Bourdieu and international relations: a structural constructivist analysis for rethinking state identity

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Abstract:

This study explores how Bourdieusian structural constructivism contributes to our understanding of state identity in international relations. While there has been a significant concentration of constructivism on the description and understanding of state identity, constructivist approaches still have not comprehensively answered all the controversial questions of structural theories. The aim of the dissertation, thus, is to improve understanding of state subjectivity and identity by means of Bourdieusian sociological approach, which provides a basis to form a middle-way between the structuralist and constructivist perspectives on the issues of identity and state.

The dissertation is based on two fundamental objectives. The primary objective of the thesis is to utilize Bourdieusian sociological research and terminology to improve our understanding regarding the formation and change of state identity. Secondly, the dissertation purposes to contribute to the existing constructivist understanding of state identity in line with Bourdieusian structural constructivism. In this way, the study theorizes that the state as a social entity – which is therefore subject to unconscious symbolic violence before it forms and embodies the physical understanding of fear and anarchy in the interactive processes of international relations.

The methodology is structured around Bourdieusian terminology and research. In this respect, the project is separated into two logical stages. As the descriptive stage of the thesis, the first stage discusses the theoretical foundation of the problem of state identity and useful theoretical tools of Bourdieu with regards to the problem. It firstly identifies weaknesses of the existing literature regarding the understanding of agent and structure relations. Then, it describes how this Bourdieusian perspective improves our understanding with regards to structure, subject, and identity. The second stage would fundamentally conduct a prescriptive stage, which tests the applicability of Bourdieusian terminology in the different fields of political, economic, cultural, and social capital. In order to illustrate the theoretical findings of the research in a more comprehensive way, the chapters in this stage utilize distinctive methodological concepts of globalisation, neoliberalism, democratisation and the developing state, respectively. These methodological concepts are the substantiating methods of theoretical findings, which improve the harmony and content integrity of the chapters. Ultimately, the study determines how Bourdieusian structural constructivism improves the theory of international relations beyond the existing borders of constructivism.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Research question

Questions on the identity of the political subject in international relations have been an ongoing research process. Identity has been studied from nearly all of the prominent perspectives in international relations. At the same time, the identity of the political subject – the state – has been transformed over time into an intertwined and even ambiguous set of meanings. Early examinations of identity were based on theoretical approaches of realist and rational theories of state identity. However, these realist and rationalist approaches identified the identity of the political subject within the context of nations existing in the international arena. Realist and rationalist theorizations of nations' similar interests and fears stereotype state identity, because structure uniforms the characteristics of national identity as a set of behaviours. In other words, realist and rationalist motivations regarding structure marginalize state identity and its social and cultural relations and characteristics.

After the social and cultural turn in international relations, the identity of the political subject attracts considerable attention from international relations scholars. In particular, the cultural expansion of constructivism brings social relations and normative definitions into the study of identity. Constructivism distinguishes the existence of fear or anarchy from an ontological standardization of state identity. Constructivism rests on the existence of norms in the international arena, and, as a result, it observes that state identity is a result of social relations and intentional motivation on the existence of norms. Social interactions are becoming a prominent element in explaining the existence of state identity. The state's perceptions of itself and other states are evaluated as the fundamental basis of identity construction in international relations. This illustrates a shift in classical rationalist thinking because it takes into consideration the state's internal perception in addition to the external structural effects on identity formation. Ideas and identities gain incredible importance because states construct conscious relations with others in order to make sense of their identities. Consciousness with the existence of anarchy leads to the normative consideration of living in the same international space. Here, constructivists rely on creations of norms and rules in order to operate in the international field. However, the stressing of norms in international relations turns into discussions of basic normative nature, especially discussions of sovereignty. This great stress on the norms of sovereignty trivializes states' structural inequalities to reach the identical knowledge of conscious interpretations. As a result,

constructivism improves unilateral definitions of identity, but, by attributing great importance to the normative nature of identity, it renders state identity unambiguous in a constructivist normative approach to the problem of structure and agency. In short, constructivists have not dealt with the intertwined and equiponderant effects of material and ideational structures on the formation of state identity.

Indeed, the formulation of identity relies upon discussions, representing the methodological preference between structures and norms. Agency–structure relations come down to the identification of state identity or, in a broader sense, the identity of political agency; scholars then make a pragmatic preference between the material nature of structure or the ideational norms of social relations. In fact, both the material nature and the ideational nature of agency–structure relations explain how states' identities are structured rather than how they are formed. The constructivist inclusion of structure via anarchy in international relations does not do enough to reach a comprehensive definition of state identity in relation to structure–agency discourses. In constructivist discussion, the state's socially constructed identity depends on the state's consciousness regarding its ontological existence. However, it is not so persuasive that the state's perception of its own ontological nature always creates conscious ideational actions which meaningfully try to explain its nature to the other states. At least, as long as all states do not reach the same normative values and maturity in international relations, they cannot be seen as equally conscious actors to create the social realities of their identity formation. Without understanding these mutual and intertwined existences of structures and normative ideations of the formation of state identity, the constructivist perspective renders identity a derivative of sovereignty.

Here, social sciences and anthropology are good sources to improve the constructivist normative approaches. I will move beyond methodological approaches regarding sovereignty and integration. In line with sociological references, this research considers states as living social organisms, with habitus, emotional reflex and embodied culture in a wider societal space. Similar to the individuals in society, states may have invisible structural constraints, which can be a pre-existent habitual embodiment of the state's identity. Therefore, state consciousness of the production of norms can be related to the state's habitual characteristics or the inadequacy of cultural accumulation, which affect the roles and positions in social relations. It is claimed here that the state as a social entity is subjected to predisposed habitual structural dispositions before it produces its identity into conscious socially constructed relations. In this respect, I depict the mutual and intertwined existence of unconscious

historical structure and conscious normative productions into the composition of state identity.

In this research, I focus on Bourdieusian sociological approaches as the main theoretical theme. Bourdieu has received a considerable amount of discussion of his illustration of how individuals form their entities in society and the way in which the socialization process pre-influences individuals' unconscious characteristics. If we examine the state as a social actor in a wider social space, it is possible to illustrate same constraints and habitual influences on states' identity. Bourdieu here helps to explain the state's ontological presence and the production of conscious norms and rules in practice. The ontological presence of states may be related to the pre-existence of habitus of accumulated history, which produces relevant dispositions in international relations. This Bourdieusian perspective questions constructivist socially constructed state identity, because social construction in his sense is achieved by the existence of accumulated structural history in the agent's identity. Therefore, the Bourdieusian perspective theoretically helps this study to manifest the mutual existence and function of structure and construction on the formation of state identity.

To sum up, my fundamental question in this thesis is:

How does Bourdieusian structural constructivism contribute to our understanding of state identity in international relations?

Existing international relations theories have not achieved a comprehensive explanation for the formation and change of political identity in international relations. The emergence of new cultural and sociological approaches in international relations indicates that neither structure nor ideation precedes the formation of state identity. In order to understand the presence of agency and identity in international relations it is more important to see the intertwined links of structures and ideas in cultural and social perspectives. By using a Bourdieusian study, I can show whether and how the identities of political subject/state are formed and transformed. Therefore, this study highlights the distinguishing tools of the Bourdieusian sociological approach, which refuses the methodological separation of ideas from structures.

Background to the research question

Scholars involved in international relations debate widely on the meaning of international relations. These discussions concentrate on the relations of political objects over time and history. In this aspect, the English School claims that international relations are the realm of

'recurrence and repetition'.[1] By contrast, constructivist approaches claim that international relations mean discontinuity, progress and change (Ruggie, 1993).[2] These different perspectives and views do not only explain the roots of international relations, but also define the characteristics of the international system. Thus, when one defines what the meaning of international relations is, that person also defines the meanings, the roles (and scopes of rules) and the norms which identities of political actors are subject to. Therefore, it is not easy to define the identities of political subjects without clarifying their relational characteristics, which are derived from time and their historical processes.

The defining characteristic of the modern international system of relations is based on the norm of sovereignty and the rule of mutual recognition. However, in line with the debate on the meanings of international relations, both how sovereignty emerged as the definitive characteristic of political subjectivity and how it will lose ground are controversial. According to the English School theorists, the historically grounded system of sovereign states describes the nature and rules of the system and how these rules repetitively evolve (Anderson & Hurrell, 2000). In the theorization of the English School, fundamentally, a principle is demanded by the system's actors, and then it becomes more established. This more established principle gains a moral value, and it eventually becomes an object of a more constituted and formal convention (Linklater & Suganami, 2006). That is why the norms, agents and rules of the modern world history or the international system are subject to repetition and recurrence.[3] As a result of this, the classical English School perspective tries to explain a formation of repetitive interactions between the political subjects within an international society rather than the formation of the political subject and its identity.

In a similar way to the English School, realist and rationalist thinkers focus on the continuity and discontinuity of the system rather than on the identity of actors within the system. They generally explain the continuity or discontinuity of the system in terms of an

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[1] This is mostly claimed and supported by the English School scholars; for further information, see Linklater & Suganami (2006).

[2] Also, some scholars claim that international relations is originally the area of change, but when it reaches a particular stage it transforms into the place of repetition as the end of history. For further information, see Fukuyama (1993).

[3] It is important to mention that the English School thinkers do not all agree on the nature of norms and principles. For example, Bull separated Wight's pure 'recurrence and repetition' and he sometimes implies the change in norms. For further information, see Anderson & Hurrell (2000).

'identifiable regularity' (Bartelson, 1995, p. 86), segmenting history, which produces practices according to sovereign subject and its knowledge. As long as the subjects/actors of the system think that rules of the system are necessary for their benefit, the system continues. If this regularity of rules or definition of sovereignty is not beneficial for the actors, discontinuity comes into existence. In a rationalist sense, change or continuity depends on material reasons. Originally, the modern state was divided into 'internal' and 'international' arenas, and it is theorized that 'the internal' is the place of security, and 'the international' is the place of anarchy (Pettman, 1996). This provides the state with a 'mutually exclusive space' (Ruggie, 1993 p. 151) in order to differentiate its own national identity from others'. In this way, the modern state constructs its ideational and identity-based domination within the territory. The state establishes its national interests as the common goods and missions for every citizen to reach. In order to reach and defend national interests, the modern state concretizes rules of power politics in institutions such as national security, national markets and national borders. In addition to the identity, rules and concrete institutions, the nation states also monopolize force and the right of violence (Tilly, 1985).

Rational explanations do not rely on any moral constitution of norms and rules, and that is why they have significant deficiencies in explaining changes in norms, principles and rules. Institutional liberal thoughts generally try to overcome these moral deficiencies of realists. According to institutional liberals, because of a lack of institutionalization the system is subject to challenge and change. The challenge for certain norms changes in line with which set of norms is preferred (Krasner, 1999). Accordingly, the norms of a system may change when certain institutional and moral deficiencies exist. In this respect, the continuity of sovereignty, as a fundamental norm of the nation state system, depends on a certain set of expectations and institutions.[4] Consequently, both realist and liberal rationalists define changes in international relations independently of identities of the system's political subjects. More precisely, they do not focus on the existence of political subjectivity (or state identity in modern history) before a system of political relations forms institutions or rules to organize a definitive language of state subjectivity in international relations.

In line with the constructivist cultural turn to the problem of identity in international relations (Lapid & Kratochwil, 1996), the normative side of political subjectivity becomes a

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[4] Some scholars make a moral preference between the different kinds of sovereignty. For example, Krasner (1999) separates sovereignty as domestic independence, international legal and Westphalian sovereignty, and makes a moral preference that international legal sovereignty is better.

more prominent theme, which supposes potential normative changes and its effects on the objective relations of political subjects. Therefore, constructivists stress that the modern system of states is likely to progress to a stage of discontinuity and change. The shift between the modern nation state system and a postmodern system is not only related to players and 'the play of power politics but [also] of the stages on which that play is performed' (Ruggie, 1993, pp. 139–140). Originally, the state was based on the rights of legitimate sovereign-based domination (Ibid.). Meanwhile, the legitimate domination of the state originated from a well-defined hierarchy of society, and the state provides common goods for all parts of this hierarchy (Guéhenno, 2000). This moral turn of constructivism considerably improved the questions on and interests in the formation of political identities and subjects. In this respect, the modern state does not only claim sovereignty for itself, but it also recognizes that other states have the same rights (Wight, 1977). Thus, the modern state forms its practices on the ground of mutual recognition. This ground guarantees that the state's territory is free from outside intervention, except from the state's own right to intervene within its territory. Mutual recognition between the states guarantees a legitimate state identity that is based on the socially constructed existence of sovereign norms. Therefore, the state's sovereign identity will be legitimate as long as relations between states do not produce other norms to mutually define its political identity (Weber, 1995). The state and its identity, norms and institutions are only peculiarities of a particular time and place (Ibid.). As a result, states' socially constructed identities are always subject to change in accordance with changing normative constructions of relations in international relations.

An important question here is how to define political subjectivity which forms actors in international relations. From a Weberian perspective, the classical way is to refer to political subjectivity in the presence of state and its central governmental authority. Beyond this, the state also refers to a territorially identified related unit which is able to construct politico-institutional relations in international space (Buzan, 2008). However, the new dynamic process of globalization changed these conservative forms of political subjectivity regarding the state. State functionality is challenged by new kinds of political authorities, which form a new political subjectivity beyond state territorial borders. These new political authorities undermine state territorial unity at both the micro level within the state borders and the macro level beyond the territory. Indeed, in a similar way to the existing political subjectivity of family, clan or medieval king, a state-based political entity is always liable to change and erode (Bartelson, 2001). The state is only a specific type that identifies regularity in the modern historical term. Consequently, an understanding of political subjectivity refers

to a broader understanding in this research despite the fact that it will primarily put state identity at the centre of research as a historical narrative of the contemporary modern world. The state is certainly a determinative political identity of the modern era, but it is itself a substitution for a predecessor form of political subjectivity and it may in the future be substituted by a different political subjectivity in a new historical regularity.

The question regarding how we can define the political subject prompts us to think about how we can define the political subject–structure relation, which is an essential aspect for understanding political identity in international relations. Discussions on agency–structure relations inevitably rely on an ontology regarding how agents define behaviours and actions. Theories mostly focus on two general resources of state behaviours. Structural approaches emphasize the material necessities and interests of agents, which form the main characteristics of agent–structure relations. Interactional approaches mostly depend on the activities of societies which produce ideas and shared thoughts. Therefore, ideational factors are fundamental for interactional approaches in international relations. Indeed, as is implied above, all of these characterization struggles within international relations theories must consider ontologies regarding the nature of the political subject. Some prioritize structure and think that agents are players whose identities are influenced by structure. Others give primacy to actors and think that agents are able to produce conscious ideas to govern their interactions with structures. Both approaches can be supported and refuted by many different practical examples in political subjects. More essentially, an ontological theorization of agency–structure relations does not illustrate the intertwined coexistence of ideational and material factors in the bases of agent–structure relations. In this aspect, actors' conscious ideational products may be influenced by structural material characteristics or vice versa.

In order to understand agency–structure relations, it is plausible to think of different types of political subjectivities in a different historical period. These help us to understand the main peculiarity of all of these different subjectivities of political identity in different historical periods. When one looks at the common points of these different political subjects, from family and clan to state, they can realize that all of these subjects have originated from a fundamental norm characterized by sovereignty. Although sovereignty is defined in different forms, all political subjects inevitably have a sovereign space in which political identity is constructed. Therefore, it is plausible to say that continuation and change in political identity take place in accordance with fundamental norms of sovereignty. Any change in sovereign norms transforms political subjects, which shifts the existing identities and interests of the political subjects.

The construction of the political subject via sovereign norms is always followed by a construction of identity. Sovereign subjects try to understand themselves by looking at others in the same field. These observations are translated into normative behaviour schemas for political identity. These normative schemas are interpreted differently in different approaches. Rationalist approaches think that norms exist because they serve the interests of the state. Indeed, constructivists evaluate that, beyond the self-interests of political subject/state, norms become consciously bounded rules in a specific culture of identity because this gives legitimacy and recognition to the subjects (Katzenstein, 1996; Zehfuss, 2002). Therefore, constructivists consider norms not only as utilitarian tools for the state, but as an ideational and conscious consensus on the legitimate basis of political identity. In this way, sovereign subjects are subject to a kind of socialization process which creates common beliefs and norms regarding the interests of the political subject. The interactive process of sovereign subjects creates normative behaviour schemes which objectify the institutional embodiment of political identity (Tidy, 2012). Therefore, norms are an inseparable part of the definition of identity in constructivist approaches. Indeed, to have a political identity spontaneously improves certain norms, because every political identity is based on actions in accordance with expected behaviours which are constituted by norms (Shannon, 2000).

In line with this involvement in political identities, definitions and contents of political identity have been an important issue of international relations approaches. In particular, after the constructivist rise in international relations there have been a number of definitions trying to explain how to understand state identity and its components. In Wendt's theorization, identity is seen as a blueprint for states' interests, which organizes styles of objective actions in the international field (Wendt, 1999). Wendt's definition of identity is based on international factors beyond the internal existence of political identity. Wendt is generally not interested in internal clashes and situations, because he still contributes unit base characteristics of political subjectivity. Lynch also refers to the normative content of identity and argues that identity is a set of normative beliefs which objectifies the aims and interests of states in legitimate practical actions (Lynch, 1998). Barnett and Telhami refer to the interactional side of identity constructions. They think that identity is socially and corporately constructed in the process of interactions, which relies on functional productivity and the distinction of state apparatus (Telhami & Barnett, 2002). However, Guzzini and Leander criticize the definition of identity with external factors beyond the internal self-organization of the state. They claim that 'states are internally structured processes that can persist even if they are not recognized by their fellow' (Wendt, 2006, p. 205). They rely on differences

between the state systems and states and think that the interactional definition of states explains the state system but that the internal structure of states provides a spatial identity for themselves before external structures create differentiation from others. Lastly, some approaches indicate that the post-structural perspective evaluates state identity as a performative feature which should be reproduced continually by foreign policy. In this way, identity cannot create external relations before foreign policy defines the characteristics of identity (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2011). Therefore, identity is a product of performances which is constituted by foreign policy practices.

Another interesting aspect of political identity in international relations is the understanding of relations between state identity and national identity. In theory, national identity relies primarily on a social group of people who share the same historical experiences, culture, language, specific symbols of togetherness (Smith, 2008) or even a collective psychology which is derived from collective fears, sadness or victimization (László, 2014). On the other hand, state identity is related to the existence of conscious knowledge regarding self and otherness. In other words, in order to define state identity, how a collective body defines its interest in relation to other collective bodies must be considered and, therefore, state identity is a product of interactive processes between the subjects (Zehfuss, 2002). There are a couple of definitive characteristics which can be found in these approaches. In particular, national identity, referred to collectively, does not need to objectify itself via the existence of another national identity. The definition of national identity is mostly independent from a foundation of otherness. Besides this, national identity refers to the internal societal structure of a political community. However, state identity generally explains a position in international society which is related to external processes. Thus, state identity cannot be defined only by international norms and its interactive process because it is determined by how the state evaluates others and, simultaneously, how others describe the state.

Theoretically, there is no certain consensus on whether state identity is formed by internal or external factors. In fact, internal factors rely on a common representation of self which is organized by dominant groups of the society of the particular state. External factors not only refer to common beliefs of self-representation but also emphasize international norms which illustrate how others interpret identity in interactive processes. However, state identity can only be objectified by particular actions. These actions also include determinants of states' interests in relation to others. Internal elites or groups who define ideations for actions fundamentally aim to affect the external identity of the state by way of setting the

state's preferred interests. On the other hand, external dimensions try to influence the internal interpretation of self via the shared or imposed normative tools. In practice, it is more plausible to see that internal and external dimensions of state identity are intertwined and mutually existent determinants of identity (Putnam, 1988; Alons, 2007). Prioritizing external or internal dimensions actually starts a vicious circle in structure–agency discussions. In this respect, this research aims to answer this intertwined existence of internal and external dimensions via a Bourdieusian ideation of structure and habitus engagement in the practical actions of political identity in the following parts.

As both descriptive and normative discussions touch upon norms, rules and institutions of international relations, this thesis will draw upon the constructivist theoretical approach which offers important insights to the subject and allows for a rich and dynamic social context.[5] Constructivists rely on not only the material world, but also ideational meanings and interpretations of the material world, because the material world is organized by means of human actions that are based on an ideational interpretation of the material world (Adler, 1997; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). As Alexander Wendt explains, 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded' (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). This means that the world is not based on a static reality, but the reality is continually reconstructed by the identities, interests and ideations of political actors, which shape actions and interactions (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998). Thus, the norms are constituted and they change in accordance with the political actors' interests, identity construction and interpretation of the material world.

In general, there are three fundamental assumptions of constructivism that help to understand the construction of state identity and its normative aspect: ideas and interpretations are important to understand the real world; interests and actions are determined by identities; and 'agents and structures are mutually constituted' (Price & Reus-Smit, 1998, pp. 266–267). Firstly, 'ideas – understood more generally as collective knowledge, institutionalised in practices – are the medium and propellant of social action' (Adler, 2005, p. 94). That is why this thesis examines the role and influence of ideas within the emerging norms of structures in international relations. In this respect, ideas are fundamental to understanding sovereignty, as the constitutive norms of modern world, and the material world where sovereignty practises.

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[5] For an overview of the rise of constructivist international relations theory, see Reus-Smit (2001a).

In this aspect, ideas, interpretations and self-understanding are very important to understanding how norms and constructed identities are reproduced.

Secondly, as the project of modernity, state identity is seen as identical to the identity of the nation.[6] In line with the constructivist theorization, these national identities are not stabilized forms, but rather they are reproduced in accordance with the new interpretations and interests in new material environments. That is why, in contradiction with the rational theories,[7] there is no fixed international structure based on state sovereignty or an advanced institutional composition for agents (Reus-Smit, 2001c). National interests, institutional representations and structures are subject to change. Interests are the products of a certain material composition in which identities reproduce. This means that material changes result in changes within the state's interests that mean a shift in the social preferences because 'material facts acquire meaning only through human cognition and social interaction' (Finnemore, 1996b, p. 6). In order to construct modern state identity, states have produced numerous boundaries and these boundaries are strengthened by concrete borders and the notion of nation (Biersteker & Weber, 1996). This means that the state produces and reproduces a fixed definition of nation in terms of internal and international boundaries in order to 'distinguish a specific political community – the inside – from all others – the outside' (Doty 1996, p. 122).[8] These boundaries are constructed by sovereignty, as a supreme internationally recognized norm, which is a definitive element of the whole structure. Without sovereign rights, the modern state never constitutes its legitimacy as the possessor of a certain national identity. Thus, representation of sovereignty is crucial to forming an objective reality on which the boundaries are constructed in order to legitimize the right of state sovereignty (Ashley & Walker, 1990). For example, in contemporary world, the modern state has been losing its legitimacy in some arenas such as humanitarian space. Thus, normative changes in international relations continually reinterpret and change the definition of political subjects and its identity construction.

Thirdly, 'just as social structures are dependent upon and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal powers and interests of those agents,

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[6] For further discussion, see Barkin & Cronin (1994).

[7] For these rationalist claims, see Waltz (1993) and Keohane (1989).

[8] Meanwhile, importantly, the de-constructivist theorists claim that one needs to think the genealogy of the normative justification and ontological construction of sovereignty. For further information, see Bartelson (1995).

are constituted and therefore explained by structures' (Wendt, 1987, p. 359). Because of this mutual construction between structures and identities, norms vary, change and transform into new forms in accordance with interpretations and interests of agents.[9] As Katzenstein described,

> The authors use the concept of *norm* to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors with a given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having 'constitutive effects' that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have 'regulative' effects that specify standards of proper behavior. Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, or they do both. (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5)

The modern state constituted its identity by way of monopolizing some functions of structure, and it regulated behaviours by means of these monopolizations. In order to construct national identity, the modern state firstly eliminated other centres of violence and constructed its monopoly of violence as an internationally recognized norm (Thomson, 1994). Besides this, it had the right of taxation in order to establish a bureaucracy and armies (Linklater, 1996), which are operational functions of states used to construct conscious interactions with other states on the bases of a definitive rule of sovereignty. Thirdly, the state has a monopolistic role to define political identity, social separation and otherness. Lastly, the state monopolizes the legal borders of its society by way of the law (Ibid.).

The constructivist theoretical positions also characterize changes of social structures beyond materialist structural repetition. According to the constructivist theorization, 'social structures have three elements: material resources, shared knowledge, and practices' (Wendt, 1995, p. 73). Power was originally considered a product of the modern state's physical capacity, but modes of information have become the most important elements of power consideration (Ibid.). As a result, the modern state identity is defined by a 'bifurcation in which the state-centric system now coexist with an equally powerful, though more decentralised, multi-centric system' (Rosenau, 1990, p. 11), which gets it free from classical definitions of interests, anarchy, borders and the sovereignty of rationalism. Besides this, the classical relation between territoriality and political subject/state is changing in accordance with normative changes in the definition of sovereign subjects. For example, 'the right to environmental protection … requires the action of institutions that transcend the nation states,

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[9] For a good discussion on this subject, see Wendt (1994).

which are incapable of effectively guaranteeing them' (Rocco & Selgas, 2006, p. 146). In this respect, the 'transnationalisation of life … requires the use of means that go beyond the national state … [therefore] environmental rights cannot be understood outside a transnational context' (Ibid, p. 145).

More essentially, in the constructivist agenda, the 'identities, interests and behaviour of political agents are socially constructed by collective meanings and interpretations and assumptions about the world' (Adler, 1997, p. 324). Therefore, in order to understand how identity is constructed, norms are the fundamental elements to research. The modern nation state system is based on a fundamental norm called sovereignty (Reus-Smit, 1997). Sovereignty depends on recognition within determined concrete borders, which are governed by a totalized notion called nation. Institutions are based on defined norms and principles in which the identity of a particular institution is rooted (Reus-Smit, 1999). Norms do not only define and legitimate the institutions, but they also define the rightful actions of institutions (Ibid.). Thus, there is no certain rational principle to idealize the nation state and its totalizing identity. In this respect, every identity creates its own structure and actors in line with a defined set of rules and norms.

Contrary to the realist and rationalist theorization, identity creation seeks to reproduce and transform the structures (Wendt, 1994) from the early point of the modern state to the contemporary world. In particular, the construction of identity can be originated from domestic or international society (Ibid.). However, according to the constructivist approach it is not persuasive to seek a concrete difference between internal and international identity creation. Thus, the state's identity and interests are created and transformed in line with the corporate coexistence and influence of internal and international structures. In the early period of the modern state, as the dichotomy between the internal and international increased, the identity creation of the state gradually became an exclusionary process (Linklater, 1998). Historically, formations of norms and identity have always had a totalizing character that wants to include and transform all the actors of the system. In this way, the identity and constitutional norms of the system have been transformed in accordance with the expectations of the state system in the modern state era. Firstly, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Christian community, which was based on heterogenic and disorganized institutions, gradually transformed into the sovereign rights of monarch and its unity. The main institutional basis of this transformation was achieved by the Treaty of Westphalia, which determined the fundamental norms of the state system (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). In this way, the non-intervention of sovereign states became a fundamental norm of the state system.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the absolutist rights of monarchs were replaced by the positivist rights of the nation and the homogenous nation-state identity (Reus-Smit, 1997). The formation of identity gradually created a new set of norms regarding sovereignty and recognition. The recognition of national borders and the absolute control of nations within their borders became fundamental rules of the nation state system. Although the provision of the Wien Conference tried to defend the status quo, the institutions inevitably complied with the norms of state sovereignty and identity of the nation state. In this way, the interests of nation states became more important than anything else. In the same way, in the first period of the twentieth century, the institutional improvements were in accordance with the nation state system of sovereignty. The principle of self-determination was a concrete implementation of the norms and identities of the sovereign nation state system. Interestingly, although some normative and humanitarian improvements, such as the Hague codifications and the abolition of slavery, were carried out, nation state identity was still determined and strong in that historical period. That is why the state still had the unrestricted right to decide how it behaved towards its citizens in the early twentieth century.[10]

After the Second World War, the normative bases of the nation state system transformed considerably. The interests of the state became no longer the primary or sole motivation of states, but instead many other things, such as human security and human rights, became definitive characteristics in the international field.[11] For instance, after the Second World War, for the first time in history a nation was legally sentenced for genocide. This was not the first example of genocide in history, but there was no recognized norm for sanctions. However, after the declaration of the UN Genocide Convention, genocide was no longer seen as an internal problem for sovereign states and it was deemed a crime. Crimes against humanity were recognized and offenders were sentenced by an international court. Here, the developing political subjectivity of globalization is being practised without having a global government. The term 'international community' has often been repeated, and its power has been increasing compared to national identities. To sum up, moral and structural changes continually transform the identity of political subjects/states into different moral and normative bases. Consequently, how to define the identity of political subjects and to understand how to change these political identities are still vivid and ongoing questions to answer in international relations.

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[10] For further information, see Finnemore (1996a).

[11] For further information, see Donnelly (1995).

Aims of this thesis

This thesis proposes to use Bourdieusian thoughts in order to rethink state identity – or, more broadly in a historical context, the identity of the political subject in accordance with the research question identified above. In doing so, it has two fundamental aims:

To utilize Bourdieusian terminology in order to improve a structural constructivist approach that contributes continuation and change in the identity of political subjectivity in international relations.

In accordance with this aim, this thesis offers a conceptual framework which aims to show the mutual and relatively equal existence of structure and ideation in the formation of the identities of political subjects. In this way, I try to utilize key Bourdieusian terminology to understand the intertwined foundation of objective and normative structures in state identity. By looking at the state as a social entity, I pursue the idea that states are social entities embodying certain cultural and social capital which link them to certain structural spaces. In a similar way to the individuals in a society, this study focuses on how states are affected by the embodiment of existing historical structures rather than the structure in which they live. In this way, I try to reinterpret the meaning of violence in international relations. Therefore, this study puts great emphasis on the construction of violence. Beyond the rationalist and constructivist understanding of anarchy, this study aims to theorize that the identity of state is exposed to symbolic or non-physical violence rather than the physical existence of violence. By evaluating the state as a social entity, I have translated a Bourdieusian understanding of dominance and hierarchy, which helps me to characterize symbolic violence and the differentiation of state positional distribution in international relations. This perspective also helps us to define the meaning and style of continuation and change in the characteristics of political subjects. In particular, I attempt to research the foundation of norms and symbolic violence relation which maintains and changes the characteristics of hierarchy and dominance.

To contribute and develop existing constructivist understanding of state/political subject via Bourdieusian sociology and terminology.

In fact, a constructivist approach has made considerable contributions via comprehensively evaluating and emphasizing state identity as an important element to understand the nature of international relations and the changes in this nature. However, there are some weaknesses in the theoretical orientation of constructivism which can be achieved by a Bourdieusian perspective. Constructivism is mainly based on a state awareness regarding

its ideational production, which creates interactions and norms in international relations. Social interactions do not promise a comprehensive answer to the dilemma of the existence of anarchy and norms simultaneously. Indeed, how to form awareness-creating ideas and norms are an uncertain point in the constructivist evaluation. At the least, without a self-reflective look at the state and its own identities it is ambiguous whether the state's awareness is independent from any structural causation. States' normative beliefs are organized by social interactions, but a historical and structural distribution of state positions does not provide an international field which depends on equal and similar conditions for the creation of conscious ideas. Indeed, the identity of the state cannot create something beyond the sum of its potential ideational arsenal, which is bordered in a Bourdieusian understanding by its habitus. Therefore, the existence of anarchy may be a more cultural and social metaphor beyond the awareness of state identity. At this point, Bourdieu provides us with some theoretical tools to understand the unconscious historical foundation of anarchy in the process of conscious identity construction. This point is explained by constructivists, who claim that the existence of anarchical characteristics of the international system depends on a degree of internalization regarding norms. Because of the lack of a self-reflective mechanism regarding identity, state internalization is most likely to require a structural constructivist approach which reflects the intertwined relations of identity, anarchy and norms in a more comprehensive way.

Beside this, Bourdieu contributes a constructivist identity study by way of improving ambiguity about change in state identity. Explaining the change in identities via social interactions does not reflect the whole characteristics of changes in international relations. Constructivists generally emphasize collective cognitive processes, which leads to norms that create institutional changes in practices. Despite the collective cognitive process, the existence and risks of anarchy impair the understanding of changes in identity construction. Here, Bourdieu also provides a good resource to distinguish the cognitive processes from the existence of the restricted habitual arsenal of states. Bourdieu reminds us that not every actor in the same society has the same subjective infrastructure to join the same cognitive learning process and channels. More precisely, subjects of international society objectively participate the same cognitive normative process, but they cannot have the same degree of cognitive embedded knowledge, which results in differentiation of awareness. Indeed, there are two main tendencies to explain cognitive normative processes in the constructivist ideation. One way is for international society to form norms which define and change state identities. Secondly, internal societal evaluations of state subject shape the identity of states in international society. Bourdieu sits in between these two constructivist explanations and helps

us to understand the intrinsic coexistence of internal and international society in state identity. Indeed, Bourdieu combines constructed effects of international society and historical structural processes of internal society in order to theorize the identification and changes of state political identity in international relations.

Methodology

This research is divided into two logical stages, which are researched throughout the six chapters. The first stage of this thesis is the understanding of the theoretical and terminological applicability of Bourdieu, especially his symbolic capital concept, to the field of political identity and subjectivity in international relations. The second stage is the interpretation of relations between the construction of political subjectivity, especially state identity and different types of capital, as political, economic, cultural and social capital respectively. In the first stage, I try to discuss generally all of Bourdieu's relevant theoretical materials, which help us to understand the identity of political subjectivity in international relations in distinctive ways. In the second stage, I focus on the specific theoretical orientation of identity, capital and field relations. In this way, I support my theoretical research with conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis contributes to this research by making a meaningful explanation of the formation of categorization, vision and division of identity. Therefore, in each specific chapter of the second stage, I critically apply different methodological concepts that are practically interconnected with each other. The reason why I rely on conceptual analyses and combine conceptual analysis with my theoretical analysis is that perspectives are important, such as in the following statement:

> [Identity is] an actor's experience of a category, tie, role, network, group or organization, coupled with a public representation of that experience; often takes the form of a shared story, a narrative. (Tilly, 1996, p. 7)

Identity is a categorization and division which promotes and imposes a representation of collective history in the experiences of previous subjects in the former structural divisions. Therefore, this study's emphasis regarding how a vision of division in political subjectivity, particularly in modern state identity, is produced is related to an unconscious representation of previous structures into the collective bodies of states. This hypothesis relies on structural deficiencies which create epistemological and discursive inadequacies between political subjects regarding the self-reflexivity of their divisions in identities which will be discussed in this dissertation. In order to focus on how to produce relevant transition from the sociological terminology of Bourdieu to the constitutive terminology of Bourdieusian international

relations, I consider the interrelations between objective structures and subjective structures of Bourdieu, which indicate an intertwined cohabitation of dispositions in the field. Following this, these general practice of Bourdieusian theory is transferred into specific fields of capital production which define the characteristics of produced identity. In this way, I theoretically examine the validity of Bourdieusian terminology within the specific capital allocation of identity. Lastly, I research how a methodological concept subjectively produces and reproduces a distinctive sense of vision and division in different fields of capital.

Another methodological differentiation in the stages of this research is based on how the distinction of Bourdieu is defined in the description of state identity in international relations. The first theoretical stage fundamentally discusses the descriptive part of Bourdieu in identity understanding. This study defends the idea that Bourdieusian study in international relations is very productive theoretical ground for understanding the representation of political subjectivity in international relations. In relation to this presupposition, I present all Bourdieusian terminology in this part. I critically conduct a study to illustrate how Bourdieu helps to produce a distinctive explanation of the key issues in international relations, such as the agency–structure problem and the representation of identity. Therefore, I test the applicability of some important terminology regarding symbolic capital in international relations. In this way, this stage theoretically reconsiders the agency and structure problem of international relations through a Bourdieusian lens.

The second stage is based on the prescriptive side of the research. I critically discuss the Bourdieusian concept of capital in relation to construction and change in the political subjectivity of state identity. It aims to achieve a prescriptive account in international relations theory regarding how to define the political subject, how to construct identities, how to understand relations between structure and ideas and how to interpret the vision and division of states in international relations. Therefore, in this prescriptive stage I not only work on how to produce political identity and political subjectivity but also focus on how and in what conditions the identities of political agents transform. I reconsider the existence of domination in international relations. Contrary to existing positivist international relations, I theorize how domination is embedded in symbolic pre-existing divisions in the produced rules of international relations. In other words, the study focuses on embedded division in the positions of states and its symbolic reproduction in domination beyond the conscious interpretive and structural consideration of power and its domination in the formation of interests and ideas.

The theoretical background of both stages is based on the social constructivist ideation of identities and political subjects, especially states in international relations. However, the study does not scrutinize the constructivist paradigm as the theoretical otherness of Bourdieusian study of international relations. Rather, particularly in the first stage, I critically review social constructivism in order to see the potential weaknesses in the structure and agency problem which show similarity with ontological engagements of structural theories. Therefore, I consider Bourdieusian international relations as an approach which overcomes the ambiguities of social constructivism. In particular, the first part describes the embedded existence of symbolic violence, which produces a distinctive approach beyond the existence of anarchy as an ontological presupposition of both constructivist and structural theories. In line with the main objective of this study, I research the potential of a structural constructivist approach in international relations. In the first part, I give descriptive elements of what a structural constructivist approach distinctively produces in international relations. In the second part, I highlight the practical productivity of Bourdieu's structural constructivism via specific engagements with methodological concepts. In the second stage, chapters of political, economic, cultural and social capital are researched with the contribution of globalization, neoliberalism, democratization and developing state concepts. These concepts are logically chosen because they have an intertwined coexistence. In this way, I rely on a broader methodological concept of globalization in the third chapter and, in the following chapters, I use a more particular methodological concept in accordance with that of the previous chapter.

In the second chapter of my thesis, I offer my readings of the understanding of Bourdieusian structure with the aim of developing an account of what distinguishes his understanding of structure from the other perspectives and of how his approach improves understanding of identity in international relations. The chapter begins with an evaluation of the constructivist impact on the definition of identity and the ontological dilemma of this definition, in which I discuss that Bourdieu improves the ontological deficiency of identity definition by way of his structural constructivist perspective. I illustrate how Bourdieu distinguishes the understanding of structure by way of his theorization with regards to the production of dispositions. I discuss that the qualification of identity constitution is created by the values embedded within the dispositions before the agents constitute constructive objective relations in the field. In this way, I question the value and reliability of ideas in the creation of identities. I research what takes a prominent role in the determination of identities. The claim that constitutive values and inter-subjective ideas construct dispositions is questioned, because a Bourdieusian understanding of structure proves that a structural

dependent history of dispositions affects how agents produce their interrelations and ideas. Then I turn to rethink the essential impacts of misrecognition from a Bourdieusian perspective, which rejects the conscious control of produced ideas because the agents in less dominated positions always lack a reflexive understanding of self.

Then I turn to the concept of structuring and structured structures, arguing that both structures have an intertwined coexistence on the definition of state identity. I illustrate how Bourdieu understands subjects and structure relations which question objective and subjective differentiations. I consider how Bourdieu theorizes reality and misrecognition relations via *illusio*, and considers the embodiment of accumulated structural history as norms and shared ideas in which objective–subjective differentiation are rendered invisible. Then I focus how structured structures function as the base of division and classification of identities. In this way, I research the productive power of structured structures on the productions of symbolic capital. In particular, I indicate its functionalization on the unequal distribution of habitus between the agents, which results in positional differentiation in the international field. Then I emphasize the mutual cooperation of recognition and structured structures in international relations. I emphasize that value creates itself spontaneously when the agents struggle to achieve a certain kind of capital or its doxic relations. In this way, I aim to show how to distribute distinction in line with structured values of structures. I try to reach an understanding of how a classification mechanism objectifies itself through the domination of produced symbolic capital.

Then I turn my attention to the symbolic power of identity. This is the variety of thought that indicates how collectiveness and its collective subjectivity, in which cognitive process and its interests are objectified, are created. Therefore, I focus on the functionalization of symbolic capital as means of collectivizing domination. I examine how certain domination determines itself in the predisposed symbolic capital of agents. Further, in order to emphasize the spontaneous embodiments of dominant symbolic violence into the identities of agents, I show how symbolic violence is unconsciously represented as objectified forms of doxa within the international field. In this way, I set out the engagement between the structural effects of accumulated history and the divisionary characteristics of symbolic violence into the organizational bases of international relations. I show that the subjectivity of identity has a pre-given nature which is characterized within the field via an objectified form of common knowledge – or, as Bourdieu named it, doxa. I introduce how political identities embody values of structured domination. Ultimately, I try to show the arbitrariness of production of symbolic power, which forms values of categorization that shape the definition of identities.

Then, drawing on Bourdieu's ideas, I develop my argument on political identity and change. Firstly, I look at the construction of modernity and its state identity. I discuss how modernity transformed the previous interpretation of political subjectivity in international field. Secondly, I observe how the state's political identity transforms into different forms beyond the theorization and institutionalization of modernity. Thus, I go beyond the perspectives which claim that state identity is an objectification of sovereignty or power relations which are produced by relations of states. I consider the identification of state identity as a fraction of capital accumulation. The accumulation of existing structural symbolic power essentially affects the transformative production of identity. In this way, I discuss the construction of modern state identity in line with symbolic power and a symbolic capital understanding of Bourdieu. Then I turn my attention to the discussions of how the symbolic capital of modernity loses ground in defining the subjectivity of states in the contemporary international field. I conceptualize how to define political identification beyond modernity. Therefore, I research differentiations in descriptive symbolic orientation within contemporary international relations. In particular, I observe transformations in the institutionalization of sovereignty in contemporary international relations, which create ungovernable zones for the classical understanding of state identity and its subjectivity. As a result, I argue that new transitions of capital allocation distinguish the distribution of state identities.

From this, I establish my concept of the international field. Firstly, I discuss how a Bourdieusian understanding of the field is a relevant conceptualization in order to define the international field of politics. I argue that field and habitus engagements illustrate how to construct realities in international relations. I find that, even though political identity and political subjects differ, they always produce similar forms of habitus and field engagements in order to produce a categorization of identity. I observe that the transformation of political subjectivity represents a different interpretation of identity within a more complex field of relations. A different expression of political subjectivity always produces its unique practical field, which distributes identities in line with a predisposed nobility of domination. Therefore, I discuss that the representation quality of certain political collectiveness, such as modern state identity, depends on characteristics of accumulated capital which objectify compatibility between accumulated capital allocations and structured nobility in the international field. Then, I focus on how the field credits and produces certain realities. I objectify the production of realities via discussions on how to define security within different state identities. I try to show that the understanding of security creates different roles in accordance with the

positional distribution of identities. Eventually, I conclude this stage by expressing how Bourdieusian study creates a distinguishing understanding of identity in international relations. In this respect, I argue that Bourdieu refuses duality in objective and subjective structures, indicates the pre-given nature of habitus beyond social interactions and constructions, represents embedded nobility within the socio-cultural field of practices and theorizes how domination subjectively reproduces itself within the identity of subjects, which shows us how transformation come into existence despite the existence of domination.

In the third chapter, firstly I provide a reinterpretation of debates with regards to theory and practice relations in international relations, and focus on Bourdieusian theory and practice in comparison, especially, with the existing constructivist perspective in international relations. I also discuss how to understand the relations between history and nature and the subjects of political identity. In this way, I lead to arguments which conceptualize how collectivization on the basis of identities creates its own understanding of self-limitation. Therefore, the chapter begins by arguing the compatibility between an understanding of self-limitation and an understanding of reality or objectivity in the international field. I logically contribute the idea that a good compatibility between self-limitation and artificial realities results in a good distribution of stability in the objective world. I note that there is an inseparable mutual existence between common sense reality and recognized membership of the international field. I then rethink relations of power and the political field, which produce bases of legitimacy in international relations. I rely on a Bourdieusian understanding of power–field relations, which indicates that power is a relational phenomenon. I note that such an understanding of power is related to definitions of interests in international relations, but argue that these interests not only depend on objective forms but also include subjective socio-cultural knowledge and interests simultaneously. In following this, I consider in detail the definition of the political field in international relations. Before I go on to make a conceptual discussion, I also discuss the problem of reflexivity and definition of the bureaucratic field in international relations via a Bourdieusian understanding of reflexivity. In particular, I note that the importance of the bureaucratic field in international relations is generally overseen by the theory of international relations.

In the conceptual part of the third chapter I engage with globalization and symbolic violence. Here, I represent a reading of the Bourdieusian habitus approach as a moderator of the forms of symbolic capital which produce domination via a reproduction of inequality, anarchy and legitimacy in international relations. I argue how globalization changes structured doxic relation beyond symbolic violence of modernity. The globalizing

representation of political subjectivity is theoretically constructed as emancipation from inequality and stratification, but in practice it redefines the existing symbolic violence of modernity within a wider spatial field of practice. Then I discuss the objectification of globalization within neoliberal institutionalization. In this way, I aim to show how globalization produces a new historicizing process beyond modern state subjectivity. In the final text, I discuss the characteristics of the new bureaucratic field of globalization. I define the characteristics of relations between the new bureaucratic field and the political field in the globalizing process. I research the differentiation of institutionalizations between the modern identity of the state and a globalizing identity of political subjectivity. Essentially, I argue that globalization tries to impose new forms of legitimization which impair the legitimate roots of modern identity distribution in international relations. Finally, I consider how globalization produces norms which change the doxic relations of states in international relations.

In chapter four, I move away from the existing study of international political economy in order to consider the economic field via a Bourdieusian study of economic capital. Drawing on the contemporary constructivist engagement of international political economy, I argue that Bourdieusian structural constructivism can improve the existing understanding of constructivist political economy in international relations. Therefore, my arguments here focus on the similarities of the Bourdieusian and constructivist understandings of political economy and the distinction of the Bourdieusian economic field beyond the constructivist economy. I firstly rely on the constructivist perspective, which sees the economic field as a result of the creation processes of social engagements. Thus, constructivists do not theorize any rationality. Rather, the economic field depends on a collective understanding of relations. As a result, I argue that interpretations of the economic field in constructivist political economy are as important as the factual objective data of the economy. In line with this, I discuss a constructivist understanding of agency in accordance with political capital. Constructivism thinks that agents are not simple implementers of objective interests which are defined beyond their own ideas and identities. Rather, agents are active creators of their interests in accordance with their knowledge of interactions. Following this, I develop my claims on a distinction of the Bourdieusian economic field. I firstly discuss why Bourdieu questions the interactionist emphasis of economic capital. He claims that the structured existence of accumulated history always influences the institutionalization of economic capital. Then I discuss how Bourdieu understands norms distinctively beyond social construction. In this way, I consider the habitual tendencies of agents within the political field of international relations. In line with Bourdieu, I argue that embedded form of culture is an

inseparable part of the economic field, which imposes the effects of structured structures onto the identity of states. Indeed, I discuss how embedded subjective capital and its culture produce doxic reflexes from agents or states. And, finally, Bourdieusian economic capital questions interpretations of agents because the habitus of agents impairs the subjectivity of agents on their thoughts.

Then I turn to considering the conceptual side of economic field via neoliberalism. I start by considering how self-limitation and a sense of reality are produced in the economic field. In this way, my main objective is to illustrate how neoliberalism changes the sense of limits in modern state identity and how it produces new realities which are objectified by the institutionalization of neoliberal economic capital. I critically engage the changing vision and division of neoliberalism, which transform the stratification of political subjectivity in international relations. Then I exemplify this transformation of neoliberal policies via an objective institutional observation of the international political field. Following this, I consider how neoliberalism changes territoriality understanding of modernity. Firstly, I give relevant discussions on the topic, such as homogenization, glocalization[12] and hybridization, which consider how neoliberal expansion conceptualizes the economic field. In line with Bourdieu, I provide an alternative understanding of neoliberalism and territoriality understanding based on a re-collectivization of the political subject beyond a modern understanding of territoriality. Lastly, I conclude this chapter with discussions on how neoliberalism impairs existing states' collective borders and identities. The social side of states' modern collectiveness is seen as the otherness of neoliberalism. Therefore, neoliberalism firstly impairs social democracy understanding of modernity.

Chapter five follows the general structure of the thesis and researches cultural capital in international relations. The chapter opens with the characteristics and definition of cultural capital from a Bourdieusian perspective. I critically engage the functionality of cultural capital in the production and reproduction of political subjectivity of modern state identity. I try to show how a Bourdieusian perspective of cultural capital produces a distinctive approach between structural and constructivist approaches. Then I discuss the fundamental norms of the Westphalian system in accordance with my argument of cultural capital in international relations. In this way, I argue that cultural capital is free from the produced knowledge of

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[12] The term means the simultaneous and intertwined presences of localization and globalization. It indicates that globalisation can be integrated into the local values peacefully. For more information, Robertson (1995)

common sense in the subjective identities of states. In line with this, I question the fundamental constructivist understanding of sovereignty, legitimacy and morality. I question how states, as collective agencies of modernity, become conscious regarding their produced knowledge and identities and how cultural capital defines the value of identity between the agencies of the international field. In this respect, I argue that cultural capital fundamentally substitutes the role of morality in international relations. Then I discuss the intertwined relations of common sense and domination in line with cultural capital. Following this, I emphasize the function of cultural capital on the determination of the categorization and division of positions between states.

Following this, I research how cultural capital functions as a mechanism of transformation in international relations. Although a Bourdieusian engagement of cultural capital is seen as a very static representation of reproduction, I argue that the cultural capital approach simultaneously also embodies the relevant functionalization of transformation. Then I reconsider Bourdieusian forms of cultural capital within the study of international relations. In this way, I trace the embodied, objectified and institutionalized cultural capital in the international field. Embodied cultural capital is fundamentally related to the distributions of positions in international relations. Alongside this, I propose that the objectified cultural capital of the international field depends on the existence of international law, which creates a functionalization of the vision and division of state identities. Lastly, I consider institutionalized cultural capital in accordance with produced agreements and regimes of international relations. Then I indicate how dominance produces itself via a production of legitimacy in international relations. Indeed, I discuss how legitimacy becomes the battlefield of domination which constitutes the characteristics of recognized subjectivity in international relations. Finally, the chapter closes with a conceptual methodological engagement of the understanding of democratization. In this way, I consider democratization in order to practise the findings of the chapters regarding cultural capital in international relations.

In chapter six, I introduce what social capital is and explain how I can apply social capital in international relations. I begin with an introductory summary of the concept of social capital because social capital is explained in distinctive ways within social sciences. In specifically engaging with a constructivist understanding of social capital, I try to rethink what social agents struggle to achieve in order to gain legitimacy within the field of collectiveness. Then I apply a Bourdieusian conceptualization of agency in order to understand how agents produce their sense of belonging in the common field of practice. These explanations are followed by considerations of how Bourdieusian social capital creates

a distinction to identify the political identities of states within the international field. In this way, I try to find out how Bourdieu is distinguished from a constructivist understanding of identity construction in international relations. I discuss the roles of habitus beyond conscious ideas and ideologies. I note that having an identity inevitably imposes a certain vision and division within the field, but the motivation of agents regarding the demand for legitimacy creates a misrecognition regarding the self-cate gorizing function of identity construction. In this way, I presuppose that the state is a social entity which has its own characteristics and personality. Following this supposition, I discuss the inequality of social capital distribution among the states, and the functionalization of social capital as a set of obligations for recognition.

In the remaining parts of the last chapter, I indicate further descriptive research on social capital and state identity relations. I focus in detail on how social capital functions as a producer of inequality between the theoretically equal identities of states. Here I note that there is a positive correlation between the accumulation of social capital and the stabilization of denomination in the field. In this way, I indicate that social capital is a value which creates stratified forms of positions in field. These differentiated forms of positions guarantee the domination because dominated identities of states define their positions in accordance with positions of domination. I then examine the potential of Bourdieusian social capital in international relations via the developing state concept. Essentially, I research how developing state identities and positions are defined in the international field. I focus on the advancement of developing states regarding the accumulation of social capital because it shows the links between a lack of social capital and the definition of positions within the international field. Finally, I discuss how a lack of social capital weakens the networking qualification of developing states in international relations.

Significance of study

I believe that analysing Bourdieusian study and his terminology in international relations is an original way of studying the political subjectivity of states. There are few, primitive, studies examining Bourdieu in international relations, and these have attempted to discuss whether Bourdieu is appropriate to apply in international relations. Thus, this study is one of the earliest attempts to propose Bourdieusian study as a relevant and innovative resource for international relations theory, and to transfer his terminology into the international relations field. Consequently, this study seeks grounds for the potential of a structural constructivist approach through a Bourdieusian lens beyond social constructivist perspectives. This study

believes that Bourdieusian structural constructivism improves the ontological ambiguities of constructivist approaches with regards to anarchy in international relations. Besides this, this study strongly discusses that Bourdieusian studies in international relations can potentially answer many dichotomies and chronic questions such as theory–practice engagements and objective and subjective structure differentiation within the field of international relations. Furthermore, I believe that this study will be theoretically innovative in understanding not only the production and reproduction of political subjects and identities but also changes in political subjectivity. It is, therefore, hoped that this study will offer new theoretical expansions within the field of international relations.

CHAPTER 2
IDEATIONAL CAPITAL AND IDENTITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Structures

Just as identity lies at the heart of sociological research regarding the formation of social groups, political identities are instrumental in dominating the interpretation of political subjectivity. There are a lot of discussions and identifications, yet these raise difficulties in understanding how political identities empower the parallel mobilization of its subjects in the field of politics. As outlined in the previous chapter, constructivist international relations theory has seen heated and powerful debates on the formation and change of political identities, which have become a blueprint for further discussions of the concept. Further debates on the issue mostly use similar conceptual approaches with social construction debates. Linda Alcoff tries to depict phenomenology and the embodiment of identities. She emphasizes the interpretive roles of social beings that dialogically produce visible identities (Alcoff, 2006). Ernesto Laclau researches the orientation of subjectivity in the construction of identity, which is constitutively maintained by *acts of identification*, playing a central role in the reconstruction of political identities (Laclau, 1994). Similarly, Charles Tilly inspires *creative interactions*, creating representative shared ideas by the way of knowledgeable actions of individuals (Tilly, 2003). Although these studies produce distinctive approaches on political identities, they still engage knowledgeable ideas, interactional interpretation and mutually constitutive functions of identities which analogically represent somewhat constructivist discussions of political identities.

Rather essential peculiarities of these post-structural approaches are the underestimation or ignoring of the 'structural ontology' of the construction or existence of political identities (Ladyman, 1998). This research argues that structures still have determinative power of political identities beyond interactions and social constructions. Debates on the transformation dilemma in political identities from particularism to universalism trivialize the importance of structural equilibrium in the objectification of subjectively oriented political identities. Structural predetermination, or the ontological dilemma of structures, is a fundamentally intertwined component of political identity formation, yet it disappears in the objective field of inter-subjective construction where political subjects practise their underdetermined subjective dispositions. In this respect, I argue that Bourdieu's conceptual terminology and his approach to structural considerations

have very influential points to understand the (re)formation of political identities and its subjects. In line with Bourdieusian study, it is argued here that (re)formation in the actions of political agents does not come into existence in accordance with a certain normative way and universal *de facto*, but political subjects constitute dispositions which proceed from their historical accumulations of sociality. Political subjects have different dispositions according to their positions of structures, constituting their subjective field, because dispositions are not standardized forms but are socialized products of accumulated historical structure and objective constructing structure relations. In this respect, Bourdieu fundamentally provides a 'genetic structuralism' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 14), which helps us to understand how structuration affects the ideational construction of political identities.

Dispositions as the equilibrium of objective structures are the products of *habitus*. As Bourdieu described,

> Constructing the notion of habitus as a system of acquired dispositions functioning on the practical level as categories of perception and assessment or as classificatory principles as well as being the organizing principles of action meant constituting the social agent in his true role as the practical operator of the construction of objects. (Ibid., p. 13)

The core of this explanation problematizes that subjects conceptualize their dispositions in accordance with a practical notion which is not rooted in a constructive objective world. These dispositions externalize themselves by way of two distinctive manifestations simultaneously. They both function as practically applied structural principles and ideationally operated objective constructions. In this respect, political subjects develop their dispositions in accordance with their degree of historical social accumulation, and this accumulation affects the further production of dispositions, which defines the position of subjects in the objective field. The perception of objective structures is based on the subjective disposition of habitus, which operates the inheritances of former structural fields. Therefore, dispositions are to reach equilibrium somehow, continually leading to a new totality of the social field in accordance with the re-structuration of existing structures in line with dispositions. In this aspect, the modern political subjects of states emerged as the dominant disposition in the field of international relations because structured habitus formed dispositions to habilitate tendencies of state, which operate the consciousness of societies as quasi-comprehensive responses of the objective field (Goldmann, 1975). Thus, modern nation states constructed their subjective symbolic considerations in their habitus as 'the source of cognition without consciousness, intentionally without intention, and a practical mastery of the world's regularities which allows one to anticipate the future' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 12).

The transformation of identities is linked to dispositions, which are products of interrelations in transforming objective and conserving subjective structures (Bourdieu, 1990b). Political identities are operated by preoccupied habitus and given realities of objective world in order to accumulate more recognition in the objective field. Interrelations of objective and subjective structures reinterpret the understanding of what will be recognized and misrecognized in the objective field. These intertwined relations are one of the distinctive element of Bourdieusian understanding identity, because they are mostly disregarded by post-structural political identity research. Post-structural research is mostly based on interpretations, conceptualizing the dehistoricization of changed political interpretation and pure empiricism of 'social' (Nicholson & Seidman, 1996, pp. 8–9). However, the dehistoricization of political identities only interprets actual bases; it cannot conceive of the domination of practical unconscious as embodied actions in the international field. In other words, a historical structural perspective is necessary to see unconscious practical dispositions of political subjects which are not socially constructed in the objective field. Structural totality of history constantly imposes the production of new dispositions in habitus. The transformation of habitus is perceived and interpreted differently by individuals according to their objective positions in the field. In this way, structures are unconsciously regenerated by means of political subjects' conscious practices on their political identities.

The relations between political subjects depend on the totalizing equilibrium of structures in the habitus, which satisfy specific necessities of domination. In the Bourdieusian context, these specific necessities are kinds of 'ontological complexity' or 'a subconscious fit' as an intentionality and principle without any rationality (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 108). In other words, when political subjects or states manifest their habitus in the field they consider their actions as kinds of rational and conscious strategies, but they are mainly based on a subconscious and complex intentionality. In this way, political subjects always reinterpret their identities in terms of this objective adjustment process, yet they are unconscious to negotiate how these are reconstructed in accordance with the pressure of a preoccupied subjective world. Thus, I argue here that political identities constitute a totalizing basis in the real world, but they depend highly on the construction of structured history in order to create further totalities, serving the demands of domination. Therefore, habitus and its disposition illustrate how political identities constitute their bases according to the necessities of political subjects and how they change the understanding of political identification in accordance with the changes in the habitus of the historical processes.

The underdetermined effects of structures on political identity formation design the fundamental dilemmas of social constructive identity theorization. As discussed, the constructivist approach tries to separate its 'holistic ontology' from realist scientific understanding, and it perceives that identities are constructed, but it also explains certain aspects of the identity as given (Zehfuss, 2002). Improbably, identity becomes a contextual entity in social construction. At the very core of my argument, this ontological side of the holistic or totalizing identity actually points out underdetermined structural effects on identity. Identity is a kind of symbolic capital. It is formed by dispositions which are the totalizing predisposition of structures. Political identities are not automatically socially constructed. Rather, dispositions adapt them according to the practical unconscious actions of political subjects. Consequently, the consensus on legitimacy and recognition does not depend on free cognitive actions or operations. Habitus operates its dispositions, which produces the content of legitimacy and recognition. In this way, habitus produces disparate objective practices which differentiate according to the field (Bourdieu, 1990a). Therefore, sovereign legitimacy and mutual recognition among the political subjectivity of modern states are not cognitive properties of international relations, but these notions are predisposed adjustments which are subject simultaneously to conservation and transformation.

Habitus functions as both a system for the predisposition of objective structures and a producer of perception for the constructive field (Ibid.). In this way, political subjects unconsciously produce classificatory bases of political identities because habitus concretizes the objective differentiation of field in order to satisfy a degree of totalizing equilibrium. Bourdieu not only evaluates the objective structure and its social construction but also depicts how structures function as a predisposing reason for the perception of identity. The (re)formation of identities is always involved in conserved dispositions because individuals inhabit and codify structured dispositions in their habitus. Thus, shared knowledge of agents is not purely acquired in the process of social interaction. Rather, it is structured in the preoccupied habitus of individuals. Common senses or shared ideas are unconsciously acquired by habitus, but political subjects pretend to have their own consciousness of political identity when they are influenced by their perceptions.

The state, as 'the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital' (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 4), is an objective field of political identity whose borders are structured according to the totalizing characteristics of habitus. Therefore, the formation of the political identities within state borders is independent from a kind of 'scientific objectivation' (Bourdieu, 2003a, pp. 284–285) which focuses on the objectification of

objectivizers as well. Ideas and interactions are just one side of political identity construction. In order to construct political identities, political subjects use 'the historical unconscious' (Ibid., p. 285) as a kind of cognitive structure which is in practice internalized in structures. Therefore, political identities, from the primitive clan to modern state identities, are based on two different fields: an objective field, where interests are embodied and proliferated, and a cognitive unconscious field, where reasons for normative frame, understanding and recognition are pre-consciously attained in habitus. Political identities always have conscious constructed and cognitive unconscious bases. The cognitive unconsciousness of the subjective field is the realm of the normative construction of the identity. As cognitive unconsciousness weakens, particular identities obtain new importance, roles, fields and interests in order to satisfy a new equilibrium on the basis of a new style of structural and symbolic domination.

At this point, it is important to rethink an important term of Bourdieu's 'allodoxia' in line with the political identities. The term basically means misrecognition regarding the recognition of an order (Miller, 2003). In other words, identities unconsciously depend on cognitive processes and preoccupied symbolic habitus of individuals, yet individuals misperceive that these cognitive processes are parts of their own ideational creation. Allodoxia is a battlefield where the Bourdieusian twofold political identification process is performed by political subjects or states. Firstly, structures are means which determine political subjects' identification of the objective world. Secondly, structures are means which are reformed by the interpretation of political subjects. In other words, allodoxia firstly imposes the predisposed interests of structures and then focuses on the interpretive knowledge of political subjects on their political identities. This knowledge creation process of political identities is similarly maintained at every stage of political identity (re)formation.

In order to understand identity of political subjects, it is important to evaluate the relation and connection between the cognitive field and the objective world (Bourdieu, 2001). Social interactions do not always underlie shared ideas between the actors, and it is not possible to estimate how much particular ideas are voluntarily shared by the subjects, yet political subjects may still behave in accordance with certain kinds of structured frames. In this aspect, it is important to rethink consciousness of subjects on their cognitive structures. As Bourdieu argues,

> When we say that gender, race, class, and other social distinctions are 'socially constructed', we must not forget that there are social conditions and mechanisms of construction of the constructors, including the state which is the great hidden constructor of agents via the mediation of legitimate identities. (Bourdieu, 1996a, p. 199)

In this aspect, one of the essential deficiencies of social construction is related to the construction of constructors. Certain forms of behaviours unconsciously take place in the subjective habitus of individuals that functions as the constructor of the constitutive cognitive actions of political subjects. Modern states, as the subjects of political identity, are influenced by underdetermined structures which predispose their interests by means of national educations, anthems, laws etc. Therefore, states are imposed on by these pre-existent codes, which unconsciously determine the construction of position in the objective fields. Consequently, in order to understand the formation of political identities, it is necessary to have a reflexive focus on the practical habitus of the state beyond the objective social interactions.

Structuring structures

In order to shape perspectives and images, individuals attempt to form meanings of things in the real world. Reality becomes an objectified form because individuals construct perspectives in order to make sense of the real world. This is argued in Bourdieu's work as *illusio* (Bourdieu, 1990b). Whenever individuals are involved in knowing the objective world they embody the identification of structures, which creates realities of field. Reality is not intrinsically objective without meaningful interrelations and identifications which transform a field into a structuring structuration. Interest, anarchy and identity are not intrinsically social realities, but they change into realities after they become meaningful in this structuring field. As Bourdieu explained, the 'immediate meaning of the world … depends on … a homogenous conception of time space, number and cause one which makes it possible for different intellectuals to reach an agreement' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). This implication weakens social construction approaches because it evaluates the objective world as a fraction of the practical immediate form of non-cognitive actions beyond communication processes, institutions, interactions and shared ideas. It is argued here that there are logics, perspectives and interests of identities which are located outside the domain of interaction processes. Subjects of political identity have their own logics and perspectives which are not based on their conscious preferences about the objective world. Structuring structure provides this immediate meaning. In other words, structuring structure highlights how to understand the objective field and to exercise identities because it embodies the totalizing equilibrium of the objective world.

Structuring structures is the way to internalize the objective world. At this point, norms and institutions are important to understand how individuals evaluate the objective

structures. Structures are mutually constitutive by way of shared norms and ideas (Wendt, 1992). However, the political identity of subjects or states is firstly independent from conscious interactions and identities. They are implicitly ascribed by practical unconscious actions which satisfy a recognized position in totalizing equilibrium in the field before political subjects are involved in constructive struggles by means of their own political identities. Whenever states are involved in conscious processes of structuring structures they become parts of founded totality and its domination, which are continually designed in conscious processes of structuring structures. Indeed, 'the "interactionalist" error which insists on reducing relations of power to relations of communication, is not enough to note that relations of communication are always, inseparably, power relations' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 167). Norms and institutions are not standards to define identities. Rather they are intermediary ways to harmonize *illusio* which impose sense of a certain division into a concrete political field. In these processes, ideas are reconstructed as a set of objective institutions which provides new bases for political subjectivity of states in order to reproduce their identities on the basis of *illusio*. In other words, ideas are a kind of intermediary power which constitutes structuring realities of *illusio*. Therefore, the social constructive process is firstly subject to practical unconscious actions of political subjects in structuring structures, yet these unconscious actions re-form institutions and norms in conscious processes of structuring structures.

There is no normative and moral integration or shared norm, before political subjects or states respectively perceive, evaluate and accept structuring structures as occupying realities. Structuring structures provides position for political agents because it brings inter-subjective recognition of positions among the members of political identity. In this way, states become, simultaneously, subjects of both the implicit institution of recognition and the potential transformation of recognition. Because of this, structuring structures compose distinctive symbolic means in different historical terms. These means form disparate kinds of political identities which are operated by different dominations in the forms of dispositions. If existing totalizing equilibrium does not satisfy unconscious domination in the habitus of political subjects, it is most likely to be transformed. The political identity of state performs two important functions in this scale. It unconsciously hides power relations by way of its dominated habitus and then it classifies political subjects via its position in the international field. These functions are hidden in power relations, which generate what is structured in objective fields (Edwards, 2010). Structuring structures, therefore, are to reform a totalizing domination in accordance with structured interests. National sentiment, as the basis of modern

state identity, does not depend on the cognitive preferences of the state, but it is related to practical sentiments of its position in the field of international relations.

Political identity and structuring structure relations theoretically cover the middle bases between two distinctive approaches in this study. Firstly,

> structures are independent of actors within it. It is autonomous. While structure is affected by activities of actors within it, nevertheless the structure has … a determining effect on the behaviour of actors and the outcome of social processes. (Olson & Groom, 1991, p. 224)

At this point, it is argued that structures are not completely independent from subjects' ideation and construction. Therefore, the study separates structures as structuring and structured. This structuration shows what extend state identity can be effective on structures. More importantly, states have conserving and even transformative effects in the field of structuring structures in accordance with how much their habitus is compatible with the structured morality of domination. Secondly, structuring structure and political identity relations mediate the ideas that political subjectivity of state constructs social realities by conscious–cognitive acts of participation; and, therefore, there are preliminary instructional rules which classify the social world to improve participation (Kowert, 2015). The state's ideational field is not independent from the preoccupation of the unconscious ideational and symbolic knowledge. The externalization of political identities is subject to what states internalized in a historical frame. In this way, the state's identity needs a reflexive understanding of state habitus. Purposeful actions are states are always embedded in a domination. This unconscious domination is a very primitive functionalization of political identity from the family and clan to king and modern state. Fundamentally, the political subject always wants to achieve an inter-subjectively recognized position, because it can only survive in a social space – or, as Bourdieu calls it, a field. Thus, the definition of political identity is an automatic practical use of habitual political capital. Political subjects inter-subjectively functionalize its identity in accordance with its capacity of constructed morality in the international field. In line with this, for instance, the concept of the Western state carries meaning, a moral distribution and a distinction beyond a simple sense of locality. In order to have an inter-subjective position in the international field, the other members of political identity describe their position, such as Middle Eastern, which also results in a practical confirmation of domination that shows the extent to which the morality of political subjects is compatible with the morality of understanding the structuring objective world of the international field.

The objectification of identity (re)formation in structuring structures is based on the same functional continuum in whole historical process. Firstly, political subjects embody the occupied symbolic codes and representations to internalize them. Then, political subjects interact in different fields to accumulate recognition. Finally, they unconsciously succeed in knowing subjects in terms of certain realities/meanings and, therefore, they obtain particular types of identity. However, the unconsciousness of individuals is not an invariable process. The consciousness of subjects of their political identities needs to have a reflexive approach to structuring structures. In this respect, structuring structures are objectified by a 'triple historicization' of the agent, fields and the knowing subject (Wacquant, 2000, p. 111). Political agents firstly question their dispositions, interests, and judgments about their identity in structuring structures. After individuals problematize themselves, they question the objective field in which their political identities are constituted. This is important because it questions why political subjects always need to pursue a certain kind of recognition in comparison with others. The centre of the field of power is occupied by recognition. As a result, political agents cannot control their political identification in structuring structures as long as they don't evade boundaries of recognition. Following individuals and their objective field of historicization, political subjects need to question the conscious means of knowledge. The means of knowledge show the way that the totalizing principle, equilibrium of recognition and division are constituted in structuring structures. It is not possible to disconnect the link between the field of power and the objective field as long as political identities are reflexively historicized in this way. Hence, political subjects unconsciously and permanently produce changing historicization by way of an occupied historicizing in habitus without presupposing the actual world (Bourdieu, 1990b).

Structured structures

Structuring structures is the way to internalize the external symbolic and subjective occupation of the objective world. Separately, structured structures produce instruments of interactions for agents in order to get involved in the construction of identities in the real world. The existence of certain symbolic structures is implicitly preceded by former structured structures. Therefore, 'as instrument of knowledge and communication, symbolic structures can exercise a structuring power only because they themselves are structured' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 166). Structuring and structured structures are continually in relation with each other in order to reproduce the realities of false historicizing. In this respect, habitus functions as a transformative instrument which converts the passively and unconsciously

preoccupied subjective world into the objective process of construction. Structured structures incarnate into habitus as the centre of classification, inclusion and exclusion of the identities of individuals. Structured structures and structuring structures are highly intertwined, yet instruments of structured structures vary in relation to structuring structures. Structured structures depend on the means of communication, culture and language (Ibid.). Political subjects form their ideations in accordance with their historically structured dispositions, which obey embedded rules of structured structures. Contrary to the conscious shared ideas of social construction, this is just a degree of consensus on the implicit unconscious perception of identification. This structure prompts the reproduction of social bases. Political subjects or states do not affect any presupposition of former structured structures, yet they can (re)form the structuration of actual structured structures by way of their practices in objective field. In other words, states have no influence in the habitual foundation of their political identities, but they are able to change further production of future political identities.

Therefore, habitus rests upon structured structures in a bilateral way: the formation of habitus is produced by structured structures; and the existence of habitus continually reproduces the field of power (Lizardo, 2004). In the production process of political identities, states do not fall into rational processes but, rather, objective actions are improvized by existing structured rules in the international field. The process regarding objectification of habitus in accordance with structured structures is a dynamic process that rationalizes the improvisational habitus. The objectification of field produces different practices in different political subjects of the same totalized identity because it is exercised by unequally distributed dispositions of habitus. This affects how states make their inclusion and exclusion regarding their objective field of international relations. Structured structures are mostly related to the roots of the totalizing equilibrium of identities. Structured structures incarnate all the necessary bodily knowledge into individuals' habitus. The totalizing equilibrium of bodily knowledge is a *sine qua non* requirement of political identification and it is subject to change in accordance with the historicization of identity. In this respect, pre-modern history influenced into the totalizing principle by way of religious sentiment. Religious sentiment in structured structures firstly created a vision of power which suzerains obeyed because it persuaded a degree of recognition under the presence of the king. Afterwards, religious sentiment in structured structures satisfied the division, approved of by all social classes, of structuring the world despite the hidden unequal division in the field of power. The (re)formative power of structuring structures has affected the dispositional construction of structured structures. In line with this, totalizing equilibrium transformed into the subjective

presence of national sentiment. The national sentiment of identities firstly created a vision of power and then imposed a strong sense of division in the structuring world. Therefore, structured structures transform into structuring structures, after primitive states produce vision and division respectively.

Politics is the overarching field for all objective relations of agents (Bourdieu, 1995a). States struggle to satisfy certain kinds of political identities in order to get recognition. Being parts of recognition also connotes an unconscious consensus on the network of certain political relations. In this respect, political identity is the way for politics to create 'distinction' in the objective world (Lane, 2000). The fundamental aim to fall into this distinction of identities is to enhance recognition. Recognition becomes a reason for the internalization/externalization of certain structures in order to satisfy political identification. This perception of recognition goes beyond social constructive perspectives, evaluating recognition as normative institutional and inter-subjective as 'social closure' (Wendt, 1992, pp. 412–413). Similarly, critical interpretation is likely to interpret recognition in the bases of the moral inter-subjective construction of normativity (Honneth, 2007). However, recognition is mostly related to structured structures of field. Recognition as a social closure is highly problematic. Recognition does not a cognitive basis to (dis)empower political identities. The categorization of identity is unconsciously achieved by the divisionary function of structured structures before recognition is conceptualized by political subjectivity of states. In addition to this, recognition is related to history and the field of historicization rather than normativity and inter-subjectivity. History produces its structured structures before inter-subjective conditions give the meaning of recognition. In other words, normative institutional construction is not independent from the boundaries of states in their practical dispositions in the field of international relations. Recognition is not a direct conscious interest of states. States produce political identity to satisfy a totalizing equilibrium of hidden domination which constructs its recognition. Therefore, recognition is a result of states' practical sense regarding the necessity of their social position in the field rather than a cognitive evaluation of interests. Consequently, recognition is based on conformity between historically accumulated dispositions of states and historically embedded rules of structuring structures in the field of international relations.

Structured structures impose pre-dispositional bodily knowledge, which produces the distinctive social positioning of individuals. The fundamental function of political identities is to form sentimental bases of distinction. Distinction provides means of identification which function as social conditionings to comprehend the borders of the field's conscious process.

Distinction presupposes how individuals interact with the objective field and what behavioural pattern is approved by political identities. As Bourdieu argues,

> The struggles to win everything which, in the social world, is of the order of belief, credit and discredit, perception and appreciation, knowledge and recognition—name, renown, prestige, honour, glory, authority, everything which constitutes symbolic power as a recognized power—always concern the 'distinguished' possessors and 'pretentious' challengers. Pretension, the recognition of distinction that is affirmed in the effort to possess it … (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 251)

Distinction is the field of social positioning. Political subjects obtain the conscious processes of their political identities. Any concrete objective domination or consciously and mutually accepted power construction does not exist in the social positioning process. Recognizing the social positioning of certain political identities also means that a political subject unconsciously becomes part of a field of power beyond its identity. The determination of political identities by means of nationality, gender or race indicates what kind of power field is unconsciously internalized in structured structures. Therefore, the state most probably defines its distinctiveness in accordance with different sub-fields in the field of international relations. This is a necessary practical action by states because their dispositions do not provide adequate position to be involved in certain fields. In other words, structuring states' dispositions may not fulfil the requirements of the structured rules of the field. As a result of this, structured structures concentrate on the creation of appropriate positions for the political subjects they construct implicitly otherness and division. In other words, the division of political identities is embodied before political subjects inter-subjectively construct interactions with each other.

To know how the inclusion and exclusion mechanism operates in accordance with structured structures of fields of power, it is also important to see how culture and the language of structured structures organize the subjective sphere of habitus. Culture and language function as inculcation mechanisms for the reconstruction of structured structures and spheres for interactions where values of cultural and linguistic productions transform symbols and dispositions into meaningful justification means of identity. Different products within the cultural and linguistic field form unconscious borders of habitus, which interpret and achieve distinctive structures and conditions (Ibid.). In this respect, culture and language do not only provide objective codes, but also provide the ways for political subjects to position their identities in the objective field. When culture is perceived by way of nationalistic sentiments, habitus takes the position of objectifying nationalistic values to enhance its position inter-subjectively in international relations. In this respect, culture and

language function as the bordered subjectivity of reproduced national sentiments. Consequently, divisions and exclusion between states are operated by dispositions which objectify themselves by means of culture and language. Language and culture cannot be separated from the interests of totalizing equilibrium in structured structures. When the codes of culture and language transform in structured structures, habitus takes a new position in order to enhance the recognition of identity. In order to achieve positioning, political subjects engage culture and language because culture and language provide meaningful symbols by way of practical dispositions which normalize the divisionary bases of structures.

Identity as symbolic power

One of the fundamental problems regarding the discourse of political identity in international relations is to focus on collectiveness, the state, groups and class and to oversee field and identity interrelations on the formation of classification. Classical structural theories evaluate states as units and they research how states relate to each other in the international arena as dominant sovereign actors. This understanding is argued at length, especially by social construction approaches, which evaluate the structure of states as the constructed production of collective minds rather than material conditions. Material conditions, interests and ideas are mutually constituted entities and they are distinctive perceptions (Wendt, 1999; Legro, 2005). On the other hand, social construction approaches see how ideas and interests of states' internal/endogenous sub-structures and compositions interact with each other. They rethink the social practices of human and cultural productions as reproductive force of structures. However, they determinedly evaluate that the production/reproduction of an international system is fundamentally produced by state interactions (Wendt, 1999). In other words, the reproduction of international systems is achieved by the interactions of totalized nation state identities. In substance, the interactions of nation states are just constructed parts of political identities which describe a field's objective practices, but 'socialization processes internal to a state can change the state's identity and interests independently of such interactions' (Copeland, 2000, p. 203). In this respect, it is logical to think which socialization processes change collective identities. This conception directs my research towards the structured accumulation of fields beyond collective identities. In spite of discussions which propose that 'interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is' (Wendt, 1999, p. 231), this research argues that identities are mostly predisposed by structured rules of the historical social accumulation before political subjects form their political identities. Because of structural effects on cognitive constructive processes, moral

rules are implicitly and unconsciously influenced into dispositions of political subjects and, therefore, political subjects do not problematize divisional domination of power on their identity construction.

It is hard to envisage predisposed structuration, identity and field of power as long as research focuses on structured rules of objective field of international relation beyond existence of collectiveness. It is argued here that collectiveness – groups, classes, states – does not have any direct influence on the structuration of political identity, but the structures, which socially collective identities dominate, are predisposed towards the founded morality of the structured objective world. Thus, state identity affects subaltern collective identities, yet it does not orientate individuals' subjectivity. It is important to understand how perceptions of political subjects ideationally transform into social collectiveness. In this respect,

> It is as structured and structuring instruments of communication and knowledge that 'symbolic systems' fulfil their political function, as instruments which help to ensure that one class dominates another (symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them and thus by contributing, in Weber's terms, to the 'domestication of the dominated.' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 167)

Identities are rooted in symbolic systems which are produced by the unconsciousness of individuals. Individuals' symbolic systems are externalized in relation to the other individuals who gather their symbolic system into the same structured structures. This symbolization of individuals also forms subjective borders of their identification, which defines power and divisional domination before inter-subjective processes are constructed. Due to symbolic codification and violence into the habitus of individuals, the political identities of social collectiveness do not struggle to construct a dominated subjectivity beyond political subjects' own subjectivity. Consequently, the collectiveness of political identities directly occupies constructive, normative and institutional means of fields of power and domination. Ideas and perspectives of collective political subjects are preoccupied by a set of symbolic instruments of subjective violence and, therefore, political subjects approve the unequal distribution and division of their political identities in norms and institutions. Subjective violence becomes a conscious process which influences meanings in objective field, because it legitimizes the otherness of political identification. Inter-subjective and communicative processes of identities objectify individuals' internal dispositions of subjective violence.

Symbolic violence as the (re)producer of divisionary structure of identities is related to ideological productions and misrecognition. Classes, groups and states are embedded in the structuration of symbolic violence. They hierarchically obtain social positioning according to

their relations with symbolic violence. This positioning of socially collective identities indicates their interests, which produce ideological infrastructure of the identities in relation to the field of power and its symbolic violence. Therefore, ideologies are 'doubly determined' because they are based on class practices and also on an endogenous logic of production simultaneously (Ibid.). Symbolic violence originates from a specialist body of reproducers in structured structures. This specialist body of production fundamentally functions as a persuasion mechanism of political identity, which also gives meaning to how the subjective violence of the field of domination is organized. This persuasion mechanism of the state/political subject's habitus externalizes itself as a concrete disposition in structuring structures. Thus, the political identities of class, states and other collective entities are the reflective objectification of the symbolic division of historical structured habitus of political subjects. Ideologies of social collectiveness transform individualistic symbolic borders of identity into generalized social objective borders in the practical world.

Doxa, which means that individuals consider knowledge of structured structures as their own production, is another important point to understand symbolic violence and identity interaction. Practices in structuring structures create a common culture which achieves the integration of collectiveness. Doxa is based on a structured world which is continually reconstructed in order to achieve the distinction of identities (Ibid.). Political subjects define their identities according to objective social positioning. Doxa provides the infrastructure required to accumulate meanings of social realities which objectify the integration of distinctive groups of collectiveness. Norms and institutions of identities are based on these perceived realities. Therefore, consensus on symbolic production always precedes consensus of normative productions. Separation between identification of social collectiveness takes place before the normative bases of political identities are constructed inter-subjectively. Structured symbolic dispositions of individuals create consensual social solidarity for distinctive groups. Then this separation of positioning collective entities is transformed into legitimized political identification by institutional norms. In this way, the functionalization of domination influences the institutional construction of identities. The influence of domination also legitimizes the structuring distinction of symbolic domination. In order to distinguish their identities, sub-collective groups identify their political identities in relation to other groups. When sub-identities define their distinction from others they also unconsciously legalize the distinctive position of a totalized political identity.

Symbolic instruments of domination legitimize the establishing identity, which originally preserved the domination of a particular social collectiveness (Ibid.). Political

subjects behave in accordance with their preoccupied habitus and they accept a common culture in their particular historical social fields. In this way, misrecognition imposes preoccupied interests which socialize as everyone's interests. The core beneficiaries of symbolic ideological instruments take a better position in fields where the domination of the field manipulates all normative processes of identity construction. The social collectiveness of political subjects expresses interactions and practices which construct an identity that is not involved in their actual interests. In other words, political subjects unconsciously speak in the name of the structured domination of identities. Created knowledge, norms and institutions are always functionalities of domination which transfer political functionalization into objectified identities of political subjects. Inter-subjective processes, recognized moral values and political identities are means of the field of power. Thus, inter-subjective processes form a recognized morality which satisfies common sense. Due to this common morality, political subjects obey their positioning in their own distinctive collectiveness. On the basis of objective moral identification, the political functionalization of identities achieves a hierarchical construction of domination in the objective field.

Political identities unconsciously obey structured domination, which forms roots and standards of division, knowledge and knowing processes and interests of identities. The formation of every political identity is subject to existing domination in the field. In pre-modern history, clerics functioned as structured structures. They preoccupied structuring interests which were based on a religious ideology that explains the moral borders of the recognition of individuals' identity. Structured doxa emerged from the morality of *Summa Theologica*, which indicates that the identities of individuals should defend union, eternal togetherness and the fellowship of God under the rule of its representative king (Finnish, 1998). In practice, the promised morality of recognition was to the benefit of a dominant group and its field of power, yet theoretically this morality was represented as salvation and recognized identity for everyone. This vision dominated structuring realities and division as long as another structured structure of modern historicization substituted its doxa. In the historical turn of modernity, the monopoly of clerical elites over structured structures was questioned and eventually substituted by a new group of elites which consists of some fraction of the old aristocracy and the new wealthy in a new capital production procedure. The new group changed the moral construction of the former clerics. It formed its own Puritan ethics in order to influence the identities of individuals. Contrary to the former passive participation of eternal fellowship, the doxa of structured Puritan ethics demanded that individuals had to be active and hard-working. It claimed that it is hard to define who is

selected by God, therefore accumulated wealth would prove whether a person had been selected. It supported self-scarification for the benefit of individualistic and societal goods (Weber, 1991). Importantly, Puritan ethics claim that former clerics are not automatically 'God's elected', and then they define the conditionality of 'God's elected' by means of accumulated wealth and social responsibility. The doxa of modern nationalistic state identities was ideologically preoccupied by this ethical foundation in the collective state habitus. The structuring structures of modern state identities under the influence of self-devotion, accumulation and social responsibility formed its objectified realities according to the interests of new structured specialists. The new interests changed perceptions of recognition, hierarchy and vision of division simultaneously. The political centres of identities were eventually transferred from the objective king to the subjective body of nation. Social collective bodies of structured structures created their conscious political national identities by way of structured specialists' interests. Similarly, the (re)formation of political identities affirmed once again that the structured dispositional production of identities precedes modern construction and the normative institutionalization of political identities.

In a similar way to medieval political identification, national political identities promised a similar kind of functionalization in the objective field, yet it assigned distinctive meanings to reinterpret created realities. Generally, national identities are understood according to a system of associational ideas, the indivisible solidarity of groups in defined territory, the mutual tasks of members, the mutual recognition of automatic membership, the participation of everybody, a common history etc. National identities of states are (re)formed by recognition, hierarchy, division and mutual understanding, as well. In other words, the functional means of political identification are the same but the symbolic construction of power and domination between collective groups and structuring structures gives distinctive meanings and practices in order to function these means. This argument goes beyond the ordinary discursive omnipresent formation of Foucault, which theorizes power as a unique peculiarity of nature of identities (Sindic, Barreto, & Costa-Lopes, 2015; Strozier, 2002). Discursive field/language plausibly forms the borders of political subjects' ideation and identification, yet political collective subjects never have the same discursive capital because their discursive capacities differ in historical social processes. Therefore, they cannot produce the same reasonability and argumentation which might be proofs of the omnipresent nature of identity. I argue here that political identities are the products of historical processes and symbolical exchanges of individuals and structures. Reality is not discursively omnipresent, but it is historically an intuitional misrecognition of knowing processes in structuring

structures. Political identities, as the highest institutionalization of the field of power, are the products of perpetual conflict of the division beyond omnipresent domination. The institutionalization of political identities is misrepresented by the historicization of reality, which is constituted by the social collectiveness of states as political subjects. Created structuring collectiveness is arbitrarily selective rather than suppressive. Historically contingent realities of structure and subject relations do not directly dominate political identities, but they selectively reward some social bodies. Selectiveness is recognized by individuals because it satisfies a sphere of recognizable justification for political subjects. Therefore, the formation of political identities is to continual selective division in order to satisfy the struggle of justification in the process of structure and identity historicization.

Symbolic power is arbitrary and it is objectified as it is exercised (Bourdieu, 1991). Identity is a symbolic power to make political subjects believe some predicted and recognized division of the world (Bourdieu, 1991).[13] The symbolic power of political identities is independent from not only political subjects who exercise a given doxa but also political subjects who are selectively consecrated by the given subject structure relations. In other words, the dominant position of the social collectiveness of political identity in social division is predisposed beyond power in the objective world. Eventually, continual conflict between dominated and subordinated identities maintains the differentiation of structured structures which reforms the division and justification of political identities. Similarly, political identity and globalization engagement trace a new historicization of this subject and institution structuration. As is noticed above, martial tourism is a very peculiar case to see how structured structure deteriorates justification capacity of national political identities. The case firstly orientates division beyond the national identities. Secondly, the case reinterprets symbolic violence. Having a justifiable national identity renders obsolescence, but being a part of a third locality is valued by new symbolic violence. Importantly, recognition does not depend on a shared historical background, but it is defined according to accumulated economical values. Therefore, globalization offers a division of political identities which is

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[13] Bourdieu (1991, pp. 181–221): 'Struggles over ethnic and regional identity … are … classifications, struggles over the monopoly of the power to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the legitimate definition of the division of the social world and, thereby, to *make and unmake groups*. What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of social world though principles of di-vision which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish meaning and consensus about meaning reality of the unity and the identity of the group.'

based on material financial background rather than a culturally and historically shared background of nationalistic identity. Globalization distinctively reinterprets functions of national divisions. It 'offers the prospects of at least fully realizing the promise of modernity … market forces, electoral multiparty democracy, techno-scientific rationality, national self-determination and international cooperation have the opportunity to work their complete magic, and the benefit of all humanity' (Scholte, 1996, p. 51) This characterization of globalization changes the divisionary vision and justificatory recognition of national political identities. It extends the borders of structural reality from the interests of nation to all humanity. It changes the justification of division in individuals' dispositions. It defines the institution and division of doxa within a more inclusive transnational structuring structure. Finally, it changes the symbolic structure which reforms practices of symbolic violence in field of power.

Political identity and change: modernity and transformation of political identities

The relation between change and identity is a longstanding debate in the international relations field. In particular, critical theories extensively argue the link between interests, ideas and identities. It is assumed that the constructed relations between states change identities, and the transformation in interests of states reconstructs these changes of identities (Wendt, 1999). These claims illustrate an essential shift in the classical realist–rationalist theorization which is based on selfish interests and prefixed political identities because interests are found before states construct a relation web among the members of the international field (Waltz, 2001). On the other hand, post-structural theories rethink the sovereignty of the state as a form of dominative power relations (Nicholson & Seidman, 1996). Post-structuralism debates structuration and idealized institutionalization of political identities beyond the perdurable existence of power on identities. It is interested in sovereignty as a kind of discursive subjectivity. As a result, changes in identities are conceptualized by a large spectrum of debates from structuration to social construction, power and domination.

In order to understand change and identity link, it is essential to know what the interactions of states are based on. According to the theoretical outlook of our argument, these interactions are based on a dual formation of *capital* in structured and structuring structures. Identities are reformed according to the change in capital, which is predisposed in structured structures and constructed in structuring structures. Changes in political identities determine

the relation webs, organizational frames, rules and borders which satisfy the structuration of a justified identity. As Inayatullah and Blaney realized,

> By contrast with the vision of an emerging tolerance, we suggest that the practical and intellectual repercussions of the Thirty Years' War fostered a movement as much towards uniformity as towards recognizing and respecting diversity … Westphalia deferred a deeper exploitation and engagement of the problem of differences (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004)

Not only the roots of modern political identities, but also the historicization roots of every political identity from pre-modern to postmodern are based on a uniformity which conceals division in the field of the perpetual struggle on capital. States always demand the justifiable field of their existences because predisposed capital and field relations always constitute a uniformity of identification. Therefore, the main guideline in the historical process of identities aims to satisfy a kind of totality.

The capital allocation of identities of modernity reshaped the normative aspiration of the internal and external formation of the modern state identity. Externally, it formed mutual recognition and sovereign-equity between nationalities. Internally, it was involved in a kind of internal consensus which embodies supreme laws. The externalization and internalization of modernity also reproduced relationships between the objective field and political subjects or individuals. Concrete borders insulated institutionalized capital allocation from other localities. This institutionalized capital imposed a symbolic foundation for the justification of being within/outside this bordered political national identity. In this respect, subaltern social collectiveness took part in national identities not only materially but also mythically, because the mythical foundation of physical localities constructed the national identities' historical narratives (Newman, 2001). Also, territorial borders not only prove a differentiation in physical capacity, but also indicate a potential differentiation in cognitive, cultural and informative capital. As a result, borders, as the productions of physical capital, concretize new territorial divisions which mean a new responsibilization according to the idealized capital allocation of national division.

In the history of modernity, the state obtained legitimated rights, concrete rules and the monopoly of legitimate violence in certain borders. The modern nation state functions as the centre of physical force and coercion. The monopolization of the use of force is not an ontological foundation of nation states, but it is a *sine qua non* peculiarity of domination which is ruled by socially coercive institutions, concrete borders and symbols (Wilson & Donan, 1998). Changes in capital allocation satisfy the creation of the coercive institutional realities of political identities. In this respect, the institutionalization of the modern state is

rooted from differentiation in capital allocation. One interesting institutional change in the coercive function of identity in modernity arose from the institutionalization of national armies according to the perception of total war. The coercive capacity of pre-modern professional militaries was operated by the selective aristocratic institutionalization of army, generally based on royalty and the nobility of aristocratic knights. Being a constant member of the military in pre-modern history bestowed privileges upon a distinctive occupation of some social groups, which enhanced higher capital allocation in the structuring structure. Socially distinctive positioning was constructed by way of exclusive membership of the army. Afterwards, owing to the changed capital allocation of modernity, being a member of a professional army in pre-modern societies lost its distinctive vision of division because the nationalization of modern political identities forced the whole population to go to war. The institutionalized realities of modernity changed inclusionary practices on the division of political identities. The divisionary positioning of the aristocratic institutionalization of armies was replaced by the distinctive positioning of bureaucracy. The former distinctive role of the army was transformed into a compulsory task for everybody, including subaltern social groups in this field. Therefore, being a member of the army lost its prevailing position in capital allocation and the power of justification. The domination of modernity on the historicization of identity changed the totalizing equilibrium of structured structures, operated by bureaucracy. Indeed, bureaucracy was rewarded by royalty and nobility in this new vision of division.

The field actually objectifies the accumulated production of former structures which controlled power (Bourdieu, 1985) because it embodies a consensus of state collective habitus and discursive historicization of misrecognized consensus in structuring structure. Changes in identity mean a reformation from one unification to another. Subjective capital identifies a new kind of responsibilization when individuals reach a distinctive stage of unification, because subjective capital always provides prospective responsibilities which are recognized by all parts of social construction (Bourdieu, 1989). Capital provides an accumulation of information which is involved in a redistribution of objective capital by way of cognitive reconstruction (Ibid.). Identity reforms language in order to achieve consensus according to reconstructing knowledge (Bourdieu, 1991). The Treaty of Westphalia was the primitive proof of changing language of capital allocation in identity of modernity. In accordance with the changes and expectations in physical capital, the Treaty of Westphalia reconstructed a new kind of consensus which imposed a distinctive capital allocation in comparison with the pre-modern institutionalization of capital. The changing subjective capital internally reformed

normative standards between the sovereigns because institutional differentiation in the functions of states required dependence and the integration of boundaries (Habermas, 1998, 2012). Therefore, the political identity of modernity functioned as 'world-making', which manipulates the practical vision of the social group in order to reproduce the cognitive realities of individuals (Bourdieu, 1989). The identity of modernity reinterpreted all cognitive, informative and subjective bases of knowledge.

The political identity of modernity is a kind of marketplace in order to share and distribute cognitive interaction and information, which accumulate the consciousness of former structured structures. It satisfied the instrumentality of internal legitimacy and external recognition because it created a national ideology which survived in the forms of symbolic codes. These codes also form the bases of national laws, which are legal and objective creators of symbolic violence and the borders of states' identification regarding their collectiveness. Thus, social and legal products of cognitive capital, such as national languages and the law, transformed into unification on the basis of given codes of subjective habitus. National identities also created international norms and institutions to objectivize division and inclusion/exclusion in the field of struggle.

Capital forms three different categories as embodied state, objectified state, and institutionalized state (Bourdieu, 1985). The embodied state functions as a kind of starting point for differentiation in the political identity of modernity. The embodied state is based on imposed codes and practices which give the meaning of rules, norms and institutions of national sentiment of modernity. In the embodied state, national identities and their normative and institutional routines are transferred to individuals and their social groups. The embodied state firstly provided the standardized rules and borders of citizenship. Secondly, the embodied state formed distinctive imposed codes in the international arena, where normative productions of embodiment were integrated into national identities. In this cognitive process, national citizens learn 'the rational' behaviours as inter-subjective values to achieve internal justification of modern collectiveness (Reus-Smit, 1999). The codes of unification for 'rationalization' are given by shared symbolic capital between citizens. Symbolic capital represents both objective and subjective capital and it creates a perception of a shared set of beliefs to standardize the differentiation between the national states.

Objectified capital is represented by concrete items of national identities such as languages and armies. While embodied capital forms the ideational bases of unification of national identities, objectified capital symbolizes embodied capital in the real life. Modern state identities depend on knowledge of the objective structures but knowledge is independent

from its created realities (Bourdieu, 1989). Thus, objectified capital provided an appropriate construction of embodied capital in order to achieve national unification and justification of political identity. That is why the objectified capital of modernity is not an autonomous, distinctive and supreme form. Rather, it is a reproduction of historical discursive realities. Therefore, it is plausible to say that forms of objectified capital in modern national identity strengthen or weaken in accordance with the differentiation in embodied capital.

Institutionalized capital is a product of the recognition of the interrelation between certain embodied and objectified forms of capital. Institutional capital is based on both internal and external recognition of national identities. Institutional capital is also a mechanism to create definite and permanent differences between the subjects. Constituted absolute differentiation between subjects of institutionalized capital is derived from the indirect exclusion of power relations, which institutionalizes and/or stabilizes capacity and legitimacy of access to certain resources (Lamont & Lareau, 1988). Indeed, the institutional capital of modernity externalizes itself by way of sovereignty. Sovereignty is internally concretized by means of national laws. This normative supremacy of laws is involved in mutual recognition between the similar national identities in the international arena.
The nation states' sovereign identity is only a historical stage of certain kinds of interactions in capital. This research claims that the nation states are products of differentiation in subjective and objective capital and they are doomed to disappear as interactions in capital are reorganized, redistributed or relocated. In this respect, social identities are products of physical, economic, informative, cultural, cognitive and symbolic reformation.[14] Capital functions as the collectivity of objective and subjective resources which objectifies knowledge of reality for justifiable identification (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). The perpetual struggle of capital in structuring structures reforms the imposition of structured individuals. Therefore, the historicization of different structured structures reinterprets cognitive and informative processes because different political identities depend on a distinctive organizational sum of capital. Changes in capital allocation result in the reorganization of structures, the reformation of interests and the redefinition of political identities. Capital allocation fundamentally functions as a patrimonial symphony for the justification of social position, which suppresses any contradiction with symbolic and objectified division.

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[14] For further reading, see Bourdieu (1995a).

Political identity and change: reproduction of political identity beyond modernity

Today, the political identities of the modern state are experiencing a new stage of differentiation and responsibilization. The monopoly of nation-state identities over bordered localities is impaired by a new kind of intertwined political representation and pluralism. The contemporary political interpretation tries to make objectified capital allocation and institutionalization of modernity non-functional. The institutional capacity of modernity is not in harmony with the dispositional capital of individuals any more. This means that the structured structure of modernity forms new capital allocation, which changes the institutional bases of justification of political identities. In this aspect, modernity is forced into sharing capital allocation and its field of power with changed rules of structure because, quantitatively, the number of institutions is rising beyond the scope of modern territoriality, and, qualitatively, rule- and law-making authorities of the new political identities are increasing beyond national collective identity (Grande & Pauly, 2005).

The conceptualization of state identity was originally endowed with capital allocation, which enhanced states' symbolic and objective positioning according to socially collective division of identities in the field of international relations. Citizenship is derived from the dispositional doxa of modern identity. The modern state, in line with continuing expansion and complexification, defies the existing institutionalization of modernity on violence and coercion. The national unification of modern political identification renounces some spaces of coercion because the collectiveness of the modern state on the disposition of nationality transforms into distinctively new institutionalizing fragmented structuring dispositions. The fragmentation of political identification also changed the institutionalization of threats, which affects the perception of states regarding unconscious symbolic violence. In line with the differentiation in the physical and symbolic capital allocation of modernity, centres of threats become heterogeneous and plural in character (Mansbach & Wilmer, 2001), which results in a new distribution for the symbolic violence of domination. The fragmented post-structural characteristic of modern state identities creates their heterogeneity via symbolic violence which interprets a new vision of symbolic division in a more complex field of international relations. Originally, symbolic violence functioned as a way of unification in political identity of modernity. New practical dispositions of the modern state shelve various subaltern distinctiveness and division, which are bordered by diverse symbolic violence according to the domination of new structured structures. The doxa of new, fragmented post-structural states revives diverse symbolic violence of national identity such as ethnic, language-oriented or gender-based symbolic violation beyond the collective symbolic violence of nationality.

Symbolic violence, as justification of political identity and modern domination, is unconsciously designed new structured domination in a more complex and wider field of international relations.

In line with this, changes in symbolic perception of socio-cultural, economic, political positioning in the field affect modern national identity, which loses its control on the historicization of discursive realities in the field of power. National spaces are substituted by issue-oriented fragmented subaltern identification, which forms new knowing processes of the subject beyond the unification of modernity. The same national spaces are rendered obsolete by the new physical institutionalization of local and global pluralism. In this fragmented plural knowing process of individuals, different quantitative and qualitative political identities represent 'bottom–up' alternatives of states as responsibilizing individuals to achieve more-accountable institutions (Chandler, 2007). This new, fragmented resemblance of capital allocation forces states to define their inter-subjective social positions in the field of international relations. Modern laws lose their power and mutual recognition becomes meaningless because structuring realities construct quasi-sovereign interaction webs. New capital allocation weakens both knowing processes of modernity and the objectivized institutionalization of modernity as laws, coercion and sovereignty.

Institutional reformation of citizens' identity of modernity dialectically decays the institutional roots of nation states. Modernity tries to loosen the border of nationality and, therefore, it constructs new kinds of political cooperation. However, this results in a differentiation of capital allocation within territorial borders. This changes individuals' perceptions of justification, coercion, division and inclusion in their socially collective boundaries of identities. As is experienced in the process of European Union, economic and socio-cultural capital takes a significant position in citizens' capital allocations, while physical and political capital lose their prominent role within the new bordering of the EU. In this way, the EU vitiates the national identities of states that help the local entities to interrelate with a wider global society (Vitanyi, 2001). This also changes perceptual misrecognition of citizenship and division within and outside the domain of EU. New fragmented political identities form a kind of global division, inclusion and justification beyond institutional realities of modernity. New capital allocation in habitus influences new globalizing structuring structures and creates new misrecognized common knowledge of individuals' political identities, such as the global society. Consequently, it is common today to hear that borders of the EU have become concrete for refugees because the problem of

refugees is too complex to achieve without the contributions of the global society (Sassen, 1998).

In the process of the perpetual struggle on capital allocation, the supreme authorities of modern states are impaired by cognitive, informational, cultural and symbolical capital of new structured rules. Modern states abide by certain kinds of constructed norms to achieve mutual recognition among the states, which is determined by their symbolic, informative and cultural political capital allocation. However, the post-structural international relations field redistributes the role of cultural, informative and symbolic capital according to new structural rules of symbolic domination. Essentially, knowledge schemes and symbols are not territorially restricted anymore. Rather, they are becoming independent from the particularization of national identities. In this aspect, particular cultural capital or knowledge influences all parts of world. This not only results in a changing understanding of morality in habitus, but also produces a new position for the political subjectivity of states in the field of international relations. This means a common language and knowledge that transmit the local subjective capital to other localities. In this way, the new division and inter-subjective distinction of the state identity re-define themselves beyond the justifiable unification of modern national identities.

Moreover, the identity of modernity does not homogenize modern state identity any more. Externally, the mutual recognition of the modern state loses its value to define its inter-subjective position in international relations. In a historically changing field of the structuring world, national states engage new structured rules of institutions such as democracy and human rights. These institutions are seen as a blueprint to define the position and symbolic nobility of states because the contemporary fragmentation of institutional norms forms 'universal grounds' which are becoming a sphere for states to request emancipation of a more complex field of international relations (Eva, 2002). With reference to the democratization processes in the developing world, these differentiations 'can create *zones of ungovernability* that complicate transformative processes even for states that are inclined to cooperate' (Grande & Pauly, 2005, p. 296). Internally, states do not solely rule their internal authority and law because borders of states are increasingly becoming a battlefield of division of the new capital allocation. The new division creates a new resistance and responsibilization in which new social groups and collectiveness increasingly express their 'experiences of exclusion' from the modern state boundaries (Patton, 1996, p. 239). New embodied capital impairs the national foundation of subjective capital and creates a new disposition to improve a better position and recognition in accordance with historically changing rules of doxa.

Citizens of modern states are transformed into members of wider collectiveness by a new responsibilization and symbolic violence of proliferated and complex fields of action. Objectified capital creates distinctive fields and practices for the institutionalized capital of post-structural identities beyond the identities of national states. Knowledge, information and symbols increasingly emphasize a more complex field of power relations to accumulate capital. This transforms the former political rationalities of modernity in accordance with a wider globalized society (Rose & Miller, 1992). Besides this, growing technologies improve new governmental processes outside the control of nation states. The changing political identification of the modern state is involved in new governmental processes which result in negotiating the classical authority of states and institutions and interests. Consequently, it somehow gains roles in the construction of socially collective identities, such as the EU, in order to fulfil the changing requirements of capital allocation in the field. Differentiated capital creates many different fields of action for modern states, which are causes of new symbolic violence and vision of division, because the changing justification of modern state identity aims to achieve nobility according to the epistemology of new institutional capital, which is unequally distributed by historical social processes. Meanwhile, new post-structural states gradually form ways of practical knowing in order to reconstruct political rationalities. As a result, post-structural identities of modern states interpret sovereignty and recognition once again because the identity construction of capital allocation requires changes in knowledge, language, symbolization and information according to changing positions of identities in the international relations field.

It is true that decline of modern political state identity created essential liberation from organizational principles of modernity. Some radically evaluate that the downfall of modernity results in a separation of the subject from any kind of collectivization: emancipation of knowledge as public discourse from domination (Shapiro & Alker, 1996). However, changes in institutionalization of modern political identities depend on differentiation in the dispositional vision of division. In this respect, the post-structural world means a new reformation of historical discursive realities in globally inclusive structuring structures rather than a creation of autonomous conscious realities. Post-structural identities promise a new knowing process of the field according to a new justifiable unification. The uniformity of political identities is actually imposed into knowledge which lulls state identity into a false sense of justification. Therefore, the post-structural field of international relations can be seen as a new struggle for inclusion in order to reform the structured division of identities. Consequently, physical and subjective capital extends its borders at both local and

supranational levels because modern borders of structuring reality do not institutionalize its existing realities in structuring field.

The expansion of modern international relations field results in a new style of symbolic violence of domination according to new structured capital allocation. It enhances the speed, scope and bases of capital interactions. The borders of modern collective political states experience a functional de-bordering of borders, which leads to structural, social and cultural shifts beyond physical shifts in the borders (Albert, 2002). A new bordering of political identities weakens the concrete character of modern bordering and constructs a new historical discursive division in a wider and heterogeneous field. Heterogeneity is a fundamental characteristic of the new interactions of political identity in order to form a new common knowledge of justification or sovereignty. The political borders of modernity failed to keep the possession of operational/external and formal/internal sovereignty because they are confronted by new issues which require interactions for the changing meaning of rules of structure (Mills, 1998). New political identities unconsciously form a new way of knowing which is interested in environmental issues, human rights or the rights of a language minority beyond the classical security of state identity. Therefore, this new discursive historicization of realities is fundamentally in conflict with the former dispositional interests of political identities of modern states.

The structuring world is experiencing a process of new capital allocation in the field. The fundamental means of nobility and symbolic violence in the changing international relations field are somehow to achieve democracy. Therefore, a whole field of international relations experiences a kind of structural instrumentalization of democracy. All modern states claim to be more democratic because the justification of modern state identity is changing according to the reformation of practical dispositions of domination. In other words, national political identification in modernity no longer institutionalizes a vision of division, but the field of power is objectified by a distinctive construction of power in a wider inclusion process (Held, 2002). This vision of division is important, because identities in the field of power demand a distinction which is transformed into otherness in order to defend their self-certainty (O'Hagan, 2004). In this way, identities are products of changes in accumulated knowledge and constructed interactions. In order to reconstruct their identities, modern states are involved in this unconscious accumulated knowledge, which consists of loyalty to changing domination styles. Consequently, changes in political identities create dispositions for interaction to accumulate political, economic, cultural and social capital in a changing international relations field. In this aspect, capital allocation is institutionalized in cognitive,

knowledge-based and informative interactions which continually create objective realities of individuals. As a result, changes in the political identities of modern states are changing loyalty and symbolic violence of modern state capital allocation in the field of international relations.

The international field and the identity of the state as the political subject of modernity

The fundamental concentration of this thesis is to research how the Bourdieusian understanding of field (Bourdieu, 1984), the habitus of the agent (Bourdieu, 1995a) and the understanding of reality (Susen, 2011) come together and depict the identity of states, as subjects of totalized political power relation, in a wider and more complex space of international relations. These three components of Bourdieusian study emphasize a distinct manner of state, an organized group of people, which forms identification beyond the structuralist and ideational/social constructivist understanding of identity. The purpose of this part is to transfer Bourdieusian understanding of social relations and the identification of reality from individuals' spaces to the international field of an organized group of people or the state. The first and most essential engagement of this study is to evaluate the state as a social group which experiences power relations in the field of international relations. In practice, Bourdieusian field theory will be a guideline to understand the identity of states in the international field. The state as a social organism rests on its social position in the international field, creating a specialization in the spheres of power relations. As a consequence, it is important to understand what kinds of power relations the agent/state/political subject can opt for to define the behavioural tendencies of the agent in the international field. These behavioural tendencies of positional relations in the fields result in the social categories of the agents' identities.

The second important element of the state identity – defining positions in the field – is a perception of the agents' reality. The realities of agents, defining their identity, are interrelational phenomena which consist of both structuring and structured components of field relations. The agents carefully observe differences in power relation in the international field and define their identities in comparison with different relational exercises of the other agents in the same international field. Therefore, structuring a sense of subjects leads simultaneously to the reproduction of themselves (Goodman & Silverstein, 2009). The existence of structuring and structural elements in the same field of relation rejects the astaticism of structural thinking and overvaluation of social construction of the identities of the states. This existence discloses the bilateral influence of habitual practices of the agents

and the socially agreed conditionality of doxa on the formation of a relational state identity. This reveals the interplay and tension between the resistance of existent relational identity and revisionist acts of the intended identity struggle.

The last distinctive element of definition of the state identity is the habitual spaces of agents which stock all essential capabilities of agents to improve a better and more favourable power relation in the international field. Habitus fundamentally defines the relational differences in different fields according to subject (Reed-Danahay, 2005). It shows the style of exchange and hierarchy in a field of practice. Habitual space lays a burden on agents to show a willingness towards the submission of their actual identities. On the other hand, habitual practices have the potential to change the definition of agents' identity in their favour. States' power relations in accordance with their habitus structurize state identity in the international field. Therefore, in order to understand how state identity is defined, its necessary to look at what involvement the power relation in the habitus of agents enables.

Understanding field and identity relation

One of the most important characteristics of Bourdieu in defining the identity of the state in international relations is based on understanding the concept of the field and its spatial distribution of state identity. The fundamental expansion of this study in relation to Bourdieusian epistemology is to understand the state as a group of social representation in a politically concentrated field of international relations. This expansion also describes the conceptualization of agency in the international field. In this aspect, the state, as the agency of the international field, is a group of individuals which constructs social relations with other similar entities. In this way, there is no differentiation in the socialization of individuals in the field of a community/family and the socialization of the state in the field of international relations. Similar to individuals, the state can only have an identity in relation to other states in the same practical field. The state acts as an individual in its socio-spatial field of practice. The entire system of states functions as a system of a single society, and states perform as individuals, who accomplish different spheres of actions in different fields of the society.

The structure of the international field, functionally, is the same as for pre-modern political systems, and even the basic tribal community or family's practical sphere of relationship. From the tribal to the pre-modern and modern societies of states, differentiation is derived from the expansion of space in practical world. The spatial expansion of space illustrates what 'global' is involved in a certain system of society. In this way, the modern state system is practised in the wider space of the international field. A wider international

space contains a more complicated and intensified field of practice because, as Bourdieu implied, fields are dynamic and diversifying (Mendelson, 2010). In this aspect, modern state identity is based on a complexification of the same social and relational existence mechanism of pre-modern societies. In this way, the international field is a more complex form of conventional societies where the state substitutes for individuals' and the king's agency positions in the pre-modern social spaces of practice. The identity of the state fulfils the specialized field of action in an international relations field. The increasing specialization of the sphere improves the identity of agents because differentiated sphere of action and spatial complexity in the international field demand a certain definition of identity to naturalize legitimized positioning in relation to other identities (Coicaud, 2002). The international field is a complex form of the pre-modern field of political space. Therefore, the state fulfils a societal role similar to that of individuals in societies.

The relationship web in the international field has all the political field features of any pre-modern societal practices. However, there are some characteristics of state agents which downplay the substitutive characteristics of state identity in pre-modern identities. Essentially, the advanced bureaucratic functionalization of agents under the name of the state dissembles the social characteristics of the agency (Bourdieu, 1996b). Owing to the great stress of structure and state relations, the social and mutually relational characteristics of state are mostly disregarded. Similar to the individual position in the society field, in the international field the state only claims its identity in relation to the other states. In this aspect, it is not possible to think of modern state identity in a structure where a single world state takes place because the identity of the state is social and relational. This socio-relational identity can only survive as long as certain structured structures are conserved by its political agencies. A state can only define its advance in relation to others and another state can only identify its lack in the same relational way. Individuals define their position in society by evaluating the relational differences in practice. Similar to this social functionality in comparison with the society of individuals, state identity is also defined by marking differences between observed practices in the international field (Ibid.).

The spatial expanse of pre-modern societal space simultaneously widens the field of political practice. This imposes a more complex way of capital allocation in society, which provides distinguishing power for subjects' actions. Because of a complex accumulation of capital, individuals and their groups struggle to have a better identity which is more compatible with the structured rules of the international field. The spatial expanse of political space fundamentally refers to a space where more differences are manifested. The more

differences the agent has, the more power relations the agent gets involved in in a wider field of practice. Whenever an identity in a societal space does not deal with these power relation webs, it inevitably creates another social agent to become an answerable part of new field of practice. The identity of the modern state is a result of such spatial expanses of practice. It answers the production of new diversified differences. These differences improve the institutionalization of social identity in accordance with the practical relations the state can compete with.

Similar to the previous political fields of practice in conventional societies, the international field, in a wider inclusive global space, typifies the patriarchal social structure in its relational practices. Therefore, all the 'international' agencies occupy a positioning of the practical field of action beyond a constitutive academic theorization of the state as a sovereign equal identity (Reus-Smit, 1999; Shannon & Kowert, 2012). The occupied positioning of the state agent in the international field caries out different dispositional productions. In the same way, with a patriarchal relationship of conventional pre-modern societies, the state performs its potential characteristics of action derived from its capital allocation. Capital allocation embodies itself in a symbolic accumulation which reflects agents' positional distribution in the structured international field. As a social entity, the state has always had a symbolic sum of capital which has defined the roles and position of the state in the patriarchal relations in accordance with other states in the international field. This symbolic accumulation is a sum of agents' embodied previous experiences (Loveman, 2005) and, therefore, there is no structural natural characteristic and boundary to expect its own symbolic capital allocation. Hence, the identity of the state is predetermined by its socialistic tendencies in a patriarchal relationship web.

The distribution and redistribution of identities by way of differences are closely related to agents' dispositions of nobility (Grenfell, 2008). Identities can only be defined by differences and differences can be achieved by relational practices on the basis of structured nobility. Agents form their practical understanding of nobility according to the structured practices of the field, which improve agents' compatibility to constitute interrelational differences (Bourdieu, 1991). However, a potential expansion in the scope of the field results in a redistribution of nobility in agents' practices. An expanse of space also produces new fields of practice which improve agents' engagements in different fields. Increasing the number of fields of practice also improves the capacities of the agents involved simultaneously in different fields. The dissipation of existing differences between the agents weaken the ordering capacity of nobility between the agents. At the same time, new relational

differences strengthen differentiation in line with a new vision of nobility. Under the field of medieval political identity, nobody criticizes the king's ordering of nobility because the structured structure persuades that nobility that kingship is bestowed by God. In line with new fields and opportunities of capital allocation, the king's nobility is destroyed because the safety of new capital achievement also transforms the symbolic capital of agents, which defines a suitable nobility for itself.

Changes in the scope and extent of a field and its space do not change the fundamental institutions of being a society, which focus on the symbolic influence in the nobility of the field (Swartz, 2013). In a nutshell, every certain field of practice creates an understanding of nobility which forms ordering disciplines for the distinction and differentiation of agents. Therefore, modern state identity constitutes a distinctive societal practice of nobility in its international field. Changes in nobility in modern state identity are not a natural process. The state constitutes its own interrelational understanding of nobility because it is not independent from the constraints of being in a society. This is an unconscious strategy: states are bounded by their habitual practices when they share the same understanding of nobility as national sovereignty. States' conscious actions in the field are unconsciously embodied by their capital allocation, which defends states' positions in the international field and supports the societal functioning of nobility.

The state's sovereign nobility does not intentionally operate in line with any social convention between states in the international field. Although the definition of identities depends on an inter-subjective observation of differentiation (Hopf, 2009), state agency is not independent from the positioning of its subjective capital when it translates its identity into practical relations (Melanie, 2014). Indeed, in the field of practical relations, states have a variety of different positionings according to their available capital allocation. They obey the same national sovereign functioning but this functioning is certainly not equally expedient because sovereignty is not equally distributed. It functions in accordance with the capital allocation of the state. It is persuasive that the state perceives structures by means of its conscious experiences, but these experiences are mostly limited by its social positioning in the international field. The capital allocations of a sub-Saharan state and a Western state do not produce a similar positioning in the international field. They claim the same sovereignty even though they have different capacity in terms of the distribution of sovereignty. Both states deliberately link to the same nobility of sovereignty but the Western state has more adventurous structuring capital to get involved in the advantages of nobility. Otherwise, if one looks at these two states in a socially constitutive conventional way, one cannot clarify why a

state becomes a particular part of international society, which creates an uneven situation in relation to other states. Consequently, these two states abide by their unconscious structured symbolic sum of capital as a conscious product of relational convention. Their relations with the structure become not only a conscious social convention, but also a practical unconscious strategy which fulfils the necessities for being a meaningful part of a society.

The fundamental disposition of a historical political agency is to fulfil the practical requirements for being a part of a community (Navarro, 2006). Having a political identity is a struggle to occupy a relationally recognized social position in a community. This is the structural narrative of any kind of political agent whose structuring practices confirm its dispositional necessity of social position (Weininger, 2005). Political agents always strive for a recognizable social position beyond a mutually beneficial agreement of the meanings. Even though the social positioning enables a less reputable position for a political subject or an agent, this agent hypostasizes the availability of this social space for itself. Further, it does not acknowledge any other positioning in the practical community field because symbolic capital allocation does not enable itself to fulfil the social reality of another position which does not stress and clarify the relational differences of agents' identity in the field of practice. In line with this logic, neither a structurally generalizing individualistic nature/principle nor a conscious consensus of a social convention automatically prompts political agents to have a certain political identity, but 'a social nature of structure' compels agents to be parts of a social body (Wacquant, 2013, p. 2), because political agency fundamentally has a meaningful presence in a social whole and, therefore, it always unconsciously defines itself in the social whole before it produces mutual and rational conventions on their identities.

The state is a social whole and, therefore, it functions its positional practices, derived from its capital allocation, in the social whole. The social whole acts as a family, where states perform their positional prosperity to conserve and transform their capital allocation in the field of international. In this respect, social relations between agents create realities which describe both differences and roles of the political subject in the field. The social nature of structure imposes onto the political identity of agents. The political subject does not criticize its potential unequal positioning in the field, because taking a recognized position in the family is an inevitable structural prerequisite to conserving and changing its positioning by way of constitutive ideational processes. In this aspect, state identity naturalizes the unequal distribution of social positions in relation to others. Relationally created social realities influence practices (Crossley, 2011) and state what kinds of power relations a certain state can take part in. The international field provides all the necessary social functionality of this

patriarchal distribution social positions. The issue-specific and double-decision mechanism of the UN is one of the most interesting peculiarities of this patriarchal social nature of structure. Every state of the UN is represented by their capital allocation in the international field. States of political subjectivity consciously know the unequal positioning of their social natures, which prompts them to be part of a union. States give higher decision-making capacities and a patriarchal higher position to the core states because they know that the sum of their symbolic capital cannot provide a thoughtful position in terms of the nobility of the international structure (international law). So the core states try to conserve their patriarchal position in the UN and the other states try to transform this via improving their capital allocation.

Understanding of reality in international relations

In line with the functionality of the field for understanding state identity, Bourdieusian study also opens up an opportunity to problematize thunderstanding of reality in international relations.[15] Reality is interrelational beyond any materialistic and structuralist evaluation. Agents value their identities via looking at the differences in similar entities in the same social space. Agents always struggle to become parts of the social space, therefore they try to have spatial power relations in the fields according to their comparative differentiated positions in the field (Pouliot & Mérand, 2012). In this respect, from the primitive family to the modern state, political subjects increasingly become parts of more sophisticated and differentiated spatial relations in diversified fields of action. On the other hand, the agents of spatial power relation have never been passive bearers of objective structural features. Every single agent constructs relations with the social space in accordance with its interaction with the intensified interaction with the field. In order to reform structured space, agents have a meaningful identification in the existing structured contents of identity. Existing objectivity gives meaningful identity allocation to become a recognizable member of the space, which provides a basis for constraining existing structures and their power relations.

The state as the political subject is disposed to the participant of social relations in the field of practice. These social relation webs provide differentiated and unequal positioning for each state in the field, but, in order to transform social positioning, the state must firstly consider that it has to have a recognized social positioning in a different field of power relations. This positioning in the field defines the scope of power relations for every

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[15] For a comprehensive discussion on Bourdieu and reality in social science, see Jenkins (1992).

individual subject of the same international field (Bennett, 2008). The scope of the social positioning of the state here is more complex than a concrete understanding of self-defence. The social positioning of state identity functions as a field of recognition which empowers state identity to transform its social relation and its positional location in the field. Because of differentiated social positioning, state identity does not externalize itself in a monotonic anarchic structure, but differentiates according to restricted spheres and the capability of action in its special positioning. Thus, in order to understand how state identity operates, one should look at what kind of power relations can be taken part according to the particular social positioning of individual states.

The differentiated positioning of state identity in the field carries out different dispositions for each state. These dispositions are linked to certain 'rules of game' as social realities which are actually social constraints of comparative social positions between states (Swartz, 1997; Nye, 2013; Pilario, 2005). The political identity of the subject is not determined by structures, but dispositional constraints of a certain positioning predetermine how political identities are defined in relation to the others. In this respect, the social positioning of the political subject is free from the structural determination, but dispositional constraints distribute a different nobility of structure, which empowers different constitutive conscious practices for every political subject. Social reality derived from dispositional constraints of practices continually balances political identity under a new patriarchal system of identity which changes its identity via a conceiving and transformative functioning of dispositional positioning/repositioning.

The identity of the subject is always defined and survived under the existence of a somewhat patriarchal balance in the practical field (Kårtveit, 2014). These patriarchal relations are practised in a similar way in the international field by political subjects. On the other hand, these patriarchal links between political subjects become invisible as the political subjects link more complex and diversified fields of action simultaneously. Here, I want to reconsider the understanding of 'security' for political subjects. Every political subject produces a different disposition of security according to its social positioning. Dispositions predetermine how security is conserved and transformed into political subjects in relation to others. Because of dispositional constraints in practical field, it is not plausible to talk about an automatic self-defence system of structure.[16] Political subjects are structured by a different

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[16] For further information, see Kolodziej (2005).

positioning which depends on different dispositions. If the self-defence system does not operate for agents in the same way, one cannot conclude that the space is anarchical. Because of the fact that different dispositional positioning survives in the same field, dispositions should unconsciously dictate certain roles in the social reality of a patriarchal balance. In this way, in a primitive tribal political structure, the patriarchal leader is believed to save the security of other individual political identities in the practical field of relations. Individuals of this patriarchal balance provide some other functions, such as giving gifts to the leader and providing their fundamental necessities, which construct the nobility of security. In the feudal political organization of identity, this patriarchal balance is reconstructed by nobility exchange between the king and their feudal units. The king provides security in exchange for tax from feudal units which organize the nobility of security in a new patriarchal balance. Owing to the complexity of the field of practice in the modern state as political subject, this patriarchal balance weakens in the field of practice. The function of security in the international field is operated by the UN system. The UN Security Council is theoretically believed to guarantee the safety of all states in the system. Other states give a patriarchal role for five permanent members of the Security Council. This patriarchal balance in the international field illustrates the nobility of security and distribution of positioning among the states. These five states undertake patriarchal roles and the others help them to achieve security via giving them such appropriate necessities as military bases in their territorial spaces. The distribution of positioning from the UN General Assembly to the Security Council embodies the symbolic exchange of nobility and disposition. Therefore, the exchange of nobility on the basis of positioning is also a social reality of state identity, even though it becomes more complex in comparison with former identities of political subjectivity.

In a similar way with constructivist social understanding, it is plausible to say that the identity of the political subject has the conscious ability to negotiate the structures (Frueh, 2003; Chandra, 2012). From individuals in a peasant community to modern complex state identities, political subjects have been able to negotiate their identities in the field. The critical point here is to see whether the dispositional products of political subjects carry out the similar negotiation capacity for the political subjects. Political subjects do not simply embody structures, but structural embedded constraints in political subjects' dispositions affect the independent transformative ability of political subjects regarding their identities (Seidman, 2013). International law is a characteristic tool for describing the conceiving and transformative ability of subjects' political identities. Here I want to focus on the classical constructivist claims that modern state identity is derived from conscious agreement on a

fundamental norm – sovereignty/recognition – which creates an international law-based society of states (Shannon & Kowert, 2012; Neumann, 1996; Green, 2002). International law forms an objective embodiment of normative agreement on state identity. Similar to the gift exchanging system in peasant society, international law constitutes unconscious dispositional constraints which are preserved by the states. For example, international law regarding sovereignty within the defined borders of national states is likely to be in the interest of certain countries, because they are more likely to be under the pressure of immigration in comparison with others. Consequently, by conceiving of a social positioning in international relations, the state also conceives of its dispositional differentiation in terms of international law. International law theoretically constructs a normative agreement among the members but in practice embodies a notion of nobility and the distribution of roles in a more complex patriarchal international field of practice.

Therefore, in the formation of the identity of the political subject, objective and subjective structures and conceiving and transformative social productions intrinsically coexist in the field of practice (Hassdorf, 2007). Otherwise, if the political identity of state depended purely on conscious ideational consensus on fundamental norms, it would be hard to understand why all the states would want to be part of agreements which create unequal positions for its members. Substantially, it is not plausible for some political subjects to recognize certain identities in the cause of fundamental norms because they certainly become parts of social practices which are disadvantageous for them in comparison with other political subjects in the field. Political subjects are restricted by their structural experiences in a different social positioning. In this way, when political subjects reproduce themselves they are consciously involved in their dispositions, but these dispositions are subject to embodied unconscious structural experiences (Lane, 2000). In this way, the political subject or state is capable of transforming its identity, but the dispositional arsenal of this transformation is derived from structural constraints and the experiences of the political subject. The illusion regarding conscious normative agreement, or 'unconscious universalisation of a particular case' (Bourdieu, 1998b, p. 136), actually traces a more complex and diversified field of action. It forms a new patriarchal system of exchange which reproduces a suitable disposition for the changing social positioning of political identities. Conserved symbolic perception of the political subject transforms its identity in relation to other subjects in the same field. In other words, the inseparable existence of objective and subjective structures embodies the social positioning of political subjects, which uses its conserved dispositions in order to transform its positioning and its identity simultaneously.

Habitus and political identity formation

The potential distinctive element of Bourdieu regarding the political subject/state and its identity is to use habitus as the mediator between the objective and subjective structures (Bourdieu, 1990b). Habitus is mostly based on a blended amount of disposition derived from objective structures. These dispositions comprise all positional experiences and predisposed cognitive structures such as the tastes and fears of subjects. They unconsciously affect and restrict the potential structural engagements of subjects. Owing to these embodied dispositions in the identity of subjects, subjects unconsciously border their transformative actions and possible imaginations of their advancement in the structural world. This compatibility between the conserved and transformative character of identity helps us to reconsider objectivity and subjectivity confusion on identity creation. Both structural and constructivist approaches to political identity of state try to confirm a standard totalized identification for all members of the political subjects. Therefore, discussions focus on a kind of overarching characteristic of all members. They mostly oversee the individualistic characteristics, positional distinctions in fields, cognitive abilities to discussion of structures and expectations for being a part of society of political space. However, habitus not only provides us with a basis to take into account individualistic features of subjects/states, but also affects states' transformative qualification on their own identities (Guillory, 2000).

Accordingly, the reasonability for a state of being in the international space does not cohere with the reasonability of other states in same international space. Every individual subject/state has their own ability of discussion regarding acts of the field. Because of the individualistic and distinctive dispositions of each state regarding their structural position and identity, it is not plausible to link the rational choices of subjects and their identities in the international field. In other words, the state does not operate a functionalization of its identity by means of a coherent ideation of its members or a norm-based consensus of structures which requires a parallel belief of all states on an external social structure of existent fundamental norms. However, this could only be possible when all members of political identity originated from the same forms of dispositions in their habitus. Consequently, political subjects or states do not consciously make rational decisions on the definition of their identities, but they behave in accordance with a practical strategy (Bourdieu, 1998b; Lane, 2006), which is influenced by their positional dispositions in international field. This practical strategy – or, as Bourdieu defined it, 'feel for the game' – serves as a part of social space (Bourdieu, 1998b). This functions in the same way from political identification of a very

traditional primitive community to the modern state identity. Individuals' practical sense of the feel for the game in a primitive community results in a definition of their identities in relation to the patriarch (Bourdieu, 2012) because the practical sense of the political subject is fundamentally prone to occupy a position in social space. Similarly, medieval political subjectivity was based on a practical sense on having a position in social space in relation to the king. In the same way, the identity of the national state system cannot be seen as a result of mutually cognitive production and participation of all members, because, apparently, the construction of the international field is not equally feasible for all states pursuing national identities. This can only be explained by a practical strategy of states in order to be a part of the social field. Otherwise, it would not be logical for a state to act in accordance with fundamental norms of the international system which provide unequal conditions in relations to others.

As it is described, the identities of political subjects only live in the social sphere field. This continual socialization of identities takes their distinctive positions of the field, which always link to a somewhat patriarchal distribution of sociality. This structure spontaneously forms and influences certain limitations on the positional behaviours of political identity. When a certain political subject enters into a field, it is always subject to an evaluation of presuppositions in this field. These presuppositions effectively function as descriptive blueprints of the subject which are benefited by other subjects of identity when they construe actual positions of individual identities into the field (Bourdieu, 1984; Robbins, 2000). This means that every field has its own rules or internal organizational expectations which originate from an aggregated experience of field throughout the history of structures (Bourdieu, 1993d). The rules are found before subjects of political identity produce their unconscious dispositional strategies in the field of action (Sparrow & Hutchinson, 2013). In this way, the objective field of structure forms a certain type of guideline logic beyond the subjects of identity's own dispositional production of habitus. Productions of habitus or dispositions of subjects belong to ongoing transforming structures of history of society. Also, rules of fields or logics of structures belong to the present state of aggregated history of socialization, which contains traces of all existing and inexistent fields of historical accumulation. This double foundation of the societal field indicates that structures not only restrict the actualization of political subjectivity but also predispose the practical strategies of political subjects through dispositions. The degree of harmony between the rules of the structures and dispositional unconscious strategies of political subjects illustrates the distinguishing characters of particular identities in accordance with the other identities of the

field. This harmony forms an unofficial common accord among the members of political identity. It functions as a mediator for political identity to gain certain positions. According to their positions, political subjects embody a founded patriarchal structure which distributes social roles of political subjects in an unequal invisible hierarchical way in the field. Thus, political subjects perceive the structures' rules simultaneously as members of the same structures.

Bourdieu calls these internal aggregated rules of field 'doxa'. Doxa, or primordial political belief (Bourdieu, 1998b), is essential to understand how the identity of the state, as the political subject, is influenced by the aggregated history of structures; therefore, the state does not contravene the rules of objective fields. It was embodied before conscious struggles come into existence between competing political identities (Ibid.). The field of international relations also forms a distinctive patriarchal role in which the identities of states can take a potentially suitable position in comparison with others. The quality of position for the political subject is determined by how well its disposition (feel for the game) corresponds with doxa (the rules of the game) (Busby, 2015). The better a political subject matches up with the aggregated doxa of the field, the better it establishes objective relations. In a medieval political field, the king is in his position because the dispositions and aggregated rules of the field accomplish a higher patriarchal role for the king. In this respect, the field of international relations is a distinctive distribution style for the disposition of states and doxa of the field. The rules of the international field certainly serve the purposes of certain states in comparison with others. Although states try to transform the field in accordance with their practical future strategy, they conserve patriarchal distribution of political identity in accordance with the rules of the international field. In this way, the rules of field, such as national identities, the inviolability of defined borders and the sovereignty of the state, create better values for some states, which have a better patriarchal position in the international field. In addition, the symbolic role of identity for some states becomes more valuable than for other states. In particular, the European Union is able to utilize sovereignty better than the other developing states. In consequence, it is possible today that an individual can buy residency or even nationality of a state in exchange for a considerable amount of money. On the other hand, a Third World state cannot sell its residency or nationality because its position in the international field is not in accordance with international rules, and, therefore, nationality of that state cannot create symbolic value which helps to improve better objective relations in the field.

Language is another important point to understand the construction style of patriarchal identity distribution and its historical accumulation of doxa in the international field (Bourdieu, 1991). Produced strategies of state identity symbolically focus on creating meaningful answers for this socially produced and aggregated language. In the international field, international law forms the language of state identity. The international law of the international field also juggles with the representative positions of its state members in the practical field. In the same way, dispersions of habitus manifest how well certain states can take advantage of the existing language in international fields. This is important because in practice it determines the patriarchal distinctions of state identities in relations to the others. Consequently, the language of international law offers an opportunity to define positions – such as 'First World' – for some state identities. This also results in the creation of a practical space, such as the Second World, and the Third World, for other subject states of the same international field. Other states which want to be a member of the same societal field objectify their legitimate positions in accordance with the language of doxa in in international relations.

In this way, constructivist weakness regarding state identity in international relations rests upon its overarching emphasis on the rules of the field, or doxa (Checkel, 1998; Rieker, 2006). Although constructivist terminology intensively discusses the effects of historical aggregated rules on the institutionalization of state identity (Guzzini, 2013), it theorizes these rules as a conscious accord between the members of political subjects. A Bourdieusian concept of habitus helps us to remember that states as political subjects do not consciously find out the rules of the international field, but they are motivated by practical strategies of habitus which are deeply embedded in their previous structural experiences and qualifications (Swartz, 2013). Indeed, constructivists are highly successful in understanding the subjective structures of identity construction in international relations. However, the question of what kind of rationality forces the state to be a part of the international field raises problems, because, in practice, being a part of this field also means being a part of an unequally distributed identity on the basis of credible pride in a new internationalized patriarchal field. A Bourdieusian understanding of habitus complements a doxa-centred definition of state identity in a constructivist evaluation. Owing to the distinctive dispositions of the states in their habitus, their objective practical strategies embody even non-advantageous positions in the international field. This asserts unconscious structural effects on the practical implementation of doxa in international relations. Habitus as structuring structure creates unconscious practical strategies for states to conserve and transform their identities in the doxa-ruled field of international relations as structured structures. Therefore, a fundamental

distinctive success of Bourdieu in understanding states' political identities is to propound habitus as structuring a practical sense of political subject which provides indirect habitual effect in the formation and practice of political identity beyond the more structured historical aggregated doxa of international relations. Consequently, constructivism is successful in demonstrating more structured relations of political subjects, but it is not plausible to understand the structuring effects on identities and practical strategies of habitus beyond any rational convention between the states or subjects.

Distinction of a Bourdieusian study of political identity

First and foremost, Bourdieusian study of political identity in international relations opens up an opportunity to obliterate the duality of subjective and objective structural approaches (Fogle, 2011). It enables this study to successfully depict the intrinsic, intertwined and inseparable coexistence of structural and idealistic productions on the formation of political identity in international relations. Similar to social construction, a Bourdieusian study of political identity conceives that the political field is based on social structures and the historical social accumulation of experiences beyond the material structures, but it also questions the determinative reductionist approach of shared ideas and knowledge/culture on the socialization of the field and its subjects. Political subjects are not wholly conscious regarding their productions of ideas. They form their knowledge according to practical dispositions which depend on historically accumulated experience of structures. Different political subjects experience different positions in the field of structure, but they unconsciously become parts of a structural accumulated culture by means of their unequally distributed positions and positional dispositions. In this way, the identities of political subjects are not independent from their ideations and interactions. On the other hand, political subjects are also not independent from the unequal structural distribution of positions and their dispositions. This means that political subjects are always invisibly influenced by structural predetermined dispositions. Political subjects use these dispositions as a practical reflex when they produce their practices. Due to the unequal distribution of subjects' positions in the political field, these practical dispositions also transfer a founded structural domination into the field of politics. Shared knowledge or culture always imposes the symbolic violence of a certain founded domination in the field. In this way, the intertwined foundation of subjective and objective structures in the political field emphasizes two important structural effects on the ideational construction of socially accumulated experiences. Firstly, the habitus of political agents imposes predetermined structural forms into agents' practical reflex of actions

in line with their social positions in the field of action. Afterwards, the compatibility between the positional dispositions of political subjects and historically accumulated knowledge or culture (doxa) of structure defines how agents interpret their identities according to invisibly founded structural domination.

Besides this, Bourdieusian fieldwork in particular opens up questions regarding the internal indigenous representation of political subjects beyond their social interactions. The study pays regard to the indigenous socialization process of political identity. It not only conceptualizes the actions of political identities in accordance with other political identities in the same field, but also researches the individualistic presence of identities before interactions in the field. This gives us an opportunity to scrutinize the indigenous subjective structures of political subjects in political field. In other words, Bourdieusian study highlights the subjective structures of political agents before agents constitute their relational identities in objective fields (Narváez, 2013). In a nutshell, Bourdieusian study does not approach political subjects as unit-based similar actors in the field of interrelational practices, but the study works out all indigenous subjective productions of political subjects, which are also significant means for tracing the foundation of political identity. The study emphasizes the links between the founded capital allocation of political identities and their relative positions in the process of socialization (Bourdieu, 1998b). Consequently, it is interested in the indigenous capital allocation of political identity, which restricts the dispositions of subjects on the perception of identity. It researches that the subjective capital of agents is an important productive element of political identity beyond the objective capital of agents. It claims that a certain combination of subjective and objective capital achieves a better position according to founded culture of structures (rules of field/doxa) in the field of practice. It shows transitive links between the subjective capital of agents and the objective rules of structures. In this way, agents' indigenous dispositions and habitus become elements of political identity foundation as much as agents' exogenous inter-subjective position, knowledge and culture of structures.

Bourdieusian fieldwork also observes continuation and transition of historical structural accumulation of experiences in a more descriptive way. It helps us to see that, from primitive peasant political socialization to modern state identity, political subjects render themselves members of more complex and diversified fields of practices. Increasingly, modern political states develop into participants of different conditions in different fields, which prompts an involvement in distinctive power relations in line with their positions in the fields. The kind of power relations that states take part in also defines how they interpret their political identities in the objective field of action. By contrasting the social constructivist

perspective, inter-subjective ideas, knowledge and culture of particular historical accumulated experiences are not the sole bases of political identity production in Bourdieusian theory. In addition to this, Bourdieusian study tries to show the similarities regarding the unconscious interpretation of identity construction in different structural field of practices. In other words, Bourdieusian political identity engagement not only shows a differentiation of political identities in different historical accumulation of socialization, but also illustrates the structural resemblances of identity construction from the primitive political identity to the modern state identity (Bourdieu, 2012).

The core of structural resemblances regarding political identity construction is derived from a rendition of patriarchal representation in a different socialization of historical accumulation. The patriarchal representation of political identity in Bourdieusian study goes beyond the ordinary study of patriarchy in Hobbesian and Weberian study. Hobbes naturally transfers the family organization of patriarch to the state authority and describes patriarchy as anthropologically and morally empowered natural and historical fatherly authority (Thornton, 2005). Besides this, Weber truly distinguishes patriarchy from its gender-based definition but he inadequately thinks that patriarchal distribution of identity is based on a historically static and natural relationship of dominance (Gerth & Mills, 1991; Adams & Sydie, 2001). However, Bourdieu, in a similar way to Weber, helps us to distinguish patriarchy from its gender-oriented bases, and provides us with the perspective that patriarchal political identity is reproduced by practical dispositions which unconsciously force agents to behave in accordance with certain structurally dominated norms of patriarchy. These embodied dispositions of political subjects unconsciously impose dominance onto identities of political subjects as natural social practices of structures. Patriarchal representation is found in symbolic unconscious embodied dispositions of political subjects, rather than a natural, historical and unchangeable fatherly structuration of subjects. Therefore, a Bourdieusian understanding of patriarchy emphasizes a distribution of symbolically defined hierarchy between the members of political identity. Bourdieu does not see patriarchy as a static form of primitive family authority in more complex political identities, but Bourdieusian understanding of patriarchy is apt to understand how the honour mechanism of a certain hierarchical structure is reproduced in accordance with a different distribution of political identities. Honour, which is the symbolic border of a subject's position in the practical field, is a hidden form of patriarchal subjective domination in the socialization of political identities. Structured honour not only creates symbolic consensus for the loyalty of patriarchal hierarchy on political identities, but also forms contents of symbolic violence for the subjects

which are dependent of this patriarchal honour. As a result of this, Bourdieusian patriarchal resemblances of political subjects in different historically accumulated structural experiences depend on a dynamic and symbolic representation which produces honour for the consensus of invisible domination and symbolic violence for the determination of position in symbolic hierarchy.

Consequently, a Bourdieusian study of political identity achieves a better understanding of reproduction and changes of identities in the political field. The existing studies of social construction mostly focus on the interactional side of political agency (Klotz & Lynch, 2007; Copeland, 2000). According to this, interactions among the political subjects may change the identity perceptions of subjects, because subjects do not have any pre-defined understanding of identity but they define self–other differentiation and its content in the process of social interactions (Risse-Kappen, 2005; Wendt, 1999). It excludes socialization processes in the political field from the internal social productive processes of agents because it supposes that the inter-subjective processes of political identities produce independent distinctive cultures of knowledge and ideas for the definition of identities. This makes structures a space that only exists in the inter-subjective productions of political subjects. This means that changes in identities are only possible via the creation of a distinctive understanding of the self–other dichotomy in the process of inter-subjective interactions. In line with Bourdieusian identity study, the existing research misses out some important bases regarding changes of political identities. It does not explain the scope of changes or the question of why political subjects prefer certain changes in comparison with others in the process of inter-subjective social interactions. Besides this, it fails to notice political agents' indigenous socialization of self beyond the inter-subjective field of action. Bourdieusian study of identity emphasizes that political subjects depend on embodied habitual behavioural dispositions derived from structural position of self, which gives code and conduct of self and other separation before political subjects construct inter-subjective relations. Any differentiation in the embodied structural dispositions also changes positions that affect definitions of self and otherness in the field of practice. In other words, the embodied structural habits of subjects affect the characteristics of reproduction and change in political identities before inter-subjective relations come into existence.

In line with this, the Bourdieusian study of political identity also understands the indigenous socialization of agents before social interactions in the political field (Susen, 2011). Characteristics of these indigenous socialization are defined by the capital allocation of self, which depends on the structural subjective bordering of political subjects. Because of

these unconscious subjective borders, political subjects comply with the reproduction of political identity in the field of practice. Therefore, changes in identities are transferred into practice by both structural and inter-subjective processes simultaneously. Existing structures interpret borders of knowledge or the culture of particular subjects because they restrict unconscious dispositions of political subjects according to their present state of capital allocations. Then, political agents define their positions and identities in line with their unconsciously dominated dispositions in the inter-subjective processes of the practical field. Changes in political identities fundamentally depend on crisis or conflict on doxa or shared rule of structures, which prompts the problematization of the unconscious domination of practices. In this way, political subjects reproduce their identities by way of dispositional behaviours which objectively confirm their positions in the field and subjectively embody the unconscious domination of power. Accordingly, changes in political identities happen when political identities start to resist the unconscious dispositional cognitive productions of domination in their habitus which impose to behave in accordance with the domination of a certain patriarchal nobility. Therefore, Bourdieusian study of political identity presents both conserved and transformative characteristics of political identity in the field (Bourdieu, 1995c). Transformation not only happens in the inter-subjective field of actions but also firstly depends on the internalization crises of political subjects regarding embodied dispositions that go beyond the indigenous space of inter-subjective construction. Changes of political identities arise out of conflicts with the symbolic indigenous dispositions of subjects; these conflicts are then brought into crises on the inter-subjective cognition of doxa in the objective field.

Bourdieusian study of identity also interprets cultures of fields in political spaces in a more comprehensive way. The existing research on construction generally conceptualizes culture in line with the existence of anarchy in the field (Dessler & Owen, 2005; Hopf, 1998). Bourdieusian study does not focus on objective existence and construction of culture on the basis of anarchy, but it highlights subjective the existence of nobility, which unconsciously imposes a patriarchal domination onto the social bodies of political subjects. Being part of the doxic relations of the field also creates a consensus on the distinctive position of domination because doxa always complies with certain nobility of domination which is unconsciously valued by all members of the political field. The existing nobility of the political field creates different positions for the members of political identity. Nobility functions as domination and its capital allocation for some members of the political fields, but this nobility also functions as a symbolic violence for some other members of the field which have less capable capital

allocation (Bourdieu, 1991). Therefore, the production of culture is related to the existence of a consensus of nobility rather than the existence of certain anarchy in the field. In this way, beyond the cognitive production of knowledge and culture, political identity is derived from the behavioural preferences of agents, which are not objective rational products but are the subjective unconscious values of agents' positions, containing spheres from nobility to symbolic violence of domination. Eventually, in the light of these distinctive elements of Bourdieusian political identity, this study defines political identity as a struggle on capital allocation which facilitates the domination of symbolic dispositions and enables the reproduction of domination in accordance with the recognized doxa of the political field. Improved capital allocation of subjects may change consciousness of subjects regarding their dispositions; political subjects may then rebel against structured rules of doxa. In this way, subjects refuse the symbolic violence of dominative nobility and they problematize their conserved positions in order to transform political identification. To sum up, for Bourdieusian study, political identities depend on both objective and inter-subjective relations and have both reproductive and transformative capacities simultaneously.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Politics: theory and practice via Bourdieu

Consideration of theory–reality relation and its inferences in the field of economics is seen as a different and problematic construction by Bourdieu (2005). This is in part because theory is not seen as a kind of subtraction or complement of reality. Rather, it is perceived as a deliberate intention of power allocation in the social life. Thus, every theory constructs a particular kind of neutralization in order to form the rational means of causation. These rational means of causation serve the arbitrary logic of powerful and collective identity. Objective structures and their real world interrelations are not theorized by factual reason–result implications. Contrarily, they are designed by theoretical evaluations because theories interpret how the domination of social structures relocates the relation web, classification, boundaries, collectiveness and distribution in political, social and economic life.

The Bourdiean turn in international relations can prompt approaches that are in many ways more embedded in historical and social context. History is dialectically full of objective social changes. However, to evaluate history as just an interpretation of objective changes (Krasner, 2009) not only ignores the dynamics of social interactions regarding the production of a common future, but also objectifies the past as a sole concrete meaning. In this respect, Linklater seeks to understand the history in which transformation of political society comes into existence at a deep level. He claims that 'freely chosen moral principles' improve history in order to emancipate the future of society (Linklater, 1998, p. 22). Nevertheless, these principles cannot be the reference of history as long as they are not compatible with the objective socio-political and economic structures. Historical subjectivity is intertwined with the objective structures because it indoctrinates the causation of historical arbitrariness in certain collectiveness. In addition to this, to evaluate history as a kind of story or linguistic permissiveness (Jenkins, 1997) impairs the dialectical objectification and re-objectification of history. Dominance of arbitrary interpretations of history does not solely depend on interpretations of the subjects. In fact, history is an ongoing process which governs the coexistence of pre-domination of subjective structures and continuation of objective social life.

There is not any ontological connection between human nature and structures, but it should be seen that human nature, interests and identities always cohere in the whole history. The ontology of human nature is the relativity of historicizing which transforms temporal

particularity into ontological universality via the 'ethernalization of temporality'. Ideas cannot provide common actions to prompt common interests and shared identities. In order to give the meaning of common ideas and interests, it must be by means other than the ontology of human nature. In this way, it is thought that habitus is the way to explain the meaning of how interests and identities can be constructed similarly. Habitus bridges the gap in structural and interactional ontology. The agents freely pursue their interests in accordance with their ideas, but their ideas are unconsciously imposed by a set of representations of certain habitual constructions. The material world is designed in accordance with this set of instructions in habitus. Habitus is continually reorganized by the feedback of this material and objective world. Therefore, concepts such as peace, war and cooperation do not correlate to the construction of certain historical identities, but, on the contrary, they refer to how habitus identifies the objective world and how the objective world reorganizes agents' dispositions in their habitus. The objective world is not the constructive basis of common norms or identities, but this field undergoes unconscious construction of the agents' habituation and conscious reconstruction of habitus respectively.

Every social collectivity produces practices to maintain objective changes in accordance with its own aspirations and expectations. Changes firstly dominate the subjectively internalized structures of individuals and then they externalize their existences by means of objective embodiment of subjective structures. A totalized political collectivity in social stratification tends to influence objective structures in accordance with their own arbitrariness. Theory functions as the nobility of this collective subjectivity, which naturalizes the artificial conditions of their interests into practices. In other words, theory comes into existence when individuals, groups and classes in the same social collectivity want to improve and naturalize their own objective structures because dispositions are inadmissible without this theoretical invasion in the subjective structures of political identity. Thus, history is the field to understand the linkages between the deliberate construction of subjectivity and the objective structures of this subjectivity (Bourdieu, 1995a). Theory forms the beliefs of the whole political identity, which leads to codes of practices. Because of this belief, political subjects do not conflict with the objective structures and its stratification.

The function of theory is to produce a *sense of limit* for subjects in a certain historical social stratification (Bourdieu, 1984). The basic instrumentality of theory for political subjectivity not only rests on objective institutions, moral expectations and linguistic relativity, but also improves a state of ideational social stratification which produces coherent practices for subjective and objective structures. According to Bourdieu, this coherence is the

most consistent nature of established order, which operates on its own peculiar logic and stratification (Bourdieu, 1995a). The theoretical domination of individuals extends from individuals' practices to the common practices of the state called common sense. This improves the recognition of political subjects in accordance with their social spaces. The success in theoretical dominance enhances quality of differentiation in social positioning and standardizes the boundaries, borders and rules in a given political field. Standardization also means naturalization of the relationship styles and intensity between the classes, because the state perceives its positioning in the international field as a kind of natural positioning, which can be the only suitable closure for their theoretical knowledge and disposition. Therefore, theory functions as the subjective predetermined mode of an arsenal which produces misrecognition for the social positioning of the state in a particular domination of objective practices. Misrecognition constructs the self-limitation mechanism due to the limited and determined knowledge of state identity regarding its own positioning. In accordance with this theory and practice coherence, objective political relations in the international field are produced and reproduced as long as a new theoretical naturalization comes into existence in order to serve a distinctive domination of social stratification.

The second part of the same coin is the *sense of reality*, which means the objectification of self-limitation in real life (Bourdieu, 1984). The *sense of reality* pretends to be the production of subjects and, therefore, political subjects evaluate themselves as autonomous entities when they produce their identities. The autonomy of the state, achieving social and political identity, is a political fictionalization of knowledge in order to maintain the continual reproduction of the political field. Any kind of inconsistency in theory and *sense of reality* may cause significant obstacle to achieve stabilization in the distribution of political identities. A lack of strong *sense of reality* and challenges of new limitation result in differentiation in political order and identities because theoretical statements do not support the objective social world.

Furthermore, the most important function of the *sense of reality* is to produce and reproduce power relations in the identities of political subjectivity. It always has a political function, which also shapes the social and economic institutions (Bourdieu, 1995a). In this aspect, subjective references of state identity have the same classification, division and boundaries as the objective field because subjective and objective fields are framed by the same power relations. When state identity is identified, an understanding of 'nature', which is an interpretation of power relations in the objective field, always precedes this theorization. This 'nature' is naturalized by theories, exercised by practices and changed by new

allocations of power relations or social stratification. The roles and positions of political subjects are distributed according to these power relations. The dominance of power relations as an invisible hand constructively governs every differentiation in the international field from gender, labour, age groups and family to ethnicity and nation of state. In order to be a part of the international field, the state should be part of the existing sense of reality because this reality is basically a presupposed common sense in their subjective structures (Holton, 2000). For example, a gendered discourse hardly produces a counter position, as opposed to gender differentiation in the market, because its subjective world is also constituted by the same sense of reality. In other words, it has to take advantage of the existing dispositions in order to give meaning of the objective world.

Therefore, when we try to understand the construction of political identities, it is important to evaluate the social constitutive norms, recognition and legitimacy of sovereign actors (Reus-Smit, 2007; Ruggie, 1998; Finnemore, 1996a), but these are not enough to understand the political subjectivity of state because, from a Bourdieusian perspective, these are always contingent upon a theoretical deliberate focus. Therefore, when one tries to understand how identities are constructed, one should take into consideration two indispensable functions in addition to recognition, norms and legitimacy. These two indispensable factors are misrecognition and arbitrariness of domination (Bourdieu, 1995a). A political field is formulated when all these recognizable and misrecognized factors regularly operate and produce each other. Any incoherence in misrecognition and recognition processes prompts crises in the political subjectivity of the state. Dominant states of political stratification in the international field want to maintain the coherence, but other states are gradually troubled with political restlessness when their symbolic accumulation does not achieve their practices. However, crises do not automatically lead transformation in political identities. Another set of habitus should fulfil the symbolic incoherence of existing political structure because the new symbolic coherence is provoked by new power relations and domination, which always claim distinctive political identity.

In the theory of international relations, the constructivist turn to ideas and identities deals with the material realist/rationalist theoretical justification of human nature via re-emphasizing shared interests and ideas (Ruggie, 1993; Reus-Smit, 2002; Reus-Smit, 1999; Guzzini, 2000), but it generally oversees the habitual production/reproduction of agents in the nature. Human nature is not the reason for production and reproduction of the structures of international relations, but the agents still construct their ideas in line with the formations of habitus in nature as the objective fields of politics. Identities are not pre-given forms of the

nature but they are primarily shaped by the agents' habitus, which is continually reproduced in nature. In this way, when agents construct their identities, they cannot produce the nature beside of their social habitus. Objective and subjective natures always reproduce structures in relation to each other. Thus, it is necessary to look at the interrelations in the reconstruction of ideas and reproduction of nature. One of the guiding references of the Bourdieusian concept in international relations is to understand these interrelations between nature and subjective ideas. In this part, the Bourdieusian concept of symbolic violence is rethought in the field of international relations and it is discussed how symbolic violence references the production and reproduction of globalizing identities. Then, the study will rethink and reinterpret the construction of bureaucratic field in international relations.

Classificatory function of political field

Political capital is reorganized by new classifications, forms and limits at every stage of historical accumulation. Classification, forms and limits reproduce new totalized collective beliefs which institutionalize and concretize certain kinds of rituals as the recognized norms of certain political identities. The political capital of identities is reconstructed when collective beliefs change. Therefore, it is important to first reinterpret the functions of collective beliefs. Collective beliefs prescribe the ideal forms via the symbolic world of individuals. When individuals are involved in the objective structures, they do not fall into any ambiguity because collective beliefs form the ways of access to the objective structures as kinds of ethical norms or rules of exchange. Collective beliefs stem from historicization of the totalized symbolic world into the objective structures and they become the bases of identities which internalize divisions and achieve mobilization of collective political actions (Bourdieu, 1984). Agents unconsciously gain the dispositions of collective beliefs which code individuals' identities. The 'unconscious' simply means an omission of the former historicization and an attachment to a new historicization (Bourdieu, 1995a). Consequently, collective beliefs originate in a dehistoricization of former structures for supporting a new historicization when a new political identity unconsciously succeeds in representing its own interest in the habitus of the other agents as the interests of everyone. In this way, political capital does not differ from the individualistic preferences, tastes, aesthetic and material interests of certain classes which are concretized by collective beliefs. Historical improvement of the abolition of slavery is a good example to depict the historicization/dehistoricization of collective beliefs so as to reconstruct political identities. Slavery was originally institutionalized as the identity of certain individuals. The states had a right to take advantage

of slavery as a kind of social institution. Slaves unconsciously gained their identities by way of symbolic violence. They embodied the symbolic construction of slavery and also exercised objective structures of slavery. Slavery was historicized by some dominant classes of some territories. The subjects of this social institution recognized the interests of these dominant groups via falling into misrecognition despite the fact that these interests or 'realities' were the worst conditions for the slaves. However, in time, slavery institution was recognized all over the world as illegitimate. There is no doubt that every agent disapproves of slavery as a social institution today. Changes from the approval to disapproval of slavery are the important points to understand changes in common beliefs. In this aspect, the interests of dominant political identities have changed. This dehistoricized slavery and historicized another identification of the individuals instead. These improvements were unconsciously organized without the exception of the slaves' own will because institutionalization of the abolition of slavery was gradually realized by the consensus of domination. Therefore, the historicization of agents begins the dehistoricization of embodied judgments, which means a dismantling of older habitus (Fowler, 1997). Political capital always totalizes identities as the common beliefs whose agents are unequally represented according to their territorialities, subjective dispositions and objective 'realities' by historicization.

Collective beliefs represent the particularities of a certain domination as universal identity. It makes the individuals internalize political capital, which is the reproduction of inequalities and distribution of domination. However, the individuals do not realize these particularities or inequalities because the particularities dominate unconscious parts of their habitus, but they can realize the contemporary functions and objectives of civilization which have not been formed as the unconscious common beliefs of the agents (Bourdieu, 1995a). In this aspect, when agents engage their identities, they do not form their own collective beliefs in the process of these engagements, but they objectify the collective beliefs of identity which are produced and reproduced throughout the long processes. In this respect, inequalities are not objective conditions, but they are predetermined accumulations of values which make agents recognize and regularize their unequal identities. Common beliefs are the producers and reproducers of the political order which dissemble inequality and domination of identities. Common beliefs are the ways of symbolic power to impose 'the realities' of political capital.

Systems of classification in political capital should be illustrated to understand the differentiation of political identities. In this aspect, political capital always reproduces its identities by classification of the agents. Classification comes into existence when a dominant

class imposes its own consciousness of order as subjective symbolic violence for the other agents' political capital. Bourdieu argues

> The 'social order' is thus reduced to a collective classification obtained by addition of the classifying and classified judgments through which agents classify and are classified, or, to put it another way, through aggregation of the (mental) representation that one group has of the (theatrical) representations that other groups give them and of the (mental) representations that the latter have of them (Bourdieu, 1990b, pp. 135–136)

In this respect, political capital is reinterpreted by the mutual existence of the classifying and classified identities. The dominant social classes of the political order engender a new classification which differentiates the producers of the identities from the practitioners of the identities. The agent defining the modes of classification imposes the identities and symbolic violence of a particular historicization. The dominant classes of political capital can only impose 'a vision of division' (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 134), which results in politically categorized and individually internalized identities. Classification reorganizes and modifies 'the realities' of the domination according to the new political identities. The agents construct their identities by embodiment of the given 'realities', which is based on the interpretations of other agents' categorization regarding these particular agents (De Fina, 2006). Thus, political identities always require classification in order to survive. For example, the medieval identity was due to the classification of suzerain and vassal. The suzerain functions as the creator of classification and the vassal serves as the practitioner of this classification. National identities objectified new kinds of classifications such as nationally civilized/uncivilized, modern/premodern, Third/Second/First World and core/periphery. These classifications ideologically serve the purposes and interests of the dominant classes of national identities. In the same way, globalization is creating distinctive classifications which are territorially decentralized and heterogeneous. Globalization disintegrates the national totalization of identities. It classifies the identities according to their degrees of democratization, liberation, individualization, genderization or humanitarian-orientation.

Furthermore, it is logical to re-evaluate 'the politics of forms' (Bourdieu, 1995b, pp. 84–85) in relation to the political capital of identities because forms are always created in order to reference political roles, interests and values (Ibid.). The agents are unconsciously involved in the politicization of forms so as to give meanings to their identifications. These forms are represented by the symbolic construction of the agents. In this aspect, when the Western world is defined as the developed world, it also creates sub-forms to make sense of the definition of West, such as the developing world. The form of developing world is taken

advantage of the agents in order to eliminate the 'othering' of the developing world. Political order, which stems from social order, is internalized by relative interactions with otherness. Objective limits to embody political orders lead to the recognition of inclusion/exclusion, whose agents include or exclude themselves from the others in terms of thoughts, status, places and belongings (Bourdieu, 1984). Division is recognition of political order in objective practices. Antagonism between the political capital of the different groups represents political orders which creates political hierarchy because some agents embody some kinds of political identification as the most advantaged political position for themselves so as to encounter other political identities. This creates dispositional fields of emancipation for the dominated or subordinated classes. These fields of emancipation make the subordinated classes obey the identity of political capital. They eventually reproduce 'the classificatory judgments' (Ibid., pp. 170–171) in order to continually regenerate the hierarchical division of political orders.

Power and political field

Understanding the identifiable characteristic of political subjects leads to discussions of how to define power in international relations. Bourdieusian study gives us comprehensive descriptive theatrical tools to rethink power in international field. Bourdieusian perspective of power mostly relies on legitimacy beyond any structural elements of power (Bourdieu, 1996b). Power is fundamentally a product of subjective misrepresentation regarding objective positions. The misrepresentation of positions is contributed to by an accumulation of legitimacy which characterizes a taken-for-granted feature of power. In this respect, power and compulsion are not identical and coexistent. The existence of power is based on the habitual existence of legitimacy, which naturalizes practices as taken-for-granted actions beyond objective structural struggles (Swartz, 2013). Political subjects do not realize the existence of power relations because their habitus imposes particular forms of definition as legitimate ways to achieve political recognition and representation. As a result of this, the main struggle of power is related to struggles of how to represent legitimacy for descriptive roots of political collectivization. The field of power is distributed by a contestation of different forms of capital which try to influence the roots of legitimacy in the definition of collective political identity.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, power is relational (Navarro, 2006). It is a product of different forms of capital which improve its capital allocation as the most distinctive form to define objective institutional relations in the field. This relational characteristic in the Bourdieusian understanding of power creates a distinctive expression beyond material factual

(Cesa, 2009) and ideational consensual explanation of power in international relations (Reus-Smit, 1997). Power can only be defined when unequally distributed forms of capital compete in order to obtain a dominant position in definitive or transformative power of political identity. In this respect, the existence of power depends on a creation of subjective categories in political identities. These subjective categories can only be produced by positions in international fields. In this way, relations actually create objective positions which unconsciously legitimize the field of power among the members of political identities. Political subjects do not only legitimate their own positions but also legitimate the dominant and dominated positions in relation to their own positions. Power is mainly objectified by domination in particular political identification, but the control mechanism of this domination is not formed by struggles in the objective field. The field of power relies on struggles for the domination of dispositions, imposing internalized knowledge which embodies a certain position and categorization of political identification as a legitimate and natural way of existence.

The fields of power are not objectified by interests because interests are formed by dispositions of states, which are distributed by capacities regarding the objectified legitimacy of capital. In other words, there is no immediate consciousness on the interests of states because capacities of struggles for legitimacy are differentiated in accordance with the harmony of accumulated capital and its legitimate domination. In this respect, state identity is constituted by collective memories, but these collective memories are connected to unequal capacities of dispositions. Unequal capacities fundamentally create positional differentiations in the international field. States can only produce conscious interests in relation to each other after this unconscious distribution of habitual classification in positions of the international field. The main struggle on the definition of political agency arises from different forms of capital, which increase the legitimacy of domination in a field (Bourdieu, 1994). As the result of these struggles, owners of a particular form of capital dominate the power of practice in the field and they constitute the legitimate definition of political identity. In this way, ownership of a particular combination of capital becomes more legitimate in comparison with others. Domination of particular capital in the field also defines the conversion rates of capital, which depicts distribution in the field of power and position in practice. Consequently, the objective interests of political subjects are products of this conversion rate of capital because the value standards of behaviours are only defined after a particular conversion rate creates categories and positions in a field.

After the domination of the collective identity of political subjects is internally embodied, this also transforms the internal situations of other political subjects in the same field. The internal situations of political subjects are reorganized in accordance with the exchange rate of political subjectivity regarding distinctive forms of capital (Swartz, 2013). This exchange rate for forms of capital is transferred to the territorial space of other political subjects because this increases internal legitimacy, which leads to the relative external recognition of political subjectivity. The success of this transformation depends on the relative strength of a legitimate form of capital within a particular state identity. A lack of legitimate capital results in having dominated positions in relational field of practice. Similarly, a conversion rate of accumulated capital also distributes the positions of states in a wider international field. In this respect, control over the conversion rates in the internal societal structure of political subjects extends the borders to control the rate of capital in the international field. This conversion rate determines relative dispositional capacity of political subjects. The capacities of each subject naturalizes their positions in field because capacity imposes definitive characters of classification in the practical international field. As a result, the dispositional capacities of states correspond to their positions in the field.

Contrary to the existing dominant structural approach in international relations, considering the existence of power in relation to the objectification of material interests (Moravcsik, 1997; Keohane & Nye, 1989), in Bourdieusian study the field of power is not only associated with pure economic reasons or interests. The field of power is always in affiliation with an embodiment of a certain form of social and cultural capital, such as religious or ethno-centric or academic capital. Political capital is a mechanism to influence the legitimacy of state identity, which eventually improves the accumulation of economic capital via the domination of power. Economic capital is just a more fluent form of capital which is convertible to all other kinds of capital. Therefore, having a dominant position in terms of economic capital does not achieve a dominant position of political identity because identity construction always requires distinguishing the subjectivity of social and cultural capital over the control of disposition, which improves the accumulation of economic capital in the practical field. The accumulated history of political identity is the evidence that there is no political collective envisioned by the pursuance of economic capital, but political identity is continuously designed by differentiation in the forms of subjective capital in distinctive styles of domination. However, due to the conversion fluidity of economic capital, it is possible to enhance the accumulation of a certain form of social and cultural capital in exchange for accumulated economic capital. In this way, states can improve their social, cultural and

political capital via their use of the advancement of economic capital. For example, advancement in economic capital can provide a relevant opportunity for states to represent prestigious international social and cultural events within their territories, which enhance their relative positions in social and cultural capital of state.

In line with a Bourdieusian understanding of power, it is essential to understand how political capital can be framed in the field of power. According to Bourdieu, political capital is a subjective form of capital, but it should be objectified by institutional objective actions and, therefore, political capital also functions as a subtypes of social capital when it is examined in objective world (Swartz, 2010). According to this perspective, political capital can be objectified in different ways. In this respect, political capital can be linked to the individualistic fame and nobility of personal qualification, or it can be more connected to existence of representative qualification of particular institutional bodies (Kauppi, 2005). Both forms are relevant objectified categories to understand the formation of political subjects' identity in the field. In both ways of objectification in political capital, having a distinctive political capital in social collective body is prerequisite for having dominant positions in the struggles for the field of power. Looking at the political objectification style of pre-modern clans, it can be seen that both representative and personal styles of political objectification intrinsically affect the construction of political identity. The political identity of clan is more connected to patriarchal ties, but it also requires the functionalization of the primitive family or group's primitive internal representativeness. Contrary to this, the objectification of political capital in pre-modern political identity is represented by the personalized loyalty and nobility of the king, which embodies many different forms of symbolic instruments such as religious capital. On the other hand, the objectification of modern political subjectivity is based on a representation of institutionalization because political capital relies on the organizational capacity of the state, which rewards individuals or groups with domination in the field of political power. The representative objectification of capital also constitutes its own organizational distribution, which forms new social capital for the embodiment of a representative body. This representative body of the modern state is institutionalized by the functionalization of bureaucratic capital into the state identity. Therefore, a well-defined bureaucratic capital functions as a power which approves the domination of political capital in the name of selected individuals or groups in the international field.

The objectification of political capital always arises from the political field, where all struggles over the objective institutionalization and distribution of subjective capacities take

place. In this way, unequal and dominative classifications of political identities are objectified in the field of political capital. The political field produces practices to persuade political struggles which enhance symbolic capital regarding the domination of vision and division (Pouliot & Mérand, 2012). All of these struggles in the political field serve a particular political domination which imposes a particular interpretation of identity and obedience of collective behaviours. In this respect, domination in the political field means control over the collective actions of other political subjects. These behavioural actions are transferred into political subjects through doxa. The political field always forms its unique culture of representation or doxa which limits the actions of states in accordance with the vision and division of positions in the political field. The international field, as the political field of modern state identity, provides a suitable basis for all these struggles over the subjective capital of political identification. Indeed, states, as actors of political subjectivity, carry out the expected political culture of the international field in their practices. Considering the United Nations' institutionalization as an objectification of political capital in the international field, it is seen that the UN practices represent the fundamental characteristics of a Bourdieusian political field. The foundation of the UN mechanism provided a distinctive political vision and division under the dominant positions of four states. Four states achieved the legitimacy of power via their superiority of political capital, which imposed legitimate standards of keeping peace. The founded political doxa of state identity was constituted on the existence of relational and external recognition in the international field. After recognition of state identity became connected to UN membership, states pursued membership of objective institutionalization in a proposed peace of the international field because, without having a position in accordance with the doxa of the international field, state identity is always under pressure from the symbolic violence of domination. As a result of these, the legitimacy of domination, empowered by four dominant states, achieved collective mobilizations of political subjects, which imposed a legitimate meaning of peace onto the identity of all other dominated states of the international field.

The positional and relational distribution of states rests on borders of the political field, because state identity can be only defined by the positions of other states in the same international field. Therefore, struggles are based on competing positions beyond the definition of political identity. Struggles for the collection of better political capital aim at changing the structured inequality of opposition. States do not compete for the abolishment of inequality in the domination system, but rather they struggle for enhancing their capacities to produce a better positional distribution in the field. Inequality in the political field is an

embedded characteristic because the existence of a political field relies on a relational exchange of capital between states, which requires division in continual positional differences. The autonomy of states from the embedded relational inequality depends on the institutionalization quality of domination in the political field. When a certain political identity, such as modern state identity, concretely establishes its institutional basis in the international field, it becomes autonomous from the dispositional capacity of dominated states. The dispositional infrastructure of dominated states is trivialized by the institutional advancement of domination in the international field. However, this dispositional domination in relational practices loses its autonomous characteristics in the existence of crisis situations (Bourdieu, 1994). Crisis situations in the international field mean that the existing institutional distribution of domination and its bureaucratic functionalization remain incapable of proving doxic political capital in practice. Political doxa or culture provides practical ways of behaviour which states obey unfalteringly, because doxa makes all other potential ways unthinkable for the states (Swartz, 2013). In this respect, crisis discloses these unthinkable options which damage embedded domination. In line with crisis, the autonomy of dominant positions decrease. This relational peculiarity of the political field was materially experienced during the independence process of colonial territories. At the beginning of colonialism, imperial states had great autonomy in the determination of the relational distribution of political culture because the primitive political identities of the colonial territories were incapable of accumulating political capital. As accumulated political capital increased in the colonial political society, the existing institutionalization of colonialism was questioned. Colonial political subjectivities improve relevant political capital to define their political identity in distinctive positions in the international field. Accumulated political capital also transformed the dispositional capacity of these political bodies, which changed the embedded political culture of the political field. Eventually, crises in colonial distributions inevitably decreased the autonomy of embedded domination in the international field.

Problem of reflexivity and bureaucratic field of international relations

One of Bourdieu's most productive theoretical tools to understand the political identities of states in international relations is to rethink political subjectivity in accordance with his approach of reflexivity. Bourdieu emphasizes that agents perform their identity in a spatial field position, but they lack insight with regards to their own objective positions (Bourdieu, 1990a). Under a dominant distribution of identity definition, agents are unable to produce critical shifts from their political localization and division. The subjective embedded culture

of habitus into agents' identities restricts their practices in line with the expected characteristics of their capital allocation. The divisionary structure of the political field confirms practices of agents and dispositional embedded culture of domination. In this respect, the state can only improve a reflective insight into its own identity when there is an irreparable inconsistency between its position and dispositions, which can be monitored by crisis situations in the international field. This crisis rests on significant changes in sums of states' capital allocation, which impair or improve the political capital of states in the international field. Consequently, a lack of state reflexivity with regards to its identity represents stability and embedded domination in the international field. Indeed, the genetics of international law are the basis for the state's incapacity to self-reflect in the international field. Many rules of international law influence the identity of state as *jus cogens* which states obey unquestionably. Many fractions in *jus cogens* are in practice inapplicable functions or restricted spaces which do not cope with capacities of dominated states. Also, *jus cogens* are pre-mediated institutions which reflect the culture and nobility of designer political actors. However, because of the limited dispositional capacities of dominated states, the divisionary capacity of domination undoubtedly becomes a practical institution of the field. Institutions such as the monopoly of the use of force or the equality of sovereigns are in practice inapplicable and feasible institutions for states in a dominated political position in the international field, but they become parts of the same institutional objectivities in line with their incapacity of reflexivity. In line with discussions above, reflexivity can only overcome dispositional domination of *jus cogens* in the event of crisis in the international field. In this respect, slavery was a peculiar institution which was a functional capacity of domination until the Hague Conventions in 1889. Consequently, slavery become unjustified after the dominated states accumulated a significant amount of institutionalized capital. Similarly, owing to the fact that the lack of self-reflexivity rests on a stable obedience of dispositions, genocide was not represented as *jus cogens* until dominant identities imposed its doxic infrastructure, which was reorganized into dominated dispositions. Therefore, the Armenian Genocide was disposed of as the internal action of a sovereign state until it was institutionalized as *jus cogens* in the international field after the Second World War.

Following Bourdieusian reflexivity argumentation, it is claimed here that state identity is embedded in political relations which are defined by the unconsciousness of otherness and division in categories. Contrary to the constructivists' conceptualization regarding states' own consciousness on the construction of their identities, the collective identity of state identity does not explicitly produce reflexive consciousness because its consciousness is distorted by

the pre-disposed political culture of the practical field (Bourdieu, 1990b). Therefore, a state's identity depends considerably on its positional space in the field. The potential conscious actions of the state lose their essence and transform into dispositional practices of the state because embedded history in its political field restricts state actions via the bordered engagement of institutional objectivity in the international field. To be in a certain political position in the international field means that state has a certain form of political culture and behaviour which constitutes its interests simultaneously. In this respect, to be a part of European identity depends on certain behaviours and characteristics of accumulated history which objectify divisions without any deliberate intention of divisionary behaviour. The European state identity describes a position which defines an objectification of history. Thus, the border of European identity extends according to this accumulated identity beyond the any objective reality of territoriality. To claim European identity eventually requires the inclusion of all parts of a shared collective history, which demands similar capital accumulation for the participants' states of the same European identity. Consequently, individual improvements of a state in capital allocation are not enough in order to improve the relative position of its identity, but also other states, having the similar categorical positions in the vision and division of the international field should improve and distinguish their relatively distributed political positions.

Bourdieu also considers that the formation of state collectiveness over the use of power and its capital allocation results in the formation of particular struggles with regards to categorization and division (Bourdieu, 1994). These struggles target domination on the legitimate use of functionality and institutionalization of the state. Thus, the state, as the representative of political identity, rests on particular interests which are seen as being for the collective benefit of all individuals and groups in state identity. In this respect, state identity continually reproduces dispositional representations of objective structures which should constitute particular interests of domination as universal values of all members in political society. The state functions as a stability of a particular vision and division via producing legitimacy, which creates particular language on how to understand universality and its institutionalization. The stability of domination requires a 'monopolization of universal' (Ibid., p. 17) via practices of a bureaucratic field. In line with this, the bureaucratic field in international relations functions as the creator of political dispositions which describe universal values for the struggles between states. The bureaucratic field invests its interests of domination as universal values for the interest of state identity. Consequently, the bureaucratic field represents legitimacy in the international field and, therefore, it contributes

characteristics and borders of vision and division which constitute political culture or doxa of the international field.

In a Bourdieusian sense, the bureaucratic field is the sphere where the vision of division is produced and distributed (Wacquant, 2013). In this respect, the bureaucratic field in the international field normalizes the unequal distribution of positions because it produces relevant legitimacy which synchronizes the dispositional capacity of the state and its unequal positions in the objective international field. Bureaucratic capital is also subject to changes which diversify the embedded doxa and influences objective institutionalizations. In other words, in order to impose particular legitimacy, changes regarding the distribution of the bureaucratic field impair existing political culture and its institutionalization, which is also a product of the former distribution of bureaucratic capital. In line with this, the bureaucratic field in international relations functions as an intermediary which not only produces and imposes a meaning of political culture, but also improves and impairs the objective of state identity in the institutional sphere of international relations. Consequently, different bureaucratic fields in different historical accumulations interpret the objectives and institutions of political capital in accordance with their distinctive arbitrariness. Due to this, the arbitrariness of interpretation in imposed political culture, as it is discussed in previous parts, and similar problems of the international field, such as genocide and slavery, or institutions such as democracy and development are distinctively identified in accordance with particular arbitrariness of bureaucratic capital in the international field. Although the produced arbitrariness of bureaucratic capital generally does not express the unequal positions of dominated states, the domination of the bureaucratic field on the disposition of meanings supresses any revival between dispositions and the self-reflexivity of the state.

The bureaucratic field in international relations rests on struggles between different forms of groups which obtain and dominate distinctive capital and its subjected and objective accumulation. Political collective groups, having domination of different forms of capital, try to influence the bureaucratic field in order to impose their own discrete interests as the common agenda of the field (Bourdieu, 1996b). Therefore, the capital allocation of the bureaucratic field differentiates in accordance with characteristics of domination and distribution of positions in the international field. Different identifications of political identity are constituted by different combinations of forces in the bureaucratic field. The arbitrary power of the bureaucratic field in the legitimacy of the king is formed by the subjective and objective capital of religion. On the other hand, the objective and subjective capital of religion in the capital allocation of the modern state's bureaucratic field is mostly eliminated by the

domination of distinctive capital allocation of bureaucracy, which is constituted by the economic and cultural interests of specific bourgeois factions. In other words, the characteristics of the bureaucratic field in international relations improve the positions of particular capital ownership, which organizes the political culture of state identity in accordance with its own arbitrariness. The bureaucratic field in international relations eventually influences the internal bureaucratic capital of states and imposes the transformation into capital allocation of the states' internal bureaucratic field. The success and failure of this transformation process indicate states' positions in the dominated–dominant field of international relations.

In order to dominate the definition of political identity, dominant political subjects also need to form and impose their legitimate nobility, which distinguishes the dominants from all other political subjects in practical field. In this respect, an essential functionality of the bureaucratic field is related to its distributional power of nobility (Bourdieu, 1994). The bureaucratic field defines the characteristics of nobility, which produce a doxic concentration of symbolic capital. Looking at the political identity of the king in medieval political subjectivity, it can be seen that the king embodies all of the bureaucratic field and its capital allocation because he defines the meaning of nobility and arbitrarily distributes this nobility in the political field. On the other hand, in modern state identity, the nobility of king transforms into the cultural and economic supremacy of bourgeois, which defines the legitimate nobility to be a recognized member of the political field. Therefore, in the same way as the Bourdieusian conception of nobility in political societies, in the international field the symbolic infrastructure of a particular capital allocation becomes the legitimate language of institutionalization. States in the international field struggle to improve the nobility of particular domination because the bureaucratic field synchronizes this particular nobility and legitimate recognition, which institutionalizes itself into the practices and productions of international law. Eventually, international law as objectified capital produces institutionalized capital in accordance with the nobility of the dominant bureaucratic field.

Symbolic violence on political identities in the globalization process
The questioning regarding identification of identities in international relations is liable to be rethought by the existence of anarchy and peace. Anarchy and peace are forms of social practice that give meaning to 'the reality' for identities. In this respect, it is important to understand how the agents formulate 'the reality' of the objective world. The formulation of identities derives from a deep-rooted domination in the individuals' habitus. This domination

is found before the anarchy or peace is perceived by the agents and 'the reality' is embedded in the structures. This pre-dominated perception is achieved by symbolic violence, which is more embedded than physical violence because the unconsciousness of the state regarding symbolic violence results in dispositional obedience and conformation of violence beyond any self-reflexivity of identity. Therefore, symbolic violence is the product of the agents' misrecognition of the recognizable processes of habitus. Symbolic violence is never seen as dominative violence by agents, even though agents become the battlefield of symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1995a). In this way, the agents are both practitioners and bearers of symbolic violence via social practices. The political subjectivity of the state unconsciously procures symbolic violence and passes down this produced symbolic violence via its practices. More importantly, symbolic violence takes a formalized and constituted form which is seen as shared habitus by states. Consequently, symbolic violence functions as a determinative factor of all dominant and dominated identities of states in the international field.

It is not plausible to separate symbolic violence from concrete violence of states in the international field. Controversially, it is argued that concrete violence fully stems from symbolic violence of a certain historical habitus. In other words, concrete violence is organized/reorganized in accordance with symbolic construction of violence in dispositions of state identity. Symbolic violence forms a basis for the political control of states via the objective violence of domination in international field. In this aspect, symbolic violence is perceived as the particular characteristic of identities and, therefore, agents unconsciously subscribe the construction and objectification of it (Bourdieu, 1990b). In relation to habitus, states are liable to different kinds of symbolic violence which distinguish their capacity of objective violence simultaneously. This is a reason for the different definitions of identity, interests and anarchy in different historical terms. More concretely, religion as a system of symbolic violence has been of vital importance regarding the construction of identities, but religion induces different kinds of collective beliefs and symbolic divisions, which result in different kinds of objective perception of identities because political subjectivities of different historical accumulations raise diverse interpretations of objective violence. In the middle ages, identities were categorized in terms of their religious capital as a positive value of dominant political subjectivity, which was seen as a legitimate basis of political subjectivity. It means that religion defined practical formal forms and categories. On the contrary, in modern state identity, religion constructs its symbolic violence in the political identities of dominated states as a less legitimized and negative value of state identification because religion and state

collectivization is seen as anarchical and illegitimate creators of disorders in international institutionalization.

The shared habitus is the epitome of symbolic violence and, as a consequence, concrete violence as the monopoly of legitimacy in everyday life (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Anarchy, peace, domination, inequality etc. are not socially constructed but rather they are produced and reproduced by the misrecognized consciousness of states regarding their positions in the international field. Because of misrecognition in habitus, states turn to the origins of violence which are linked to the other identities of international field. As the habitus of a state socializes its identity in field, symbolic violence forms concrete characteristics, features and roles of domination which promote the institutionalization of symbolic violence. The misrecognition of violence is recognized by the collectivity of agents, which denies the controversies between its identity and recognition because agents can only represent the objective world via their recognition (Bourdieu, 1991). Thus, the socialization of habitus always precedes the social construction of identities but states cannot realize this because they refuse the opposition between their misrecognition and recognition. What states misrecognize is what states recognize in their relational practices of the international field. For instance, there is no certain geographical justification regarding which land is eastern in comparison with the others, but Morocco is usually categorized into the values of eastern states. This categorization immediately describes the Moroccan state in accordance with its location between the east and west, modern and less modern, developed and underdeveloped etc. These forms represent symbolic violence in state identity, which generates other sorts of objective violence afterwards.

Symbolic violence is not a stable form, but it may change in accordance with the changes in symbolic power and habitus. Symbolic power hides itself into a misrecognition of habitus but it envisages the reality before reality is socially constructed. Before domination emerges from real-life experiences, domination is embedded into political doxic relations of the international field as common sense, which is subject to change in line with changes in the representation of domination. As discussed above, slavery was seen as *de jure* and communities were involved in slavery in accordance with their skin colours until slavery was purged from the embedded doxa of the international field. These kinds of changes not only mean institutional changes, but also illustrate changes in the dominated social hierarchies

which depict the habitus of the individuals.[17] Gender questions in the international field also produce relevant examples here. Women were not seen as parts of everyday political action because women embody awareness of social hierarchy and its domination in their habitus, which construct/reconstruct the means of judgments, tastes and individual spaces (Bourdieu, 2008). In this way, women's habitus makes women accept the 'realities', hierarchies and domination, which are the most inacceptable conditions for their individualities and social spaces. These inacceptable conditions are subject to chance according to changes in the internalized social hierarchy and its combination of domination. However, this does not put an end to the social suffering of women, but, rather, the disadvantages and social suffering continue via new forms of judgment and categorization in the political collectiveness of state. As a result, changes in the political conditions for the production of habitus result in differentiation in social realities and objective domination, but the symbolic suffrage of violence remains stable for dominated identities.

In Bourdian theory, the objective social world is a production of 'accumulated history' (Bourdieu, 1993c, p. 67), which influences the habitus of the state as universalization. Universalization is the basic feature of every kind of historical accumulation and its habitus. The dominant subjects of historical accumulation impose their interests as the existing order and 'universalize their particular interests … for others to grasp the universality of their particular conditions' (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 434). In other words, accumulated history precedes the habitus of the agents but this historical accumulation consists of a kind of specific interest which is represented by domination. However, political subjects internalize and represent these particular interests as universal principles of their identities as a whole. Thus, the identity construction of political subjectivity is always based on a hidden power relation, the political representation of particular interests, inequity and unjustness. Symbolic violence always demands universalization in order to set a framework for states, both theoretically and practically. For instance, English School theory tries to categorize and standardize the notion of identity of modernity or modernization. It claims that whoever wants to become modern should produce certain social, economic, political conditions, institutions and social infrastructures. The school then represents certain kinds of rules and norms which guide the agents to embody symbolic violence in habitus and represent this in the real world. In this

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[17] For a counter point of view, see Finnemore (1996b).

way, the theory standardizes the modernity of state identity even though the sovereign capacities of states are distributed unequally in the international field.

In line with self-reflective involvement in embedded political doxa, it is argued that theories in international relations function as an objectification of symbolic violence. Theories translate how symbolic violence is constructed and reconstructed in terms of a certain accumulated history because they represent identity as a separation of human nature (as bad and good), as moral preferences for some norms (such as sovereignty), as an estimation of certain institutional foundations and/or as a conservation of a gendered construction of the objective world. All of these perspectives rely on structures or ideation but oversee a mutually intertwined existence of structures and a socially constructed nature from the perspective of habitus. For instance, when a theory describes gendered discourses, it also defines the basic structures for the universalization of gender inequality in habitus. It defines certain gendered roles for certain genders, which elicit a separation and a stereotyped relation web. Indeed, socio-political domination and power relations are also taken advantage by gendered discourses and feminist movements (Bourdieu et al., 1999).

Globalization as symbolic violence

Theories of international relations always construct new kinds of separation, forms and moral equivalencies which differentiate state identity and its materialization. Theories engender meaningful answers regarding the political capital of states in order to make sense of state identity in accordance with historically accumulated symbolic capital. Theories function as totalized forms of symbolic capital which organize symbolic capital as practically applicable order for the construction of identities. In the early twenty-first century, theories delineate some stages of anarchy in nature. The classical English School claims some fundamental rules between the states in order to recover this anarchy; neorealism claims that there is no central ruler outside state borders and that is why the borders of states are seen as fences of self-safety; and neoliberalism emphasizes states' cooperative actions regarding their similar interests and institutional organizations.[18] These theories represent states as kinds of safe haven for political collectivity. Any of these theories cannot see any life sphere without a bureaucratic state field. After the post-structural expansion of international relations, anarchy is seen as a creation of states' identity. Therefore, theories try to find ways for emancipation

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[18] For more information, see Mearsheimer (2001) and Keohane & Martin (1995).

to get rid of state anarchy.[19] In other words, states' identities lost their significance as the sole creator of symbolic violence because new symbolic violence is created and reproduced beyond state identity. It is discovered that the identities of the states are not seen as *sine qua non* factors but rather as ideas, as a particular form to represent the collectiveness of political subjectivity. By means of weakening state-centric symbolic violence, symbolic violence is reproduced in a more globalized sphere. Thus, globalization becomes the new field of symbolic violence to represent the political dispositions of habitus.

Globalization as symbolic violence is consciously represented as a kind of new habituation in states' dispositions. Therefore, states unconsciously embody this new symbolic violence, which represents the new realities of international field. Thus, it is not plausible that

> inter-subjective communication generates common understandings of reality, shared norms for social behaviour, and notions of group identity and solidarity. Conversation and symbolic exchanges lead people to construct ideas of the world, rules for social interaction, and ways of being and belonging in that world (Scholte, 2005, p. 131)

Globalization is not a simple intensification of social interaction, an expansion of solidarity outside the state borders or a political belonging of a more inclusive society outside states' identities. As Jan Aart Scholte accomplishedly describes, in substitution for the identities of states, globalization brings out a blend of complex multidimensional, competing, conflicting or conciliating identities which may belong to the same agent at the same time (Ibid, p. 227). However, this illustrates the transformation of state identity as a hybridization of identities or hybrid identities[20] which may be non-territorially and multi-nationally based on sexual orientation, gender, disability, class orientation, race or age groups (Ibid., pp. 251–252). In line with Bourdieu, it is argued here that class-based, gendered or racial characteristics of identities are not embedded classifications, but what is new is the production of representations of identification in the international field. In this way, we are practising new symbolic violence on the basis of globalization and its distinctive historical accumulation, which supersedes the former historicization of the state. This new historical accumulation of

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[19] For more information, see Cox (1987).

[20] 'A hybrid identity draws from and blends several different strands in substantial measure, so that no single marker holds clear and consistent primacy over others. For example, a hybrid self might encompass several nationalities, or might be of mixed race, or might have a multifaceted sexuality, or might combine different class contexts. Likewise, a hybrid identity can give strong emphasis to several types of being and belonging, with the result that, for instance, national loyalties, religious bonds, and gender solidarities could compete and conflict.' (Scholte, 2005, p. 252)

symbolic violence represents the changes regarding the borders of identities from the territorial states to indefinite and uncertain spheres where particularization and universalization exist simultaneously.

The contextualization of democratization in globalization exemplifies this coexistence of particularization and universalization. In modern state identity, there was a standardized way of democracy which was represented and standardized by Western domination. However, globalization falls into the misrecognition of the agents' habitus, which makes a gap between the former and actual understanding of democracy. Globalization imposes that democratization can be possible without having any standardized infrastructure such as freedom, free markets, free expression, gender equity etc. With the trend of globalizing democratization, democracy gains new meanings, hybrid forms in relation to the localities, boundaries and beliefs which create 'radical democratic pluralism' (McGrew, 2003, p. 502) as humanitarian, environmental and feminist movements. In other words, the new socialization of globalization imposes new forms such as Islamic democracy or illiberal democracy. In this aspect, the globalization of identities represents the most undesirable conditions of the agents as legitimate interpretation. Globalization reconstructs two important functions of solidarity because it does not only impose an internalization of social identities but it also contributes the stability of objective structural relations (Schiffrin, 2006). In this way, the agents construct their identities in accordance with the new symbolic constraints of the democratization processes.

Globalization also imposes a distinctive historicization and universalization beyond the legitimacy of state identity. The new historicization renders the objective institutions of states obsolete. For instance, democratic revolution imposes new direction and values, which result in new kinds of colourful, ethnic, religious, ethnic and regional revolutions. Pro-democratic forces of these revolutions become very vulnerable in terms of the Westernization of democratic politics because pro-democratic forces of the postmodern revolutions do not break deep-rooted territorial connections (Tucker, 2007). In other words, the political subjectivity of globalization relies on distinctive forms, but vision and vision continues in order to define positions and domination via a categorized identification in the international field. In this respect, globalization imposes a new understanding of justice (Fraser, 2007) via the transformation of existing symbolic violence. The globalization of state identity is experiencing a kind of marketization of democratization which imposes individualistic values as 'the realities' so as to achieve a 'social good' (Couto & Guthrie, 1999). Contrary to the former international relations, which identified national borders as the fields to beware of

anarchy in the international field, globalization represents a borderless world as the cure for the emancipation from anarchy. As a result, globalization results in a misrecognition in the dispositions of state subjectivity, which forms distinctive symbolic violence in the international field.

Changing political subjectivity of globalization and its bureaucratic field

Historical accumulation linked to particular capital allocation interprets a distinctive bureaucratic field which presents its interests as the 'universal realities' of political practices. This is achieved by the national bourgeois elites, which form the 'universal class' (Fraser, 1990, p. 60) in the political subjectivity of the modern state. As globalization impairs the national sentiment of the bureaucratic field, the new globalizing political subjectivity relies on de-territorializing the bureaucratic field. In line with the weakening separation of the state's internal and external structures, the stratification of states changes because the globalizing bureaucratic field does not rely on territorial division and the classification of nations, which depended on secured and defined territorial spaces. On the contrary, the new bureaucratic field influences ambiguous structures and hybrid diversity, which creates primitive empowerment arenas such as the humanitarian space, transnational workforce or supranational unions. These new structures of political capital are based on indirect relationships which do not only change the orientation of values but also change the social structure, power and constructiveness of direct relations (Calhoun, 1991, p. 103). More precisely, the bureaucratic field of globalization does not pursue a direct relationship style of modern state identity, such as sovereignty, citizenship and nationality, but it utilizes indirect relationships with classes and other collective bodies. As indirect relationships become widespread, fundamental institutions and institutional functions of state identity become less collective entities in line with the creation of new functionalities such as multi-national citizenships. As a result of this, globalizing bureaucratic capital does not directly relate to other classes and individuals in order to form its symbolic violence in their habitus. On the contrary, it takes advantage of the indirect objectification of political capital, which is derived from the newly produced capital allocation of globalization such as finance capital and informational capital. Originally, the bourgeois collectiveness of national states directly constructed the national educational systems and it imposed symbolic structures of state

identity.[21] In other words, modern national identity directly engages educational processes to maintain their domination of political capital. However, globalizing bureaucratic capital is not directly involved in these direct relations, but rather they apply social cultural and especially informational capital, organized by global media, the internet, international organizations, NGOs etc. In this way, the habitus of political capital becomes subject of large-scale, de-territorialized and indirect symbolic dominance (Calhoun, 1991).

In order to construct strong national ties with regards to national identities, national bureaucracies are important mechanisms imposing symbolic construction of national homogenization of identities. The dominant bourgeois of nation states educate a group of individuals which maintains the organizational foundations of state identity and materializes the interests, tastes or expectations of the dominant classes of states. National bureaucracy basically takes active roles to objectify the political emancipation mechanism. It creates an elite group consisting of all the national classes. Due to this, the sub-classes fall into misrecognition and think that they are constitutive parts of political capital because they can reach a status via an elitist bureaucracy: 'The monopolization of the universal is the result of … the bureaucratic field'. Therefore, bureaucracy is the fundamental way for the national bourgeois to construct the political emancipation mechanism, because the individuals in national boundaries evaluate bureaucracy as the proof of the potential for fluidity and transition between the classes. In other words, the heterogeneous class characteristic of bureaucracy is seen as the empowerment of sub-classes in the formation of political capital. The bureaucratic field of modern states establishes political doxa in accordance with expectations of domination because the habitus of state collectiveness has already been imposed by the symbolic capital of the bureaucratic field. Bureaucracy is not the durable power of political capital, but rather it gives states ephemeral power regarding certain issue-specific functions of political capital. In this way, bureaucracy serves as the formation and continuation of hierarchy via the stratification of states in the international field. The hidden hierarchy, which is constructed by the symbolic violence of the domination, is maintained by bureaucracy and, then, it is transformed into practices in the objective world. However, the globalizing bureaucratic field differentiates into new forms of durability and hierarchy. Globalization is a decentralizing national definition and distribution of justice and empowerment techniques. It is not involved in organic functionalization because it does not

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[21] For more information, see Bourdieu (1996b).

institutionalize in every part of political capital, but rather it dominates and institutionalizes issue-specific areas which are occupied by their interests, such as the IMF and the World Bank. Therefore, global bureaucracy is more durable than the bureaucratic field of the modern state. In order to impose its identification of the hierarchy, the globalizing bureaucratic field forms new spaces, such as human security, and humanitarian spaces make a subordinate representation of state institutions with regard to the definition of interests. As a result, similarly to the former national bourgeoisies, the new global ruling class represents their own interests as a kind of common will.

Recognition is also redistributed by the globalizing bureaucratic field. As the political decentralization of state identity becomes prevalent, recognition between modern states and its symbolic capital lose significance. This decentralization objective by the new vision and division in political capital allocation beyond the materialistic accumulation of recognition in modern state identities, such as new collectiveness regarding religious, ethnic and feminist collectivity, leads to a shift of recognition because these new identities pursue recognition without deliberately engaging any materialistic accumulation, redistribution or expectation (Fraser & Honneth, 2003). Recognition of political capital is reproduced by a new globalized stratification, values and tastes. In this respect, globalization paves the way for new 'aesthetic dispositions' which reinterpret political recognition in accordance with new global stratification and the bureaucratic field.

> Any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception and tacitly defines as the only legitimate mode of perception the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain competence. Recognizing this fact does not mean constituting a particular mode of perception as an essence, thereby falling into the illusion which is the basis of recognition of artistic legitimacy. It does mean taking note of the fact that all agents, whether they like it or not, whether or not they have the means of conforming to them, find themselves objectively measured by those norms. At the same time it becomes possible to establish whether these dispositions and competences are gifts of nature, as the charismatic ideology of the relation to the work of art would have it, or products of learning, and to bring to light the hidden conditions of the miracle of the unequal class distribution of the capacity for inspired encounters with works of art and high culture in general (Bourdieu, 1984, pp. 28–29)

Therefore, in order to legitimate the political capital of globalization, the new bureaucratic field represents its political interests, individualistic tastes and their objective 'realities' as the common perceptions for the political recognition of the agents in the system. States sharing the same globalizing international field fall into misrecognition because they perceive the imposed habitus of globalizing political capital as their own ideologies. On the basis of the new disposition and the doxic relation of globalization, recognition eliminates nationalistic

class structure and it also unconsciously reconstructs a new stratification of global which invisibly redistributes inequalities beyond state borders. The contemporary world exercises the disposition of political capital of the new ruling classes. In order to be recognized by the new global distribution of classes, the agents should embody a certain set of values, including individualism, liberalism, market-orientation, humanitarianism, multiple-identity etc.; these are not equally applicable to all states, but rather they mostly represent the interests of the new globalizing bureaucratic field.

Globalizing bureaucratic capital imposes a distinctive capital allocation, which subordinates the capital allocation of national states. Differentiation in capital allocation indicates a shift in the distribution of domination beyond the distribution of modern state identities in the international field. The main rivalry of globalizing bureaucratic capital takes place in the allocation of symbolic and objectified capital in the international field. Objectively, the accumulation of distinctive capital allocation in modern states is based on the more collectivized and material apparatus of the economy. However, the new globalizing bureaucratic field rests on a virtual creation of the economic apparatus, which enables the accumulation of economic capital without occupying any physical production, or creating any employment. Subjectively, the new bureaucratic field struggles to change the state monopoly on the definition and embodiment of nobility in the international field. Previously, the modern state was the only power centre capable of deciding how to evaluate the relational and collective nobility of the international field. Indeed, dominant states in the modern international field influence the bureaucratic field and produce relevant doxic relations of the field, which was originally determined by the practical sentiment of the Treaty of Westphalia. In this way, domination organizes the values of political identification in accordance with its own capital allocation. Because of the disposed values of membership in the international field, other subordinated states subjectively embody the interests of domination as valued nobility without any concrete enforcement. However, the globalized bureaucratic field abandons the mutually supportive link between state identity and definition of nobility. Nobility becomes a more pluralistic agenda beyond the collectiveness of the state. In practice, the institutional and positional advancement of the state is decided considerably by decisions of institutions such as Standard & Poor's, or organization representatives such as the annual reporters of Human Rights Watch. In this way, the globalizing bureaucratic field decides the credibility of states' political identity, which values or devalues the practices of states. More concretely, the globalizing bureaucratic field defines the distribution of state positions in the international field because it changes the values of doxic relations regarding how to pursue

interests or how to represent the nobility of the international field. Eventually, it enhances its capacity in the categorization, vision and division of political subjectivity.

The modern state loses its effectiveness in the determination of legitimacy or representation. The globalizing bureaucratic field imposes a dehistoricizing process beyond the existing institutionalization of states. In this respect, territorial integration and unification forms the most characteristic objectification of the new political capital in the globalizing bureaucratic field. Integration weakens historical accumulation and makes political collectiveness believe in the existence of distinctive political identification beyond the national identity of modern political subjectivity. Also, integration demands new political constructions which are generally in opposition to the identities of nation states. Owing to the advanced information regarding values and lifestyles such as ethnicity or religion in the globalized world, the grouping, identification and political good of the agents are formed beyond the national borders (Held & McGrew, 2003). This subordination is relevant in order to increase the transitivity of the symbolic violence into the other territorial spaces. The fundamental characteristic of global institutionalization is represented by individualization, which is supported by the new globalizing ruling class as a kind of symbolic violence. Social capital changes the ways that agents engage, from totalized communal nationalistic participation to interest-based, self-oriented and volunteering engagements (Field, 2008). These changes are concretized by IMF policies. Theoretically, the IMF focuses on treatment for the objective structural problems of dominated states, but in practice it imposes a doxic relationship of globalizing bureaucratic capital, which weakens the political institutionalization of modern state identity.

The globalizing bureaucratic field reinterprets the fundamental norms of modern state identity in order to accomplish relevant disengagements from the political capital of the modern state, especially sovereignty, which is transformed into sovereign individuals (Scholte, 2005). Therefore, the symbolic violence of the globalizing bureaucratic field firstly tries to disconnect the psychological ties between the collectivity of states, which results in a distrust of national institutions and their social functionalization within concrete borders. In this respect, the globalizing notion of social capital defines 'the moral resources of trust and cooperation' which are represented by individualism and self-reliance in globalized identities (Couto & Guthrie, 1999, p. 64). Through the instrumentality of the new sovereignty of individualism, globalization creates new ways, rules and laws, which give the possibility to judge states regarding their institutional practices. The globalizing bureaucratic field not only surpasses national laws and rules, but also abandons the collectivity and institutional

domination of states. Besides this, the physiological/subjective sovereignty of globalization represents new ways of emancipation, which relieves the individuals from the emancipation mechanism of national citizenship. Thus, globally increasing inequalities not only function as an erosion of the social capital of the modern state,[22] but this is the reconstruction of emancipation mechanism in a new stratification of social capital, based on the new symbolic violence of globalization. This new symbolic reconstruction of social capital manifests itself via the new objectification of institutions and values in political capital. For example, new sovereignty constructs new supranational laws to judge the state and its institutions, creates humanitarian spaces within the territory of state collectiveness and qualifies multi-nationality to weaken the national ties of collectivity. The symbolic reconstructions and objective representation of the new sovereignty of individuals result in a new distribution of stratification and domination beyond the modern stratification of states in a globalizing international field which is more pluralistic, heterogeneous and de-territorialized.

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[22] For a counter view, see Putnam (2000).

CHAPTER 4

ECONOMIC CAPITAL IN THE INTERNATIONAL FIELD

The structure of this part is to critically find out the similarities and distinctions of constructivists and the Bourdieusian perspective regarding economics in international relations. By doing this, I aim to figure out state identity and its positional distribution in international relations by way of the Bourdieusian structural contribution within the socially constructive theorizing of the economic field. The constructivist tradition provides scholars with relevant theoretical means to criticize and overcome the materialist domination of realities in the field of international economics (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001; Ruggie, 1998; Abdelal, 2009). Essentially, Bourdieu, whose research targeted the anthropological and sociological roots of economic fields in the practices of economic agents, takes advantage of social construction when he conceptualizes the economic preferences of agents in the structure of the economic field (Bourdieu, 2005). Although Bourdieusian anthropologic and sociologic research does not aim to explain the economy in the frame of politics, the inferences and approaches of the economy by both Bourdieu and the constructivists in international relations are in line with each other. However, by engaging with the embedded structures of domination, Bourdieu enhances further relevant discussion on the production of collective dispositions and identities in the economic field (Kauppi, 2003). In this respect, firstly, this part will summarize the similar directions of economic theorization in constructivist international political economy with constructivist side of Bourdieusian economic capital. Then, I will examine Bourdieusian distinction from structural constructivism regarding the economic field beyond the constructivist economy in international relations. By doing this, I will try to disclose how we can locate state identity as political agency in the economic capital of the international political field.

Distinction of a constructivist approach to economic capital

Social constructivism conceptualizes a considerable contribution for the field of economics in international relations by theorizing the inter-subjective products of political subjects, which impairs the materialist rationalist domination of economics (Abdelal, 2009). It discovers the intertwined links between the social and institutionalized realities of the international economy. Constructivists focus on a conceptual perspective beyond the material facts of the economy in international relations because the material facts cannot explain the realities of structures which are linked to the ideational, inter-subjective and social bases of economic

relations. More precisely, the rationality of the materialist economy explains realities which do not illustrate the facts of practices in the international economy. Social constructivism rejects the reductionist rational perspective of the economy because it theorizes that ideas regarding economic realities are constructed by a collectivized interpretation of agents in the process of inter-subjective relations. In a similar way with constructivist conceptualization, Bourdieu emphasizes that the economic field can be understood by its social engagements. From a Bourdieusian point of view, the agents' economic field is socially constructed (Bourdieu, 2005). As a result of these socially constructed dispositions, agents do not spontaneously produce meanings in accordance with an objective logic of structure.

One of the most visible peculiarities in the Bourdieusian and constructivist international political economy theorization is related to the gap between the economic facts of rationalism and social practices. The constructivist perspective questions the compatibility of rationalized economic facts with the realities of international political economics (Abdelal, 2009). At this point, constructivism emphasizes that all rationalization of economic apparatus actually depends on the relational practices of agents, which depict a socially constructed embodiment of collective understanding (Tuomela & Balzer, 2002). In line with this constructivist theorization, relying on the quantitative data of economic calculation produces some applicable facts for agents but these mislead the reductionism of a rationalized ontology.[23] Indeed, many tools of economics, such as the annual economic growth index, expected inflation and global prices, describe to some extent the facts, but these facts are mostly not compatible with the practical realities, which are contrary to a rationalist international economy theorization. For instance, the facts with regards to the expected inflation of an economy vary in accordance with the prices of products or services which are considered in the accounting of inflation. In order to come to this rationalist ontology, constructivists conceptualize that quantitative facts and the products of economics in international relations only indicate identities on the basis of agents' beliefs and ideas. Therefore, the proposals and scope of economic facts generally embody social identities. Actors in an international economic space do not necessarily have a required set of rational behaviours, but the ideas and beliefs in socially constructed identities supply an appropriate collective understanding which limits their economic behaviours in a certain way without rational engagement. Basically, it is possible to see similarities in the tendencies regarding the

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[23] For further discussions regarding the subject, see (Mäki, 2002)

facts and economic realities in a Bourdieusian approach of economy. Bourdieu evaluates that the factual bases of economic actions generally rely on 'empirically established statistical correspondence between dispositions and positions' (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 215), which conducts agents' tendencies in line with the objective possibilities of the economy. In this way, the practical facts of the economy do not necessarily need to be compatible with the social realities of the objective world, but these need to dominate agents' inter-subjective expectations, which must create a collective understanding of the possibilities regarding the objective structures of the economy.

Another important peculiarity of a constructivist economic approach is to reveal that the interpretation of economic objective structures is as important as the empirical facts of the economy in international relations. Thus, objective facts are perceived in different forms in accordance with the interpretations of agents (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). This approach opens up an opportunity to go beyond the reason–result objectivity in international politics. Interpretations question both the validity of single reasoning and the results in the economic field. At this point, the constructivist economic approach values two essential factors which do not fully depend on the factual objectivity of the international field. It firstly considers the productivity of the inter-subjective interactions of agents in the economic field (Seabrooke, 2007). Further, it bears in mind that the historical accumulation of knowledge affects the economic inter-subjective productions of agents (O'Brien & Williams, 2013). Agents mostly depend on their interpretations when they establish practical actions on the basis of economic facts. Despite Bourdieusian suspicion on the extreme emphasizing of agents' interpretations (Bourdieu, 2005), his thoughts on the economy resemble a constructivist understanding of the inter-subjective production of economic actions. In particular, the Bourdieusian stress on habitus and economic action relation asserts that the inter-subjective ideational production of agent establishes links between socially constituted ideas and structures of the economy (Lebaron, 2002). The dispositions of agents embody the same economic facts in various ways in accordance with their positional engagements of objective structures. Economic actions originate from the dispositions of subjects and their positions in objective relations. Therefore, the economic field is deeply rooted in the historical accumulation and produced dispositions of different positional distributions in objective relations. The dispositional interpretation of states regarding their positions in the economic globalization is a good example of this approach. States' ideations of their positions differ beyond the reason–result facts of their economies. For instance, the American interpretation of economic globalization can vary, from the cheap prices of cheap production in developing states to a high unemployment risk

from production outside the USA. As a result, economic reasoning and facts are not generally compatible with agents' production of dispositions.

In line with the explanations above, constructivist economic approaches contradict the passive positions of agents in economic actions. Economic actions are organized by the embodied values of agents beyond concrete facts in the economic field (Abdelal, 2001). Although economic facts persuade clear facts for agents, these facts generally exclude the positional distributions of the identities of agents in the political field. A constructivist economy in the international field not only objects to the static reason–result relation of agents regarding economic facts, but it also improves agents' positional values and inter-subjective dispositions in the economic field. Therefore, the constructivist economy evaluates agents as dynamic actors who perform economic relations in accordance with their beliefs and identities. In other words, agents' ideas, which originated from their constructed positional identities, depend considerably on their dispositions (Palan, 2013). In this way, the interests of agents in the economic field explain the socially constructed nature beyond the structural deterministic nature of economic agents. In the constructivist economic approach, agents gain autonomous roles in defining their ideas and values. This autonomy improves the importance of human interactions and interpretations regarding their ideations and practices. Economic ideations are reproduced practices which originated from the socialization of agents' experiences into the interaction processes. In this way, agents become active elements of economic reproduction in the construction of mutually represented realities. Interestingly, although Bourdieu highlights structural interferences in the habitual representation of agency, he does not exclude the externalization of agents' unique capacities in the economic field. Social structures influence agents via the scarcity or abundance of economic capital in agents' capital allocations. These influences create distinctive economic roles which distribute the positions of agents in the international economic field. Consequently, agents of the economic field internalize economic distribution in habitus over time, but also externalize economic actions in the social relationships of the field. An internalized structure is always followed by a structuring process of externalization in which outcomes are not determined. Therefore, agents in the economic field are for Bourdieu simultaneously structuring beings who take advantage of positional strategies in order to struggle for the allocation of economic resources. In short, agents are not static representatives of certain rationality, but they are dynamic actors of potential changes and differentiation via struggles on externalization in their positional distribution in the economic field (Bourdieu, 1995a).

Constructivist international political economy also develops a distinctive understanding of how to understand interests derived from the ideas of economic agents despite their material or factual representations in the objective world (Risse & Wiener, 1999). Classical rational politics rests on the struggle over certain determined economic interests among the actors. In this understanding, structures embody determined and clear interests which produce similar strategies to realize expected outcomes in economics. From a classical rational perspective of economics in the international field, agents are fully informed and motivated with regard to the potential ways of successful engagement with economic tools. They know how to deal with potential economic hardship, and act in accordance with the potential outcomes of certain economic behaviours. At this point, uncertainty in economic production/reproduction is taken into account by the constructivist ideation of the international economy (Shelton, 2015). Agents' ideas, values and identities are not factual productions, but they are subject to change over time. The changing nature of ideas and identities affects to reach a possible standard of rational outcomes in economics. In other words, ideas and values impair any certainty in economics because actors produce their economic behaviours in line with their identities, which leads to different outcomes in the same economic issues in the international economy. Constructivists show that the motivational force behind the interests of agents supports uncertainty in economic actions, because economics depends on non-materialistic tools which require agents' individualistic ideations of economic consideration in the international field.

In line with the considerable emphasis on the inter-subjective characteristics in the production and reproduction of actions, constructivist economics embodies the importance of produced norms in the international field (Seabrooke, 2007). Agents' beliefs and ideas on economic interests are constructed in an inter-subjective environment. Due to the social construction of economic norms between agents, uncertainty in the non-materialist presence of economic factors leads to instability and crisis. The economic actions of agents are restricted by inter-subjective understandings of similar situations in the economics of the international field. The objective factors of economic reality are substituted by collective interpretations of actors. Therefore, constructivist economics embodies non-materialistic factors of economy beyond materiality, but, owing to the existence of norms, the uncertainty of non-materialistic inclusion in economics results in stability. At the same time, these norms are not identical to the legal rules of the international field of economics even though legal rules may support a normative constitution in international economics. In this way, agents, having different ideational bases, ideas and identities, obey the informal inter-subjective

presences of norms and, therefore, norms lead to inter-subjective stability in the production interests and appropriate actions for produced economic interests in the4 international field.

Bourdieusian distinction of economics

A potential distinction in the Bourdieusian interpretation of economics is to position interactions and inter-subjective relations in economic consideration. Interactions are based on the existence of a cause and effect relation in the practical world of agents. In this way, agents are firstly theorized as self-conscious entities. Besides this, the conscious actions of agents are thought to produce effective results regarding the productions of other agents in the same economic field. By ignoring such an interactionist approach, Bourdieusian economics takes into account structural embedded history, independent from the interactive intervention of agents (Bourdieu, 2005). In accordance with this, objective economic relations are possible before agents construct conscious relations. Objectivity is subject to the existence of a history of actions which links the dispositions of agents into the economic field beyond the consciousness of any inter-subjective production of agents. To assign excessive meaning to interactions rules out the practices of agents, consisting of the non-interactive processes of accumulated history. Having a certain social position or amount of accumulated capital characterizes agents' identities and economic dispositions, which define their preferences in economic capital in accordance with the dispositional legitimacy of accumulated history (Ibid.; Bourdieu, 2000). Being in a certain position in the economic field results in the production of identical histories for different agents in the same economic field. Similar histories produce homologous dispositions and actions in the economics field, and they are subject to dispositional legitimacy in the distribution of positions and capital. Having a certain social position and capital accumulation in economics is predetermined by resembling histories before agents interact their dispositions into the practical constraints of the economic field. The distribution of economic capital in different positions develops out of unconscious legitimate similar histories, which are the objective relations beyond interactions. In this respect, interactions are social trajectories which enhance the struggles against embedded legitimate history because interactions create potential redistributions in the economic field in opposition to the existing legitimacy of history. As a result, agents' objective relations resembling histories characterize economic actions before interactions construct conscious struggles between the competing agents in the economic field.

Interactions apprehend the structuring characteristics of economic capital, but they trivialize the structured forces that produce agents. Structured historical accumulation

produces agents who produce and reproduce the 'objective relations'[24] of economic actions in accordance with their structured distinctions. Bourdieu's objective relations are distinct from interactions because they are based on the positional distribution of agents, which objectifies the achieved amount of economic capital. The positional distribution of agents unconsciously relies on structured structures. Cognitive actions in the economic field embody structured structures which represent differences in the positional distributions of agents. By occupying a social position in the field, agents characterize their economic ideations before they produce their interactions. The occupied positional distribution imposes bodily experiences of differences (Bourdieu, 1986). These bodily experiences are the product of symbolic struggles of history which agents embody without consciously constructing structuring structures of interactions. In this respect, states, as political agents of economic capital in the international field, are subject to structured objective relations in accordance with their positions. Indeed, the positional distribution inevitably makes agents internalize different logics of structure before agents engage with the conscious interactions of economic capital. Objective relations are not reducible to interactions at any stage of historical accumulation. In this respect, the political identities of states can be defined in many different ways, but structured structures in which states survive impose certain languages and dispositions for agents. Today, independently of economic systems in the international arena, every state is guided by the language of neoliberal economics because the embodied social body of the state produces neoliberalism as the indicators of economic differences and hierarchies. In another words, states' positions in the international political economy are defined by the existing structured accumulation of history before they make a practice of different positions by way of economic interactions in international relations. Thus, the state is dominated by a definition of neoliberal identifications because their structured dispositions provide positions which are created by the neoliberal distribution of differences in economics.

In line with the Bourdieusian resistance of interactionism, it is plausible to say that Bourdieusian study acts with suspicion towards the central productive roles of norms in constructivist economy ideation. The constitutive role of norms in Bourdieusian study is substituted by the tendencies of habitus, which are objectified by the actions of agents in interactive processes. The tendencies of habitus are always found as deposited forms in agents

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[24] Objective relations here not only indicate actions between different positions but also highlight position taking which carries out how to reflect understanding of occupied positions and preserve these positions: see Towney, (2014); Bourdieu & Wacquant, (1992).

(Shotwell, 2011). In this way, agents behave in accordance with convergent dispositions, labelling their differentiation and power in the positional distribution of identities. Although economic capital is irreducible to conscious interactions, it is not fully independent from these interactions. The economic decisions and actions of agents are subject simultaneously to a combination of the unconscious embodiment of structures and the interactive representation of objective conditions. Dispositions, leading to production of economic decisions, rely on the embodied differentiation of positions, which is reproduced by agents' relational conscious processes (Bourdieu, 2005). Existing social bodies influence agents' dispositions and, therefore, agents produce differences before conscious interactions take place in a field. Convergent experiences of historical accumulation lead to similar beliefs, which are independent from the productivity of interactive processes, relying on the existence of norms. Thus, in order to describe the unconscious embodiment of dispositions, Bourdieu illustrates the inclusionary roles of doxa in comparison with norms. Doxa unconsciously imposes a common sense of structural divisions, which socially legalizes the unequal positional distributions before agents construct interactive processes of economization. Rarely for constructivist norms, doxa are structurally taken for granted and subjectively describe the accumulated amount of economic capital in the international field. In the international field, doxa influences states' economic decisions and cooperations before states consciously discuss their bilateral and multilateral economic actions.

An important distinction of Bourdieu in economics is the study of culture as an inseparable part of economics. Bourdieu is actually innovative in rethinking whether the distribution of economic capital originally centres upon constitutive objective processes. Indeed, the distribution of economic capital fundamentally emerges from subjective cultural characteristics. As discussed above, doxa forms a taken-for-granted common reflex for agents (Deer, 2014). Agents in the same field inevitably become parts of a common reflex, determining the positions of agents in field (Lainé, 2014). However, the language of common reflex also defines the degree of contrariety between cultural characteristics and economic capital. More precisely, doxa subjectively enforces agents to define their objective positions and differences via certain definitive reflexes. The degree of compatibility between these definitive doxic reflexes and cultural structures indicates an objective advancement in positional distribution and economic capital allocation for states in the international field. In particular, Bourdieu's early empirical research illustrates that capitalism, as the means of the divisions and economic differences of accumulated history, influences every individual member and class of the field (Bourdieu, 2012). Although the dispositions of agents define

their objective positions and relations via capitalism, the subjective cultural habitus of culturally disadvantaged agents in the hierarchy does not contain cultural subjective dispositions, according to the doxic reflexes of capitalism (Bourdieu, 1987). In the field of international relations, these implications of Bourdieusian study suggest to us that the obtaining and maintaining of a better hierarchical position in the embodiment of economic capital do not depend on objective advancement in materialist relations and accumulations. To the contrary, hierarchically better-positioned agents should save their monopolistic roles in cultural attitudes, which create a distinction in the practical experience of economic relations. In other words, states, having a suitable cultural habitus for the doxic reflexes of capitalism, always maintain their hierarchical advancement over culturally less-advantaged states. Today, all states define their identities and positions according to the capitalist system of vision and division. However, only some of them have the cultural altitudes of capitalist production in order to produce appropriate dispositions regarding economic actions in the field. In other words, states definitely struggle under the rules of capitalist production, but some of these states are able to have capacity regarding appropriate capitalist economic culture in order to reproduce differences and distinctions in state identities. Therefore, the possession of physical economical capital is less important than possession of capitalism's symbolic disposition because possession of appropriate capitalist dispositions lead to control over the hierarchy of competing positions in international relations through domination of the methods of classification in a capitalist system. In this way, in the identities of states, having a high GDP or economic resources is not always classified with a higher position in the hierarchy of competing positions in the international field. Even a considerable increase in capitalist productions, as experienced in China, does not comparatively increase the relative political value of state identity in international relations. China in practice becomes a part of the doxic norms and hierarchy in which classificatory means are designed and produced by the European and Anglo-Saxon puritan culture of capitalism. Besides this, states, having classificatory means of capitalist doxic reflexes, can also reproduce identity in struggling positions of hierarchy even after great economic catastrophes, such as Germany experienced after the Second World War. As a result of this, in order to differ from the capitalist distribution of hierarchy in state identities in international relations, states have to reproduce distinctive ways regarding the classification of the means of capitalism and its doxic reflexes beyond the physical means and capacities of economic capital.

The other significant distinction of Bourdieusian economics is derived from its structural constructivist approach to the field. Bourdieu not only relies on the delegation or

social construction of structures but also emphasizes that the dispositions of agents are constituted by accumulated history (Kauppi, 2005). Agents produce economic habitus, which is independent from their conscious interactions. In this respect, beyond any material distribution of social interactions, economic structures depend on vision and division capacities, which lead to domination over the classification characteristics of accumulated history. The accumulated history of economic capital results in a similar economic habitus, where classificatory identification is subjectively dominated by certain agents (Bourdieu, 2013). Accumulated history indicates the role of the existing field regarding the tendencies of actions in practice. In this way, Bourdieu emphasizes that interactions and exchanges between agents do not explain whole infrastructure of economic capital, but the field, as the practical arena of structure, should be taken into account in order to understand historical nature in socially constructed interactions. As a result, states in the international field have determined positions according to historically accumulated economic culture before they campaign for the exchange processes of the international economy. The international economic field is always embedded in a certain economic culture, producing habitus that defines which states indirectly decide and impose the economic strategy of other states. The economic habitus of states is not a rational or interactional phenomenon, but it represents the cultural accumulation of states into the economic realities of the international field. Therefore, reproduction or change of economic capital is derived not only from interactional production in economic relations of states, but also from the dispositions of economic culture. Consequently, economic capital is fundamentally subject to symbolic productions which link the social realities of the field into positional distributions of state identity in international economics. In line with this explanation, it is plausible to say that economic habitus after the 2000s is not compatible with the economic realities of neoliberal culture. For instance, contrary to the theorization of economic construction, economic capital did not result in any significant change from the identification of Chinese identity in international relations, but it changed the symbolical economic habitus of China in accordance with the neoliberal culture of accumulated history. Neoliberalism represents the accumulated history of economic culture, which influences China's dispositions to impose economic norms. China does not rationally define its economic habitus, but it reproduces its economic dispositions in order to produce reasonable strategies as 'economic reason' against the realities of the international field. In this way, China embodies the collective history of the economy into its individual history because the embodiment of objective structures leads to the social structuration of neoliberalism into the economic habitus of states. As a result of Bourdieusian study, it can be

said that economic capital in the international field is embedded in symbolic exchanges, and states produce dispositions which create reasonable strategies rather than totally conscious rational actions. On this point, I will examine the concept of neoliberalism in accordance with Bourdieusian study in the following section.

Sense of limit and sense of reality in neoliberal functionalization beyond modernity

The subsequent widening of the gap between recognized realities and misrecognized senses is considerably stimulated by neoliberal policies which aim at changes in the identities and political agents of states. Through a Bourdieusian lens, I will go beyond the classical international relations discussions on the institutional achievements and the market organization creating channels for multiple gains (Keohane, 2002; Liberman, 1996) or its fractions as commercial and democratic peace theorization (Mitchell, 2012; Doyle, 2005). Here, I will mostly rethink neoliberalism in terms of Bourdieu's agency–structure engagements. I try to achieve a critical approach to the understanding of globalization and neoliberal economics with regards to social distribution regarding the redistribution of wealth, rights and the class structure of neoliberalism. In this respect, events and changes occurring in the contemporary world have brought into question neoliberalism and its spatial bearer of the globalizing world. Neoliberalism has been developing in line with the disengagement of modern state identities, with the propose of gaining an advanced domination of objective realities, and designing the fall of existing state identity in a new social stratification, or constructing a new identification of power allocation on the basis of a globalizing arbitrariness. The basis of neoliberalism is the construction of a new naturalization, and specifically how the new naturalization is being reproduced in line with the characterization of political identity. By looking at this given structure, neoliberalism is seen as an answer to the representative *sense of limit* for agents because it answers many questioning points of the political identities from classification and boundaries to collectiveness and distribution in economic life in a new improving social stratification. Therefore, it is important to see how neutralization is constructed by the theorization of neoliberalism.

In the first place, neoliberalism dissociates economy from all existing social realities (Bourdieu, 2002). It firstly tries to change the meanings and visions of social stratification in the subjective world of the agents. When neoliberalism changes these meanings, it benefits from two important steps. Institutionally, the economy and state boundaries become dissembled. Secondly, the agents are being attached to more inclusive economic borders beyond state identity (Scholte, 2005). The first mechanism affects the distribution of wealth

globally because it changes the conditions for the allocation, sharing, production and consumption of capital on a global scale. The second mechanism affects the social stratification on a global scale because it creates new opportunities, spaces and social roles for the existing political orientation of state identity. These two mechanisms are the answers to the perceived inability of state identities to offer a useful theoretical neutralization which relies on globalization. However, under the favour of the globalizing world and its redistribution of institutions and agents, neoliberalism reinforces the deliberate realities of globalization in line with the creation of its political identification of actors. Unlike the state-centred economy, neoliberalism creates new codes, institutions and social classes, maintaining that state collectiveness is not sufficiently appropriate to the global materialization.

In line with social stratification, neolibearlism has been creating another collective *sense of limit*, or a 'systemic feature of advanced capitalism' (Sassen, 2011, pp. 22–23), whose borders and distribution are broader than conventional nation states' identities. However, neoliberalism is not the sum of systemic objective metaphors and no one can predict whether it has reached an advanced peak of capitalism. Neoliberalism is a new challenge of the existing social and subjective stratification. In order to affect the existing dominant social stratification, neoliberalism produces potential ways to engage. Firstly, the new identities and their social stratification give more optimistic or desirable hopes and opportunities for the future. Secondly, they make the border of existing state identity unworkable, nonfunctional, inoperable, inhabitable, incapacitate and unrecognizable for the interests of the new global collectiveness. These two functions were originally governed by the boundaries of modern states. Originally, states both provided the whole social good for individuals and their social classes, and constituted a sense of limit, to say that the international arena is anarchical and uninhabitable without state borders. Now neoliberalism theoretically provides these two functions both influentially and spontaneously.

Neoliberal functionalization is seen in many areas of economy, from production to distribution and social sharing. The new instrumentality of state identity reinterprets the distribution of production, labour, capital and wealth. Neoliberalism relocates production procedures in a borderless understanding of globalization. Formerly, everyone engaged the production procedures in order to increase the national welfare as much as their own wealth. However, new production procedures are not interested in any moral duty concerning a rise in the national wealth. Because of weakening national moral ties and identities, individuals do not consider the long-term national profits of these production procedures because habitual limitation given by state identity does not concretively constitute political collectiveness any

more. This process is nothing short of the instrumentalization of state identity in accordance with the new reformation of political collectivity (Finger, 2002). In accordance with this, images of products are becoming more important than the nationality of products and, therefore, individuals unconsciously pay 'image fees' for the new products of globalization (Veseth, 1998). These image fees are related to a sense of limitation and the new construction of neoliberal social stratification. They actualize invisible limitation in order to symbolize/emblematize certain products as the labels of certain nobility. Neoliberalism marks products by invisibly stratified class codes and that is why the usage of certain products shows which class of the new social stratification an individual is included in. In other words, social stratification cannot be formulated by nationalistic nobility and role in production. Rather, it constructs its sense of limitation by way of the products which an individual can continually use and reach.

Global capital apparently causes many controversial issues in the globalizing market, such as working conditions, working hours and lack of social insurance (Ibid.), but there is no objective responsible to impeach because the new political power does not necessarily accommodate in a certain territorial border. Contrary to state identity, a power understanding of the new social stratification never directly engages the governance procedures of any political authority. It just has very developed lobbying and information and pressure mechanisms by which the state is forced to regulate coercively in the labour market. In this way, the classical definition of state identity is under attack by a new sense of limit because neoliberalism is free from the political pressure and condemnation of internal classes of states. It is an 'invisible hand' for conventional state authority because national state identities lose the capacity to produce a sense of limit and, therefore, national stratification becomes a sub-assembly of global stratification. The dominants of social stratification control the new social collectiveness by way of a distinctive rational consideration in comparison with an irrational, ethnic and ontological consideration of the states. The state's political identity becomes less connected to the localities and 'more fluid – less fixed static node and more and assemblage of flows' (Short, 2001, p. 175). In practice, this is mostly supported by transparency and the domination of knowledge. Knowledge cannot be controlled by the nation state identities but mostly implies the common values, tastes and expectations of humanity, which implies a new normative transformation in the international field. In order to defend their identities, states should emphasize the differences from each other but, contrary to this, neoliberalism mostly indicates both the similarities in the international field and the differences in the internal structures of states. These make considerable inroads into states' identities because the

individuals firstly understand that conditions outside the state borders are not anarchic as it is claimed; then they see that their conventional identities are not inseparable after they see the different ethnic entities within the same national identities. Thus, the rationality of neoliberalism undermines the ontological *sense of limit* of state identities.

Neoliberalism also changes the distribution of capital, property and wealth (Unger, 2001). National identities attribute considerable resistance to the contemporary distribution of capital not to the structure of capital regime *per se*, but, rather, to the flow and reproduction of capital as they tend to be implemented in globalization. The new global flow of capital aims to depict how the chronic problems of nation states, especially issues regarding restricted/bordered markets, suppliers and consumers of the nation state, could be addressed if capital and wealth were free access and circulated quickly in any market on the globe. Therefore, the new system provides not only a kind of unlimited market, but also a production opportunity based on short-term returns without using any factor of production apart from capital (stock markets) (Stiglitz, 2010). As wealth increases its fluidity, national states lose control over the national distribution of wealth, which deteriorates social policies. In particular, the loss of state power in the field of social policies results in very destructive effects on state identity because these social policies pretend to equalize the wealth within boundaries. These social policies originally formed a misrecognition of the social classes within the nations. As a result, national state identity loses a very important mechanism to defend its social stratification.

Whenever there is an increasing arbitrariness regarding the meanings of identities, a dominant theory, such as contemporary neoliberal expansion, always comes into existence to define the interpretation. The dominant interpretation is not the reality, but an arbitrary reality, formed by the dominant classes of social stratification, supported by the sub-classes of the same social stratification and functionalized by the misrecognition of the agents with regards to the perception of their old national and new global identities. In this respect, it is highly visible that many promises of neoliberalism resulted in rather severe situations for the socially incapable classes. Despite the neoliberal claims, neoliberalism has not achieved a more transitive and comprehensive social stratification. On the other hand, the stabilization of the economy, dynamics of growth, developmental issues and income disparities have deteriorated in comparison with the political nature of the modern state (Krugman, 2007). Therefore, beyond the optimistic sides of the frame, neoliberalism functionalizes some negative and controversial mechanisms to impose the inoperability of state borders. For example, neoliberal invasion has already created millions of hopeless individuals, as the new global

slaves or refugees, who have already broken their ties with their territorial national boundaries. In this respect, to isolate these people out of the borders or intercept the movement is seen as an impossible action in the national borders. The other political medium/state response may be the revitalization and accentuation of national identities. However, this way is so dangerous, and conduces many social and political traumas. For example, the accentuation of national identities and national immigrant minorities in society resulted in a dramatic increase in the support of the radical right-wing revivalism.

An interesting function of neoliberal emancipation is related to the means of collective ideas. The nation state identities in the neoliberal process lose their essences to impose the ideas which emphasize existing national accumulations. National identities are established for the sake of totalizing institutions, as national economies and armies, that are based on national sentiment, with the assumption that if national security, law, borders, survival and interests are attacked, the individual identities of every citizen totalize quickly so as to defend the national presence. The national identities in the national social stratification are based on a totalized sentiment of state, but this collectiveness demands extraordinarily extensive propaganda, the investigation of knowledge, financial instruments which are very expensive, and inoperative policies in the neoliberal world. However, neoliberal approaches attempt to outline a more embedded response, replacing the intangible and citizen-based description of the total with knowledge among all individuals affected by a given procedure of globalization (Scholte, 2005). The aim of knowledge-based collectivity is generally issue-specific, and the conversation depends on very quick knowledge and information dissemination, which is provided by the means of technological improvements in the neoliberal world. Contrary to national collectiveness, neoliberal identity pretends to defend universal and up-to-date responses to specific issues, allowing little room for nation-specific interpretations, past experiences and the historical affinity of citizenship (Bourdieu, 2005). In short, similar to Martha Starr, who describes in her work the function of *the Economist's* role in the globalization of identity, knowledge and power, neoliberalism renders knowledge accountable, accessible, arbitrary and mistakable (Starr, 2004). Owing to this quick accessibility of information, neoliberalism anonymously and heterogeneously fires up the internal nature of state according to its specific interests. Neoliberal collectivity is more heterogeneous, individualistic, territorially borderless and universal in comparison with uniform, territorial and bounded national collectivity.

Neoliberalism also takes the control of crisis and transition (Duménil & Levy, 2011). It changes the characteristics, frequency and composition of crises. The crises between states

are becoming regional and territorially limited issues. Besides this, in accordance with the economic benefits/interests of gross capital owners, state crises are suppressed or fuelled. More importantly, the new global crises are more universal, complex and heterogeneous. Interestingly, the most unsolvable national crises cause wars, which end after one side conquers and comes up a solution at the end. However, neoliberal crises cannot be clearly identified. The causes of crises may not be clearly determined or visible and these crises may have many unclear consequences. Moreover, the impacts of neoliberal crises affect many different states simultaneously. In this respect, neoliberalism makes benefits of persistent crises in order to maintain domination. The universal crises are essential to transferring the economic values from state control to the new neoliberal political stratification. While states had drawn essential experiences from the political and economic crises, these experiences were merely the fundamental cure in the process of reshaping the larger institutionalized global economy and its territorial proliferation. They are far from being institutionalized into a meaningful *sense of reality*. On the other hand, they are still highly functional in practising the appropriate policies of neoliberalism. In this aspect, after the 2008 America-centred world economic crisis, it was supported that the state authority had to undertake the liability regarding the private financial sector's deficits. The US government paid a great amount of private-sector deficit under the name of 'corporate welfare' (Stiglitz, 2010, p. 38). This is mostly seen as a neo-empowerment of state identity and power or a 'return of the state authority'. However, this is nothing short of the false consciousness of neoliberalism or the sense of reality, which originated from the state identity of modernity, because the state payment of costs weakens state economic tools and flexibility in order to distribute sustainable economic wealth and economic accumulation. In this way, state functionalization on the interference of future crises weakens sharply.

Neoliberalism has increasingly imposed its theoretical ideation, especially since the 1980s. It has created a great neutralization as an extension of the 'universalization of particular characteristics', which is based on the economic field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 226). This economical neutralization superseded the dominant position of the traditional political fields of the state and suppressed the other social and cultural fields simultaneously. The neoliberal application of the subjective field of individuals is not simply a programme of economic liberal practices, but a theoretical indoctrination which tends to reproduce social arbitrariness for the benefit of new neoliberal social stratification (Ibid.). The new theoretical indoctrination firstly engages a 'de-familiarization' from a *sense of reality* of existing national stratification and a 're-familiarization' or naturalization of the new globalizing social

stratification. The experience of establishing identities is being substituted by a new subjective field powered by a neoliberal theorization. The global distribution of classes, which gave rise to the arbitrariness of neoliberalism, does not mean that the economy-oriented domination of neoliberals does not invade the political field of national identities. Rather, the domination techniques of the new stratification are indirect and heterogeneous. Neoliberalism creates individuals of stratification in substitution for the citizens of the state identity.

Neoliberalism also means the indoctrination of new power relations in the objective world conditions. This power relation of neoliberalism does not firstly dominate the concrete economical field. Rather, it is subjectively embedded in the *sense of limit*. The establishing mechanism of the sense of limit in nation state identities was the ontological sentiment of nation, which was substituted by global information technology and knowledge in the neoliberal era. In other words, the ontological national domination mechanism of a *sense of limit* changed into objective informational exchanges under the name of 'structural adjustment' (Ibid., p. 230). Thus, *sense of limit*, regardless of states' territorial boundaries, is taking a suitable time adapting to the new social stratification of neoliberalism. The former social stratification of the state is less likely to compete in a *sense of limit* than the neoliberal reinterpretation of the agents' identities. In this respect, the misrecognition of a new neoliberal *sense of limit* supports a new institutional reconstruction which represents a new *sense of reality* of the individuals. The new social stratification of globalization is mostly a process for producing individuals within a wider borderless world. The economic capital of neoliberalism produces new institutional bases to impress the arbitrariness and economic reconstruction of the new domination on the new produced individuals. As a result, the new individuals are the products of the new neoliberal understanding of social collectiveness. After neoliberalism atomizes individuals, contrary to nation states, it does not provide the same territorial space for every individual. Rather, the individuals are granted different social spaces in accordance with their functional differentiation from others and their economic accumulation. In this way, social space becomes very complex and heterogeneous for individuals. Besides this, a neoliberal *sense of limit* fulfils a new legitimacy for individuals to define their identities. The individuals cannot rationally legitimate their identities, regardless of the new understanding of global capital, production, the global market, neoliberal humanitarianism, the global labour market etc. These interpretations are based on a sense of reality and produce the identities of political subjectivity. In conclusion, neoliberalism creates a new theory for more atomized individuals beyond the citizenship and state borders. It imposes a different *sense of limit* which provides a new set of tastes, norms and perceptions for the interpretation of modern

state identity. The neoliberal *sense of limit* legitimizes a new set of global institutions, which changes the perceptions of states regarding sense of reality. The collectivity perspective of neoliberalism uses economic capital as a base and neutralizes state stratification in order to achieve redefinition in a collective body of state. That is why neoliberalism is becoming a process of transforming political identities from state to a more heterogeneously bordered and complex structure.

Discussions on the neoliberal imagination of field

The main propose of this part is to understand the neoliberal engagement of territoriality and state via the globalization process. Contemporarily, neoliberalism weakens the unification of the territorial boundaries, which means a removal of all existing limits of state functionality.

> In this aspect, neoliberalism and globalization, as its spatial functionalization,
>
> refers to an economic policy aimed at unifying the economical field by a whole set of juridical-political measures, designed to remove all the limits to that unification, all the obstacles to that extension, most of which are linked to the nation-state … In other words, global market is a *political creation*
>
> (Bourdieu, 2005, pp. 224–225)

Similar to the elimination of former institutions by the bourgeois class in modernity, neoliberalism eliminates the interests and institutions of state identity to achieve a distinguishing domination of new social relations beyond state borders and boundaries. The existence of state borders is a functional tool and an arbitrary political interpretation of new neoliberal economic capital because the existence of state boundaries theoretically creates a strong sense of equality which pretends to insulate state internal economic classes from the new global economic class and its domination. In practice, it only insulates the state from the outside; it cannot prevent neoliberal expansion from territorial boundaries. The state loses its structural and institutional power to penetrate the global and institutional advance of the neoliberal field, but the new economic classes of neoliberalism interpenetrate state borders easily via the neoliberal expansion of economic capital. Thus, the relations between the former economic capital of state and the economic capital of neoliberal globalization are asymmetrical and rely on inequality rather than more equal opportunities in the economic field.

In line with – especially – the neoliberal transformation of the economic field, it is important to answer how the identities will take part in a globalizing locality or localizing global of the economic field. There are a number of different perspectives working on the defining characteristics of neoliberal globalization. One of the prominent perspectives with

regard to the issue evaluates that neoliberal globalization objectifies a homogenization which interprets the whole market and its apparatus into the same collective representation. This impression approves that, after the universal domination of globalization, identities will be based on a more homogenous interpretation (Norberg-Hodge, 1999, 2003). Besides this, the second reflection regarding the characteristics of the neoliberal globalizing field indicates that the neoliberal world creates different effects in different localities. This means that 'the universal' and 'the particular' create intertwined interactions and, therefore, they gradually resemble each other. This perspective refers to a process of 'glocalization', which shows the heterogeneous characteristics of the spatial distribution of new identities that achieves a particularization of the universal and universalization of the particular simultaneously (Cox, 1997). The process of neoliberal expansion is seen as a differentiation of territorial identities because the effects of neoliberal expansion are perceived in many different ways according to the peculiarities of different localities. Beyond these two perspectives, another considerable perspective claims that neoliberal expansion does not create homogenization or heterogeneity of the different local identities because neoliberalism does not synthesize or integrate the values and identities of states. Rather, it combines different local identities. In this way, neoliberal globalization constructs a new identity, which includes a variety of peculiarities from all localities. Thus, the neoliberal territorial expanse of globalization is nothing short of a hybrid organization of existing political identities, or – more appropriately – neoliberal expansion on global scale is a 'hybridization' of former values and identities (Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002; Woods, 2007).

It is plausible that all of these thoughts reflect some aspects of the neoliberal characterization of the economic field. However, these implications focus on descriptive observations in the objective world, but they do not see the prescriptive characteristic of globalizing identities, constituted by a particular nobility of domination. The particularization of 'the universal' is ambiguous because the meanings and scope of 'the universal' are very controversial. In line with Bourdieu, 'the universal' is nothing short of the arbitrariness of the neoliberal sense of limit beyond state boundaries. Quintessentially, this study follows the idea that 'the universal' is formed by theory, created by the arbitrariness of the domination of new global stratification, naturalized by the new global economy-centred institutionalization in the objective world, and practised by the atomized individual agents and collectivization in the global stratification of subjective and objective fields. Neoliberal globalization as a political creation does not resemble the values of all of its members. It is plausible that the globalization of particularity is a peculiar characteristic of the neoliberal field of practice, but

this particularity is just a representation of domination because only capital allocation of a certain domination is sufficient to get free from any delimitation and to infuse into the institutionalization of symbolic capital in the international field. As a result of this, the particularization of globalisation into different state identities can only present the same dominant values and its globalizing doxa of relations.

In this respect, in line with the consideration of Bourdieusian economics, it is claimed that the globalizing identity is mainly involved in a new globalizing 're-collectivization'. States are mostly experiencing a unification and coexistence of identities because they are dominated by the same economic rules, objectives and institutionalization in the different territorial localities and regimes. Homogenization approaches ignore the differences of localities, but the new re-collectivization considers that differences are a constitutive element of the new vision and division as long as their constitutive objectives target the same expectations, which are subjectively imposed by the neoliberal sense of limits. In addition to this, as is implied above, the heterogeneity approach of neoliberal territoriality stumbles in seeing the construction and meaning of 'the universal'. Many differences, such as gendered, regional and ethnic differences in state identity, still exist, but globalization does not directly take aim at such sub-structures. It divides these sub-identities into small parts, such as low-ethnicity and local minorities. Thus, the older superstructures, such as the state justice in the territorially defined borders, lose their impact on the agents (Fraser, 2007). In other words, although the values are interpreted in different ways in different social collectiveness, they claim to obtain the similar superstructure and objectives which are provided by neoliberal economic identification. In this way, globalisation re-collectivizes territorial values in accordance with the neoliberal encroachment into state territoriality. As long as these sub-forms abide by the fundamental economic rules and expectations of the new global stratification, state identity will locally have the flexibility to interpret the super-structural institutions such as democracy in accordance with local objectives. This transforms the subjective perception of state, which interprets its identity in accordance with the new sense of limit of the neoliberal globalization because neoliberal globalization is a political creation which aims at the domination of a new global economic stratification via the elimination of the limits of state identity (Bourdieu, 2005).

Historically, every process of unification, or every new homogenization, is connected to the monopolization of a new set of powers which constitutes a distinctive form of former domination. State identity is just a recent form of a distinctive homogenization which is pictured by modernity and its theorization. In this way, a distinctive homogenization is always

constituted by the naturalization of homogenization between the imposition of dominants and the disposition of dominated social factions into the same political collectiveness. Therefore, collectivization on the basis of subjective capital is always followed by a collectivization or homogenization in the economic field, as has historically been observed in the foundation of national economic markets. However, as indicated, the differentiation between imposition and disposition or between vision and division is the *sine qua non* of a successfully founded domination. The harmonization of imposition and disposition creates a false consciousness about the practical positions of agents owing to the fact that the subjective capital of collectiveness is determined by the imposition of some social groups over others not equally ready to compete within the same competitions. False recognition is based on this unconsciousness regarding unequally distributed symbolic capital between the agents. Subjective inequality eventually results in a disadvantaged situation in the economic field for dominated agents because subjective domination transforms into an objectified institution which inevitably produces unequal engagements in economic capital. All agents should be part of competitions in economic field, but only the producers of domination obtain qualified capital allocation to produce asymmetrical economic benefits. Looking at the homogenization of modern state identity, it can be seen that the economic success of the former aristocratic domination was not based on advancement in economic apparatus, but it was instead related to the advancement of subjective capital because subjective domination constitutes a distinctive nobility which is transformed into institutional practices. Therefore, when nobility transferred to the bourgeois, the older form of political subjectivity inevitably lost its domination. As a result, every collective harmonization of political identity is a product of distinctive domination in the economic field (Fraser, 1997).

Neoliberal institutionalization in the economic field does not rely on the harmonization of all actors' visions, but it consists of arbitrariness and particularity in a dominant or a group of dominants. In this respect, the identification of political identity takes on a new meaning. Originally, the political identification of medieval kings was defined by territoriality and its functionalization in the practical field. National identities developed this territorial identification of the medieval king. On the other hand, the modern state also built on a value-based identification in addition to the territorial definition of identity. In this way, in addition to territorial definition, the value of nationality becomes an inseparable definitive characteristic of modern state identity. As modernity changed the medieval definition of political identity, neoliberal globalization tries to change these definitive characteristics of modernity. The neoliberal definition fundamentally tries to get free from territorially defined

political identities. It tries to constitute a pure value-oriented definition of political identity via eliminating any territorial delimitation and its characteristics, which deteriorates participatory arenas for struggles of decision making and justice (Fraser, 2007). The value-based system of neoliberalism conceptualizes political identification, which depends on an advanced engagement of democracy and unlimited market economy under the rules and jurisdiction of universal dominant particularity beyond the state's territorial legislative power. Therefore, the new vision of division in the neoliberal economic field is based on an accumulation of a certain kind of value system which enhances the positions of political actors and states in the international field. This value-based definition of identities is eventually distributed into a kind of organizational process which affects the decision regarding the definition of identities. Indeed, European unification characterizes this value-based identity definition of neoliberalism. Historically, Europe has interpreted with a more territorial definition than by using value-based characteristics. As a result, it is easy to define the territorial borders of Europe. On the other hand, historically, European identity, based on a common value system between the territories, is not as obvious as its territorial, geographical, historical borders. Although territorial European identity is more descriptive, the European Union was formed in accordance with a consideration of a certain value system, the values and principles of which many member states in the union are achieving – or have achieved *post facto*. As a result, the European Union has defined its identity in line with the value-based divisionary identification of neoliberalism.

Re-collectivization implies that the localities recognize the expectations, stratification and objectives of global capitalist domination because potential differences in the objectives of localities and regulations basically do not intend to achieve any other structural allocation beyond neoliberal arbitrariness. Therefore, methodological differences in achieving the global objectives are acceptable for the neoliberal definition of collectivity. The basic understanding is firstly to hammer the classification and objectives of globalization into the subjective field of state. Re-collectivization is the natural result of neoliberal globalization because every improvement in a certain territoriality depends considerably on other territorialities. For instance, a state's expectation of its gross domestic product mostly depends on the purchasing powers and economic decisions of other states, and states' sovereign interrelations are not capable definitions with regards to their functional positioning in the global stratification of neoliberalism. In order to define the delimitation of the new collectiveness, neoliberalism takes advantage of cooperation, dialogue, territorial fairway and common values and common global problems because it tries to maintain its dominance in a common sense of different

localities. Consequently, harmony between unequal collective agents is achieved by stresses on common values and created language, such as such as the global sense of humanity and everybody's environmental conscience. The differences are prerequisites of the new global stratification and its division. As is claimed, if every territorial space of the world achieves the same homogeneous structures, the new global capital cannot profit from the differences in labour prices, market efficiency and consumer tendencies which can change from a territory to another. Contrary to national welfare states, the new global capital domination does not only absorb the surplus value within a restricted territory. Rather, it absorbs the relatively and functionally created surplus of all the territorialities. As a result, the global domination of capital does not homogenize values of identities. Rather, it tries to achieve a functionally well-operated re-collectivization between the identities.

Some approaches show that state identity actually supports globalization – or, more precisely, 'the state and global have been substantively mutually reinforcing' regarding governance in relation to identity (Scholte, 2005, p. 148). They evaluate new global solidarities/new forms of sub-identities; gender groups, age groups, religious identities, immigrants and diasporas are the proofs which show that the importance/dominance of national state identities is continuing and contributing to the hybridization of identities. However, the biggest advancement of neoliberalism is to atomize the identity of the state. The more globalization atomizes the existing structure of state identity, the more the world becomes governable for the global capital market. Therefore, these sub-identities are rational results of the atomization of the class structure in the state. States are nothing short of functional organs to make legal changes for the global common market in their own territories. They gradually lose their financial counteraction capacity in opposition to the new global stratification. The new sub-identities mostly come into existence in order to form opposition beyond the state territories because they prove that state does not have the capacity to save the new collectivization of political structures.

Lastly, the new global structure changes the relations between responsibility and power. Originally, sovereign national states were very centralized powers and, therefore, they had absolute responsibility to distribute public goods. However, neoliberal stratification and its dominants substitute state functionality and the power of arbitrariness. The new global stratification created its new collectivization of unequally positioned political identities (Bourdieu, 2005). Meanwhile, it also restructured its new classification of identities and power allocation globally. Most importantly, neoliberalism does not take advantage of a subjective, ontological and theoretical sense of equality in order to populate its identities and

classes. The unequal and arbitrary distribution of integration is a basic functional tool of global economic capital. The differentiation of institutional structures is also the arbitrary politics of neoliberal economic capital because inequality and differentiation in institutional structure are essential to produce added value. The important thing is to save the single global market and its rules. In this way, economic capital subdues collectivization in differences and inequality via global autonomous organizations. These organizations also impose and defend the fundamental rules of the single global market. The state becomes a functional part of the policies of these institutions because the state lose its functions of domination without having control of its own economic capital within its territorial borders. Domination of global economic capital obtains power and its arbitrariness, but it does not undertake all the functions of state identity. In other words, contrary to state identity, the new global capital dominates the power, but it does not undertake the responsibilities (for example, new neoliberal economic capital is not interested in social welfare policies). The nation states have to pay these benefits, but nation states are not capable of welfare politics without economic capital. Due to the failures of nation states regarding welfare politics, the reaction of the atomized citizen increases and the agents discredit their national identities in favour of globalizing collectivization.

Neoliberalism and collectiveness of state identity

Neoliberal collectivization on the base of the globalizing economic field is a political creation which is substituted for the former political creation of the national state on the basis of modernization. More precisely, modernity as the theoretical concept of the national state is under attack from a new collectivization which is theorized by a new spatial expansion and its unifying principles of economic policies. Therefore, neoliberalism promises a new collective identification of political subjectivity on the basis of economic, political, symbolic and legislative collectivization beyond the delimited collectivization of states. It is not plausible to expect that such an expansion in the economic field and its objective institutionalization represents the whole set of values and dispositions of all of the collective political agents or states into the international field of globalization. As modernity and its identity construction of states were represented and framed by Western symbolic values and cultural supremacy, which established and imposed their own imagined institutionalization and organization of political identity in the international field, neoliberalism descriptively constitutes a particularity of a certain domination as the collective representation of equality within a wider unified economic field of globalization. In this respect, neoliberalism indicates a distinctive

naturalization which changes the functions and characteristics of the former institutionalization of the state. In order to achieve a successful domination, neoliberalism de-territorializes the dispositional understanding of state institutionalization. In this way, neoliberalism impairs divisions on the basis of the democratic welfare state engagements of modernity within territorial defined borders and improves a stakeholder democracy of globalization which imposes a new collective emancipation from the delimitation of state identity. In this respect, neoliberalism tries to impose a misrecognized particularity of emancipation on the dispositions of agents, which constitute the possibility of democracy, welfare and unlimited exchanges within a globalizing economic field.

Economic capital is the productive element of all kinds of capital, and other kinds of capital can be reproduced according to their interrelation with economic capital. The functionalization of economic capital, therefore, is subject to the 'conversion' capability of different kinds of capital (Bourdieu, 1986). Neoliberal marketization tries to change the state-centric conservation capacity of economic capital in relation to the other kinds of capital. The basic structural objective of neoliberal expansion is to create atomized individuals and eliminate any collective links of states. In order to achieve this, neoliberalism tries to get free from state-centred interests, citizenship, social stratification and identities. When neoliberal expansion does not directly target state identity, it supports and brings out the low identities and differences within the territories. Thus, neoliberalism had to impose the rationality of stratification, which relies on new symbolic dispositions beyond state identity. The new stratification is likely to depend on the objective actions of atomized individuals whose social positioning is likely to be independent from the territorial interests of the state. In this respect, social positioning will be determined by the capacity and success of individuals regarding the pursuance of competition and accumulation globally. Individuals and their social groups, as citizens, families and citizens, always mobilize on behalf of ontological and subjective ties of their collective identities. When they mobilize on behalf of the state, they cooperate for the benefit of their nations and social classes in addition to their own individualistic interests. However, the new global stratification needs individuals who rationalize their identities in accordance with a pure economic logic and the mentality of the single global market. Consequently, the existing social collectiveness within state identity is seen as the biggest obstacle and competitor to achieve neoliberal expansion.

Initially, the single market of globalization tries to separate social realities and the economy. This process reached a peak when privatization policies became widespread because the state lost commend over many socially important functions and means which

form the interference mechanism of the welfare state. Consequently, state identity mainly intervenes in social disputes and restlessness via negotiating neoliberal capital affiliations. States do not freely invest in the collectiveness of their classes and local markets, because class stratification within state territory loses its function in the global market. In this respect, the objective reality of the social world is not compatible with the subjective expectation and objective institutions of individuals. In other words, individuals still have social rights and spaces in the territorial nation state identity. However, the neoliberal economy deliberately tries to put these social collective entities out of commission because the loss of former social collectiveness probably creates a 'social anomia' for all the collective entity of state identity. The state's classes do not find appropriate spaces in the former form of social stratification. As a result, when the existing habitus does not answer actual structures, the vision of state economic capital is questioned by new forms of dispositions formulated by neoliberal expansion. However, at this point, Bourdieu makes an institutional preference and advocates that European social democracies are the basic structural entities for achieving emancipation and reviving public interests. In other words, social collectiveness and collective institutions can only be protected by the European social democratic welfare state model. He relies mostly on social distribution and the social welfare policies of the social democracies. He believes that social democracies can create spaces for threatened social collective institutions in order to stand up to the neoliberal destruction of collectiveness (Bourdieu, 1998a).

The function of salvation or the emancipation of social collectiveness is considerably prejudicial to the logic of new global single marketization. The social collectiveness of state identity provides a space to mitigate the problems of internal social groups. In this respect, social democracies and welfare states were constructed in order to achieve this emancipation mechanism of social groups. Without the 'social' and its social collectiveness, individuals were isolated in the pure market domination, which dominates the fields of accumulation all over the globe. However, not only does this domination not tries to get free from the pressure of the 'social', but also global neoliberal polices increasingly aim at dominating the fields of distribution (Teeple, 2000). As a result of this, the state is not easily involved in the direct subvention of social classes and spaces because these policies are increasingly opposed by neoliberal social domination. As it was witnessed during the 2008 global financial crisis, despite the fact that the biggest victims of the crisis were the new atomized individuals, the subventions were not directly allocated for the benefit of the emancipation of individuals.

The symbolic violence of the modern political identity created a 'common sense' on the basis of a division in accordance with sovereign state identity. However, new rising

structural inequalities aim to change the vision of structural violence in the subjective sphere of individuals because knowledge is produced and distributed by the neoliberal expansion beyond the knowledgeable power of state. The new global economy and its global market create new structural violence for individuals beyond their affiliation with state identity. Neoliberalism also extends the borders of the former structural violence in a new global arena. The new economic functional means of the global market improve the success of new structural violence via global-scale unemployment, income distribution and capital fluidity. In this way, the states are imposed to subsidize 'the deficits' of global neoliberal expansion because new economic capital imposes that the new distribution is not achieved by direct welfare subsidies of social classes and individuals. This also affects the roles of families on the consumption of their members because the new global power has better knowledge for producing things according to such groups as age and gender (Bourdieu, 1998a). Therefore, the result of dissolving state identity may result in a more de-socialized world than that which knowledge of globalization reveals to us. In other words, the 'social' is considerably disassociated from its roots as classes, families, citizens and its collective form of state identity.

Beyond the neoliberal theorization of the globalizing economic field, the territorial limitlessness of new economic capital in descriptive world actually provides a dispositional habituation process for domination in order to influence the subjective habitus of dominated states and their territorial positions regarding the doxa of intended neoliberal identification. Symbolic and objective deficiencies in the capital allocations of dominated states retain these dominated states from competitive membership of new global exchanges and struggles. Domination embodies all of the required subjective, objective, juridical and informative capacities to struggle in the limitless world of economic capital. However, the theoretical freedom from all territorial and institutional limits creates a practical deterioration in the collective bodies of disadvantaged states in the international field. Because of the subjective and objective capacity deficiencies of these dominated states, they cannot operate with unlimited rights and institutions in accordance with the dispositional and institutional superiority of domination. Therefore, it is correct that the neoliberal economic field abandons limits for every state, but, in practice, dominated states do not have the requisite capital allocation to compete in the positions of domination. States' territorially secured economic spaces actually function as the emancipation mechanism of modernity, which de-escalates the symbolic violence of states. On the contrary, neoliberalism substituted the emancipation mechanism for states with a universally unified field of practice which creates a deeper

divisionary symbolic violence for the political identities of states because the new collectivization universalizes particularity and the one-sided values of domination, which results in 'integration within inequality'. In order to constitute the asymmetrical exchange system of economic capital, new global domination has improved its institutionalization in every aspect of the international field. Indeed, the neoliberal expansion of the economic field enhanced its legislative power and accomplished the capacity to form international law. As a result of this, the international law-making capacity of globalizing domination improved its penalizing functions in states' internal laws, forming symbolic violence within the globalizing collectiveness of the economic field.

Structurally, neoliberal globalization is the systematic destruction of social collectiveness in international relations (Bourdieu, 1998a). All types of social collectiveness, from national states to family and classes, are potential counters of the new global marketization. The spaces of the former institutional collectiveness are narrowing. When the new global stratification substitutes institutional bases of state identity, it utilizes the functions of states by way of certain policies and global establishments, such as privatization and WTO regulations. Functional policy harmony is supplied by supranational or – more precisely – global regulations which are based on a new normative domination in state habitus that guarantees a single global market with free and safe movement of goods, services and money. This new normative domination inevitably creates social and economic risks within state borders. However, due to the non-territorial distribution of neoliberal economic capital, the new normative institutionalization of global neoliberalism does not contribute to social responsibility/liability for state identity. The actions of states' – and non-states' – 'corporate social responsibility' practices are failing because they have not achieved a well-founded agenda.[25] That is why the state is just seen as a policy mechanism to guarantee more finance and revenues, and why it functions as a kind of 'risk bearer' (Fuchs & Kratochwil, 2002). For instance, when a state obtains a loan from a global financial institution, the institution can express a preference in decision making in all policy areas: social distribution, individualization, privatization and the functionalization of the risk-bearer function of the state.

Institutionally, the former social collectiveness of the state identity is linked to the new rules and laws which depend on the individualistic policy arrangements of the new global

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[25] For more information, see Vogel (2006).

stratification. Neoliberal stratification constructs its own legislative bases and, therefore, states try to regulate their own internal laws in accordance with the values and norms of the new single neoliberal market (Bourdieu, 2005). The former international structure of the state was based on objective and recognizable procedures between the mutually equal entities. The state as a social collectiveness had responsibilities for its sub-collective identities and also for a clear policy agenda against all other equal states. However, the states now have duties towards many global power centres. The subjective recognition of states is determined by credit rating agencies rather than other state peers. Thus, the loss of social collectiveness also results in a loss of fundamental institutional and legislative bases of the former social collectiveness. More seriously, the ontological collective and subjective equality of the citizens of the states removed severe medieval institutions of slavery in the international era. Due to the individualization of globalization, a more severe form of global slavery came into existence in a neoliberal economic capital distribution. In the neoliberal social stratification, individualized and socially annihilated identities can easily become parts of global slavery and marginal identities, which are constructed by a new interpretation of symbolic violence in state identity.

The mentality of neoliberal economic capital creates considerably different borders and boundaries for individuals according to their relations with globalized capital, because the new neoliberal globalization is seemingly boundary-broadening (Rosenau, 1997). In other words, the new global stratification redeploys the objective and subjective boundaries of atomized individuals in accordance with the affiliations of social collectiveness. Subjectively, states originally pursue the determined objectives and collective social aims for citizens. The state was based on long-term profits, cooperative/collaborated responsibilities and social solidarity in a mutually recognized international space. The responsibilities of citizens compromise the duty towards their social classes, family and potential future generations of the same national identity. By contrast, the new global economic capital pursues short-term profits and is free from responsibility to any collective affiliation, identity or future generation because new neoliberal expansion does not have any collective boundary. Objectively, individuals are categorized according to the degree of individualization and the position of short-term profits. Every category in neoliberal globalization has its own borders and boundaries. Individuals can obtain a wider space if they seek more individualized short-term profits. As a result, the state had to remove borders for very wealthy capital owners, who are free from the fundamental prerequisites to be a local citizen in a particular state. Individuals under the pressure of loosened state collectivity are most likely to be a part of a local

workforce of global affiliations in more restricted borders. The other bordered category is the professional and highly educated workforce. If individuals have potential to increase and contribute their neoliberal economic capital, they can functionally be free from boundaries in accordance with their abilities. As a result, the new global stratification utilizes individuals in relation to capital and short-term profits.

CHAPTER 5
CULTURAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Defining cultural capital in the international field

International relations among states characteristically depend on both objective power and interests and subjective norms and values. The formation of units in international relations rests on a homogenization of identity by way of different historical formations. The creation of state boundaries relies on different normative and practical interpretations of structures. In practice, in medieval Europe, the king's feudal units were unified by the holy idea of a mass retaliation called crusades. In the same way, modern states have homogenized their identities by means of assimilation, nationalization, genocide etc., which are linked to many objective power relations and legitimize the state as the new political units (Donnelly, 1998). Subjectively, a normative set of values always forms the general rules to be the standard units of international relations. Norms mainly represent the principles of interactions among those units. Accordingly, the Westphalian construction was the first attempt to underline the normative environment of the modern state, but its constitution-based institutional nature was substituted by a new nation-based institutionalization due to a historically changing interpretation of political identity. The production of a new political identity always historically precedes the structures on the eve of every new institutionalization. This normative construction evolved in time and described the international systems as the international system. At this point, neither objective geographical redistribution nor subjective normative reconstruction comprehensively explains the changes in the identities of political subjects. My goal in this part is to bring Bourdieu's cultural capital into the international relations field. It is claimed that cultural capital precedes and produces state identity both normatively and objectively.

According to Bourdieu, cultural capital means all kinds of inherited, institutionalized and objectified apparatus of agents which credit the agents with knowledge of the capacity to produce meanings of the social world and to become subjectively conscious regarding the identities of the objective world (Bourdieu, 1984, 1973). In this way, cultural capital is a way of monopolization which achieves a common sense of identity and, more particularly, its standards. Cultural capital is a functionality to produce, at the least, a minimum agreement for all agents. This means that cultural capital is produced in order to create a future because the agents only evaluate the structure by way of a standardized perception of the subjective world (Ibid.). Monopolization and standardization seem to underpin the styles of relationship in the

field and to show that there is a standard way which subjects of a particular structure recognize. In this way, international relations not only means simply a kind of territorial objective differentiation but also indicates a monopolization of created standards that distinguishes the positioning of agents in the structure.

Cultural capital firstly indicates a consensus on how the agents understand each other. This consensus is largely derived from defined standards of identities. However, consensus based on standards is not an agreement of cooperation or coexistence. It impresses theoretically utopian knowledge upon the agents because it changes the self-evident origins of the structure. In this way, consensus creates pre-organized and pre-supposed knowledge regarding the objective world. Knowledge is transferred to all agents by means of habitus and dispositions. Habitus and dispositions are unconsciously practised by the agents because they are represented as the only way to create profits in the objective world. Cultural capital underpins knowledge and the recognition of the relationship, which standardize consensus. Cultural capital about the moral and objective intentions of the agents represents the social position of the authority, providing the monopolization of justificatory recognition and the imposition of legitimacy (Ibid.). In other words, agents are unconsciously liable to deliberate interpretation and they become parts of the monopolized knowledge of cultural capital because habitus represents knowledge which imposes that the agents should be parts of the same dispositions in order to have a defined social position. Social position is needed to create new profits. In this way, particularity of authority's knowledge becomes the monopolized standard for everyone and particular profits are generated in order to pursue the social positioning of cultural capital.

The existence of agents and institutions in international relations is generally portrayed as a production of shared norms and values (Ruggie, 1993; Finnemore, 1996b; Reus-Smit, 2001b) or the nature of power politics (Mearsheimer, 2001; Keohane, 1989). The first reflection depends on the normative construction of 'international', which creates common a basis for setting identified standards for the identities of agents; the second is linked to an idea of the struggle for power. Beyond this second paradigm of structuralism, as the modern system has been practising since the constructive normative frame of Westphalia, the modern state identity was seen a product of the standards of constitutionalization or social interaction. In light of both structuralism and post-structuralism, the creation of the modern national identity of states is seen as a result of a process based on the achievement of the struggle for

power, the accomplishment of common standardized perspectives or a 'functional necessity'[26] (Buzan, 2004) to reorganize the globalizing relationship of the political units. However, beyond the objective necessities in interactionalists' claims and shared norms and values in constructivists' perspectives, Bourdieu underlines the roles of cultural capital, habitus and dispositions in the formation of identities (Fowler, 1997). First of all, agents in pursuit of their goals are based upon their subjective understanding of necessities, needs and conditions, which is derived from their dispositions. From this point of view, the reproduction of identity is preceded by dispositional and habitual processes rather than normative, functional or rational understanding. That is why it is claimed that, owing to the fact that agents can produce meanings and interpretations by way of their pre-given dispositions, cultural capital plays the dominant role in forming the identities of agents in different historical terms.

Cultural capital and production of identity beyond social construction

It is mainly argued here that shared ideas and norms are not the primary origins of the institutionalization of national identity in international relations. However, constructivist international relations studies are usually based on generic structural fundamental institutions to define state identity in states' societies (Ruggie, 1992; Wight, 1977; Reus-Smit, 1999). In this way, they identify national state identity by way of a fundamental institution: sovereignty. The institutionalization of nation state identity is derived from this generic institutional structure. In this way, the state socializes into this normative environment and learns how it can be a recognized part of the society of nation states or modern international relations. In other words, states form the generic norms and then they produce secondary institutions such as sovereign territory and multilateralism in order to define the features of recognizable identities. This constructivist approach is generally incapable of explaining the structuralization of fundamental institutions because it emphasizes sovereignty as the sole generic root of subjects, identities and institutions. Similar to the ontological roots of structural theories of international relations, sovereignty itself, becomes an ontology in the constructivist explanation of the roots of state identity, because sovereignty itself needs a kind of common understanding or cooperation on the basis of territorial and constitutional structures. More precisely, modern states as the agents of national identity do not create a sovereign understanding without having any sovereign practice or imposition of dispositions.

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[26] For more information and perspectives, see Suzuki (2009).

Some constructivists try to overcome the deficiencies of pure generic sovereignty as the fundamental root of the national state by claiming that sovereignty should be understood as a more complex 'constitutional structure'. In this aspect, they think that sovereignty is supported by shared ideas about the moral purpose of the state (Reus-Smit, 1997). Both subjective sovereignty and its constitutional objective institutionalization are derived from a shared moral belief of the state agents. The weakness of this consideration is to think that modern states form their identity because of the fact that they have the same moral sentiment. First of all, morality is not a constitutive element of identity. Rather, it is generally involved in the description of identity. Moreover, we cannot define whether moral values or shared standards of morality precede identity or vice versa. More importantly, morality is a very subjective basis for defining how to objective structures are standardized and institutionalized.

It is argued here that the institutional bases of modern state, including sovereignty, are derived from a constantly accumulated set of habitual rituals called cultural capital. In other words, the identity of political subjects is based on a historically accumulated set of cultural capital. This is considerably different from the constructivist understanding of state identity. In the first place, ideas can only decide or determine the procedural process; they cannot have any impact on habitual reproduction. Cultural capital is always constructed before the subjects define their identities in a certain way. In this aspect, the constructivist perspective is plausible in that states can create certain kinds of generic constitutional common structures, but these generic constitutional structures do not interpret how states define their identities according to national sentiment. Otherwise, states are seen as fully rational entities creating common a moral and constitutional apparatus, but this becomes a vicious cycle of other structural theories. From the Athenian political structure to the medieval political identity and modern national states, it is not possible to state a common moral purpose shared by all political agents. However, all of these different political organizations, which are represented by different identities, arise from a kind of cultural capital which forms political identities immediately before procedural cognitive processes come into existence. Morality, or a belief of shared purpose, is not free from the determinative habitual existence of cultural capital (Ignatow, 2009). In this respect, in order to gain certain political identity, the agents are not rationally or morally structured entities because cultural capital provides a meaningful arsenal for achieving a shared belief regarding their identity. Thus, identity construction has intertwined links with constitutional processes with regard to positioning (recognition among the members of the same sort of identity) and cultural capital with regard to the habitus of agents (unconscious conducts of agents).

In the same way, the construction of identities is relatively free from any ideational conscious process. It means that identity is fundamentally formed by unconscious habitus imposed by cultural capital. In relation with this, agents' actions are 'pre-reflective' strategies (Swartz, 1997). These pre-reflective strategies of cultural capital have meanings beyond the objective ideas of the agents. They objectify the ideological and social expectations of a certain identity allocation which interprets the rationality of actors or the degree of rationality that is necessary to recognize the legitimacy of embedded power relations. That is why to obtain an identity is unconsciously derived from the 'hierarchy of values' (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 102), which establishes unequal power relations and the legitimated system of relations. The standards and judgments of the identities in the same system harmonize with the hierarchy of values that creates the 'rational agents' of the pre-reflective relation system. In other words, identities become rational members because they produce hierarchical values in the objective world. The objective interests of power relations unconsciously transform into the subjective and pre-reflective aims of the agents, which achieve integration according to hierarchical values. Because of the hierarchy of values, identity dignifies some values and impairs some others in order to fulfil the social positioning of unconscious cultural capital. This process signifies the socialization of cultural capital, the rationalization of agents and the reproduction of order. Ideas indicate the rationalization of the agents when they give meanings to identities but they do not primarily produce identities. Rationalization is based on pre-given dispositions that reproduce social positioning and stratification. Thus, cultural capital reproduces unconscious dispositions which rationalize the hierarchy of values in accordance with a certain power allocation. Afterwards, dispositions objectify the hierarchy by way of the agents' pre-reflective ideations and practices.

Social interactions and shared ideas objectifying the reproduction of collectivity and identity stem from the symbolic representation of social order (Ibid.). Thus, political organization and its identity depend on the representation of symbolic power in the objective world. The objective world is the field that materializes shared ideas and institutions assembling the individual identities into the same symbolic bases. On the other hand, the subjective field precedes objective structures and it produces symbolic power that reconstructs the categorization of the social world. Categorization connotes the imposition of cultural capital, which embodies the arbitrariness of symbolic representation when political agents produce their identities. In other words, when the political agents – the states – share some ideas and institutions they are liable to arbitrariness of cultural capital. The arbitrary power of cultural capital cannot be realized by the individuals, as the practitioners of political agency,

because it represents the meaning of legitimacy in order to be a recognized identity in the objective field. The self-reflective logic of cultural capital interprets 'the rational field' of different groups in the same categorization. In this sense, the identification of the agents' 'social self' is never completely reduced to conscious ideas. The legitimacy of arbitrary power is related to the constitutive characteristic of subjective habitus and it only discloses itself by way of the subordination of social structures in accordance with cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1993b). Thus, ideas do not function as the mechanism of a shared belief regarding the moral purpose of social being. The symbolic power of cultural capital unconsciously imposes the belief of categorization and social positioning onto the objective field. Then, the agents relate to each other on the basis of cultural capital. This produces legitimacy for agents in order to achieve recognition in the objective world. In this respect, cultural capital operates two important functions to give meaning to identities: firstly, it stimulates the agents who construct themselves in relation the other, because some structures become rational and/or legitimate in comparison with others. Second, it consciously imposes domination because the agents embody the necessity of domination under the subordinated field of cultural capital.

At this point, some important interference should be done with regards to state identity. The political identity of the state is defined according to the individuals and classes who represent their own presence by way of the symbolic representation of the political society. That is why the political identity of the state always represents a subjective form of symbolic power. This symbolic power is embodied by national sovereign rationalization in the post-Westphalian political construction. In line with the Westphalian system, from absolutism to nationalism, the state, as the highest entity of political identity, is categorized according to the new symbolic power. This symbolic power presupposes the interpretation of objective truth. It defines legitimate actors and recognized behaviours of the actors simultaneously before constitutional institutionalization comes into existence. Symbolic power about the political identity of the state forms constitutional rationales and foundations, providing meaningful categories for the identification of political identity and social positioning in the objective field. That is why there is no moral purpose of the state that enhances normative functionality for the institutionalization of a certain identity. The identity of political authority or the state can only be produced and reproduced by symbolic power. Contrary to the common understanding of the constructivist paradigm, objective constitutionalization of the political identity and its sovereignty are just spatial implementations of symbolic power, and their 'common sense' is not related to a normative ideation of right action or morality. Rather, the political agents unconsciously form their

identities according to given categories and construct their social positioning in terms of these categories because they become parts of same universality and they form quasi-moral legitimacy (Lamont, 2000). In this way, the state can struggle for objective power without problematizing its own identity. Here it is essentially argued that the constriction of state identity does not presuppose any ideational conscious moral purpose, but it is produced by power relations. However, the power relations are not related to a physical manifestation of power, because the state, as the basis of physical violence (Gerth & Mills, 1991), cannot institutionalize in the subjective fields of individuals. Therefore, the objective institutionalization of the state cannot be explained by morality. The recognition of institutions such as national armies is subject to a more intertwined symbolic power relation. In order to be a part of a national army, individuals firstly need to define themselves by way of a categorization based on nationality, which is provided by cultural capital. To this end, instead of conceiving of state identity in relation to a commitment to the same moral good and of constitutional structuralization, Bourdieusian reflection on identity construction evaluates the political identity as a fraction of cultural capital which unconsciously imposes categories that individuals apply in order to produce moral purpose and common sense (Lamont & Lareau, 1988).

Cultural capital, morality and distribution of identity in international field
In line with the constructivist understanding of state identity, it can be plausible to say that the state defines its identity in relation to other states according to a Bourdieusian point of view (Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Wendt, 1992; Jackson, 1990). However, constructivists have some illusions when they claim that the state defines its identity according to the social engagements with each other. Basically, neither a constructional, norm-based structure nor morality derived from a socially constructed sovereign understanding is an appropriate principle for achieving any ordered social relation or agreement, imposing legitimacy to define the identity of agents in relation to others. Here we should reconsider the meanings – or, more precisely, the functionalities – of morality, sovereignty and recognition. Firstly, when one tries to ground identities by way of morality, one trivializes the socially constructive structuralization of identities. Identity becomes a fraction of the unsocial presence of moral values. However, here it is argued that morality is a set of values originated from cultural capital, which creates a relational positioning of the agents within the same structure. Morality is always in relation to a subjective totalization/cultural capital on the basis of the 'rightful actions' of agents. The agents take advantage of cultural capital in order to

understand the social world. Cultural capital comes off imposing socially objectified positioning, which interprets the meaning of actions in relation to each other. Cultural capital is fundamentally a social relation for defining the value of agents according to other similar entities.

Essentially, the construction of the identity of the state, as the modern political identity, is derived from cultural capital rather than morality. In this respect, cultural capital produces three distinguishing features in comparison with the moral purpose of state identity. First of all, state identity is mostly based on the unconscious symbolic production of identity rather than a conscious moral purpose of the state. Ideas and agents do not automatically seek to achieve an ordered life or a social good. Socially contingent processes try to claim that the agents are conscious to achieve a cooperative understanding of the material world because they produce similar purposive structures in order to define their identities (Reus-Smit, 1997; Wilmer, 2002). Cultural capital challenges the assumption of contingent social practices by showing that the social self is always and continuously a bounded subjectivity of the arbitrariness of cultural domination (Swartz, 1997). Thus, material interactions of agents have very fractional effects on the social reproduction of identities because the agents' consciousnesses only achieve how they cooperate on the basis of shared ideas and identities, but the social contingency of identities is not plausible in understanding how the agents form these shared ideas. This means that the socially contingent beliefs of identity production regarding how the identity of the state is reproduced have not originated from agents' conscious ideas with regards to the solving of the cooperation and stabilization problem of sovereignty. State identities are historically reproduced in different social and cultural environments but the state is not a conscious entity which seeks a constant stabilization, organization or morally ordered institutionalization for the mutual understanding of identification. The transformation of state identity is to reproduce the domination of cultural arbitrariness in the objective world. In this respect, it is unconsciously practised by the agents because the agents have a certain amount of cultural capital that interprets identity in relation to the structured domination. Thus, the agents cannot define themselves without a given interpretation of cultural capital. The state, as the political identity, is the centre of symbolic capital, which generates the socialization and materialization of cultural capital that the agents embody in a given domination, or, more precisely, a representation of domination in social life. At this point, the concept of the 'developing state' is a relevant point to indicate how cultural capital and its arbitrariness unconsciously dominate the definition of state identity in the objective world. Differentiation regarding the allocation of cultural capital in a dominant

social order leads to the differentiation of identity, which reproduces political institutionalization. The domination of arbitrary cultural capital produces a distinction to influence the definition of identity (Bourdieu, 1993c). There is a substantial correlation between the existence of cultural capital's articulated distinction, which constitutes identities, and the formation of unconscious representation within a structuring structure which is preceded by a structured domination in habitus. In this respect, cultural capital imposes that a certain kind of political organization is more advanced than any other because it has appropriate capital allocation in order to achieve a distinction in social habitus that reorganizes domination. Due to the accumulation of cultural capital, the capitalist mode of the state produces a distinction in the objective world and, similar to the individuals and their classes, it categorizes states, as their political institutionalization, according to their allocation of given cultural capital. All of the individuals and classes have a relational positioning which defines their identities according to a distinctive form of domination. In this way, the states do not problematize the classification named 'developing state' because they unconsciously accept their positioning and social function in a greater social system called international relations.

Secondly, state identity is reproduced by way of the dominative force of cultural capital rather than a cooperative understanding of self-identity. To claim that political identity differentiates because of different historical contexts and institutionalization simultaneously discredits the correlation between the reproduction of political identity and cooperation on the basis of the moral purpose of political identification. The production of political identity is always materialized by a misrepresentation or misrecognition of history, which pretends to organize the same moral purpose for the objectification of identities (Lovell, 2007). In other words, competition for domination creates conditions for the misrecognition of political identity, and this maintains the socialization of morality for everyone. The struggles on identity fundamentally result from the dominants of the order, which have the social position to shape cultural capital. Because of misrecognition, the dominated individuals or classes define their identity relationally. In this way, individuals perceive that the misrepresentation produced by power relations/domination or the arbitrariness of social order is a naturally achieved phenomenon of their ideas regarding the constructed world. When all of the individuals misrecognize their identities and define them by way of necessities for cooperative morality (Shannon & Kowert, 2012), they unconsciously produce two important results. In the first place, they reproduce the domination of their identities and the legitimization of domination. Then, they also produce structures again.

The state, as the most developed form of political identity, is the practising field of this misrecognized construction. Different forms of social totalization on identity are represented as the common values of all social classes, but they have actually originated from the continual struggles of cultural capital between the different factions of dominants. Differentiation in political identity historically never changes the social order of domination. Athenian political identity created a structure based on the dominated and the dominant. The dominated parts of society defined themselves in relation to the given order, and they accepted their pre-reflective positional rationality in Athenian democracy. Medieval political identity was grounded on the holistic values as the centre of political identity (Reus-Smit, 1999), but this also did not change the social order supported by dominated–dominant relations. Similar to the other historical variables, states' national identities are also built upon dominated and dominant relations. Although political identity changes in the field according to historical variables, the social positioning and arbitrariness of the social order continue in different forms. In accordance with Bourdieusian sociology, it is plausible to say that the political identity of the state is historically shaped and changed by the interrelations and competition of dominant social classes because political identity cannot be produced without the reproduction of cultural capital in individuals' habitus. Cultural capital is just one sort of capital that social and political dominants have to accumulate, but it is strategically important in defining the characteristics of the political interpretations of identities. Cultural capital, as a functional part of individuals' symbolic capital, unconsciously imposes the recognition and legitimacy of domination on political identity (Bourdieu, 2000). This creates historical variables such as the holistic values of medieval political identity or the national sentiment of modern state identity, which constitute political identity according to the arbitrariness of domination.

Contrary to the constructivist agenda, institutionalization does not theoretically differentiate from one historical political identification to another. Historically, for all of the different kinds of political identities, from early historical forms to the nation state form of modernity, institutionalization depends on a degree of arbitration, a set of misrecognized beliefs regarding the moral purpose of a certain identity, a degree of sovereign self and law-like verbal or contractual construction in practice. Thus, it is not easy to define how the identification of political identity has been changing from one historical stage to another, because, despite the differences in practical implementation, the fundamental frame of totalization and a certain institutionalization is historically based on the similar theoretical orientation. When one focuses on the dominant–dominant relations instead of dominant–

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dominated relations, it can be seen that the fundamental differentiation of political identification rests upon cultural capital. The main struggle arises from a contestation of different dominant groups on cultural capital (Emirbayer & Williams, 2005). In this way, the differentiation of political identities originates from a relational change in the representation of the historical variables which continuously reproduce the political identities in everyday life. The historical variable is the power which structuralizes the misrepresentation of the constructed understanding of political identity. It prevents the dominated groups having any other independent representation of identity. The historical variables also define the scope of moral evaluation which organizes the characteristics of sovereign political identity. In other words, the individuals do not have any conscious ideational and moral evaluation on the scope of the state's political identity, but morality is linked to created historical variables which are reproduced by the struggles of different dominant groups on the representation of historical variables. When the allocation of cultural capital differentiates between the dominated groups of society, it improves or impairs historical variables; this changes all of the institutional, territorial and structural organization styles of political authority. In order to understand the representation of political capital in relation to political spatiality such as the state, one should reveal how cultural capital is distributed in accordance with political, social and economic capital in the objective world. In this framework, while historical variables impose a moral quasi-equality for all members of the same political identity, they also structuralize arbitrary inequalities. This process is related to the Bourdieusian concept of 'classification struggles', which puts pressure on the political identities of individuals (Goldberg, 2008). The phenomenon of classification struggles is the definitive power of social and political division and identification 'to make and unmake groups' (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 221). Therefore, the construction of political identity not only forms representation but also produces the divided groups in the objective world. This function of classification struggles shows that there is no group independent of political identity, because a constructed identity always precedes the construction and division of groups and the individuals have a social position according to this pre-given identification. The modern political identity of the nation state is produced and reproduced by this power. The nationalization of political identity and the territorialization of the modern state are the bases of dominant power relations with regards to the representation of historical variables. Nationality became the historical variable of modernity as a consequence of the classification struggle between the dominant factors of societies. The changes in the combination of political, social and economic capital between dominant social

factors created a new cultural capital based on the notion of nation, consisting of a new habitual representation regarding the interpretation of the social world.

The other important peculiarity of identity is that cultural identity is based on hierarchical distribution rather than equitable apportionment. Ideas and objective fundamental institutions are important functions to interpenetrate the whole society in the objective world, but identities cannot produce any independent structure owing to the habitual limitations of classification struggles. Ideas are main factors in objectifying the moral sense or historical variable of cultural capital. In this aspect, the dominated individuals of the same political identity do not have any determinative power on cultural capital because a degree of classification empowered by domination always precedes the formation of political identities. This point leads to a very important peculiarity that the structural and constructivist agenda does not generally underline: to have power over cultural capital means that one also has the function of reproduction. The dominant power reproduces its arbitrariness by way of cultural capital. The power of reproduction is essential for the legitimization of political order because it enhances the construction of social and political hierarchies for the continuation of dominated classification struggles. In this respect, the power of reproduction is a fundamental root of objectified political identity due to the fact that it changes not only identities but also defines the combination of different forms of capital in dominant social groups. Changes in the composition of capital allocation are as important as the amount of capital for dominants (Sayer, 2005). The most functional peculiarity of reproduction is to obscure the objective function of identity, which distributes relational roles and capital both unequally and hierarchically. That is why cultural capital not only produces interpretations of the political self but also constitutes the basic forms of political divisions. It means that cultural capital is the basis of both the production of perception, such as nationality, and form, such as territorial state, simultaneously. Any other capital forms, such as political, economic or social, do not produce and obscure the hierarchical structures of political identities without having the reproduction power of cultural capital. As a result, when one considers the political identity of the state, one should observe the hierarchy problems of a particular structure rather than cooperation problems, because the institutionalization of a more civilized political identity requires the reorganization of hierarchy, which reinterprets sovereignty in order to achieve cooperation problems in practice. Thus, nationalism, as a historical variable of modern relational domination, ultimately becomes an arbitrary and conscious means for domination, a moral purpose and an unconscious principle for the dominated identities in relation to each other.

In particular, on this point, some Anglo-Saxon sociological research underestimates or misreads the Bourdieusian understanding of reproduction. They evaluate that the Bourdieusian understanding of reproduction is deterministic and stable rather than dynamic and changeable. They focus on the identities of dominated factors in relation to the domination, but they miss out the internal categorization struggles of domination (Guillory, 2000). On the contrary, changes are the inevitable results of the Bourdieusian reproduction of identity, but these changes do not affect the stable foundation of two interrelated functions: domination and cultural capital. When the struggles of domination on the allocation of capital opt for a new schema of classification by means of cultural capital, the other sub-identities of the same political constitution firstly internalize a new classification in their habitus; they then externalize them by way of objective actions. From the spiritual doctrines of the medieval political organization or state to modern national states, it is clearly seen that many fundamental institutional changes occurred because historical variables were considerably reproduced. However, these institutional changes have never removed the construction of domination on the basis of a new classification in modern political states. Similarly to the others, the modern state identity is based on a certain categorization, inclusion/exclusion and domination, which are continuously being reproduced in the field of political, social and economic capital by cultural capital.[27] Changes of political identity firstly transform the relational hierarchy and the distribution of power within the dominant social classes, from intellectuals to political and economic arbitrary powers; these changes then produce a new social positioning in the reproduced political domination. Following this, cultural capital imposes a sub-structural interpretation of reproduced domination that is gradually embodied by the habitus of individuals. Afterwards, the dominated social classes define their positional identities according to the unconscious arbitrariness of domination.

Interestingly, the political positioning of intellectuals from medieval political identity to modern national identity is an objective illustration to justify the processes of inclusion/exclusion, change, continuation and reproduction of political identity. For instance, the relational positioning and division of intellectuals transformed between the medieval and the national state. Their roles in the division of power, the combination of capital and the relational definition of identity changed according to nationalism as the new historical variable. Further, their power of arbitrariness regarding the domination of individuals' habitus

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[27] This instrumentalization of cultural capital is called the power of *sociodicy* by Bourdieu (2003b).

differentiated into 'a superior degree of universalization' (Bourdieu, 1998b, pp. 23–24). For instance, the clerical intellectual's role in the field of cultural capital was more prominent than nationalist intellectuals of the French Revolution. All in all, their political functions had transformed into new roles or fields of practice; that is why their positioning gained new meaning according to the new allocation of arbitrariness and the domination of a nationalist relational division. This means that the field of the new historical variable produced a new functional harmonization obscuring the unequal distribution of political identities in the field of the dominant social classes. The functional theme of categorization is produced by the internal struggles of the dominant social power; the sub-identities of the dominated individuals and classes are then reproduced by this functional frame. The functional roles of the peripheral dominated individuals regarding the reproduction of identities are imposed by the new domination because of the misrecognition of the objective world. The dominated social classes will always be in a struggle to change the division or construction of political identities, but they do not produce anything without engaging the given cultural capital which has already been imposed by the apparatus of symbolic capital.[28] However, the dominants of political identity reorganize themselves according to the changing condition of the objective world. They produce the positioning and power of domination by way of the inclusion/exclusion of different social groups into the field of domination. In this way, the peripheral dominated identities do not have any significant effect on the production of their political identities, but their struggles in the objective world create a conditionality for the dominants to reinterpret cultural capital and to reproduce political identities respectively. In short, change is fundamental peculiarity of the Bourdieusian reproduction of identities, but it depends on a certain conditionality of the dominated classes and the struggles for capital allocation in the dominants' social classes. Changes can only be reproduced by way of engagement with a certain process of domination. Struggles for the division of dominants and the inclusionary/exclusionary influences of sub-identities create a conditionality for reproduction. The arbitrariness of dominants organizes reinterpretations of cultural capital and imposes them. In this way, political identity organizes changes on the basis of new historical variables. Thus, when the distribution of accumulated capital differs in the field of domination, the whole political institutionalization and its identity are reproduced in accordance with the inclusion/exclusion process.

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[28] Although symbolic capital is mostly interconnected to cultural capital, they are not the same facts according to Bourdieu. For further information, see Bourdieu (2004).

To sum up, in line with the Bourdieusian reflection of cultural capital, it is plausible to emphasize that the construction of political identity is set between structural reproduction and social construction. It fundamentally reforms the ontology of structuralism and social construction. The nature of individuals is linked to cultural capital imposed by domination. It means that the nature of agents is not ontologically determinable but depends on the reproduction of domination in the social structures of different capital, organized and imposed by cultural capital. In the same way, the construction of institutions does not rest on any moral belief of political good because morality is mostly reproduced by social settings (Ignatow, 2009). Morality constitutes the arbitrariness of domination. That is why changes in the moral belief of political good mean a reproduced functionality of domination or, more precisely, a redistributed functional differentiation of capital allocation. Furthermore, state identity is not primarily formed by the shared norms of socially constitutional structures. The construction of identity precedes the construction of social institutions. The power of cultural capital also means the power of reproduction, which produces and imposes a framework of political identities in the field of habitus. The main struggle of identity production is to produce a sovereign space (Ruggie, 1993), because domination can only survive at the border of a sovereign field. When the allocation of capital changes within the dominant social space, it requires a new sovereign space which is defined by cultural capital. In this respect, cultural capital is the functional tool of domination in order to reproduce sovereignty. Cultural capital always creates a historical variable in order to define the moral and normative borders of identities. That is why sovereignty is not only the fundamental institutionalization of the modern state. Rather, sovereignty is a peculiarity of all kinds of historical political institutionalization. In line with changed political identity, sovereignty was reproduced in the modern state system because the historical variables of political identity had continuously been reinterpreted from Westphalia to the nationalist definition of the French Revolution according to differentiation within the allocation of capital. In accordance with this, international institutionalization does not precede state identity (Katzenstein, 1996), but cultural capital firstly imposes a new inclusion/exclusion of identity which achieves social institutionalization by way of a historical variable. In other words, institutionalization in the subjective field of identities always precedes objective institutionalization because the individuals should be fully conscious about the legitimacy of identity in order to be in accordance with institutions. Further, the dominated individuals do not have any generative effect on the power of cultural capital and that is why they are continuously exposed to the symbolic violence of domination. A certain identity has to precede the institutionalization in

order to achieve legitimacy in the objective world. At this point, this paper will research how cultural capital forms a new political identity and legitimizes misrecognition in terms of the new symbolic violence in the following sections.

Cultural capital and changes in identities

In literature, Bourdieusian understanding of cultural capital has been restrictedly evaluated that cultural capital intermediates to maintain the reproduction of identities and its institutional and social determinism (Dillon, 2010). These approaches render Bourdieusian cultural capital an ideological apparatus of domination and elitist identities. This impairs the theoretical distinction in the Bourdieusian approach of cultural capital from the classical understanding of structural and Marxist theories. However, from a holistic point of view, cultural capital also generates potential revolutionist dichotomies to promote transformation in political identities and institutions. Bourdieu emphasizes that cultural capital transfers the values and interests of domination, but it also facilitates potential ways to oppose the symbolic domination of dominant identities (Bourdieu, 1990b). Of course, the reproduction of political institutionalization produces more predictable and expectable results than the transformation of political identities, because cultural capital was originally the symbolic know-how of domination in order to secure the economic and political capital of domination. As all structured institutionalizations of cultural capital are subject to the practices of structuring structure in the political field, the agents or societies of political identities also take advantage of the given know-how to deal with their positional distribution of political identities. Nationalization is one of the most dramatic and striking processes to prove this Bourdieusian functionality of cultural capital in international relations. The dominant identities of the international field originally took advantage of the symbolic capital of nationalism in order to stabilize their economic capital and interests in territories under the rule of the traditional political identity of political organizations. The structuring functionalization of nationalism resulted in self-reflexive questioning on political membership and solidarity in traditional political identities. The old positioning of solidarity and recognition was transformed into new national sentiment via the structuring contradictions of dominant cultural capital. In a nutshell, embedded cultural capital proceeded to transform the political identities of states, which also transformed and deteriorated the embedded economic capital and interests of domination within these new nationally positioned state political identities.

From a Bourdieusian perspective, changes in the identity of political subjects originated from struggle and dominance of symbolic power and its cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). The objective existence of objective economic capital only defines positions in the objective world, but the power of cultural capital forms the meaningful naming of distinction and its institutionalizing nobility in the field because cultural capital contains the appropriate tools for creating vision and division in accordance with the structured disposition of domination. In this respect, the identity of the political subject – the state – is determined by a distinction which is empowered by the symbolic expansion of cultural capital (Appelrouth & Edles, 2008). In the international field of practice, this distinction transforms into a meaningful understanding of state identity described by its associational tendencies, security visions, political values and interests, because these describe the positions of states. This identity of distinction also characterizes the peculiarities of power relations between the dominant and dominated members of the political identities of the states in international relations. The states dominating structured cultural capital in the international field not only struggle to maintain their prominent roles in determining the symbolic disposition of states, but also influence the differentiation of political identities in order to take the potential differentiation of division under control in accordance with its reproduction practices. The changes in the political identities of the subject or state come into reality when the dominant principle of political differentiation does not succeed in imposing its vision of division in the international field. Here it is theoretically beneficial to remember the Congress of Vienna to emphasize this functionalization of cultural capital on the reproduction of change in the political identities of states. The Congress was a prominent historical objectification to illuminate the imposition of values regarding vision and division in the international field. In the Congress, the dominant political identities tried to defend the structured position of symbolic values, which were based on a traditional vision and division beyond nationalism. However, as Bourdieu discussed, the identities of political identities can only produce meaningful positions in an interrelational context (Swartz, 1997). In the same way, the relational production of the structuring world produced contradictions at the Congress of Vienna, which resulted in rivalry between the subjective values of nationalism and socialism in transforming the political identities of states. In the Congress, the symbolic power of cultural capital became the battlefield for power struggles aiming to conserve the traditional division of identities in the field. In this way, the essential point of the Congress was to secure the symbolic domination of identity division rather than economic or any other objective capital and its profits. In this respect, nationalism, for example, did not fundamentally focus

on a redistribution of economic capital, but imposed a new style of political membership which was opposed to the dominant vision of division. In a nutshell, the Congress of Vienna did not secure the structured dominant values of division because structuring structure forms a new political membership in terms of nationalism, which transformed states' relative positions in relation to domination in the international field.

Forms of cultural capital and international field

At this point, to get the main contributive points of Bourdieusian cultural capital in international relations, it will be theoretically appropriate to focus on the embodied, objectified and institutionalized forms of cultural capital respectively. In a Bourdieusian evaluation, objectified capital refers to dispositions in relation to all bodily presentations and behaviours of subjects which conduct a genuine dispositional existence of mind–body products without a proper conscious stance (Bourdieu, 1984). Owing to the fact that embodied capital derives from very rooted unconscious traces of structured structures in bodies of subjects, it is not easily altered by subjects, in contrast with objective economic capital and values. As has been previously discussed, I presuppose that all kind of political subjects, from primitive political organizations and clans to the modern state, assemble a similar functionality with individuals in a society as the totalized social identities of a wider practical field. Therefore, all political subjects relatively position their identities under the existence of a certain domination and stratification (Bourdieu, 2012). In this respect, states inevitably have certain embodied capital which constitutes their unconscious dispositions for their perceptions regarding their own identities and positional identity classification for the perception of other states in the international field. Embodied capital most particularly manifests itself in the positional distribution of state political identities. The state, as a social and political subject, naturally depends on a field for practising its own capital advancement. This territorial distribution of state identity naturally conducts certain habitus and its practices (Swartz, 2013). Having a territorially recognized space in the East, the West, the Middle East or Central Asia is linked to different structured dispositions which are free from the rational thinking processes of states. State identities in these different localities instantaneously embody peculiar expressions and behaviours which are linked to the penetration of structured structures into state identity. As states are unconscious regarding the natural existence of their localities in their identities, they cannot instantaneously change the embodied guidelines of their identities. This natural existence of embodied capital is also derived from the use of language (Lin, 2008) when states interact with other states. The socialization of a state within

a determined territory over a long historical period contributes to a characteristic use of language, which makes state behaviours predictable in certain relations of international law because the use of language creates a normative internal rationale of behaviours in accumulated history. The use of language always bears the traces of the structured embodied manner codes of the state. The tones of language show states' embodied capital and their bordered positions in the international field. The use of language reveals the guided tones of states in the application of certain concepts, such as democracy or human rights. The usage of these concepts in relative relations characterizes states' embodiment of structures.

Objectified cultural capital is another important form in cultural capital and state identity relations. The identification of objectified cultural capital is easier than the definition of embodied capital because it basically originates from international law in the practical field. International law fundamentally characterizes the objectified forms of cultural exchange for state identity in international relations. The capacity of states regarding the utilization of international law points out their accumulated international capital in state identity. International law mainly presents itself as an accumulated form of history, manifesting the materialization of former experience, relations, dispositions and theories, which pretends to connote autonomous form beyond state consciousness. In other words, although international law, as objectified cultural capital, is seen as an independent form of relations, it represents the dispositions of past nobility and distinction on the appropriation of cultural capital. Of course, in contradiction with embodied capital, it is possible to improve relative advancement in collecting a better accumulation of objectified cultural capital in exchange for obtaining social and economic capital (Jackson, 2010). However, if states do not have proper dispositions concerning international law, they can only position their identities, which does not achieve the accumulation of objective capital in the identities of states. A state identity lacking the concept of human rights can internally have a recognized function in a human rights mission of the United Nations, but there is no connection between this state position and the accumulation of objective capital because the embodied capital of this state lacks appropriate language and the symbolic foundation of the concept of human rights in the historically embedded cultural capital of its state identity. In this respect, owned social, political and economic capital can provide better opportunities to consume the objectified cultural capital of international law, but it does not increase in the accumulation of objectified cultural capital if states do not have proper language concerning objectified cultural capital. For example, in order to obtain non-permanent membership status in the United Nations Security Council, a state can take a position using its relative political and economic capacity

in the process of elections. However, structured nobility and the distinction of international law, as objectified cultural capital, historically and conceptually promotes security in the name of a structured domination. The definition or redefinition of security in the international field is given to a certain domination under the representation of permanent membership status of the UN Security Council by international law. Therefore, the positional involvement of states in security does not transfer the values of cultural capital, which facilitates states' relative capacity to get involved in the definition of security in the name of all other states in the international field.

Because of the stratified structures of state identity in the international field, objectified cultural capital cannot be distributed equally. Bourdieu emphasizes this via distinguishing the 'legitimate culture of class societies' and the 'culture of little-differentiated and undifferentiated societies' (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 228). Objectified culture could only produce the value of capital for all the members of the field, and the accumulation of objectified capital could be relatively equal among the states if all of the states in the international field were involved in historical actions for creating the products of objectified capital. In this respect, an objectified form of culture in the international field indicates a value of capital for certain dominant state identities, and points out the legitimization of domination for the other states in international relations. This means that objectified capital only functions as capital for certain state identities, but it also refers to the legitimization of domination for the other states. The values of objectified cultural capital are also not distributed equally. Therefore, dominated state identities lack the means to take advantage of objectified capital appropriately. International law, as objectified cultural capital, is a product of the historical acts and practices of structured dominations and its political subjectivity. It embodies the material and symbolic considerations of dominant identities. In line with the values of international law, the state reflects a more functionalized and bureaucratized form regarding historically rooted demand and the symbolic creation of domination (Swartz, 2013). Furthermore, international law not only bears the traces of the historical value heritage of domination, but also imposes a bordered space for other identities because the lack of values restricts the ways of obtaining embodied capital. State identities, being deprived of the proper embodiment of structured cultural capital, are also devoid of the legitimatization and recognition means of state identities. To obtain legitimacy and recognition in the international field, international law determines the proper ways for every state, but these functions of international law serve only as objectified cultural capital for some dominant states' identities in accordance with their historically structured cultural capital. The components of

international law are mostly and fundamentally tailored by the historical experiences of certain states or their political subjectivities. These structured experiences become the blueprints for recognition of the equal political subjectivities of all states in the same international field. Therefore, international law functionalizes domination and its distribution of stratification via creating differences between the ownership of objectified cultural capital and the participants of structured cultural capital in the international field.

International law always manifests itself by way of determined principles of structured structures (Arend, 1999). States construct their relative relations according to the produced meanings of international law. In other words, state identity consumes the standardized meanings of the structured world of international field (Kratochwil, 2011). States take advantage of the principles of international relations, which actually guarantee the objectified cultural capital of dominant state identities. For instance, in order to accept an engagement of states as international agreement, this agreement has to accord with principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. Otherwise, even if the sides are comfortable with the conditions of agreement, it is not recognizable in the structured cultural capital of the field. This rule is a basic necessity of having recognition in the international field. However, originally, the principle derived from the characteristics of European historical experiences of political subjectivity. In this respect, this principle of international law functions as objectified cultural capital for certain European states. At the same time, the other states, having less-advantageous positions in the international field, have to use the same objectified cultural capital for recognition despite the fact that they lack this objectified capital. As is exemplified, the cultural capital of dominant state identities in the international field objectifies itself into other state practices because other states have to comply with the created principles of others for recognition. Consequently, objectified cultural capital forms meanings of recognition on behalf of domination, and distinguishes international stratification beyond the conscious sovereign will of states.

Furthermore, Bourdieu defines another important form of cultural capital, named as institutionalized cultural capital, which is derived mostly from the relative practices of subjects in the field. The institutionalized form of cultural capital fundamentally concentrates on institutional recognitions of practices (Bennett, Savage, Bortolaia, Silva Warde, Gayo-Cal, & Wright, 2009). It is a practical implementation of objectified capital in the field of institutional engagements which guarantees social positions (Bourdieu, 1993a). In line with our study on the political identification of states, I assume that all kinds of institutional relations and practices of the international field become involved in the institutional capital of

political subjects. It is important to understand how the identity of a certain state can affect the applicable values of the institutionalization processes in comparison with other states in the international field. In this respect, all regimes, agreements and institutional cooperations of states produce and reproduce institutional capital in international relations. The institutionalized cultural capital of state identity determines the exclusion or inclusion of state positions into a certain institutional field of international relations. In line with Bourdieu, institutions in international relations represent a particular embodied value system which forms political closure for the identification of state identities and positions. By bestowing a privilege regarding the institutional membership of states, institutional cultural capital distinguishes the value of a certain state identity from all other state identities. Each institution in international relations requires a certain degree of value systems for membership. Institutionalization in international relations contributes to the domination of power relations by distributing institutional capital between states. In this way, institutionalization in international relations enables states in dominant positions in the international field to determine the membership of institutions because they have the key institutional advancement in institutional capital. However, the other states in dominated positions in international relations have to prove their qualifications regarding the required institutional capital of certain institutions. This differentiation between dominant and dominated positions in institutionalized capital can be seen in the fundamental institutionalization of the European Union. The basic mentality of the union is to affiliate the states which have institutionalized cultural capital. Afterwards, in order to be a part of the same institutionalization, the other states are expected to show a considerable amount of qualification on many different institutional and practical areas.

According to Bourdieu, institutionalized cultural capital also opens up an opportunity to distinguish subjects by way of comparing their qualifications (Bourdieu, 1986). In this way, states' objectified and embodied cultural capital is involved in distinguishing the process of state positions in relation to other states. Institutionalized cultural capital indicates the ownership of appropriate dispositions and qualifications, which is recognized in the institutional practices of states (Swartz, 2013). All institutional practices among states are based on structured principles. In order to be a part of the UN system, states necessarily need to obey standards and requirements for the recognition of their positions and identities. However, by obtaining recognized identity in the UN system, a state also conforms to a standard understanding of the international security agenda, a bounded space for certain fields within the UN institutional field, such as the permanent membership status of certain states in

the Security Council. In this respect, because of the institutional practices of the international field, states obey a distinction of domination in order to obtain stable recognition. The distinction is derived from the state owners of institutionalized cultural capital, who have all the required principles of institutionalized capital, and contender states, who struggle to show their appropriateness for obtaining institutionalized cultural capital. Consequently, because ownership of institutionalized cultural capital guarantees the dominant positions of states in institutional relations, these states can have also the flexibility to oversee or violate principles of institutional cultural capital. Looking at the institutional example of the UN, it can be seen that domination institutionalizes itself by way of the retention of violence. In UN practices, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq without the institutional involvement of the UN Security Council prove that ownership of institutionalized cultural capital also distinguishes itself from other dominated states via the ownership of the violation right in institutional practices.

Domination of legitimacy and symbolic capital in the contemporary democratizing international field

Cultural capital embodies the potential to change state identity by way of changing the dispositions regarding structured categorizations in the international field (Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). If the struggles of states regarding cultural capital change the positions of domination, this can result in a new vision of division for the interpretations of states' identity. In such a case, the political identities of states are to be reinterpreted in accordance with the new categorization of divisionary symbolic dispositions (Lane, 2006). In this aspect, symbolic struggles in international relations are fundamentally political struggles, targeting the reproduction and transformation of vision and division which change the structured dispositions of state identities. At the end of struggles, if the categories of vision and division are substituted by new divisionary dispositions, this can create a total transformation of political subjects. On the other hand, all struggles of the international field do not substitute the structured dispositions of vision and division. In many cases, the political identities of states can only reproduce the practices of embedded domination in international relations. In this respect, both the French Revolution and the Russian Revolution should be seen as struggles for vision and division. They both tried to dissociate the structured dispositions of domination regarding the vision of division. However, only the French Revolution accomplished a new nation-based division in accordance with the national association of the political identity of states. By contrast, the Russian Revolution ended up

with the reproduction of structured domination because the Russian Revolution could not relatively achieve the cultural capital to impose a new identity of state political subjectivity in line with its class-based vision of division. As a result, a transformation in the political identity of states leads to success when struggling state identities achieve an appropriate amount of cultural capital in comparison with structured domination.

In order to maintain domination in the international field, dominant states continually have to rule the production processes of cultural capital, because domination has to reproduce the identities of states. Therefore, domination controls cultural capital in order to have legitimate naming in the dispositions of dominated states (Bourdieu, 1989). However, struggles in the legitimate naming of identities result in further constraints on the positions of dominated state identities. In order to reproduce further constrains, domination of the international field increases the intensity of symbolic violence (Springer, 2011) to which dominated states are exposed. As the intensity of symbolic violence enhances, the international field frequently overcomes crises because the existing dispositions of states do not quickly fill new positions in the international field. The contemporary globalization process and its neoliberal functions cause such frequent crises in the international field because they intensify the existing symbolic violence of domination on the dominated identities of states. In this respect, neoliberalism not only functions as a reproduction of structured domination but also intensifies the power of the existing symbolic violence in the international field. The neoliberal functionalization of domination imposes new symbolic closure by way of the neoliberal democratization processes beyond its economic practices in the practical field. Although domination can be seen as successful in reproducing itself, its symbolic violence of legitimate meaning abandons dominated states' identities because the dispositions of states cannot immediately satisfy the dispositional requirements of the new symbolic violence. Contemporary examples prove that the democratization process of dominated states as symbolic violence transforms into the de-functionalization of conventional state identities. Neoliberal democratization destroys the social collectiveness of existing dominated states and creates a nihilism for social collectiveness which can be substituted even by terrorism. In this way, although states which are dominant over cultural capital and its symbolic violence do not intend to do so, they unintentionally abolish the conventional dominated identities of states, which are vital for the continuation of structured domination. This inevitably leads to a struggle for legitimate naming by creating a new political collectiveness beyond the classical dominant and dominated sovereign state structures in the international field.

Eventually, in order to reproduce the states' existing identity stratification, cultural capital should be compatible with practices in the international field. Otherwise, a potential transformation in the political subjectivity of states becomes inevitable. In this respect, as discussed above, the symbolic violence of contemporary practices weakens this compatibility. Theoretically, these transformations depend on very different variables, affecting the political association styles of state identity. Basically, this may be a redistribution of the stratification between dominants in the international field. In other words, transformation may depend on internal de-functionalization and the struggle of domination when the existing distribution does not refer to subjective dispositions and the objective practices of agents (Scott, 1996). Some – dominant – identities of the international field may try to position their identities in accordance with other dominants via a new political collectivity of identities. Despite the homology in domination on the basis of subjective capital and field compatibility, some members of dominant political identities can enhance cultural capital in comparison with others and, therefore, they can try to position themselves in accordance with other structured dominants in a new social stratification. In fact, neoliberal globalization has been creating a new political homology in the new styles of dominant association or classes in different dominant states which try to transform modern state identity and collectivity in accordance with their contemporary advancement in cultural capital and its legitimate meanings. In other words, new groups of dominants, influencing the governmental function of dominant state identity and bearing resemblances of differentiation, are trying to abandon the structured domination of national collectivity for the benefit of their new legitimacy. The political association in this new superior form of former domination desires a more fluid and transitive international field for their legitimate meanings beyond the borders of state identity (Tittenbrun, 2013). In addition, the transformation via struggles among the dominants may be derived from struggles between dominant and dominated states. Relative improvements of dominated states in economic or social capital may change the dominant exchange rate of different capital. For instance, the accumulation of a considerable amount of economic capital may increase social capital or weaken the affectivity of cultural capital in the international field. This is seen in practice in the Chinese position in the cultural capital of domination. Despite the categorization of Chinese political identity, China improves its neoliberal capitalist engagements with other states for the benefit of economic capital. The Chinese approach fundamentally impairs the structured dispositions of cultural capital in international relations. The Chinese separation of economic capital and ideological identity renders the objective cultural capital of domination obsolete. In other words, the cultural capital of

domination in the international field loses its essence because the Chinese do not actively invest their capital to struggle for dominant cultural capital. This makes many principles of objectified cultural capital and many institutions of the international field meaningless.

Democratization as symbolic violence in the international field

My aim here is to understand the extent of the democratization process of state identities in the international field. As theoretically framed above, there is a considerable adaptation between the democratization processes of developing states and the reproduction of domination in line with the supremacy of cultural capital. The functionalization of democratization in international relations creates distinctive dispositions in different state identities because democratization maintains the justificatory elements of structured domination in a field (Forst, 2015) where the gaps between stratified political subjects – states – are tremendous. In such an international field, the instrumentality of democratization differs in accordance with the positions of states. Because of the structured superiority on legitimate meanings, democratization functions as cultural capital for states' positioning in the domination of the international field. On the other hand, because of the inability of conscious disposition producing processes regarding structured cultural capital, the democratization process leads to further symbolic violence of dominated state identities. Indeed, to think that the democratization process distributes identities of states equally and enables access to cultural capital for every state corroborates states' misrecognized dispositions with regards to their positions. In a nutshell, democratization as the cultural capital of neoliberal domination creates a legitimate culture which guarantees a certain legitimate domination in international relations.

Liberal democracy is a qualification for a state to have a dominant position in international relations. This is actually derived from a distinction mechanism of cultural capital to illustrate what counts as a state's legitimate identity (Wacquant, 2005). In this respect, democratization, as the cultural capital of domination, becomes legitimate violence or symbolic violence for dominated states in international relations. In accordance with the position of dominant states in the international field, democracy characterizes the embodied capital of dominant state identities (Nye, 2013). Dominant states transform this embodied capital into an objectified form via a functionalization of international law in the area of democratic values in neoliberal theorization. In the end, the objectified forms of the democratization processes are imposed into the identities of dominated states via instruments of institutionalized capital, such as the World Bank and the IMF, which institutionalize

domination in terms of symbolic violence and democratization engagement. In this way, the neoliberal imagination of democratization actually overturns the social collectiveness of developing or dominated state identities because it destroys the dispositions regarding the solidarity of dominated states (Wacquant, 2004) without having relevant the cultural capital of democracy. The objective principles of political collectivity in any of the developing or dominated states are still quite primitive or uncertain. The collectivization principle of nationality is mostly fractional in these dominated state identities and, therefore, nationality as a vision of division becomes an operational tool to achieve relative recognition in the international field. In this respect, the democratization process discloses weaknesses regarding the principles of collectivization in developing state identities. In practice, nearly all of the practices of democratization in developing state identities failed in the contemporary history of international relations. More importantly, as is seen especially in many crises in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, democratization processes not only deepen the deficiencies of developing countries regarding the principle of political unification but also create new crises between the different principles of collectivity, such as ethnicity or religion, in dominated state identity.

Another core question here is to problematize whether states in dominant positions really support a successful neoliberal democratization process of developing or dominated state identities. Democracy as cultural capital gives a distinctive position in the international field which rewards dominant state identities with a distinctive role in the stratification of international relations. Democratization as symbolic violence maintains the distinction of structured domination in the legitimate understanding of democracy. In this way, the neoliberal engagement of democratization practices in the developing field of international relations creates a pursuance of a legitimate meaning of democracy. This legitimate meaning functionalizes symbolic violence, which vitalizes the demand for a distinctive position of domination (Samuel, 2013), because only dominant states in international relations have sufficient cultural capital to distribute the stratification of identities according to the democratization process in international relations. The symbolic violence of democratization also stabilizes misrecognition on the *sine qua non* position of domination in the distribution of state identities. In this way, the symbolic violence of neoliberal democratization process produces two important results for roles of domination in the international field. Firstly, it guarantees the functionality regarding the redistribution of stratification of state positions in the international field. Secondly, it monopolizes the further production of symbolic violence by stabilizing the structured distinction of democracy. Distinction emphasizes the capacities

of dominant states with regards to valuing the democratic functions of cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984). On the other hand, it is important for dominant state identities that all other identities of states should pursue the same values and standards for the improvement of their political identities. As the Bourdieusian vision emphasized, this is a standard necessity to be a part of the group identity. In order to define international relations as a political field, the international field is subjectively expected to consist of a group of state identities which share similar experiences, values and expectations. State identities, having similar experiences, compose the political field of international relations. Therefore, dominant states impose democratization to strengthen the group identity of the international field via emphasizing similar experiences in practice. In this way, dominant states contribute a popularization of democracy in the process of democratization because popularization creates a low culture of democracy imitations, thereby maintaining the supremacy of dominant states in the definition of the legitimate meaning of liberal democracy and democratization. In this way, the popularization of democracy reproduces symbolic violence in accordance with high culture and low culture differentiation of democratic values.

The popularization of democracy not only highlights the distinction in the ownership of cultural capital, but also implies differences regarding the functionalization of democracy in dominated and dominant state identities (Layoun, 1997). Due to a lack of cultural capital regarding democratic representation, dominated states function as consumers of structured democracy understanding. Dominant states occupy a relatively well-defined and durable position in accordance with the amount of owned capital (Swartz, 2013). The positions of dominated states in the international field are subjectively obliged to verify their positional competence and effect institutional improvements in democratic representation. In this respect, the dominant states of international field utilize democratic values for the integration of dominant identities on the basis of appropriate language regarding the abstractions of meanings and subjective tones of structured violence. On the other hand, dominated states in the same political field, as the consumers of structured democratic values, are mostly prone to fulfil the structural necessities connected to their recognition in a practical space. Therefore, they do not associate their political judgments to abstract meanings of any moral integration. Dominated state identities embody popularized meanings and principles of democracy in a particular historical space. In a nutshell, the necessity-driven perception of democracy imposes a disadvantaged state of international space onto simple consumers of the understanding of dominant democracy. The democratization process in this framework does not produce a distinctive way of expression and distinctive idiosyncratic democratic values

for dominated states. Their constant consumer positions of dominated states in the international field constrain them from being parts of the democracy debates which produce structured structures of the understanding of future democracy and its dispositions.

Bourdieu is also considerably relevant for the reinterpreting of the progressive process in nature of democratization. More precisely, Bourdieusian study in international relations creates discussions to understand whether contemporary democratization concept really is a process and progress in the international field. The implementation of contemporary democratization in the international field justifies the positions of dominant states in democracy debates because it creates an endless process of democratic transformation which does not result in any significant improvement for the democratic bases of dominated state identities. As discussed above, democracy is related to the necessities of recognition for dominated states. Therefore, dominated states collect the most practical principles of democracy in the democratization process of the international field. However, democracy is mostly a symbolic tool to maintain dominant states' control of cultural capital. Consequently, in order to maintain symbolic violence via a continuous democratization process, dominant states come up with different definitions of democracy at different stages of historical accumulation. In other words, domination in the international field changes the agency of social collectivity, which forms and organizes the appropriate use of values in the political identities of states (Wacquant, 2005). As revealed in the history of political accumulation, democracy is defined by different concepts of domination, such as protective democracy, liberal democracy and neoliberal democracy, in different historical social accumulations of domination, which attribute value to different social collectivities as the guarantor and operator of democratic presences in state identities. Protective democracy supports political collectivity on the basis of institutionalized governmental bodies. In this respect, they idealize the collectivity of nation on the basis of their practical understanding of democracy. This consent of national totality is substituted by liberal democracies because the social collectivity of liberal democracies is derived from civil societies within and beyond the borders. On the other hand, the neoliberal engagement of democracy distributes political collectivity on the basis of privatized cross-border associational institutionalization in similar groups. Neoliberalism destroys all kinds of conventional collectivity regarding the definition of former democracy representations. As a result of this historical evaluation, the continual evaluation of democratic orientation and collectiveness helps domination to maintain its distinctive loyalty in international field. Conversely, these continual changes of democratic orientation preclude the progressive optimism of democratization practices in dominated state

identities because the dispositional principles of democracy transform into new forms before disadvantaged or dominated states successfully embody the democratic principles of a certain democracy definition. Therefore, democratization not only imposes the embodiment of predetermined democracy meanings but also puts unequal embodiment of political collectivity formations into action (Wacquant, 2013).

The symbolic violence of democratization also legitimates the power of dominant states regarding judgments on the democratic identification of dominated states. The states which have the cultural capital of democracy judge the dominated states' identities. The dispositions of dominated states unconsciously promote the democratization process because of the judgments of domination regarding their positions in the international field. Becoming part of the democratization process actually results in the advertisement of democratic loyalty, which rules out dichotomies between the political identities of dominant and dominated state in the international field. These dichotomies actually depend on the conceptual theatrical bases which originated from different values in democracy and democratization.[29] Democracy is the value of liberalism which aims at guaranteeing fundamental rights between citizens within a territorially bounded political field. However, democratization is a product of neoliberalism, which targets the guarantee of relative gains and accumulation of individuals and groups beyond any territoriality and citizenry definition. Therefore, territorial differentiations are crucial to maintaining dominance over the structures. Eventually, democratization will function as the symbolic violence of otherness which produces relative and competitive loyalty in order to continually reproduce the symbolic violence of control.

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[29] For more information, see Parry & Moran (1994).

CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Background of the concept of social capital

Individuals, as fundamental social agents, single-handedly produce restricted material and intangible benefits/qualifications. They also try to obtain other kinds of capital allocation. At this point, social capital most basically defines all kind of achievements and qualifications of individuals produced by cooperative social exchanges, links and memberships. The background of social capital rests upon the thoughts of de Tocqueville regarding union-based society and associational life (de Tocqueville, 2003). Although it was firstly used at the beginning of the twentieth century in sociology literature, it became a strong concept in the second half of the twentieth century. In that period, it generally implied the importance of social exchange and cooperation. It is claimed that society needs well-constructed communication and exchange links to achieve self-development and trust among its members. In the early period, social capital originally referred to human capital because it tried to explain the value of cooperation, which could simultaneously enhance economic capacities (Jacobs, 1961; Schultz, 1961). Therefore, early studies suggest that social capital – or, more accurately, human capital – can construct a productive relationship and exchange networks which can enhance human productivity in other fields, such as economics and politics.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, the economy-centred human capital focus on social capital definitions was substituted by a more inclusive understanding of social capital which tried to include all intertwined relations of social capital (Bourdieu, 1995a; Coleman, 1988). The efficiency of social capital might depend on many different interrelations and exchanges, from economic to cultural capital. In this process, social capital became a considerably debated and referenced concept in sociology. The subsequent theoretical direction of the concept was interpreted by way of two categorizations. The first category generally argued that social capital is the sum of resources which help actors to construct the exchange networks and relations with other actors (Knoke, 1999; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Portes, 1998). This categorization was generally interested in the productivity of personal relations for individuals and their society. The second categorization was interested in collective relations, rather than individualistic relations and productions. It tried to understand relations within a wider, complex and intertwined objective world of exchanges (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 1995; Inglehart, 1997; Fukuyama, 1995). However, afterwards, some scholars tried to take advantage of two concepts interchangeably

and simultaneously when they interpreted their conceptual definitions (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998).

The developing concept of social capital has drawn the attention of scholars in different fields of social sciences to constitutive and cooperative functions of the concept in social exchange processes because it potentially enhances trust, collaboration and benefits in both individualistic and social exchanges of modern social structures (Rose, 2000). New studies have generally observed that economic and political capital may not be enough to reproduce and maximize gains and interests. It is seen that economic and political capital are reproduced in a wider complex relations web and, therefore, social agents – both individuals and groups – need to have some other requirements to have a corner in social relationship webs. Economic, political and even cultural capital is a fundamentally inseparable part of the exchange webs embedded in societies. The agents should be able to improve interaction, relation and recognition in their societies. Consequently, it is understood that the agents can productively produce benefits if they invest not only in economic and political capital but also in social relations, concerns and interests. In this respect, social capital explicitly creates a productive basis for individuals to produce their own benefits. At the same time, social capital implicitly establishes social cooperation, recognition, respect, trust and collective identity. In accordance with these interpretations, the concept finds meaning in very individualistic points of view that describe the individualistic gains of the agents (Burt, Cook, & Lin, 2001); and, therefore, a variety of societal points of view that imply the normative, socially collective and cooperative sides of the concept (Fukuyama, 1995).

In sociology, the research of Robert Putnam, James Coleman and Pierre Bourdieu has been instrumental in understanding the conceptual differences, interpretation, scope and effectiveness of social capital. These three scholars interpret the objectification of social capital differently in social world. Putnam strongly argues that products of social capital, such as cooperation, civic engagements, collective trust and associational life, are evidence that social capital is a very positive and productive necessity in social life (Putnam, 2000). On the other hand, Bourdieu clearly argues that the process of social capital is mostly based on unequal distribution, separation, social positioning and division. He basically claims that social capital is a resource which stands by powerful social agents to maintain their social positioning in comparison with less-powerful social agents in the same field (Bourdieu, 1986). Coleman takes a relatively neutral position between Putnam's positive representation of social capital and Bourdieusian inequality and social capital relations. According to Coleman, social capital is a neutral resource in social structures that organizes the

interactions, collectivity and social exchange processes of individuals (Coleman, 1990). In this aspect, the potential yields of social capital vary from inequality to the support of social collectiveness because the productivity of social capital depends on how individuals engage the processes of social capital.

Contrary to the social capital research of Coleman and Bourdieu in the educational field, Putnam fundamentally stressed civic engagements in the social networks. He argues that the active participation of social networks creates trust and reciprocity, which lead to social benefits and collectiveness (Field, 2008). Putnam thinks that social capital consists of two distinctive categories: bridging and bonding social capital. These forms serve different necessities of societies. Bridging social capital brings together different heterogeneous members or groups of society in order to produce common benefits. Bonding social capital creates strong unification and homogenous representation to maintain the solidarity of identity (Ibid.). However, he is likely to support bridging rather than bonding social capital because extreme solidarity causes the political alienation of individuals to their identity, but bridging social capital enhances social voluntariness with regard to the cooperation of individuals and the civic representation of identities. Contrary to Putnam, Coleman is not interested in the political functionality of social capital; he tries to combine sociology with economics in relation to social capital (Field, 2008). As implied, he mostly claims that social capital is a neutral resource. However, he also thinks that social capital can enhance the gains and aims of both powerful and disadvantaged social agents simultaneously. According to Coleman, social capital and objective structures are intertwined. More precisely, social capital forms some of the functions of social structures. Social agents establish their actions on the basis of these social structures. At this point, Coleman's and Bourdieu's understandings of social capital are based on a fundamental difference. According to Coleman, different kinds of social structures are supported by different kinds of social capital and, therefore, agents take advantage of relevant social capital when they produce relationships (Coleman, 1990). In other words, agents are fully conscious regarding their identities and interests because they have complete knowledge with regards to which structures are suitable for certain social capital. However, Bourdieu clearly argues that agents are not fully conscious with regards to their own actions. In short, Coleman constitutes his understanding of social capital on the basis of three elements: trust, obligations and norms (Lesser, 2000). In a certain structure, agents constitute trustful engagements, which result in forming recognized objective obligations. Afterwards, respective norms are created in order to maintain respect for obligations in structures.

In the chapter on social capital, this research fundamentally tried to focus on the applicability of the Bourdieusian social capital concept in the international field. It focused on the capacity of Bourdieusian social capital and reconsidered the re-construction of the political identities of agents in the international field. Therefore, the main focus of this part is to identify potential interrelations between the production of social capital in habitus and the objective construction of political identities of agents including individuals, groups, associations of groups and states. It is argued that social capital and the construction of political identities are intertwined and, as a result, social capital has certain functions in identity production processes. In this respect, the main theoretical engagement of the study is the constructivist theorization of identity. Constructivist stress on agents' consciousness and interpretation regarding their own ideas and identities is questioned in this part. While this research goes along with the constructivist stress on interpretations, it dissents with respect to the ignorance of structures and the overemphasis of individuals' interpretations in the process of identity construction in the international field. In accordance with Bourdieusian social capital, it is argued that interpretations are not conscious and they are subject to the historical production of structure or structural relations. Thus, interpretation is a secondary stage of identity construction after the imposition of structural dominations in habitus. As a result, this study explores the productivity of a 'structural constructivist' perspective to reconsider the issue. In this way, this chapter firstly engages the structural roots regarding mutual recognition and social capital. Secondly, it rethinks how social capital reproduces inequality and the division of identities in the international field. Afterwards, it discusses the roles of social capital regarding the hierarchical distribution of political identities. Lastly, the chapter tries to depict how social capital supports the reproduction of identities in a globalizing international field.

Social capital recognition and the division of identities beyond social constructivism
In a social field, the exchanges of social agents are explanatory to maintain the collective identity of social self. Social capital helps social agents to gain access to a certain sense of belonging. A sense of belonging exists exogenously and it is exclusive of the consciousness of social agents. Forms of exchanges are not formed by the procedures of actual structures which are not originally natural products of agents' conscious ideas and preferences. Rather, forms of exchanges are historically grounded experiences. Every externalized interpretation produces internal evaluations based on 'its own language' and 'the present and even the past state of its occupants', which lead to 'the unconscious unify of a class' (Bourdieu, 1984).

Hence, they are unnatural and unconscious interactions which define the rules of membership in advance. In this way, agents are not passive practitioners of a given habitus or their own conscious ideas, but rather they are subject to their internalized forms of unnatural historical beliefs. Conscious beliefs cannot affect the actualization of this habitus because they are represented as natural phenomena in order to be recognized members of social spaces. The whole process of social exchange is a more intrinsic construction and/or reconstruction because social agents want to embody collective identity which forms and reforms the rules of participation. In other words, social capital socializes the identities of agents via the agents' own internalized dominative symbolic productions.

Social agents as legitimate bodies consciously try to construct safer, legal and socially stable spaces for their presences (Shilling, 2012). In order to achieve this, social agents unconsciously take advantage of their bodily internalized social capital. Agents actualize an internalized sense of belonging which expresses the rules of membership or recognition (Bourdieu, 1985). Social capital, producing continual social exchanges, connects agents to certain identities, but this process leads to a degree of institutional relation webs because institutionalization is a necessary factor in imposing the characteristics of external relations into the habitus of agents. Owing to this function of internalized social capital, when agents struggle to be a part of a common identity they also embody and represent the means of domination because they actualize collective social capital, which speaks on behalf of a certain social, political and economic domination of power. Agents consciously want to be a part of collective identities because these identities provide recognition, which is essential to access the benefits of the fields. In this respect, relationships between an internalized sense of belonging and the functionality of recognition mainly structuralize social existence and reproduction of hierarchical domination, which do not have any direct connection with the agents. Hierarchical domination mainly obtains the productive power of mutual recognition, which is the most influencing factor in the struggle for influence in the accumulation of social capital.

In substance, Bourdieusian social capital has the potential to give distinctive explanations for the political identity of agents in international relations. Bourdieusian study produces thoughtful arguments in order to explain social capital and mutual recognition relations beyond the constructivists' ideations. First of all, the state is a field of practice, an identity of classification or a political localization where ideological productions take place (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Swartz, 2013). The correlation between state interaction and social construction loses its meaning when one evaluates the state as one field among others.

Contrary to the constructivist agenda, defining subjects and societies as the products of reciprocal construction (Onuf, 2012), social interactions do not lead to a conscious construction of ideas and identities, because agents always struggle to survive in a politically defined space in order to be a part of a collective identity. These agents construct their identities via practical sentiments in habitus rather than conscious ideational social agreements or constructions. Social institutions are just a practical set of rules to objectify the allocation of social capital. Ideas and identities cannot create social interactions if a field, as a structure, requires the reconciliation of a certain practical use of habitus and subjective predisposition. The agents seek to actualize their capital allocations, which are given by the habitus of the field. It is plausible that this process results in the social construction of ideas, but the ideas mostly originate from the inherent field of social capital. The agents originally do not aim to create socially constructed identities, but they want to improve the inherent feature of their social capital given by the field. In this respect, the modern state and its political localization and nationalistic identification depend on social interactions, but these social interactions are mostly involved in inherent social capital. The agents become part of the totalized state identity on behalf of inherent social capital. As a result, there is a reason–result relation between field/structure and identity/idea/social construction. The political field of the state provides a certain social capital allocation or 'symbolic universalization of particular interests' for the agents who do not produce their identities without engaging this social capital when they constitute their ideas in the objective world (Bourdieu, 1996b).

Having an identity also means a degree of 'vision and division' which occurs beyond the conscious social interactions because the political structure, the state, can become meaningful as long as it creates positional differences in the objective field (Ibid.). Social positioning in structures leads to an accumulation of a certain asset in comparison with other positioning (Burt, 2001). These positional differences are formed by the differentiation of the agents' inherent social capital. The agents unconsciously gain identities when they struggle over the reproduction of their inherent social capital in the field. In order to be parts of a totalized identity, agents recognize the inherent division or differentiation of social positioning. Similar to family identity, where family members recognize positional and functional differentiation, individuals and groups recognize positional and relational differentiation when they obtain certain national identities. Therefore, structures define or impose how to give meaning to identities by way of the unconscious recognition of division. When agents become members of the same social exchange processes, they also reproduce social division in the field. Thus, social capital is structured by the existence of division

because it not only produces ways of empowerment in the field but also unconsciously achieves social positioning or division in identities.

The unconscious recognition of division and the allocation of identity relations also mean that power is an indispensable phenomenon for understanding the representation of identities. Constructivists generally evaluate power as the inter-subjective representation of meanings in the international field (Hopf, 1998; Guzzini, 2005). Contrary to constructivist implementation, the inter-subjective representation of power does not help us to understand the whole process, because the subjectivity of the agents is subject to the unconscious representation of a certain social positioning, and structure imposes a different habitus in accordance with social positioning in the objective field. In other words, positioning in structures affects the meanings of the subjects which are not within their conscious knowledge. Thus, political locality/state and state power are derived from the unconscious dominance of habitus, which influences and organizes the whole processes of division in social capital. The distribution of social capital is never equal because the power of symbolic capital differs in different political territorialities. Some parts of agents have a better representation of social capital in comparison with other members of the same identity construction (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Every member of the same identity in the field has a collective sort of internalized capital, but their possessions of social capital are not *pari passu*. In order to trace the power relation of identity construction, agents do not consciously and rationally need to struggle for material power relations, but they are always subject to the inherent division of social capital and its unequal distribution in any totalized identity. In this respect, state identity as a politically collective field of identity depends on a structurally inherent division empowered by symbolic capital. This division is fundamental in order to maintain the monopoly on the legitimate representation of social identity, which imposes a non-material power relation into the constitutive processes. Institutionalization results in the successful embodiment of social capital because institutionalization means the construction of mutual recognition, which requires the division and acceptance of functional spaces in the allocation of social capital. The institutionalization of social capital represents a particular social division of totalized identity because symbolic power relations impose the representative dominance of certain individuals and/or groups who simultaneously have the better social capital allocation and right of identity representation on behalf of others. Therefore, power relations are the very presence of identity construction and mutual recognition, but these power relations do not consist of the material interests of agents. Power relations are fundamentally credited by social capital and imposed by a division which is

unconsciously recognized by the agents in order to be a part of a common identity throughout the process of exchanges.

State identity, as a social entity, functions as a common identity in the territorially defined political space. Similar to any other social identity construction, it is a production of internal division and, as a result, the differentiation of social capital. In the same way, modern states are local agents of a common identification of a wider exchange web which represents their unique institutionalization of mutual recognition. This process structurally engages the reproduction of inequalities, exclusion and inclusion; it then interprets a constitutionally normative language for the institutionalization/recognition of objective structure (Cleaver, 2005). When state identity achieves recognition of other similar entities it is also unconsciously involved in division. State identity struggles to improve its capital allocation in accordance with the strength of its social capital. However, similar to the internal structure of the state, symbolic power is not distributed equally among the states and, therefore, some of them have a better symbolic power of structure to speak on behalf of others. In other words, social capital is unevenly distributed between the different states in a wider field of exchange called international relations. Similar to the different social groups in the internal political field of local borders, states benefit from membership of a common identity in order to obtain mutually recognizable characters in the international field. However, similarly, individual states are imposed on by an inherent symbolic capital which defines the capacities of their social capital in the processes of exchanges. In this way, social interactions determine social capital in relation with other political and cultural capital in the international field, but identities are defined by power relations regarding symbolic capital, which result in the acceptance of division for the purpose of mutual recognition.

Bourdieusian study figures out two important points in order to interpret the mutually recognized political identity of states in the international field. Initially, symbolic capital is not distributed equivalently among the localities. Some states have a better symbolic capital allocation than others. Owing to this advantage, some local identities gain a better combination of social capital and they obtain a better positioning in the inherent division of identities in the international field. In this respect, state identities are recognized as relatively equal, but social capital, which organizes the exchanges of mutual recognition, are distributed unevenly. With regards to this, the representation of democracy is an essential functionality in order to understand the uneven distribution of social capital. The symbolic capital of democracy is defined and embodied by certain localities of Western states. This bestows these states with the same hierarchical symbolic role and function as the father or the oldest people

in a patriarchic family. This symbolic role also provides a superior positioning in the field of exchanges in the international field because social capital can only produce positive engagements, such as Putnam's imagination of associational democratic engagements (Putnam, 2000), rather than consequences and inequalities, if states have appropriate means of democracy in the fields of political, social and economic capital.[30] When other localities or states try to achieve recognition in the international field they define their positioning by way of unconsciously using the same symbolic capital. This symbolic capital is not their inheritance but it becomes part of the habitus in historical processes. Other unequal state identities in the same international field are not part of the symbolic production of democracy but they become unconscious practitioners of democracy or democratization because, in a field of unequally distributed social capital, agents still obtain trust and solidarity links that provide access to limited or poor-quality resources (Portes & Landolt, 2000). This also means a kind of unconscious recognition regarding their social positioning because using the same symbolic knowledge results in the recognition of an uneven social capital distribution in the international field. States' social capital interprets their social positioning and it also objectifies the false consciousness of states as if it is their own ideational creation. When states that have less social capital recognize the 'patriarchic'[31] role of certain Western states regarding democracy, they also recognize the unconscious division between the 'relatively equal identities of states' such as the Third World or developing state concepts. Although these states do not have any essential influence over symbolic democratic reproduction, they try to structuralize their identities via harmonizing their unequal social capital and democracy in the cause of more recognition. The Third World democracy, Muslim democracy and developing democracy concepts are all reasons for this unconscious division of social capital regarding identity.

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[30] Warren (2004, p. 18): 'the theory of social capital in ways that help distinguish better and worse kinds of social capital … more political, economic, and cultural democracy exists, the more likely social capital will function in good ways. The argument for democracy is simple: democracy tends toward more equal empowerments of individuals. Empowerments are generative: by reducing vulnerabilities they act directly on the precursors of association, which in turn provides individuals with social capital they can use to resist imposed externalities. In theory, more egalitarian distributions of social capital should, reduce the tendencies for social capital to produce social bads such as political corruption.'

[31] In this research, patriarchy indicates autocratic dominance in power relation and social stratification beyond its popular and common usage, which refers to male domination in gender-related social and political studies.

Besides this, the fundamental objective of the Bourdieusian concept highlights the core role of social capital – as a 'form of capital of obligations' (Bourdieu, 1986, 254) – in shaping the characteristic and stabilization of mutual recognition (Kuokkanen, 2007). Therefore, social capital consists of unconscious obligations, but it does not engage any objective or material obligation when it constitutes its characteristics in habitus. Agents have a certain degree of social capital and, accordingly, they inherently become parts of the 'capital of obligations' because to obtain social capital is to embody the invisible codes of obligations. In line with this, contrary to constructivist inter-subjectivity in international relations, every identity has the characteristics of obligations before they are involved in exchange and institutionalization in the objective world. Agents do not produce conscious obligations, norms and sanctions without engaging their inherent social capital as the capital of obligations. Social capital, as the function of obligations, improves and regularizes the dynamic of hidden division and power of categorization in the construction of mutual recognition. Social capital paves the way for a privileged positioning of some agents in comparison with some others who share the same mutually recognized identities (Field, 2008). Because of this relatively differentiated distribution of social capital, the powerful positions of some agents are perceived as the usual characteristics of the structure. Social capital, as a possession of privileged localities, also results in the misrecognized division in terms of organic relations with obligations in the international field. Some identities living in certain localities, such as the field of the European Union, possess relatively better capital of obligations in comparison with other identities living outside this field. Meanwhile, states acquire capital of obligations before they form inter-subjective meaning in the objective international field. This forms a relative symbolic superiority of identity for the EU zone regarding categorization, division and representation, which are structuralized by international law. International law is a considerable practising arena for the capital of obligations. The fundamental characteristic of international law originates from the complexity of obligations, which is abundant in the social capital of a particular European territoriality. Thus, the other relatively weak agents of the international field unconsciously try to produce capital of obligations and to comply with their positioning, such as Third World or developing state identity, which structuralizes in accordance with the privileged positioning of the particular Western territory. In other words, social capital unconsciously imposes obligations into the habitus of unprivileged identities before they inter-subjectively produce the exchanges and social structures (Burawoy & Von Holdt, 2012).

Social capital and inequality between states in the international field

Bourdieusian study argues considerably that structures are important to give meaning to the actions of individuals because the agents' unconsciousness regarding their actions and exchanges is only misrecognized and produced in certain structures, which are the production fields of obligations in habitus (Throop & Murphy, 2002). Structures in a particular field are fundamental for defining the value of social capital, owing to the fact that structures impose a symbolic division of habitus which objectifies the access capacity of different agents to social capital. In this respect, the unequal distribution of social capital attributes value to certain symbolic objectives. Following this, these objectives become obligations of exchanges and objectively meaningful ways to pursue interests. Because of the misrecognized recognition of division, agents recognize and value social capital. Habitus infuses social capital into agents and it also regularizes social positioning. In this way, when agents pursue their own interests, the unequal positioning and privileged structuralization of social capital are internalized in their pursuance of interests by the disadvantaged agents in the same field. The political life of individuals in many Middle Eastern political territorialities displays essential observations and traces to illustrate this inequality, structure and social capital relations. The enfranchisement of women is not seen as a part of women's social capital in many Middle Eastern political fields. The symbolically structured inherent habitus of women naturalizes the division of gender in the process of exchange (Bourdieu, 2001). Because of this misrecognition, empowered by social capital, women recognize that their positioning in political elections is a privileged way for them to be esteemed and recognized members (a constitutive function of self-reflexivity regarding gender inequality) (Adkins, 2002; McNay, 2000) and to reach their interests in the process of social exchange. Similarly, *taba'iyya* (politically bounded subject/subjecthood) (Butenschøn, Davis, & Hassassia, 2000) functions as citizenship in many political fields of the Middle East, but, in reality, there are considerable differences between the identity of citizenship and *taba'iyya*. Becoming a part of *taba'iyya* does not entitle many of the rights and responsibilities which citizenship recognizes. However, as it is argued, the structural field of social capital values the obligations of independent/bounded relation in the political identities of individuals in the Middle East and, therefore, individuals having the identity of *taba'iyya* misrecognize the privileged positioning of the agents and interests of social capital. Thus, social capital becomes the means of the construction of inequality, division and social positioning between privileged and disadvantaged identities in the field of exchanges.

In accordance with the concept of social capital, Bourdieusian study gives us an intermediate objective of inequality between structural thinking and constructivist theorization. The constructivist agenda generally assumes that inequality is derived from social subjects' own interpretations regarding objective social exchanges, which differ in their interpretations and perceptions of inequality (Harris, 2004; Holstein & Miller, 2003). It implies the relativity of inequality in accordance with social processes, subjects and the conscious social exchanges of individuals. This perception of constructivism infers that it is not plausible to research any objective definition and reasoning for inequality because it is always interpreted subjectively regardless of structures. However, when this consideration of social constructivism is rethought vis-à-vis social capital, it can be traced that possession of social capital is affected by structural division and its symbolic structure, which result in the misrecognition of the social agents regarding their own constructions and exchanges. Because of invisible division and unequal distribution in the symbolic products of structure, the agents cannot reach the relevant social capital and, therefore, the interpretations of individuals go beyond their consciousness with regards to their unequal positioning in society.

The structural effect on the misrecognized symbolic domination of habitus not only imposes an unconscious division of agents and the unequal distribution of social capital but also contributes to the continuation and re-structuralization of inequality in social capital sharing. Social capital as the capital of obligations deepens the gap between privileged and disadvantaged identities of agents. The control capacity of advantaged agents over the obligations of social capital prevents disadvantaged agents from accumulating a better allocation of social capital, which is necessary to improve the exchange quality in the objective world (Field, 2008). In other words, beyond being a reason for inequality, social capital also improves the social basis for the re-constitutionalization of chronic inequality. In this respect, inequality, symbolic division and otherness become important and integral parts of structures in order to maintain the objective and interpretive domination of identities (Schwalbe, Godwin, Holden, Schrock, Thompson, & Wolkomir, 2000). In relation to the political identities of agents, the international field is a praxis space of unequally distributed social capital. International law boosts the efficiency of symbolic orientation and it also organizes obligations regarding how agents pursue their interests. For example, the membership statuses of international advocacy organizations and other NGOs in international organizations, as the agents of international field, are exclusive. Some NGOs have priority to be participants or members of the decision-making processes of the organization because their accumulated social capital and basis of social exchange give them an advantage over other

NGOs. The organization styles of many institutions, especially the United Nations, maintain these bases. Therefore, the social positioning of some organizations defines the borders and scope of interests for other disadvantaged organizations. Similarly, political and territorial division also unconsciously indicates the inequality of social capital. Classifications like the Third World or the Eurozone define how agents perceive their obligations and how they pursue their interests in the objective world. In this way, symbolically imposed divisions become objective exchanges in the objective world.

The main objective of constructivism is interpretations rather than consequences and the results of inequality. In other words, unless agents consciously and reflectively focus on inter-subjective meaning and the construction of inequalities, constructivism does not try to find answers for the abolition of inequality in the objective field (Harris, 2006; Holstein & Gubrium, 2005). However, Bourdieusian study also stresses the link between the distribution of social capital and the incapacity of the agents regarding their own self-reflexivity of identity. Perceptions and interpretations of ideas lose their importance because the agents do not consciously control their perceptions and they exercise an imposed reflexivity rather than their own self reflexivity of ideas (Hoy, 1999). In this respect, a higher level of social capital possession enhances the agents' self-reflexivity and control on their own interpretations. It also improves their capacity of exchange because higher social capital leads to better engagements of interests. Therefore, the capacity of social capital intensifies the reflexivity of domination, which bestows a deeper social classification of identities. The political identities of the international field mainly verify this causality of social capital. The intensification of social capital in a certain political field always improves privileged social exchanges, both in the same fields and among the different fields. The European Union has the highest intensity of social capital in the international field. Consequently, the enlargement process of the European Union is also a field of practice with regards to the reflexivity of social capital. Due to the privileged position regarding social capital allocation, the European Union can freely define the borders of the field and the obligations of capital in the field. In order to be a member of the same field, other states or localities need to take advantage of self-reflexivity derived from the European Union's cultural, political, social and economic capital, obligations and interpretations. Another interesting field of praxis is immigration. The social positioning of immigrated social groups in host families leads to imposed self-reflexivity, producing inter-subjective inequality within the same field. The incapacity of social capital in immigrant identities generally functions as an inseparable part of imposed positioning, which is subject to the capital of obligations in the same political field. Integrative political policies

in immigrant societies simultaneously and symbolically maintain and deepen the unequal distribution of social capital because they are generally implemented in structures, regularizing inherent advancing positions and divisions in the same political identity and spatiality.

Constructivism thoughtfully research how subjects, interpretations and perceptions of inequality are inter-subjectively constructed according to the ideation of different subjects (Harris, 2006). In this aspect, constructivism is not interested in labels such as subject and the subjectification of inequality (Ibid.). However, the inter-subjectivity of both privileged and disadvantaged subjects is not free from the symbolic habitual representation of historical structures. Not only do disadvantaged agents pursue the symbolic inherent structure of their habitus, but also privileged agents focus on symbolic interpretation which aims at the exclusion of disadvantaged agents in order to maintain their interests by way of social capital. In other words, the inherent dispositions of habitus create different unconscious objectives for both advantaged and disadvantaged agents (Adams, 2006). Therefore, privileged social capital owners are prone to exclude disadvantaged agents from their internal exchange of social capital. Appropriate strategies for the structuralization of inequalities penetrate differently into the habitus of different agents according to self-reflexivity, which may become a function for the symbolic domination of habitus (Sweetman, 2003). When they objectify their interests they also unconsciously produce interpretations, serving inequality and the naturalization of unequally distributed social capital. In this respect, it is not plausible to think that the institutionalization of the international field is solely the ideational, inspirational and conscious interpretations of subjects/agents of political identities, including individuals, groups, organizations and states, in the objective world. It is generally seen that the political institutionalization of the international field generally groups the localities, states or other political subjects who have similar capacities or incapacities of social capital. When privileged political fields define their identities in accordance with the interpretation of 'developed' they also create a social closure, serving the inclusion of certain social capital and the exclusion of the other social positioning. The enlargement processes of the European Union prove that the inclusion of localities into the interpretive field of Europe is mostly derived from an inherent resemblance of social capital. On the other hand, exclusion also creates social positioning based on interpretation of 'developing'. This also results in grouping disadvantaged subjects in the international fields. As a consequence, social capital deepens inequality and its social positioning in the international field while agents pursue its subjectively imposed obligations and interests.

Furthermore, social capital is a historical formation which transfers its symbolic divisions and obligations of capital to the next generations (Field, 2008). This also contributes to the unequal distribution of social capital because it restricts the expectations and interests of targets. In other words, the potential improvement of agents is suppressed in accordance with the perception, identification and expectation of agents' own social groups. Social agents are expected to fulfil the social expectations/impositions of their social groups and inherent solidarity of their habitus because the habitus of social groups is formed in opposition to other social groups and, therefore, it produces distinctive internal hierarchies and exchanges which are incoherent for other social groups (Portes, 1998). In the light of these interpretations, it can be inferred that the symbolic structure of nationalism functions as a bearer of inequality for relatively disadvantaged agents in the international field of modernity. Contrary to privileged identities, members of disadvantaged groups have relatively very restricted borders constituted by strict visa regimes in the international field. This structure vitiates the influence of agents' engagements with other fields. On the other hand, the solidarity of the group symbolically puts pressure on the identities of members. Under the restricted social capital of national space, agents embody imposed otherness to be recognized members of internal solidarity. In contrast with the constructivist stress on human ideation, nationalism is not simply a political institutionalization of human interpretation or an interactively created norm of sovereignty. Otherwise, modern sovereignty, the Westphalian order, the ad hoc conference system and nationality should simultaneously have come into existence. However, nationalism came onto the historical stage more than a hundred years later than the institutional changes of the modern political field. At this point, social capital gives clues to understand the nationalization of identities. Here social capital is the key term to understand the construction of national identities, because it depicts the inherent symbolic representation of structures in agents' identities. In line with the concept of social capital, it is considered that national identity is a historical process of habitus which produces an unequal distribution of social capital in a new and distinctive way. Social capital is the fundamental phenomenon to reinterpret the style of exchanges, membership and capital of obligations. In this process, social capital defines the construction of solidarity, division and otherness which are necessary conditions to reproduce symbolic, political, economic and cultural capital inter-subjectively.

Social capital, stratification and hierarchy in the international field

The reproduction of hierarchy among political subjects and the functionalization of social capital in the practical political field have always come into existence simultaneously. A successful reproduction of the hierarchy depends on a redistribution of existing social capital among the members of the political identity (Bourdieu, 1991). Hierarchy in the existing study of international relations mostly observes the characteristics of the power structure, the roles of inter-subjective recognition and norms (Gallarotti, 2010). The existing approaches overlook the social characteristics of the state as an individual member of the international field. The state, as a social subject/organism of a certain political identity, spontaneously produces a hierarchy in accordance with its borders and limits of social capital. In this respect, international relations is not a realm of hierarchy empowered by the power structures of anarchy or by subjective conscious consent on anarchical structures. Indeed, the roots of hierarchy are founded on the social presence of the state's political subjectivity beyond these structural or constructional considerations. Hierarchy is a more conscious phenomenon which is imposed by the social capital of states. Social capital continually reproduces the social limits and characteristics of powers and interests. The state unconsciously obeys the social limitation of its social capital before it objectively conforms to power and its normative constitution in international relations.

Social capital in the international field is a subjective arsenal of domination which reproduces power and its political identification. Social capital distributes an unequal involvement into subjective materials (Hughes & Blaxter, 2007). These subjective materials consist of appropriate functions of historically collectivized bodies to accomplish a better positioning in the actual power relations of political identity (Bourdieu, 1991). A dominant positioning in the international field always obtains a better positioning because it takes advantage of well-founded networks, relations and contextual tools. A non-dominant state in the international field possesses a less-advantageous position regarding social capital which institutionalizes the conformity of objective obligations in the field because the pursuance of social capital also creates an infrastructure of membership in the international field. In this respect, social capital is a conscious strategy of domination to produce collective meanings, borders and functions of political identity (Swartz, 2013). In addition to this, the pursuance of social capital also unconsciously imposes values and expectations of the international field. A state's social capital not only constitutes the borders of positioning in the international field, but also objectifies the structural obligations of relationship and institutionalization in the field. Social capital empowers and restricts the states' abilities gain better access and a better position in the hierarchy of the international field. Therefore, every individual state in the

international field possesses the same identification of political identity, but only better-positioned states in relation to symbolic power have the opportunity to access all benefits of a given political identity.

The hierarchy of the international field fundamentally survives on the basis of conformity regarding membership of the field, which naturalizes inequality via formal equality between the agents (Inayatullah & Blaney, 2004). Social capital takes an active role in the reproduction of mutual recognition for this membership via contextual factors such as power and inequality in the networking styles of social capital (Christoforou & Davis, 2014). The networking styles of social capital characterize the valuable pursuance of states and the institutional requirements of objective obligations (Bourdieu, 1986). When states are involved in valued practices and obligations of the field, they simultaneously produce a membership of the international field and a hierarchy of political identities. In other words, valued obligations of international field actually comply with a certain positioning of domination because dominant subjects of the field always have well-established tangible and contextual social links which provide for the production of sustainable inequality between domination and dominated states of hierarchy in the international field. This contextual superiority of social capital can be visibly seen if one researches the valued obligations of a certain historical international field. When political identity attributes value to nationality, certain dominant European states have taken better positions in the international field because they have already obtained better positions regarding the contextual means of social capital and constituted networks which transmit the interests and strategies of these dominant states as common strategic and contextual social networking for states of the same field. In this way, the other states had to pursue the same strategic interests and power relations but their social capital is unequal; it produces less-capable networks to accomplish the valued obligation of membership and its recognition. Similarly, the identity of political subjectivity contributes liberal democracy as the valued obligation of the international field, and liberal democracy becomes an objective obligation for being a respectful member of the hierarchy in the field. However, networks and the contextual means of liberal democracy are only developed by certain members of the international field. The available social capital of the other states is not adequate to obtain appropriate durable relational networks and their contextual productions. In a nutshell, the dominant states in the international field invest their creditable contextual superiority into certain strategies and interests; they reproduce relationships and networking styles which defend their subjective and objective dominance of the field. Investment in the contextual bases of social capital results in dominance of the reproduction styles of social and

political relationships, which stabilizes the institutional and subjective distribution of the hierarchy in the international field. Objective structures are organized by values which provide superior networks and strategies of social capital for certain states. On the other hand, the other unequal member states of the same social capital space struggle for the same values in order to achieve the structural obligations or doxa of the international field and an institutional guarantee of a better recognition in the field.

In line with the stabilization of hierarchy in the international field, social capital reproduces two structural practices of interconnectivity. The first of these practices is related to the characteristics of domination of the field. Social capital reproduces unequal stratification in accordance with the existing hierarchy of the field (Bottero, 2005). Similar to the former political subjects of history, state identity relies on structured networking strategies which depict the production styles of social capital in the whole international field. In this way, social capital functions as the inter-subjective basis of recognition in the international field. Every individual state invests its dispositional knowledge to accumulate social capital, but unequal delegation regarding the available knowledge of networks improves the distinctive positions of certain states because they create strategies of recognition in the international field by continually reproducing the valued accumulation style of social capital. As creators of the institutionalized delegation system in international relations, a certain group of states gains an inter-subjective power to delegate representation of the whole field in international relations and the interest of all collective representations. The power of social capital subjectively maintains the existing invisible domination via totalizing the representative strategies of recognition in the presence of privileged members of the hierarchy in the international field. In other words, social capital empowers the networking strategies of certain states as the basis of recognition in the international field, which exacerbates the unequal positions in the hierarchy of international field.

The conformity on the embodiment of social capital among the states in the field improves the existence of autocratic distribution of political positions on the basis of a certain political identity. The leader position of dominant states in terms of social capital exchanges imposes dispositions which stabilize dominant states' subjective representation and objective structural power on the definition of recognition. Social capital guarantees and maintains the social relation of the existing stratification, which institutionalizes the legitimacy of representation for being a member of the field (Susen, 2011). In other words, social capital institutionalizes the unconscious willingness of the states in accordance with the monopoly of the dominants on the social relation of states. Being a part of this institutional recognition

imposes the nobility of dominants, which highlights the distinction of dominants from other member states of the same political identity. The nobility of the dominant state or states achieves a power which can speak in the name of the whole international field as the highest representative of the political identity. In this way, the institutional delegation of nobility dominates social relations, which empowers the dispositions of states regarding their own positions in the field. The states define their positions in the field by the way of the representative quality of their nobility because this quality gives a better position or accumulation of social capital.

The second important product of social capital is related to the relative positions of states in the international field. Social capital continually reproduces social stratification in the field of international relations. Social capital maintains a stratified system which reproduces a system of distinction between the dominant and the other sub-identities in the field (Bourdieu, 1984). Discursively, all of the members of the international field, regardless of their positions in the domination, obtain the same styles of national identities and they are involved in the same sphere of international law. However, having the same types of identity practically guarantees the differences between the individual members of the international field. Continually reproduced distinction via social capital penetrates into understandings and images of states regarding development, growth, governance and many other state agendas. These agendas or policies are organized by the dominant states in the political field of international relations. Domination produces the beneficial characteristics and mechanisms of its appropriate political identification, which depicts the behaviours of the dominant classification (Ibid.). The distinctive representation of domination creates a number of characteristics and behaviours which organizes nobility or the most appropriate social capital of the international field. The other states of the same international field utilize these nobility, characteristics and behaviours of domination as guidelines because they figure out the identified relations which help to understand their own positions in relation to the political identities of other states.

Social capital reinforces the stratification of political identities in the international field. Every position relies on different networks and relations, which are distributed by the dominant states' exclusive monopoly of nobility (Bourdieu, 1996b). These networks are distributed unequally in international fields. States have restricted use of networks in accordance with their capital allocation. In this way, certain states have access to a majority of networks, but many other states can take advantage only of a restricted number of networks which defines their exclusion in the international field. The embedded doxa of the

international field or international law highlights that members of political identity take part in same mutual recognition and sovereignty but, in practice, social capital restricts the use of networks, which is necessary to enhance recognition and sovereign representation. The doxa of the international field inherently imposes individualistic preferences and embedded characteristics of domination which can only be accomplished by networking styles of domination. The political stratification of social capital in the international field materializes the characteristics of dominant political states as the nobility of whole field. In order to be a highly respected member of the international field, a state is expected to achieve this nobility, but because of a lack of social capital, the standards of nobility function as a maintenance mechanism for the political distinction of domination over other members of the same political identity in the international field. Owing to a political stratification of social capital, the interests and preferences of states are shaped by bordered networks of states. In this respect, limited access to social capital simultaneously creates an internalization of the external production of nobility because limited networks of states result in the reproduction of stratified positions which maintain the distinction of domination. Having similar social capital unconsciously categorizes states into certain positions, which legitimizes political stratification without any resistance against the symbolic form of power relations in the international field. In this way, the dominant states of political identity influence the practices of the other stratified states by means of their embedded nobility of domination. Unequally positioned states of the international field pursue these principles of nobility but they are unconsciously bound to the restricted networks of social capital. Eventually, social capital reproduces political stratification via the stabilizing position of dominant and dominated identities in the international field.

Developing state and Third World concepts: dominant–dominated vision and division
Developmental research (Greig, Hulme, & Turner, 2007; Peet & Hartwick, 2009) and its conceptualization of developing states are significant examples in the contemporary international field to understand the functionalization of the Bourdieusian understanding of social capital for the definition of political identity and position. Developmental research generally argues that the handicaps of developing states not only depend on a lack of economic resources, but also rest on a lack of social capital, which results in ineffective networking and accumulation of political values (Christoforou & Davis, 2014). Social capital is seen as the objective networking styles of individuals and groups, which can be accomplished if states are internally involved in particular objective sustainable governance

processes. The developing countries concept is associated with the internal disabilities of states within their own territorial borders. Social capital is bordered by the associational qualification of societies within a particular state border. In this way, it is thought that if the associational qualification of internal communities of states improves, the developmental quality of the state will gain acceleration. Consequently, developmental studies fundamentally focus on the deficiencies of the state within its own borders, which depend on the structural constraints of groups and individuals with regards to associational networking practices.

On the other hand, states categorized as developing have more structurally rooted deficiencies related to their own political identities and subjectivities beyond the internal societal inadequacies. As social capital materializes the divisionary identity positioning of individuals and their social groups, it also provides a divisionary and unequal distribution of networking among the states as the subjects of political identity in the international field. The dominant identities of state identity in the international field have a tendency to depict the stratified conceptualization of the developing state in accordance with institutional and constructive deficiencies. In line with Bourdieusian insight, the conceptualization of the developing state is primarily free from any institutional weakness. It fundamentally originates from the dispositions of states regarding their own positions and identities. In this respect, the conceptualization of the developing state relies on the habitual foundation of accumulated history, which changes into institutional and constructive perception after states give meaning to their identities in relation to the other states. Because of embedded structural constraints, social capital is found in stratified forms in the habitual practices of developing states which do not satisfy the needs for constructed rules of international field. The habitus of a developing state restricts its relational understanding of political identity because habitus produces dispositions which depend on the structurally limited embodiment of networking. In other words, under the limited networking, the objective experiences of subjects harmonize the conditions of existence, which unconsciously impose identical ways of expression for identification (Bourdieu, 1990b).

The aim of this part is to find out the potential Bourdieusian contribution of political subjectivity and its identity in relation to social capital in international relations by way of the developing state concept. The first contribution here is to focus on objective/subjective structures and social capital engagement with regards to the reproduction of the concept of the developing state. Basically, the concept of developing states is fundamentally based on a reproduction of the historical developmental perception as the core phenomenon of the social capital and state identity interrelation. The distinction between the objective and subjective

structures of the developing state allow the reproduction of social capital as possession of a predisposed position in the field, which impairs the networking of its relative political identities. The perspectives of development are seen as a problem related to the objective structures of state identity, but if there is a correlative link between the positioning of political state identity and social capital it will be irrelevant to separate the objective and subjective structures in the conceptualization of the developing state. Therefore, in accordance with Bourdieusian study, social capital proves that the conceptual approaches of state subjectivity cannot be popularized within the economic and institutional discussions and definitions of objective structures in the international field.

The positioning of political identity of the developing state is oversimplified by objective institutional accountable means of economy via industrialization data and produced GDP of developing states. Development is standardized by dominant dispositions of growth, and it is influenced into the positioning of developing states by domination in the international field. The fundamental basis in the concept of developing state is the idea of 'standardized development',[32] intrinsically stratified and linked to control of the reproduction of political identities. Objective inquiries and the institutions of development function as doxa which imposes an obligatory schema to get involved in recognition in the international field. The standardization of development in practice consolidates the total control of the reproduction of an institutionalized political identity. The developmental concept of modern state identity is the deliberately objectified phenomenon of domination in the international field, which, while not unique to the contemporary stage of historical social accumulation, hushes up subjective stratification with respect to the ownership of social capital. In this way, social capital provides the institutionalization of distinction in the dispositions of a state regarding its position in the field, which reproduces the consciousness of standards regarding institutionalized developmental actions in the objective structural space of the international field.

The conceptualization of the developing state relies on phenomenological dispositions of subjective structures, which reproduce social capital before state produces objective actions with regards to economics and politics. Although developing states refer in practice to a structuring objectivity, originally it was bound to a structured distribution of subjective capital

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[32] For a developmental agenda which is mostly contributed by IMF and World Bank perspectives, see Kingsbury (2012).

in the positioning of the developing state. Development is more structured in that stratified domination of the international field is represented as a structuring target which the state can reach in accordance with their success in objective economic and politic relations. However, economic wealth apparently does not graduate a developing state to a more developed position. Development requires a considerable amount of social networking, which helps a state to get involved in the required amount of objective institutional field of practices. In this respect, 'developing' means an inability to produce enough networking because of the lack of social capital. In order to understand the categorization of developing state identity, it makes better sense to look at who is bordering whom, rather than the economic wealth of individual states. The economic objective conditions of states do not compulsorily distinguish state identity and the concept of the developing state. In many cases, visa conditionality between the states makes meaningful sense to understand state positioning with regards to development, because states that have more social capital achieve an easier freedom of movement for its citizens.

Potential improvements in the political and economic capital of developing states do not change their developing positions because indigenous styles of networking differ from the expectations of the international field. This means that developing states indigenously lack the means to pursue a successful process of collecting social capital in field. The networking capacity of social capital, which creates distinction in the mobilization of other agents in the same field (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), can only be successful for dominant states of international relations, because social capital can only comprehensively institutionalize into the identity of distinctive identities as a durable potential power (Bourdieu, 1986). In this way, social capital, as production process of developed states within their borders, maintains a compatible transition of its characteristics from internal indigenous networking styles to the international accumulation of social capital. Thus, the indigenous associational life of a developed state within its border and the networking styles of the international field are derived from similar social capital accumulation processes. In this way, developed states indigenously do not confront any difficulties when they try to increase social capital in the international field. Because of indigenous associational practices regarding social capital, developed states easily transfer their dispositions, characteristics and experiences into the international field. On the other hand, the embodied dispositions of developing states produce a practical consciousness which can only produce social capital in accordance with their indigenous associational lives. The concept of the developing state subjectively imposes the roles of external structures in subjective state habitus by placing development under the

control of social capital before developing states produce meanings in relations to others. Associational life within developing state borders does not cover the expected social capital accumulation in the international field. These expectations are fundamentally autonomous from improvements in other forms of capital. The Chinese status of developing character highlights this autonomy, which proves the compatibility between the indigenous accumulation of social capital within borders and the accumulation of social capital in the international field. Despite a great development of economic capital in the international field, China is still deprived of producing the required social capital, because its indigenous associational life is still distinct from what networking styles demand in the international field. Consequently, the Chinese cannot transform their economic development into a meaningful power of social capital in the international field.

As Bourdieu emphasized, social capital is an actual and credential resource which improves the qualification of actors when they develop their relative economic, political and cultural capital allocation (Lin, 2001). As a credential value, social capital not only functions as a stock of power, but also transfers the unequal distribution of material and non-material resources in the field. Because of social capital, certain behaviours of certain actors in the same field are seen rational and non-objectionable even though similar behaviours may be seen as uncreditable and irrational for other actors that have relatively less social capital. In the same way, with a Bourdieusian emphasis, the field of international relations exercises this credential feature of social capital in the routine practices of states. In practice, being a developing state also emphasizes that the position of the state is less secure than the states that have a better position in the domination. The positional insecurity of developing states is also seen as a potential threat by developed states in the international arena. Because of the credential social accumulation, no state in the same social space thinks that a developed state can be a resource of insecurity, thread or instability. In other words, constituted social networks and their credential dispositions rule out any ideation which implies the potential for a developed state to be a reason for threat and violence. The credential feature of social capital consolidates the social functionalization of developing and developed states. It assigns the developed state to protect security in the international field. It simultaneously compels developing states to think that insecurity is assigned to their identities and developed states have the right to be in charge of reinstating security in the name of developing states. In this respect, the demand for military bases is seen as natural expectation of a developed state within developing state borders, but, on the other hand, any similar demand from a developing state within the border of developed states is unthinkable. The credential feature of social

capital not only brings potential social networks for developed states in order to get involved in different actions, but also highlights the incapacity of developing states with regards to the embodiment of a better capital allocation. By engaging credential functionalization, social capital regularizes the unequal distribution of political and economic capital via the reinforcing functionalization of recognition for the dominant position of developed states.

The credential feature of social capital creates further questions regarding why a developing state plays a part in a field which describes it in a relatively unequal way. Here it is logical to refer to Bourdieusian study on social class and its unequal stratification (Swartz, 1997). The state is mostly evaluated as a social actor beyond its political rationalization and functionalization. State identity fundamentally tries to realize the social expectation of a less homogenous group of people in the international field. Therefore, state rationality mostly depends on a social logic which behaves in accordance with the functionalization of societal grouping. Social grouping takes form in the existence of unequal positioning and stratification, which are determined by the existence of a valid and accepted dominant core in the social system (Bourdieu, 1984). In the international field, states as social actors value their identity relatively in accordance with distinctive positions of domination. The existence of domination values every individual member of the field via a standardization of recognition and position in the field. As a social actor, states want to gain a recognized position before anything else. This recognized position is derived from the state's practical sense regarding its identity in the objective field. Within its state border, society distributes positions unequally in line with a loyalty to a founded historical domination and its ruling practices. In this way, a state does not feel out of place when it becomes part of an unequal international system under the loyalty of domination. In this aspect, having a recognized identity has more primacy than having an equal position in the international field. Having a recognized position in the international field enounces the state's practical logic regarding its political identity. Thus, developing states do not discuss why their identities are determined by an unequal definition of positions. In this way, the concept of developing states simultaneously defines a standardized recognition of dominated identities and stabilizes/regularizes positional stability and the superiority of a dominant position for developed states. Even though developed and developing states have a different unequal social stratification, ranging from primitive to modern, basically, all unequal structures of society are derived from a sum of nobility practices determined by dominance. In the international field, the domination of developed states, therefore, subjectively imposes its nobility practices, which defines the borders

between developed and developing via defining the understanding of development at a certain historical stage.

Due to the structured unequal stratification embedded in the normative objectives of social capital (Christoforou & Davis, 2014) beyond material inequalities, states rest in restricted networks in accordance with their accumulated social capital, which is distributed by their capacity in the control of the assets of international law. Social capital interprets the positional distribution of state identities, which defines how much the state can benefit from the rules of structured international law. In this sense, the concept of the developing state is a misrecognized consensus that the developing state approves its disadvantaged use of structural nobility/international law in return for having a recognized position under the rule of international domination. The economic and political capital of a state determines the state's potential to have a position in international relations, but only social capital shows how well a state can put into action that potential. In other words, accumulated social capital conceives of a qualification of the dominant state on the actualization of international law in the international field. Consequently, in the international field, the advancement of economic capital does not always interpret states' positions in international stratification of domination. Despite a considerable improvement in economic capital, a state can be defined as developing country in line with its relative accumulation of social capital. Therefore, it is not easy to reposition a state in the structured interpretation of the international field, because, in practice, all inclusions and exclusions of state identity in the international field are structured by the ownership of social capital. As is monitored in the construction and expansion of European identity, to claim that a certain state does not have European identity means, in practice, that the state is still developing its social capital in order to have a considerable engagement with international structured law. In other words, the state cannot respond to similar issues or exercise the international nobility of democracy or human rights in accordance with the practices of stratified domination.

Despite the structured domination of stratification in the international field, a Bourdieusian emphasis on the structuring feature of the objective field, social capital, also instigates mechanisms which facilitate the transformation of structured values and institutions (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Certainly, dominant states of the international field try to reproduce their nobility by means of securitizing the distinction between developed and developing in an unequal stratification of a wider international field. However, simultaneously, the structuring international field provides considerable opportunities for developing identities of states to accumulate social capital beyond economic capital and to

transform values and institution beyond a structured understanding of international law. In this way, even the dominant identity of international field maintains an understanding of the symbolic values of social capital and recognizable networking styles of the field; developing state identities form new styles of symbolic exchange and networking which are in conflict with standardized ways of international domination and the formation of political identity.

An actualization of this change has been done through the process of the European Union project. The EU project has considerably changed the structured distinction between domination and developing in the understanding of international field. The project blurs the understanding of what is developed and what is developing in the objective world. It fundamentally changes the symbolic values of being associated beyond the structured form of association in international law. New associational improvements of state identity trivialize the prominent position of economic capital. In this way, the differentiation between developing and developed within the new political network trivializes because the developing states obtain an opportunity to compete with the developed state within the same position of the international field. In other words, developing states take advantage of positions in developed states' domination without having the characteristics of their new positions. This enhances their chance to improve their social capital accumulation and to extend their networking capacities. Another aspect of this change in state political identity originates from social capital and the constructed nobility relations which institutionalize a particular networking (Bourdieu, 1986). The new understanding of nobility arises from how European identity should be perceived. In particular, an ideology-driven differentiation between the developed and developing political identities of states have been rendered obsolete in the structuring international field. The networking on new European identity has proved that the social capital of states changes their perspectives on ideology. The new networking is derived from a value-specific understanding of political identity beyond ideology and economic growth. The position of European identity is filled by those states who can have a dispositional reflex to answer the international exchanges via certain values which are esteemed by the dominants of the union identity. Therefore, a developed position in the field is shared by developing states who have the potential to answer international law by way of certain values beyond their economic qualification and ideological competence.

Ultimately, to prove the potential of social capital for the transformation of the political identity of state, an exchange system between the developed and developing states and its symbolic construction in the international field should be considered. Similar to the

other exchange system between dominant and dominated identities in other social groups,[33] in order to have a recognized position in the international field states take part in a structured exchange system in international relations. Because of the structured nobility of domination, the symbolic dispositions of states embody the values of symbolic capital in accordance with the structured rules of domination and its international law. However, the structuring feature of social capital reveals to us that the exchange system of the international field can be subject to change and transformation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, this transformation of the exchange system become visible. In a nutshell, the embodiment of the distinction between dominated and dominant evolved from the First/Second/Third World to the developing and developed differentiation. In their new positions, developing states re-conceptualize their symbolic dispositions on security and recognition. Formerly, giving military bases to dominant political states within the borders of dominated states was seen as a natural exchange system in exchange for security. In fact, domination symbolically produced its distinction and securitization in this way. In practice, these kinds of actions were seen as presents to show the affiliations of states with a certain security understanding within the international field. The new distinction of developing states transforms this exchange system considerably. The US military invasion in Iraq exercised one of the practical arenas for this change. Although Turkey was one of the prominent actors in these sorts of exchange systems, Turkey did not authorize the use of its territory for the military invasion of Iraq. The new networking system of the developing–developed distinction and its dispositional changes in social capital guided Turkey to produce new dispositions for the understanding of security in the international field. In this way, Turkey took advantage of international law's rule of the inviolability of state borders as a reference which is originally a tool of the dominant nobility in the international field. As a result of this, transforming the understanding of the exchange system evolves the functionality of the structured doxa of international law between developing and developed states.

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[33] For further reading, see Bourdieu (2005).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to think through how it is possible to have a Bourdieusian approach of the state's political identity in international relations. Drawing on the sociological tools of Pierre Bourdieu, it has developed a concept of structural constructivism which aims at bringing the intertwined coexistence of structural and ideational productions into the social bodies of political organizations. The political identity of the state is a collective living social entity which is produced, reproduced and transformed by an inseparable structural embodiment into self-produced knowledge, ideas and dispositions. 'State' here indicates a political agency in the field of the political sphere which, similar to the individuals within a society, forms an identity in relation to others. In this respect, the political identities of agents cannot be considered separately from the embedded structures which unconsciously influence the dispositions of political agency in international relations. As a result, structural constructivism in international relations not only considers state identity in accordance with conscious productions of knowledge in the international field, but also highlights how different agents have different limitations with regards to embedded structures, which results in a differentiation of tendencies in objective political exchanges.

Structural constructivism is based on a spatial or 'field-centred' explanation (Bourdieu, 1984). Therefore, the theoretical implications of structural constructivism depend on a foundation of structural realities. However, these structural realities are not independent from embedded forms of tendencies which form the qualifications of states regarding the production of ideation and identity. In this way, structural constructivism not only improves the interpretive engagements of constructivist international relations, but also avoids the ontological structural dichotomies of materialist and rational international relations. It is important to remember here that structural constructivism emphasizes a distinctive style of structure and identity engagements in international relations. Thus, in line with Bourdieu, we

suggest in this thesis that in order to produce a relevant understanding of the agency and identity problem in international relations, it is necessary to improve a new structure perspective independent from any kind of ontological theorization. By way of the sociological implications of Bourdieu, this thesis implies that we should avoid the inseparable understanding of structure in international relations. It offers to consider the separation between structured structures from structuring structures, which helps us to understand how agency and identity relations differ within the objective field of practices. The thesis emphasizes that materialist rationalist theories and ideational constructivist theories of

international relations actually focus on different structures, which results in an imperfect understanding of identity and agency relations. If one understands the distinguishing effects in the intertwined relations of structuring structures and structured relations, one can have the opportunity to explain the political construction of state subjectivity without any ontological postulate. As a result of this, the research aimed at showing the productivity of structured and structuring structure perspectives within the field of international relations.

The theorization of structures on the distinctive bases of structuring and structured structures helped me to reinterpret the key elements of identity, such as norms, recognitions and classifications. This means that a Bourdieusian structure understanding in international relations also problematizes the fundamental theoretical implications of constructivist perspectives. I illustrated that the claim to moral and normative integration on shared norms (Reus-Smit, 1999) is disposed towards an ontological explanation of rational understanding, because it only evaluates what is found in structuring structures and its available spatial vision and division. However, the political identity of state agency not only reflects the values of interactive socio-spatial productions, but also embodies the historical accumulative social productions found in the unconscious tendencies of states. Morality and normativity are based on the structured effects of history as much as social interactions and exchanges (Bourdieu, 2012; Bourdieu, 2013). To reckon upon interactions should have resulted in the equal positional distribution of identities in international relations. However, the identities of political agents are always parts of a distinguishing vision and division (Bourdieu, 1984). These divisional differences are not subject to the interactive processes of agencies. Indeed, a Bourdieusian structure understanding showed that the tendencies of structured structures form and affect the characteristics of vision and division in identities. The embedded unconscious tendencies of agents define the quality of structuring structure and agent engagements, which produce and reproduce values of vision and division. In this respect, beyond the conscious interactions of states, the structured limitations of history constitute limitations of states which define states' qualities of interpretation with regards to their own identity. Therefore, interactions between the states always produce and reproduce norms which affect the characteristics of recognitions. However, limited interpretation quality between states results in division within the distinctive positions, although states participate in the structuring process of produced norms. Owing to structured structures, states unconsciously produce disadvantaged positions for themselves, and also allow an advantaged vision and division for the positions of other states within the same political spatiality of international relations.

It is clear in this research that I considered identity as the objectified forms of dispositions which depend on an embodiment of accumulated historical structures (Bourdieu, 1990b). Thus, interest and interaction relations do not comprehensively explain state identity. The interactive processes of states are not independent from the unconscious pressure of historical structures. As a result, the interests of states not only indicate mutual exchange processes but also produce the unconscious embedded limits of states. In this respect, I have also developed the consideration of identity as a symbolic power which does not rely on the interests of states because the interests of states mostly explain the positional distribution of states; identity indicates how well states embody different forms of capital. Interests do not indicate states' identities but identity defines states' positions, which determine the limits and characteristics of the interests. Consequently, identity as a symbolic power constructs vision and division, which distinguish identities with regards to domination. Symbolic power in the characteristics of identity continually produces and reproduces symbolic violence, which distributes recognition between the political subjects. Symbolic violence is reproduced by way of orienting the unconscious dispositions and then imposing an embedded division of domination. Such a production process, I have argued, is necessary to objectify the hierarchical distribution of positions in international relations. I have also argued that subjects/states as the producers of their own identities never obtain identical structural tendencies and, therefore, the dispositions of states represent a symbolic vision and division of domination. In this way, because the distinctive embodiment of dispositions defines the positional distribution of state identity, which indicates the relative independence and dependence of states from the structuring symbolic violence of the international field.

In line with constructivism, the interactions of states should be seen as a productive force of common practices and norms in the field of states. However, the subjective capital of states distinguishes the interpretive qualifications of states. In this way, my approach identified the functionalization of identity as symbolic power. I have argued that, while political identity functions as the legitimization of embedded domination for some states, it represents the embodiment of symbolic violence for other states within the same international field. I have argued that historical changes in political subjects and their characteristics of structure–agency relations do not transform this functionalization of symbolic violence. I have shown that interactions between political identities always objectify a distinctive form of recognition which legitimizes particular forms of symbolic violence between all of the subjects in the field. Consequently, the sovereignty of modern states represents a sort of legitimization which creates a certain vision of division and its symbolic violence of

domination. Therefore, identity may be subject to change but, due to the unequal distribution of structured structures in the identity of political subjectivity, interrelations between domination, legitimate symbolic power and violence will be continually reproduced in different characteristics and forms.

I have shown how the Bourdieusian understanding of field must adapt to contribute to structure and state relations. Whilst my fundamental aim in this research is to transfer a Bourdieusian structural constructivist approach into the field of international relations, I have also considered that this approach will not achieve a counter-concept to the existing literature; rather, it will contribute inadequate applications of identity and structure relations in the constructivist understanding. In this way, I utilize a Bourdieusian understanding of field in order to show that international relations is a sphere which consists of many different fields of struggle. These different fields of struggle are distributed in accordance with the accumulated amount of dispositions in accumulated historical social structure (Bourdieu, 1986). The amount of compatibility/incompatibility between accumulated history and structuring objective field indicates which positions political subjects take within the sphere of international relations. By utilizing Bourdieu's field approach, developed in this research alongside the state 'capital' concept of Bourdieu in relation to the political identities of states, I also illustrated how 'field' defines the relative categorization of state identity. In doing this, my objective was to contribute a construction of power relations in accordance with the characteristics of classification in different fields of struggle.

In relation to Bourdieu's field concept, I have discussed the similarities in field and agency relations between pre-modern political subjectivity and modern state identity. I have argued that the differentiation in political organization and subject does not change the fundamental fields of struggles, but as the sphere of international relations expand, the quantity and quality regarding relations and subjects enhance. Therefore, struggles in political, economic, social and cultural fields exist in every agency–structure relation regardless of the historical term of political engagement (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). In addition to this, I have also considered that distinctive subjectivity and its political field in history always produce a different form of nobility which constitutes relevant power relations, classification and domination within the international field. Consequently, I focused on the functionality of nobility with regards to the reproduction of political identity. Indeed, nobility composes forms of norm and recognition which define all organized principles regarding the divisionary function of political identity. In this way, modern state identity is constructed on a distinctive form of nobility which consists of a distinctive sovereign space and its divisionary

norms. However, I also discussed that produced nobility does not signify all members of states, because of the gap between their available dispositions and expected values of produced nobility. Therefore, the nobility of international relations results in obedience to symbolic domination and the classification of state identities. As a result of this, in the international field the identities of states are distributed by the symbolic violence of structuring nobility before they produce their interpretive interests and mutual relations.

In order to develop the conceptual framework utilized in this research, I also problematized the understanding of reality in international relations via Bourdieusian sociological understanding (Bourdieu, 1995a). Because of the dispositional inequality between the states, states' identities are linked to different positions in the field of practice. I argued that dispositional differences are contributed by different rules of the game as social realities which function as sources for political constraints or the symbolic violence of state identities in accordance with their positioning in the dominated–dominant relations of the field. On this point, I meant that, contrary to realist and rationalist approaches, the positioning of states in the international field is independent from the structural deterministic rules, but, due to the differentiated compatibility of states regarding structured nobility, realities in international relations are reproduced by dispositional constraints which are derived from the unequal foundation of structured structures within the dispositions of different state identities. Furthermore, I emphasized that these dispositional constraints always exist under the exchange system of a patriarchal balance. A patriarchal system of balance is distinctively reproduced in every historical system of political organization because this system defines the realities that indicate how political subjects exchange knowledge in accordance with their determined positioning and its limited engagement of nobility. In other words, the reproduction of patriarchal systems in different forms defines the expected behaviour schemes of different positioned subjects within dominant–dominated relations from primitive communities to the modern state system.

In addition to Bourdieu's field and reality understanding, I also utilized the Bourdieusian understanding of habitus within the field of international relations. I argued that habitus is the way to create a mediator role between the objective and subjective structures of political agents. In line with the Bourdieusian concept of habitus, the objective–subjective duality of international relations is rendered meaningless because habitus helps us to prove the unconscious mutually existing and transitive characteristics of objective and subjective structures. I also showed that there are 'realities' in the field which are not real but which become common sense for all of the members of states. This understanding is derived from

the perception of doxa in Bourdieusian study. Due to these doxic relations with structures, the embodied habitus of political subjects/states produces a compatible knowledge of structures which does not question the classified divisionary and unequal positioning in the international field (Bourdieu, 1995a). By utilizing habitus to refer to the compatibility of state identity and existing doxa of structure, this research also argued that structural domination imposes deterministic characteristics onto the identities of all member states of the international field. In line with this, I described that doxa also provides domination of the symbolic value of language of which all members of states take advantage when they express their conscious interests and actions. As a result of this, Bourdieusian doxa and habitus relations develop a constructivist understanding of norms, because it indicates the unconscious foundation of the political 'feel for the game' beyond a conscious foundation of normative rules in the international field.

Theoretical implications

The objective of the thesis was to research a Bourdieusian understanding of international relations, to understand the concept of state identity and to test the applicability of a structural constructivist perspective beyond the existing constructivist approaches, with specific emphasis on a Bourdieusian concept of capital in a different conceptual framework and exemplification. After I introduced all of the theoretical terminology and illustration in Chapter 2, I engaged different fields of capital, from political and economic to cultural and social capital, in the third, fourth, fifth and sixth chapters respectively. In order to objectify and exemplify the theoretical foundation of research, I utilized a different methodological concept in each chapter between the third and the sixth. After I introduced the framework of existing research and concepts with regards to the concept of state identity, I then researched all of the available Bourdieusian sociological terminology in order to find out the relevant conceptual means of Bourdieu on the field of international relations. The fundamental target was to find out middle and mediator ways between rationalist and constructivist perspectives in order to understand the political subjectivity/state and its identity beyond both interpretive and deterministic explanations of the existing approaches of international relations. Therefore, I reviewed all of the theoretical materials of Bourdieu in the second chapter. Contrary to the common tendency in Bourdieusian literature reviews, which generally evaluates that Bourdieu's approaches are relevant to explain reproduction because they do not provide appropriate answers to how changes come into existence, I have discussed that Bourdieusian

study also consists of relevant theoretical knowledge to identify changes in the concept of political identity. In line with this, I focused on a study of change in political subjectivity.

In Chapter 2, after I rethought the understanding of structure in order to focus on Bourdieusian terminology in line with structure and disposition relations. I identified the distinction of Bourdieu regarding subject–structure relations. In addition to this, I focused on how Bourdieu dealt with the objectivity–subjectivity dichotomy in international relations. I then discussed identity as a symbolic value. State identity, as created by the symbolic values of habitus, plays a significant role in constructing interests, visions and divisions. Moreover, I have discussed the understanding of changes in state identity. I focused on the functionality of Bourdieusian 'capital' for the reinterpretation of changes in political subjects and their identities. I have proved that the forms on which political recognition constructed compromise a number of unconscious symbolic values which objectify a certain combination and amount of capital allocation as the legitimate interests in order to have recognized positions within the political field. These forms play a constitutive role in the foundation of coercive institutional realities, because the distinction between the capital allocation of political identities and structured realities results in a division of identities in accordance with a constructed domination. In this way, I argued that, in line with accumulated history, how the identity of political subjectivity transformed into the modern state form and its state identity. I theorized that the modern state identity relies on changes in the embodied capital allocations of political subjects which transform the form and distribution of structural organizations, interests and divisions. In line with the transformation in the vision of political subjects, modernity created a new harmony of justification which renders symbolic violence and the divisionary positioning of structure invisible. Therefore, owing to changes in familiarized and structured capital allocation, modern state identity and positional distribution are embodied by states which have achieved a recognized positioning in a new definition of the political field called international relations. I have tried to show some historical proofs that, for example, religion took an important place in the capital allocation of the medieval feudal king's political identity, but it then lost it place in the capital allocation of modern state identity.

I have also tried to discuss the potential transformations of state identity beyond the international field of modernity. I have argued that the contemporary structuring field is experiencing a changing interpretation of capital allocation which depends on a distinctive style of political recognition and legitimization. When the new allocation of political subjectivity and its identity influenced the structuring structures, it firstly tried to render political identities, divisions and institutionalizations of modern states non-functional and

inoperable. The changing capital allocation of the modern political field is creating new forms of governance which objects to classical modern state subjectivity and its identity, institutionalization and classification of international relations. In this respect, I have argued that changing capital allocation contributes to the construction of socially collective identities, such as the EU, which represents a distinctive capital allocation in a distinctive classification and its field of practice. Indeed, I hypothesized that political identity in a globalizing world is creating a new form of nobility which constitutes a distinctive legitimacy beyond the sovereignty of modern state identity. This nobility of the globalizing world functions as forms of symbolic violence or domination in accordance with a new political vision and division in the international field of practice. I asserted that the new capital allocation of the post-structural world contributes to a new harmonization of discursive doxic realities and dispositions of state identity beyond any constructive knowledgeable consciousness of states. Consequently, I also emphasized that this process renders the justification and legitimacy forms of modern state identity obsolete in a new supranational – as well as micro-localized – field of struggles.

In Chapter 2, I also discussed the habitus and field approaches of Bourdieu in order to reconsider offering the theoretical framework of the research. The target was to find out the unconscious existences of structural and constructive elements in the formation and change of state identity. I highlighted that the habitus and field approaches of the Bourdieusian concept contribute to an unconscious transitivity between the dispositions of states and structuring norms of international relations. By reviewing the Bourdieusian approaches, the most fundamental and distinguishing basis of the research beyond constructivist understanding was to see the states as social entities, consisting of organized social groups, which have their own habitus, dispositions and capital allocations similar to other social entities within the social spaces. This proved that states, as the modern objects of political subjectivity, can form their own sense of limits, sense of reality and unconscious misrecognition, which produce their positioning before they practise their capital allocation within the power relations of domination in the structuring field. I have argued that the structured characteristics of limits are found in states' own habitus; they are unconsciously externalized throughout field and habitus relations in structuring international relations. In this way, I tried to emphasize the similarities of a patriarchal system of exchanges within primitive family–clan political subjectivity and the modern political subjectivity of the state. While constructivist identity consideration in international relation focuses on the consciousness of subjects and norms, the Bourdieusian study of the habitus field relations provides a theoretical expansion for us to

understand state identity and the existence of power relations as in some way the genealogy of states' own unconsciousness of self-limitation.

After the theoretical framework, I focused on the descriptive chapters of research in order to examine the applicability of Bourdieusian terminology and structural constructivism in the practical field of international relations. The first important conclusion derived from the descriptive chapters is the functionality and characteristics of the bureaucratic field, as the bearer of political capital. Here I fundamentally discussed that political capital frames collective beliefs regarding the classification of states via rituals and organized forms of norms. In this respect, when states are involved in practical struggles, they do not question the classified characteristics of structure because collective beliefs have already formed the realities of the objective world as ethical principles of exchanges. The existences of political subjects and their particular identities in a defined political field means that certain interests of domination are successfully represented as the interests and values of all subjects, because this particularity accomplishes the normalization and legitimacy of unequal classified forms in the identities of every member subject. Therefore, I inferred that power in international relations is not constituted by the conscious interests of states because interests are forms of the habitual tendencies of state capacities regarding the objectification capacity of legitimization in political capital. These particularities are continuously reproduced by political subjects and identities at every stage of history, because, as a result of a lack of self-reflexivity, every kind of political agency, from family and clan to the modern state, is incapable of producing conscious knowledge regarding positions and classifications. In accordance with this, I discussed how the genetics of modern international laws prove this lack of self-reflexivity in state identities. I also researched that the universalization of particularity requires well-defined political dispositions which need to have an organizational basis in the international field. In line with Bourdieu, I indicated the functions of the bureaucratic field as producers and bearers of political dispositions in international relations. All of these Bourdieusian descriptive tools helped me to improve a methodological concept of political capital by the way of the globalization discussions. Beyond the existing reading of globalization, particularly in constructivist international relations, I evaluated current globalization as a new form of symbolic violence which serves for a distinctive political identification, subjectivity and bureaucratic field beyond modern state identity. The most visible peculiarity of this new bureaucratic field is based on its capital allocation, which relies on economic capital contrary to the prominent roles of ideological and cultural capital in the capital allocation of modern state identity. As a result of this, I also reach a conclusion that the

changing bureaucratic field impairs doxic normative constitutions of the modern international field.

Another important conclusion derived from research on economic capital proved that Bourdieusian political economy in international relations contributes to the existing constructivist international political economy. By considering Bourdieusian political economy, I discussed that economic capital not only contributes to economic interactions between states, but also relies on the structured structures which represent divisions of state positions. In this respect, by occupying a certain positioning in the international field, states objectify their dispositional tendencies of economic capital before they produce their conscious interactions. Therefore, I argued that the economic interests of states originate from the dispositional and unconscious ideations which represent states' positioning in the international field. As a result of this, I also questioned whether the constructivist understanding of norms is unable to express the economic interests of states because the economic capital of states is fundamentally derived from taken-for-granted knowledge represented by the doxic realities of the international economic field. These doxic realities form the economic interests of states before they produce interactions in the international field. In this way, I inferred that the cultural capital of states also have central roles in producing meaningful economic interests because states in the same international field are involved in the same taken-for-granted reflexes of economics, but only few states' cultural capital support compatible nobility. Indeed, states interact in capitalist forms of practices but the cultural language of capitalism is unequally found in the identities of states. In line with these discussions, moreover, I indicated how contemporary neoliberal economy impairs the *sense of limits* of modern state-based economic capital. Through a Bourdieusian lens, I basically examined that the neoliberal economy imagines a distinctive economic field and doxic realities, which aim to quash all collective bases and institutions of modern state identities. I also discussed that neoliberalism produces its vision and division via the new forms of symbolic violence which de-function the economic field of modernity.

The other two important components of state identity in this research were cultural and social capital, which examined via the methodological concepts of democratization and the developing state respectively. In line with the Bourdieusian framework, I discussed that the limits and borders of state identity depend on cultural capital. Cultural capital is embedded in the pre-reflexive strategies of states, which contribute to the hierarchy of values. These pre-reflexive strategies of states are called habitus, which produces inequality in the self-reflexivity of identity. In this way, cultural capital actually represents struggles on the

legitimate interpretations of identity and its institutionalization (Swartz, 1998). At this point, I questioned the representation of morality in constructivist ideas, because I examined that morality mostly functions as the superiority of a state or states regarding the universalization of its particular cultural capital. Indeed, when all states define their identity by way of the same sovereignty understanding, they unconsciously embody certain states' supremacy of cultural capital because they have to interpret their identity via certain cultural values which have already been accomplished by the dominant states. Therefore, the reproduction of state identity is always embedded in dominated–dominant relations which misrecognize inequalities in cultural capital as the morality of the international field. Thus, I also examined the role of cultural capital with regards to the reproduction and change of structured hierarchy. Afterwards, I discussed Bourdieusian forms of cultural capital, which helped me to understand how these forms are found in the field of international relations. In order to understand these forms of cultural capital, I took advantage of the contemporary democratization understanding as a methodological concept which differently functions as cultural capital for domination and symbolic violence for dominated state identities. In addition to this, I also argued that, similar to individuals in societies, states distinguish their identity in accordance with produced social networking and relations. Indeed, I averred that state identities struggle to produce better social capital allocations in the field of international relations. Because of a lack of networking, social capital imposes an unequal distribution of subjective mater ials, which results in a stratification of the states. Social capital imposes certain networking styles which contributes to domination (Bourdieu, 1986). Here I argued that, when institutionalization was based on nationalism, certain European states constructed better social networking because they had already embodied legitimate justifiable bases of nationalistic values in comparison with other states. In this way, I inferred that social capital interprets the nobility of certain states as the legitimate networking styles of the international field. I tried to exemplify these functions of social capital via a methodological concept of the Third World state because the Third World concept indicates a categorization and positioning of states in accordance with their superiority/inadequacy in the networking of social capital.

Findings of the research

The main lesson derived from this research is to see that Bourdieu in international relations impairs objectivity and subjectivity duality. By way of Bourdieu, it is possible to overcome objective–subjective duality without involvement in any ontological consideration of state subjectivity and identity. In particular, differentiating between structuring and structuring

structures is a very productive theoretical expansion to find out the intertwined coexistence in the process of identity production. Relying on a pure understanding of ideas and knowledge with regards to the identity of states in international relations results in focusing on the ongoing objective structures of the international field, and, therefore, this impairs the predetermined functionalities of structured structures on the productions of states' interests and identities. Here Bourdieu distinctively shows us how to see the unconscious, unequal and classified foundation of states' structuring relations. In practice, the interactions of states are essential to produce conscious interests and identities, but states do not have the same capital allocation to form the same successful and equal participation in the process of interest and identity productions. States have unconscious and structured forms of dispositions which create symbolic political categorization and positioning before they interact each other. By way of Bourdieu, I inferred that it is true that the meaning of ideas and identities is derived from the interactions of states, but, because of the unconscious and unequal distribution of dispositions derived from structured structures, states embody a limited amount of capital allocation which restrains the state from participating equally in the production of meaning.

In addition to the finding above, this research improved a Bourdieusian perspective which resolves the ontological fallacy and dilemma in the constructivist perspective. In line with rationalist international relations perspectives, constructivism similarly defines the international field by way of anarchy, despite that fact that its understanding of anarchy is not based on a pure materialistic understanding. I found that the Bourdieusian understanding of field and habitus perspectives are very productive to come off this constructivist dilemma. On this point, I justified that the international field is not an anarchical sphere in both cultural and objective senses. States, as modern political subjects, are conscious about what they observed in structuring structures, but they are unconscious about their dispositional habitus, which promotes their positioning in interactions of field. In this respect, if a state lacks the appropriate capital allocation of habitus derived from an unconscious embodiment of structured structures, the structuring world of interactions produces inconvenience of practices, as like a 'social and political anomia', and, therefore, the structuring world becomes symbolic violence for this state. Consequently, I discussed that the inconvenience of states is derived from habitual limits and constraints of structured structure before they produce a meaning of anarchy in interactions. In this way, I inferred that structured structures do not materialistically characterize the nature of states, but they symbolically constitute and affect states' perceptions, which unconsciously produce dispositions of symbolic violence as opposed to the superiority of domination in structured capital allocation. In other words, the

unconscious foundation of structured history in state dispositions impairs theorization of any ontological consideration of conscious/interactional or material/genetic understanding of anarchy in international relations.

Through a Bourdieusian lens, I also found out the necessity and appropriateness of a structural constructivist understanding of international relations. As I discussed in the paragraph above, it is not possible to explain the foundation of state subjectivity and identity by looking only at the interactions or structures of the international field. The constructivist side of Bourdieusian conceptualization provides a basis for understanding the state as a social entity, similar to individuals living in a society, which is limited by habitus and its objective positioning in the field of struggles. In other words, states have habitus which affects their perception of interest and identities. The structural side of Bourdieusian theorization reminds me that states unconsciously produce structured violence, vision and division which are not genetic characteristics of state identity, but rather practical tendencies of the past history of habitus originating from a limited distribution of dispositional knowledge and doxic experiences into the identities of states. Therefore, Bourdieu helped me to understand the foundation of past experiences, visions and divisions in the conscious interactions of states within totally social processes without applying any ontological postulate, and also structuring the character of interactions for the future characterization of political identity without forgetting the double-structured foundation of the objective international field. An important theoretical result derived from this is that states do not always have constitutive control over their interests and ideas, because the symbolic foundation of the past evaluates their identities in accordance with the foundation of past domination into their dispositions. Indeed, interactions produce meanings of identities but only some states, which have a considerable amount symbolic capital, can define the meaning of identities; many others can only apply and use these produced meanings, which become the symbolic violence of their struggles in the international field.

Another important finding of the research is to see that we should act with suspicion towards shared ideas of the international field. States embody pre-given and misrecognized tendencies of accumulated history, derived from structured structures, which are represented by shared ideas, and, then, institutionalized by objective norms. Therefore, social construction is generally interested in the construction of knowledge and its institutionalization, but fails to notice structural influences in the 'construction of constructors' and their identities. Different states are equipped with a distinctive and restricted amount of capital which originates from accumulated history. This inequality in the distribution of accumulated historical knowledge

and experience in state identity results in an unequal participation of shared ideas, which means a simple confirmation of produced knowledge rather than a co-production of the common knowledge of the international field. Consequently, the restricted structured qualification of state identity affects creators'/states' perceptions with regards to their own identity. States form their knowledge in line with their limited dispositions in their habitus, which imposes a consensus on distinctions and divisions in the international field. Therefore, shared ideas also mean a consensus on positioning in the international field. For example, one of the inseparable principles of being a state is to have a group of people called nations. This principle actually represents the knowledge and experience of European states, but it is also confirmed by other states even though they do not take the same form of national identity. The UAE and Kuwait have *tebaa* (people) instead of citizens, but, in order to confirm the shared ideas of the international field, they embody a shared knowledge of the international field regarding nationality. Similarly, many subjects of shared ideas in the international field, such as human rights and free trade, were fundamentally produced by only a limited number of states, but these principles became the shared ideas of all members of international relations. As a result, shared knowledge is mainly an *illusio* which produces a structuring qualification of domination and its classification.

A Bourdieusian international relations perspective also helps to question the understanding of culture in international relations. The existing constructivist literature in international relations interprets culture in accordance with the existence of anarchy in the field. However, Bourdieu conceptualizes that the existence of division and classification in the field depends on forms of structured nobility which distinguish some members of the field from all other members. Thus, I infer that nobility is a subjective state derived from a distinction between states' dispositions and realities of classification and domination called doxa. Although nobility is successfully represented and, therefore, accomplished by only particular states, all of the states of the international field struggle to obtain the same nobility. Nobility functions as a sum of realities, which results in the legalization of a differentially distributed state positioning. Struggling for the same nobility also means a subjective adoption of domination and dominated relations because doxa unconsciously imposes a certain nobility of domination which is obeyed by all of the states. Consequently, this helped me to realize that the existence of anarchy does not depend on the form of culture that states have internalized in interaction with each other. Before states produce ideas and identities in interactive ways, they embody some structured tendencies of habitus which restrict their engagements with the appropriate behaviour scheme of nobility. In this respect, anarchy

depends on a distinction between a legitimate nobility, derived from the habitual tendencies of a certain culture and its states. Therefore, the struggles of nobility are related to incompatible habitual dispositions of structured structures in the habitus of states. In this way, ideas and interactions are not adequate to understand anarchy, because, without having the appropriate habitual tendencies of legitimate nobility, states cannot produce self-reflexive ideas and interests regarding their positioning in international relations. As consensus with regards to certain nobility continues, nobility functions as a form of symbolic violence for some states, having a disadvantaged position in the political interactions in the field. As a result of this, we cannot define any culture of anarchy by looking only at the construction of identities; we also see a distinction between the dispositional habitus of states and structured nobility which causes potential anarchy in international relations. Thus, anarchy is not only constructional and cultural but it is also a structured phenomenon. Democracy is a peculiar example of this claim. Although states principally defend democracy as a value of identity, a great number of these states do not operate democracy because of the gap between their disposed habitus, having incapable capital allocation and structured nobility; they defend democracy out of loyalty to a dominant group of states which have achieved appropriate capital allocation in international relations.

Culture, derived from the habitual unconscious tendencies of states, is no less important than culture, which is derived from interactions. It is true that interactions produce ideas and knowledge, but they also objectify the subjective embodiment of states in the field. States promote the knowledge production processes of the field in accordance with their capital. Owing to the fact that capital allocation symbolizes structured limitations, visions and division, the culture of interactions also objectifies the visions and divisions of the symbolic field. In other words, interactions cannot directly produce classifications and divisions; they only objectify structured symbolic habitus. On this point, Bourdieu distinctively indicates the importance and limit of the self-reflexivity of subjects regarding their own identity. Realizing a high level of self-reflexivity results in a better positioning with regards to the reproduction of self-identity. Otherwise, state identity is predisposed by the pressures of the structured nobility and the tendencies of habitus. In this way, when a state reflects its dispositions it also examines the structured classification of domination. In this respect, I inferred that existing constructivist approaches generally focus on the structuring world, which is constituted by the relation of the systems of modern European culture and states; therefore, they are only relevant to obtaining a comprehensive understanding of European and Anglo-Saxon states and identities. Owing to the domination of structured habits, the remaining identities of states

outside the domain of European relations are unable to promote a conscious culture of the field. At this point, Bourdieusian self-reflexivity understanding questions the Europeanized constructivist understanding of the state, and, therefore, provides a more comprehensive understanding of culture, structure and identity relations, which indicates not only a positioning of domination but also examines the positioning and limitations of states in the dominated field of practice. In practical international relations, this inadequacy of constructivism is particularly observed by many structuring organs of the international field such as the United Nations. Although the identities of many states, culturally and habitually, are derived from undemocratic characteristics, all of the states in in the United Nations General Assembly obey and practise democratic delegation systems, because their disposed culture does not provide any appropriate way to promote the structuring norms in international relations. Consequently, a Bourdieusian understanding of culture and self-reflexivity in structuring and structured structures explains why a state that has undemocratic characteristics in its habitus needs to obey democratic rules and exchanges if their identities are tyrannized by the characteristics of the undemocratic dispositions in their habitus.

Bourdieusian international relations produces a better understanding with regards to reproduction and change in international relations. The embedded nobility of domination and its doxic realities impose certain exchange systems as legitimate forms of interactions in the international field. By way of these exchange systems, dominants legitimate their ideations of classification and division, which guarantee distinguishing positions of domination in the field. By creating defined roles subject to particular exchange forms, domination reproduces its distinctions as a patriarchal role in the field. Owing to the fact that states struggle to achieve the same nobility, which is formed by the habitual tendencies of structured domination, they lack self-reflexive insights into their dominated positioning in the exchange systems. Indeed, when the states struggle for the nobility of domination, they have to apply the language created by domination. In this respect, the language of domination cannot provide any productive tool to operate a self-reflexive insight into their own state identities. Consequently, states are subject to a practical sense of self and otherness before they produce conscious interactions. On the other hand, despite the fact that reproduction is a more common peculiarity in subject–object relations in a Bourdieusian perspective, Bourdieu does not exclude the possibility of a potential transformation of identities. Fundamentally, in order to enhance the changes of political subjectivity, subjects need to improve a self-reflexive understanding with regards to their own identities and positions. As I discussed in this research, Bourdieu describes such a transformation as a crisis situation in the field. When a

state achieves an appropriate capital allocation in order to improve a self-reflexive insight into habitual structured limitations and classifications, it begins to question the embedded forms of interactions and exchanges, and, therefore, it impairs the legitimacy of dominant nobility. Consequently, changes in international relations depend on a self-reflexive insight into the vision and division of structured structures in habitus, which results in struggles for the changes of institutional norms and ideas in structuring structures.

Eventually, another very important finding of this research is that Bourdieusian sociological terminology is very productive for reinterpreting the existing discussions and also for creating a new distinctive field of perspectives in international relations. Bourdieu provides rich theoretical concepts and research tools which not only contribute to identity and state subjectivity but also answer many other theoretical questions in international relations. In particular, field, capital and habitus are very productive theoretical tools for understanding power domination and classification in international relations. Furthermore, symbolic violence, nobility and doxa relations are also essential theoretical concepts for reinterpreting the structure and agency relations of international relations, which highlight how the institutionalization of international field, especially norms and sovereignty, can be identified. In addition to this, identifying state identity in accordance with struggles on not only political and economic capital, but also social and cultural capital, is also relevant to understanding how the bureaucratic field is reproduced and transformed. Unconsciousness in disposition and habitus relations is important to research future expansions in the stratification of globalizing political identity and its international relations imagination. To sum up, beyond the existing international relations approaches, Bourdieu provides appropriate knowledge for evaluating states as a social organism, consisting of the totalized structured habitus of different social groups.

Suggestions for further engagements

Despite the importance and relevance of the concept of state identity in this research, several points of criticism may be noted. These points emphasize some limitations of my research on state identity. Firstly, the political identity of a state depends on the perspective that states behave like social entities. Because my main purpose is to research political subjectivity in line with Bourdieu, I did not discuss the rationality and foundation of states as social entities. In other words, I did not comprehensively work on why we need to conceptualize states as a social organism even though this is, in practice, an organizational organ of political subjectivity. Therefore, further research can be produced on the social characteristics of states,

especially in relation with a Bourdieusian understanding of the bureaucratic field. A second limitation is based on a historical evaluation of political identity. I conceptualized that Bourdieu offers better insights into the reproductions and changes of political identity, which can provide a theoretical expansion to research how modern state identity changes in the future. On the other hand, I did not consider the situation in which identity is reproduced and changed. It requires critical insights into the conditions of reproduction and change, which result in the transformation of political identities. The third limitation concerns the Bourdieusian concept of capital in different fields of practice. In line with the theoretical establishment of the thesis, I researched state identity in accordance with different forms of capital separately. Due to the time and structural limitations of the thesis, I did not engage the intertwined relations of forms of capital in the bureaucratic fields of states. Consequently, producing some case-based research can be very fruitful to show the intertwined structure of social, cultural, political, symbolic or economic forms of capital.

In this thesis, I have offered a theoretical framework to examine, a distinctive theoretical approach and a Bourdieusian sociologic perspective in international relations. I believe that this framework can be fruitful to develop further research with regards to the theory of international relations. For the fundamental purpose of this research, I have a theoretical perspective on the formation of subjects/states and their identities in a structural constructivist perspective in international relations. However, the structural constructivism approach in international relations still requires further research. I believe that structural constructivism will establish a new theoretical expansion. It should be noted that such research not only improves constructivist theorizing, but also contributes to different critical perspectives of international relations which search for alternative ways of understanding beyond the scientific understanding of realist and rationalist theories.

In a general sense of this thesis, I focused on Bourdieu and his sociological research to understand international relations as the field of practice and state identity as the collective body of struggles on different forms of capital. I researched state identity in relation to a broad conceptual framework of Bourdieu. In this way, I have argued for the applicability and relevance of a peculiar Bourdieusian terminology which I applied through the whole sense of the thesis. I suggest that future research to develop a Bourdieusian sense of international relations is required. Indeed, Bourdieusian international relations is very primitive and, therefore, it is necessary to have further research in order to have comparative findings, derived from different methodological studies of Bourdieu. I would suggest two distinctive forms of Bourdieu and international relations research. Firstly, it would be theoretically

productive to focus on a particular Bourdieusian term in line with a small-scale question of international relations such as a culture of anarchy and symbolic violence. Secondly, I would recommend case studies which specifically apply content and/or discourse analyses. Because of the limited Bourdieusian theoretical engagements in international relations, I construct my study on a broad terminology and theory of Bourdieu. Hence, it is necessary to have a further case-based study to see the applicability of this theoretical framework of the Bourdieusian international relations approach. I believe that many relevant and fruitful contents and discourses can be found to prove the applicability of my theoretical engagement of Bourdieu.

Another interesting research question derived from my experiences in this research is to understand when political identity is reproduced and when it is transformed. I comprehensively focused on the contribution of Bourdieusian study with regards to reproduction and change in political identities. I argued how Bourdieusian study improves our understanding of reproduction and change in the political identities of states. In line with this, new contributions should be done in order to understand the differences between the conditions of reproduction and transformation in detail. In the contemporary world, especially in line with neoliberalism and its field understanding of globalization, a large number of descriptive data will be available to test the differences in the situation of reproduction and changes of state identity. I hope that a Bourdieusian approach would benefit from future advances in the questions of international relations, including state identity, and will complement the existing literature in the field.

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