed for x-centered studies from a world society perspective. The analytical framework considers three different perspectives to capture global actors' activities comprehensively.

Case Selection: Capturing the Diversity of Influences

An analysis of the spread of SCT programs is difficult because much variety on country level is involved (e.g. Weible, *forthcoming*). Yet, some policy models can be identified. With multiple actors involved and several SCT policy innovations spreading, I have to select cases which represent as much of this diffusion process as possible. Are there policy innovations that are more prominent than others?

Three out of the four models of SCT that have become consensual in global discourse during the 2000s refer to children and older people (von Gliszczynski 2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). While social assistance policies for the working age do not diffuse much, programs for young and the old diffuse in a fast pace in the form of recognizable policy models. The non-diffusion of social assistance for persons of working age may have multiple reasons. Two reasons, first, no global actor is advocating especially social assistance (von Gliszczynski 2015), and, second, the idea to hand out cash to people who are poor but able to work is not very popular in many developing countries. There is a great fear that social assistance would disincentive recipients to go to work and, thus, make them dependent on the cash transfers; moreover SCT for all poor workers would require considerable resources.

This is contrary to programs for vulnerable groups – like for children and older people. Such programs are advocated by IGOs and INGOs' and have a high legitimacy at global and national level since the mid 2000s (von Gliszczynski 2015). This is why I consider programs for children and older people as predestined to be case studies.

The second criterion would be to cover not just the main SCT policies but the major actors, too. There are multiple global actors recognizable which are classified mainly as IGOs and INGOs. Moreover, some regional development banks, national development agencies (NDAs), think tanks, and individual consultants contribute to the diffusion of SCTs. From all this variety I chose my cases based on two criteria: first, the selected actor should be a main advocate each of the main types of social policies, which are SCTs for children or families and SCTs for older people. Second, I intended to choose an IGO and an INGO as most-different cases in order to capture the diversities of instruments and strategies actors can use to influence national policy-making.

It turns out that the World Bank is an IGO and the most active global actor in the field of conditional child benefits (for non-conditional child benefits and family allowances, UNICEF has been the main advocate) and that for non-contributory pensions an INGO - HelpAge International - is the most active actors (von Gliszczynski 2015). According to HelpAge, the fact that for social pensions the main advocate is an INGO might be due to the fact that the rights of older people played just a minor role at global level, where is almost no organization, which has promoted the rights and needs of older people, except HelpAge. Thus, HelpAge International is

the main global actor that advocates a social policy which is targeted especially towards older people.

From what is known about these actors, those cases seem to be fairly different. While the World Bank is known as a strong and influential actor, which can use large amounts of money in order to influence and effectively push for its policy preferences (Orenstein 2005), HelpAge International as an INGO would be known for country projects and general advocacy for all kind of issues around aging. Yet, so far there is no scientific analysis about this organization which would provide any more profound understanding of how this INGO is involved in influencing national policy-making (but see Walker Bourne et al. 2011). Nevertheless, it meets the eye that HelpAge International holds a strong presence at global level by organizing and attending global events. Can an INGO which does not have the financial means of the World Bank be influential on policy-making? From a world society perspective both actors could use norms and knowledge to influence. This investigation in 'soft power'-influencing provides a common ground to make both cases comparable and to develop an analytical framework in the following to compare the World Bank and HelpAge International according to their strategies and modes of influencing.

Three Perspectives on Global Actors' Activities

This study intends to capture the governance mechanisms and instruments which global actors that have used in this diffusion wave of Social Cash Transfers; which is a deeper investigation into the question of how policy innovations are transmitted from the global to the national level. Grounded in theory, this study understands global actors as 'world society actors'. From this perspective knowledge and norms appear as powerful means to influence. Traditionally, the influence of knowledge and norms has been widely ignored by more realists' approaches, which emphasize 'hard power'-mechanisms (sanctions) as being influential. Global actors also appear to be the ones delivering expertise and advice to the national level.

I discern three analytical perspectives, which have a clear focus but are also able to capture a variety of activities within each perspective. The analytical perspectives fall together with basic mode of influencing. Each mode describes particular instruments, which global actors can use to make use of this mode. My research interest is: First, what are the activities within each mode? And second, what are the strategies behind those activities? Furthermore, the consideration of all

modes of influencing can reveal the *interplay between activities and instruments* used at different levels and in different modes. Such an encompassing overview of those activities might significantly facilitate a better understanding of global actors' contribution to policy diffusion. With its findings, this study contributes to the analysis of the diffusion of social cash transfer programs in the Global South and reveals the activity pattern of global actors; how they are contributing to Global Social Policy, to the development of Social Cash Transfers in general and for policy models in particular. Moreover, the comparison of different types of actors (IGO/INGO) with analytical categories can show at glance the differences of how instruments are used and strategies are designed. Among others, this study reveals that INGOs use their capabilities in such a way that they compensate the (potential) advantages of IGOs. Due to the categories developed in the following it becomes clear how they do that.

The analytical perspectives, which are presented in the following, are consequences of the chosen theoretical perspective. The examples of instruments are based on the findings of previous studies.

Mode of Influencing 1: Advocacy

Global actors are characterized as 'global' based on their scope of activities. Even though a particular actor is based in a single country it can be considered to be a global actor when it operates globally. The global actors promoting SCTs are active at national level and might act as a transmission belt for global ideas. World society theory characterizes global actors as transmission belts between the global and the national level. The global community organizes numerous conferences, which primarily are directed towards other global actors. Global communication grows and develops its own sphere. This global cultural environment establishes its own institutions, normative models, and socializes certain codes of conduct and norms for appropriate behavior. The first perspective of this study looks especially on such activities. What does this specific global actor do to interact with the global development community? Does this actor use global norms in order to edit or develop new cultural norms? And, the main question is: How does this global actor make use of the global environment to send a recognizable signal at national level for the consideration of its policy suggestions?

If global actors use such kind of norms and arguments behind their suggestions and ideas, I will call it *advocacy*. Defined as the act of arguing in favor of

something, I will pay extra attention to the question *for what* international organizations argue and with *what instruments* they put their arguments out there. A prerequisite for advocacy is interest. Only if international organizations have an inherent motivation to diffuse a certain policy advocacy can come into play. This motivation or self-interest can be less obvious to detect because World society theory describes global actors as 'disinterested others' (Meyer 2009), which means that international organizations portray themselves as neutral and altruistic with the aim to support domestic policies according to their socio-economic development and national priorities. This does not mean that these organizations do not follow their own agenda and advocate particular elements of this agenda towards governments. It is just that it is more difficult to identify in how far global actors are motivated by an own agenda.

This study investigates the publications, interactions between other global actors and global conferences in order to identify in how far international organizations are driven by a world cultural mission and in which ways publications and conferences are instruments in order to advocate global ideas and models. Of particular interest are all those instruments which are directed towards nation-state so they might have an impact on national-level.

Advocacy can have direct effects and also impact indirectly taking effect to a later point of time. Advocacy can make a policy idea more popular in general so that it can trigger learning-effects in multiple national-states without the direct involvement of global actors. The implemented policy can be initiated by the government and yet follow a global trend. Advocacy is a rather abstract stimulus for policy diffusion. This study investigates qualitatively in how far global actors have used this mode of influencing for the diffusion of social cash transfer programs.

Mode of Influencing 2: Advice

A further key characteristic of global actors in the field of global social policy, is their direct involvement in domestic politics. World society theory has pointed out how the promotion of policy models reflects world culture: models are *rationally* argued, underpinned by *scientific* evidence; and advocacy by global actors has to be 'disinterested' and expertise-based. In other words: '*advice'* is a seemingly neutral way to assist developing countries in a legitimate way. 'Disinterested' basically

means that it is somehow illegitimate that global actors would act based on self-interest.

Thus, those actors invoke global norms and appear to be the executive organization of norms. For example, instead of being self-interested HelpAge International works for the rights and needs of older people based on global norms and codified agreements, and the World Bank appears not to be interested in selling loans but to work for the national development of countries and to end global poverty. Poverty reduction, development, and support for 'most vulnerable groups' (like women, orphans and vulnerable children, cultural minorities, and disabled and older people) are highly legitimated global norms embedded in our global culture. To operate at national level mainly with expertise and advice allows organizations to appear as neutral advisors. With their advice, international organizations are helping countries with the proper design and implementation of global norms and models. It seems that technical details are a much-needed resource at national level, like, for example, the technical know-how on how to set up a primary education system or a work injury insurance. The delivery of technical advice and expertise as 'disinterested others' to the national level seems to be a less provocative way to tell people what to do. The delivery of technical advice is considered to be key for influencing national policy-making directly.

The main questions for the analysis are: How do global actors get access and contact the national level to start communications? What are the instruments used to deliver the expertise about SCT policy innovations? Inspired by the classical policy-cycle model (Jann and Wegrich 2003:82) this study asks: In how far does advice influence *agenda setting*, so that IOs preferences get on the national agenda to be further discussed and processed within the political system? How does advice influence the process of *policy formulation*? Policy formulation is the actual development of a policy. In this process global and national influences like path-dependencies merge. In a syncretic process policies are developed. Finally, the question: How advice influences *policy implementation*? The implementation of policies is often a gradual process and correlates with the building of institutions. Social policies' survival is ensured, if the building of institutions succeeds. The development and implementation of a policy is a process where much advice is needed and multiple chances exist for international organizations to deliver and to influence. If and in how far global actors have taken this chance is matter of the analysis.

Again, I do not necessarily expect that all global actors are actively making use of advice in order to influence. Yet, to strengthen the assumption that global actors have been influential in this SCT policy diffusion and have effectively contributed to national policy-making, cognitive influencing via advice would be a prerequisite.

Mode of Influencing 3: Incentives

My focus on 'soft power' influencing to study how global actors make use of knowledge and norms in order to influence policy-making should not exclude the more classical perspective of more 'hard power' mechanisms based on sanctions. This mechanism is captured best by Keohane and Nye's concept of carrot and stick influencing which emphasizes the two sides that certain instruments – like loans – can have.

> "The withholding of loans may not be a stick that IOs use often to influence social policy, but the promise of loans may be a useful carrot. [...] If IOs offer financial carrots for particular types of reforms, we would expect reformers to acknowledge forthcoming support and find evidence of financial support following the reform. [...] IOs can also provide funding for technical or pilot studies, thereby increasing the likelihood that reforms will occur" (Keohane & Nye 1998: 27).

These two aspects of more 'hard power' influencing show that it is merely a matter of perspective if this kind of 'hard power' is characterized as a 'coercive' mode or an 'incentive-based' one. Due to the strong fixation on the World Bank's conditional lending policy in the 1990s, the term coercive influencing made its way into the diffusion literature. And even though the term 'coercion' is still very prominent in the diffusion literature, I do not understand this term as an adequate description, because it seems to me that international organizations have learned to operate more and more in a mode based on partnership and support avoiding antagonistic relationships. Moreover, developing countries – especially in Latin America – experienced economic growth and developed a more self-confidential attitude allowing them to easily reject loan offers or loosen the conditions attached to this. Brazil is a good example for a developing country which became one of the major self-confident players in a relative short time frame. Thus, I focus on the 'carrot'

instead of on the 'stick' and use the term *incentive* in order to capture IOs' usage of "hard power". I see two instruments serving as hard power incentives: first, financial means, which global actors make available to national governments for certain policy reforms; second, political pressure, which is providing the government an incentive to gain support from certain parts of the society or political players by responding to their claims.

Table 1: Models and instruments of International Organizations
for influencing domestic social security policies

Table 1

Mode of Influencing	Advocacy	Advice	Incentives

Instruments	- Policy Models
	- Documents
	- Conventions
	  & Agreements
	- Conferences
	  (global/regional)
		- Expertise &
		  Technical Assistance
		- Workshops &
		  Trainings
			- Financial Means
			- Political Means

Source: the author

The table above presents the analytical framework as it was used for the empirical analysis of this study. The chapters on the World Bank and on HelpAge International follow this categorization. Additionally, for the introduction of each case study I investigated in the actors' ambitions; analytically speaking: the mission of the actor. The analysis of the mission is part of the advocacy mode of influencing, because such intention is the prerequisite for advocacy. The guiding questions for this analysis are: Does this actor intend to influence national policy-making? How direct or indirect does the particular actor show that it supports and advocates a SCT policy model? Those questions help to get a better understanding of how actors portray and perceive themselves. The modes of 'advocacy' and 'advice' evaluate the role 'soft power' plays within policy diffusion. Therewith one might better understand how global actors serve as a transmission belt for global policy innovations. This understanding can enhance the conceptualization of policy diffusion/ policy transfer studies. Showing global actors' activities on influencing beyond 'hard power' means

to influence should provide a fuller picture which allows to evaluate if global actors have been involved in the diffusion of SCT programs in the Global South.

1.4. Data Collection:
Interview and Document Analysis

To get all necessary data for the analytical framework this study relies on multiple methods to gather the information. Moreover, the access to information for the different case studies varied among each other, because each time different sources were available. Multiple methods have been necessary in order to compensate the difficulties and challenges with regard to access to the empirical fields of each case. While international organizations are devoted to a high degree of transparency and provide much information online, there, however, is a difference between INGOs and IGOs. Non-governmental organizations are easily approachable for interviews while governmental organizations tend to be more closed and did not respond to interview requests. While interviews are a highly valuable source of information to get to know the strategies involved in policy diffusion, I had to compensate the lack of interviews with the World Bank with a much more extensive document analysis. In sum, I made a document analysis, expert-interviews, and participating and non-participating observations. Each method is linked to different data sources. All methods together contribute to get solid information on the instruments, modes and strategies used by global actors to influence national policy-making. In the following, I give an overview on the methods and sources which I used for my analysis.

1. Websites & Conferences: Know the Background!

It would be difficult to make sense of the collected data without tan observation of global discussions, which explain the broader context. To understand the broader context help interpreting the data and make statements, which might be hard to conclude merely from the data of a document analysis. Participatory and non-participatory observations have been used in order to get an understanding on the activities and thoughts of the international policy community. A first good impression on the global actor's ambitions can be found on the websites of those organizations.

Why can websites be considered a valuable source of information? Do global actors publish documents and protocols about their activities publicly online? From a world society perspective websites and publicly available information is considered as a valuable source of information, because the need for global actors to present themselves and provide information on their activities is strong. To make information publicly available through the Internet not only serves the global norms of transparency and accountability, it helps to get reputation and recognition from other global actors and, thus creates or reconfirms the actor's reputation. While the need for self-projection is strong, the information might be biased especially when it is about the achievements of this actor. Yet, I found a way of presenting information, which is primarily based on technical facts. Furthermore, disregarding any biases the websites reveal in any case the worldview of the particular actor and how it terms, defines and categorizes social facts on SCTs. With my observations I look in particular at the way categories are build, introductions are written, and what image the actor cultivates for itself. This source contributes to understand the actor and the actor's behavior better.

The analysis of the actors' websites was the main source to investigate in the analytical aspect which I called 'mission', which is about the expression of global actors' ambitions to influence policy-making in favor of SCT policy innovations. Do global actors just work on SCTs, or do they expressively intend to diffuse their worldviews and programs? Are they on a 'mission' to diffuse their knowledge, or is a potential spread of knowledge a rather unintended byproduct?

For the general characterization of the actor it is also necessary to have information about the actors' origins, their past and development to the present. I could not rely on my own observations for that but was dependent on observations other experts have made. I found for each actor a recent publication. For the World Bank case study Katherine Marshall (2008) wrote about the IGO based on a insider perspective grown over years based on multiple interviews. For the HelpAge International case study the INGO's staff wrote a contribution for an edited volume itself. The article was written by Astrid Walker Bourne, Mark Gorman and Michael Bünte (2011) who are central persons within the organization. Both publications helped a lot to get a fundamental understanding on the organization's past.

Additionally, in order to find out how people discuss SCTs, I relied heavily on participating observations of individuals who are key to the development community around the topic of SCT. With this method I could observe controversies, what is consent, and on what global actors intend to focus on their activities. Supported by

the FLOOR project of the Bielefeld University I visited several conferences with multiple global actors attending. Most of the events were attended by the whole sociology department of the FLOOR research group, which was a great plus for the discussions and reflections on those events. Additionally, I presented parts of my results in academic forums in order to get comments and different perspectives from other scientists.

In the following, I enumerate the events I attended to make transparent which events have fueled my observations: In 2011 I attended a workshop in Bonn (Germany) with policy experts of the development community discussing in how far development aid is in a crisis because it is in between of two paradigms, first, providing help for the purpose of stimulating self-help, and second, providing support for the development of social protection systems. In the same year, I participated in discussions on social protection at events organized by German parties and think tanks in Berlin, like the meetings of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (German Social Democrats) and Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Green Party). Moreover, I went to a conference in Bochum (Germany) about the topic "Reforming Social Protection Systems in Developing Countries" where also many policy experts and global actors attended. The University Bielefeld also invited several experts on development and global rights and hosted their stay for half a year funded by the Center for Interdisciplinary Research Bielefeld. In this time, we were visited by Armando Barrientos (University Manchester, UK) who is one of the major scientist on social protection in the Global South, especially in Latin America, with many publications in this field and who had also advised himself several developing countries on policy reform. Also in 2011, Arup Banerji – the director of the social protection and labor division of the World Bank – visited Germany, and presented the new World Bank strategy in Bonn, which will serve as a guideline for the organization for the next decade. At the end of that year, I attended in Geneva (Swiss) the 100th ILO Conference where the International Labour Office tried to get countries to agree on a convention/recommendation on the social protection floor. In the first year of the project, I collected most of the fundamental impression I based my research on later in the process. The main event in 2012 was a workshop in London organized by HelpAge International where most of the INGO's staff from all over the world came together. It was a unique opportunity for me to get first and impressions of what was going on within the organization and how it was working on and thinking about its current mission. Later this year our project organized a workshop with Bernd Schubert in Berlin who is one of the main policy consultants from Germany active in

African countries to disseminate SCT programs targeted towards people living in extreme poverty.

To get reflections on my observations I presented my work basically in three different scientific settings; for the world society community (Institute for World Society Studies "World Organizations" 2011 in Bielefeld [Germany]), for the political science community (Annual International Studies Association "Panel: Development Practices From Below" 2013 San Francisco [USA]), and for the global social policy community (Workshop "Studying International Organizations in Social Policy" Bremen [Germany]; International Sociology Association – RC 19 Annual Meeting 2012 "Welfare States Facing Global Turbulence, Ageing and Migration" Olso [Norway]). Additionally, I had several presentations and workshops at both universities of my supervisors: Bielefeld University (Germany) and Emory University (USA).

In sum, the participating observations have contributed substantially to make sense of the information I received via interviews and the document analysis. I have met most of the key figures of the SCT and global social policy community in person and could hear their opinions and talk with them about their work. The next section explains my approach to a document analysis.

2. Document Analysis: Get the Facts Straight!

As mentioned above, global actors do provide a lot of information on their website about their policies and activities. This can serve to be a valuable basis to get more detailed information. A document analysis was my main source to find out the main facts about the instruments global actors use to influence national policy-making. INGOs have a particular need to be recognized at global level and, thus, provide a lot of information easy accessible. HelpAge International provides access to multiple documents which provide information about their activities in a clear, simple and recognizable way. Moreover, the INGO has several papers, magazines and newsletters publishing on a regular basis. Information about the World Bank is a little harder to get and instead of information provided in the style of short brochures World Bank documents tend to be around one hundred pages or more and entail much more technical material like charts, tables, an numbers. This technical style is simply the way this IGO communicates. Additionally, the World Bank has also established several types of documents, which provide new information on a regular

basis, publicly accessible in a huge database. The main difference between these the sources of HelpAge and the World Bank is, that the information of HelpAge provides an overview with country examples, while the World Bank provides specific information in country examples, so that it is up to the reader to discover the general information. Fortunately, the country examples of the World Bank are a rich source of hundreds of documents.

I found that the database of the World Bank (http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/docsearch/document-type/540613) is a valuable source of information that is hard to get otherwise. For the case study on the World Bank I relied mainly on one type of document the World Bank calls 'Country Assistance Strategies' (CAS). What are CAS? Whereas developing countries which receive loans from the World Bank have to periodically publish 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper' (PRSP) in order to show what kind of progress the country has made to mitigate poverty and to stimulate economic growth, the World Bank answers to this papers with CAS. I found this type of document in particular helpful because it is about the activity areas of the country's development policies the World Bank engages in and entails at the same time the country's vision of its development goals. The expected outcomes of the World Bank's support discovers it's preferences and policy advice. The usage of multiple of the Bank's instruments, activities on advising, and support can be found in the CAS. I analyzed the CAS for all developing countries, which have an SCT program in place, since the end of the 1990s until today. With new CAS published ever three to six years that means between two to four reports for each country. Covering the World Bank's activities in 24 countries I studies in sum about 130 CAS reports.[2] A CAS is on average about 100 pages long; including reports that are just between 40-70 pages long, while others have 130-160 pages. Those reports are so long because they cover the countries' development with regard to many aspects. With a filter system I went through the 13.000 pages to discover those parts which are about poverty, social protection, their policy model, education and health. Based on this analysis I made a summary report for these countries which served my as a source for illustrative examples and details for the empirical chapter.

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2   For a list of the CAS reports used for this analysis: see appendix.

3. Expert Interviews: Discover the Strategies Behind the Actions!

Documents are a valuable basis to collect the details about global actors' activities, but they have a weakness when one wants to discover the strategic usage of the actors' governance instruments. I conducted for this study interviews with the staff of these organizations. I was in particular interested in the ambitions of these actors with regard to their SCT policies, and how they approach national governments. I attempted to discover the organization's aims and the strategies with which these aims are pursued. As mentioned above the workshops of HelpAge International held in London was an excellent opportunity to conduct several expert interviews with staff from different departments and world regions of this organization.

All interviews where guided interviews based on a guideline which I developed according to the questions about the process of influencing stemming from my analytical framework.

It is to note that the access to information about these two actors was very different. While the access to information about HelpAge International was rather simple due to the fact that INGOs publish so openly and directly, and due to the fact that I could make multiple interview where the people have talked with me very openly about processes inside the organization, the access to information about the World Bank was much more difficult due to missing contacts which made interviewing a complicated endeavor. Thus, the case study on the World Bank relied for the most part on the extensive document analysis.

Part II
Empirical Analysis of Diffusion Strategies

Chapter 2: The World Bank
and Conditional Cash Transfers

In the following I give an introduction in how to understand the World Bank as an actor in the Global South. The introduction shows how to understand the range of the World Bank's activities and how the World Bank's instruments have developed towards 'knowledge-based' instruments complementing loan provision. After this more general introduction I describe my findings supporting the thesis that advocacy of global models is one to the main strategies to influence national policy development. Following this chapter I describe that technical advice at national level is an important mechanism to support institution-building so that the globally established models become institutionalized. In a final part, I discuss incentive-based means to promote institution-building at national level apart from technical advice. The results confirm what the introductory section about the nature of the World Bank as a 'Knowledge Bank' already theoretically described, namely that knowledge-based instruments have become important means to promote particular policies.

2.1. How to Understand the 'World Bank'

The World Bank is an international governmental organization (IGO) which "aspires to be the world's premier development institution" (Marshall 2008:1) with an emphasis on lending money to developing countries in order to fight poverty. It has close working relationships with most of the UN institutions, and can be considered as part of the UN system, though it holds a special status due to the governments' direct influence on the organization (Marshall 2008:35). The World Bank is well equipped with financial resources by governments that are able and willing to devote money to this institution. Even though governmental influence is weighted according to their financial contribution it wouldn't be appropriate to merely understand the World Bank as acting on behalf of national governments. The World Bank is a

complex set of institutions which is driven by an own dynamic. "The World Bank consists of a complex set of multinational, multisectoral, multidisciplinary institutions that are involved in almost every issue imaginable" (Marshall 2008:2). Above that the World Bank is driven by its mandate and ideology which changed its focus through the reforms in the 1990s. To understand the World Bank current activities and instruments one can take a look at the development of the World Banks's policies, the logic of its particular departments, its general mandate and its underlying ideology. Yet, this policies and the logic of its institutions has to seen in relation to the partners it interacts with and the arenas in operates in. In this regard I emphasize two different arenas, namely, on the one hand, the World Bank's activities towards nation-states in the Global South, and, on the other hand, the World Bank's activities towards other international organizations in the global developing community. The World Bank "is a major actor both in countries that seek its support and partnership and in the development community at large" (Marshall 2008:1). Both arenas have their logic and requirements. Being constantly involved into interactions in those arenas, the World Bank's behavior seems to be much more driven by its activities in those arenas and its policies than by the interests of the governments that provide the funding for the World Bank, like e.g. the United States of America or other major actors. Most recent research on international organizations does confirm this perspective: "IOs exist independently of states, and have an effect of their own that makes them matter in various ways" (Oestreich 2012: 5).[3] An additional factor that is giving the World Bank even some more autonomy is that it generates its own revenues. Noticeable, the World Bank is not a charity organization but a bank which lends money with interests. The cash delivered to developing countries is not a give-away or donation, it merely is lending. Due to this fact the World Bank holds a relative autonomous position because it is not necessarily dependent on specific funding provided by states:

> "The World Bank had operated with relative autonomy in its early years, in large measures because it did not depend on regular budget allocations from member governments and because borrowing countries repaid their loans on time and its financial borrowing program was so successful" (Marshall 2008:38).

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3   "We understand that IOs are often severely constrained in their powers, particularly when their actions go against the wishes of important states, and we don't suggest that states can't control IOs when they really want to. Still, a growing body of literature takes seriously the option that IOs can be independent, and, when conditions are met, serious actors in the international system." (Oestreich 2012: 2).

Thus, the World Bank can be understood as a more or less independent institution that is part of the UN system and foremost guided by its policies.

To be precise the "World Bank Group" does include many institutions but there is a narrow set of institutions which I refer to when mentioning the World Bank.

Historically, "the Bank began as a relatively minor player whose primary role was seen as financing postwar reconstruction in Europe and Asia" (Marshall 2008:2). The institution that still today represents the World Bank the most because it is responsible for lending is the "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" (IBRD). The name of this institution clearly describes the World Bank's focus on after-war reconstruction. However, "over the succeeding decades, the second part of the institution's official title – development – became its core mission" (ibid.). Even though the IBRD is the core institution with respect to the multiple other institutions it would be more appropriate to speak of the World Bank Group:

> "The World Bank should be seen as composed of several different institutions, with different charters and mandates. The three principal institutions include the IBRD, also confusingly called the World Bank; the International Development Association (IDA), created in 1960 as a fund for concessional financing; and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which lends to private companies for private-sector projects" (Marshall 2008:6).

Next to the IBRD the IDA is the second core institution which is interacting with governments and, thus, of importance for my analysis. As in the 1960s most African states became independent as a consequence of decolonization, the Bank had to react to this changing realities: "It was becoming crystal clear that the resulting new nations – especially but not exclusively in Africa – were not creditworthy on the near-commercial terms at which the Bank's financial structure allowed it to lend" (Marshall 2008:36). As a consequence the IDA emerged as a new entity within the World Bank Group to provide the African countries with funding free from interests. Marshall (2008) provides a short summary:

> "Unlike IBRD, IDA depends on grant contributions from wealthier nations – set initially at a total of $1 billion – which the agency lends to poorer nations on highly concessional terms. The management of this system and its overall operating policies would mimic those of IBRD, which would run the new fund. [...] While the reality is that

it functions as an integral part of the Bank, often so closely allied that the two are indistinguishable except in financial structure and financial terms. Still, that distinction is an important one. The IBRD relies on careful tests of creditworthiness to determine whether a country is eligible and for what amount before lending on close to commercial terms. IDA, in contrast, offers "credits" (distinct from IBRD loans) with 0 percent interest, repayment over 40 years after a 10-year grace period, and a 0.75 percent service charge on outstanding amounts. [… Additionally,] IDA grants were introduced in 2002 for some IDA countries and projects" (Marshall 2008:36-7).

The IBRD and IDA together form what I will call in the following "the World Bank" noticing that in most cases the IBRD is active while in Africa it is mainly the IDA. The IDA is especially focused on the poorest countries. It has by far not the capacities of the IBRD because it is dependent on voluntary grants of countries. While the IBRD became stronger with the years, it began "to grant some of its profits to IDA on a regular basis, but these funds represented only part of IDS's financial needs" (Marshall 2008:39). Chronically under-resourced the IDA has in particular to focus on the most urgent needs of its client countries.

What is the mission of this lending organization? Keeping in mind that the World Bank was founded as a financial organization for after war reconstruction, it had an economic and a social dimension from the beginning on. The social dimension might be best described by referring to the slogan written at the entrance of its main building in Washington: "Our Dream is a World Free of Poverty". Therefore, the World Banks works with the poorer countries of the world to further their economic and social development.

"It does this by providing a combination of financial resources, technical support, advice and analysis, training, and coordination of development assistance. In practice the World Bank is deeply involved in virtually every facet of development, and is a major actor both in countries that seek its support and partnership and in the development community at large" (Marshall 2008:1).

The World Bank pursues this broad variety of activities with "several thousand teams at work in over 120 countries, some based in the World Bank's many offices, others traveling on what the Bank calls 'missions' " (ibid.). Still lending is the central purpose of the organization:

"Unlike many other organizations working in the development field, the World Bank has access to significant resources. The World Bank lends on the order of US$20-25 billion each year, and its outstanding loan and credit portfolio stood at $200 billion as of June 2007. Its approved operating budget for fiscal 2008 was $2.1 billion, and a myriad of other funds administered by the World Bank gave it still further financial leverage" (Marshall 2008:4).

Marshall (2008) with his insider-knowledge about the World Bank does not stop at emphasizing the lending part of the World Bank. Marshall highlights the importance of *knowledge* as the World Bank does also provide technical support, trainings, advice and analyses*.* Thus, two of the main analytical categories for this actor are about the cash/lending as "incentives for national institution-building" and about the knowledge as "advice on national institution-building".

"The "banking" role of the World Bank should not overshadow its many non-banking roles. Indeed, most who work at the World Bank understand well that money alone solves few problems, and that ideas are by far more important as a vector for lasting change. Lending and money are indeed central to the character and structure of the World Bank, but they are not the whole story" (Marshall 2008:4).

This quotation emphasizes "ideas" as a third aspect which plays an important role for knowledge-based advice but is – as described in my theoretical framework – a category of its own. If it is true that the World Bank has particular ideas on how certain policies are suppose to look like, policy models to play a role. Thus, the third analytical in this chapter is "advocacy of Global Models".

After this overview of how to understand the World Bank I explain how the Bank's operational approach to poverty reduction has changed over the years. It will show that the perspective has chanced from a top-down mode to one that is much more country-led and takes different development paths into account. A further aspect of the shift away from a top-down mode is that next to lending the role of knowledge gained constantly more weight, so that current the World Bank is as well described as a 'Knowledge Bank'. The next section sheds more light on this transition.

The 1990s: shifting policy concepts of the World Bank

Loewe's publication on social security (2008) includes a short overview of the development inside the World Bank: After the post-war reconstruction, especially in the 1980s, the World Bank was guided by the "Washington Consensus", which was based on a neoliberal economical ideology. Stability and structural adaptation programs were core elements of the politics in this time. The consolidation of public budgets in developing countries was the top priority. Poverty reduction was regarded as being a consequence of economic growth and a trickle-down-effect. According to this idea economic development would stimulate after a "while" (in terms of years or decades!) social development as well.

Thus, the World Bank focused foremost on the consolidation of public budgets by suggesting reductions in public expenditure and the privatization of public services. This kind of outsourcing and austerity measures concerned foremost the social sector. This kind of 'advice' was delivered to the developing countries in a rather authoritative way. Being in a strong need for new financial resources they had to accept the suggestions of the World Bank. As a consequence of those policies income poverty deepened and the Bank was heavily criticized by social movements. After 50 years of the Banks existence civil society protests arose with the "50 Years Is Enough" campaign (Marshall 2008:49). Already before, in the 1970s and 1980s some changes within the World Bank occurred, when economic shocks forced a rethinking of the concepts applied so far. Moreover the Bank already was criticized for its behind-closed-doors-politics focusing foremost on infrastructure and human resources. More important, the notion of development broadened in this time making institutions aware of the complexity of the task confronting them. "Education, health, nutrition, land tenure: a steady drumbeat of new topics appeared on agendas and filtered into organizations" (Marshall 2008:14). In this time the focus of the World Bank still was on economical factors and less on poverty. Thus, poverty reduction was included in a residual 'safety net' approach instead of being part of an encompassing social protection plan.

The 1990s are understood as the period of trend reversal in international development politics (Loewe 2008) that finally also reached the World Bank. At latest in 2001 were the United Nations agreed upon the Millennium Development Goals

(MDGs) which became a benchmark for the World Bank as well. Loewe (2008) describes numerous UN conferences preceding the MDGs as responsible for that change. Starting in 1991 where the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) confronted the World Development Report of the World Bank for the first time with its Human Development Report. In the following years, the international community focused more on social and ecological development. This process resulted in a new paradigm of international development policies with a stronger emphasis on and a more encompassing understanding of poverty and the dimensions involved. Education, health, and social and political rights became inherent to the understanding of poverty. Especially education and health became important activity areas of the World Bank.

Also due to Wolfensohn, who became president of the World Bank in 1995, the focus of the Bank widened. He introduced what came to be known as the 'comprehensive development framework'. "The core message was that the economic and social aspects of development were like 'breathing out and breathing in', and he insisted on recognizing the complexities of the development process, and thus of the Bank's work" (Marshall 2008:50). In the years of Wolfensohn's presidency the World Bank faced the critique already mentioned above and reacted to it by abandoning most of its authoritative style:

> "Two new mantras entered the discussion. The first was _country ownership_, reflecting the important observation that unless leaders and mangers responsible for politics and programs are convinced and determined to act, development programs cannot succeed. Too often, it became clear, development institutions including the World Bank had taken too heavy a hand in program design, suiting it to their perceptions of how development should proceed, and had taken far too much at face value national government acceptance of proposed programs and conditions without testing commitment and recognizing the obvious pitfall that came when officials accepted proffered funds in the face of limited options. The second traced a path _from consultation to participation_ and empowerment. This path reflected the crucial observation that communities must be far more directly involved in programs designed to help them. An array of advocacy, tools, and rules emerged to ensure that programs did indeed engage the people they most affected" (Marshall 2008:16; emphasis added).

In a nutshell, the general understanding of development and poverty changed in the 1990s in the international community. This trend made it into the World Bank as well with a new perspective including three major changes.

First, the Bank adopted a more open perspective towards a more complex definition of poverty. As a consequence education and health gained a more important role.

Second, the developments within the UN system leading to the MDGs and the experiences of global economic crises stimulated that the World Bank was rethinking its economic approach based on a 'trickle-down' effect and introduced an economic approach that also includes what is know today as a 'trickle-up' effect, echoing the new credo of the international community that 'poverty is not the problem, but part of the solution'. As a consequence the World Bank became more open towards social protection and direct support of the poor. Fighting extreme poverty with a more direct approach encapsulates the idea that social protection measures are an investment in human capital that contributes to a favorable environment contributing to economic growth.

Third, due to the critique the World Bank received in the 1990s it abandoned most of its authoritative style and emphasized country-led development. However, due to its financial commitment in form of lending the World Bank still has an interest that national governments implement policies that stimulate economic growth enabling the country to pay back the loans. Thus, it is important for the World Bank to have a say when countries design programs and think about policy innovations. To ensure that the lending can be payed back in a more or less near future, the World Bank must ensure that those programs are beneficial for the country's economy.

A final transformation within the World Bank, that was also introduced by Wolfensohn, is connected with a couple of innovations and the new term 'Knowledge Bank' which is supposed to reflect the new emphasis on information technology.

What is the "Knowledge Bank"?

Wolfensohn intended to equip the World Bank with new instruments to exercise influence. Well aware of the information revolution he "launched the ambitious Development Gateway, designed to bring together in a giant web site and database information on development ideas and projects. He also pressed hard to launch a Global Distance Learning Network, which uses state-of-the-art videoconferencing to

provide flexible training courses and conferences" (Marshall 2008:51). While that is proof of the fact that data and knowledge production and the speed of its traveling increased, the term might also indicate that knowledge has become more important as an instrument to influence national policy-making. In this light Marshall emphasizes: "When asked to highlight the World Bank's primary contribution to development, most staff members would cite ideas and knowledge" (Marshall 2008:72). The World Bank directly says on its website that it addresses national governments with this new strategy on influencing:

> "Fighting poverty requires a global strategy to share knowledge effectively and to ensure that people who need that knowledge get it on time, whether from the World Bank or other organizations. Sharing knowledge enables the World Bank to respond faster to client needs, deliver a quality product, _encourage innovation_, and continually introduce new services to its clients" (World Bank Website 2011; emphasis added).

How can the World Bank use its rational and scientific behavior to "encourage particular innovations"? The World Bank can introduce new ideas and policy suggestions by making it appear to be an outcome of seemingly rational calculations. These "results" can become facts when just mentioned often enough:

> "By repeating certain propositions sufficiently often, they can be made to sound like facts, and given the credibility of economics in other areas, most people treat them as facts. This creates scope for subversion, feeding people with 'facts' that are convenient to some" (Basu 2003:892–893).

Continuing with this strategy the World Bank has the potential to increase its influence dramatically, and, at the same time, in a new more cooperative and less authoritative style. Already at the end of the 1990s the World Bank has been described as "the single most important external source of ideas and advice to developing-country policymakers" (Gavin and Rodrik 1995; see also Stern and Ferreira 1997).

From this perspective another part of the World Bank, the Human Development Network, is of some importance as well. It is the intellectual arm that is working in all the fields of importance for social cash transfers and social protection.

"The Human Development Network (HDN) is the World Bank's home for policy, programs, and research in the fields of education, health, and social protection and labor. The HDN Chief Economist's Office supports evaluations and training measure program impact and improve service delivery" (World Bank Website 2013).

The HDN is just mentioned to sensitize for the fact that some other institutions next to the IBRD and the IDA will be of importance for the analysis of the World Bank's modes of influence.

Finally, it is to notice an important feature of indirect and knowledge-based influencing, namely to appear as an institution that provides its knowledge on a neutral basis and free of particular policies. Instead of simply prescribing policies, advice has to be delivered as a result of consultations and scientific analyses. I found no statement in World Bank publications or on its website that clearly indicates the World Bank's intention to influence. I understand this as being part of the World Bank's new strategy to establish itself as a 'knowledge bank' that appears to be interest and advocacy free. The analysis of the World Bank's modes of influencing in the following shows has the Bank manages to make policy suggestions while merely providing technical advice.

2.2. Advocacy of Global Models: Constructing "Conditional Cash Transfers"

In this section I describe the World Bank's ideas and thoughts on social cash transfers (SCTs). I will point out that its actions are guided by a particular policy model which has become recognizable for other global actors as well as for national governments: the model of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). I have to note that the World Bank works in so many fields that it difficult to say that one particular policy model is the only favored policy. Instead multiple different programs and policies are mentioned on one or another context. For example, social pensions as a social policy for older people has been already mentioned in 1994 in "Averting the old age crisis" (World Bank 1994). Yet, it was not a concept that guided the World Bank's actions in any way since it became more prominent one decade later. So I focused on references to policies that were dominant within action related policy papers of the

World Bank. From this point of view, I claim that CCTs are the major policy suggestion of the World Bank for SCTs, besides non-contributory pension and cash-for-work programs (referred to as the zero-pillar in the revised multi-pillar pension model of the World Bank; Holzmann and Hinz 2005, see Wodsak 2011) CCTs have been the flagship model for the World Bank's activities on SCTs. In a first step, I describe in how far the World Bank has developed a policy model and, in a second step, I describe I how far the World Bank has made use of the global environment in order to increase the model's normative influence.

How a National Social Security Model
became a Global Policy Model

The story about conditional cash transfers begins in Latin America.[4] The policy innovations of Mexico in 1997 and Brazil in 1995, reformed in 2001 mark the initial phase of the development of CCTs. As those programs grew larger within a short time frame covering millions of households with direct cash transfers to the poor/extremely poor, both programs caught the attention of global actors like the World Bank at the end of the 1990s/beginning of the 2000s. At this time the term conditional cash transfer was not yet born. The programs of those countries can simply be described as social policies in the form of child benefits targeted towards poor families based on the recipients compliance with certain conditions. While the child benefit programs within the countries involve a high degree of complexity the World Bank managed quickly to find formulations that reduce the complexity and establish catchy descriptions instead. The payments of Mexico's *Oportunidades* (beginning in 1997 with the name PROGRESA; renamed in 2001) consist of several components. At its core households with children received a monthly benefit depending on the type of school the children go to, their gender, and the grades the kids get in school. Next to the condition that the children need to have good grades the children have to have a minimum school attendance of 93% over the year. Moreover, they have to complete the 12 grade before age 22, and complete middle school. This benefit was complemented with a payment for school material and a benefit that was payed out once after completion of the high school. Moreover, *Oportunidadas* provides a benefit depending on compliance by all household members with required preventive medical checkups, and the attendance of family

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4   For an in-depth analysis of the rise of four social security models where the roots can partly be traced back to Mexico and Brazil see von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016.

members older than 15 years at health and nutrition lectures (cf. World Bank 2009: 268).

How to describe such a complex program with so many components and factors in a brief and concise way? The innovation of the World Bank describing this program simply as a child benefit that is dependent on an education and health condition cannot be underestimated. Brazil with its *Bolsa Familia* program is the second case of a country that innovated a country program which became a lighthouse example in the CCT debate in the following decade. It started in 1995 as a program called *Bolsa Escola* which disbursed a monthly benefit to poor households with children that have a minimal school attendance of 85% a year. In 2003 this program was closed and integrated into the newly introduced program *Bolsa Familia* which made its benefits dependent on compliance with education *and* health conditions. Described in this abstract way which is leaving most of the complexity aside one could already say that *Bolsa Famila* had an education and health condition just *like Oportunidades* in Mexico. Reducing complexity makes it possible to compare heterogeneous cases and to describe them as one of a kind.

It was the 'Latin American and the Caribbean Regional Office' of the World Bank that described those programs as conditional cash transfers (World Bank/LACRO 2001) at a time were the World Bank referred to those programs as 'targeted human development programs':

> "Targeted human development programs for poor households with children transfer income in cash or in kind on the basis of such observable criteria as children's age, attendance in school, or participation in a health care program. They thus serve the dual objectives of poverty reduction and human development" (World Bank 2001:158).

However, those 'targeted human development programs' were already mentioned in this report as a separate kind of program next to child allowances. A few years later the World Bank switched its language calling those programs conditional cash transfers and consequently used the acronym CCT in publications and reports. All kind of child allowances that include some kind of education and/or health conditions became quickly known in the international community as belonging to the type of social policies called CCTs.

The World Bank's attempt to establish its policy as a clear policy model does play a role in many publications since 2001, but becomes most visible in its 2009

flagship publication titled 'Conditional Cash Transfers'. This publication is widely recognized and often mentioned in the international development community. As a senior World Bank official told me: "We don't do advocacy. We are just riding a wave". That is indeed how the World Society Theory describes global actors who portrait themselves as disinterested others. In the World Bank publication CCTs are presented as an overview of programs which are already in place and as an evaluation of how they work and what effects those CCTs have. It is portrait as a pure analysis, and advocacy can just be found implicitly. However, the World Bank does advocacy, or at least tries to increase the attractiveness and popularity of its policy model. In the following I describe how the World Bank did this in its 2009 flagship publication.

Even though the World Bank merely presents an overview, the IGO does sum up very different governmental programs under the umbrella term 'conditional cash transfers', as they would belong to one type of model. In fact, I found that the World Bank has a clear vision of what it describes and it would like to see implemented as a CCT, namely, a monthly benefit for households with children dependent on an education *and* a health condition. The publication however does include to a large extent scholarships which originally had nothing to do with CCTs but are now portrait as a kind of CCT that just has an education condition and no health condition. I understand that such a perspective is a good reflection of what the Bank's staff is confronted with in its daily experiences at national level, but I also see the deviance to the World Bank's ideal model. Although the World Bank has a clear vision of CCTs it is writing its report from a bottom-up perspective. There is nothing wrong with such a perspective but it is labeling programs retrospectively as CCT what in fact never was designed to be one. I understand this as a technique to design a model and make it popular.

Especially present is this intention with a map that the Bank connects with a bold claim, namely that the last decade can be characterized as a 'CCT wave' (World Bank 2009:3). To underscore this claim a world map gives a global overview of all the countries with some sort of CCT programs; one world map shows the state of the spread of "CCTs" in 1997 and another world map shows the spread in 2008. What is visible at first glance is a massive increase of CCT programs around the world. It seems to be the proof of the Bank's observation of a CCT wave. That is in particular interesting because the description of such a wave is more than just a description it is a creation of social facts as well. The border between describing a trend and creating a trend is blurred. I recognized that the world map does also integrate countries that

merely have a small scholarship program, such as Cambodia, or just a pilot program of a scholarship program tested, like Pakistan, as well as it includes countries that already have shut down their CCT and merely continue with some kind of a 'pilot', like Nicaragua and Colombia. To integrate such large countries as India into a CCT map just because it has a program which is paying a benefit to girls once they become 18 and managed not to get married before, can be seen as a stark overstretch of the CCT definition and foremost intends to make the global spread of CCT seemingly larger than it actually is. I argue that this is used as a technique to push a policy model by making it part of a popular trend.

The map of how CCTs have spread globally may look impressive but what (small) country programs are exactly integrated can be read in the appendix of the publication. That is were I openly found that the World Bank simply had integrated every bit of information on CCTs it empirically found, even if some programs are quiet small or already somehow odd to the CCTs model. Still, the World Bank has a point here: CCTs have spread globally in an enormous pace. But it would have been more appropriate to speak of a Latin American phenomenon that is tested and spreads in recent years as well to other parts of the world. [hmm,.. I need my map here!]

The intention to make the CCT model more popular and to increase the global awareness for this policy option is the main driver of the World Bank's efforts to raise the normative account of CCTs. The World Bank leaves out policies that differ from the World Bank's norm and does also not rate country programs according to how close the program matches the CCT norm. With such a strategy the World Bank chose a rational and descriptive way to establish a norm. It has not written a book of how countries "should" design their programs, is has demonstrated what policy is seemingly becoming a trend and a new standard tool for social policies. Above that the World Bank gives several reasons why CCTs are a rationally "wise" decision in order to fight poverty and invest in "human capital" at the same time. I already have explained in how far the World Bank tries to display and exaggerate a trend towards CCTs by the way facts are presented, so I do now show how the 2009 flagship publication on conditional cash transfers argues for CCTs as the 'most rational policy option'.

For the World Bank CCTs are a good policy option for a country either if it wants a policy that helps it to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and reduce income-poverty of people living in extreme poverty, or if it wants to invest in its economic development. The publication makes clear that if a country would like to

achieve the aims mentioned above CCTs are recommended by the World Bank as the way to go. It is important to point out that CCTs are still presented to be a policy *option*, but as it is presented in the publication, the introduction of CCT programs is always rational for the World Bank. In the chapter 'When Is a CCT Program the Right Policy Instrument?' that Bank gives the reader a decision tree to answer if a conditional or unconditional cash transfer would be the best option. Even though this decision tree leaves room for choice the result will be in almost all cases that a CCTs would be the best option. How can this be?

My first explanation refers to the Bank's ideology which has slightly changed in recent years. In the last decade, the World Bank has changed its core beliefs about how to stimulate development. The belief that a trickle-down effect would finally reduce poverty within countries shrunk and the main new concept that gained prominence in the World Bank's logic is the the concept of human capital. If governments invest directly in the people they can increase human capital which contributes to economic growth much faster as if macro-economic programs would try to finally reach the people by trickle-down-effects: "Although market-driven economic growth is likely to be the main driver of poverty reduction in most countries, markets cannot do it alone" (World Bank 2009:8). The suggestion of the World Bank is that governments, on the one hand, have to invest in health and education services and provide people living in poverty with a direct cash transfer, while these transfers, on the other hand, need some conditions in order to ensure that people will prioritize the usage of those services.

Thus, the main feature of CCTs is that they "make payments to poor households on the condition that those households invest in the human capital of their children in certain prespecified ways" (ibid.). The main question of the World Bank's decision tree is if in a country an 'underinvestment in human capital' can be found (for example, because parents need their kids as workforce instead of sending them to school) or not. If a country has no underinvestment in human capital an unconditional cash transfer is the right policy option, otherwise a conditional one is to prefer. Having defined 'underinvestment in human capital' as a main cause of persistent poverty in advance as part of the World Bank's new approach to development, the answer to this question can only be 'yes, there is an underinvestment'. Also in the following the publication presents a couple of scenarios to further specify when a CCT will be the best policy option, while the result is always in favor of CCTs. If in a country the majority of people is underinvesting in human capital, CCTs are the right option (scenario A). And what is the preferable policy

option in scenario B, where the majority is *not* underinvesting in human capital? Here the publication comes to the result that "in this case, conditions are unnecessary (but harmless) for a majority, but are needed for a minority. A CCT is still the right instrument" (World Bank 2009:171). The only scenario where CCTs are not argued to be the best policy option is the situation when the quality of schools and health clinics is so low in a country that the increased usage due to a condition cannot possibly enhance human capital. What I wanted to show with this analysis of the 2009 flagship publication is that the World Bank is using advocacy in a more indirect way, namely by discovering it behind rational argumentation.

In sum, I showed that the World Bank has a clear policy model and also explicitly frames it as a model. This model is suppose to be an effective and appropriate tool to fight poverty and invest in human capital at the same time. This argumentation makes it appealing to policy makers which follow the same norms as set out by the World Bank. In conformity with the World Bank's ideology conditional cash transfers appear to be the new best practice which is applied by many countries and a already global trend. The 2009 flagship publication is a cornerstone to show this model, a global trend towards this model, and an argumentation in favor of the CCT model. In the next section I shed light on the activities which the World Bank conducted at global level to advocate this model even further.

The World Bank's relationship to other International Organizations

Looking at the World Bank's activities at global level it is remarkable to see how independent the organization is. It holds many contacts with other organizations and most certainly is a global player, not only by looking at the range of countries the Bank is involved in operationally but also in its ability to influence other global actors. The World Bank is observed my many others and changes within the World Bank's policy and politics are well recognized.

> "The World Bank has [...] developed cooperative arrangements with specialized UN agencies – most importantly with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) which also exercises a lead role within the UN for development work. Important formal cooperative arrangements with the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have brought the institutions into close and regular contact. The Bank also has developed close

partnerships with other UN-specialized institutions, notably the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the United Nations Population Fund" (Marshall 2008:35).

Thus, it is noticeable that the World Bank does not openly try to influence others to get its preferences on the agenda of the United Nations. This is puzzling because from a World Society perspective one would expect that especially the UN are a forum for the creation of legitimacy of policies. Here I have two answers: One the one hand, the World Bank still tries to benefit from the UN's legitimacy via participation in the UN's highly legitimized Millennium Project which is defined by the Millennium Development Goals. "The World Bank has been and remains very much part of the MDG process" (Marshall 2008:21). On the other hand, the World Bank is so much an institution in itself that it has much less to influence other global institutions in order to stay legitimized. To have a policy anchored within its own organization is effort enough to place a topic at the global agenda. And by having done so it can expect a policy coalition (see Sabatier 1987; 1988; Sabatier and Weible 2016) of further IOs to emerge around it.

However, even though I argue for the independence and importance of the World Bank as an institution in itself, I see that World Bank's policies are carefully legitimized including three components. First, it is really important for the World Bank to have its policies rationally argued to be a best practice against the backdrop of its economical focus. This argumentation is supported by, second, a normative foundation like the MDGs as a benchmark-orientated normative agenda for poverty reduction, and, third, evidence-based information like shown in its 2009 publication which tried to take stock of all CCTs worldwide trying to build its arguments on the country examples provided.

As scientists have analyzed in 2006 the global activity-level of international organizations concerning basic social protection they found that this topic is still small compared to other fields of interest within the social security agenda. This situation has changed much in the following years, but at this time it seemed that the other organizations wait until the World Bank finally would give a clear signal that social cash transfer are considered to be a viable policy option (Leisering et al. 2006:249). Certainly international organizations are driven by multiple influences, their own agenda and particular individuals in leading positions, but for many the World Bank is an institution that also sets important stimuli about what is on the global agenda. Therefore, my first answer to the question of how the World Bank influences the

global environment is that it is in the comfortable position to be an institution in itself and, thus, it is sufficient for the World Bank to argue in favor of CCTs like I have described above. In doing so, it automatically brings issues on the global agenda, raises awareness and influences other global actors as well. But does this automatically lead to a significant influence of national policy-makers? From my point of view the World Bank policies seem to have to targets: to provide guidance for the organization itself and to put out signals for the international community. For the interactions and influence at national level I couldn't find global agendas a visible instruments to influence. Instead, I found global conferences as a tool to spread global models to national level, as described in the next section.

Global Policy Diffusion: launching global conferences

Since CCTs became a part of the World Bank's operational portfolio it organized global conferences especially on CCTs. On the World Bank's website and their document database I found information about three major conferences at global level which were designed to be workshops on CCTs: 2002 in Mexico, 2004 in Brazil, and 2006 in Turkey. There were only very few information about further conferences taking place at this time. If there were some they must be considerably smaller and at national level. In the following I describe the three major conferences in more detail.

It meets the eye that the first conference was pretty early in 2002 and shows that the World Bank was among the first that pushed a particular SCT model. However, the first two conferences were rather focused on the Latin American region, and, thus, were a bit below the radar of the global community. Yet, it reflected the World Bank's focus at the beginning of the 2000s on the Latin American region where most of the operations took place and most of funding was invested in this region. The second major event took place in Turkey in 2006 and attracted a very broad audience with participants from all over the world. This event took place quite distant from the Latin American region where the first CCT policies emerged and was situated much closer to the Europe. It can be understood as a clear signal from the World Bank to the Western countries that the World Bank commits itself to SCTs and is not just participating in this global trend but is also providing a clear policy model.

I understand the main effect of those conferences to raise awareness at national level for CCTs as a policy model. Each conference was headed with 'conditional cash transfers' as the topic and with all its side-aspects the whole

conference was exclusively about CCTs. However, the events were not in any way portrait as an event for advocacy – on the contrary. The events were very technocratic about all the aspects of CCT implementation and CCT development:

> "The Bank's objective in organizing the workshop was to provide a forum so that executing agencies or units of different CCT's could share their experiences—both successes and challenges —so that they could learn from one other with the final goal of improving the operation of their programs. This workshop was the first of its kind to focus exclusively on operational and implementation issues related to CCTs" (Ayala Consulting 2003:3).

However, I found it striking that the exchange of the countries' experiences on CCTs was part of the conference under the headline 'successes and challenges' of national CCT programs. It was not matter of debate *if* CCTs are appropriate or make sense at all. The participants were government specialists from countries that already had some kind of a CCT in place, most of them financed by the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). It was a rather small conference with participants from eight countries: Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Turkey. It was almost exclusively a conference for and with Latin American countries. Turkey was the only country from a different region what was due to the World Bank's early involvement in financing a CCT pilot project in Turkey. Many of the other countries merely had some kind of a scholarship in place or some more or less patch-worked grant systems. *In this regard, I understand those conferences also a an attempt to reframe programs which were initially not designed to be a CCT.* To the participant of the CCT conference the national programs were framed to be a kind of CCT which simply would benefit from some technical improvements. In such a way advocacy is performed in a rather indirect way which is hidden behind technocratic lessons and best-practice sharing. This implicit influence of the World Bank can be found in further details which are noteworthy. The World Bank does not appear to be the initiator of a promotion event, but as an international organization which is merely responding to its clients' needs:

> "Program officials from different countries who are in charge of implementing CCTs have often requested the Bank to organize international workshops that deal with operational issues, which have demonstrated to be very complex in practice. In

response to these requests, the World Bank decided to organize this workshop" (Ayala Consulting 2003:10).

However, none of those conferences was merely about technocratic knowledge exchange. I argue that it was also about vivid influencing and advocacy. As I argued above advocacy is already implicitly included simply because the conferences are exclusively about CCTs and discuss details about successful CCT program development. Moreover, I would emphasize that each conference was designed to be an event which is able to leave a strong impression in favor of CCTs. Each conference was held much longer that just some hours. The conferences last between three to four days, and one of the days was nor about discussions but organized as a field trip where practitioners could see how an implemented CCT looks like within the country. In consideration that a lot of countries were skeptical at this time to set up cash based social protection programs those field trips can as well be understood as advocacy for SCTs in general. Summed up, each of the three conferences was designed to deliver expertise, to raise the account of CCTs and to leave policy-makers with personal impressions gained from directly made experiences.

Finally, I want to emphasize that the CCT conferences grew in size in a tremendous pace and the countries were the conferences took place are the ones that received considerable support form the World Bank and became lighthouse country examples in the CCT debate. The first conference with participants from eight countries was small but the country were it took place was well chosen. With Mexico as on of the pioneering countries with a program that included an education and health condition it became a central reference in the following years. Just one year after this conference Brazil turned in 2003 its scholarship program *Bolsa Escola* into *Bolsa Famila* which is as well a CCT with both conditions. Together with Mexico's program the activities of these two countries became the lighthouse examples for developing countries that have been able to set-up an effective program for human capital development. In 2004 the second conference called "Second International Workshop on Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs" took place in Brazil and included a field trip to visit Brazil's program. The number of participants of this conference had grown in this short time immensely. The Brazil conference had 100 participant from 25 countries. Again "the objective of this workshop was to bring together practitioners and policymakers from established CCT programs to share their experiences with one another, as well as with policymakers

from countries currently setting up CCT programs" (World Bank Website 2004). This time it was not just the World Bank organizing this event. The development agencies of the United Kingdom as well as of Germany were already involved. I take this as a signal that the conference already began to become recognized in the global development community.

> "The workshop was a collaborative effort between the World Bank (the Social Protection Units of the Latin America and Caribbean Region, the Human Development Network and the World Bank Institute), the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID), the German Technical Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Brazil's Bolsa Familia Program, and the Municipality of São Paulo" (World Bank Website 2004).

In 2006 the third conference in Turkey was again much larger than the one before. Around 375 participants from 40 countries joined the conference. Above that 18 international development agencies and NGOs were present and the World Bank made use of its instruments as a knowledge bank by streaming the whole conference via internet. Around 1,600 further participants viewed the live-stream of the virtual conference (World Bank Institute 2006). Being able to increase the number of participants to this extent shows how much the interest in CCT increased at national level as well as in the development community.

Conclusion

The World Bank defined the conditional cash transfer (CCT) policy model at the beginning of the 2000s. Reframing earlier national scholarship programs as "CCTs", the CCT policy model had already been part of policy developments at national level in Latin America. In 2009 the World Bank published a book taking stock of all the CCT programs worldwide and explaining the positive effects of CCTs especially on poverty reduction and investment in human capital. Moreover, the publication presented a map (figure 1) which showed a global spread of CCTs, a CCT wave of policy diffusion. It seems that just in one decade the model spread throughout the Global South, though mainly in Latin America and only partly in Asia, while it is

almost absent in Africa. Especially for low-income countries CCTs are difficult to implement, because CCTs are highly demanding programs. Countries need a good infrastructure and sufficient schools and hospitals in place in order to make possible that the people can comply the the conditions imposed to them. Besides the fact that policy-making is a difficult process which takes time, information and political coalitions in favor of a particular policy, the weak infrastructure within many developing countries is another factor that makes CCTs policies spread much slower than suggested by the World Bank.

Figure 1

Figure 1   CCTs in the World, 1997 and 2008

1997

2008

Source: World Bank.

Source: World Bank 2009

The attractiveness of CCTs was increased by major conferences which promoted the policy model. The number of participants of the conferences grew constantly with

more and more national policy experts recognizing the CCT model. All the advocacy I found was led by the World Bank itself and portrayed as technical advice or technocratic workshops to share expertise. This does not diminish the normative influence it has raising the awareness for CCTs, but it is striking how much the World Bank tries to argue every point it makes in rational and scientific terms. It is not enough for the World Bank just to raise the account for particular norms or pass declarations of intent. Rather, the norm to invest in human capital as a reason for tying the receipt of cash transfers to conditions is advanced through expertise and advice. The World Bank presents itself as a hub of expertise. The major CCT conferences have shown that the World Bank can attract enough attention just by its own activities without canvassing the case of CCT in the broader UN environment. However, the World Bank's activities are embedded in broader framework of the development community through the Millennium Development Goals and the Social Protection agenda.

In the next chapter I argue that the World Bank's affinity to a cognitive mode of influencing is even stronger at national level. The World Bank has shifted away from its approach to impose particular policies to countries by providing loans with strings attached. Instead the World Bank rather provides advice to national governments. CCTs simply appear to be an appropriate model to help countries to improve the targeting of social protection programs.

2.3. Advice on National Institution-building: Partner for Development

While the World Bank's activities at the global level have contributed to a trend towards a broad spread of the policy model called CCT. This does not automatically mean that those ideas are turned into national programs in the countries of the Global South. Workshops at the global level may stimulate a lot of activities, but the introduction of such a program depends on further favorable conditions at the national level. Newly introduced small scale programs are constantly at risk of being shut down because of changing priorities of the national governments or due to fragile national budgets. Thus, I found that the World Bank is very active at the national level – even more than at the level of global policy development – in order to support the institutionalization of CCTs as being a permanent and integral component of national social protection systems. Recently, the World Bank strictly emphasizes a systemic approach to social protection programs in developing countries. Even though this focus had already been visible for quite some years, the systemic approach manifested at highest level as part of the World Bank's new second social protection sector strategy in 2012 (World Bank 2012). In the following I unfold the World Bank's activities at national level on institution-building.

In a nutshell, I found three kind of activities with three different strategies which all support the institutionalization of CCTs at national level in Southern countries. First, the World Bank holds continuous country dialogues with countries. It is an excellent tool influence the mindsets of national policy-makers in order to open them up for the arguments which favor the introduction of CCT policy innovations. Second, the World Bank has a direct approach to stimulate the introduction of CCTs via pilot programs. Before a country rolls out a cost intensive social protection program it might be useful to demonstrate in a test phase with a pilot program the effectiveness of CCTs. Third, I found that the most important activity of the World Bank for the institutionalization of a CCT program is not about setting up new programs but about supporting the institutionalization and expansion of existing "CCTs" - or CCT-like programs. This is plausible because due to multiple influences,

countries try to implement different SCT programs in many cases. Yet, their survival in changing political settings and political priorities is at risk.

In my observation, with regard to the process of policy-making and program introduction the World Bank attempts *'to bring something in'* by influencing the mindsets of policy experts and decision-makers and by initiating pilot projects which often can help to form a policy coalition in favor of CCTs. More importantly, the World Bank focuses its activities on *the institutionalization of social programs* through the delivery of expertise and support that contributes to the institutionalization of CCTs. In order to support the institutionalization of CCTs the World Bank supports that small programs go to scale (scaling-up), that the quality of newly introduced programs improves (improving targeting), that the program development is properly monitored in order to convince the government of the programs effectiveness (monitoring & evaluation), and it supports that existing CCT programs become the main social protection program of the country (e.g. by motivation the country to remove its subsidies and allocate this cash to CCT programs).

Before I start the analysis I want to point out two things: First, the Bank has privileged access to the government and ministry of finance because one of the Bank's core business still is lending. "The Bank's relationships with developing countries often start and finish with financing as a central focus" (Marshall 2008:4). Second, the World Bank often engages on a long-term basis establishing tight working-relationships with the ministries. The purpose of this behavior is in the first place to ensure that the money of World Bank grants is spend in a sustainable way that contributes to the countries growth so that the country will be able to pay back the loan in the future.

> "Early expectations were that the lending process would be fairly simple, with countries submitting loan applications and the World Bank assessing their viability. However, in practice the Bank found itself in the business of helping shape project proposals and, from the start, it saw itself as having responsibilities for judging how well projects fit country circumstances, and how much they would contribute to a country's economic progress. Early operational work also drew attention to the importance of managerial skills: development was not simply about financing but involved the full battery of disciplines and skills needed to make projects work. Training administrators in developing countries thus quickly became an important Bank activity" (Marshall 2008:31).

So the World Bank is an actor with privileged access and long term working relationships. Moreover, "the professionalism of its staff and its capacity for action, especially in times of crisis, are widely admired" (Marshall 2008:7). Those features are crucial prerequisites that make the Bank a little more than just one actor among many, but gives it more weight so it becomes something like a development partner. I would like to introduce the term 'development partner' because I think that this term reflects the Bank's role quite well. A partner is someone engaging on a long-term basis with privileged access to decision-making. In this case the World Bank delivers for the contribution to the countries development expertise and advise to partners with whom the Bank is connected via a lending/borrower relationship.

Before I start my analysis of the World Bank's strategies and instruments to stimulate institutionalization of CCTs, I analyzed in how far the World Bank made use of its CCT policy model within its advices at national level.

How is the World Bank's policy model used at national level?

As presented above, the CCT policy is designed to be a model that can easily be understood and picked-up by policy-makers. The way the World Bank advocates this model at global level is reflected in the Bank's way to influence at national level. As described above, the World Bank does not advocate CCTs as a panacea, which would be prone to critique; instead, the Bank provides an argumentation where as a result of a conditional cash transfer has to be preferred to an unconditional one. In a quite similar way the World Bank advocates CCT. It starts with a technical analysis to answer the question what kind of cash transfer would be the most appropriate for the particular country. The CCT suggestion, then, can be presented as a policy advice after a technical analysis. In the following I show further elements that follow this technocratic approach. It seems to be very important to the Bank that it seems like policy makers have act upon an informed decision.

It meets the eye that CCTs are very demanding programs which are not easy to introduce as a low-budget version. To administer CCT programs involves relatively high administration costs and efforts because the programs are not universal but designed to help the poorest of the poor. In countries with very fragmented and incomplete information about its citizens this process of targeting is rather complicated. Furthermore, the governmental bureaucratic system has to monitor if recipients comply with the conditions imposed to them. This involves additional effort

for the recipients who not just have to meet the conditions, like sending the kids to school, attending health checkups or nutrition workshops, but have to get documents that give proof of that as well. However, the most difficult precondition for developing countries to introduce a CCT is that sufficient infrastructure must exists. A sufficient number of schools and hospitals in a good quality have to be available with appropriate roads and transportation to get there. Those conditions are often missing in developing countries. How is it possible that the Bank argues in favor of CCTs against such a background?

Due to this rather complex prerequisites I found two strategies that facilitate the introduction of CCTs. I present the *development approach* of the World Bank which combines the Bank's activities supporting the general development of the country (especially the education and health sector) and the specific support for CCTs. From this perspective the World Bank is preparing the advocacy for CCTs by supporting developing countries in education and health sector first. Moreover, I present the World Bank's strategy of technical advice which allows a government to introduce a *low budget version* of a CCT while at the same time the policy model remains unchanged with regard to its demanding prerequisites. The main suggestion of the World Bank is to design the targeting in such a way that only the poorest of the poor are targeted where schools and hospitals are in reach. The more restrictive the government defines extreme poverty and the more schools and hospitals are a prerequisite for the introduction of a CCT the smaller can be the program, because only regions with schools and hospitals in place and in particular poor citizens living there are included into this area targeting.

In this section I showed that the cognitive strategies about the CCT model gives governments the choice to decide whether to introduce a CCT or not (conditional vs. unconditional programs), helps countries to be prepared for the introduction of a CCT (development approach), and to design the targeting in such a way that the CCT can start as some kind of a small-scale pilot (advice on targeting). In the following I investigate further the strategies of how the World Bank delivers its policy model to the countries in the Global South and explain those aspects of the development approach and the Bank's advice on targeting which motivates a country to pick-up, design and institutionalize CCT programs.

Approach 1: Influencing Mindsets through Country Dialogues

As mentioned above the World Bank decided early not just to provide loans but to monitor the process of policy development as well, and guiding this process with advise and expertise. Therefor, I found it interesting that with most of the countries in the Global South the World Bank holds a long term dialogue. This is the instrument to continuously harmonize mutual expectations. While the countries are obliged to produce 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers' (PRSP) in order to explain to the Bank what kind of priorities the country has set for itself to stimulate the country's development and economic growth, the World Bank produces 'Country Assistance Strategies' (CAS) as an answer:

> "The Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) identifies the key areas in which *Bank Group support can best assist a country* in achieving sustainable development and poverty reduction. It is the *central tool* with which Management and the Board review and *guide the Bank Group's support for the country's development programs*. [...] The CAS *starts from the country's vision* of its development goals, which may be set out in a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) or other *country-owned and -led* strategy process. The CAS describes the Bank's diagnosis of the country's development situation. The CAS is grounded in a results framework that highlights the outcomes that are expected from Bank support during the implementation period" (World Bank Website 2012; emphasis added).

The World Bank itself describes this instrument as 'the central tool' for 'guiding support for the country's development program'. Though it is an instrument used by the Bank to give advice and to present the *status quo* and the prospective development of the country (re)formulated in the Bank's language, it is presented to be for the most part driven by the country itself. The Bank merely 'supports and assists a country' to realize 'the country's vision and country-led strategy'. It can be assumed that in the CAS the policy priorities of both sides meet and it might be a particular characteristic of a dialogue that it is to a certain extent unclear who influenced whom, and with what. I understand the CAS as a type of report that reflects the countries priorities from a World Bank's perspective. Moreover, the CAS gives the Bank the opportunity to sketch what kind of development it foresees. The

Bank uses CAS, on the one hand, to criticize particular developments (e.g. program fragmentation; too low institutionalization of programs; to slow implementation of programs) and, on the other hand, to outline the support it offers to assist the country. Although the Bank describes that its CAS "mirrors the government's development goals", the Bank describes Bangladesh's development goals as "lessons from IDA's recent assistance" (CAS Bangladesh 1998: 4). As an ideal type of the country dialogue I describe it as a relationship of the World Bank providing critique on and support for particular policy developments, and nationally made lessons which policy makers take on board or react upon. In the following I present, first, what I describe as the World Bank's *development approach* which is about the timing of support, and, second, how the World Bank is using CAS deliver critique in order to facilitate the introduction of CCT programs or to better institutionalize CCTs. I consider critique as the main feature of the country dialogue. Even the development approach is based on critiques of the development in the education and health sector as I explain subsequently.

First of all, I found that the focus of the World Bank on the education sector and health sector has a long tradition. The CAS in the 1990s already discuss the progress in these sectors. Slowly at the beginning of the 2000s the topic of cash transfers emerged in form of CCTs. From the perspective that already was focused on education and health the creation of the CCT policy model make most sense, because this model can be seen as a supplementary program. All parts together (figure 2) contribute to the investment in human capital which is for the Bank a key concept for stimulating economic growth and getting people out of poverty. While education and health are already established sectors, the idea of cash-based social assistance is new for most countries in the Global South and, thus, absent or weakly institutionalized. Due to the Bank's particular policy model of cash transfers based on the condition of school enrollment and attended health check-ups the three sectors are closely connected. And because education and health facilities are preconditions for the introduction of CCTs it makes sense for the World Bank to continue with its focused support for the development of the education and health sector until the introduction of a CCT is possible.

Areas of Human Capital Investment

Education Sector

Health Sector

Conditional Cash Transfers

author's visualization, based on the Country Assistance Strategy Papers

I argue that the World Bank as a developing partner which engages on a long-term basis, responds to national contexts by carefully proofing if advocacy for CCT programs would be already appropriate or if first needs to further invest in the education and health sector. This sensitivity to timing and the finding that the World Bank is supporting only CCTs in CAS when the education and health sector is at a certain stage of development, is what I call the *development approach.* This approach is characterized by an organization's sensitivity for the current development stage in order to make policy suggestions that take national conditions into account. In the case of CCTs it means that at least a sufficient number of schools and hospitals must exist before the suggestion of CCTs makes any sense. Understanding that the World Bank is in the first place a bank that wants to sell loans as its main product, it is easy to understand that such a development approach is advantageous for the World Bank because if a country finds CCTs appealing it has to engage in a multitude of program activities in the health and education sector in order to realize CCTs. The Country Assistance Report for Guatemala in 2012 shows very clear that a well-functioning CCT requires a whole package of measures implemented by the government. In the CAS the Bank indicates the fields of action:

"(i) increasing effectiveness of the CCT program by improving institutional and implementation arrangements, including monitoring and evaluation mechanisms; (ii) expanding access to quality education among the poor and indigenous; (iii) improving and expanding access to health and nutrition services, with a special focus on maternal and child health; and (iv) expanding services and investments in other areas that would maximize the impact of the CCT program (i.e. rural roads, and electricity)" (CAS Guatemala 2012:46).

This package which is necessary for CCT implementation, is so broad that all the activities for infrastructure development are part of CCT as well. The Bank provided a loan of USD 220 million available for 'Rural Infrastructure and Expanding Opportunities: CCT'. So in the end the development approach of the World Bank is in harmony with the organization's interests, because it delivers good arguments why countries need even more loans. I found in many CAS that CCTs are discussed in terms of such policy packages. Yet, I don't want to let the Bank's development approach appear to be merely a marketing strategy to promote further loan-taking. This might be true as well, but the development approach is also simply necessary to establish the preconditions for a CCT introduction. In the African region for example are almost no CCT programs at national level and the World Bank does also not mention and suggest its introduction in its CAS for African countries. In contrast, in Latin America the Bank does suggest and support CCT development quite strongly for more advanced countries. Less developed countries in Latin America have to go through certain stages first before the World Bank does suggest the introduction of a CCT program.

In Bolivia the Bank points out that the country is among the poorest in Latin America with social indicators similar to countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Bank the reason for this is a "history of slow growth, limited investment in human capital and high inequality" (CAS Bolivia 1998:1). As in most cases the Bank's analysis directly refers to the education and health sector for potential solutions, because obviously so far investments in those sectors have been too low: "Poverty in Bolivia is also directly associated with low levels of education, vulnerable health and poor nutrition – investment in human capital has been below that of other Latin American countries" (ibid.). Thus, the Bank focused on rural infrastructure projects and rural development strategies. In the following years the IDA of the World Bank financed developments in the areas of health, education, and water and sanitation

with USD 20 million in 2004 and USD 17 million loan in 2008. Bolivia got an educational cash transfer in 2006 and another cash transfer program conditional on health check-ups in 2009. This shows very well that a CCT is the next step when the prerequisites have been met.

If a country reaches the point that the health and education sector are developed enough the Bank suggests CCT as a further instrument to increase the investment in human capital. An example can be found in the CAS for Guatemala in 2008:

> "The Poverty Assessment finds that Guatemala's strong performance in delivering services over the past six years suggests that further progress can be made to improve what are still low levels of social indicators. [...] A conditional cash transfer program could be an effective instrument in this context" (CAS Guatemala 2008:3).

According to the World Bank if the country's performance for health and education is developed enough and social indicators are still low the remaining problem must simply be the poor don't use this services enough. The Bank's briefly describes this problem as a 'demand-side problem' in contrast to too few schools and hospitals as a 'supply-side problem'. In Brazil the World Bank supported poverty reduction early with loans of USD 1.5 billion for human capital formation and investments in infrastructure (CAS Brazil 1995:13). The problem the Bank mentioned early refers to both, a supply-side as well as a demand-side problem:

> "Education and Safety Nets: Brazil is making relatively slow progress in improving the poor quality of primary education. In addition, there is evidence of low demand for education among the poor and in rural areas. Repetition and school dropout rates are among the worst in LAC, and highest for children in poor rural northeast areas. […] If more rural children attended school and, for those who go to school, stayed in school longer, they would be less likely to remain poor" (CAS Brazil 1995:28).

The early developed cash transfer program *Bolsa Escola* was introduced together with a fund and program called FUNDESCOLA to improve the performance of the public education system in the poorest regions of Brazil (CAS Brazil 2000:23).

The development approach is about the timing when support for education and health can switch to a support of CCT or when both has to be supported in parallel. A final aspect which I want to mention is how the Bank handles with the

uncertainty of development. In general, a CAS report is released at the beginning of a new funding period. In other words, even with a development approach in the background it is unclear to the World Bank when exactly a country will be ready for a CCT. Thus, the Bank tries to take into account potential scenarios of the country's further development for its lending strategy. Depending on certain scenarios the World Bank has developed several lending cases (low, base, and high) which make the availability of loans dependent on certain conditions which the country has to meet in advance. Funding for certain policies are in the 'low case' and relatively easy available while other loans are in the 'high case' and only available if the country has developed to a certain degree. A demonstrative example of this lending strategy is again visible in an early CAS for Brazil in 1995. As stated in this report: If Brazil makes only little progress with reforms in order to stop inflation Brazil can just access the loans made available in the low case which limits the loans available to USD 1.5 – 1.8 billion. In case Brazil can introduce reform that keep inflation below 35%, the country is eligible for the base case and can access loans up to USD 4.2 billion. And if Brazil even manages to keep inflation below 25% it can access up to USD 6 billion through the high case. Depending on the progress made with its development, the World Bank can regulate the amount of loans offered and choose the purpose the money can be spend on. Still it depends on the general level of the country's development if the Bank puts support for social protection policies and CCTs in the low or high case for a country. Countries like Brazil get support for programs on poverty reduction already in the low case:

> "Lending in the low case would be limited to US$1.5-1.8 billion [...] with an anti-poverty focus. The program will be focused on core anti-poverty needs in human capital formation and infrastructure, with rural poverty loans, education and health loans and water/urban development projects accounting for the overwhelming share of lending" (CAS Brazil 1995).

In less developed countries like Paraguay for example the Bank offered support for a CCT program when the conditions of the high case have been met. In the low case the Bank supports such things as health and education reform, while the base case already includes loans supporting social protection, and only the high case supports CCTs. This proceeding of the Bank was due to its skeptical appraisal of Paraguay's development. The Bank literally says that it is "unlikely that Paraguay would enter the high case until the latter years of the CAS period" (CAS Paraguay 2003:23). Overall

the Bank thinks that the introduction of CCTs is "highly ambitious given Paraguay's current context" (CAS Paraguay 2003:34). The amount of loans for less developed countries is also considerably smaller. The maximum amount available through the high case is USD 425 million. Of that amount USD 100 million would be triggered through the high case only and available for a whole bunch of policies. In the end around USD 7 million would be for CCTs. Compared with other countries that receive between USD 500 – 1000 million, a loan of USD 7 million is not that much. Yet, I just wanted to show that the strategy of how to organize the lending is supporting my argument that the World Bank's lending and engagement is sensitive to the context, and, thus, follows a development approach.

The second aspect of the country dialogues which already came through in the paragraphs above, is the Bank's opportunity to criticize via its CAS reports. The World Bank does make use of this aspect for the sake of its development approach. The main logic of the development approach is that one measure to support a particular social policy leads to the support of further measure supporting follow up social policies. The introduction of CCTs is one major achievement to be pursued and visible in the Bank's CAS. Yet, I will show that this again is a first step which entails further support for these programs in order to make them stay, which means to institutionalize them. In the following, I describe how the country dialogues point out the necessity for a national government to strengthen the institutional focus on conditional cash transfers.

Analyzing the Country Assistance Reports, I found that the World Bank understands CCTs not so much as one program among others, but intends to see it integrated in the country as the main social protection program. This does not mean that the Bank does not support many other programs like non-contributory pensions as well and it does as well accept other actors that advocate other policy innovations. However, given the fact that program survival in developing country is continuously at risk the World Bank prioritizes CCTs as the main program which the Bank would like to see properly institutionalized. The main critiques of the World Bank towards a country are that subsidies for particular products should be phased out and several minor SCT programs introduced on a more *ad hoc* basis should be closed or merged into one CCT flagship program.

In Indonesia the World Bank directly and openly suggests "reallocating savings from subsidies towards strategic targeted interventions and successful implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers" (CAS Indonesia 2009:28). One the

one hand, such suggestion is pretty much in line with the neoliberal agenda of the World Bank which want to remove market distortions through subsidies anyways, on the other hand, the removal of subsidies is used as an argument to the question where the additional funding for the introduction of a SCT program should come from. According to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank in Indonesia "the CCT implementation has commenced on a pilot basis in order to reduce fuel subsidies and to redirect the savings to pro-poor programs" (IEG 2012:11). It seems that the same strategy was successful in Turkey which agreed to test a 'direct income support program' in the year 2000; financed at the expense of subsidies: "The shift to direct income support is being accompanied by actions to eliminate credit subsidies, phase out fertilizer subsidies" (CAS Turkey 2000:10). In some cases the Bank's advice to phase out subsidies is connected with the Bank's further critique with regard to the multiple small-scale SCT programs introduced on an *ad hoc* basis. In Argentina the Bank suggested to "move away from a subsidy-based approach to one more likely to build longer-term job creation" (CAS Argentina 2004:81). The World Bank offered a USD 30 million loans to support the plans of the government to move to long-term programs. The new priority of the government concerns the multiple other programs as well. The Argentine government considers "to integrate the various existing income transfer programs (including the Heads of Households project) into a single coordinated and well-targeted conditional cash-transfer scheme" (CAS Argentina 2004: 105). It is obviously that the government was considering this according to the Bank's suggestions. Interestingly, Argentina's workfare program was phased out the next year (2005), and instead the country launched a CCT program in 2004 which was based on several minor CCT programs the government has launched together with the '*Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*' in 2002 as a crisis response. In other countries like Bangladesh the World Bank was never really successful with its attempts to install a full-fledged CCT program. Instead Bangladesh got one scholarship program after another introduced in 1994, 2001 and 2004. In 2006 the Bank criticizes that the programs are an unrelated patchwork with low benefit levels and very limited scale and coverage (CAS Bangladesh 2006:26). In order to "address poverty or to mitigate vulnerability to poverty" in the short- or long-term, appropriate safety nets have to be developed (ibid.). Yet, in 2011 such a state was still not in reach so that the World Bank renewed its critique:

> "Historically, Bangladesh has implemented an array of social safety net programs to
> reach the ultra poor. At present, the country has 31 social protection programs in

operation. This includes 13 cash transfer programs, 7 food transfer programs and 11 social protection funds. Nonetheless, coverage is low, targeting is weak and government's planning and delivery capacity needs significant strengthening. [Moreover] The programs have a food support bias, adding to administrative costs and increasing leakage possibilities" (CAS Bangladesh 2011:28).

In the end it is totally up to the national government and ministries if the overall systemic policy framework will be strengthened and be focused on one program as the main social protection flagship or if the country continues to run many programs in parallel. In Chile the support of the World Bank seemed to have been successful. The CCT *Chile Solidario* was introduced in 2002 and "significantly improved the policy framework for poverty reduction and social protection" (CAS Chile 2007:77). The Bank point's out that it represents a "shift form the previous piecemeal approach of separate, targeted social assistance and social insurance programs by combining multiple services and cash transfers into a new conditional cash transfer to poor families" (ibid.).

In this section I presented one of the main instruments the World Bank uses to influence national policy-making through advice, namely through country dialogues. They ensure regular interactions and a kind of taking-stock of the country's development over long time-periods. Thus, the Bank does not recommend CCTs at the time this model emerged within the organization, but it strategically brings in suggestions in favor of CCTs when the timing is right, what means that sufficient schools and hospitals are available in order to make school attendance and health check-ups mandatory. Moreover, the World Bank does not need to wait until the timing is right but it can work towards that goal by concentrating to support the education and health sector until the countries meets all the preconditions for the introduction of a CCT program. I called this kind of long-term thinking and responsiveness to the individual state of development of a country the World Bank's *development approach*. Additionally, I argued that the Bank is using the country dialogue to actively make recommendations and criticize the country's performance on social protection. The critique shows that the Bank actively supports the sustainable institutionalization of CCTs, even if this has to be achieved at the expense of other smaller programs and the termination of subsidy programs.

Even though I showed that the World Bank highlights those two aspects, it remains unclear to what extent the country dialogues itself contribute to stimulate policy-making in this direction. However, the Country Assistance Reports revealed

some part pattern of the Bank's advocacy (development approach) with recommendations and critiques as its core elements which are delivered and recognizable through CAS.

Approach 2: Introducing policy innovations through pilot projects

Among other instruments the World Bank sets up pilot projects in order to convince a country of the viability of a CCT program in this country. I found that this instrument rarely is used alone but in most cases in combination with other instruments like monitoring & evaluation (more about that in the next section) and the availability of loans (incentive-based influencing). It means that I cannot describe a pilot project so much as an example *per se* installed in order to influence. Instead it is the coupling of a pilot with evaluations which translate the pilot into a mean to influence. Available loans have the function to provide an incentive for a country either to take on board the idea of testing a pilot project or to scale up the pilot project later on when it has created the necessary political will behind it.

Nicaragua is a good example of how essential political will is; not just for the introduction of a CCT but as well for the continuance of such a program. In the year 2000 Nicaragua introduced a CCT program due to available funding through a loan from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Though this program was regarded by the international community as pretty successful in terms of poverty reduction and hasn't cost much of the public budget (around 4 per cent of the amount the government spends on health and education) the new government that came to power in 2006 discontinued the program (IADB 2002). As Charity Moore from the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) explains: the reason for the discontinuance of Nicaragua's social protection program *Red de Protectión Social* (RPS) was the lack of political will. The example shows clearly how important it is to convince the government by presenting the positive impact through evaluations. Just to set up an effective program is not enough.

> "One former RPS official put the programme's ultimate collapse aptly. She said that RPS's greatest weakness was its failure to educate domestic stakeholders on its components and positive impacts. There had been much skepticism about RPS from its inception. Programme staff believed that, rather than wasting their time arguing

with government officials, it would be more profitable to prove that the programme could work. RPS staff did not ignore the public relations aspect of the initiative, but it is clear that the efforts they made to educate the public and politicians of RPS's purpose, components and successes were inadequate" (Moore 2009:33f).

While this is an argument to the necessity of monitoring and evaluations, and continuous dialogue with the national government, I want to point to the World Bank's reaction to the discontinuance of the program in 2006. Apparently the Bank quickly established new contacts to the political government which was new in office. With funding from the British development agency DFID, the Bank introduced four different CCT pilot projects. This time the World Bank clearly points out that "a rigorous impact evaluation will monitor economic and social results" (CAS Nicaragua 2007:84). The combination of the strategic use of pilot project in combination with monitoring and evaluations is very obvious in this case.

In several countries pilot projects signify the start of a CCT country program. Program implementation in general has to be understood as a gradual process which can take several years. This holds in particular true for developing countries where programs can start rather small and their institutionalization depends on the program's survival in the initial period. For example in Turkey, Argentine, Panama and Indonesia the official program introduction coincides with World Bank supported pilot projects. Turkey got a pilot project for a direct income support program in 2000 and set up a CCT program in 2001. In 2004 the Bank provided a USD 30 million loan for a pilot in order to support the government of Argentine to move to long-term programs. Argentine officially introduced a CCT program in the same year. Before Indonesia got its CCT program in 2007 the government decided to make a pilot project in 2006. The CAS claims that this pilot was an outcome of the country dialogue between the Bank and the Indonesian government in the last five years. The World Bank supported as well the design of Panama's CCT program. As a result the country got a full-fledged CCT program in 2006. The report says that Panama's administration chose to prioritize to make investments in human capital and "introduced a flagship targeted conditional cash transfer program coupled with the continued expansion of pre-school education, primary health care and nutrition and basic infrastructure, especially in poor and indigenous areas" (CAS Panama 2007:8). The World Bank supported "to design the targeting mechanism and pilot initiative of the CCT program, in addition to assessing the targeting efficiency of current social assistance initiatives" (CAS Panama 2007:42). As a final example, in 2002 the World

Bank developed in the Philippines a "pilot income support system for the poorest families conditional on their children's regular school attendance and participation in critical social services" (CAS Philippines 2002:25). However, the pilot itself was not influential for a long time, unless finally, seven years later the World Bank offered considerable financial resources (about USD 400 million) in order to scale up the CCT pilot (CAS Philippines 2009:16). Additionally the Bank's support is connected with the provision of expertise. To improve the targeting of the CCT the Bank will "support the improved design and operation of a well-functioning CCT program" (CAS Philippines 2009:19). The Philippines began to implement their CCT program in 2008 receiving the financial support for the scaling-up in 2009.

This section should have shown that pilot projects are an important instrument to initiate and in many cases it turned out to be a pretty effective instrument because it contributed to stimulate the introduction of national CCT programs. However, I argued as well that in many cases pilot project do not turn out to be influential *per se* but they need to be actively supported from the World Bank with financial resources, monitoring and evaluations, and continuous dialogues with the government.

Approach 3: Supporting national policies & institution-building through technical advice

While the last section showed that in some cases the World Bank uses pilot projects as an instrument to get a CCT program in, I already gave some examples of the World Bank's further instrument to provide technical advice in order to make the CCT program stay. Technical advice can also be used for initiation of a political debate, like when it is used to argue the feasibility of CCTs in the country's context or to provide advice on how to set up a CCT; however, in most cases I found that pilot projects are used to make a start or the country started a program for several unknown reasons – like being inspired by neighboring countries for example – and the World Bank is providing its technical advice to help the country scaling up existing programs. From this perspective technical advice is mostly used 'to make sth. stay', what means that the World Bank contributes to the program's survival and institutionalization.

In the following, I explain how the World Bank can use advice on targeting to cognitively adjust the CCT model in order to facilitate the program's introduction. This is a strategy 'to get a program in'. After explaining the potential for influencing via

technical advice concerning the targeting I explain the importance of (economic) crisis in order to stimulate further demand for technical expertise from the World Bank. After these aspects of how to get a program in I continue to explain in how far technical advice is used 'to make the CCT program stay'.

As mentioned above the CCT model is demanding and it is not much adjustment possible in order to make the program's introduction more likely. However, the Bank's advice on targeting entails a strategy of how the World Bank tries to tailor its policy model to national contexts. The most crucial point that would stop a government from introducing a CCT is when the costs for the introduction are too high. The other way round it is an incentive for the CCT introduction if a program can be started small-scale and expanded progressively. The Bank's approach to make the CCT introduction more appealing in this regard is to design the criteria for the programs targeting in such a way that a low budget and small-scale version can be set up. This can be achieved through the means-tested approach of CCTs. Designed to cover just the poorest of the poor the access to CCTs can be rather restrictive. Due to missing census data about the citizens in many developing countries the World Bank suggests to organize the targeting of CCTs via proxy-means-tests. Proxy-means-tests allow to omit the actual means-test by focusing for the introduction of a CCT only on regions where most people are below the poverty line. The drawback of this method is that is exclude many people living in poverty that with a proper means-test would be eligible for a cash transfer. On the other hand, the government can easily test this new program called CCT in some region(s) only and evaluate later if the CCT can go to scale or not. The advocated targeting mechanism of CCTs can be even more restrictive, yet better match with the preconditions of CCTs of good access to the education and health system. In the 2004 flagship publication the Bank already suggested to design the geographical targeting in such a way that only such areas are included that have a high share of people living in extreme poverty and in a region where sufficient schools and hospitals are in reach. That shrinks the target group again and excludes people that are in extreme poverty and, on top of that, have not enough social services like schools and hospitals available. However, this restricted targeting reduces the costs of the program and allows the government to introduce a CCT although in a strict sense sufficient services are not available yet. Progressive expansion of the CCT would mean in this case that the government can in parallel to the already introduced CCT continue to invest in its infrastructure (schools, hospitals, electricity, roads, etc.). New regions to the geographical targeting can be included step by step. Without much detail I found

that the World Bank is offering support and/or critique with regard to the targeting in almost every report. Though it is unclear to what extent in each case the Bank has made use to the strategy as explained above.

The World Bank seems to have most credibility in times of crisis because countries listen carefully in order to get advice and loans that increase the countries' development. Colombia, which became for the Bank an important country to facilitate South-South-Cooperation, might be a good example of how CCT has helped the country to manage its macroeconomic crisis. Colombia introduced its CCT program in 2001, set up in reaction to the macroeconomic crisis in 1999. The Bank used its support via a project called 'Human Capital Development Project' "to help Colombia protect its most vulnerable and meet the MDG target of reducing the proportion of people living in extreme poverty, the Bank is providing support to promote a major revamping of the system" (CAS Colombia 2002:30). The Bank's support was designed to help coping with the crisis and is advertized as such:

> "Colombia never really had a formal social safety net, something that became painfully clear during the unprecedented macroeconomic crisis of 1999. In response to that crisis, a temporary five-year Social Support Network was created to fund temporary employment conditional cash transfers to poor families and firm-based apprenticeship grants for youth" (CAS Colombia 2002:15).

Installing CCTs as a coping mechanism and to increase the resilience of a country in times of crisis seems to be part of a larger and more often used argumentation. In the follow up report in 2008 the program of 2001 is described as highly successful and innovative. Positive evaluations of the countries CCT program help to increase the attention Colombia receives by others. The country quickly could be established as a central figure for horizontal diffusion:

> "Colombia hosted a study tour to share the design of their Conditional Cash Transfer program with countries as diverse as the Philippines and Ecuador. Similarly Colombia's Social Targeting System is being replicated in the Dominican Republic and Ecuador" (CAS Colombia 2008:27).

Another example is El Salvador where the World Bank already provided advice on poverty reduction according to three pillars: economic growth, better access to social services (especially basic education), and social safety nets. The Bank's priorities are

already impressively in line with the expected effects of CCTs: Safety nets should (first) alleviate the most vulnerable in the short-term, and (second) enable the poor to take advantage of economic opportunities by improving the access to basic services like pre-primary and primary education, basic health and nutrition (cf. CAS El Salvador 1997:41). The CAS for El Salvador in 2001 entails the same three pillar strategy of 1997. Furthermore, the dominant topics are earthquakes and earthquake emergency reconstruction. The CAS in 2005 clearly points out that in the aftermath of the earthquake the government from El Salvador requested technical assistance (AAA) from the World Bank. The Bank made a Poverty Assessment with two parts:

> "(i) analysis of poverty in El Salvador and policy advice on how to improve the impact of social policy and social sector spending; and (ii) analysis of vulnerable groups and of existing programs to confront vulnerability, and recommendations on how to strengthen the country's social safety net" (CAS El Salvador 2005:32).

The first assessment puts El Salvador's current programs to a test and the second part basically suggests how to change policies and suggests what innovations might be useful to be implemented. The Bank produced two policy notes called "Poverty and Social Expenditures" and "Elements to Strengthen the Social Safety Net". Following in 2006 the Bank announced a "Social Protection and Local Development Project" in order to implement a "social safety net targeted to the poorest and most vulnerable families in the country" (CAS El Salvador 2005:47). The CCT program "Red Solidaria" was implemented in the same year, 2005, and additionally supported with a loan of USD 35 million. The Bank describes itself as a key partner in the design and implementation of Red Solidaria. The report indicates that evaluations and sharing international best practice have contributed to the programs implementation as well (CAS El Salvador2009:41).

Both examples show how ongoing technical assistance can effectively contribute to the introduction of CCT programs. A crisis can be the trigger that finally translates provided advice into action. In a next step I show that arguments on targeting can also be combined with monitoring, evaluations, advice and support on scaling up of existing (pilot) programs. Assuring the survival of regional programs and facilitating the programs extension and institutionalization nationally the World Bank actively contributes to the global diffusion of CCTs.

In many countries, especially in developing countries, program implementation can take several years and the extension and scaling-up of existing programs is far

from sure. Thus, I found many activities of the World Bank directed to contribute to the implementation of program initiatives. However, it is difficult to provide clear examples showing only the influence of technical advice in this regard because in many cases the technical advice comes in combination with financial support in form of loans. After Turkey got its direct income pilot in 2000 and introduced a CCT in 2001 the Bank made several loans available as well. In 2003 the CAS highlighted targeting as a main issue; in the report the World Bank criticized the overall performance of the CCT's targeting and offered support for the improvement of it. Efforts on scaling-up and targeting go hand in hand: "A Conditional Cash Transfer system has been tested and is ready to roll out, with a scoring formula for careful targeting to the poorest 6 percent" (CAS Turkey 2003:4). Moreover, improved targeting is also part of the Bank's call for a more substantial reform of the institutional framework. The evaluation of the institutional framework does explicitly include the education and health sector, what shows that they are considered to be part of the institutionalization of CCTs:

> "Substantial, sustainable improvements have been made in basic education. Targeting has improved for social welfare for the poorest, but the system needs more funding and a stronger institutional framework. A second stage social security reform is needed to rationalize the institutional framework, extend coverage and restore financial balance. Health outcomes remain poor for a middle income country, particularly for maternal mortality" (CAS Turkey 2003:9).

The quotation shows that institutionalization is important for the World Bank. Though loans do play a crucial role the Bank's activities of monitoring and advice can be considered influential as well. The Bank's instrument to provide technical advice is called by the Bank itself 'Analytical and Advisory Assistance' (AAA). It shows that all analytical efforts like monitoring and evaluations go together with activities to advice. Providing advice of how to target a program or how to scale a program up is a form of influencing; especially when countries are not yet decided whether to keep this program or not. The provision of evaluations at this point contributes to motivate the government or ministry to think about the further development of the program. When advice on CCTs is coupled with advice to reduce subsidies, the advice suggests to expand CCTs at the cost of other programs. In the following, I want to present some country examples for the importance of technical advice for scaling-up and a better institutionalization of CCTs.

I already mentioned in the section about pilot projects that the World Bank supported the 'pilot initiative' in Panama with technical advice. Advice on Panama's overall development already highlighted the importance of a continuous expansion of education and health facilities in order to invest in human capital. Based on this advice a CCT appears to be an appropriate policy choice. While AAA measures of the Bank helped to design the program especially with regard to the targeting of the program, technical advice played also a role for the continuance to the program:

> "The planned FY09 [Financial Year 2009] Poverty Assessment will help to *analyze the effectiveness* of interventions. A *follow-on project* will be prepared in FY10 [Financial Year 2010] to further strengthen the program with the new Government and broaden social assistance reform" (CAS Panama 2007:42; emphasis added)

Advice for the continuous improvement of the CCT and follow-on projects help to expand and better institutionalize the CCT program. In the CAS some years later the World Bank criticizes that the actual size of the CCT program "is limited when compared to the amount of eligible extreme poor households" (CAS Panama 2010:32). Thus, the Bank advices to build a 'management information system monitoring the CCT'. Moreover, the CCT program appears to be a support for the country's social protection framework because CCTs are so connected with education and health. Those two issue areas are not just prerequisites. Due to the Bank's advice CCTs also appear to be a contribution to improve targeted interventions in the education and health sector: "The support in health and nutrition is utilizing the CCT infrastructure to better target interventions" (CAS Panama 2010:74). In sum, the World Bank is very clear about its influence stemming from technical advice:

> "In Panama, the World Bank Group can be very effective when it concentrates on the delivery of a mix of lending, technical assistance, private sector support and knowledge products. The experience in Panama shows that the Bank's relevance is amplified when the delivery of lending operations is supported by knowledge products. In turn, technical operations must continue to strengthen their focus on the development of high quality designs that incorporate lessons from experiences in other countries, as has been done in the CCT where Panama absorbed lessons from other programs and went on to build one of the best targeted programs in the LAC region. […] A strong AAA program has also helped contribute to the design of

Development Policy Lending which has proven to be a useful instrument in Panama in support of key Government priorities" (CAS Panama 2010:16).

The quotation not only shows that the World Bank considers technical assistance as an important and effective instrument to influence, it also shows that the delivery of 'lessons' and 'best practices' from other countries play a role like I have found several examples of the importance of South-South-Cooperation which in many cases was facilitated through the World Bank's activities of technical assistance. Examples of South-South-Cooperation facilitated by the World Bank include for example Brazil, Colombia, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Together with other development banks the World Bank actively supports South-South-Cooperation to stimulate CCT implementation:

> "The Bank and IDB have also been jointly providing technical support to the social program *'Mi Familia Progresa,'* and plan to maintain the usual cooperation and coordination arrangements used in the past, i.e., financing different activities or in different geographic areas. South-South cooperation has been and will be promoted through sharing of experiences (including visits to successful programs in the region). Significant examples include conditional cash transfers and fiscal reform" (CAS Guatemala 2008:50).

Event though I present much more examples of the Bank's influencing via technical assistance. I want to point out that technical advice not necessarily is successful. Pakistan is an example where advocacy for CCT via technical advice fizzled out over the years. In 2006 the Bank offered to assist Pakistan to develop safety nets and "to help the poor escape poverty, e.g. via conditional cash transfers" (CAS Pakistan 2006: 31). Therefore, the Bank delivers technical assistance for policy formulation as well as for policy implementation:

> "Technical assistance will include support for strategy development, design of new social protection interventions (workfare, demand-side incentives for health and education [CCT], etc.), program implementation, e.g. improved targeting methods, administration, and evaluation" (ibid).

Though Pakistan received so much technical assistance the country only renewed its already existing stipend program and introduced some new stipend programs only as

a pilot project. In 2010 the CAS reports that "the Government has already piloted several CCTs to improve schooling outcomes of primary and secondary level children" (CAS Pakistan 2010:28). Though this is not no success at all, it falls behind the World Bank's suggestion of a CCT program. The next report on Pakistan's development in 2011 does not even mention CCTs any more. Instead the Bank re-focused on the education sector. In Morocco the World Bank also merely focused on the education sector and supported the development of an 'Education-CCT' with evaluations. Despite its effectiveness to stimulate CCT implementation the Bank is very clear about its usage of 'Analytical and Advisory Assistance' as a 'vehicle for advocacy':

> "**AAA. The importance of the knowledge role of the Bank to inform reforms** and the accompaniment of reform implementation through TA [Technical Assistance], capacity building and policy dialogue is a key aspect of the partnership with the country. The approach of the Bank has been to carry out strong AAA that underpins dialogue and advocacy in many sectors, and then builds up the Bank's engagement to DPL [Development Policy Loan] or investment financing once the sectoral reform programs are well designed, fully costed and with relevant objectives and indicators in place. In several cases, _the Bank's AAA program_ has encompassed cutting-edge work and _provided an excellent vehicle for advocacy_ of critical issues - addressing youth exclusion, social protection reform, poverty analysis, governance issues, scaling up innovative service delivery approaches such as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT), competitiveness, labor market issues - so the Bank is well placed to partner with the Government in these areas" (CAS Morocco 2012:9;).

The success of this influencing via AAA depends on many conditions but increases the probability that national programs are scaled up and continued nevertheless. In the case of Nicaragua which I already mentioned the delivery of AAA was left out which showed the effectiveness of the CCT program and argued for its institutionalization. As a consequence political support was weak and with a change in government the CCT program was discontinued. As described above the World Bank reacted with the support for several pilot projects which were than accompanied by evaluations. The Nicaragua case shows how important the Bank's activities on monitoring, evaluation and advice can be. Thus, it is not to underestimate that in cases like Peru the World Bank began activities on monitoring and evaluation because the extension of the national CCT program stagnated. In

Peru for example the Bank decided seven years after the programs introduction to support the implementation process with technical assistance. After the CCT introduction in 2005 the Bank criticized the low level of social protection and the inadequate access to public services such as health care and education (CAS Peru 2006:4). The Bank offered technical assistance and long-term plan in order to improve public services. In 2012 the *Juntos* CCT program was still criticized its incoherence and ineffectiveness with low coverage and spending levels (CAS Peru 2012:10). Thus, the Bank decided to support the impact of the program with an overall monitoring and evaluation system for Peru's social programs (CAS Peru 2012:20).

The examples show how technical assistance of the World Bank is a connection of monitoring mechanisms with the delivery of advice which either criticizes the current state of the CCT implementation and encourages to improve the program's performance, or the advice of the Bank praises the effectiveness of the CCT program and encourages to scale the program up and better institutionalize it.

Conclusion

In this chapter I showed that the World Bank's policy model of CCTs is a normative and cognitive model. The basic parameters of this model – the conditionality on school attendance and health check-ups – are difficult to modify, so either a countries implements a CCT or not. Yet, the Bank can still include some modification of the model and make some kind of a low-budget version out of it by designing the targeting more broadly or more focused on the poorest of the poor. The latter version would target only certain areas of a country when the number of people living in extreme poverty is high and schools and hospitals are available. Another strategy is the Bank's 'development approach' which is an underlying strategy of the World Bank to approach developing countries and advocate CCTs only if a country has reached a certain development level. As a consequence the World Bank is rather silent about CCTs in African countries because most of those countries still have particular difficulties to offer sufficient public services like schools and hospitals.

With most of the countries the World Bank has established longer-term relations via country dialogues. This dialogues keep the Bank up-to-date about the countries development, plans and priorities. The Bank can follow its development approach and make suggestions accordingly. The World Bank can criticize the lack

of adequate education and health-care facilities or the performance of those sectors and engage in longer-term projects. If the country has already established the preconditions for a CCT program the World Bank can continue to criticize poorly performing social protection programs. If the the first step is done and a country introduced a CCT social protection program, the Bank tries to get the program institutionalized and supports it in order to guarantee the programs survival in a fragile context. The Bank considers CCTs to be the flagship social protection program of a country and expects smaller already existing programs – especially subsidies – to be phased out in favor of CCTs.

The process of influencing is accompanied by technical assistance and advice services of the World Bank which help the country to implement a CCT program. If the country agrees to invest in social protection programs that fight poverty and are an investment in human capital at the same time but not necessarily to CCTs the Bank can make a start by offering support for the implementation of a pilot project. Often a (economic or natural) crisis hitting a country is a good entry point for the implementation of pilots. The necessary of *monitoring and positive evaluations* by the World Bank of the effectiveness of programs is crucial in order to mobilize the political support for the scaling up of the program. The same is important for already implemented CCT programs because such programs can remain rather small and underfunded for quite some years in developing countries. Technical support for scaling up the program is often an important measure. However, in most cases it is not technical support only that convinces policy-makers but the Bank offers cash via loans as an additional incentive. In the next chapter I provide more details on incentives used by the World Bank in order to facilitate national institution-building. If finally a CCT project is introduced and on its way to be the main social protection program of the country as part of a social protection system including education and health, the Bank mobilizes evaluations which are coupled with advice as a strategy used by the Bank for advocacy on CCTs in order to facilitate the process of institutionalization and to share the positive examples and evaluations with other countries. South-South-Cooperation becomes an interesting additional tool for influencing, because the World Bank can guide a process of learning from a peer group and use first successes with a CCT policy elsewhere to advocate the implementation in further countries.

In sum, the three approaches to national institutionalization and implementation add up to the World Banks's construction of CCT as a global model as well as an encompassing strategy that harnesses the normative influence of the

CCT model and the Bank's ability to influence via financial incentives. Especially the long-term relations and the ongoing country dialogue helps to translate policy suggestions to national contexts.

2.4. Incentives for National Institution-Building: Loan Provision

Despite its global advocacy, country dialogues and technical advice, the World Bank has the ability to influence and motivate countries to take up a certain policy innovation by offering large amounts of money in form of loans. The World Bank's loans are an offer that countries might take or reject according to the country's own priorities. Thus, receiving a loan is considered to be an incentive for countries and not to be means of coercion like some scientific literature might suggest. For some developing country which depend on the acquisition of new funding in order to ensure the countries survival the option to reject a loan might be remote and though policy suggestions by financial institutions may appear as quasi-compulsory. However, the World Bank only provides loans to countries that are credible and able to pay back the loan in the forthcoming years. Those countries are potentially in the position to reject a loan offer. Latin American countries which where able to benefit from the economic growth are good examples of how fast the self-confidence of governments in the Global South can grow. For countries with tight public budgets and a low level of development the IDA of the World Bank provides loans. Those loans are smaller than the loans of the IBRD but they have no interests and allow countries to pay back the loan over a long time period. With this double-structure the Bank can provide funding for a range of countries as an incentive to implement or to extend social protection programs according to the policies advocated by the World Bank. In the following I will shed some light on the World Bank's lending activities to support CCT program development.

Most interactions between the World Bank and countries start and end with the Bank's lending activities. Lending is important for the start of country dialogues. In most cases the interactions do not end quickly but continue over years of even decades. Moreover, often policy-making in one area involves other areas as well, so that a reform might be in fact the trigger for a bunch of follow-up reforms. The Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) are a good example for this kind of long-term cooperation and it becomes clear in these CAS that all other activities of the Bank circle around the Bank's lending activities. However, that does not necessarily mean

that lending is the most influential instrument of the World Bank, even though it is an important one.

It is difficult to trace in each CAS report in how far the World Bank supported CCTs and how much money the Bank made available for policy-making on CCTs. Due to the Bank's development approach the World Bank often provides most of its funding for the education and health sector. Like in the case of Turkey where the Bank first introduced a pilot project for direct income support in order to eliminate credit subsidies. The Bank advised to expand this program and combined that advice with proposing large investments for education and health. The Bank provided USD 100 million for health, USD 300 million for basic education, and USD 175 million for secondary education. These loans came together with a USD 112 million loan for social assistance. All this support in the year 2000 and in the following years mark the start of Turkey's CCT program which officially started in 2001. In the case of Guatemala the Bank also continued its financial support for investments in infrastructure measures in order to support the implementation of the CCT program. This example makes also clearly visible the connection between funding for infrastructure measures and CCT development. The Bank made a loan of USD 220 million available for 'Rural Infrastructure and Expanding Opportunities: CCT' (CAS Guatemala 2012). Loans are also a tool for the Bank to purposely change the priorities of the government. In the Dominican Republic the Bank provided loans over the years primarily for the education sector. Already in 1995 the Bank criticized the Dominican Republic for the low enrollment rates of children in primary schooling and engaged in a ten-year plan for education providing a loan of 22 million (CAS Dominican Republic 1995). In the next period from 1999 on the Bank provided USD 67 million for education. The focus on education might be explained by the World Bank's concern that the Dominican Republic is "very far from developing an adequate safety net system" (CAS Dominican Republic 1999). In 2001 the country introduced a scholarship program and in 2005 a full-fledged CCT with an education and health condition. In 2005 the World Bank provided a USD 50 million loan to support the introduction of the CCT. The money was considered to be for household surveys and the development of a database that would support the targeting of the CCT. While the Bank concentrated on CCT development other donors continued the support for the education system. While the World Bank provided a USD 42 million loan for early childhood education, the European Union continued the support for the ten-year education plan with USD 54 million and the IDB invested USD 200 million for primary and secondary education. Although it is not specifiable how the support of the World

Bank continued I found a clear statement that the World Bank used its loans to continue its advocacy for CCTs. The Bank devoted the largest share of its lending in 2011 of USD 370 million for a 'development policy loan' which "seeks to promote and consolidate a major shift in government's social sector priorities and capacities towards human capital formation" (CAS Dominican Republic 2011:1). The examples highlight the importance of the education sector because often a scholarship program precedes the introduction of a full fledged CCT. Moreover, the loans can be important for the introduction of a CCT as well as for the expansion and scaling-up of them.

In countries like Honduras the World Bank supported the new set-up of a CCT from its inception. The Bank's 'Social Protection Project' built on experiences such as *Oportunidades* in Mexico and *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil and helped to develop the CCT of Honduras. For this purpose the Social Protection Project included a loan of USD 43 million. In Chile the Bank also provided a 'Social Protection Adjustment Loan' of USD 200 million and an additional 'Social Protection Technical Assistance Loan' of around USD 11 million. According to the World Bank this might have helped to get the CCT program approved by the Chilean congress in 2004. In the following the Bank combined this support with continued impact evaluations of the CCT program *Chile Solidario* (CAS Chile 2007:39). In other cases the Bank contributed to the scaling-up of existing pilot programs facilitating the introduction of a proper country-wide CCT. In the Philippines the World Bank extended its support for the CCT pilot dramatically: "The planned loan amount in support of the CCT program was increased from US$50 million to US$405 million" (CAS Philippines 2009:16). Furthermore, the Bank planned to improve the targeting and design of the CCT. Again the combination of loans and technical expertise is noticeable.

Also major country examples that served in the decade from the year 2000 onwards as lighthouse examples, like Brazil, were massively supported financially by the World Bank. The short story would be that the Brazilian government introduced its CCT program *Bolsa Familia* in 2003 while the World Bank provided a supporting credit of USD 570 million and additionally the IDB provided a credit of USD 1 billion. All this support was for the new sector-wide approach of the World Bank for the Brazilian social assistance. However, Brazil's CCT program had precursors in 2001 with an education CCT and health CCT in parallel and a scholarship introduced in 1996. For the lending period after 1996 the World Bank already made a loan of USD 1.5 billion available for human capital and infrastructure measures (CAS Brazil 1995:13). As already mentioned this loan went along with strong criticism of Brazil's education system. Like in other countries the Bank made a ten-year plan for the

development of the education sector. In the year 2000 the Bank financed the scaling-up of Brazil's *Bolsa Escola* with USD 1.3 billion. It becomes visible that before every major reform in Brazil the World Bank made several hundreds of millions available.

The World Bank rarely engages in Africa with high financial investments. Many African countries have difficulties to take up the idea of CCTs, either for cultural reasons or because the country cannot meet the necessary infrastructural preconditions. Kenya is one of the few examples were the Bank was engaged. In the CAS of 1998 the Bank criticized the "lack of broad-based safety net programs for vulnerable groups" (CAS Kenya 1998:3) and mentioned that Kenya is characterized by a communal self-help system called *Harambee.* The CAS in 2004 mentioned that the World Bank supported the education and health sector massively together with the UN, EU, and DFID. In the same year Kenya introduced a CCT for orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs). In 2010 the CAS suggested to scale the CCT program up and the IDA of the World Bank provided a loans of USD 50 million for the 'Cash Transfer for OVCs':

> "[Kenya] recently developed cash transfer programs for orphans and vulnerable children, the elderly, and the chronically food-insecure in the arid lands and in urban slums as well as targeted programs for the disabled and unemployed youth. [...] Scaled-up and coordinated, these programs can provide a comprehensive system of social protection" (CAS Kenya 2010:26).

Yet, the report indicates that policy-making in favor of CCTs is difficult even when funding is available. The program in Kenya remained so small covering only 12.500 beneficiaries in total so that as a consequence only half of the loan was used in the end. The Bank's influence remains the strongest in middle-income countries.

Conclusion

This section showed that in most cases the World Bank is involved financially as well. To discover the financial engagement of the Bank for CCT development I followed the development approach of the World Bank and also took the investments for infrastructure measures, and the education and health sector into consideration. In many cases the Bank was financially active during the years when a new CCT program was introduced or older programs were going to scale. Especially countries

that receive most attention in the CCT community like Brazil have received financial support in extraordinary amount. Moreover, it is not just the World Bank providing loans. Especially in Latin America the Inter-American Development Bank was active with high loans as well. In cases like Argentina the World Bank supported merely a pilot project and a workfare program which the Argentine government rejected. The funding supporting the policy-making in this country came primarily from the IDB, which provided USD 1.2 billion for conditional subsidies targeting poor and indigent families around 2004 when Argentina introduced its CCT program. It shows that the Bank is not the only and maybe not even the most important player providing loans. Instead it seems like the World Bank is providing money more selectively and strategically in combination with technical advice (AAA) according to its own priorities.

In short the following three priorities of the Bank are also reflected in their approach to funding: first, the development of infrastructure measures for education and health should be maximized; second, a CCT program should be introduced; third, the social protection of the country should be coherent and systemic at its best with CCT as the country's flagship program for social protection.

Since 2010 the latter point is called by the World Bank the systemic approach.

"**During this period [2000-2010], the Bank began to make an important shift from an approach based mainly on projects that emphasize delivery of social assistance benefits to helping countries build SSN [social safety net] systems and institutions that can respond better to various types of poverty, risk, and vulnerability within a particular country context.** The systemic approach involves developing various capacities, such as data to identify vulnerable groups, targeting systems to ensure the right groups receive benefits, payment mechanisms to channel resources to beneficiaries, and monitoring and evaluation systems to measure program implementation and impact, as well as a set of coordinated programs appropriate for different groups of poor and vulnerable people. Only 14 percent of the 30 case study countries that IEG examined embraced a systemic approach to addressing different types of risk in the first half of the decade, but 46 percent did so by the second half of the decade" (IEG 2011: xi-xii; original emphasis).

Coming back to the example of Argentina – mentioned above – in the period from 2004 to 2010 the World Bank criticized in 2004 the workfare program '*Jefes y Jefas de Hogar*' because it failed to stimulate long-term effects. The Bank advised the

government to move away from social emergency programs to medium-term programs and provided USD 30 million for a pilot project in this sense (CAS Argentina 2004). In 2010 all efforts of the World Bank focused on the development and implementation of a "Universal Social Protection Strategy for the most vulnerable groups" (CAS Argentina 2010:23). For this purpose the Bank provided technical assistance (AAA) and funded a 'Basic Protection Project' with USD 450 million and additional USD 480 million one year later. In 2009 the government introduced new CCT programs. While the first CCT in 2004 was funded by the IDB the second one was supported by the World Bank but according to systemic approach of the World Bank.

2.5. Conclusion:
The World Bank's advocacy, advice and incentives

To make sense of the World Bank's activities on policy influencing I used three categories: advocacy, advice and incentives. While one would expect the World Bank to use money as a strong incentive to influence policy-making, I found that advocacy and advice have played an important role as well. The activities on all three dimensions have been so rich, that it is hard to say which has been the most dominant mode of influencing.

With regard to *advocacy*, I gathered information on the World Bank's activities with regard to the diffusion of social cash transfers (SCTs) and found that the Bank does not support all kind of SCT models equally. Besides social pensions, which the Bank has advocated with muss less activities, I showed that the Bank supports *one model in particular: conditional cash transfers* (CCTs). CCTs are not simply a policy but clearly advocated as a *policy model*. The acronym CCT is well known within the developing community, and the World Bank published flagship publications about it, held international forums, conferences and workshops devoted to CCTs, and measures and describes countries' policies in terms of CCTs. Those events and publications increase the attention of this policy model and present this policy to be part of a trend. This 'trend towards CCTs' is debatable. The publication of maps where mere scholarship programs have been suddenly described as CCTs is an illustrative example of how strong the World Bank advocates CCTs in global

publications. Yet, one might ask if this advocacy for a particular policy model is a coincidence or if it actually make sense for the World Bank to support CCTs. This model is so attractive for the World Bank because it combines several aspects that fit perfectly to the Bank's logic and sets of policies which the World Bank has supported and established in the previous decades.

According to a neoliberal ideology a cash transfer to the poor should not create dependency and disincentive to work. But the World Bank has come to ascribe rationality to the poor – making rational use of cash transfer –, but this rationality is seen to be bounded, legitimizing the conditions of benefit take-up (von Gliszczynski 2015). In the World Bank's view, a small cash transfer is supposed to lift the poor out of the most devastating state of poverty with the effect to enable effective self-help. Above all, CCT are considered to be an investment in human capital (healthy and educated workforce) of the future working generation – the children – because the cash transfer is conditional on the children's regular school attendance and regular health check-ups. While this argumentation fits very well to the Bank's logic, it, furthermore, fits to their preceding policies. The World Bank has supported the education and health sectors in developing countries for a long time. A cash transfer, which is designed in such a way that it is dependent on sufficient hospitals and schools in place does make sense for the World Bank because it is in line with its previous policies. A country which follows the World Bank's argumentation has to continue its investments into infrastructure measures in order to implement a CCT in a second step.

Having shown that the World Bank engages in global advocacy based on the promotion of a particular policy model, I found that advocacy as well as advice at the local level is sensitive to the developmental state of the particular country. The circumstance that the implementation of a CCT is dependent on an infrastructure of schools and hospitals allows the World Bank to promote a wide range of policies from their agenda in a developing context. In least-developed countries (LDCs) the Bank has to continue and strengthen its support for infrastructure measures, while for other countries the main policy suggestion is focussed on CCTs. Because CCTs are the flagship SCT program of the World Bank, it seems to me that the World Bank would like to see the CCT model implemented throughout the Global South, but for countries that do not have the preconditions in place, the Bank focusses its advice and critique on infrastructure measures. This kind of sensitivity to the individual development state of particular countries is what I call the *development approach* of the World Bank.

While the effect of advocacy in global discourses is rather diffuse and hard to measure, the advice tailored to the national level is much closer to most decision-making. All developing countries are in one way or another connected with the World Band because they receive or have received some kind of lending. To ensure that the loans are used for the purpose as originally intended the World Bank accompanies national policy-making with advice and review papers while on the other hand hand the countries publish strategy papers for the World Bank. This is a continuous country dialogue driven by the World Bank. The injection of advice and knowledge to national policy-making is not the exception but a common and rather normal mode. One central document in this regard are Country Assistance Strategy Papers (CAS) published by the World Bank for national policy-makers. CAS are published almost annually and have existed for decades, which makes them an excellent tool to evaluate what kind of advice the World Bank tailors to domestic politics. Here I found two kinds of advice: the World Bank advises countries either to pick up and test the model of CCTs, and the World Bank follows up on this and advises countries to prolong the test phase and to scale-up the pilot projects. While the global policy model of CCT entails ideas about how a CCT is an investment in human capital and how social indicators like school attendance and health check-ups can be improved, such arguments can be found as well in the World Bank's advice in the CAS. The CAS criticize social indicators, such as low school attendance, and suggest that a CCT might be tested in form of a pilot project in order to evaluate in how far it would improve these social indicators. Based on this critique and the presentation of CCTs as a simple and viable solution one can find in later CAS that countries have taken action and introduced pilot projects to test the positive impact on social indicators. Even thoug this could be considered to be a quick win for the World Bank in terms of influence, the "impact" is fragile and prone to be washed away at the end of the pilot period. Therefore advice remains a critical instrument. Policy development at national level is accompanied by monitoring and advice measures, which seem to be crucial to convince the decision-makers of the effectiveness of CCTs. Only if evaluations about the CCT have been conducted during the pilot period and constantly mentioned within the country dialogues, it can be assured that the CCT model receives the attention it needs to go to scale instead to be phased out. In short: the World Bank's advice aims equally at the *introduction* of a CCT pilot as well as the *institutionalization* of CCTs and CCT pilot projects.

The third analytical category refers to the kind of incentives the World Bank can make use of. In case of this organization the usage of money via loans seems

obvious. The Bank's loans seem to be an important stimulus, and a method to overcome political doubts and implementation barriers. The influence of the World Bank via loans does not seems to be the strongest driver, because there are other players in the game, like the regional banks which often have provided much larger sums than the World Bank. Moreover, the mere availability of loans is not sufficient to motivate countries in the Global South to introduce CCTs, because lending means new debts for the country, which the countries not always seem to welcome so willingly as a decade before. The program has to be appealing and desirable – which is why the Bank's activities on global advocacy are so important –, as well as political motivation has to be assured for the policy adoption as well as the period of implementation which can take several years.

I found that advice is a strong component within interactions between the World Bank and national governments. The World Bank monitors and evaluates country programs and injects its advice in the political process. Country dialogues with the national government are a tool of critically analyzing particular developments and to offer support and expertise for counter-measures to undesirable developments. I see the particular combination of advocacy, advice and incentives as a favorable precondition for an organization to stimulate global policy diffusion.

Chapter 3: HelpAge International
and Universal Social Pensions

HelpAge International (in the following referred to as 'HelpAge') is the leading global organization with a mandate to advocate the rights and needs of older people. On HelpAge's website its mandate is described as follows: "HelpAge International helps older people claim their rights, challenge discrimination and overcome poverty, so that they can lead dignified, secure, active and healthy lives" (HelpAge Website 2013a). In terms of size and global outreach there is no comparable organization for older people. It describes itself as a "global network striving for the rights of disadvantaged older people to economic and physical security" (Walker Bourne et al. 2011). HelpAge is a remarkable case because it is one of the few international *non*-governmental organizations (INGOs) that have been influential on national policy-making in the Global South for social cash transfer (SCT) programs. It is an interesting research puzzle to find out how an INGO has been able to contribute to policy diffusion. Moreover, it seems to be peculiar to the self-description of this actor that its mission includes – among other things – the advocacy of social cash transfers, intending to influence global policy-making as well as national policy-making. The slogan on HelpAge's website in the 'social protection' area explicitly state: "Find out how we're influencing policy makers to ensure a secure income for older people" (HelpAge Website 2012). This ambition is the first feature which highlights HelpAge's distinctiveness from those of many other INGOs in the field of global social policy.

3.1. How HelpAge differs from other INGOs

In order to better understand the distinctiveness of HelpAge it might help to contrast this organization with another INGO. Many INGOs follow a classical approach of direct service provision as many national non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do. The involvement and cooperation with the government can also become pretty intense in this case. Governments tend to rely more and more on the contributions provided by *non-governmental* organizations.[5] The difference between national NGOs and INGOs might by less the way of engaging nationally than the fact that INGOs simply provide services and emergency aid in multiple countries in the Global South instead of just in one, and have more possibilities to raise funds across countries. To illustrate how exceptional HelpAge's focus on advocacy and on influencing national policy-making is, I contrast it with the activities of the German INGO "Kinderhilfswerk Global-Care" (KHW) which supports the needs of children worldwide.

In 2011 the INGO ran 442 projects in 17 countries mostly in the Global South, while spending EUR 2.3 million on its projects (KHW 2012). The objectives the INGO pursues at national level differ in so far from the international development community that the promotion of social cash transfers and social protection is less an issue for the Kinderhilfswerk. Instead the INGO focuses on emergency assistance, building schools, supporting the construction of houses, and food supply.[6] This is not to say that the KHW is not recognizing that national programs of social assistance are missing; but what kind of consequences does it represent for the INGO? How does the organization intend to react to this recognized 'grievance'? Whereas HelpAge tries to push for the introduction of national social protection programs (i.e. social pensions) as a consequence of incomplete national systems, the KHW

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5   The appearance as a service provider is also recognized at national level by other IOs. The World Bank describes that in Bangladesh the involvement of NGO in service provision grew extensively at the end of the 1990s: "Five years ago, almost no IDA-assisted projects in Bangladesh relied on substantial NGO involvement. Today almost all do. Government programs that collaborate with NGOs are often more successful than those that do not" (World Bank CAS Bangladesh 1998:6).
6   The delivery of services and emergency aid is what INGOs are known for in most cases, and are either praised for their contribution to fill a vacuum within the national service infrastructure left by the government, or they are criticizes for their lack of coordination among each other, and their patchwork assistance have been condemned as unsustainable and contradicting the credo of "help to self-help" which e.g. the German government continuously emphasizes as the guideline for development aid.

illustratively reports about their activities in Uganda: in order to help the people not being covered by pension- or health insurances, or child allowances, the KHW intends to build three houses so that the people can find shelter. Direct aid provision might be some kind of a natural response for INGOs. In its early days HelpAge has started with such a focus itself by providing eye surgeries to people in rural areas.

To switch the focus of their operations towards influencing national governments is described by HelpAge as a result of a learning process by having realized that an INGO can implement one, two or hundred single projects, and it would be still rather a "drop in the ocean" (HelpAge Interview No.6), and less effective than having stimulated a commitment of the national government which is able to devote unequally more resources to people living in need and poverty than patchwork country projects could provide:

> "HelpAge started in the early days trying to directly improve the lives of older people through project programs, direct service delivery, and addressing concrete needs. We might be able to reach kind of one thousand older people with your programs, but then the structural causes of poverty would still remain. And what about the people that would become older some years later down the line? With such an approach you would never be able to change structural causes" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

To tackle the structural causes is an immense undertaking that is rare and differs from the work of other INGOs. That might be the reason for the fact that most literature ignores the influence of INGOs and concentrates on governmental organizations instead, based on the assumptions that they have stronger means to 'enforce' policy suggestions. As noted above the World Bank can motivate the adoption of policy suggestions with large amounts of cash in form of loans, whereas the ILO can set standards and pass recommendation through the ILC as a highly legitimized body. An INGO that is for the most part relying on soft power as means to influence makes it puzzling of how this might work and casts doubt in its effectiveness. I found that in limited contexts HelpAge can become highly effective in influencing national policy-making.

In a nutshell, my analysis found that HelpAge's influence is due to considerable activities on multiple levels making use of normative influencing on the global and regional level, cognitive influencing at national level, accompanied by an own specific mode of influencing stemming from its unique network structure

enabling HAI to set up grassroots movements at local level which can strategically unfold political pressure.

What is HelpAge? Actor, network, or both?

Before I start with the analysis of the organizations activities of influencing I will explain what kind of actor HelpAge actually is. Through discussions with scholars from other disciplines I have experienced that for some this is difficult to understand HelpAge's nature at first glance. Is HelpAge a global actor like a single organization, or is it a broad network with a secretariat to represent the network? To answer this question is not as easy as one might assume. I argue that what makes HelpAge so interesting is that it is both at the same time, namely, a network-based global actor.

Let me posit just two basic principles connected with global actors: first the ability to act as one (coordination), and, second, that its entities have the same core mandate (uniformity). According to those criteria both can be confirmed for HelpAge. All parts of HelpAge's network share the same core mandate focused on the advocacy for older peoples' rights and needs, and coordination is ensured and realized through highly visible global campaigns design by HelpAge's central secretariat in London (more below). On the other side, I posit the organizational decentralization through independence of its units as the main criterion of a network. The units within the HelpAge network indeed have a high degree of independence because most of the HelpAge network consists of national NGOs that have joined the network. One of HelpAge's officers wrote: "Wherever possible and appropriate these tasks and technical support areas are located in regional and country offices" (Walker Bourne et al. 2011: 410). The organization's guiding principle to make decisions according to national and geographical environments automatically decentralizes parts from the internal decision-making structure. Whereas the main directives comes from the secretariat, all other decisions are made at the lowest level possible. This is a first important strategy to maintain good working relations with the national governments. HelpAge rarely appears to be an 'external' actor that tries to 'impose' some ideology. As I will show, this 'bottom-up' structure is accompanied by many further strategies that build up on the guiding principle of processes being 'country-led'.

A further explanation of why HelpAge has such an interesting network-based character can be found in the history of HelpAge's development. A brief overview of

HelpAge's origin shows that, on the one hand, it was born as an INGO and grew to an independent organization in the early 1990s out of the British organization 'Help the Aged'[7] which is a highly centralized national organization with the purpose of organizing charities for fund-raising within the United Kingdom foremost for the needs and interests of older people directly in the UK. On the other hand, Help the Aged has set up HelpAge as a branch organization for international projects, which means that networking has been from the beginning on a major part of HelpAge's activities. The organization was founded as a network connecting five (independent) organizations around the globe: Help the Aged UK, Help the Aged Canada, HelpAge India, HelpAge Kenya, and Pro Vida Colombia. In the following decade the network increased to a total number of 34 organizations in 2011 with an outreach to 41 countries. With the years the network constantly improved and strengthened coordination, while at the same time not impeding the organizations ability to act independently.

In order to visualize HelpAge's setup, 'figure 3' (see next page) shows in red all the units of this actor that have been set-up by HelpAge International and, thus, are more tightly coordinated. Furthermore, units colored in green represent the national NGOs which are affiliated organizations of the HelpAge network. The main coordination is executed by the HelpAge Secretariat in London from where the organization sets up new country offices whenever it has funding for country missions available. Even though these country offices highly depend on project funding HelpAge actively works towards making these offices stay by attracting new projects before the precursor ends. This strategy seems to work because, as a HelpAge officer told me, until now no country office ever had to be closed. More direct responses and coordination in detail is ensured through regional development centers. As a basic principle the HelpAge secretariat provides funding and, if requested or necessary, expertise to the regional development centers as well to country offices. In return, the regional development centers are responsible for the activities carried out in specific regions and can inform the secretariat about encountered problems and concrete needs and opportunities for successful advocacy. With this information flowing to the secretariat, it has an advantageous position in designing strategies and coordinating campaigns executed around the globe.

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7   'Help the Aged' merged with 'Age Concern' and is known since 2009 as 'Age UK'.

Figure 2

The Organizational Structure of HelpAge International

Global Level — HelpAge Secretariat

Regional Level — Regional Development Centers

outreach to 22 countries

National Level — Country Offices

additional outreach to 19 countries — National Affiliates

Source: author's own visualization

Additional to the units which are genuine to HelpAge, the INGO was able to almost double its outreach to countries by spanning a network of associated national affiliates, and ensuring coordination through communication between the national affiliates and HelpAge's regional development centers. The affiliates are national NGOs that can look back to its own history which is usually deeply rooted in national origins. They became affiliates of the HelpAge network because they share HelpAge's intention to engage in advocacy and support for the well-being of older people and broader sets of issues important to aging. Before incorporating an organization HelpAge engages in a longer dialogue in order to ensure that certain

principles are met, which foremost means to prove if the organization agrees upon HelpAge's values and its mission to support older persons. Yet, HelpAge welcomes a high degree of its affiliates' autonomy and respects national peculiarities. One example stems from the Asian context where even the term 'older person' or 'elderly' is regarded as being too offensive. Therefore, HelpAge affiliates rather choose to use the term 'senior citizens' instead. Moreover, HelpAge affiliates do not even have to be named as HelpAge. In most cases they keep their own name and appearance.

Summed up, I have argued that HelpAge is a network-based INGO. It can be seen as a single INGO because it can act as such on the global level and is coordinated through campaigns in regions and nationally. Offices of HelpAge around the globe resulted from HelpAge's activities, and belong either directly to HelpAge or are part of its network. The secretariat is key for coordination of campaigns and representing the actor's interests. Moreover, the network character is clearly visible as well through its affiliates which enable HelpAge to act with high responsiveness according to national contexts.

A final aspect of the network structure is its global spread. I found that most country offices and affiliates are located in the Asian region (47%), followed by the African region (35%) and Latin America (18%). Without going into detail, one can see that HelpAge's activities directly take place in the Global South in low- and middle income countries where the share of older people living in poverty is particularly high (HelpAge 2004). This feature makes HelpAge eminently relevant for an analysis of policy diffusion in the Global South. In the following I present the results of my analysis of strategies HelpAge is using in order to contribute to the diffusion of social cash transfer programs, i.e. social pensions.

3.2. Advocacy via Global Models and Conferences: Translating down the Idea of "Social Pensions"

As a first aspect I analyze to what extent norms, values and policy models exist as guidelines and motivation for the actor's actions. The second aspect is if the INGO has strategically made use of the global environment in order to establish its model as a normative template, such as 'best practices', and in order to 'deliver' the model to national governments. For the identification of HelpAge's strategies I conducted multiple interviews in London with policy officers from regional development centers in Asia and Latin America, HelpAge staff from the secretariat ,as well as with the policy officer for strategic planning who is responsible for the global missions and was also involved in advocacy in the African region.

Are HelpAge's actions guided by a policy model?

I begin by analyzing if HelpAge's activities on influencing have been motivated by an underlying policy model or particular norms, values and concepts which were carried, implicitly or explicitly, to countries in the Global South. In a nutshell, I argue in the following that HelpAge's activities in the field of social protection are driven by the idea of 'social pensions' as a particular policy model seen as a component of development strategies. That an IO is driven by a clear policy it has set for itself to be 'best practices', which guide the IO's behavior in many ways, is not self-evident. World society theory posits that IOs often portray themselves as some kind of unambitious when it comes to policy suggestions. They appear to be rather interest free or "disinterested". In the same way HelpAge also talks about bottom-up approach and support of governmental ambitious. In many cases NGOs are regarded as service providers at national level and not understood as agents involved in strategic influencing. Especially strategically coordinated activities on the global level are rather unusual, and deserve some explanations of how HelpAge expects to use a global normative mode for influencing national policy-making. I start with a brief explanation of the policy model HelpAge advocates.

At the beginning of the 2010s the term of 'social pensions' and reference to this model started to spread among actors at the global level.[8] The origin of this model is hard to determine. The idea of having a non-contributory pension was prominently advocated by the World Bank at the beginning of the 1990s (World Bank 1994). The so called 'zero pillar' (Holzmann and Hinz 2005) was designed as a residual program complementing the World Bank's advocacy for pension privatization. The term 'social pensions' however was not a famous concept in the international development community at this time. I found this term being first used in academic analysis of the pension system in South Africa at the beginning of the 1990s (cf. Lund 1993; Ardington and Lund 1995; Møller 1996). It was a term used with regard to South Africa and not used in a broader way or to describe a general type of pension or model. This changed at the beginning of the 2000s when it became part of HelpAge's agenda. At first introduced as a working paper in 2002 for the ILO, the author's analysis of non-contributory pensions by Armando Barrientos and Peter Lloyd-Sherlock became known to HelpAge as well and their results an official HelpAge paper in 2003 authored by the same scientists (cf. Barrientos & Lloyd-Sherlock 2002; 2003). Barrientos' and Lloyd-Sherlock's paper was important in this regard because it showed HelpAge what a prominent role non-contributory pensions systems can play in developing countries. This was especially relevant for Africa where due to HIV/AIDS basically one generation of people is missing and, thus, older people have to care for children. Moreover, the report mentioned the repercussions globalization can have for developing countries:

> "In countries affected by the pandemic, many traditional multigenerational households have become missing-generation ones, with the responsibility for sustaining the household falling squarely on older people. Rapid economic and social change in developing countries is having similar effects, and migration, unemployment, and globalisation, have further implications for intergenerational support. Pensions for the poor are therefore an urgent issue for developing countries" (Barrientos and Lloyed-Sherlock 2002:1).

However, this studies included the term 'social pension' only with reference to South Africa and Brazil while maintaining the self-explanatory term 'non-contributory pensions'. Stephen Devereux of the British think tank 'Institute of Development

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8   For more information on the usage of particular terms on social cash transfer see Gliszczynski 2015.

Studies' (IDS) was among the very first scholars using this term more extensively and broadly (Devereux 2001). HelpAge in the year 2002/03 was in the position of choosing which term to pick up and to advocate. HelpAge deliberately choose social pensions in order to get away from the technical discussions that seem too much to discuss the necessity of contributions or where the financing for a non-contributory pension should come from (HelpAge Interview No.7). The term social pension was suppose to have a totally different perspective on such issues clearly indicating that this kind of pension is part of social policies in order to mitigate poverty for people in old age. HelpAge emphasized in the following years two aspects in particular. First, that countries have in some way the responsibility to care for older people by means of social policies; and second, that the fulfillment of this social policy is functional because it comes with a multitude of positive effects.

HelpAge's flagship publication "Age and Security" of 2004 provides a good basis for analyzing how the INGO presents and frames social pensions. In this publication HelpAge argues the case for social pension in general and universal social pensions (USPs) in particular, and, therewith, records a clear policy preference. The distinctive feature of USPs is – as the name indicates – the component of universality. The only criterion for the disbursement of the pension should be the age of the recipient. Means-tests are not part of this model. The rational behind the decision to advocate USPs takes the context in developing countries in consideration where the governmental capacity or available data that would be necessary to implement means-tested pensions is low. So called 'exclusion errors' even in large and established programs like *Bolsa Familia* in Brazil remain high. Estimations state that about 70% of eligible people that would meet the conditions of a means-test are excluded (HelpAge Interview No.5). Moreover, corruption still is a widespread phenomenon in developing countries. To let officials at local level decide whether an applicant meets the preconditions for a means-test of not is prone to be matter of corruption. The report in 2004 argues as advantages of USP programs their administrative simplicity, the advantage of having a clear target group, and the increase in popularity due to the universality. Further arguments characterize USPs as stigma-free, transparent and easy to understand, and gender-neutral (HelpAge 2004:39ff). There are no negative implications mentioned or described. The only critical point discussed is the affordability. Are social pensions to expensive? HelpAge argues that this is not the case. It refers to countries that successfully have implemented social pensions, and describes several strategies to lower the costs.

However, the report is ambiguous and does not consequently operate with the term of universal social pensions. The argumentation of HelpAge oscillates between universal and means-tested non-contributory pensions. The usage of the more abstract term 'social pensions' makes it often hard to distinguish what kind of social pension the argumentation refers to. The same ambiguity can be found all over in HelpAge's efforts on advocacy. As the next sections will show, this is less a coincidence as of strategic value because it allows to make compromises at the technical level without loosing USPs as the ideal model. So HelpAge does advocate USPs but does also enforce any kind of policy-making that includes social pensions in any way. This approach might be due to HelpAge's focus on country-led development which respects national peculiarities and tries to offer support in the way needed from the country, but can also simply be due to the limited capacity of the organization to enforce their policy models in national contexts. While the latter aspect might be relevant so well, the following section shows that country-led development is at least important in this regard that the integration of countries is a good strategy to create ownership for policy innovations at national level.

Does HelpAge attempt to establish social pensions as a normative model?

Even more important than having a policy model in place is the ability to charge a topic with a normative impetus. In this section I argue that HelpAge has done that by arguing for the importance of social pensions and, thus, proving reasons why this policy suggestion *should* be implemented, and by connecting the policy model to other issues and topics that are already equipped with normative imperatives. Moreover, HelpAge shows trends of popularity towards social pensions by providing a comparisons among countries. This is a technique which as well can have the potential to increase global normative influencing.

With the 2004 flagship publication HelpAge provides an impressive list of normative as well as cognitive arguments in favor of social pensions. I already stated the particular arguments for USP above, but additionally to that one can find half the report arguing for social pensions in general by providing arguments of economic benefits (because social pensions tackle national poverty), social benefits (because older people are more independent; can better fulfill their role as caregivers for children; and get a higher social status), and health benefits (because older people

can afford to pay for food as well as for necessary medical treatments). This arguments open new possibilities of connecting social pensions to further issue areas. The arguments for economic benefits allow to argue in the language of and with reference to the World Bank. Thus, HelpAge can profit from the economic credibility of this institution. Further arguments for social pensions describe older people as caregivers for children. This argument has also made possible some cooperation and joint publications with influential and financially well-equipped organizations such as UNICEF and 'Save the Children'.[9] Finally, the argumentation for health benefits connects the topic of pensions with health as one of the strongest and most visible topics in the international community. By connecting social pensions to new issues the normative value of the policy model can be increased as well as new possibilities for cooperation are built.

In addition to the creation of linkages to other organizations HelpAge embeds its policy model in general themes, like 'social protection' and the 'human rights', and even actively pushes those themes presented as being closely related to aging. The main achievement of this endeavor is that HelpAge's policy claim for social pensions is not just a claim for older people as a small minority group, but it is a functional policy suggestion in order to establish social protection systems that reduce poverty and, thus, are functional in order to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

> "[The report] *Age and security* shows that establishing, or extending, non-contributory pension programmes in other developing countries could have a significant impact on reducing poverty and vulnerability among households with older people (and their *dependants*). If international poverty reduction targets, such as the Millennium Development Goals, are to be achieved, urgent consideration must be given to the establishment and extension of social protection mechanisms in the form of non-contributory pension programs" (HelpAge 2004:2).

Being part of such a broad agenda like social protection has the advantage that this normative agenda reinforces the policy model by increasing its legitimacy. Connecting their policy model to other agendas enabled HelpAge to establish

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9   A common publication of the IDS (Institute of Development Studies), HelpAge International and 'Save the Children' in 2005 was conducted as part of a UNICEF-commissioned review of social protection and gives proof of this newly established relations of those organizations (Devereux et al. 2005). Moreover, HelpAge's eyeopening discovery that older people have to care for children because the middle aged foremost died on HIV/AIDS is captured in a short policy note that appears on HelpAge's as well as on UNICEF's website (HelpAge 2007; UNICEF website: www.unicef.org/mozambique/activities_1906.html).

strategic cooperation with policy experts of other institutions. The acknowledgment in the foreword of HelpAge's flagship publication of 2004 already indicates existing relationships with the ILO (Michael Cichon), the World Bank (Anita Schwarz, Robert Palacios), and British academia (e.g. Armando Barrientos, Peter Lloyd-Sherlock). The closest working-relationship is between HelpAge and the ILO because HelpAge welcomes and supports the social protection floor concept of the ILO. The social protection frame has become a main reference for almost all global actors in the decade since 2000 (Gliszczynski 2015). A small but interesting indicator that the concept of social pensions is tightly connected to social protection is the fact that during my interview with the HelpAge officer the pension often was called 'social protection pension' instead of social pension (HelpAge Interview No.1).

Besides good arguments and strategies of embedding the policy models in global agendas in order to charge the policy model with legitimacy, I wanted to investigate if HelpAge uses techniques that contribute to establish social pensions as a norm itself. Indeed, I found techniques similar to those of the World Bank (provided in their 2009 publication); namely the provision of comparisons and overviews. Therefore, HelpAge describes several country examples and provides tables comparing multiple countries by their pension programs. With more data available HelpAge has intensified this technique by providing larger tables and a global map on its website. In 2011 HelpAge provided an overview of 50 countries and their pension programs (HelpAge 2011b). The key message of this overview emphasized the feasibility of USP:

> "The cost of a universal pension appears to be affordable in all of the 50 countries surveyed, both relative to the economy and to government spending. For example, in all 50 countries a universal pension for everyone over 65 would cost less than 1.8 per cent of GDP. In no country would these costs make up more than 8 per cent of current government expenditure" (HelpAge2011b).

I emphasize that this is not just a technique to provide an evidence-base but that those techniques are can also create an impression of a global trend towards social pensions. Based on the assumption that visualized popularity of a policy model can facilitate that policy makers at national level take this model in consideration, this technique can be considered being a tool for policy diffusion. A further and similar technique can be the creation of maps.

Figure 3 "HelpAge's Global Overview of Social Pension Programs"

Country map

Access social pension information by country
Click on a country to see a country fact sheet on demographics and social pensions. Use the bar on the left to zoom in.

tool by ammap.com

Key
- Social pension – high coverage
- Social pension – low coverage
- No social pension

High coverage social pensions are considered to be those which cover the majority of older people. For more information on the definitions in the map see our **FAQ**.

Source: http://www.pension-watch.net/pensions/country-fact-file/ (accessed in May 2013)

HelpAge provides an interactive online map showing the global spread of social pensions (figure 4). It meets the eye that again USP and means-tested pensions are displayed together and indistinguishable. Countries without a social pension are colored in grey; countries with a social pension are colored in red; and countries with programs covering a high number of beneficiaries are colored in deep red. According to HelpAge's policy preferences one might rather expect a distinction between USPs in deep red and means-tested pensions in red. However, the impression of a trend towards social pensions appears to be much larger in HelpAge's current version. Furthermore, a map has two aspects: 'naming and praising' ("look what is already there!") and 'naming and shaming' ("look what is missing!"). By showing in colored the programs in place according to the size of the system, HelpAge has chosen a form of positive and motivational statements that I found as characterizing for this INGO. In this case the strategy is explicitly normative because social pensions are presented in such a way – making use of the technique of global comparisons – that social pensions rather appear to be a desirable norm with grey areas of countries that have not yet reached a state were this policy model is nationwide implemented.

Advocacy between means-tested Social Pensions and the Idea of Universal Social Pensions

In summary, presenting and arguing for a policy model in publications, showing a trend in comparative maps and tables, and establishing relationships to other policy-makers as well as embedding the policy model in large normative agendas is the groundwork in order to establish a policy as a normative model. I want to point out that, though non-contributory pensions are on the rise for many years, this purely technocratic term has been replaced in the last decade by the term and model of 'social pensions' which is nowadays widely recognized by most international organizations (Gliszczynski 2015). This is at least an indicator for HelpAge's successful advocacy. However, the claim I make in this section is much more modest. I describe that HelpAge has with USPs a clear policy preference it advocates; yet, this model is somehow in the back of HelpAge activities and rather instructive for the INGO. Though it is as well matter of active debate, the more general and flexible model of social pensions is much more visible. This might be somehow a natural outcome for an organization operating with an evidence-base approach, and, thus, tries to operate more with a model that can adapt to different realities at national level. Before I describe how HelpAge is working at national level I present different strategies of the INGO of how it strategically is making use of the global environment to increase the awareness of national policy makers for social pensions.

A final aspect about HelpAge policy model directly leads to an explanation of why HelpAge is engaging within the UN system. In their advocacy for the implementation of social pensions HelpAge does not prefer to have the policy implemented as any kind of program, because that is not a sustainable way to set up a program in developing countries where programs can be closed as easy as they can be opened simply depending on the resources available through the national budget. Thus, the INGO emphasizes that implemented social pensions should follow a rights-based approach. Its 2006 publication "Why social pensions are needed now" clearly emphasizes this rights-based approach and indicated what additional aspects HelpAge's strategic influencing has to care about:

"Social (non-contributory) pensions are a valuable and strategic element of a minimum social security package that supports the realisation of rights, via implementation of the right to social security for all and furthering state provision of social protection for vulnerable people. Social pensions support commitments made by governments in the Madrid International Plan of Action on aging 2002 [MIPAA] to halve the numbers of older people living in extreme poverty by 2015." (HelpAge 2006a:1).

This quotation shows 'social protection' is an important frame for HelpAge because with the help of that the INGO can argue for social pensions as an important instrument within the social protection framework. Moreover, already the first line emphasizes the social pensions are understood to be an instrument for the realization of human rights as well. The policy of social pensions is understood as "a valuable and strategic element" to implement the "right to social security for all" (art.22 UDHR). In order to make the link between social pensions, and global agendas (social protection) and human rights more visible HelpAge needs to make further use of the global environment. In the following, I investigate deeper in the activities of HelpAge in this regard. A good start are HelpAge's activities with regard to the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) which – as indicated above – played a central role in committing countries to goals that are in particular related to aging.

HelpAge's strategies to diffuse
social pension in the global community

As argued before, HelpAge's actions are led by more general norms as well as a concrete policy model. I already showed a couple of arguments and issues attached to the policy model of social pensions in order to establish it globally and to make it normatively appealing to national policy-makers. This kind of normative influencing would stem from the the policy model itself. Above that I was interested in analyzing if HelpAge uses global institutions and further strategies in order to influence national policy-making. A starting point for this analysis was the rights-based approach of HelpAge. HelpAge criticizes the absence of a global rights agenda for older people, and, thus, pushes this idea globally. In this sense HelpAge was involved in the preparations of the the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) behind

the scenes. Moreover, I found that HelpAge organized many conferences with governments as participants and referring all to MIPAA. In the following I argue that those activities are part of a strategy I call 'translating down'. With this strategy HelpAge manages to bring abstract global conventions to life by specifying its content and committing countries to more concrete action plans. By doing so the INGO can influence normatively in order to directly have an impact because counties follow the commitments they made or indirectly by having crafted normative a framework HelpAge can refer to with further advocacy at national level. Furthermore, I found that already the development of normative framework involves strategies. HelpAge is making use of the global level and other international organizations in order to shape a cooperative environment for common projects at national level or common advocacy at global level. I refer to such a state as futile grounds and explore in detail the strategies involved to reach such a state.

The strategies to stimulate global cooperation: 'mainstreaming' and 'packaging'

Before investigating in the global-to-national interactions of the 'translating down' strategy, I want to emphasize that HelpAge does as well consider global-to-global influencing as being part of it activities. I briefly sketch HelpAge's strategies of 'mainstreaming' and 'packaging' in order to establish positive preconditions. First, I describe the reasons for those strategies and the expected effects of them, then I argue that those strategies are part of HelpAge's actions and describe in what form they are applied.

In what way are 'positive preconditions' important for shaping global agendas and being part of an indirect strategy of influencing the national level as well? Establishing positive preconditions within the international community is important because influencing global agendas is a highly cooperative act. Single actions would hardly be influential. The more other actors of the global community can be convinced to support an agenda, the more likely it is that this agenda can be crafted as a global one. Networking and influencing global debates is key for HelpAge. The same is valid for influencing national policy-making. HelpAge does understand that it has not the resources to be influential solely on its own. That other actors include aspects of aging or policy models related to aging into its own policies is important for HelpAge because it enables cooperation among global actors at national level and

forges a constructive environment of policy harmonization so that contradicting policy advocacy can be avoided. For the advocacy of SCTs the important frame that builds such positive preconditions for HelpAge is 'social protection':

> "The international debate and global actors have a significant influence on policy developments at a national level. We therefore work to influence and share experience of social protection schemes with key players such as the World Bank, academic institutions, donor agencies and UN agencies" (HelpAge 2012:3).

In the following I argue that HelpAge tries to facilitate positive preconditions with the strategies of 'mainstreaming' and 'packaging'.

I define 'mainstreaming' as the attempt of an actor to add a new issue to general and legitimate knowledge by framing and presenting the issue in such a way that it is easy understandable for others because it is connected to already established frameworks of ideas. In this case HelpAge would like to see issues on aging as being part of general knowledge and to be considered by further actors. Thus, the INGO picks up already established topics and argues and advocates that aging is an important aspect of that issue as well. Influencing is a matter of delivery, and, thus, HelpAge has to develop new expertise to have a saying in those new areas. HelpAge is broadening its evidence base to be able to advocate more effectively for aging with regard to issues like health, rights, livelihoods and work, and social protection. These topics correspond with the internal divisions of the INGO. Each division takes care of a particular topic and holds contacts with major international organizations of this field. The strategy of mainstreaming was incorporated in HelpAge's structure in 2001 when HelpAge discovered the connection between older people and children (HelpAge Interview No.1). Supporting older people means supporting children simultaneously, because in Africa in most cases older people are the main caregivers to children because the middle-generation foremost died on HIV/AIDS. The 'HIV/AIDS' division was the first one established in 2001/2. Moreover, HelpAge was able to build further divisions and to argue that aging is a crucial aspect the particular issue. HelpAge build the 'older people' rights' divisions in 2006/7 conceptualizing older people as rights-holder. It build in 2007 the 'social protection' division advocating old age as a targeting mechanism for people living in extreme poverty and social pensions as being part of social protection approaches. 'Health' became an own division in 2010 arguing for health as a crucial precondition for physical and mental well-being in old age.

Recently in 2012 'livelihoods and work' got its own division trying to sensitize the development community for a broader understanding of the live-cycle concept. Due to this broader concept people not simply enter a stage of being old but run through several stages including a stage called 'active aging' where older people are still active elements of the informal economy. Moreover, HelpAge still is very active in emergency aid and has reacted to the prominence of the climate change topic as well. With regard to climate change HelpAge tellingly stats on its website "Older people are affected by climate change and the increase in natural disasters. They want to be included in the climate change and disaster risk reduction debate" (HelpAge Website 2013b). The gradual expansion of such divisions and mainstreaming activities indicates that this strategy has turned to be functional for HelpAge to prepare futile grounds. As a result of HelpAge's activities it holds working-relationships with many UN organizations like UNICEF, ILO, WHO, UNDP, and many more, and can distribute arguments and policy suggestions much more effective than without those.

In the following I explain the strategy of 'packaging' which shows in what way most of the organization's activities of mainstreaming are in particular supportive for HelAge's SCT model of social pensions. I define 'packaging' as the framing of an issue as being connected with further issues that built a package of interrelated ideas. As a consequence, the advocacy for one issue can be used for advocacy for another issue as well. I found roughly three kinds of packaging. First, HelpAge orientates along the ILO's social protection floor model[10]. This model knows a life-cycle approach, which is a set of policies that try to protect the individual in different phases of its life with different sets of policies. It is simple to include social pensions into this approach as the main cornerstone for the protection of older people. However, the social protection floor model itself does mention social pensions directly only very scarcely like in its affordability studies (ILO 2008c). The ILO's official recommendation codifies – in general – the 'right to social security', universality of protection and a guaranteed minimum of income security and essential health care over the life cycle, and – in particular – nationally defined minimum levels of basic income security for older persons (ILO 2012). Such a strong consideration of the topic of aging within ILO's policies seems to be due to working-relationship between ILO and HelpAge for already over a decade. Since 2009 it is easy to argue for social pensions by using the social protection frame in order to argue that USPs are part of a social protection package.

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10   In 2009 the ILO's model became UN policy in form of the social protection floor initiative (UNCEB 2009) and in 2012 it became an official ILO Recommendation (ILO 2012).

Second, HelpAge makes policy packages that are in particular useful for the support of older people but are much broader so that many other global actors can engage within those issue areas as well. As argued above, HelpAge is able to claim that social pensions are part of a social protection package. The other way round, can HelpAge advocate its own package while advocating social protection: "Universal social pensions, universal basic education and universal health care should be incorporated as a single social protection goal in international development agreements" (HelpAge 2004:10). The topics of income security, health and education might be all focused on the needs of older people, yet, it allows many other actors to include their particularly favored policy models as well, and to cooperate with HelpAge in particular settings. Thus, this kind of openness of HelpAge's social protection package is very functional to prepare positive preconditions for cooperation within the global community.

Third, the mainstreamed topics of HelpAge's agenda are all interrelated with each other, so that it is possible to refer from each topic to social pensions. Here are some brief examples: A. *Health and HIV/AIDS* theme: the health of older people can be increased by providing a social pension; HIV/AIDS has almost eradicated one generation and has put older people in the position to be the main caregivers for orphans (*childcare*); thus, social pensions protect older people and children at the same time (household approach). B. *Social Protection* theme: *poverty reduction* can use social pensions as a targeting mechanism because targeting solely on the condition of age is simple and surveys show that older people are disproportionally stronger effected by poverty. C. *Global Rights* theme: the implementation of the 'right to social security' should encompass social pensions as well in order to protect a particular vulnerable group of people. D. *Livelihoods and Work* theme: having worked in the informal economy a life-time around 70% of older people have to continue working even in old age in order to survive and support the family; a social pension could take some pressure from older people enabling dignified aging.

Even though each of this mainstream topics has its particular focus and aims at protecting older people and raising awareness for their particular needs, I argued that it is possible that all those themes can be packaged in such a way that social pensions are part of it. Thus, activities in each of these themes contributes to prepare positive preconditions for social pensions as well. Indeed, cooperating with a country for one of these themes in order to bring in social pensions later, is one of HelpAge's influencing strategies (HelpAge Interview No.1).

I argued in this section that HelpAge is using several strategies to be part of the further normative frameworks. The INGO puts a lot of effort on mainstreaming its issues, and due to the strategy of packaging the organization can advocate social pensions from different angles. By doing so HelpAge is raising awareness and can set global and national agendas. Some indicators that HelpAge has been successful in doing so are that many organizations have included issues on aging in their agendas, and that they hold ongoing working-relationships with HelpAge. Such positive preconditions allow HelpAge to better advocate social pensions at national and global level.

The strategy of 'translating down': motivating countries to make commitments

HelpAge understands that global agreements not automatically turn into effect. While it is rather difficult for HelpAge to enforce global agreements by means of sanctions or strong incentives, HelpAge chose to continue advocacy and engage in agenda-setting. The strategy of putting abstract global agendas into effect at national level by means of attention raising via conferences and workshops as instruments of influencing is what I elaborate in the following as a strategy called 'translating down'. Through this strategy abstract norms come to life and global agreements increase their normative value because follow-up events reemphasize those values. As an effect the probability that governments pick up policy innovations stemming from this agendas goes up. In the following, I exemplify the usage of this strategy by discussing the processes that took place in the African region.

The starting point is the 'UN Second World Assembly on Aging' which was held in 2002 in Madrid. It was held to adapt the agreement of the preceding conference held in 1982 in Vienna to the social, cultural, economic and demographic realities of the new century (UN 2002). Moreover, the first UN plan was never really recognized by the Global South because it was felt as an agenda that was designed *by* the Global North *for* the Global North. It might surprise that HelpAge as an INGO was heavily involved in the second UN conference. The organization contributed at highest level to the design and content of this agreement at UN level. It was of particular importance to HelpAge to bring in the perspective of the Global South, and to emphasize the importance of the 'social protection', the Millennium Development Goals and HIV/AIDS, which at this time where all missing an age perspective.

"The first plan in 1982 was more the developed-world thing, whereas this time it was for the developing world. We [as HelpAge] worked very hard to push in our previsions into the plan which were relevant for the developing countries, both government and citizens. So, things like the issues around of the MDGs, the specific mention of the MDGs, specific mention of social protection, and HIV for example; they were there because, we put them there" (HelpAge Interview No.8).

The outcome of this conference was the 'Madrid International Plan of Action on aging' (MIPAA) which was adopted by 159 countries in consensus. The former Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan points out that MIPAA "represents the first time governments agreed to link questions of aging to other frameworks for social and economic development and human rights" (UN 2002:foreword). As argued in the section above, having the topic of aging as an integrated component of social and economic development helps to include aging into other policies more easily (mainstreaming & packaging). Furthermore, MIPAA raises awareness for the growing share of older people in society. According to prognoses the proportion of older people is going to quadruple within the next 50 years. This demographic change will hit developing countries the hardest, and with most people having worked in the informal sector a life-long not being able to make any contributions to insurance based social protection older people are in particular affected by poverty. I also noticed that MIPAA reestablished governmental responsibility as a norm, which has been questioned by the World Bank in the former global wave of pension privatizations by praising the strength of the market and warning to shift "more responsibility to government than it can handle" (World Bank 1994:3). Moreover, MIPAA encourages governments to take action in order to implement social protection/social security systems where they do not exist to ensure a minimum income for the countries' citizens. The plan considers further non-contributory pensions as the number one recommendation of how to achieve this aim (UN 2002:31). That is no claim for universal systems but the implementation guide of 2008 considers universal pensions and means-tested ones as the two models available (UN 2008:40-4). In sum, MIPAA is of major importance for HelpAge because it is: first, a general framework for actions on aging that is also recognized by the Global South; second, useful for mainstreaming aging into social protection, development and human rights agendas; and third, an acknowledgment of a common problem definition, of governmental social responsibility, of non-contributory

pensions as a policy prescription. Against such a backdrop HelpAge can now state that:

> "There is growing recognition of the contribution older people make to development and agreement that the neglect of older people is unacceptable. There is also increasing interest in social protection, with social pensions as a key element in old age" (HelpAge 2004:23).

However, HelpAge has not considered 'growing recognition and increasing interest' simply as an outcome following automatically by having passed MIPAA. Instead HelpAge began in 2002 to increase the importance of MIPAA by referring to this agreement wherever it can. MIPAA served to be a global governmental declaration of intend to better protect older people. It legitimized for HelpAge to take further actions. The strategy to organize conferences and workshops in order to translate a policy to a context is exemplified in the following for the African region. It is one major principle of HelpAge's strategy to transfer ownership to the African countries. HelpAge did that by doing all the preparatory work in the background (including the initiation and organization of the workshops) while letting the governments from the African region and the African Union take the lead, and appear to be the official initiator and host of the events. 'Table 2' provides a chronological overview of the events that took place in the African region with regard to aging which finally became part of the African Union's 'Social Policy Framework'. In the following I show that HelpAge was involved in each of those events. Moreover, I argue that those activities can be seen as part of a strategy called 'translating down' by narrowing down the content from more abstract and general policy frameworks to concrete workshops recommending USPs as a policy model.

Table 2

'Translating Down' of the Policy Framework on Aging

2002	Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging *(MIPAA)* AU Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Aging
2006	Livingstone - Call for Action
	Yaoundé - Call for Action
2008	Social Policy Framework for Africa

In the same year than MIPAA was negotiated the African Union (AU) approved the 'African Union Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Aging in Africa' in 2002. HelpAge was involved in this process from the beginning on starting to draft the framework on aging in 1999 in cooperation with the Labour and Social Affairs Commission of the 'Organization of African Unity', now 'African Union'. HelpAge's involvement is clearly visible by having published the framework's report together with the AU with a HelpAge logo on its cover as well as in the header of every page (cf. HelpAge & African Union 2003). Both agendas (MIPAA and the Policy Framework on Aging of the AU) emphasized the importance of aging with regard to multiple issues. HelpAge used a lot of the expertise gained during the preparation of this framework which it used for the organization of MIPAA. Though both plans were adopted in the same year, they are not linked with another. HelpAge chose not much to mention the UN agenda MIPAA within the AU Policy Framework on Aging or to present the AU framework as a realization of MIPAA. In terms of world society theory one could expect to see MIPAA in particular emphasized because MIPAA is a UN document and, thus, highly legitimized. HelpAge turns this perspective partly upside down. The AU Policy Framework on Aging mentioned the Madrid conference just

once and not as working on its implementation but, the other way round, by claiming to have successfully influenced MIPAA:

> "The International Plan of Action on Ageing agreed upon in Madrid during the Second World Assembly on Ageing in April 2002, borrowed significantly from the AU Policy Framework, as the concerns of Africa's older people are, therefore, well outlined in the International plan" (HelpAge & African Union 2003:5).

This statement points out the ownership the African countries have with regard to the international agenda MIPAA. Moreover, one could say that the INGO does not solely rely on one kind of legitimacy but is using the legitimacy stemming from global agendas as well as legitimacy that emerges when national governments and world regional institutions develop ownership for agendas. On the one hand, HelpAge refers continuously to MIPAA in all follow-up conferences and workshops it organized, though, one the other hand, it was of major importance for HelpAge to transfer ownership to African institutions. The statement above could be read as a signal to the African countries: "Be proud to have contributed to MIPAA and understand that due to these contributions MIPAA is in particular addressing the African needs and concerns!" In sum, the AU Policy Framework on Aging and MIPAA mark the year 2002 as a turning point emphasizing the topic of aging at the global level and in the African region. Some authors confirm the thesis that those agendas can b understood as a starting-point for further activities at national level:

> "MIPAA and the AU Plan, together with ensuing NGO and UN advocacy work, have clearly heightened an awareness of issues of aging among national governments and have prompted a readiness, at least rhetorically, to develop national policy responses"(Aboderin & Ferreira 2008: 56).

Building on a common understanding concerning aging HelpAge made a strong call for social protection and social cash transfers in the African region by organizing a follow-up event reconfirming MIPAA four years later (HelpAge 2006b). HelpAge's capabilities to organize this follow-up event in the region seem to be due to informal contacts to African government officials which HelpAge has made during the negotiations in 2002 making it easy to send around information and invite policy-makers to events (HelpAge Interview No. 1). In March 2006 the 'Intergovernmental Regional Conference on Basic Social Protection in Africa' took place in Livingstone

(Zambia), and resulted in the 'Livingstone Call for Action'. The event was initiated, organized and managed by HelpAge and funded by the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID). However, HelpAge was not the one inviting the participating African governments. Instead HelpAge asked the African Union and the Zambian government to hold the conference, which seems to me as an important strategy to transfer ownership to the African governments. As one of HelpAge's policy officers said:

> "We had massively negotiations we the Zambian government. We didn't wanted it to be HelpAge's conference. […] So the president of Zambia opened the conference; not HelpAge International. HelpAge International was at the conference fairly invisible though we organized the conference" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

The conference seemed to be part of the African Unions efforts to develop a concept for social protection. The preparation of the social policy framework of the AU (adopted in 2008) was already in preparation at this time so that the discussions at the Livingstone conference fed into the social policy framework. At Livingstone HelpAge managed to narrow the broad discussion on aging within the social protection frame down to a strong emphasize of cash-based solutions. The SCTs encompassed in particular older people, and social pensions as a concrete policy model. How did HelpAge manage to do that? I argue that HelpAge used a normative mode of influencing by mainly relying on arguments referring to former conferences and agreements. Moreover, the impression that the implementation of norms is urgent was reinforced by learning effects stemming from intense and direct experiences from a field trip to the SCT pilot project in Kalomo (Zambia).

    A closer look at the conference document revealed the following argumentation of HelpAge: HelpAge emphasized the mandate of the African Union making the AU responsible to care for older people as a group of particular vulnerable people. According to the Livingstone report the AU came into being to free Africa from its colonial legacies and building independent nations, and to tackle the continent's greatest challenges: poverty, inequality and promoting the rights of all Africans (HelpAge 2006b:2). According to the Livingstone report the AU has pledged to draw up strategies and policies to face those challenges, and place people at the center of development, in particular, to support marginalized and vulnerable groups (ibid.). The norm to take special care for vulnerable groups within social policies directly took older people on board, even though in a row with children, women,

unemployed, families, and people with disabilities. HelpAge managed to bring in older people directly by emphasizing that:

> "among others, member states committed themselves to improve the living conditions of older persons, through better social protection services including improved pensions, health and other social security schemes" (HelpAge 2006b:2).

As a result the 'Livingstone Call for Action' highlighted explicitly social cash transfer programs including "social pensions and regular cash transfers to vulnerable children and households, older people and people with disabilities" (HelpAge 2006b:5). In this regard, the emphasis of social pensions is noticeable.

Next to the emphasize of the AU mandate and the commitment made by countries to improve the living conditions of older people, HelpAge made several connections to normative agendas. On the one hand, HelpAge brought in the rights perspective by emphasizing that the development programs of the AU Commission adopt a rights-based approach and human security (HelpAge 2006b:2) an by referring to the Human Rights Declaration of 1948 (HelpAge 2006b:4) with the 'right to social security' (art.22 UDHR) and the right to an 'adequate standard of living' (art.25 UDHR). On the other hand, the Livingstone conference was presented as being part of a legacy of the 'African Union Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Aging' (2002) and the 'Ouagadougou Declaration on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa' (2004). Both aspects do not come with technical advice as part of cognitive influencing but raise the normative account of the 'Livingstone Call for Action'.

Apart from increasing the ownership in the African region, and committing countries in particular to SCTs and aging, the Livingstone conference increased the normative effect of the argumentation by providing vivid learning effects. The 'Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme' in Kalomo District (Zambia) of the German GTZ (now GIZ) started in 2003 and had a strong impact on HelpAge's own thinking because it was a vivid example that demonstrated that social cash transfers are doable in low-income countries.

> "The fascinating thing about Kalomo was that a lot of the people that the community identified with cash transfer ended up being older people. 70% to 80% of the beneficiaries in Kalomo were older people. […] It had such a stimulating and thought provoking impact on us as an organization, because there were different opinions in

HelpAge around whether we can or should argue for universal pension, or not. […] We thought: 'wouldn't it be great if we could bring together government and other key stakeholders to have a similar learning process?! Let's expose them to the project. Let's bring them to Kalomo, let's bring them together, and let's talk about it'" (HelpAge Interview No.1)

Indeed the cash transfer project in Kalomo itself had two main objectives: to test a targeted social cash transfer to the poorest 10% living in Kalomo to "reduce extreme poverty, hunger and starvation", and to "generate information on the feasibility" in a low income context (MCDSS & GTZ 2006:7). To enhance the learning effect HelpAge organized field trips for the African Ministers and other governmental participants which directly met the people living in poverty but benefiting from the SCT pilot project in Kalomo (HelpAge 2006b). The impression of this experience was rather intense as most policy makers even in Africa are not confronted with poverty in their everyday life (Consultant Interview). The learning effect was supported by country examples presented at the conference showing a lot of countries from the African context as already having several social programs in place. Some countries appear as pioneers and provide lessons learned whereas others show room for improvements. The provision of regional examples seems to be important for inner regional comparability in order to stimulate competition, mutual learning and making certain country examples prominent for policy-making in Africa.

Though the Livingstone conference was not about social pensions but generally about social cash transfers targeted to the poorest of the poor, I argue that it aimed at creating learning effects to set the stage for universal social pensions. Having emphasized cash-based social policies for most vulnerable groups, and having provided practically vivid examples of older people representing the majority of the poorest of the poor in Kalomo, helps HelpAge to refer much easier to social pensions in national contexts.

In a final step HelpAge provided a more concrete account of what it understood by cash-based social policies in Africa. The INGO organized a follow-up workshop in Yaoundé (Cameroon) just half a year after Livingstone in order to emphasis in particular the policy model of universal social pensions (USPs). Again, HelpAge made sure to invite the Government of Cameroon and the African Union to open the workshop. With slightly more than hundred participants from eleven African countries the workshop was again a huge event which resulted in the 'Yaoundé Call for Action'. Together with the 'Regional Center for the Welfare of Older People in

Cameroon' as a main driver of this event Yaoundé was foremost focused about older people and criticized "the absence of social protection measures to protect older people in their advance age, especially those without access to formal social pensions" (HelpAge, Government of Cameroon, AU 2006:2). Thus, as in Livingstone, this call for action asked for the development of national action-plans. This time USPs were explicitly mentioned as a policy model to be placed in "comprehensive social protection schemes" in a "national coordination framework" (ibid.). Moreover, this event reconfirmed the global and regional normative frameworks by referring to MIPAA and the AU Policy Framework on Aging in 2002. Continuous reference to abstract agendas and policy frameworks in different contexts is a method to enrich them with further details and policy suggestions with each conference (focused on 'social cash transfers') and workshop (focused on 'universal social pensions).

Finally, I briefly want to sketch the 'Social Policy Framework for Africa' passed by the AU in 2008; not because it is in particular relevant for the description of the 'translating down' strategy, but to show how the topic of aging finally was represented within the regional African policy framework which is suppose to be an orientation for African policy-makers. The social policy framework for Africa aims "to provide an overarching policy structure to assist African Union Member States in the development of their national social policies to promote human empowerment and development" (AU 2008:5). The main topic of this framework is social protection introducing a perspective that is tackling poverty and securing people's lives directly instead of relying on economic policies that might only indirectly contribute to poverty reduction through 'trickle down' effects: "The framework moves away from treating social development as subordinated to economic growth, but justifies social development as a goal in its own right" (ibid.). This is a very fruitful policy framework for HelpAge's advocacy on social pensions; however, as social protection is such a broad frame aging is just one issue among many others. The framework knows fourteen more topics as part of the social policy framework and each one builds on its own set of agendas. The topics of health, children, and gender encompass by far the most agendas. It meets the eye that aging in Africa builds merely on one agenda which is the 'AU Policy Framework and Plan of Action on Aging' developed in 2002 by HelpAge with – and for – the African Union. However, it shows that aging finally has a standing in social policies and that it was due to HelpAge which invested a lot of effort and expertise to the design of African policy frameworks.

Even though the examples were stemming from the African region I wouldn't be surprised if HelpAge would use the strategy of 'translating down' in other world

regions as well. Without having all the details about the conferences in the Asian region, the sequence of events looks very similar to the example I presented from the African region. In Asia HelpAge held regional conferences of considerable size, and made income security a prominent topic in 2006. The policy-makers on this conference agreed to take "further steps to advocate for income security in old age" (HelpAge 2006c: 21). One year later in 2007 HelpAge organized the 'Asian Meeting on Income Security' (UNESCAP 2007) as a ground breaking event at world regional level, held together with UNESCAP (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) which was calling for national follow-ups of MIPAA. Following to this event HelpAge organized a workshop with patronage of government officials of the Asian region where social pensions were presented. "From there on there were more specific workshops, trainings, and events in Indonesia, in Thailand, in Vietnam, and other countries" (HelpAge Interview No.6). This brief overview showed that the main features of the strategy of 'translating down' can be confirmed. HelpAge set up regional events in order to raise awareness on issues already part of abstract agendas and bringing in the policy model of social pensions through more action orientated follow-up workshops.

The main argument presented in this section is that HelpAge is using regional conferences and workshops *translating abstract agreements from global level to regional contexts*. Based on the assumption that global agreements *do not* turn into effect as an automatism and it is *unclear* what elements of a global agreement are prioritized global conferences are a method to add this focus later on and to condense vague norms so much that in final workshops HelpAge's concrete policy model of universal social pensions can be presented. As an outcome these conferences help to shape a mutual understanding of the issues that are important to HelpAge so that it is more easy to advocate USPs. Above that these events can be seen as giving HelpAge the mandate and legitimacy to be active at national level and to approach the policy-makers with particular concerns on aging and social pensions. Finally, this strategy includes attempts to stimulate learning effects that are not based on 'teaching' (telling countries what to do) but 'learning' by sharing experiences and examples. Experiences made in field trips can raise the account on particular issues, and sharing country-examples from the region can make certain policy models cognitive available to policy makers. This rather indirect form of advocacy based on learning together with the ability to create a mandate and get commitments seems to be valuable enough for HelpAge to engage at the global level in an influencing process that takes several years.

Conclusion

In this part I highlighted HelpAge's policy models and strategies of how to make use of global institutions and norms and how to cooperate with the global community. Of particular interest have been the strategies of how policy ideas can have an impact on national policy-making via policy models and conferences. Far from being self-evident I found that HelpAge's operations on influencing policy-making are inspired by an ideal model of 'universal social pensions' (USPs); though more often HelpAge does not insist on the universality component, and rather speaks of 'social pensions'.

This model, as being pushed at first solely by some individuals within the organization, became official HelpAge policy and explicitly advocating as a model from the year 2004 on. Main elements of this model is that social pensions should be government-led, non-contributory, nationwide and appropriate with regard to the eligibility age and monthly benefit level. The reason for governments to implement this policy is argued based on the assumption that older people are a particular vulnerable group that deserves social protection as a matter of the human rights. Instead of arguing that social cash transfers to older people are some kind of an investment that pays-off through macro-economic effects, HelpAge emphasizes that it simply is a human right and, therefor, governments *should* implement it.

The INGO is active at global and regional level to increase awareness for the importance of social protection in form of SCTs to older people by crafting global agendas, committing national governments to it, and translating the abstract norms of those agendas down to regions via conferences and workshops where national governments learn about the importance of social protection, of cash-based assistance, and of social pensions, as well as of HelpAge's preferred model of *universal* social pensions. Moreover, HelpAge mainstreams the issue of aging into many different global issue areas, like health, education, rights, livelihoods and work, emphasizing the need to take older people in those areas as well in consideration. With regard to social pensions HelpAge has set this policy model as a centerpiece within packages that highlight the link between each issue area and social pensions, so that HelpAge can advocate this policy model from very different angles. The main function of mainstreaming as well as of translating down seems to be to raise awareness for social pensions and to legitimize a mandate for claiming a national implementation. I conclude that due to its rights-based approach HelpAge's

interactions with the global community and its usage of norms from the social protection agenda is particularly strong.

3.3. Advice on National Institution-building: Becoming a 'Hub of Knowledge'

Policy-making is much about technical details. Normative pressure can stimulate policy-making but the process itself is driven by expertise. Thus, advice can become an effective tool to influence policy-making. HelpAge uses particular strategies in order to stimulate that national governments take social pensions in consideration for policy making. This is not about governments to understand that social pensions might be a good thing which is desirable and legitimate, and thus, prioritize this policy model. That would be the effect of global norms and normative agendas. Advice is about governments to understand and learn about the technical aspects of the policy that enables them to better implement this policy.

In this section I present the main findings indicating that the INGO does not insist on a one-to-one translation of the normatively advocated model but advices countries on the different components and how these components are modifiable according to national budgets. As the main strategy of HelpAge I identify that the INGO tries to establish itself as a 'hub of knowledge' by being close to policy-makers and earning reputation of being an expert in the field of age-related social policies. In the following I explain the adaptability of HelpAge's policy model and of how the INGO is making use of its hub-function to 'deliver' advice about the implementation of its policy model to the national level.

What are the arguments behind HelpAge's technical advice?

I already explained that HelpAge's activities on influencing are inspired by a policy model of universal social pensions (USPs) which serves as an ideal model. In concrete HelpAge rather speaks of social pensions blurring the line if it talks about universal or means-tested pensions. It is one important argument for social pensions to argue its feasibility because its introduction is supposed to be affordable also in low income countries.

Affordability. Though HelpAge's arguments are focused on USPs, the argumentation about affordability always refers to means-test ones. That seems to be due to the fact that HelpAge tries to argue evidence-based whenever it can and references to already implemented USPs are hard to find. Moreover, affordability is argued in terms of total costs of the program as a share of the national GDP. It is tempting to take means-tested programs for the calculation because they appear to be much less costly than USPs. HelpAge's 2004 flagship publication on social pensions mixes its arguments for USPs and the affordability of means-tested programs in an interesting way:

> "The experience of existing schemes demonstrates that *universal provision* of social pensions to older people is *administratively simpler and less expensive* than means-tested provision. Evidence from countries that are already implementing *large-scale social pension schemes* indicates that the overall *cost of these schemes, in terms of GDP, is relatively low*. In Namibia, the social pension programme costs less than 2 per cent of GDP. South Africa's scheme, funded through general taxation, represented 1.4 per cent of GDP in 2000. The Mozambique targeted programme is scheduled to be US$13 million in 2005, or 1.4 per cent of the government budget" (HelpAge 2004:9; emphasize added).

Although it seems that this section of the report argues in favor of the affordability of universal provision of social pensions the country examples are all about means-tested pensions without saying that at any point. Many more examples from the report provide evidence that HelpAge's favored policy model of USPs is charged with good argumentation partly stemming from means-tested pension programs.

That is not to say the INGO cannot argue for a reasonable price without reference to means-tested programs. It can and it does; however, the wish to present evidence-based examples seems to be rather strong. In favor of those examples a lack of precision in argumentation is accepted. The examples above estimate costs for a social pension of less than 1,5% GDP. Social pensions as being affordable is an argument that HelpAge has confirmed in later publications by listing 50 countries and calculating the costs for a social pension of about 1.5% GDP with 65 as the year of eligibility (HelpAge 2011c). At its website on affordability in 2013 HelpAge estimates the cost between 0.7% and 2.5% GDP for each and every over 60 years[11]. In the 2004 publication HelpAge shrunk the target group by rising the age of eligibility to 75

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11   http://www.pension-watch.net/key-debates/key-debates/affordability/

years. As a result the average costs for a social pension are less than 0.5% of GDP (HelpAge 2004:45).

Variability of the *eligibility age* is a component HelpAge has used from the beginning on in order to respond to national contexts. Instead of advocating means-tested pensions HelpAge continues to advocate USPs and prefers to allow that compromises are made with regard to eligibility age (e.g. 60, 65, 70) to shrink the target group and with regard to the *benefit-level* (e.g. starting at 5 dollar a month). On its website the organization has made available a simple *tool for cost calculation* that can display the costs of a USP for each country according to the age and benefit-level chosen[12]. What meets the eye is that the calculation is always and only for a *universal* social pension and – though changeable – the default age is set at 60 years. It seems that the most preferred option for modifications is the benefit-level. HelpAge upholds the norm that every citizens above 60 years deserves at least any kind of a pension.

Targeting mechanism. Having explained that HelpAge has a clear policy preference also with regard to the parameters of the policy model I also explained that HelpAge often calculates with the means-tested version of social pensions and is also flexible with regard to the parameters of implemented social pensions. Moreover, HelpAge has not only normative arguments in place like their preferred rights-based approach and a globally legitimated social protection agenda specified in UN conventions, or the MDGs' focus on poverty reduction. Above that HelpAge tries from time to time to just show the *practical aspects* of social pensions with regard to poverty reduction. It was an insight that HelpAge gained through the previously mentioned SCT project in Livingston which focused on the poorest of the poor. It turned out that most of the very poor where older people (also called 'poorest of the poor' or 'ultrapoor' in the global development community). Thus, social pensions become a simple *targeting mechanism* for the mitigation of extreme poverty. Here social pensions are not presented as normative content that countries should take on board because it is a right in its own, but they are presented as a technique or a tool in order to achieve a very different aim, like poverty reduction. And because policies for the 'poorest of the poor' enjoy much legitimacy in the global development community the argument of social pensions as a targeting mechanism is well-suited in order to make governments prioritize social pensions above other kinds of policies. As a the policy officer for strategic planning at HelpAge told me:

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12   http://www.pension-watch.net/pensions/about-social-pensions/about-social-pensions/pensions-calculator/

> "We would not tell governments: 'You need to do pensions first of all, and then everything else.' But we would say to governments: 'You have huge poverty rates across households, and you need to start somewhere'" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

HelpAge advocates social pensions as among the best policy options to start with because they don't cost much, implemented as a universal program they are very simple and cost-effective to be administered, and they are effective in order to target the poorest of the poor.

The two points of HelpAge's argumentation, which I want to highlight with regard to their policy model, are flexibility on components like age and benefit level in order to argue for its affordability even in a low-income context, and, secondly, flexibility on the purpose of the policy introduction, which can be part of different topics (compare '*packaging*' in the previous section) or – in a very technical sense – simply a targeting mechanism for poverty reduction.

The next section shows how HelpAge tries to become a h*ub of knowledge* in order to be influential with advice at national level with the provision of concrete advice for policy-making.

Hub of Knowledge:
1. Entering the political arena

HelpAge does understand influencing as a long term process that can take several years. Under the buzzword 'political economy' the INGO considers that its efforts on influencing are not simply about the delivery of the best argument but about the right timing as well. Windows of opportunities, such as elections, global crises or national public debates, are important to win the support of a political majority on particular issues. Therefor, the INGO engages in a *constant advocacy processes* feeding the political process with knowledge in order to change cognitive patterns for program introductions. HelpAge's country offices play a key role in this process. Even though these offices are dependent on funding for projects HelpAge manages to retain a permanent presence by making sure that follow-up projects are available. The INGO tries to establish personal long-term relations to policy-makers based on some kind of professional friendships. Meeting a minister for dinner and discussing particular issues is one example (HelpAge Interview No.6). This is network-building based on trust and credibility as the main resources which can grow over time. To get a first

contact to a ministry is crucial. Often it is fairly simple to contact the ministry of social affairs in developing countries because those ministries are among the weakest with low budgets. Any help and support – like coming from a large and credible INGO – is very welcome.

Yet, to create a critical momentum is more difficult. An example stemming from Peru shows that HelpAge uses multiple stages of influencing in order to gain access to the political arena (HelpAge Interview No.2). The first phase was about finding opinion leaders, which are people like for example popular academic writers for columns in newspapers. In this way the topic receives public attention and becomes a matter of national debate. In a second phase HelpAge was looking for allies among organizations working in that country. International partners like UNFPA, UNDP and the ILO have helped a lot in the case of Peru. Supported by a national debate, and expertise and support of other global organizations the third phase targeted the political system in order to gain political support. Especially with the ILO the collaboration was tight because of the 'Social Protection Floor-Initiative'. As HelpAge said: 'the ILO turned out to be a door-opener to work with the parliament' (ibid.). After convincing the parliament it was possible for HelpAge to start working with the senators in a fourths phase. When the media, other global organizations, and parts of the parliament are on board and the ministries still cannot decide on the implementation, in a fifths phase, HelpAge tries to increase public interest by carrying out public discussions on social pensions in different parts of the country. In this example and with this strategy HelpAge was able to turn around the leading opinion which initially was against social pensions, so that within three years Peru got a means-tested pension.

Though HelpAge most certainly was aiming at the introduction of a universal social pension (USP) the resulting social pension in Peru was a means-tested one. The resulting version was a result of a dialectic process that is conciliating diverging positions; in other words: a compromise. HelpAge *has to* make such compromises in order to get the policy accepted and I argue that HelpAge also *can* make such compromises because the INGO follows a strategy of *gradual expansion*. I explain this strategy in a later section because HelpAge's ability to stimulate protest does play a role here and support HelpAge's activities of delivering technical expertise.

Especially for the first phases the important methodology of HelpAge was to identify *champions*, as HelpAge calls policy entrepreneurs (HelpAge Interview No.1). Champions are people that are more open to the new policy prescriptions than others and have the potential to convince others. Those persons are *crucial for alliance-*

building and, if the contact can be stabilized over time, they are valuable bits of an informal network for advocacy.

I do understand policy formulation from the perspective of *influencing in stages* as described above as a dialectic process between policy suggestions made by the INGO and the reactions of different stakeholders. The outcome of a dialectic process in one arena is than carried on to the next one. That does not mean that HelpAge is partly giving up its vision of introducing a universal social pension, it is more acknowledging that compromises have to be made to open the door for further suggestions to be made in the coming years and opportunities. This is gradual expansion that is like the introduction of a program dependent on an appropriate *window of opportunity*.

Hub of Knowledge:
2. Sharing best-practices & delivering expertise

When access to the policy arena is ensured, the question arises of how HelpAge is trying to inject relevant knowledge. The organization is using its established informal network and tackles two challenges of which HelpAge is confronted with, that is the general question of how to put social pensions higher on the governmental agenda, and the specific question of how to influence the ministries of finance because those are the ministries that in developing countries have to be convinced in order to introduce policy innovations. I show that in each situation HelpAge is using a direct and an indirect strategy of knowledge provision, either by facilitating learning by organizing events of best-practice sharing or by delivering expertise enabling ministries.

For HelpAge attempts to push social pensions higher on the political agenda the organization is using its informal network to reach national policy officers. Nevertheless, this is a challenging task because governments are always subject to multiple demands and multiple priorities. Raising awareness and continuously engaging in advocacy is important to get topics higher on the agenda. HelpAge is active at national level in a variety of ways:

> "Our engagement with government includes training on issues of social protection and social pensions, undertaking studies answering key questions on the feasibility of social pensions, supporting government players to strategize on building broad

governmental support, and contributing to frameworks, policies and strategies on social protection" (HelpAge 2012:2).

The main strategy of those activities is to stimulate learning effects. It is not self-evident that learning is an effective strategy for advocacy. Many issue areas are ideologically charged in a way that policy prescriptions are dismissed even though it might be rational to introduce them. However, making policies for older people is less problematic because the topic of aging is widely seen as a *non-confrontational issue* based on the broad consensus that aging is an issue everybody will be confronted with at a certain time (HelpAge Interview No.6). Practical experiences of HelpAge's staff have shown that regarding the topic of aging governments are well intentioned: "Even Myanmar in its worst times of dictatorship was willing to do something for their population" (ibid.). That allows for influencing based on good arguments and expertise. The necessity to create such learning effects is high with respect to the challenge influencing national policies of whole countries. Policy implementation cannot be realized by IOs or INGOs but national governments have to take responsibility and ownership.

> "We understand that in a country like China or Indonesia you can implement one, ten, or hundred projects and that is like a drop in the ocean, but what you can do is gather lessons from those implementations that can be expressed in policies that are supported and funded" (HelpAge Interview No.6).

Practical knowledge and technical aspects for policy formulation become important resources to create learning effects. Using its informal network and targeting national governments HelpAge uses cognitive influencing by facilitating exchange of expertise. Interestingly, HelpAge policy officers made the experience that it seems to be that government officials accept knowledge better if it is stemming from empirical examples from the region able to demonstrate impact (HelpAge Interview No.6). This is why HelpAge has a chosen an indirect way of influencing. Like at global and world regional level HelpAge took the approach to invite governments to workshops and meetings where countries from the region can share their experiences. An example of such process can be found in Myanmar:

> "We had an event in the capital of Myanmar, where we brought some NGO from Thailand, we brought some governmental official from the Philippines, somebody

from Vietnam also and one of us, and we met with the government to share how they had developed policies on aging in different contexts, because Myanmar was starting to develop their policy on aging and they weren't clear how to do it" (HelpAge Interview No.6).

The strategy used here is again the role of a facilitator. HelpAge rarely delivers know-how directly, but is setting-up strategic workshops, meetings and events to led selected knowledge diffuse. The role to select who is invited gives HelpAge the possibility to determine what voices are heard and what expertise is shared. Though, HelpAge has just the role of the facilitator it can influence the learning process.

"It was a learning process. In that way you do two things, you build a legitimacy of HelpAge, because we are not giving any bible, we are providing experiences, and at the same time you provide knowledge, you provide more understanding of issues that can be used for developing a better policy" (HelpAge Interview No.6).

This interaction is described as an exchange process where capacity is build at governmental ministries and HelpAge in return gains trust and credibility usable for prospective advocacy. Being known for its capacity to provide practical knowledge makes HelpAge a credible player government officials turn to when being in need of advice. As one of HelpAge's policy officers from the Asian region summed it up:

"HelpAge can become sort of a hub of knowledge, hub of understanding, hub of advice, hub of exchanges, hub of promoting best practices and I think that will be more and more our work." (HelpAge Interview No.6).

The function of being a *hub of knowledge* for government officials emphasizes HelpAge's dual role of being, on the one hand, merely a facilitator, and, on the other hand, an active player itself because of its outstanding role. Furthermore, this role is emphasized by the fact that HelpAge is by far the biggest and almost the only global actor working on aging globally as well as nationally and locally. Thus, it has a strong standing in the national area where aging is a niche with few actors involved (HelpAge Interview No.1).

Besides the organization of workshops and events as an indirect way of influencing where country experts from the region can share their insights about social pension development there is also a direct delivery of expertise from HelpAge

to national ministries in the Global South. For the delivery of expertise the ministries of finance do not necessarily need to be approached directly. Another promising strategy that HelpAge usually takes is to enable the ministries of social welfare to argue the case for social pensions towards the ministries of finance. This approach is taken because the ministries of social welfare are the natural counterparts of the INGO. Moreover, it is usually rather simple to establish contact to the ministry of social welfare because those ministries are among the weakest in the set-up of national ministries and keen to get support of large INGO like HelpAge, which is offering support (HelpAge Interview No.1). The most important resource for this support is expertise about the feasibility of social pensions: "Key to our work on social protection is convincing government players of the feasibility of social pensions, and supporting allies within government to make the case within the political system" (HelpAge 2012:2). This is why HelpAge included this aspect in its 2004 flagship publication and welcomes possibilities to refer to other studies (e.g. DFID 2005) arguing for social pension's affordability.

To show the feasibility of social pensions is important because convincing ministries of finance is a challenging task. Every introduction of a new cash transfer system means a heavy shift in resource allocations, even if just 10% of the government budget is needed. It is not likely that other resorts voluntarily would accept cuts in their budgets easily. Thus, HelpAge has to provide convincing arguments. In Latin America, HelpAge chose to invite the ministries of finance of several countries. This is the most direct intervention of HelpAge that I could find at national level. The INGO set up a micro-simulations training in 2008 inviting government officials from Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Peru and enable them to calculate the costs of social pensions (HelpAge 2010). HelpAge initiated this undertaking by convincing the Bolivian government first suggesting free training for micro simulations of cash transfer systems for older people. With the approval of the government it was possible to invite the ministry of finance of the other countries. It was an intensive training for just 10 participants with three teachers. The courses were run with the expertise of the Economic Policy Research Institute, South Africa (EPRI) and support from the UN Population Fund (UNFPA). HelpAge describes the micro-simulations training as a very costly, intensive, but also very successful method to influence government officials (HelpAge Interview No.2). HelpAge organized a comparable event with EPRI in the Asian region as well, however, there the focus was more on awareness raising, whereas for the Latin American region HelpAge just wanted a concentrated version of the quantitative facts and

calculations. It turned out that in the following two years the participants of the micro-simulations course became key figures in their country in the process of policy-making for the introduction of social pensions, like Paraguay introduced a social pension in 2008 and Peru in 2010. In both cases the year of introduction fell together with an election and change in government. When in Ecuador social unrest emerged around the discussions of a new constitution it were the policy experts which participated in HelpAge's micro-simulations course that were in charge to redesign the small SCT program *Bono de Desarrollo Humano* in order to make it a social pension. As a result the government pledged to scale this program up to make it a universal social pension. The examples show that the mere delivery of expertise can turn out to be really influential. Especially the approach to directly target the ministries of finance has turned out to be influential.

Conclusion

Advice at national level easily can be considered to be important in order to influence policy-making. I found that HelpAge delivers expertise to national ministries or facilitates direct information exchange. However, this is only a part of HelpAge's activities at national level. Having access and good working relations with governmental policy officers which are part of an informal network between HelpAge and the ministries is not just functional to deliver technical know-how and best-practices as a hub of knowledge. Instead HelpAge is using as well its connections and relationships to governmental officials to advocate global norms and raise awareness (cf. HelpAge's activities on *advocacy* in the previous chapter). Moreover, the informal relationships to governmental officials play as well an important role for local campaigning (cf. HelpAge's activities on *incentives* in the next chapter). What I want to emphasize is that in HelpAge's case all the activities are deeply connected with each other. In a nutshell, HelpAge's delivery of expertise is essential advice in order to increase the acceptance of social pensions. Moreover, on the one hand, HelpAge being a 'hub of knowledge' allows to emphasizes the importance of the rights-based character of social pensions by referring to global rights and globally made commitments of the government. On the other hand, HelpAge points out the potential of a social pension introduction for winning votes and responding to the people's needs (cf. next chapter). Accompanying its activities on advice and delivery of technical knowledge with global norms and policy models and making use of local

campaigning is what HelpAge calls the *twin-track-approach*. It is a particular emphasis of the interconnectedness of HelpAge's modes of influencing.

Policy-making can be stimulated by global agreements and norms can be translated down via conferences and workshops. However, global agreements and norms do not automatically turn into effect. Without technical advice delivered directly at national level it is much harder to influence the process of policy-making. Thus, it might be no coincidence that organizations that turn out to be influential on policy-making tend to be highly active with the delivery of advice. I have shown that HelpAge establishes long-term relations to policy-maker and tries to earn a reputation of being a 'hub of knowledge'. To do that HelpAge needs to find allies in order to gain access to the policy arena. 'Champions' within the government and among IOs, INGOs and NGOs which are open towards cash-based policy innovations of social protection become important door-opener allowing HelpAge to influence in stages until a supportive alliance for social pensions can be formed. The informal relationship to policy-makers enable HelpAge to provide expertise and stimulate policy-learning on a regular basis waiting for 'windows of opportunity' to pop-up.

I identified two strategies in order to influence policy-making – a general and a specific one. First, HelpAge used its function of being a 'hub of knowledge' to provide evidence-based learning by facilitating that countries share experiences and best practices with regard to social pensions on workshops and meetings. Second, HelpAge provides expertise for the social ministries in order to be argue the case for social pensions trying to convince the ministries of finance, and HelpAge began to target more directly the ministries of finance enabling them with courses on affordability to calculate the costs of social pensions.

Finally, I would like to emphasis that HelpAge's focus on country-led development and its pragmatism allows this INGO to be more influential by being more directly connected with the national policy-makers. Instead of arguing purely from a global-rights based position, HelpAge tailors its policy model in order to make it fit to various national conditions and budgets. The model of social pensions can be modified in order to make low-budget versions of it. This does not mean that HelpAge is giving up on its ideal version of universal social pensions, but it gives proof of the organizations ability to make compromises in order to be influential.

3.4. Incentives for National Institution-Building: Local Campaigning for Policy Implementation

It is unusual to expect an INGO to have a mechanism that can represent a strong incentive as money can do or activities which may have an impact on political power relations. Most INGOs do not have that much funding to influence governments with money or have not mechanism beyond lobbying that would be politically relevant. Compared with organizations (like UNICEF) working for issues on the topic of children, HelpAge has considerably less money for influencing available. Yet, HelpAge has developed a strategy to provide a politically relevant incentive which the INGO uses to influence the political system in order to facilitate the introduction of (universal) social pensions.

In this section I present that HelpAge is stimulating local campaigning and organizing local movements of older people which represent a growing share of the population and become politically relevant; especially in democratic systems. Those older people' movements claim rights deriving from global agreements which national governments have signed. HelpAge can steer this political pressure via campaigning organized with older people themselves. By doing so, HelpAge can *gather momentum* for the introduction of programs. Continuous protests allow to pressure for the *gradual expansion* of social pension systems.

In the following, I explain how HelpAge managed to organize those older people movements, how this process is organized and the function it has for the INGO. As a bottom-line I point-out that this process of influencing aims to facilitate the introduction of universal social pensions through continuous advocacy and political pressure. A *long and steady* process of influencing is the key for HelpAge's effectiveness on influencing because it is functional to gather momentum and for gradual expansion.

It all began with HelpAge's involvement in the development of the Madrid Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) of 2002 which was a milestone for policy-making and was reconfirmed as such a milestone through further international and regional conferences. While HelpAge was quite satisfied with the development of national

action plans as a reaction to MIPAA, they were not with the implementation process within the countries:

> "Governments where beginning to put in national action plans on aging. Many countries have indeed national action plans on aging which relate to implementing what's being agreed upon. [...] The problem is that they are not being implemented, because aging is a side issue in national debates and hasn't got a seat at the table. Like I was saying, the ministries of social welfare are weak ministries" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

Because MIPAA was rather a declaration of intent than a legally binding standard, the instrument to enforce this plan of action is soft pressure stemming from monitoring and evaluation. MIPAA itself just mentions the 'Commission for Social Development' (CSocD) as in charge of monitoring which is done by collecting governmental reports periodically. However, the expert group meeting on modalities for review and appraisal of MIPAA emphasizes a *bottom-up approach* (UNDESA 2003). It is a very unusual approach to include the target group of older people directly in the evaluation process.

> "The bottom-up approach to review and appraisal should be seen as an on-going process rather than a product delivered at a certain time. In this sense, the bottom-up review and appraisal should be seen as an innovative tool for social analysis, as it promotes the inclusion of views from groups that may have been previously excluded from traditional sources of information" (UNDESA 2003:6).

From interviews I know that HelpAge was among the group in charge of writing the UN evaluation approach of MIPAA. HelpAge included the bottom-up approach based on the common understanding in that committee that something new and innovative has to be developed in order to be more effective than the provision of governmental reports every five years would be (HelpAge Interview No.9). However, the bottom-up approach does not describe how this bottom-up approach should be designed. Instead the committee argues simply to be open minded and try new approaches that incorporate information coming from other IOs, INGOs, or older people themselves. By directly mentioning and emphasizing the importance of civil society and NGO involvement in this regard the UN agreement (UN 2002) provides HelpAge with a mandate to implement new bottom-up approaches as shown in the following.

Moreover, the importance and awareness for bottom-up monitoring mechanisms was heightened among African governments through the activities of the African Union. In 2008 the 'AU Social Policy Framework for Africa' was developed which put the African Union in charge of pushing social protection including advocacy to spread the innovative monitoring mechanism based on a bottom-up approach. The section on 'Monitoring and Evaluation' in the AU Policy Framework calls to "create a network of civil society organizations to support the dissemination, implementation and monitoring of the SPF [Social Policy Framework]" (AU 2008a:44). It surely is no coincidence that the African Framework echoed the UN agreement with regard to the monitoring mechanism because in this case as well HelpAge was also involved in the development of the AU Social Policy Framework:

> "The AU Commission, in close collaboration with HelpAge International, is organizing three Regional Experts Group Meetings on Social Protection on the theme: 'Investing in Social Protection in Africa', to cover the five regions of the Continent" (AU 2008b:1).

As a consequence, the AU Social Policy Framework and the UN agreement were two central documents reconfirming HelpAge's mandate for advocacy and evaluations of the implementation process. HelpAge followed this approach and has been pushing for a new type of organization called 'Older People Association' (OPAs). Furthermore, HelpAge organized with the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) an evaluation including group discussions and case studies around the globe (UNFPA & HelpAge 2011). The results will be brought into an upcoming publication of the 'State of the World's Older Persons 2012', which could be a fundamental document for taking stock and generating comparability in the context of aging.

After having described how HelpAge got its mandate for the initiation of their bottom-up mechanism, I describe how HelpAge implemented a monitoring mechanism as a reaction to the UN's monitoring guidelines called 'Older Citizens Monitoring'. The above mentioned OPAs are the structural entities for this mechanism and DFID provided the funding for the creation of OPAs over a four-years-period. To initiate a OPA HelpAge is going to cities and villages and organizes meetings for older people which often come together for the first time in their lives. OPAs can be rather small encompassing some handful of older people. They meet on a regular basis, discussion issues around aging and taking action. The strength and activity level of those groups depends on the individual motivations of the people

within the groups. Therefore, the status and the quality of OPAs are very different within a country and especially among world regions. Whereas in most countries OPAs are informal small-size groups of older people, in some countries OPAs begin to become legal associations with the right to have an own bank account. In Latin America the formalization process continues in a tremendous way. The OPAs organize and align with other OPAs to form larger representational bodies (HelpAge Interview No.2). That has to do with the fact that the civil society in Latin America has been organized for a longer time being able to look back at a longer history than most OPAs in other world regions.

In many cases HelpAge has to initiate OPAs almost out of nothing, because it has very limited resources. In order to do that, HelpAge has a standardized process of how to set up OPAs. The know-how of how to set up an OPA delivers HelpAge to national governments as well, because the formation of OPAs is nothing that can be organized solely by one INGO alone. Once OPAs had been established as a new type of organization it spread globally at enormous pace, driven as well by older people themselves copying this idea by learning from neighbor cities and villages. However, the expansion in many regions in large numbers was only possible with the help and engagement of national governments which included OPAs in their national action plans and, moreover, provided funding for the initiation of OPAs. In the following I explain how useful and crucial OPAs are for HelpAge to influence national policy-making. Thus, based on the assumption that government do not especially like being confronted with strong civil movements interfering in policy-making, I found it puzzling to hear that national governments massively support the process of OPA development. Why do national governments do that?

As a HelpAge policy expert from one of HelpAge's regional development centers told me, the motivation for governments to support this idea is that OPAs appear as a cost effective way to directly support people living in poverty. OPAs represent self-organized service communities including healthcare, homecare, HIV and AIDS treatment, social activities, disaster risk reduction, livelihoods and women's participation, in order to improve the well-being of older people which should benefit the community as a whole (HelpAge 2009). In a context where the extension of the national education and health infrastructure to all parts of the country (with the particular difficulty to reach rural areas) is difficult, costly and can take several years. Small investments in effective self-help groups appear to be a favorable way to go. However, HelpAge always made clear towards the national governments that the creation of OPAs is about two aspects: to enable older people directly to establish

community-based self-help, and to enable them to get involved in advocacy for their rights and service provision.

The latter aspect leads my description to the explanation of the function OPAs have for HelpAge. Next to the service- and self-help function OPAs were set up to generate valuable information for the evaluation of the implementation process of MIPAA. For HelpAge OPAs enhance the INGO's capacity for advocacy in two ways: first, through the generation of information and, second, through the formation of a grassroots movement campaigning for the implementation of social pensions. The information gained through evaluations OPAs have conducted at national level is useful to make arguments and to gain credibility for advocacy in favor of social protection and social pensions. Increased credibility is an important resources for the dialogues with national ministries of welfare and ministries of finance which usually are of technical nature. In this context, evidence-based advocacy gained through local expertise can be advantageous (HelpAge Interview No.1):

"We do not have millions of HelpAge stuff on the ground. The idea is to strengthen national, local civil society organizations and older people. We work a lot with older people associations which we have set-up on the ground. This is absolutely critical to the work we do, otherwise we wouldn't have the credibility" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

While the first aspect has some importance for cognitive influencing the evidence-based credibility is also relevant for negotiations with the government in order set new impulses for policy-making. The second aspect of how OPAs enhance HelpAge's capacities for advocacy is campaigning. The INGO introduced the 'Age Demands Action' (ADA) campaign in 2007 with the purpose to get older people people directly involved in advocacy and protest. It was the first time ever that HelpAge set up a campaign. The formulated goal of ADA campaign is "to support governments to extend existing or put in place new social pensions schemes in developing countries and to enable civil society to campaign for pensions and hold governments to account" (HelpAge 2012:1). ADA was evolving and quickly becoming a large movement where huge protest marches in developing countries and dialogues with local, regional and national policy-makers were organized in October each year. At the beginning of the ADA campaign older people were protesting in 26 countries, and in 2011 HelpAge was already able to organize protests in a 59 countries. The 'UN international day of older persons' at the first of October is the day when the protests are organized. However, the ADA campaigning involves

activities and lobbying throughout the year as well. Long before October HelpAge begins negotiations with the national government about the issues older people want to campaign about (HelpAge Interview No.1).

A core element of OPAs is to enable older people to claim the realization of existing rights through programs or better access to those already existing. The strategy for that is to show older people what an entitlement concretely means, by telling them what kind of governmental services exist and how to make use of them:

> "OPAs [...] play a vital role in raising awareness of the rights and entitlements of older people and improving their access to existing services. Linking with government service providers enables OPA members to recognize that government departments are resources for them to utilize. This builds confidence among older people and articulation in expressing their specific needs" (HAI 2009:5).

If HelpAge manages to raise awareness for globally enacted agreements and right charters (e.g. 'right to social security', art.22 UDHR) by teaching the thousands of OPAs around the world in form of workshops, trainings and brochures what their governments have pledged to do, it means that there is a massive infrastructure for advocacy via campaigning for HelpAge available.

However, even though the OPA movement is inspired from the HelpAge secretariat in London coordinating the protests around the world, the bottom-up aspect of the OPA movement is not to underestimate. In most cases, older people organize the protests themselves and in some cases HelpAge is supporting this with further material and know-how.

> "This campaign is driven from the bottom-up. We are not telling them what to campaign about. It depends on what is hot on the national agenda. We are not telling them what to do and how to do it, but facilitate them in the process" (HelpAge Interview No.1).

I investigated in the question of how and to what extent HelpAge can guide and influence the process of campaigning and the topics chosen by having a closer look at the ADA campaigns list of 59 countries (HelpAge 2011d). It is remarkable that the campaigns are monitored and evaluated from the London secretariat strictly in terms of policy influencing. The list records the issues of older people in the particular country and the interaction and impact it had on politics. HelpAge does categorize

the issues according to six predefined themes. This is a process of re-framing the diversity on the ground. A closer examination reveals that the INGO is getting their issues on the agenda even though this process of campaigning is led bottom-up by OPAs. HelpAge has successfully developed a dialogue with local OPAs and manages to educate older people to care about social protection and to take action while the INGO is open for the issues of older people as well. As a result of this non-authoritative guidance of the ADA campaign the ownership felt by older people is high.

Based on the analysis of the campaigning list of actions in 59 countries I can describe two strategies of HelpAge: one aiming to get social pensions on the agenda and a very similar one to ensure the proper implementation of social pensions. The analysis revealed that OPAs consider the introduction of social pensions or even a call for universal social pensions as important issues. 'Social protection' is next to 'age and development' the topic OPAs protest for the most (HelpAge 2011d). It shows that HelpAge's policy model is very high on the agenda of older people. The OPA protest pressure for policy innovations that HelpAge negotiates with the governments. In order to raise the awareness of policy makers HelpAge organizes the protests and gives older people directly a voice in front of the government. The INGO organizes meeting where government officials directly meet older people. Educated and empowered by HelpAge older people can express their needs which often reflect the policy priorities of the INGO. As HelpAge describes: "the Age Demands Action campaign showed that older people have clear aspirations and can present their issues effectively to governments" (HelpAge 2008:16).

However, governments do not always take action just because of a campaign once a year. HelpAge considers the campaigning as an ongoing process that reaches its aim of being influential on policy-making in the long run: "we are using them not once a year; we are supporting them in an ongoing process" (HelpAge Interview No.1). HelpAge calls the strategy attempting to convince a critical number of government officials to take action: *gathering momentum*.

The second aspect of the political pressure of campaigning is that the protests are also an instrument allowing HelpAge to make compromises. The campaigning lists shows that to another large share the protests are about the extension of already existing programs by lowering the age for eligibility, for example, or increasing the amount of money, broadening the coverage base (towards universal coverage), or improving access. It reliefs HelpAge from the need to insist on the introduction of full-fledged social pensions. Instead the INGO can follow a strategy of *gradual expansion*

where OPAs monitor the state of implementation and push for the extension of social pension programs in the subsequent years. Often policy-makers pledge to introduce some policy innovations, but if the government really takes action can only be measured in the following year, where new campaigning engages in pointing out shortcomings of the policy process. So, many issues of campaigning mostly have a follow-up campaign in the next year:

> "The campaign does not end once a call for change has been made. It is essential to develop a clear follow-up process to ensure that commitments become reality and politicians are held to account. ADA partners for example in Bangladesh and Ethiopia are requesting for the campaign to continue throughout the year to ensure that commitments by governments are implemented" (HelpAge 2011c).

A prerequisite for the strategy of gradual expansion is the engagement of older people over a long period and the monitoring of the implementation process. Often people join these protests highly motivated in large numbers because the benefit levels of social pensions are often much too small and age eligibility can be up to 85 years[13] where most people die much earlier without ever being able to get a pension (HelpAge Interview No.6). The *monitoring function* of OPAs enabling to point out shortcomings of implementation processes is rather simple because older people are the direct recipients and experience in their everyday life the consequences of national policy-making. HelpAge facilitates the monitoring process with questionnaires and evaluation sheets and support to fill them, because in many cases older people are illiterate. Sometimes people even have to protest for the fulfillment of existing programs because promised benefits simply have not been paid out. In Ghana for example the government withholds the money from the cash transfer program, called LEAP. The beneficiaries had not received money for months. Due to OPA protests the government release GHC 2.7 million (about USD 1.6 million). OPAs do not only push for the extension of programs but also ensure that programs function as promised and designed on paper.

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13 It is not as rare as one might expect that life-expectancy is lower than the age of eligibility for an old age pension. Nepal indeed is an exceptional example of a country that started its pension program with a very high age of eligibility. The country introduced a pension for pensioners aged 90 or higher, and reduced subsequently the age to 85 and than to 80 years. In 2012 the country has a pension for the people aged 70, and in certain regions the year of eligibility is even 60. Nepal is as well a country where HelpAge focused its advocacy to facilitate pension reform in order to make the program more accessible for people in old age.

Conclusion

In this section I have argued that the UN monitoring mechanism of the Madrid International Agreement of Action on Aging (MIPAA) provided HelpAge with a mandate to test new bottom-up mechanisms. As a result HelpAge invented 'Older People Associations' (OPAs) and spread this concept globally with the support of national governments. While for the governments the community-based self-help function is advantageous HelpAge used campaigning to create political protest pressuring for the introduction or extension of social pensions. In both cases the INGO recognizes that a slow policy process demands to get involved in a long and steady manner over years. HelpAge's strategy for the implementation of programs is *gathering momentum*, while the organization's ability to make compromises is based on the strategy of *gradual expansion* for existing programs.

3.5. Conclusion: HelpAge's Advocacy, Advice and Incentives

This chapter has shown that in the global diffusion of social cash transfer programs an INGO has become an important global actor for Global Social Policy. With a secretariat in London, the INGO has a centralized coordination unit that allows to be active in lobbying issues of aging globally and promoting the INGO's particular policy model of Universal Social Pensions. I have pointed out that this model is constantly advertised by HelpAge and pursued as an ideal model. However, the organization more often just uses the term 'social pensions' which allows HelpAge to be open to non-universal (means-tested) pension policies. The flexibility with regard to the parameters of the policy model allows HelpAge to make compromises and to design a low-budget version of their policy model which facilitates the probability that national governments pickup the idea of age specific social protection.

Analyzing HelpAge's strategies on advocacy, it turned out that for HelpAge policy models as well as global conferences play an important role. As a centralized INGO HelpAge's engagement has a remarkably global scope. It is unusual to see an INGO so deeply involved in the activities of the UN system, stimulating global

agreements that emphasize the importance of aging and social protection and organizing regional follow-up events that translate abstract agreements into regional and national action plans. These activities reconfirm and increase the importance of the UN agreement signed in Madrid (Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing - MIPAA). Via advocacy HelpAge managed to *mainstream* issues on aging into other domains such as global rights, healthcare and the social protection. By connecting different issue areas with each other, HelpAge arranged *packages* that allow to advocate social pensions from very different angles and issue areas. With global conferences and workshops, HelpAge brought an UN agreement to life by raising first the awareness for social protection as the cornerstone for the advocacy for social pensions; by then advertising social pensions as the central policy, enabling countries to ensure social protection for older people; and, finally, by anchoring the concrete policy model of universal social pensions in national action plans. I exemplified this strategic procedure of *translating down* for the African continent where HelpAge was particularly active due to the organization's excellent working-relationship with the African Union.

Moreover, HelpAge has a remarkable network structure which allows the INGO to be in close contact with government officials around the world and even directly with older people. Although HelpAge as an INGO has limited financial resources and lacks other means to create strong incentives for national governments to pick up the organization's policy model, I found that HelpAge is using political pressure via *local campaigning*. MIPAA allowed HelpAge to develop a new kind of bottom-up monitoring mechanism. As a result, HelpAge began to group older people together, explained the relevance of global rights to them and organized political protests once a year at older people's day and a dialogue involving older people directly.

Next to advocacy at global and regional levels and advice delivered directly to states, the activities of incentive-based influencing take place at national or even local levels. By identifying domestic actors who are in a favorable position to inject the policy model of social pensions into the process of policy-making, HelpAge influences in stages and builds step by step cooperative relationships with different ministries, other global actors and NGOs, scientists and the media (e.g. newspapers, television) in order *to get access to the political arena* and establish contacts. Gaining a reputation as a *hub of knowledge* through the provision of expertise for developing social pension programs and calculating the costs, HelpAge can focus to *gather momentum* and is ready to become active when an appropriate window of

opportunity opens up. Moreover, HelpAge seems to be particularly effective in directly influencing the ministries of finance which are decisive player that have to be convince in national settings.

All in all, I found that the interplay of advocacy, advice and incentives on all kind of levels – multilevel-influencing: global, regional, domestic – is particularly characteristic for HelpAge's activities in policy diffusion. While HelpAge has established long-term relationships to policy-makers and serves as a hub of knowledge for policy-makers, HelpAge can benefit, on the one hand, from its advocacy at global and add a normative emphasis stemming from international agreements where governments have pledged to take action and, on the other hand, HelpAge can benefit from its local support of campaigning where it creates political pressure though protests of older people. HelpAge focusses on direct influencing via advice and calls this multilevel interplay, where *advice* delivered to states is facilitated by advocacy (international covenants and regional and domestic action plans) and by *political pressure* stemming from people's movements, the *twin-track-approach* (HelpAge Interview No.1). Advice is supported by activities at global and local level.

It is not just remarkable to recognize how complex this strategic interplay between the levels is; above that it is noteworthy that HelpAge's activities are driven by long-term goals. Influencing the UN system, organizing large-scale political protests, and becoming a hub of knowledge for states based on trustworthy relations to domestic policy makers takes time. A slow and steady process of diffusion based on multilevel influencing seems to be characteristic of HelpAge.

Chapter 4: Other Global Actors'
Support of SCT Diffusion

After this extensive analysis of two major actors in the field of global social policy this section gives me the opportunity to provide a brief overview of other global actors' activities. HelpAge and the World Bank are by far not the only actors contributing to the diffusion of SCT programs. They are in particular relevant for the analysis of the particular drivers behind the models 'social pensions' and 'CCTs', but many more actors contribute to the creation of an learning environment which establishes SCTs as the current best practice as development policies.

I would not go so far to say that all global actors work together so that the SCT diffusion is a global project with multiple actors working on it. Instead each actor is first and foremost focused on its own mandate and defines for itself in what way SCTs are part of its portfolio. Yet, it is remarkable that in less than a decade SCTs as a topic have become a key policy suggestion for most actors in the global development community. Even by following primarily their own mandate, there is still considerable contact between global actors. They work together via temporary coalitions and shared global events/meetings. The development community is indeed a close community. Having attended several of global events makes clear that only some handful of people take part in all the global discussions. Global actors know each other. That might not be true for most of the staff working for global organizations and institutions but it is true for specific people of the organizations which usually attend global conferences. I myself have met a large share of representatives of global organizations at conferences. Certain knowledge is discussed among those actors and finds its way inside the language and the concepts of other actors. Some actors might pick up some new ideas and terms directly, while other 'translate' new approaches into their own language. Based on my observations I choose to discuss in the following briefly some other organizations in order to give an insight into other actors' activities and to provide a sense for the broader picture. This section shows that multiple actors contributed something to the general trend of SCT diffusion even though their activities where considerably fewer than of the two cases I have presented above. In order to give an overview of the

spectrum of activities I chose to select three different types of actors: one further IGO, two regional development banks, and two national development agencies.

4.1. The International Labour Organization

The ILO is able to get easily in contact with countries as well as other global actors to stimulate discussions. This is a privileged position to develop and spread new norms. Moreover, the ILO can provide technical assistance to help countries to take action and start implementing programs which reflect those norms. The idea to provide cash-based social assistance to people in need regardless if these people have been able make contributions or not is key to social protection. I understand the ILO as the main driver of the new focus on social protection. Above that, the ILO addresses primarily developing countries with this concept even though, as it is the character of this organization, the ILO designs concepts so that they are applicable to all countries worldwide. In the following, I argue that the ILO has been tenaciously pushing for social protection as a new normative reference because it gives new responsibilities to the organization reconfirming its relevance. In order to achieve this the ILO went new ways and were lobbying the United Nations and other global actors in order to open their agendas for the idea of SCTs.

By reading into the literature on the ILO and its historical development I realized that the survival of organizations is an issue, even for such big organizations like the ILO. The realists' assumption that beyond all mandates an organization's first goal must be to secure its own survival seems to hold true. The ILO was at certain points in its history at risk of loosing its relevance and successfully claimed responsibilities back. Let me make a brief historical excursion. The ILO as a child of the Treaty of Versailles 1919 was restricted to a strict interpretation of the treaty's articles and ran risk "of becoming a bureaucratic institution with no real authority" (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 7). Due to the influence of the ILO's directors the ILO was able to claim responsibility for a more abstract vision for workers, that is, "stability in daily life and security against the threat of war" (ibid.). The first part of this vision legitimates ILO activities within nations and the second part legitimates to be active to mediate tensions between nations. After the Second World War with the USA as a strong new member on board the ILO was able to gain new relevance as

the "main forum for social questions associated with post-war reconstruction" (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 12). Moreover, the ILO were to become a forum to mediate tensions between communist systems and liberal democratic ones. During the 1950s and 1960s the ILO established technical assistance programs for the newly independent developing countries supplemented by a network of regional and field offices "to address more readily the needs of the ILO membership and permit the expansion of the technical assistance program" (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 15).

Having overcome the threat of becoming a merely bureaucratic institution by enlarging its agenda after World War, and stabilizing its relevance in a global arena by picking up the issues of post-war reconstruction after World War the Second, the organization faced new challenges in the 21th century were economic globalization became a dominating factor effecting the living conditions of workers.

> "The ILO's historical emphasis on trade unions, collective bargaining and freedom of association had become irrelevant and anachronistic. [Instead] globalization, social justice, and poverty reduction, became more prominent in popular discourse as social division increased" (Hughes and Haworth 2011: 18).

With the narrow focus on labor standards it seemed like the ILO were missing out on many aspects of the conditions affecting workers. Thus, the ILO reacted to that and called for a strengthening of the social dimension of globalization.

> "In the last two decades, however, the traditional cornerstones of the ILO's activities have changed, shifted by the transformation of the economic and social environment brought about by the emerging global economy" (ILO 1999: 3).

Moreover, the discovery of the fact that in developing countries the majority of people works outside the formal job market and, thus, is out of reach for any kind of ILO labor-standards hit the organization like a shock-wave. The 'Decent Work Agenda' of the ILO in 1999 introduced this new focus on the informal sector particularly in developing countries.

> "Because of its origins, the ILO has paid most attention to the needs of wage workers — the majority of them men — in formal enterprises. But this is only part of its mandate, and only part of the world of work. Almost everyone works, but not everyone is employed. Moreover, the world is full of overworked and unemployed

people. The ILO must be concerned with workers beyond the formal labour market — with unregulated wage workers, the self-employed, and homeworkers" (ILO 1999: 6).

As a consequence one can see that the ILO's mandate broadened a lot so that the organization describes its mission as follows: "the ILO's mission is to improve the situation of human beings in the world of work" (ILO 1999: 5). This mandate is in particular related to 'the social dimension of globalization. In 2008 the ILO set with the 'Declaration of a Fair Globalization' this new course presented as a natural (and necessary) development of its core standard.[14]

With this new vision in mind the ILO agreed to implement "initiatives to extend social security to those who are not presently covered" (ILO 2008b: preface). As a result the ILO launch the 'Global Campaign on Social Security and Coverage for All' in 2003 (ILO 2010: v). This was revolutionary in so far that the ILO has never before launched a campaign. Based on ILO Convention No.102 "the Campaign focuses on the fact that there still remain many countries in the world where social security coverage is low or very low, particularly among those with low- and middle-income levels" (ibid.). While this campaign to extend social security coverage addresses all countries globally, the quotation above already indicates that low- and middle-income countries are the primary targets.

At the level of activities the ILO describes that the first phase of the campaign will last for five years, from 2001 to 2006.

> "During this period the objective is to place, in as many countries as possible, the extension of social security at the top of the development agenda and to support national and international policy makers in developing strategies to extend coverage. Such strategies will be inspired by values, such as solidarity and universality, and will be based on cost-effective ways to extend social security" (ILO Website 2005; emphasize added).

The main aim the campaign was to get as many countries and global actors on board. While countries were addressed directly the ILO chose to develop this idea of extending social security to the informal sector with a working group with the telling name 'World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization' (WCSDG) which

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14   The ILO emphasizes the importance of this declaration: „This is the third major statement of principles and policies adopted by the International Labour Conference since the ILO's Constitution of 1919. It builds on the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944 and the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work of 1998. The 2008 Declaration expresses the contemporary vision of the ILO's mandate in the era of globalization" (ILO 2008: 1).

started in 2002 and released its final report in 2004. The WCSDG was set up by the ILO itself but tried to gain a wider authority and legitimacy by incorporating stakeholders from the "government, politics, parliaments, business and multinational corporations, organized labour, academia and civil society" (WCSDG 2004: ix). The final report 'A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities For All' was not just often cited by the ILO, but managed to gain wider recognition from other actors like the World Bank and the European Union as well. The EU played an active role in the WCSDG and, thus, entered a 'Strategic Partnership' with the ILO after the release of the report in 2004 (Orbie and Tortell 2009: 666). The report draws on the 'Decent Work Agenda' of 1999 and suggests a "minimum level of social protection for individuals and families [...] as part of the socio-economic 'floor' of the global economy" (WCSDG 2004: xiii). Both elements were embraced by the European Commission (Orbie and Tortell 2009: 887).

The initial campaign for the extension of social security to the informal sector got as a new element the idea of a minimum level – the social protection floor. The ILO supported that this idea became an UN policy and managed to get the lead agency for this framework together with the WHO. In 2009 the UN Chief Executives Board published the paper 'Global Financial and Economic Crisis - UN system joint crisis initiatives' (UNCEB 2009) where the 'Social Protection Floor-Initiative' (SPF-I) was one out of nine responses to financial and economical crisis. While the WHO did not much with its mandate the ILO developed a whole framework out of it and pushed to mainstream it in the global community and towards the nation states in order to reach a new ILO standard or recommendation. Mainstreaming of the floor concept was facilitated by the fact that several organizations have agreed to support this UN initiative, as there are to mention: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Bank.[15] Although the ILO received its new instrument (a recommendation on the SPF) in 2012 the year 2009 can be seen as a marker where

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15   A complete list of all organizations officially listed as 'supporting agencies' of the SPF-I are: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Regional Commissions, UNAIDS, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Populations Fund (UNFPA), UN-Habitat, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the World Bank.

the idea of cash-based minimal levels of social protection became common-sense in the development community.[16]

The crucial point is that the ILO with its campaign promoted rather an idea with implications for policy models than a particular policy model itself. The floor is open to several programs which provide a minimum level of social protection. Yet, the life-cycle approach is a defining element which considers specialized programs for particular age groups which is disturbing policy ideas of general social assistance equally for all age groups.[17] Moreover, the ILO supports the idea of systemic, institutionalized and government-led programs and emphasizes a rights-based approach which refers to the human rights charter. When it comes to policies the ILO mentions social protection for children, the working-age and older people without specifying this more directly. This life-cycle approach might be due to the fact that the many global organizations are already structured in a way that they support particular social groups. The floor approach is so inviting for many organizations because they can choose their own preferred policy model and push for it as part of a common consensus among global organizations. The common nominator is cash-based assistance for people in need in order to assure a minimum level of social protection.

The main achievement of the ILO is that is has been successful in opening many other global organizations for this basic idea to turn away from emergency response and turn to support for systemic social protection programs that give people in need access to social services and financial aid. Even though the ILO is very reluctant with claim to be influential because of its deep respect for other actors' autonomy the ILO says about its influence with regard to social protection:

"For ILO the SPF is a really big success because so many organizations are now interested in social protection and work with this terminology, present their own activities as within this framework, and change their own terminology accordingly. A very clear example is the World Food Programme which suddenly framed its own activities as being part of social protection. That is new. For sure, it makes a lot of sense to describe it as such, because food security is an important aspect of the SPF and the right to food is an essential right which clearly is part of social protection. However, the World Food Programme has not described itself as a social protection actor before. For example, the last publication of the World Food Programme has the title "From Food Aid to Food Assistance". Food Aid represents the old connotation of

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16   More on that development of the SPF framework leading to a new ILO recommendation can be found in Deacon 2013.

17 This observation was made by my supervisor Prof. Lutz Leisering. Many thanks for sharing this thought and allow me to share it here.

'charity' and 'emergency response', while food assistance refers to more systemic and institutionalized approaches. It is good to see that social protection has become a higher priority for many organizations" (ILO Headquarter Interview; translated by author).

Even the World Bank embraced this new focus and began to focus its support more on systemic solutions. As I have shown above the World Bank advocated CCT policies as the main social protection program which is supposedly the basis for the development of social protection systems. Institutionalization of programs is the main focus of the World Bank. The growing prominence of social protection as a reference at global level might have been the reason to make this focus part of its official strategy and inter-agency communication so that in 2012 the World Bank published its new 'Social Protection and Labor Strategy' (World Bank 2012) which the World Bank presented personally with a presentation in every country worldwide, so that in 2012 the new focus on social protection and systemic solutions was impossible to overhear for any development organization and agency.

The reason why so many organizations listened to the ILO's new framework for development policies can be seen in the ILO connecting successfully the frames of a 'fair globalization' and social protection as an effective 'crisis response mechanism'. Social protection can now be understood as normatively important in order to reinforce 'fairness' and it is a tool to increase a countries resilience after economic crisis. The latter has particular relevance for developing countries and global organizations which are more economically orientated like the World Bank. This is how Michael Cichon – the ILO's Director of the Social Security Department – puts it:

> "The exciting story is that we have a window of opportunity in the discussion on social policy and development policy were for once social protection has structured a certain focus of the political debate which it never had in the last years; and the reason to some extend is the crisis because social protection systems have been observed as being social and economic stabilizer in that process and become now a much more accepted policy tool than they were five years ago" (Michael Cichon, Director of the ILO's Social Security Department; ILO TV 2011).

Finally, I had not the opportunity to evaluate the ILO's activities for social protection at the operational level in detail, but most of the technical cooperation between 2000

and 2010 was in the Asian region followed by Africa and Latin America. It shows that indeed developing countries are the focus of the ILO's activities. Yet, I would not overrate the ILO's influence through technical assistance because the overall budget for all global technical cooperation is with USD 1.3 million too small to have impact on the program level (ILO 2011).

Thus, I argue that the main impact of the ILO was the development of the social protection framework. Above that, on the operational level the ILO has a very different approach than the two main cases of this study. The ILO focuses primarily on capacity building at national level and relies on its standards and recommendations to turn into effect because countries have agreed to do so. In other words, the ILO invests in capacity building and to raise the account for social protection and – at the same time – leaves enough space for variation so that countries develop their own approach and other global actor can distribute their models as part of the framework. For the ILO it has turned out to be more effective to run in a cooperative mode which can be characterized by pragmatism and a focus on outcomes. This what the Social Security Extension Officer in the ILO Headquarter said about the ILO's approach to assist countries nationally:

> "The ILO has become much more pragmatic than it probably was in the 1990s where debates were more ideology driven. The ILO is more focused on *outcomes*. […] Questions concerning the particular design of policies are not that important for the ILO. I am not sure if I can say that for the whole ILO but I am personally convinced that it is much more important that a country puts considerable efforts into the implementation of an ILO standard, has enough administrative capacities and devotes enough funding for an adequate implementation structure, and tries to prevent corruption etc. Even if the choice of design and program is not the optimal choice but the program is properly implemented, it still can be successful in reaching *outputs*. […] For the ILO *capacity building* plays an important role, because the ILO simply would not have the capacities to assist the countries to design their policies. The basic idea of the ILO's assistance is to build the capacities within countries in order to enable them to design and implement policies on their own." (ILO Headquarter Interview; translated by author; emphasis added).

The impression of this Social Security Extension Officer that the ILO cares the most about outcomes is substantiated by the fact that the Programme and Budget Report (2012-13) strictly evaluates the programs on the basis of outcomes. And the

cooperative mode is visible when looking at the way the ILO delivers technical assistance for the SPF. It is by far not that the ILO intends to deliver all the support and expertise on its own. That would give the ILO privileged access to the policy-making arena but as the ILO is very pragmatic and more focused on outcomes there is no need for the ILO to do that. Instead the organization set up the SPF Advisory Network where all cooperating organizations can deliver their expertise and knowledge. Instead of influencing directly the ILO chose to rather provide the platform for cooperation, and is monitoring in how far the countries make progress with the SPF implementation. This is how the ILO has designed the SPF Advisory Network:

> "It is the network of the SPF-I and the headquarters of the cooperating actors. Every participating organization has at least one focal person. It can be considered best as a mailing list with technical experts from all the organizations active in technical assistance. If countries have any questions, face problems or show that they have a need for assistance it is a possibility to consult this group of actors. According to responsibility, expertise and capacity would an organization of the Technical Advisory Network respond to this request. The support for countries takes place on very different levels. On country-level exists the SPF task force or the social protection joint UN groups – there are different labels –, and they can as well turn to the network to request further expertise. On the other hand can they also forward their knowledge and expertise to facilitate global knowledge sharing. Its the idea that there is communication, on the one hand, between the inter-agency headquarters at global level and, on the other hand, the country groups working on the SPF-I" (ILO Headquarter Interview; translated by author).

The limited resources of the ILO do make this cooperative mode the best fit for the organization in order. Moreover, it is also important to note that the ILO has the national social security ministries as its counterparts, which – as mentioned in the case of HelpAge International – are usually among the weakest in the arrangement of ministries. While HelpAge has also not the strongest financial capacities but enough staff and partners to lobby and deliver expertise and accompany policy-makers in the process of policy-making on a long-term basis. The ILO can compensate its own limitations by welcoming the support of other actors because the ILO is not that much focused on any particular model.

In sum, I have argued that the ILO played an important role for the the diffusion of SCT programs already by changing the priorities of other global actors and by developing social protection as a new framework that can be an inspiration and a reference to others.

4.2. Regional Development Banks: IADB and ADB

Regional development banks are another important type of actor which can influence national policy-making by providing the necessary loans, providing technical assistance and organizing regional conferences. The Inter-American Development Bank is the most active one supporting social protection, closely followed by the Asian Development Bank. The following sections reveal how those actors understand social protection and what role SCTs play for them. Furthermore, I indicate how active the banks have been in the last decade.

The Inter-American Development Bank

The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)[18] had social protection as its main reference at the beginning of 2000 which is visible in its publications "Social Protection for Equity and Growth (IADB 2000) and "Shielding the Poor – Social Protection in the Developing World" (Lustig 2001). The line of thought developed there is already pretty much the thought the ILO developed later. This reaffirms the impression that the Latin American region was earlier than other regions in the Global South aware of the importance to set up social protection programs to reach the poor in the informal sector:

"Over the past 20 years, Latin America and the Caribbean have faced recurrent economic crises and natural disasters. The acceleration of market reforms and global integration has expanded economic opportunities while increasing country and individual exposure to risk. To manage these risks, people resort to available insurance markets or informal coping mechanisms. But the poor often have little or no

18 The IADB is also often called IDB or with the Spanish acronym BID (*Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo*), but I will stick with the more distinct acronym IADB.

access to these instruments, and their incomes are too low to be allocated to anything other than consumption of basic goods" (IADB 2000: v).

The IADB argues early that governmental programs are needed to 'shield the poor'. Furthermore, the IADB points out a deficit in social programs throughout Latin American countries. As typically for a bank's rational the IADB points out that there is a relation between social protection investments and economic growth. The idea of 'investment in human capital' was already present at the beginning of 2000:

> "Latin America does not have adequate prevention and compensation systems to reduce the impact of shocks on its poor. As a result, shocks not only have severe effects on poverty and equity, but also diminish economic prospects for growth. In the absence of reforms that address the needs of low-income households — that is, both social protection programs and investment in human capital that can raise the future earning capacity of the poor — shocks will continue to have these dire long-term implications for poverty, inequality and prospects for growth" (IADB 2000: 2).

On the program level the IADB publications refers to Argentina's employment program *Trabajar* and the first CCT program, *Progresa* in Mexico, and argues for the affordability of such programs by pointing out that the above mentioned programs cost only a fraction of a GDP percentage (0.2%/0.3%). Yet, at this time the IADB had no clear policy suggestion. Instead the IADB discussed a whole set of measures, such as unemployment insurance, employment generation programs public work programs and wage subsidies), short-term training programs, old-age security and 'social assistance on pensions', and 'microfinance for consumption smoothing' (Lustig 2001). Conditional child benefits were not a priority at the beginning of the 2000s. It seems that regional examples have at least partly driven the popularity of CCTs.

The IADB contributed to policy diffusion with regional knowledge-sharing among Latin American countries. Already in 2001 the bank set up the 'Poverty Reduction and Social Protection Network', which focused on technical cooperation and best-practice sharing based on the criteria of impact evaluations.

> "The objective of this Network is the creation of a forum where the countries of the region can share experiences, learn about practices carried out outside the region and explores opportunities for regional cooperation in the areas of poverty reduction and social protection. The Network is made up of a government representative from

each country of the region holding the highest technical rank and with experience in the design and implementation of poverty reduction policies and programs" (IADB 2001: 1).

The effectiveness and influence of this networking activities is hard to measure and would require an own case study. At this point I just point out that the stimulation of networking among Latin American countries was early a priority for the IADB.

The topic of conditional cash transfers can be found in the year 2003 when the Lead Human Development Specialist of the IADB held a presentation on "Safety Net for the Poor - The Role of Conditional Cash Grant Programs" (Sedlacek 2003). The presentation speaks of programs which are 'broadly targeted to poor children' providing 'grants conditional on school attendance' and 'visit to clinics' and mentions the programs in Mexico (*Progresa*) and Bolivia (*Bolsa Escola*) as examples (ibid.). In general, the IADB has the same focus on human capital creation as the World Bank.[19] As I already partly showed in the World Bank case study the IADB is involved in most of the Latin American countries' activities on social protection. On their website the IADB provides a map which shows the lending activities and the technical cooperation missions in Latin America.[20] The importance for conditional cash transfers and the IADB's involvement formulates the bank as follows:

> "The most visible expression of this experience is the support that it has provided since the late 90's via Conditional Cash Transfer Programs (CCTP). Almost every country in the region has used this type of program as a pillar of its strategy for alleviating poverty and inequality at some time in its development history, and the Bank has had a role in just about every one of those programs. To a large extent, the popularity of the CCTP is attributable to its effectiveness, which has been proven through rigorous evaluation"(IADB Website 2013a).

Interestingly to note that the IADB is not precisely referring to the World Bank's CCT model but tries to find with the term CCTP a more general description in its own terminology. Yet, the close affiliation is visible as well. Moreover, the IADB claims to be involved in every Latin American country for CCTPs. Even though the role and the contribution the IADB played in each country might have varied a lot the extend of

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19 In a video on the IADB's channel BIDtv the bank shows how the investment in childcare is so important because it is an investment in human capital which is suppose to contribute later considerably to a country's growth (cf. http://vimeo.com/57637293#at=0, accessed in November 2013).

20 Available at: http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/social-protection/social-protection-tc,2154.html, accessed in November 2013.

involvement seems plausible. The IADB maps shows that the bank is active in every country in Latin America with technical cooperation and lending. The priority countries of the bank's actual involvement are Honduras, Colombia, Peru, and Uruguay. Furthermore, the activities are focused on El Salvador, Jamaica, Ecuador, Guyana, Brazil, Mexico and the Dominican Republic. Even though the major countries such as Mexico and Brazil don't seem to be priority countries any more because the Bank has not as many missions and active loans with these countries, I reported above that the IADB has supported those countries with considerably high loans of about one billion US dollar. For Mexico there is still to find information on the IADB's website about the actual financial involvement of the Bank in Mexico of about USD 600 million. As the bank says:

> "Ninety-eight percent of the loan's resources will finance payments to beneficiary households that receive transfers in exchange for meeting certain requirements, such as school attendance and medical checkups. […] Technical assistance will be provided for implementa-tion and evaluation of program improvements" (IADB Website 2013b).

Obviously the IADB still supports the development and extension of CCT programs and accompanies this process with technical assistance. Cognitive influencing backed up by stron financial incentives seems to be also here the way to go for this institution. The website even makes a clear statement about the banks support at the introduction of Mexico's program: "The IDB has supported *Oportunidades* since 2002. During this time the Bank has provided financing for the program with five loans totaling $3.8 billion" (ibid.). The IADB is an important player in this world region and seems to have contributed to the fact that social protection programs (including CCTs) have spread so much and so quickly in Latin America.

Finally, I think that it is interesting to see that very recently traces can be found that the IADB also engages in spreading CCTs beyond the Latin American region. The organization published a paper in 2013 with the telling title "Conditions for Success in Implementing CCT Programs: Lessons for Asia from Latin America and the Caribbean" (Paes-Sousa et al. 2013).

The Asian Development Bank

The Asian Development Bank works on Social Protection since 2001 (ADB 2003). Yet, the focus of the social protection agenda of the ADB is much more diversified than it was the case with the IADB. The components of what the ADB understands as social protection have not change since 2001:

> "ADB defines social protection as a "set of policies and programs designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability by promoting efficient labor markets, diminishing people's exposure to risks, and enhancing their capacity to protect themselves against hazards and interruption/loss of income." Five major elements comprise ADB's social protection strategy: labor markets, social insurance, social assistance, micro and area-based schemes, and child protection. Projects related to these five components are spread fully or partly across several sectors of ADB operations" (ADB 2011).

While social assistance is part of the social protection agenda from the beginning on the agenda is much larger. The focus of the ADB becomes clearer when one is looking at what the ADB listed as key priorities in 2001/3: improvement of the labor market, elimination of violations of Core Labor Standards, expanding the role of micro-finance, promoting the development of social funds, designing disaster preparedness programs, and increasing child protection programs (ADB 2003). With regard to social assistance and other non-contributory cash transfers the ADB has to admit: "Social insurance and social assistance are areas where the ADB has lesser expertise and, if any, interventions should be developed in close collaboration with strategic development partners" (ADB 2003: 56). In consideration of this openness towards programs the ADB's activities seem to be primarily driven by what the countries demand. Instead of promoting particular models or program ideas the ADB focused on two ares: contributing to the institutionalization of programs and monitoring the current state of activities within countries. With regard to the first focus the ADB sees its role to contribute to a program development that ensures adequate coverage (i), adequate targeting (ii), a sound financial management and good governance (iii), and adequate institutional arrangements with consistent integration among the programs (iv) (ADB 2003). The focus on the countries' own priorities is explicitly mentioned:

"ADB operations may appropriately include social protection lending and non-lending activities to serve country-specific needs. The proposed social protection policies should complement one another and help countries to meet their international commitments for poverty reduction and social development" (ADB 2003: 54).

Additionally, the ADB refers to UN commitments and global standards such as from the ILO. At all, the ILO represents an important partner of the ADB because of the bank's strong focus on the labor market in their social protection strategy (ADB 2011: 27). In later years the reference to the social protection floor became more prevalent. With regard to the second focus on monitoring, the ADB designed a 'Social Protection Index' for the Asian region (ADB 2013). As the Bank says this index is not designed to rank the countries but to take stock of what is in place and what could improve. The collected data shows that most of the programs in Asia are child welfare programs and social pensions come after disaster relief.

While this is the situation within countries, the ADB developed a strong interest in social pensions in recent years (ADB 2009, 2012). This is how the ADB sees the situation for older people:

"The growing aging population in developing Asia and the Pacific has significant consequences for providing social protection to the elderly. Social protection in the region has historically been weak and fragmented, and has mainly supported small segments of the population in the formal sector. Many older people do not receive pension support and rely on their families and informal social networks for survival. Yet the support provided by such networks is becoming less dependable in the face of rapid urbanization and modernization" (ADB 2012: xvi).

This was in so far not surprising to me that I know that HelpAge International has been pretty active in this region in recent years raising the account of social pensions and strengthening the perspective on the issues of older people.

Though it is not a particular focus of the ADB, the bank operates also with the CCT model and embraces fully the rationality of human capital (ADB 2010a). Yet, the institutions shows no clear preference for conditionalities on social cash transfers. If conditionalities are welcome then in most cases with regard to an educational condition. The bank is also well aware of the fact that conditional programs are

demanding with regard to necessary investments in schooling and health. In sum, I could not find a clear preference of the ADB.

Even though the statics of the ADB's lending activities and technical assistance seem to be very heterogeneous the bank claims to be primarily focused on social assistance:

"Of the five SP components, social assistance is the most preferred in the ADB SP portfolio. During the study period, the largest share of the total ADB lending, grants, and TA for SP went to interventions for social assistance. The lending assistance included welfare and social services to highly vulnerable sectors of the population, and cash or in-kind transfers such as CCTs in health and education" (ADB 2011: 29).

Finally, the ADB hold as well a few large conferences in the Asian region. In July 2009, the ADB held the Regional Workshop on Social Assistance and CCTs "to explore the use of conditional cash transfers and other social assistance programs in different country settings" (ADB 2010b: xxi). In April 2010, the ADB organized the 'Regional Conference on Enhancing Social Protection in Asia and the Pacific'. While the first conference was more about the World Bank's new model and described CCTs as a powerful tool to invest in human capital, the second conference was broader and attended by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the ILO, the OECD and UNICEF. The ADB described the 2010 conference as "a venue for sharing ideas about, benefits of, challenges in, and experience with developing and expanding social protection in Asia and the Pacific" (ADB 2010b: 1).

In sum, the ADB is another strong actor contributing to the diffusion of SCTs in the Asian region. The ADB primarily reacts upon countries' requests and priorities but also engages in the promotion of CCTs and social pensions, and puts with 2.3 billion (lending portfolio 1996-2008) a considerable amount of money behind this support, even though this lending is for a variety of measures and represent only 2.8% of the total lending portfolio. The statics on the ADB's lending however show an increase in 2006 and continuing onwards. This might represent the time social assistance became more important to the ADB. The following conferences in 2009 and 2010 can be seen as a contribution to raise the account for SCTs in the Asian region.

4.3. National Development Agencies: DFID and GIZ

National development agency (NDA) like the German 'Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit" (GIZ) and the "Department for International Development" (DFID) of the United Kingdom are additional player which can contribute to the diffusion of SCTs. Their main contributions are evaluations and bilateral cooperation. The cases have something in common: both were pioneers and at the forefront of SCT diffusion. The major difference however is that DFID supports SCTs explicitly while the GIZ set with the Kalomo SCT pilot project an early and well monitored example of SCTs in a developing context but was no promoter of SCTs and supported SCT development just indirectly via managerial support. The further analysis shows in more details what kind of program ideas these NDAs work on.

DFID: Department for International Development

DFID[21] is one of the most active NDAs supporting SCTs globally. The agency explicitly declares influencing as one of the NDA's main goals:

> "DFID's key objectives with regards policy influencing on ST/SP are to:
> – Influence international partners to gain greater commitment to the use of ST [social transfers] in the poorest countries including the re-focusing of SP [social protection];
> – Influence national governments and other donors to support ST and the development   of national strategic frameworks for SP" (Hickey et al. 2009: xii).

So, indeed DFID has two addressees: national governments and the international community. Especially in the international community their activities are widely recognized. As a global actor DFID operates around the globe and holds and participates in global conferences and is connected with other global actors in this

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21   DFID is since 2009 also known under the label 'UKaid', which was designed as a name to increase the visibility of the fact that the aid is payed and delivered by the United Kingdom.

regard. A most recent discourse analysis highlights DFID's 2005 publication "Social transfers and chronic poverty" as an important milestone for the international community, because it represents the first encompassing overview on SCTs (Gliszczynski 2015).

Nationally, DFID is focused on low- and middle income countries in Africa (DFID has 17 country offices in Africa), and partly in Asia (it has 5 country offices in Asia) (DFID 2013:2). It seems that this has to do with the former British colonies and the continuing responsibilities and cooperation the UK has with those regions. DFID's focus is interesting in so far that in the Latin American region where most of the activities for social protection are located DFID is not present. DFID argues for Africa as the main focus area because, first, after those programs become popular in Latin America they began to spread in Africa as well, and, second, because DFID's main business is evaluations and Latin American programs are already well monitored; the need for evaluations seems to be much higher in Africa. This is what DFID stats in a common project brief of DFID, UNICEF and the FAO:

> "Why Africa? Until recently, most evaluations of such programmes have taken place in Latin America. However, this is changing fast as CTs [cash transfers] gain traction in Africa, where most new CTs are accompanied by rigorous impact evaluations. Moreover, poverty reduction and inclusive growth strategies in Africa will require engagement with rural and agricultural development issues" (FAO, UNICEF, UKaid: undated flyer).

Additionally, the last sentence of this quote indicates that specialized know-how about African countries and low-income countries in particular is needed in order to design programs which reach rural areas. And, in this context DFID has already acquired a considerable amount of expertise.

When investigating in the question since when DFID engaged in the discussion on social protection and, even more interestingly, in the promotion of SCTs, then 2002 for 'social protection' and 2004 for SCTs can be found:

> "Since 2002, DFID has made increasing efforts to influence many of the governments who receive UK aid to adopt and implement social protection programmes, policies and strategies as a means of reducing vulnerability and poverty. From around 2004, this approach has come to focus on the specific promotion of social transfers, both as

an end in itself and as a means towards establishing broader social protection policies and strategies" (Hickey et al. 2009: xii).

While SCTs are a main component for DFID within the concept of social transfers, this actor has a much broader understanding of social transfers including food or asset transfers, public works, school feeding schemes, agricultural inputs packages (Davies 2009). Working in an African context it seems that this NDA has to be quite flexible on what to support and where to contribute know-how to. Of main interest to me was how DFID influences and provides expertise in detail.

First of all, it is not just to my impression very difficult to provide information about the amount of money DFID has in order to initiate pilot projects or to conduct evaluations:

> "It is difficult to quantify in precise terms the resources that DFID has expended in pursuit of policy influence on ST/SP. DFID's financial commitment to projects varies between £93m over 4 years in Ethiopia to £10m over the same length of time in Zambia" (Hickey et al. 2009: xiii).

The rough estimations show that the amount is considerably smaller than what the World Bank can offer. However, this money can be used primarily for evaluations and does not include any lending activities.

What is usually known from NGOs as a *modus operandi* does apply for DFID as well: DFID has adopted a 'project-based' approach to its influencing work on cash transfers and social protection (ibid.). In general, this is not a good precondition for influencing activities on a long term basis. Fortunately, DFID sets up country offices which can maintain communication and influence from one project period to another. The 2009 report claims that due to the work performed by the country offices and DFID's persistence with regard to social transfers is a reason why DFID became 'alongside the World Bank as the most significant player in this field':

> "DFID country offices and their advisors, with the support of other donors and DFID headquarters, have directly help achieve some of the outcomes listed above [development of national strategies; budgetary commitments; raising awareness; piloting ST schemes], most notably through strategically positioning itself as a lead donor in this field, helping to establish new policy spaces through which social transfers and social protection could be discussed and promoted, providing high-

quality evidence and technical assistance on critical issues relating to social transfers and social protection in a timely and responsive manner, and through its persistence with this focus as a priority area for several years. High-calibre DFID advisors in country offices have been critical to this process" (Hickey et al. 2009: xi).

Here, DFID claims to be successful on influencing national policy-making through positioning itself, and by providing evidence and technical assistance. So, what kind of evidence is DFID delivering through evaluations? DFID reports about four areas it works on, which are targeting (to assure appropriate targeting minimizing inclusion and exclusion errors), implementation (by pointing out factors important for the development of an appropriate implementation plan), costs (e.g. to calculate the costs per unit of transfer), governance (strengthening accountability and minimizing leakages) (DFID 2012: 16). In understand the delivery of knowledge (evidence and evaluations) as the main instrument to influence. Similar to HelpAge using cognitive influencing by being a 'hub of knowledge', DFID is described as a 'knowledge interface' what basically is a synonym.

"Acting as a knowledge interface: DFID has achieved its most significant levels of influence through acting as an interface between key stakeholders and the wider evidence base on ST/SP" (Hickey et al. 2009: xvii).

What is DFID going to achieve with being a knowledge interface/ hub of knowledge? As I mentioned, DFID is very ambitious with regard to influencing. Thus, it might not surprise that one of the main aims of expertise delivery is to create political will and to form a 'constituency for change':

"Building political support will require an analysis of the social and political forces for and against change. Based on this analysis, reformers can assess any existing momentum for change and draw up plans to build support for specific reforms or initiatives, identifying allies and putting in place arguments and incentives to bring opponents on-side, particularly those in the middle class. The aim should be to construct a ''constituency for change'' in favour of social transfers" (DFID 2005: 24).

A strategy to better deliver knowledge is the combination of evaluations and pilot projects:

"One common means of creating a constituency for change is to build the evidence base by implementing a small pilot programme. This was important in developing a political consensus in favour of some of the Latin American conditional cash transfer programmes. It is also a key motive behind the pilot cash transfer programmes that have recently been initiated with support from UNICEF in Kenya and GTZ in Zambia" (DFID 2005: 25).

In some cases, like in Kenya, the pilot projects and the supporting evaluations specifically aim at replacing preexisting emergency food aid programs with social cash transfer programs:

The Hunger Safety Nets Programme (HSNP) is a pilot social protection project. The HSNP is intended to reduce dependency on emergency food aid by sustainably strengthening livelihoods through cash transfers. Monitoring and evaluation aims to inform programme scale-up as well as the government's social protection strategy more generally" (DFID 2012: 6).

Pilot projects to provide good examples of how SCTs work and look like when implemented is one strategy. Delivering support for reforms through know-how accompanies this strategy. As I described above, evidence can be used to win strategically relevant partners in order to form an alliance of supporters within the government. A strategy to ensure that a country continues its road towards SCT-implementation is to develop with governments strategic frameworks and national strategies:

"One way of setting out national commitments to social transfer programmes is within a strategic framework – such as the national social protection strategies that many countries are currently developing – which is then incorporated into the PRS [Poverty Reduction Strategy]. Once plans for social transfer programmes are included within national strategic plans, such as the PRS, donor funding for these programmes could be most effectively provided through the national budget as poverty reduction budget support (PRBS), as long as countries are deemed eligible for this type of funding" (DFID 2005: 26).

What becomes even more clear in this quotation is that nationals are important prerequisites for country to access external funding from donors which in recent

years to a growing extend decided to deliver funding for projects rather indirectly through general budget support. In this way the governments ability and responsibility to take care for the implementation of the program should be strengthened ('country ownership'). Thus, it is an incentive for countries to develop such strategies and to 'commit' themselves to achieve certain development goals.

For all this strategies DFID faces the same difficulties than HelpAge, which is that it rather has the social ministries as its counterparts than the financial ministries. In this regard DFID makes use of the fact that SCT implementation concerns not just one but many ministries. DFID tries to target stronger ministries first:

> "Since transfers cut across the work of various ministries – such as food security, health, education, HIV/AIDS, and OVCs – good co-ordination among ministries, as well as non-state actors such as NGOs, is essential. Often, the ministries responsible for traditional social assistance programmes – such as ministries of social welfare – are relatively weak, with little influence over other ministries. Given the cross-cutting nature of social transfers, consideration should be given to locating strategic responsibility in a more powerful ministry, such as finance, the presidency, or a major sectoral ministry. Once established, responsibility could be transferred to a potentially weaker ministry" (DFID 2005: 26).

What are difficulties DFID has to deal with when trying to apply those strategies? Well, first of all it is interesting that DFID thinks about SCT implementation as a long term project. That makes in particular sense with regard to the African context DFID operates in:

> "In poor countries with limited experience of social transfer systems, the capacity to administer and deliver transfers is likely to be weak in the early stages of implementation. A too-rapid introduction of social transfers could overwhelm local capacity and undermine broader civil service reform initiatives. Many large and successful social transfer programmes, such as Progresa and Bolsa Familia, started as small initiatives in specific geographic locations. They were gradually expanded as interest was generated and lessons were learned. The same model should be followed in weaker institutional contexts" (DFID 2005: 27).

Another difficulty is the delivery of support for particular SCT programs through the general budget which strengthens country ownership, but includes as well uncertainties how well the country might handle the implementation process:

> "Even where donor support for social transfers will be delivered through the government budget, it may be necessary to put in place a complementary programme to strengthen the institutions that will manage and deliver the transfers" (DFID 2005: 27).

Finally, I found an interesting quotation which indicates that DFID did not so well with its strategy to target ministries higher up the internal hierarchy of ministries. Instead, DFID seem to still communicate primarily with the social ministries:

> "DFID has been less successful in building productive relationships with more powerful political and policy actors, including parliamentarians, high-level political leaders, and those within the more powerful ministries of finance and planning" (Hickey et al. 2009: xvi).

This casts doubt in how far DFID was success in 'coalition formation' for SCT implementation. With a few SCT projects in Africa, the diffusion process can assumed to be pretty difficult and cumbersome.

In sum, this section shows that DFID is an ambitious actor with a clear focus on the African and the Asian region. It supports SCTs since 2004 and has a strong voice internationally able to spread knowledge among global actors and rising the account for SCTs. Nationally, cognitive influencing is the dominant mode. Evaluations, with or without pilot projects, are used to convince policy-makers and to provide them with the necessary knowledge to start implementing. Additionally, it is seems to be DFID's main strategy to get SCTs into country strategy plans and to initiate a tedious political process. Yet, DFID seems to be tenacious enough to achieve results with this strategy on a long-term basis.

GIZ: Gesellschaft für internationale Zusammenarbeit

After a recent change of the organization's name from 'Deutsche *Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit*' (GTZ) to 'Deutsche *Gesellschaft für Internationale*

Zusammenarbeit' (GIZ) I use both acronyms here interchangeably according to whether I refer to a time before 2011(GTZ) or after (GIZ).

The German NDA was one of the pioneers with regard to social cash transfers. However, that does not mean that the GIZ is a particular strong advocate of SCTs. In fact, it is not. Whereas other global actors have a policy preference in favor of SCTs because they regard it a in particular effective to overcome 'chronic poverty', which is passed over from one generation to another without much opportunities to change this vicious circle in between; for the GIZ SCTs are one instrument among others and not even among the most favored instruments.

Interestingly, this actor shows that the description of NDAs as global actors is not just a scientific one but part of the organizations self-description as well. With about 90 offices around the globe and more than 16.000 staff the GIZ operates in about 130 countries and describes itself as a 'global player' contributing to improvements in program management, know-how provision, and solution development (GIZ Website 2013a; 2013b; 2013c). The contributions this actor makes are well reflected in its name as an actor for 'technical and international cooperation'. Technical aspects are of main concern for this actor; instead of advocacy for particular policies. Yet, among many technical aspects the GIZ lists also 'political support' within a country as a crucial precondition for program extension. Among the instruments of the GIZ one can find also such which are especially used on order to stimulate political support. The main instrument to achieve that are pilot projects. Nevertheless, I found no indicator showing that there is any main strategy behind such activities of advocacy, or that any policies are systemically favored above others. It is important in this regard to mention, that the GIZ (like many other NDAs) contracts out most of the country projects and rather provides funding. The GIZ mentions on its website that 70% of its staff are employed locally as national personnel (GIZ Website 2013b). Individual policy consultants applying for funding from the GIZ can influence quite a lot how particular programs can look like. This takes away quite some agency from the GIZ, but is an interesting mechanism which allows new policy ideas to emerge and become an element of the organization portfolio of supported policies.

The GIZ's support for SCTs began as a pilot project in Zambia (Kalomo District) developed by a single policy consultant, Bernd Schubert (cf. Von Gliszczynski 2015: 55-60). This was one of the very first SCTs and the Kalomo pilot project marks a starting point in the global policy diffusion wave of SCT programs. Yet, this program is a specific type of SCT which fits very well to the GIZ in so far that

it focuses on the 'poorest of the poor'. A program with such a focus fits very well to the GIZ's human rights approach which is a systemic approach committed to fight the worst forms of poverty. Bernd Schubert developed a SCT model which focuses on the poorest 10% in a developing country. Working primarily in the African region Schubert was well aware that countries in this region have very high levels of poverty. According to him a full-fledged SCT program would overburden the country with costs (Schubert Interview). Thus, the 10% approach is designed on the basis of food poverty measured in calorie intake. He discerns four groups: (A) those people in poverty who can afford two meals a day and are able to work (called 'viable poor'), (B) those who can afford two meals a day but are unable to work (called 'unviable poor'), (C) those how can only afford one single meal a day but are able to work, and (D) those who only can afford a single meal a day or less and are also unable to work (GTZ 2005: 17). SCTs according to this 10% approach are supposed to a cash benefit to lift the people in category D from a 1.400 calorie-intake a day (or less) up to a 1.800 calories-intake a day.

This is a low-budget-program to prevent just the worst forms of poverty. The GIZ embraced this model also because the German development aid is pretty strong guided by the credo 'providing help for self-help'. The direct provision of benefits was at the beginning of the 2000s considered to contradict this credo because a direct delivery of benefits is prone to create dependency of the recipients and being a disincentive to work. Only support for the 'unviable poor', who cannot help themselves and suffer of starvation, can be considered to be a help for self-help. Independent from the GIZ Bernd Schubert visited many countries in Africa and convinced the governments to implement this 10% approach.

The GIZ can hardly be considered to be a major supporter of SCTs because it has not pushed or advocated this 10% approach as a model. Yet, retrospectively the GIZ is well aware and proud of the fact that in 2002 with the Kalomo pilot project the NDA pioneered cash-based social protection programs:

> "The design of basic social protection programmes is a relatively new area for international development cooperation that has gained momentum through the initiatives of the World Bank, ILO and DfID. GTZ, as one of the pioneers, decided to acquire expertise in this largely unexplored field." (GTZ 2007: 1)

Due to the fact that the GIZ is a well respected actor in the development community the early support for a SCT program might have contributed to the consolidation of

SCTs as a potential program innovation that could be used to tackle poverty in developing countries.

As already mentioned, the emergence of the topic SCTs was due to Bernd Schubert. All the reports after the introduction of the Kalomo pilot project in 2002 were written by him (Schubert 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; 2004a; 2004b). And even in 2005 the GIZ commissioned reports which showed no clear direction to go. Bernd Schubert continued to a advocate SCTs (GTZ 2005a), and provided an overview in what other global actors do in this regard (GTZ 2005b). At the same time the GIZ had staff working with the World Bank and, therefore, has a report on CCTs as well (GTZ 2005c). An another report of the GIZ discusses under the title 'social protection systems' exclusively programs in the health system (GTZ 2005d). All this is far from any clarity about the direction to go in the field of social protection.

Instead, the GIZ is much influenced by the policy ideas and rationalities of other global actors; mostly the ILO and the World Bank. Therefore, it is not puzzling to find the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), which funds and awards contracts to the GIZ, saying that "at multilateral level, it is above all the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Bank and the regional development banks that play a decisive role in promoting social protection" (BMZ 2002: 4).

The GIZ follows basically the World Bank's neo-liberal rhetoric conceptualizing SCTs as an investment in human capital. With reference to the World Bank the GIZ report of 2005, which is a feasibility study on CCTs in Madagascar, emphasizes "high cost-effectiveness", the "stimulation of the local economy", "growth promotion" and "the combination of reducing poverty in the short run while building a long term human capital" (GTZ 2005c). The report is very positive about the CCT model and does not critically reflect on it. The core problem that CCTs might not be transferable to low income countries because basic infrastructures, such as schools and hospitals are not in place, and the bureaucratic costs for the monitoring of the compliance with imposed conditions are high, have not been discussed. Additionally, the GIZ shares with the World Bank the focus on the mitigation of 'extreme poverty'. Further fact sheets and summary paper in the years after 2005 almost exclusively refer to CCT programs as envisioned by the World Bank. CCTs are the type of SCT programs the GIZ supports the most.

Furthermore, one can see the influence of the ILO when the GIZ speaks "a basic floor of social protection" which seems to be "affordable not only in middle-income countries, but also in low-income countries". The ILO's floor concept comes

handy for the GIZ because it reflects the same variety of policies that is supported by the GIZ.

> "Basic social protection is not a static construction, but is tailored to the individual needs of a country and can consist of **various instruments:** [1] **social cash transfers** such as social pensions, social assistance transfers, child grants and conditional cash transfers tied to school attendance, vaccination of toddlers etc. [2] **in-kind transfers** such as free waivers for health services, scholarships and waivers for school fees, food aid, school-meal programmes, free health checks for infants, etc. [3] **public works** such as cash or food for work programmes for households with a degree of self-help potential." (GTZ 2007: 1; original emphasis).

As shown above the GIZ works on several issues concerning social protection. With the increasing prominence of SCTs for other global actors the importance of SCTs increases accordingly for the GIZ. So crucial questions remaining are: In which regions has the GIZ been active? And, what is the GIZ's contribution with regard to SCTs?

Fortunately the BMZ showed in a presentation in 2012 a map with the information in which countries the Germany contributes to the development of social protection programs (figure 5). The figure shows that the GIZ is active in Sub-Saharan Africa and parts in Asia. However, due to the many issues the GIZ works on with regard to social protection, the majority of programs might not be about SCTs. Furthermore, the map does not show all of those activities which date back further. For example, in two cases the GIZ has supported the implementation of CCT programs in Latin America – in Paraguay and in El Salvador (GTZ 2008a; 2008b). Those two cases show that the GIZ contribution is not a strictly goal-orientated process in order to achieve the implementation of SCTs. Instead the GIZ is contributing to certain aspects of SCT program development and implementation. While in El Salvador the GIZ has organized a conference to stimulate South-South-Cooeration, the organization has in Paraguay supported the training of national staff and optimized operational planning. In the following I explain on what general aspects the GIZ works.

Figure 4 "Global GIZ Operations on Social Protection"

Source: Attachment in BMZ Protocol 2012 (BMZ 2012)

In general, the GIZ numerates three preconditions for SCT policy implementation at national level: 1. political will, 2. administrative capacity, 3. financial resources (GTZ 2005a: 3). The GIZ however seems to contribute mainly with regard to point number two, because despite a few pilot projects I haven't found many indicators that the GIZ much involved in advocacy, and with regard to financial resources the GIZ points out the importance of having programs payed out of the general national budget. Technical assistance for capacity building is the main business of the GIZ. Thus, I see the GIZ's contribution more in the expansion and scaling-up of already existing program projects. This is were the GIZ's know-how would be needed most. As said by the GIZ: "Such ambitious expansion of the programmes over just a few years calls for a well-developed system of implementation, effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms, and well-trained experts" (GTZ 2008c: 2). For this process the GIZ contributed the following support services within the scope of technical consultancy and capacity development: "process-oriented programme-expansion, establishment and development of decentralized monitoring and evaluation capacities, promotion of regional exchanges, and strengthening of South-South cooperation in the area of basic social protection" (ibid.).

In sum, the GIZ was an important pioneer for the global discussion on SCTs in 2001 and after. From the year, 2005 onwards the GIZ became most influenced by

the World Bank's CCT model. Without any own ambitions the GIZ supports certain aspects of SCT implementation at national level. Instead of pushing for any kind of model, the GIZ supports managerial aspects as well as South-South-Cooperation.

Conclusion on Other Global Actors' Support on SCT Diffusion

Different world regions have been influenced by different global actors. While the World Bank and HelpAge International have truly worked in all regions of the Global South, other actors have been more focused to particular regions. While in Latin America the World Bank and the IADB have been strong promoters of SCTs (primarily CCTs), which provided funding and facilitated exchange of ideas within the region, in Asia the ADB supported this process and in Africa it was a national development agency, namely DFID, which is also active in parts of Asia. The German GIZ has not promoted SCTs but contributed to the process of exchange of ideas (South-South-Cooperation) and the managerial aspects of scaling-up processes in Africa as well as in Asia. All of these organizations were intrigued by the World Bank's CCT model. Just in Asia I found the organizations more critical and flexible on the conditionality aspect and promoting social pensions as well. In this regard, I want to reiterate that HelpAge is very active in the Asian region and held large regional conferences. In the same way the ILO has a strong presence in the Asian region. This IGO framed the social protection floor concept which anchored SCTs within a global framework in 2012 and is since used as a reference for many global actors. I would go so far to say that the ILO managed to establish a new world cultural norm, which summarizes the global consensus among IOs that had emerged during the 2000s..

Part III
Discussion of the Results and Conclusion

Chapter 5: Discussion of the Findings

This chapter highlights the findings of this study from two perspectives: one perspective uses research and research design (policy-cycle model) and another perspectives compares the findings to empirical quantitative data (global diffusion waves).

Concepts highlights: The study has employed three basic categories of diffusion activities of IOs: a) *advocacy* – with policy models and conferences at its heart, b) *advice* – which basically is technical advice, and c) *incentives* – which are non-knowledge-based 'carrot and stick' instruments, such as money/lending and political influence. These instruments and categories have turned out to be relevant for this study and can serve further actor-centered studies on policy diffusion as well. Chapter 5.1 applies these instruments to the concept of the policy cycle, in order to show what policy stage the instruments are part of. Similar to the notion of the domestic policy cycle policy diffusion can be conceptualized in different phases. Mitchel Orenstein uses a basic distinction of three phases: policy development, policy transfer and policy implementation. Only if IOs are involved into all these three phases a diffusion process would qualify as a case of *global* social policy diffusion (GSP). This chapter shows how the instruments I found fit such cycle of a policy diffusion model to demonstrate how the findings here can be used in the light of other concepts such as the policy cycle, which was designed to bring conceptual clarity to rather complex and intertwined processes.

Quantitative empirical highlights: This analysis has focussed on the activities of global actors without having shown in how far these activities have led to real change in national policies. It has been mentioned that in many cases policy change has taken place, and that global actors have been involved in the process, but causality in a strict sense has not been shown. Many factors play a role in policy-making so that it is difficult to identify causal factors. Often the success of a diffusion process is dependent on reaching a tipping-point, and on the opening of windows of opportunity, like economic crises or a public uproar in the media or in the society. By taking quantitative number on the introduction of SCT programs I can contextualize

the qualitative findings of this study and see in how far global actors' activities have accompanied processes of policy-diffusion.

Global policy diffusion is not about single events taking place in one particular country. Instead policy diffusion becomes most obvious when multiple countries at different stages of economic development implement a similar policy in a short period of time. A global trend usually is visualized by graphs that show the number of adopting countries in a wave- or a S-pattern (see figure 5). This wave- or S-pattern is determined by a few innovative early-bird-countries, by more and more countries joining in as followers and some late-comer countries which had hesitated to implement the policy. Chapter 5.2 takes into account the number of countries which have adopted CCT or social pensions policies in each year between 1950 and 2012. The trend pattern and the tipping points of each wave have been indicated.

Figure 5

Based on Rogers, Everett (1962) Diffusion of innovations. Free Press, London, NY, USA.

Type a) bell-shaped trend pattern >> non-accumulated numbers

Type b) S-shaped trend pattern >> accumulated numbers

5.1. Global Actors' Policy Instruments in a Global Policy-cycle

To apply the concept of the policy cycle, which is originally designed for domestic policy processes, to the global level is not unthinkable, yet, it is even more difficult to maintain the notion of phases of this 'cycle' because so many influences and so many actors interact. The nation-state might try to implement a policy reform of some former programs, while an international forum just develops a new standard in this field, while a global actor is transferring its already developed concepts to the national level, and a national coalition of veto players is trying to stop this national reform. Who of these actors is in what stage of a 'global policy-cycle'? How can so many diverse influences of all kind of different actors from multiple levels be merged together to get out something like a sequential policy-cycle? I found this model not applicable for this study and rather focussed on policy instruments and how they have been used by one particular type of actor: international organizations. Yet, in the end I discuss the results in terms of a policy-cycle model to show how the results can be applied for other concepts. Besides demonstrating applicability the policy -cycle provides conceptual clarity by unravelling the complexity, the policy-cycle demonstrates that this diffusion process is part of the discipline Global Social Policy (GSP), and this concepts discovers new aspects for further investigations and studies complementing the empirical findings outlined in this study.

The policy-cycle model from GSP has been chosen because it seemed to be an appropriate tool to capture also more complex qualitative findings. While the complexity of multiple factors in a policy diffusion process seems to be acknowledged in the literature (Rogers 2003; Brooks 2004; Elkins & Simmons 2005; Weyland 2005; Berry & Berry 2007; Sugiyama 2011), it has often been a challenge to integrate the factors in an meaningful way. As a result, many studies have ended up in a quantitative study where multiple factors have been integrated into multivariate event-history-analysis. Such studies have corroborated the impact of global factors like the presence of international organizations in a developing country or the number of ratifications of international treaties and covenants on the likelihood of the implementation of a particular (global) policy model in a country.

This chapter builds on the qualitative research findings of this study and discusses them within a basic phase model. Scholars from GSP operate with a simplified policy-cycle model which is less about the the sequentiality of the phases than about the global actors' involvement in each of this phases. Orenstein defines global social policy by the involvement of global actors in each of the phases: "Global policies are those that are developed, diffused, and implemented with the direct involvement of global policy actors and coalitions at or across the international, national, or local levels of governance" (Orenstein 2005: 177). Thus, the categories are: policy development, policy transfer and policy implementation.

The guiding question for each category is similar:

a) *To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations – contributed to the development of the policy that has recognizably spread globally?* The definitions for 'global' are twofold: spacial and by reference to global actors. Often a laboratory country, which as innovated the policy first, is involved in the process of policy development. Yet, this policy has to become a model in some way in order to be picked-up easily by other countries. Where does this model come from?

b) *To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations – involved in the transfer of the policy that has recognizably spread globally?* While policy diffusion literature looks at the spread of a policy, which simply is the adoption of a similar policy by multiple countries in a narrow time-frame, the policy transfer can be driven by nation states as well as by global actors or both. It is to note that policy transfer could also be solely government-led without any involvement of global actors. The subsequent part of this chapter will show how difficult it is to identify the main drivers. Only an in-depth country case-study might provide a final answer to such a question.

c) *To what extent were global actors – especially international organizations – involved in the domestic implementation of the policy that has recognizably spread globally?* One could ask why policy implementation is a category at all. Cannot a policy only be considered as being 'transferred' if the policy has been implemented? Here the implementation is understood as an ongoing process exceeding the point of the initial policy adoption (cf. Orenstein

2005: 180). This understanding matches with my observation that the policy implementation in a developing context can take up to several years. Policy innovation are in a constant risk of being reversed or phased-out. From a policy introduction to an institutionalized program can be a long way.

In the following the findings of the empirical chapter will be discussed with reference to the categories developed above.

a) Policy Development

An in-depth analysis of how the ideas about Social Cash Transfers and particular models have been developed and spread within the global community has been provided by Moritz von Gliszczynski (2015) and also from the FLOOR project. The analysis here was not focussed on a discourse analysis to trace the roots of discursive elements and ideas. Based on a x-orientated research design this study has focussed on the activities of global actors. Interestingly, both actors (World Bank and HelpAge International) not simply refer to particular country programs as best-practice or make country-specific suggestions. Instead the World Bank as well as HelpAge International have developed their own policy models.

One might expect that the World Bank suggests a development path for a developing country's economy and leaves the development of concrete policies to the nation-states. In this picture the countries would design country initiatives and apply for funding from the World Bank. Instead the World Bank developed with Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) a policy model based on observations of policies of Social Cash Transfers in Brazil and built an abstract policy model out of it. This policy model is embedded in the World Bank's rhetoric and concepts of human capital and economic growth. Moreover, this policy fits perfectly to the World Bank's ongoing and already established support for education and health.

One might expect that the engagement of an non-governmental organization (NGO) in developing countries is focussed foremost on direct service provision. With the support of NGOs schools are build and lessons to children are hold, wells are drilled, food is distributed, and more. HelpAge International made early the experince that it is a much more effective way to improve the life of their target group, which are older people, by focussing on advocacy at global, regional, national and local level. To be most effective with its efforts HelpAge has developed a policy model of

universal social pensions (USP) which they advocated at global level and fed into the global discussions on Social Cash Transfers. By lobbying and collaborating with the United Nations (UN), HelpAge has established with USP a legitimized rights-based social policy model for developing countries. HelpAge can advocate social pensions in the Global South on all levels and directly with national policy-makers, because social pensions have become a UN policy concept.

What makes it so attractive for global actors to engage in policy development? I see clear benefits for global actors, which makes it understandable that IOs invest considerable resources (time and money) in order to engage in policy development. A first benefit of policy development can be that an organization has with such a policy clear policy goals for itself and might better be able to focus its activities of advocacy. Subsequently, an organization can provide a clear message towards others. Advocacy is then backed up by good arguments, because a policy model often is described as a policy solution and provides the problem definition in the same way. In such a way social facts might be (re-)defined as new social problems which might not even have been existed before. In this way a new awareness for social problems can be stimulated and the interest in a policy solution can increase. Finally, designed and developed in a particular way these policy models can enjoy a high level of legitimacy. Let me state three factors which also apply to the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and Universal Social Pension (USP) models.

First, legitimacy can increase when a policy model is based on rational arguments which resonate with values and norms that are already established in the international development community (cf. Strang and Meyer 1993: 490ff). Support flows from scientific evaluations and empirical evidence which demonstrate and argue for the policy model's effectiveness and functional value with regard to global norms like 'human capital', 'economic growth', 'development', 'social progress' or 'poverty reduction' (von Gliszczynski 2015). Both, the models of the World Bank and of HelpAge, argue scientifically and are based on empirical evaluations through pilot projects or 'laboratory countries'. For example has the World Bank proven that a cash transfer that is conditional on school attendance does decrease the number of absence days of schoolkids, and HelpAge has shown that a cash transfer to older people benefits empirically the poorest of the poor, because households with older people often belong to this group, and kids in the same way, because older people tend to be the main caregivers for children in countries where the middle-aged people have died to a significant extend due to HIV infections. All these arguments

make the policy models more legitimate and make it easier for policy-makers to pick up these policy innovations.

Second, the more a model is anchored at global level, within globally signed conventions or declarations of intend, and the more it is discussed among actors, on global or regional conferences or in publications, the more legitimate is the policy model. Again, both actors made use of this source of legitimacy. While the World Bank placed some major global events by holding large global conferences, HelpAge tried to get their model in UN conventions and 'translated it down' to the regional and then national level via conferences and workshops. Moreover, both actors created and published maps which give the impression that the particular model is already part of a global trend. The active discussion of the policy models among actors and the manifestation in conventions and publications substantiate those models and increase the legitimacy as well as it draws attention to those policy models.

Third, it has turned out that it has become less accepted in the developing community if policy models follow a 'one size fits all' approach and appear to be something like a panacea to certain problems disrespecting the individual particularities of each country. Terms like 'country ownership' have become important buzzwords in the international developing community. Thus, policy models would benefit from being cognitively open so that certain parameters of a policy model can be adapted to national contexts. The policy models of the two actors which have been analyzed in this study are both described as adaptable. The World Bank says explicitly that their CCT model should not be understand as a 'one size fits all' model. Instead the World Bank starts its advocacy with evaluations at country-level which 'test' in how far CCTs would make sense in this particular country context. Yet, it has been shown how the World Bank structures its argumentation so that the CCT policy model appears to be the recommendation with the best fit. HelpAge International instead is indeed much more flexible with their policy model. Instead of continuing arguing for and talking about universal social pensions, HelpAge drops in most cases to talk about the universality component and its rights-based approach appears solely in introductions of side-notes. Instead HelpAge points out all the parameters that can be adapted to the national level, like the age of eligibility for the cash transfer and the amount of the monthly benefit. This adaptability is supported by a calculation tool on HelpAge's website with allows policy-makers to calculate the design of a social pension with a particular national budget given. Making the policy models more responsive is an important further feature to increase legitimacy and the likelihood such policy models will be picked up at national level.

This section showed that the World Bank as well a HelpAge International have engaged in policy-making. They had good reasons to do so and they established their models in a way that gives them legitimacy from multiple sources so that one might classify the policy models of CCT and USP as world cultural material according to world society theory. The next section will discuss what it means for policy ideas if they become part of world culture in form of policy models. Moreover, I point out the manifold tools which those global actors have used in order to transfer their policy models to the national level.

b) Policy Transfer

As shown with this study: there is a rich variety of instruments for global actors to use in order to transfer their policies to the national level. There is first to clarify what is actually meant by a policy transfer. It can mean that global actors transfer a policy concept from the global to the national level, leaving open if the policy is actually adopted or if the policy-makers deliberately decided to reject the policy concept transferred to them. Yet, it seams that Orenstein had another concept in mind. He mentioned the 'initial adoption' of a policy for this phase. So the 'successful' delivery of a policy would mean that a policy truly has been transferred. Ideally a policy transfer is defined by a transfer of a concept which in some way played a role for policy-making at national level. If the relevance for policy-making is a criterion for the definition of a policy transfer, it brings a further aspect to light: a policy transfer can be led by global actors as well as from national policy-makers.

National governments can observe developments in other countries, in the development community or can be inspired from global conferences. They could return and initiate policy-making by transferring particular to national level. If they pick up a concept from global actors it would be a policy transfer where global actors have been involved in so far that they have developed the policy model. Thus, it is not a criterion for policy transfer, if governments or global actors have been the driving force begin a policy transfer. This autonomy of the nation-states and that policy transfer can be led from both ends, makes it even more difficult to measure global actors influence.

Moreover, it is to note that for the observation of a policy transfer, which is a concept traveling from A to B, the intentions of global actors does also not play a role. A policy can be transferred due to global actors' activities also it was completely

unintended. The intentional and strategic influencing of national states is no criterion for the observation of a policy transfer. Yet, it would be interesting to see how the activities of global actors come into play and if one can see strategic behavior shining through.

While policy transfer is a process that might happen around the world in multiple countries or not at all, I respond to policy transfer in so far that I pay attention to the sending-site which are the global actors. Each of their instruments can lead to policy transfer or not. The assessment if policy transfer has taken place would require to prove in individual cases if and in how far a policy adoption has taken place. As this was not matter of my analysis, the discussion of global actors' instruments in the section is discussed from the sending site.

Policy Models. The World Bank as well as HelpAge International have developed policy models. While the World Bank has made Conditional Cash Transfers with the abbreviation CCT popular in the development community by publishing books about CCTs and holding major events at global level, HelpAge has made its policy model of *universal* social pension not quite as popular. Even though the consensus in the global community for social pensions is high, the component of universality is debated and the abbreviation of USP would be rather unknown to the developing community. Instead HelpAge has lobbied and cooperated with the United Nations to turn older people into a subject of global policies and debates. To raise the awareness for older people as a particular vulnerable group which should be targeted by particularly designed policies is one major aim of HelpAge. Through the strategy of 'mainstreaming' HelpAge has lobbied international actors and conferences constantly in order to make older people a subject of debate. The second part of their strategy was the development of the social pensions model and to make this policy one of their most favored policies. By the strategy of 'packaging' HelpAge connected on the theoretical level social pension with all kind of topics, like healthcare and HIV/AIDS, childcare, social protection, poverty reduction and livelihoods and work. As a result multiple actors can understand social pensions as a topic which is of relevance for them as well.

I see the reasons for the different strategic approaches between these actors resulting from their different capabilities. While the World Bank is a global institution in itself, HelpAge is not. The World Bank can organized global events via conferences and flagship publications which attract a wide audience. HelpAge is not

able to create similar global events directly. Instead the INGO needs the reputation and influence of the United Nations.

Interestingly, both actors are driven by a 'mission' to spread their models. Many other actors do not develop or choose a favorite political policy which they would try to fed into the international community. Especially most non-governmental organization are driven by a more pragmatic approach which is much more country-led and focused on direct service delivery. I would not understand it to be a common mode of influencing for NGOs to target national policy-making. Yet, as a finding of this analysis both – the INGOs as well as the IGOs – have engaged in policy development to a similar extend.

As mentioned above, it is difficult to measure the influence of policy models and policy ideas. They can unfold an impact without any further involvement of global actors. How does that work? Well, learning at national level does not take place in a vacuum of ideas. There are always ideas, norms and institutions around that influence national decisions. If organizations engage in the process of global knowledge production to establish policy models they fill the cognitive and normative space with ideas which can be influential beyond being measured via direct influence. Instead multiple channels can carry a policy model from one place to another. Countries can pass knowledge from one to another, publications can be picked up by policy makers who look for inspirations and policy innovations to tackle particular social problems, and myriads of further actors – from big to small IGOs, and all kind of different INGOs, development banks, NDAs, think tanks and institutes, and individual policy consultants working on issues of social protection – carry elements and rationalities of policy models or rationalities those models are embedded in to the countries in the Global South. The impact of global actors' policy models is difficult to measure because their influence simply exceeds the range of activities driven by a particular actor.

Although the clear impact is difficult and expensive to measure, the benefit of analyzing qualitatively the activities of global actors on policy development and the activities involved in mainstreaming, packaging, publishing and developing policy models indicates in how far indirect processes of policy diffusion might have accompanied the direct attempts of global actors at national level.

The following instruments build up on the policy models and are about their diffusion in a more direct way, where the interaction of global actors and national governments stands in the foreground.

Conferences. In this study the *interplay of policy instruments* turned out to be important. Conferences are a tool to facilitate the spread of policy models. While it has been discussed above that policy models can have an effect on policy diffusion just by being out there in form of publications, one can assume a much higher probability for policy models to spread when global actors actively present and debate their policy models together with policy-makers or technical experts from developing countries. The World Bank as well as HelpAge International have made extensively use conferences in order to spread their models.

While the World Bank again makes use of being an institution in itself, it organizes its conferences as major events inviting a vast range of countries. The World Bank hasn't hold many conferences but only a few. Yet, they where encompassing in size and well received. Moreover, the audience increased with the third event massively. Besides these major events the World Bank supported multiple activities under the banner of 'South-South-Cooperation'. Many smaller conferences were hold with countries from the Global South participating. To involve their audience and to make the countries feel to be in charge of the diffusion process (buzzword: 'country ownership') is an important element of South-South-Cooperation.

HelpAge benefits from the United Nation System and the conferences and debates around the UN Madrid Conference on Aging (MIPAA) which was a major event at global level. While HelpAge celebrates this event as a huge success, it was 'merely' increasing the sensitivity for the topic of aging and older people as a target group of social policies. This is a huge step with regard to the former absence of any age-sensitive policies including older people as a target group which are in particular vulnerable and would need some extra attention and policies. Yet, the policy model of social pensions or universal social pensions was not mentioned. So HelpAge initiated follow-up events on all levels. Each event was one level closer to national decision-makers and more concrete and specific than the event before. The regional Livingstone conference, Social Policy Framework for Africa, and the Yaoundé call for action specified how appropriate social policies for older people would look like. Social pensions resulted as a clear policy advice from those conferences. This usage of a global UN framework for a sequence of follow-up events is what I have described as a strategy of 'translating down' policy ideas to the national level resulting in clear policy advice.

Both actors have conducted multiple conferences where particular policy models have been explained to policy-makers, which in turn could decide to consider them for policy making or not. One might neither expect policy-makers to start

implementing CCTs or social pensions right after such a conference nor that the ideas about new ways in policy-making have left no effect at all. At least new subjects for national discussions might have passed on; leaving aside the question if in the end those ideas have been rejected, implemented or used to modify existing programs.

Technical Advice. The delivery of technical advice do both actors consider as a *long term effort* in order to influence national policy making. While lending is traditionally the main activity of the World Bank, there are a lot of ongoing advice and discussions to find. The World Bank is in continuous country dialogue in order to assure that their lending is spend wisely and according to economic preferences. Countries publish their country strategies and action plans, and the World Bank answers with '*Country Assistant Strategy Papers*' (CAS).

The CAS and the World Bank's language would never entail explicit directives of what countries should do. Instead their directives are part of technical advice where the World Bank would assess a current national development and than make some suggestion emphasizing their effectiveness with regard to particular social indicators (e.g. school attendance). A recurrent policy advice of the World Bank is to phase out subsidy programs and use this money instead for the introduction of CCT programs.

For the introduction of pilot projects the World Bank offers funding through loans to the governments. While lending and pilot projects have turned out to be effective to get countries started, technical advice has been used to stabilize such projects. The Bank argues to develop social protection systems with CCT programs at its core, and to better institutionalize the current programs by improving its design, by scaling-up existing CCT programs, by improving their targeting and by founding new committees at national level. To support the institutionalization of CCTs the World Bank can use monitoring and evaluations, offer additional funding for that, and offers trainings to policy-makers in order to advise them how to improve the program's design. The World Bank presents itself as a premier source for expertise to improve CCTs targeting and through its reputation and privileged access to the governments and ministries of finance it can ensure that is technical assistance reaches its audience.

HelpAge International does not have such a privileged access to the government. Instead of having the influential financial ministries as their counterparts, HelpAge usually interacts with the social ministries. These ministries are usually

among the weakest in the governmental setting, so that it is important for HelpAge to win a broad coalition of policy-makers in order to be influential on policy making. Due to its *network structure* HelpAge is effectively anchored at national level with country offices. These offices are not newly set-up and steered by the London headquarter of HelpAge. Instead, already existing non-governmental organizations working on aging have become part of their network. They are supported by HelpAge and participate in global campaigns rolled out by HelpAge. These organization are well institutionalized and enjoy a high legitimacy at national level. In countries where such strong partners are missing HelpAge sets up its own branch offices. Through this network structure HelpAge is broadly connected with developing countries throughout the Global South.

Like the World Bank influences on a longterm basis with its country dialogue, HelpAge establishes informal longterm relationships to policy-makers, in particular the social departments. Through continuous lobbying, workshops and knowledge-sharing HelpAge establishes itself as a *hub of knowledge* which national policy-makers can use as a resource in order to get expertise and technical policy advice. In order to transfer its policy model to the national level, HelpAge tries to make allies with all kind of different players. In this way it might take years before HelpAge can effectively transfer its policy model. One approach of this long-term effort is to influence in stages. While some intellectuals and media can be convinced more easily to write articles and publish papers about a new policy, HelpAge tries to find allies among other INGOs and lobbies national parliamentarians in a further step. With such a support in its back, HelpAge can focus more on senators and to win particular national ministries. Often even with so many steps taken, successful influencing often is dependent on an initiating event. Among others, one factor for such a window of opportunity can be public demand. Therefore, in a final step HelpAge uses its close connection to its target group – the older people themselves – to organize protest and to actively work towards those windows of opportunity to open up.

The important point is that HelpAge holds close relationships to policy-makers and establishes itself as a hub of knowledge where policy-makers can turn to whenever technical expertise is needed. HelpAge focusses on best-practice sharing of information from countries which have introduced a social pension in one way or another. Moreover, HelpAge argues as well for social pension as a cost-effective instrument to implement SCTs in a country. In detail HelpAge is arguing for the

feasibility of social pensions and supports in a next step concrete expertise on how to set up the targeting of the policies.

The overview of instruments of how global actors actually *transfer* their policies to the national level showed that conferences and technical advice are used to change the *mindset* of national policy-makers so that they demand support for the implementation of global actors' policy models or the introduction of pilot projects in order to put those policy models to a test. It seems that influencing is a longterm process with two purposes. First, to transfer the whole argumentation and concepts connected with a particular model in order to chance a mindset. Second, it is far from sure that an introduced policy model with survive and become an institutionalized part of the national policy. Thus, technical advice helps to facilitate the expansion of programs and their survival. Advice on how to scale-up a program and technical analyses of the effectiveness of programs are crucial to finally transfer a policy to the national-level. Important to note that international organizations do not consider policy transfer as a one-time-delivery, but a as a longterm process which can take several years until a critical mass or a tipping point is reached and the policy model finally can be considered as being transferred.

c) Policy Implementation

While the transfer of a policy model and the rationalities connected with it is one thing, the implementation is another. Organizations might transfer policies as much as they want; their activities remain insignificant if they are not in one way or another appealing enough to be picked up and policy implementations begins.

As my analysis showed: both actors have their *mechanisms to kickstart* policy implementation. While the World Bank is making use of their financial capacities and is providing loans for pilot projects, HelpAge is making use of being deeply rooted to a national society and their target group, so they can organize political protest.

Part 2 of this analysis described the organizations' instruments which can serve as a strong incentive. The World Bank hast crucial funding and mentioned often in its Country Assistant Strategies the added value for countries to run a test-period and "try" particular policy models with a pilot project. The funding for such pilots would come from the World Bank. Especially in countries with high levels of poverty and minimal social protection programs in place it might be tempting to take

a pilot project on board, especially when there is so much buzz about social protection at global level. I doubt that behind every pilot project stands a full commitment of a developing country's government to implement a full-fledged social protection program. This would explain why the World Bank is so ambitious motivating national governments to scale-up there pilot projects. As mentioned above technical advice does play a crucial role in this regard.

HelpAge cannot kickstart policy implementation with vast amounts of money. Instead they focus on what they are good: lobbying and campaigning. The London Headquarter does play a key role in designing HelpAge's campaigns. The topics for their campaigns are based on and are deeply integrated into international policies. By doing so, it is assured that national policy-makers can understand the claims which are made within those campaigns. Policy-makers have heard about the topics before when they have discussed them in international forums and, moreover, have in most cases also committed themselves through international conventions to bring particular policies on their way in oder to increase social protection for its citizens. The need for governments to act in this regard comes from all level: from international commitments, from the socio-economic conditions which manifest at local level and from the lobbying of HelpAge at national-level. Yet, where is the initializer to trigger political actions? Each of this influences can trigger national policy-making, but I found politically protest of older people an in particular visible influence which is focussed on policy-making because it is about groups of older people make their claims towards the government. HelpAge does support and organize those protest through campaigning. In HelpAge's terms, older people have been a in particular neglected social group and to give voice to their needs is one of HelpAge's main aims. And indeed, the political protest seems to have its effect as officials from HelpAge told me. It is not that politicians immediately start working on social policies after such political protests, but the protest stimulate a political discussion. HelpAge does use this protest as a momentum to start working with government officials on policy making in oder to present results when the protest rise up again in the next year. In this regard it seems to be an important feature of those protest that they are not organized once a year, but annually.

As I mentioned in the section above on policy transfer, it is important to understand the interplay of the instruments of international organizations. Policy transfer can be somewhat toothless and rely on goodwill, curiosity, obligations, innovations or the inherent necessity to act. While those are good reasons to assume that the activities of international actors can bear fruits at national level, the strong

incentives those organizations can set to kickstart policy implementation might be interesting activities complementing the other instruments.

Moreover, an understanding of the interplay is so important because the incentives of funded pilot projects as well as of political protest can not be sustainable without the further instruments, which are here: technical advice; delivered by HelpAge establishing itself as a hub of knowledge accompanying the political protest and delivered by the World Bank through workshops, 'Analytical and Advisory Assistance' (AAA) and positive evaluation studies accompanying pilot projects.

Conclusion

The analytical framework of to Mitchell Orenstein has been applied in order to show in how far global actors have been involved in each phase of policy diffusion. According to Orenstein, only an involvement in all three phases would qualify the diffusion of CCTs and social pensions as a case of Global Social Policy.

Moreover, I wanted to demonstrate the an analysis of instruments easily can be applied to other analytical concepts in order to make use of the empirical observations. An in-depth discourse analysis would dig deeper into the ocean of policy development (von Gliszczynski 2015) and the development of a large database of national policies would shed light on the variety and similarities of national policies (see the database FLOORCASH of all countries in the Global South, e.g. Weible, *forthcoming*, for pensions Böger 2013). Moreover, country case studies would reveal how far the activities of global actors have led to domestic policy innovations and policy change.

With the current analysis of policy instruments, all phases of this global policy cycle have been touched. This should have made clear that though all the activities of international organizations can be seen and analyzed as quite separate from each other, yet the effects on policy diffusion come best to light when the activities are put into perspective and are understood as supporting each other. The interplay of the instruments is what provides international organizations with the ability to be influential, and the interplay helps to explain that the role of IOs in the field of SCTs indeed a full case of GSP in Orenstein's sense, that is, IOs are active in all three phases that constitute GSP. The story of international actors' influence is simply not a monocausal one.

Finally, for all phases of a global policy cycle the importance of *knowledge* was highlighted as an influential factor; whether it was the appeal of policy models from the phase of policy development; or the role of technical advice and conferences as a distributor of policies and concepts in the phase of policy transfer; or the importance of evaluations, evidence studies and technical know-how accompanying pilot projects and development of the design of national policies. It is hard to overlook the importance of knowledge at the interface of international organizations and nation states.

5.2. Examining Quantitative Data of Waves of SCT Policy Diffusion

My analysis has shown a considerable amount of global actors' activities in the field of social protection policies. Another question of interest would be to identify in how far quantitative data substantiates that global actors have been influential at national level, even though my research is not about the proof of causality but rather about to show what kind of actors' activities one can measure. I consider this part a reflection upon these activities in order to contextualize it with quantitative data. This information might help to better evaluate not just with what instruments global actors contributed to the diffusion of SCTs but also indicates in how far they might have contributed to real policy change at national level.

There are two potential categories where policy change can come from: 'above' or 'below'. If policy change comes from 'above', the governments have learned from neighbor countries or have adapted to global norms or have been advised and motivated by global actors. If policy changes comes from 'below' governments rather react to observed socio-economic problems within their countries or react to protests from affected social groups within the society. However, the next quotation from DFID supports the overall impression that the spread of SCTs in the Global South is rather a 'revolution from above' than result of local movements.

> "Building this political will may be a significant challenge, particularly in poor countries with little experience of successful social welfare systems. The excluded and vulnerable are often politically weak and find their interests absent from or not prioritized in poverty reduction strategies and national plans. Governments are more likely to respond to citizens and interests that have a stronger voice. And those whose interests are well served by the status quo may resist change if they perceive that it will not benefit them. Meeting the needs of the poorest may, in some cases, be regarded as a waste of resources, mistakenly understood as diverting the state from its key tasks of promoting growth and increasing access to social services" (DFID 2005: 14).

The situation might not be as dramatic as DFID says here, because national agendas have changed since. Yet, it might be true that this is not due to the influence of social pressure coming from the society. HelpAge is among the pioneers to activate the potential of social groups' influence. The formation of Older People Associations (OPA) as social movements and political protest in developing country is a rather recent development. And even in this case it is not that the recipients are being directly influential, it needs HelpAge as an organization form outside to stimulate and guide this movement and to mediate between the government and the older people protesting. It seems that governments have chosen to implement SCT policies for reasons beyond the need for action stemming from unfavorable social indicators alone. But have global actors contributed to this spread? In this section I show in how far patter of policy diffusion waves may substantiate such assumptions. Yet, the quantitative data alone will not show causes und and will also not uncover the activities and processes that have stood behin policy adoptions. Therefore I take the findings of this study into consideration in order to find explanations for policy diffusion pattern.

What diffusion pattern of the tow models conditional cash transfers and (universal) social pensions can be identified? In the following I show some charts that put the activities of global actors into perspective. Indeed, the graphs suggest that global actors have contributed to the diffusion of those programs, even though further factors might have contributed as well. Yet, it seems that a lot of policy adoption was driven by the countries itself. Let me explain that in detail based on quantitative data.

The FLOOR Project (Bielefeld University) from which this study stems, also collected country data on virtually all major SCT programs in all countries of the Global South (main researcher Kathrin Weible, supported by Tobias Böger and John Berten). This database served to be the raw material for the construction of graphs about the diffusion of CCT programs and social pensions. The graphs were constructed on the basis on program introductions at national level. It was counted whenever a country introduced a national program, either a CCT or a social pension. Some countries appear twice in the graph because the first program for example was phased out and another national program was introduced.

Graph 1: Accumulated number of adopted CCTs in the Global South

Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B

(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)

'Graph 1' shows that before 1996 almost no CCTs exist. This changed within two years when a small number countries introduced some CCT programs. From 2000 until 2004 a first trend is visible and the number of CCT programs doubled. Then, from 2004 onwards there is a strong trend towards CCT programs, happening in two waves; first 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010. Moreover, the trend for CCTs is still continuing.

Overall, the spread of CCTs can be characterized as a significant trend gaining momentum in 2000 and speeding up after 2004. These years fall together with landmarks. In 2000 there are to mention the Millennium Development Goals and a new spirit in the global development community. Moreover, the World Bank began advocating CCTs via cognitive influencing and in some countries via financial incentives. From 2004 on the World Bank advocated CCTs more dominantly via normative influencing. Lending activities and cognitive influencing became more pronounced. The quantitative data provide a degree of plausibility that the World Bank might have played quite an important role for the diffusion of CCTs.

Yet, to be strict the World Bank's CCT model is on the normative level less about scholarships but about CCT programs with an education and a health conditionality. However, in 44,6% of the cases the diffusion was about scholarships.

In 42,9% were about full-fledged CCT programs, and a minority of 12,5% programs had only a conditionality on health. This data reflects the heterogeneity at national level. It is interesting to note that in almost half of the cases CCT diffusion was not about the model which the World Bank advocated after 2004. That means that if the World Bank was influential in this diffusion process the quantitative data would show that after 2004 CCTs with both conditions (on health and education) significantly increased. 'Graph 2' confirms the World Bank's influence partly. The trend-curve looks very similar to the one shown above. The main difference is that the trend for CCT programs with both conditions started later. From 2000 on CCT programs according to the World Bank model began to spread with two recognizable waves from 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010 similar to 'graph 1'. So, 2004 is the start for the main diffusion wave for CCT programs in general and the Bank's favored model. This is substantial evidence for the World Bank's influence.

The next step makes a similar analysis for the spread of HelpAge's model of social pensions. Again, I would need to evaluate the data according to all kind of social pensions to show the general trend and, subsequently, an evaluation of the spread of HelpAge's in particular favored model of universal social pensions.

Graph 2: Accumulated number of adopted CCTs (both conditionalities) in the Global South

Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B

(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)

The first thing that meets the eye by looking at 'graph 3' is that social pensions have a much longer history. Social pensions have been present in a small number of countries throughout the 20th century. The first program we found was introduced in 1928 in South Africa. The graph shows that social pension, or rather non-contributory pensions (because the term was not yet framed), began to spread in the 1970s. The phase of 1970 to 1990 can be considered the introductory phase. The 1990s show a significant trend-curve until 2000. Since 2000 the diffusion of social pensions skyrocket. The graph displays an impressive and still continuing trend with a diffusion three times faster than what happened from the 1970s onwards.

Graph 3: Accumulated number of adopted social pensions in the Global South


Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B

(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)

After several countries in the 1970s and 1980s have considered to introduce social pensions a trend was starting in the 1990s. At this time HelpAge International was not yet working on this issue. About 2000 when HelpAge began to push for social pensions it falls together with the start of a main trend. I would expect HelpAge's contribution to be measurable starting with the UN Madrid Conference on Aging (MIPAA) in 2002 and continuing onwards. Because of the long time-frame for the

diffusion of social pensions 'graph 3' grouped all introduced policy innovations made within five years together. In order to visualize the fine differences 'graph 4' was set up. It uses the same data than the graph above but shows the policy adoptions of social pensions for each year. While 'graph 3' shows very well that the trend is starting at the beginning of the 1990s, 'graph 4' zooms into the time-frame from 1990 to 2011.

Graph 4: Accumulated number of adopted social pensions
in the Global South: 1990-2011

Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B

(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)

Th graph shows that the trend started in 1992 in a first wave until 1999. This first wave hardly explainable with HelpAge's influence. In 2000 the diffusion of social pensions got a new impulse and a trend started. It must be a combination of a national trend towards social pensions, which were already beginning, and growing support and awareness for such kind of policy reforms at global level. After 2002 and MIPAA there is a noticeable spike upwards indicating its influence. Following to that in 2004 when HelpAge increased its support for social pensions the diffusion of this program accelerated by about 30% and kept this enormous pace for five years until 2009. I would explain this particular increase of the diffusion process in its last period

between 2004 and 2009 with the contribution HelpAge International and some other global actors have played in this time-frame. Yet, as in the case study of the Word Bank HelpAge's influence can be specified by looking at the diffusion of HelpAge's model of *universal* social pensions which HelpAge favors in particular. If HelpAge really contributed to this diffusion wave one must find a particular acceleration of the diffusion process after 2005.

Graph 5: Accumulated number of adopted universal social pensions in the Global South

Author's visualization. Source: database FLOORCASH, DFG research project FLOOR-B

(Katrin Weible; principal investigator Lutz Leisering)

Subtracting all the means-tested pensions, which account for 81% of the diffusion, I got a much smaller sample of only the universal ones. 'Graph 5' shows that indeed the diffusion of universal social pensions skyrocket in 2005 when is was supported by HelpAge. However, the graph displays as well that not all of the universal social pensions came after 2000. The trend started much earlier with a first wave from 1965 to the 1980s and a main trend starting at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. This trend is continuing since. So, the results give testimony of very mixed influences. HelpAge has been one of those influences but accounts only for a small share social pension innovations after 2005. The main trend began much earlier.

Both confrontations of the qualitative results with the quantitative data suggests that global actors have contributed to the diffusion of SCT programs. The data indicates that the World Bank as an IGO has been considerably more influential than HelpAge as an INGO. I would read the data as indicators that the World Bank has played a central role for the diffusion of CCTs, while the causes for the diffusion of (universal) social pensions are much more diverse and are much more difficult to be attributed to HelpAge International. Nevertheless, the acceleration of the diffusion of social pensions after 2005 has shown that even INGOs which for the most part have to rely on advocacy and lobbying can have quite a considerable influence on policy-making even though in the end the introduced policy might be rather a compromise, which is a social pension without the component of universality.

Conclusion

First of all, the level of policy convergence among the countries in the Global South is high enough to be recognizable in quantitative analyses from a macro-perspective. The global policy spreads clearly show a trend curve of accelerated spread for conditional cash transfers as well as for social pensions. The trend started early, before global actors where pushing for the implementation of these models. In the beginning a few countries provided exemplary evidence of successful program implementation. Global actors supported this early period of diffusion with evaluations and the diffusion of favorable rationalities and concepts, like children as important carriers of prospective human capital or older people as an in particular vulnerable social group and holders of internationally established human rights.

Having shown in this qualitative study the multiple activities of global actors regarding SCT, the recognizable accelerations in the spread curves seem roughly to be linked to the beginning of global actors' support of their particular policy models. Parallel to global actors' activities it can be recognized that the main diffusion process started or gained new momentum. Yet, influence remains difficult to prove in a strict causal sense. Horizontal diffusion flowing from mutual observations and cooperation between countries in the Global South also seems to have played a role. Moreover, my analysis of global policy model development showed that international organizations also created new norms, best practices and global events like conferences and conventions which can have a broader and indirect effect time after the direct involvement of global actors.

This co-existence of horizontal and vertical, indirect and actor-led, direct and indirect diffusion shows that simple answers to the explanation of diffusion of SCTs in the Global South are elusive. My analysis of how global actors are involved in the policy transfer has examined in depth processes which in most other studies are touched only selectively and measured as simplified parameters. I have shown that global actors have contributed to the vertical diffusion of SCT in the Global South with know-how and incentive-based instruments; global actors also exerted indirect influence through the development of global policy models that were perceived by many countries. Measuring the actual activities of global actors as this study has sought to do, helps to make tangible the potential consequences of, e.g. ratifications of global conventions by countries, which are analyzed in quantitative macro studies.

Chapter 6:
Conclusion

Knowledge as a Facilitator of Policy Diffusion

International organizations do play a prominent role in World Culture Theory, in the discipline of Global Social Policy (GSP) as well as in recent studies on policy diffusion in the Global South. International organizations are described as important developers of world cultural ideas and, furthermore, as 'transmission belts' or 'world society links', which bring policy ideas from the global to the nation level. IOs operate on the global level by creating international forums and conferences; on the national level IOs advise national governments and ministries.

It was the aim of this study to show the instruments which international organizations use. By doing so, multiple questions have been touched upon; such as: How does this transmission belt or world society link work? In how far do global actors engage in norm and policy model development rather than only following and supporting concepts developed at the national level? If it holds true that international organizations follow foremost their own agenda, how do they seek to implement those ideas in developing countries? What kind of instruments do they use? And, moreover: In how far are their instruments strategically interlinked with each other and work together?

Analytically this study was guided by an institutionalist perspective with a focus on two questions: Do international organizations develop their own concepts, norms and policies? And if so, how do they spread them worldwide? 'Policy diffusion' starts from the observation of emerging isomorphism of particular policies among countries. In this process international organizations could be a potential influence. The instruments and strategies used by IOs to spread social cash transfers (SCTs) have been uncovered here. Leaving open the question in how far international organizations had causal impact on policy-making in developing countries, this study has investigated the role of international organizations in view of two clearly visible and distinguishable policy models: conditional cash transfers (targeted towards children and families) and social pensions (targeted towards older people). Interestingly, social welfare policies for persons of working age have spread much less than CCTs and social pensions, one reason being that only CCTs and social pensions were promoted by a strong global actor (von Gliszczynski 2015).

The World Bank as an international governmental organization (IGO) has promoted conditional cash transfers and coined the abbreviation CCTs for this policy model. HelpAge International as an international non-governmental organization (INGO) has promoted universal social pensions, which is a policy model following a rights-based approach.

This study has aimed to capture the variety of instruments: to identify the instruments, to analyze the reasons for and strategies behind these instruments, and finally to categorize the instruments according to basic modes. The categories 'advocacy' and 'advice' were chosen to reflect two layers of the diffusion process: while advocacy is focused on norm and knowledge distribution at the global level, advice is focused on norm and knowledge distribution in domestic politics in countries of the Global South. An additional component of advocacy is agenda development, which may include norm and knowledge production. Agenda development is the prerequisite for advocacy.

Furthermore, the research design was supposed to apply an institutionalist perspective but also integrate realist assumptions, which emphasize the influence of money and power (incentives) rather than knowledge and norms. This added up to the three categories: advocacy, advice and incentives. What have been the general findings of this analysis? Knowledge, knowledge production, and knowledge distribution become increasingly relevant for policy diffusion. The three basic categories help to group influences in particular modes.

The empirical analysis of international organizations' involvement in global policy diffusion of SCTs has shown: first, the importance of an institutionalist perspective; second, the interplay of different modes of influencing and how they support each other; third, that actors with different capabilities (IGO/INGO) can use their instruments as functional equivalents for influence (e.g. political protests as an innovative tool to compensate the lack of funding and the provision of encompassing loan schemes); fourth, that global actor's influence is difficult to measure because advocacy and advice take effect in a more or less indirect way, because policy implementation remains in the hands of national policy makers. International organizations advocated, advised and created incentives for national policy-makers but decision-making remained with the countries. This interplay makes it a complex task to confirm or to reject the influence of international organizations.

a) Advocacy

Global actors are embedded in and even constituted by World Culture. Thus, they make use of already established norms in order to increase legitimacy for their own policy suggestions. Yet, it was unclear if policy actors develop their own policies because they portray themselves as 'disinterested others', following world cultural norms. This study could demonstrate that the World Bank as well as HelpAge International have a clear policy preference and took action in order to diffuse their models throughout the Global South. Their policy models are well reasoned by references to global norms and concepts, such as 'development', 'poverty reduction', 'economic growth', 'human capital investment' and 'human rights'. Advocacy is an important and first step to raise awareness for particular policy models.

HelpAge International and the World Bank have different capabilities making for different kinds of advocacy. The World Bank is a well known organization which attracts attention in global arenas and regularly interacts with national ministries. If the World Banks decides to announce a policy, it can stimulate a debate easily and feed its ideas into a global discourse. Thus, it seemed to be sufficient that the most recognizable activities of the World Bank have been the publication of one flagship document about CCTs and the assembly of three major conferences about it. HelpAge International does not have such a standing, but managed to increase the legitimacy of its policies by teaming up with the United Nations, which is able to bring multiple nations together on a desk to agree on policies. It was on HelpAge's agenda to draw the attention of international policies to older people as an in particular vulnerable social group. Based on the Madrid International Plan of Action on Aging (MIPAA) the topic of aging was established and HelpAge was able to initiate a cascade of conferences to 'translate' an abstract declaration of intend into concrete action plans on which countries could be measured against.

A further technique is indirect advocacy, e.g. through reports and documents that provide multiple rational arguments and play with world cultural ideas in order to state why a particular policy is a good idea. Diffusion maps show a trend towards policy models, and online calculators allow policy-makers to evaluate the costs of policy introduction. So policy-makers who are looking for a cost-efficient social policy will find social pensions via this calculator and countries who are interested about social policy-making in other countries will find CCTs which appear to be a trend in

the Global South. This is fostered by South-South-Cooperation events held by the World Bank. Its portrayed as a best-practice sharing, but it is all about CCTs where countries with well-know lighthouse CCTs are invited.

In sum, international organization have clear policy models which they advocate. Conferences are the main tool to do so. Legitimacy through concepts and norms and country-led implementation is the focus. While the World Bank can advocate a policy with 'big actions' (major conferences and well-recognized publications), Help Age International can compensate their lack of recognition at global level with cascades of 'small actions' (regional and local conferences, call-to-actions and workshops) and alliances with culturally embedded organizations like the United Nations. *Advocacy does increase the popularity of particular policy models*. If countries finally implement this policy model or not is left to the governments, but through advocacy at least every country in the Global South has heard of this policy innovation and can decide wether its implementation is a good idea of not. In this way advocacy can be a facilitator of policy diffusion.

b) Advice

Global actors accompany the whole process of national policy-making with advice. Their advice targets the rationalities of national policy makers which can use the knowledge passed to them to understand the technical aspects of particular policy models and learn about the next steps, which would be necessary to get the implementation going. Moreover, existing policies can be criticized on a pure technical level, so that new policy models appear to be the next best thing one might take into consideration for policy-making. Both modes intrigue the rationality of national actors and can affect domestic policy learning.

Advice is done in three steps. First, the advice of international organization argues for a cost-efficient and low-budget version of its policy model in order to get things started. The World Bank is arguing for pilot project in particular areas and Help Age International is arguing for a social pension, which is for everyone up to a certain age-level. The low-budget version of the social pension can start with a low pension, such as 5 USD a month for people with an age of 80 years and older. Second, the advice of international organizations argues for the effectiveness and positive effects of the pilot projects of entry-level pensions. Examples have shown that in developing countries without such 'effectiveness studies' tend to phase out already introduced

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policies after a while. Third, the advice of global actors aims at scaling-up and expanding the introduced smaller and limited programs to make them full-fledged country programs. It is a core element of the World Bank to advice countries on how to scale-up pilot projects, to improve the targeting of the CCTs and to extend the pilot to further regions. Within HelpAge's advice on social pensions they emphasize the right-based character and refer to global agendas in order to argue for universal social pensions for everyone of a certain age instead of implementing and continuing a means-tested social pension.

In both cases advice in a contribution to the institutionalization of country programs. Limited budgets in developing countries put social programs under risk to be discontinued with each end of a finance period or change of government. To stabilize social programs over years until they become a countries' institution is as important aspect of advice from international organizations.

The main difference between the World Bank's and HelpAge's approach on advice is that the World Bank targets the government and the Ministries of Finance in a country mainly to ensure a programs survival. This advice encompasses, on the one hand, of how to scale-programs up and, on the other hand, of how to ensure the program's funding (e.g. by phasing out subsidies). Instead, HelpAge's activities on advice are tailored to the government and the Ministries of Social Welfare with the aim to identify so called "policy champions", which are individuals that take up innovations and carry them further. To stream advice in the society (intellectuals and media) and the political center is crucial in order to win a critical mass, which supports policy development on social pensions. Moreover, HelpAge is a constant companion of policy-makers with personal ties to individuals and establishes itself as a 'hub of knowledge', which is a source of information that policy-makers can turn to if they seek technical knowledge.

In sum, while the World Bank mainly tries to ensure a programs survival with activities of advice and therewith 'to make their social program stay', HelpAge uses advice to distribute knowledge and to win a critical mass in order 'to get their social program in' the political process and make policy-makers start implementing a version of social pensions which suits national budgets and current political coalitions. *In both cases, global actors engage on a long and steady basis which accompanies policy-making over years.* The World Bank's country dialogues (Country Assistant Strategies and National Development Plans) and HelpAge's establishment as a 'hub of knowledge' are continuing efforts.

c) Incentives

Even though, this analysis is designed from an institutionalist perspective, a balanced analysis should be encompassing and include 'soft power' instruments (knowledge) as well as 'hard power' instruments (not knowledge-based). With reference to Keohane and Nye these hard power instruments are described as 'carrot and stick' instruments. While the offer of additional money in form of a loan can be a carrot and the withdrawal of a loan can be a stick, these terms describe two sides of one coin. The term incentives has been chosen in order to capture the usage of money and power for the creation of strongly stimulating stimuli for policy-making.

It is an easy pick to assume that the World Bank would be the more powerful player when it comes to incentive-based influencing. The World Bank can lend money in considerable amounts. The funds can be accessed by developing countries by reaching goals for economic and social development, which are set by the World Bank. Different scenarios ('cases triggers') allow further access to particular funding. Yet, CCTs are demanding programs and require a functioning infrastructure of schools and hospitals in place. Thus, the World Bank is guided by a 'development approach', which means that the organization argues for investments in infrastructure measures until the country is ready for the introduction of a CCT, which is considered by the World Bank as the main social program for developing countries. However, more and more developing countries – especially in Latin America – try to get away from loans in order to avoid making new dept and remaining independence from external influences. Furthermore, the World Bank was not the main actor with regard to funding. The regional banks allocated much more money for social policies to developing countries without having visibly strings attached to the funding. Nevertheless, the initial assumption that the World Bank influenced via loans was correct; it was just not a factor as dominant as one might expect. In contrast, one could rather highlight the importance of knowledge, because there is not demand for lending if not policy-makers have decided in a first step that they would want funding for particular policy ideas, which created a need for further funding in the first place.

The remarkable finding was that HelpAge International as well was able to use influencing to a high degree. The global spread of an organizational structure that builds thousands of older people associations (OPAs), which are connected by

common campaigns so that once a years huge protests can be organized. With these protests older people criticize the lack of adequate social protection programs, which is well perceived by the media as well as by politicians. To make social policies for older people is a popular issue, because a broad consensus regards older people as an in particular vulnerable group of people within the society. It is possible for policy-makers to win votes with the promise and introduction of social pensions. That makes these protests of OPAs an influential tool with repercussions for the lost or gain of power. Yet, the protests serve two purposes: *to initiate a process of policy implementation and to improve already existing social pension policies*. HelpAge with their 'hub of knowledge' follow up on those events with ongoing advice, so that policy-makers can present in the protest campaign one years later the steps and improvements that have been made. In this way the protest function as what they have been designed for: as a monitoring mechanism led bottom-up by the target group of the policies themselves.

In sum, both actors can set strong incentives to facilitate policy diffusion. The World Bank uses funding for pilot projects as an incentive to kickstart policy implementation, while HelpAge uses protests for this purpose. Yet, it seems that there is a difference between the usage of those instruments. The World Bank uses funding to initiate policy implementation, whereas HelpAge uses protest *to extend* the initial low-budget versions of social pensions. The organization of annual protests seems to be the way for ongoing improvements of already existing programs until they become universal social pensions with an adequate benefit level and an eligibility age of 60 or 65 years.

Advocacy, Advice and Incentives:
- The Interplay -

All the activities described in this study promote Social Cash Transfers by means of different instruments. The strategies behind these instruments become visible when the interplay of the modes of influencing is taken into consideration. All the instruments are designed in order to influence national policy-making; but how are they intended to take effect? How can they take effect?

Table 3 provides an overview of the analyzed instruments and describes what kind of effect or influence this instruments aim at. It becomes clear, that the effect of

advocacy is somehow equal and the effect would be an indirect one, which is difficult to measure but aims to increase the general commitment of countries. The policy models of CCTs and social pensions have full attention of national actors. And while the World Bank uses funded pilot projects to initialize policy-making, HelpAge makes a start with its constant lobbying and knowledge transfer. The local protests can than push for the extension of the programs, while the the World Bank uses ist knowledge transfer to stabilize programs and ensure that the pilot projects go to scale.

Table 3

Actors / Modes of Influencing	World Bank	HelpAge International
Incentives	**Initialization** of Policy Implementation - *"Loans for Pilot Projects"*	**Extension & Institutionalization** - *"Political Protests / OPA"*
Advice	**Extension & Institutionalization** - *"Country Dialogue, Effectiveness Studies and Support for Scaling-up"*	**Initialization** of Policy Implementation - *"Knowledge Transfer, Advocacy Coalitions and Workshops"*
Advocacy	**Indirect Influence & General Commitment** - *"Policy Model, Flagship Publications, Conferences"*	**Indirect Influence & General Commitment** - *"Policy Model, Publications, Conference Cascades"*

Author's visualization

The interplay of the modes of influencing is crucial for the instruments to possibly take effect. Activities on advocacy at global, regional and national level should increase the visibility of particular policy models and raise awareness. Countries discuss those models, hear and read about them, understand them as part of a global trend and highly legitimate policy options that one 'should' take up for the sake of 'development', 'human rights' or 'investment in human capital'. Yet, that does not mean that countries actually take action. Policy-making is not as simple as the act of buying. The AIDA rule for advertisement stands for: Attention, Interest, Desire and Action. While advocacy increases the attention for a particular policy, the interest to learn more about it and the desire to be part of a global trend, it needs also a political coalition in favor of it, the resources allocated from the national budget, the knowledge of how to implement it, the creation of governmental structures to carry out the reform, etc. As a result, advocacy alone is a weak guarantee that policy suggestions find their way into actual policy-making at national level. Thus, further modes of influencing support international actors' activities on policy promotion.

Being in a dialogue with countries and serving as a source of advice and a hub of knowledge for the government and particular ministries allows to refer to globally established models for the concrete policy-making process. Without having established particular policy models via advocacy first, the policy suggestion via advice would be some kind of hollow and without substance. When technical advice from the World Bank suggests phasing out subsidies and introducing a conditional cash transfer instead, governments know that this advice is referring to a globally established and well recognized policy models and that this advice is suppose to show how a government can take the next step and start policy implementation. HelpAge's strategy with advocacy to 'translate down' a policy model until it reaches from an abstract global agenda the regional and national level in order to result in call for actions is a almost direct transition to activities on advice. Once advocacy resulted in concrete call for actions (as it happened on the African continent) it creates a need for advice in order to let actions follow. HelpAge is advising policy-makers on how to design the policies and how to plan the budgets, etc.

Finally, incentive-based influencing can be an additional mode organizations can use to facilitate that policy-makers actually take action on policy implementation. It was pointed out that 'implementation' in a developing context is not a one time event but a gradual thing. While the World Bank uses money in form of loans to initiate policy implementation, HelpAge is using political protests and mediation between different stakeholders to motivate national policy-makers to expand existing

social pension programs and better institutionalize them. Yet, without having stimulated a demand for a policy via advocacy and having demonstrated via advice that implementation in a developing context is possible, there would be no interest in pilot projects on CCTs. In turn, having implemented pilot projects demands further technical advice on the effectiveness of such programs and knowledge of how to bring such programs to scale. In the case of HelpAge International the usage of regular protests creates a strong incentive for policy-makers to improve their social pension policies. Thus, HelpAge is able to make far-reaching compromises when advising developing countries on policy implementation. The introduction of a low budget social pension is not so difficult for governments and HelpAge can advice them to initiate social pension in order to try out the policy and see if it is an effective tool. Once introduced the programs become popular and a tool to win elections. In this regard political protests of older people (OPAs) can push for the extension of the previously introduced programs.

The interplay of the modes of influencing makes advocacy the general tool to create a demand. Making use of this awareness for globally advocated policies advice for low budget versions or pilot projects can encourage policy-makers to start implementation and to break through particular implementation barriers arising from veto players, restrained public budgets or a lack of political will. While the World Bank is using advice to stabilize the programs and stimulate the expansion of the programs, HelpAge is using large scale protests to achieve the same. In sum, I see the interplay of the modes of influencing as the pivotal element that is assuring effective policy promotion.

What's next?

The questions which have been the subject of this analysis call for an even deeper analysis devoted to each of the aspects here. Partly that is already happening or currently under development. The section of the FLOOR (**F**inancial Assistance, **L**and Policy and Gl**o**bal S**o**cial **R**ights) research group, which is focussed on financial assistance in form of Social Cash Transfers (SCTs) is led by Professor Lutz Leisering (University of Bielefeld, Germany) and includes several further investigations on aspects of policy diffusion, knowledge and norm production and policy implementation.

The study by Moritz von Gliszczynski (2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016) investigated deeper the knowledge and norm production at the global level with a discourse analysis. Tobias Böger (2013) investigated the policy diffusion of SCTs from a quantitative event history analysis. John Berten examinded the usage of statistics and numbers as factors of Global Social Policy making. Katrin Weible takes stock of all SCT programs in the Global South (Weible, *forthcoming*), resulting in an encompassing FLOOR database supplemented by country case studies.

As a direct follow up to the study presented here on the instruments of international organizations, in-depth country case studies would be of major importance to understand policy diffusion in detail, because it is in domestic politics that global influences meet national conditions, merge, and take effect. Analyzing the interactions between national policy-makers and global actors in detail would be an important contribution to substantiate not just the heavy involvement of global actors in national policy-making, but it might help to corroborate the international actors' influence on policy-making.

The (indirect) effects of influencing with knowledge

In general, this study has strengthened an institutionalist perspective on policy diffusion and sensitized for the questions, such as: Where do policy-makers get their policy ideas from? In how for are these policies part of a global trend and related to globally discussed policy models? Where do the policy models come from? And, in how far have international organizations been involved in the process of policy (model) development and policy distribution? What kind of interactions between international organizations and national policy-makers do we see? In how far have international organizations advocated a nationally implemented policy, advised policy-makers on doing so, or even have set compelling incentives motivating the implementation of particular policies?

Especially in a developing county context international organizations can use a variety of instruments in oder to promote particular policies. As it was shown: these instruments do support and are interrelated with each other. The interplay of these instruments involve advocacy and technical advice, encompass the global and the national level, and often don't become visible by observing global actors' activities for one or two years, because knowledge and norm creation and distribution is a

process that takes time. Long and steady engagement, relationship building and continuing advocacy and advice is what has been found to be the cornerstone of international actors' promotion of Social Cash Transfer policies in the Global South.

The autonomy of nation-states is a cornerstone of the current world culture, so that global actors which are operating against national preferences hardly can be influential. This study has found that none of the actors uses instruments, which are prone to conflicts. Rather, *positive support* through advice and incentives is the resource that countries can make use of for policy-making. This support is a promotion of policy models. That global actors constantly promote policies globally, can be compared to the activity of dropping stones to induce waves of policy diffusion. The initiatives to implement policy innovations stem from the countries themselves, but the ideas and the desire to be part of a trend seems to emanate from international organizations and their activities of advocacy, advice and incentives. The effect of knowledge bears great potential to unfold its effect indirectly, so that agentic actors maintain their neutral and 'disinterested' appearance and, nevertheless, have instruments for influencing in place. In these processes global actors are "dropping stones, making waves".

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Appendix

Country Assistance Strategy Papers

(73 reports / 24 countries)

– CAS Argentina 2004	– CAS Honduras 2000
– CAS Argentina 2006	– CAS Honduras 2006
– CAS Argentina 2010	– CAS Honduras 2011
– CAS Bangladesh 1995	– CAS Indonesia 2001
– CAS Bangladesh 1998	– CAS Indonesia 2003
– CAS Bangladesh 2001	– CAS Indonesia 2009
– CAS Bangladesh 2006	– CAS Indonesia 2012
– CAS Bangladesh 2011	– CAS Jamaica 2010
– CAS Bolivia 1998	– CAS Kenya 1998
– CAS Bolivia 2004	– CAS Kenya 2004
– CAS Bolivia 2011	– CAS Kenya 2010
– CAS Brazil 1995	– CAS Kenya 2012
– CAS Brazil 1997	– CAS Morocco 2005
– CAS Brazil 2000	– CAS Morocco 2009
– CAS Brazil 2003	– CAS Morocco 2012
– CAS Brazil 2008	– CAS Nicaragua 2007
– CAS Brazil 2012	– CAS Nicaragua 2012
– CAS Chile 2007	– CAS Pakistan 2006
– CAS Chile 2011	– CAS Pakistan 2010
– CAS Colombia 2002	– CAS Pakistan 2011
– CAS Colombia 2008	– CAS Panama 1998
– CAS Colombia 2012	– CAS Panama 2007
– CAS Costa Rica 2004	– CAS Panama 2010
– CAS Costa Rica 2008	– CAS Paraguay 2003
– CAS Costa Rica 2011	– CAS Paraguay 2009
– CAS Dominican Republic 1995	– CAS Peru 1997
– CAS Dominican Republic 1999	– CAS Peru 2002
– CAS Dominican Republic 2005	– CAS Peru 2006
– CAS Dominican Republic 2011	– CAS Peru 2012

– CAS Ecuador 2003	– CAS Philippines 2002
– CAS El Salvador 1997	– CAS Philippines 2009
– CAS El Salvador 2001	– CAS Turkey 2000
– CAS El Salvador 2005	– CAS Turkey 2003
– CAS El Salvador 2009	– CAS Turkey 2008
– CAS Ghana 2007	– IEG Guatemala 2012
– CAS Guatemala 2008	– IEG Indonesia 2012
– CAS Guatemala 2012	

Interviews with HelpAge International Staff

No.1 - Head of Policy, Influencing and Learning (2012-01-21)

No.2 - Social Protection Officer for the Latin American Region (2012-01-21)

No.3 - Campaigns Coordinator, and Campaigns Assistant (2012-01-22)

No.5 - former Director of Policy Development (2012-01-22)

No.6 - Regional Representative for East Asia and the Pacific (2012-01-22)

No.8 - Head of Strategic Alliances (2012-01-22)

No.9 - Head of Policy, Influencing and Learning (2012-06-15)

Further Interviews and Participatory Observations

– Bernd Schubert; Interview (2012)

– Veronika Wodsak; Interview (2012)

– HelpAge's conference and workshop at Dunford House, London; Participatory Observation (2012)