

BIELEFELD UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCE

Between Rejection and Coping: The Consolidation of Turkish Identity in Germany



Dissertation submitted for the fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (Dr. Phil.)

by

Aydın Bayad

Bielefeld, August 2021

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Declaration of Originality

I hereby declare that I have not submitted the dissertation entitled “Between Rejection and Coping: The Consolidation of Turkish Identity in Germany” either in terms of this current version or another version to any other faculty.

I have written this submitted dissertation independently, using no sources other than those expressly indicated under the guidelines of the 'Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association, Seventh Edition'.

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
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(Aydın Bayad)

Bielefeld,



*This dissertation is dedicated to my young colleagues in Turkey who forcefully drift away
from their academic endeavours to give a voice to peace bravely...*

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Thank goodness! How fortunate I am to owe a thank you to the many people at this point. Without their generous support, patience, guidance and help, this dissertation would be imperfect, as I am. My sincere thanks go to...

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Summary

Starting from a social assimilationist perspective, up to a mutual accommodation of cultures (e.g., integration), the concept and the theory of acculturation passed through several refinements during the last century (Gordon, 1964; Sam & Berry, 2006). A substantial body of literature suggested that integration orientation of individuals (e.g., biculturalism) together with a multiculturalist society is the best practice for minorities regarding health-related, psychological, and socio-cultural adjustment in a globalised world (Berry, 2006; Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005; Kaya, 2019; Kymlicka, 1995; Gaertner et al., 2000; González & Brown, 2006; Nespitt-Larking, 2014). However, Turkish postmigrants' acculturation orientation constitute an exception for the premise of acculturation theory (Sam & Berry, 2006), although, in the early 2000's, significant empirical evidence challenged the assumption about their 'peculiarity' (Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Kaya & Kentel, 2004). Eventually, a 'decline of dual identity' occurred during the last decade, since many studies repeatedly failed to meet the optimistic expectation of biculturalism among Turkish postmigrants (Baysu, Phalet & Brown, 2011; Felischmann, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2013; Leszczensky, 2013; Sauer, 2018; Simon, Reichert & Grabow, 2013).

This dissertation aimed to understand the underlying social-psychological mechanisms of the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants. Relying on the assumptions of rejection-(dis)identification models (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009), we argue that the subjective aspect of rejection rather than objective experience of it, is under jeopardy among Turkish postmigrants that can be associated with extraterritorial outreach attempts of Turkey (Adamson, 2019; Glasius, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b). To this end, we realised a three-year mixed methodological research (1) to contextualise rejection concept via a qualitative study ($n = 26$), (2) to associate demonstrated rejection components with the change in the ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants via a repeated cross-sectional survey ($n = 1093$) and (3) to re-conceptualise the well-known perceived discrimination variable in the light of previous findings via an experimental vignette study ($n = 217$).

In the first study, we employed the stigma-induced identity threat model (Major & O'Brien, 2005) and found that Turkish postmigrants are physically or vicariously *exposed* to maltreatment and *appraise* the danger through personal and social resources and finally *attribute* the harmful incidents to particular agents or sources in order to overcome the adverse effects rejection. This study shows that the fear and concerns of rejection is more widespread than the actual encounter to social exclusion practices (Kloek, Peter and Wagner, 2015). Besides, Turkish postmigrants internalise the stigma of living in a parallel society (Hiscott, 2005) and attribute the rejection to their in-group apart from blaming Germans for rejection (Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002). In the second study, we associated these components of rejection to the change of the ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants between 2008 and 2014 correspond to the shift in diaspora governance of Turkey (Adar, 2019; Arkilic, 2021; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b). As expected, we found that ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants is more sensitive to the subjective components of rejection (e.g., appraisal of threat & causal attribution) rather than the objective rejection experiences. Finally, in the third study, we reconceptualised the discrimination (i.e., Justifiable, Perceived, Structural and Apprehensive) based on a combination of the appraisal of threat and causal attribution, and examined their main as well as interaction effects on the dual identification, political participation and resilience to violent extremism. We found that while a generalised threat (e.g., towards non-Germans) promote national identification, a specific threat (e.g., towards Turks) undermine the same and increase the ethnic identification. Besides, both appraisal of threat and causal attribution have the main effect on political participation, while their interaction only affects resilience to violent extremism.

Our careful investigation clarifies that instead of a decline of dual identity, a consolidation of ethnic identity occurs among Turkish postmigrants (Klein, Spear & Reicher, 2007). Accordingly, their insecure position both within the in-group in the face of extraterritorial outreach policies of Turkey (Adamson, 2019; Glasius, 2018) and the inter groups system in Germany in the face of increased new social exclusion waves (Kaya, 2019;

Ramm, 2010), drive them toward their ethnic identity and detaches them from the national identity. However, our contextualised approach shows that framing the rejection via the loci of appraisal of threat and causal attribution might reverse the current trend of consolidation of Turkish identity in Germany. After the interpretation of diverse findings revealed from different methodologies, we draw a conclusion and discussed the possible policy as well as the scientific recommendations in the last section of the dissertation.

Zusammenfassung

Ausgehend von einer sozialen Assimilationsperspektive bis hin zu einer gleichzeitigen Akkommodation beider Kulturen (z.B. Integration) haben das Konzept und die Theorie der Akkulturation im letzten Jahrhundert mehrere Verfeinerungen durchlaufen (Gordon, 1964; Sam & Berry, 2006). Ein beträchtlicher Teil der Literatur deutet darauf hin, dass die Integrationsorientierung von Individuen (z.B. Bikulturalismus) zusammen mit einer multikulturalistischen Gesellschaft die beste Praxis für Minderheiten in Bezug auf gesundheitliche, psychologische und soziokulturelle Anpassung in einer globalisierten Welt ist (Berry, 2006; Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005; Kaya, 2019; Kymlicka, 1995; Gaertner et al., 2000; González & Brown, 2006; Nespitt-Larking, 2014). Die Akkulturationsorientierung türkischer Postmigranten stellt jedoch eine Ausnahme für die Prämisse der Akkulturationstheorie dar (Sam & Berry, 2006), obwohl Anfang 2000 signifikante empirische Belege die Annahme über ihre "Besonderheit" in Frage stellten (Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Kaya & Kentel, 2004). Letztendlich bestätigte sich im letzten Jahrzehnt der 'Rückgang der dualen Identität' da viele Studien die optimistische Erwartung des Bikulturalismus unter türkischen Postmigranten wiederholt nicht erfüllen konnten (Baysu, Phalet & Brown, 2011; Felischmann, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2013; Leszczensky, 2013; Simon, Reichert & Grabow, 2013).

Ziel dieser Dissertation war es, den zugrundeliegenden sozialpsychologischen Mechanismus des Rückgangs der dualen Identität bei türkischen Postmigranten zu verstehen. Ausgehend von den Annahmen des *Rejection-(Dis-)Identification-Modells* (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009) argumentieren wir, dass eher der subjektive Aspekt der Ablehnung als die objektiven Ablehnungserfahrung unter türkischen Postmigranten gefährdet ist, was mit extraterritorialen Annäherungsversuchen der Türkei in Verbindung gebracht werden kann (Adamson, 2019; Glasius, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b). Zu diesem Zweck realisierten wir eine dreijährige gemischt-methodische Forschung, um (1) das Phänomen der Ablehnung mittels einer qualitativen Studie ($n = 26$) zu kontextualisieren, (2) die nachgewiesenen Ablehnungskomponenten mit der Veränderung

der ethnonationalen Identifikation türkischer Postmigranten mittels einer wiederholten Querschnittsbefragung ($n = 1093$) in Verbindung zu bringen und (3) die bekannte Variable der wahrgenommenen Diskriminierung im Lichte der bisherigen Erkenntnisse mittels einer experimentellen Vignettenstudie ($n = 217$) neu zu konzeptualisieren.

In der ersten Studie verwendeten wir das Modell der Stigma-induzierten Identitätsbedrohung (Major & O'Brien, 2005) und fanden heraus, dass türkische Postmigranten selbst erlebten oder im Umfeld beobachteten Misshandlungen ausgesetzt sind, die Gefahr durch persönliche und soziale Ressourcen einschätzen und schließlich die schädlichen Vorfälle bestimmten Akteuren oder Quellen zuschreiben, um die negativen Auswirkungen der Ablehnung zu überwinden. Diese Studie zeigt, dass die Angst und Sorge vor Ablehnung weiter verbreitet ist als die tatsächliche Begegnung mit sozialen Ausgrenzungspraktiken (Kloek, Peter und Wagner, 2015). Außerdem verinnerlichen türkische Postmigranten das Stigma, in einer Parallelgesellschaft zu leben (Hiscott, 2005) und schreiben Ablehnung ihrer *In-Group* zu, der sie sich zugehörig fühlen (z.B. Türken), abgesehen davon, dass sie Deutsche für die Ablehnung verantwortlich machen (Major, Quinton & McCoy, 2002). In der zweiten Studie bringen wir die aufgedeckten Komponenten der Ablehnung mit dem Wandel der ethnonationalen Identifikation türkischer Postmigranten zwischen 2008 und 2014 in Verbindung, die mit der Veränderung der Diaspora-Regierung der Türkei korrespondiert (Adar, 2019; Arkilic, 2020; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b). Wie erwartet (Huynh et al., 2009), fanden wir heraus, dass die ethnonationale Identifikation von türkischen Postmigranten empfindlicher auf subjektive Komponenten der Ablehnung (z.B. Einschätzung der Bedrohung & Kausalattribution) statt auf objektive Ablehnungserfahrungen reagiert. In der dritten Studie schließlich rekonzeptualisierten wir Diskriminierung (d.h. gerechtfertigt, wahrgenommen, strukturell & ängstlich) auf der Grundlage einer Kombination aus der Einschätzung der Bedrohung und der Kausalattribution und untersuchten deren Haupt- sowie Interaktionseffekte auf die duale Identifikation, politische Partizipation und Resilienz gegenüber gewalttätigem Extremismus. Wir fanden heraus, dass eine generalisierte Bedrohung (z.B. gegenüber Nicht-Deutschen) die

nationale (deutsche) Identifikation fördert, während eine spezifische Bedrohung (z.B. gegenüber Türken) dieselbe untergräbt und die ethnische Identifikation erhöht. Außerdem haben sowohl die Einschätzung der Bedrohung als auch die Kausalattribution den Haupteffekt auf die politische Partizipation, während ihre Interaktion nur die Resilienz gegenüber gewalttätigem Extremismus beeinflusst.

Unsere sorgfältige Untersuchung verdeutlicht, dass anstelle eines Rückgangs der dualen Identität eine Konsolidierung der ethnischen Identität unter türkischen Postmigranten stattfindet (Klein, Spear & Reicher, 2007). Dementsprechend treibt ihre unsichere Position sowohl innerhalb der In-Group angesichts der extraterritorialen Annäherungspolitik der Türkei (Adamson, 2019; Glasius, 2018) als auch des Inter-Group-Systems in Deutschland angesichts vermehrter neuer sozialer Ausgrenzungswellen (Kaya, 2019; Ramm, 2010), sie zu ihrer ethnischen Identität und löst sie von der nationalen Identität. Unser kontextualisierter Ansatz zeigt jedoch, dass die Rahmung der Ablehnung über die Loci der Bedrohungseinschätzung und Kausalattribution den aktuellen Trend der Konsolidierung der türkischen Identität in Deutschland umkehren könnte. Nach der Interpretation der verschiedenen Befunde, die sich aus den unterschiedlichen Methoden ergeben, ziehen wir ein Fazit und diskutieren im letzten Abschnitt der Dissertation mögliche politische sowie wissenschaftliche Empfehlungen.

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CHAPTER-ONE: INTRODUCTION

1. Prologue

The picture on the cover was taken in a rally when nearly 40.000 people gathered at Cologne-Deutz to show their support to the Turkish government, more precisely, president Erdoğan in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in 2016. More interestingly, two simultaneous demonstrations occurred on the same day in different parts of the city against the pro-Erdoğan rally; one was by right-wing groups with Islamophobic banners, and the other was by a combination of left-wing groups with anti-fascist banners. How come the extreme poles of the political spectrum came together in order to stand against the mobilisation of a transnational community that used to live for more than four decades in the same country. Putting the common ground of extreme political poles of Germany aside, this dissertation is devoted to understanding the other side of the coin from the point of view of those who are intended to be integrated. How Turkish identity that once used to be associated with being 'lowest of the low' in Germany (Wallraff, 1988) can unify, protect, and mobilise people to challenge both extremes of majority by virtue of the shield-like body cover out of red Turkish flag?

The 'peculiarity' of Turkish migration and postmigrants seldom rely on empirical facts. Rather, their socio-demographical transformation barely differs from other migrant populations (Diehl, 2006), even though they might have lived in a unique transnational 'corridor' that had been imagined linking western European industrialism with traditional Anatolian lifestyle. However, social psychological investigations, supposedly relying on universalist assumptions (Bhatia & Ram, 2001), report the case of Turkish migrants as an 'exception' for acculturation (Sam & Berry, 2006). Besides, recent scholarly works underline a 'decline of dual identity' among Turkish communities, obstructing their integration as well as naturalisation process (McFadden, 2019; Sauer, 2018). In this dissertation, we postulate that a contextualised approach may better illuminate the social-psychological mechanism

that counterintuitively drives people towards their ethnic identity instead of national identity after four decades of economic, social, and psychological strain for adjustment.

In the first chapter, we reviewed the literature on the essential theories and concepts employed in this dissertation, together with a historical background of the target population. In the second chapter, we presented a qualitative field study, a correlational repeated cross-sectional survey study, and a vignette experiment conducted with a Turkish sample. We incorporated the findings derived from different methodologies to arrive at a holistic interpretation in the third chapter.

2. From Assimilation to Acculturation: Transformation of Cultural Encounter

The first use of the ‘acculturation’ concept goes back to the 19th century’s anthropological interpretation of cultural evolution. For instance, McGee (1898) stated that ‘... the long course of human *acculturation* beginning with savagery and coming up to enlightenment (p.249) is a complex but linear process. Sociologists, on the other hand, preferred to use ‘assimilation’ to define ‘... amalgamation of heterogeneous ethnic elements’ resulting in civilisation (Simons, 1901, p.793). For a long time, these diverse concepts of the colonial era were used interchangeably in Europe and were the source of the social assimilationist approach stemming from a unidirectional assumption of growth, welfare, and prosperity that even today shapes the mainstream idea of social integration of immigrants (Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Viruell-Fuentes, Miranda, & Abdulrahim, 2012). For instance, according to Gordon (1964), the social integration of immigrants in western countries towards cultural patterns of host society will ‘naturally’ follow once structural/economic integration is achieved.

Sam (2006) postulates that one of the reasons for the confusion of assimilation and acculturation terms - that can also be seen as the reason for its commonality in the literature and broader society - was the assumption of the willingness of the non-dominant group to become economically, socially, and culturally similar to the dominant group. However, Teske and Nelson (1974) carefully assessed the literature and showed that this is not always the

case for both assimilated and acculturated groups. Besides, among various factors, the acceptance by the dominant group was essential for assimilated individuals or groups, although it was not crucial for acculturated ones. Their multidimensional comparison also distinguished the directionality of these concepts and clarified the phenomenon as we understand today: unidirectional adaptation of a foreign culture (i.e., assimilation) versus the bidirectional influence of cultures (i.e., acculturation). Thereby, actual acculturation, as Sam (2006) put it, should build upon *contact*, *reciprocal influence*, and *change*, namely the building blocks of acculturation, stemming from the interaction between individuals and/or groups from different cultures sharing the same time frame and space.

The conceptual clarification in the 80s widened the scope of acculturation studies because not only indigenous people, but also sedentary ethnic and cultural minorities, transnational migrants/refugees and their children, as well as international travellers/expats, expose to cultural encounters and change in one way or another. According to Berry (1997), during the 20th century, the idea of a unicultural society came to an end. Instead, plural societies, where more than one cultural, linguistic or religious groups living together, became the norm due to advanced worldwide travelling and migration. Psychological acculturation emerged from this context of pluralistic societies to understand affective, behavioural, and cognitive, (i.e., ABCs of acculturation) changes in the psychology of an individual that eventually contribute to the adaptation of individuals and/or groups to 'fit into' a specific social or cultural milieu (Ward, 2001).

Coming from a cross-cultural psychology tradition, John W. Berry tried to explain the influence of culture on human behaviour during the acculturation process with his seminal work. According to him, despite the "... variations in factors leading to acculturation... the basic process of adaptation appears to be common in all these groups" (Berry, 1997, p.9). He postulated a taxonomy of behaviours and attitudes, known as acculturation orientations, as a reaction to two simultaneous issues that manifest from any cultural encounter: *cultural maintenance of original culture* versus *participation in a foreign culture*. Accordingly, personal characteristics such as values, attitudes and identity

would pass through a series of changes during acculturation of individuals' as well as groups' acculturation orientations (Berry, 2006). In this taxonomy (see, Figure 1), *assimilation strategy* corresponds to a departure from one's original culture while seeking interaction with the foreign culture. In contrast, *separation strategy* corresponds to keeping a close tie with the authentic culture while avoiding interaction with the foreign culture. When there is no interest in or the possibility of maintaining the original culture and interaction with the foreign culture, individuals and/or groups find themselves in *marginalisation strategy*. Finally, *integration strategy* corresponds to a mutual accommodation of both cultures by the individual. The taxonomy of acculturation orientations is found as a convenient model by the diverse scientific communities from communication sciences to social psychology (Pitts, 2017). Besides, it has been used not only to examine ethnocultural minorities' attitudes but also transferred into the larger society as *transnational expectations* (Berry, 2003) or *acculturation ideologies* (Horenczyk, 1996).




Figure 1. Berry's Taxonomy of Acculturation Orientations.

Note: The four acculturation orientations result from the two dimensions shown on the axes: how much importance individuals give to maintaining their own culture ('degree of cultural maintenance, horizontal axis) and how much importance they give to establishing interactions with other cultures ('interaction cultural interaction, vertical axis).

Nevertheless, individuals might have more than one strategy with different degrees since the issues of maintenance and participation are simultaneous; the most expected strategy is shown to be *integration* among immigrants and *multiculturalism* as the equivalent expectation of integration in a larger scale, i.e., society (Berry & Sam, 2013; Igarashi, 2019). Furthermore, among various migrant and minority groups, integration strategy is shown to be an essential indicator of better cognitive performance (Van de Vijver et al., 1999), mental health (Choy et al., 2021), educational achievement (Gibson, 1998) and family dynamic (Pitts, 2017). Apart from revealing psychological and social benefits of integration strategy and multiculturalism expectation/ideology for non-dominant groups, the acculturation orientations approach sets a new horizon for social problems stemming from intergroup conflicts of plural societies such as prejudice, discrimination, and social exclusion (Zick et al., 2001; Zick & Petzel, 1999). It gives new rooms for research focusing on identity as the forefront of intergroup relation.

2.1. *The Dual-Identity: The Ultimate Goal of Cultural Encounter*

Although psychological integration builds upon a reciprocal change of various personal characteristics, the ‘identity’ has drawn particular attention, especially in social psychology (Abraham & Hogg, 2006; Chryssochoou et al., 2011; Verkuyten, 2005; Vignoles et al., 2011). Being one of the most studied constructs of social sciences throughout the 20th-century, the concept of identity has been criticised as it became a cliché and lost its analytical power (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). However, based on a semantic history of the concept, Gleason (1983) showed that confusion and ambiguity arise from disciplinary disputes. Accordingly, the psychological tradition of identity research devotes itself to reveal the connection between social and individual via a crucial ‘psychic ingredient’ (Gleason, 1983, p.930). Subsequently, pluralistic societies, as a result of modernisation and globalisation, provide a fertile ground for the endeavour of associating the ‘personal’ with the ‘social’ that resulted in a fruitful theoretical and methodological production within psychology and beyond (Vignoles et al., 2011).

Among them, Social Identity Theory (SIT) requires special attention since, different from the classical developmental perspective (e.g., Erikson, 1959), it brought the intergroup relations in the centre of the psychological analysis (Tajfel, 1982). SIT showed that personal and social identities are distinct; and they are different processes that are connected. By this way, it allowed psychologist to study many contemporary social problems of 'coexistence' in their social contexts such as prejudice, discrimination, and social exclusion. Broadly speaking, SIT explains the internalisation of social hierarchy via self-categorisation (Turner et al., 1987). In this sense, SIT is not dealing with the question of 'who I am' but rather 'where I am' in the society (Hall, 1994). Accordingly, under salient intergroup conditions and situations, people have a motivation to quest positive group distinctiveness that starts with the discovery of the in-group (i.e., *identification*), and follows with a *comparison* based on in-group features and finally maintains a sense of positive group image (i.e., *differentiation*) which become their social identities (Spears, 2011). The earlier experimental works of SIT shed light on the internal process of the 'minimal' conditions for in-group favouritism based on the idea that discrimination arises from the conflict of interest between groups (Turner et al., 1979). Yet, arguably the real added value of SIT is coming from the concept of group distinctiveness and differentiation process by the involvement of other groups in the psychological realm that better explains real-world phenomenon such as stereotyping and prejudice (Abrams & Hogg, 2006; Spears, 2011). According to Reicher and Hopkins (2001), the differentiation process should be considered as a cultural factor because the value of the groups is not coming from anywhere personal or psychological, but from historical and cultural comparisons. Thus, the social identification process is embedded in socio-structural components of our social world such as sex, age, ethnicity, race, culture, nationality, religion, legal status that are historically hierarchical. Consequently, power difference between groups creates a tension between the members of the groups and their relative position motivates them, through identification, comparison, and differentiation processes, either to maintain or to mobilise their social statuses in a given social hierarchy (Blanz et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

By exploring the underlying socio-cognitive mechanism of intergroup conflict, different from early classical works on prejudice and racism that were seen as a deviation from rational thinking (Adorno et al., 1950/2019), an essential body of research rely upon the SIT tradition devoted to uncovering everyday prejudice, bias, and racism not only to prevent but also to reduce them in society (Dovidio et al., 2009). A large body of empirical studies showed the importance and significance of in-group favouritism in intergroup relations (Mullen et al., 1992). For instance, people tend to show positive emotion (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000), and behaviour (Dovidio et al., 1997) towards their in-group. Although in-group favouritism, also known as in-group bias, can undermine the co-existence of different groups; some researchers modelled new cross-categorisation strategies that can reduce competition and increase cooperation among the groups. The Common In-group Identity Model (CIIM), for instance, postulate that creating a one-group representation (i.e., superordinate category) between different identity categories redirect group-specific favouritism toward overarching representation (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2012). Accordingly, once a common in-group generated across the groups, more positive intergroup relations develop among all members of the new common identity. CIIM is in line with Berry's acculturation model and suggests adding an identity dimension to acculturation taxonomy (see, Figure 2), such as *separate individuals* for marginalisation, *different groups* for separatism, *one group* for assimilation and *dual identity* for integration (Dovidio et al., 2009).

The effectiveness of CIIM is shown in laboratory experiments as well as across different settings, cultures and fields, including Jews and Germans regarding the Holocaust (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). However, the main problem with CIIM is the fact that achieving a common in-group is not psychologically and politically feasible for some societies, due to the size and power differences. For instance, Israeli common in-group might not be a common category for Palestinians. Second, experimental and field studies failed to generalise the positive outcomes of common in-group into a broader context, but rather its positive effects remain under the contact settings. Finally,

some researchers questioned the causality between CIIM and reducing the bias. González and Brown (2003) argued that positive outcomes might be not due to common in-group but the cooperativeness between groups that is not always the case in real life (González & Brown, 2003).




Figure 2. Relation between the acculturation model and the CIIM representations.

Source: Image is retrieved from Dovidio et al., (2009).

To be able to overcome the limitations of CIIM, a Dual Identity Model (DIM) is proposed simultaneously by different researchers in the SIT tradition (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Gaertner et al., 2000; González & Brown, 2003). These researchers were testing different categorisation strategies originally derived from Sherif’s Robber Cave study through laboratory experiments and field studies that lead them to reach a consensus of integration of different cross-categorisation approaches (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). The immense scholarly attention accumulated around cognitive categorisation aiming to find the best practice to reduce in-group bias and increase cooperation between groups suggested that a common in-group identity allowing mutual distinctiveness of the groups through an

internalised dual identity is more generalisable (Gaertner et al., 2000; Gaertner et al., 2012) and more sustainable (González & Brown, 2006) in real-life settings. Although majority group members constitute a challenge for categorisation strategies and resist diminishing favouritism towards their in-group, for the minority group members, the impact of dual identity is still still convincing both theoretically and empirically (González & Brown, 2006; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). DIM might be more applicable especially for Turkish migrants who predominantly prefer to keep their ethnic and national identities separate (Sam & Berry, 2006).

2.2. *Globalisation and Dual Identity in Diverse Societies*

The experimental evidence from the above-mentioned cross-categorisation studies on the dual identity overlapped with and reinforced by the acculturation research. Sam and Berry (2010), for instance, argued that integration strategy is consistently associated with better adaptation outcomes through comparative studies because it "entails a form of double competence and the availability of double resources" (p.478). Accordingly, the cultural transition phenomenon constitutes a challenge for both side of cultures or groups that need to find the best way of acculturation, and integration strategy with its available double resources well equips people to cope with obstacles of cultural transition. On the other hand, the cultural transition seems not to be unique to migrants or minorities anymore, but its influence is reaching out to broader social milieus. For instance, Jensen and colleagues (2011) argue that as globalisation increased the speed, scope, and quantity of the flow of ideas and goods across cultures, the new generations find themselves more and more under the pressure of cultural identity formation, which is different from ethnic identity and pertains to people who are part of the majority culture too, considering that they are also exposed to other cultures. Based on a careful assessment of the cross-cultural evidence on language education, communication technologies and food culture across the globe, they showed that globalisation fundamentally transforms our cultural practices, experiences and identities, at least for adolescents and emerging adults. Similarly, focusing on the case of the

United States of America, Deaux (2018) highlighted the change of social demographics through a large body of social psychological research and comprehensive panel data. Accordingly, racial, ethnic, and cultural identities are becoming fuzzy categories as people increasingly choose to define themselves with ‘more than one’ identity.




Figure 3. N-gram analysis for biculturalism, hyphenated- and dual identity in the academic and fictional sources published in English between 1950 and 2020.

Note: Image generated through Google N-gram viewer based on a 10-year approximation.

A simple google N-gram viewer analysis showed (see, Figure 3) that the usage of *biculturalism*, *hyphenated* and *dual identity* terms have been in a constant increase in every decade until early 2010s. Although the 1960s marks the start of the interest for all these terms, it is obvious that from the 1980s onward, multiplicity of the identities is a rising phenomenon spreading across academic and non-academic writings.

Consequently, the multiplicity of the identities, in other words, dual identity¹, is claimed to be an antidote to cultural essentialism and homogeneity as a new form of agency

¹ In this dissertation, we prefer to use dual identity since the social psychological literature we rely upon primarily examine dual identity as a form of identity multiplicity. Yet, biculturalism and

in the age of globalisation (Kaya, 2019; Nederveen, 1995). Apart from economic disadvantages conveyed by globalisation, Giddens (2000) speculated that globalisation would push for a more democratic political climate through youth civic participation and activism. The premises of globalisation and multiculturalism are also welcomed by some political scientists and jurists across the globe, especially in Europe, where the increasing participation of old and new minorities equalized with 'feeling of the ownership of the state' expecting to alleviate feeling of exclusion and achieve the ultimate goal of social integration (Kymlicka, 1995; Hoffman, 2008). In this way, the cultural transition that multicultural societies are exposed can enhance the 'third space' which became not only a matter for minorities, but also for majorities, in order to implement fundamental principle of equality and electoral representation (Beck, 1998).

Here it is important to mention the Politicized Collective Identity model (PCI) to uncover the importance of identity for the political participation of minorities in diverse societies. Grounding on SIT and focusing on power asymmetry between groups, which is the case for minority-majority dyadic relation most of the time, Simon and Klandermans (2001) bring 'general public', namely *third party*, into the discussion in order to explain civic and political participation of minorities. Accordingly, traditional social psychological understanding of bipolar group relation is not realistic, since they disregard the ever-changing power struggle but solely focus on the numerical powers of the groups. Simon and Klandermans (2001) argue that when it comes to participation in a broader society, all groups, including minorities, need to consider the general public's interest, which is not necessarily identical with that of the majority group, in aligning their interest for realising their political projects. In the following years with an influential article, Simon and Ruhs (2008), postulated a dual identity for migrants which is a classic example of PCI because it "involves both identification with the aggrieved in-group and identification with the more

hyphenated identity concepts also refer to the same phenomenon; thereby, they are used interchangeably with dual identity throughout the text.

inclusive entity..." (p.1355), which ensures the idea of common interest in the power struggle that, in turn, lead more engagement in civic and political participation. Thus, the strength of the dual identity concept during globalisation era lay in the heart of multiculturalist sentiment that connects -especially non-European- minorities with the general public in order to achieve a common political goal: the fundamental principle of equality (Igarashi, 2019; Nesbitt-Larking, 2014).

When it comes to the empirical evidence on the low level of political participation of minorities, some researchers suggest widening the definition of the term since the opportunity structures and mediums of participation varies across countries and generations (De Rooij, 2012; O'Toole, 2015), some others draw attention to the role of country of origin and the interplay between the country of residence (Escobar, 2004; Gsir, 2014), on the top of personal and family characteristics (Born et al., 2015). Still, there is a handful set of evidence highlighting the importance of belonging and identity for political participation of minorities independent from the way and the level of participation (De Rooij, 2012; Lyon, 2008; Pachi et al., 2014). For instance, in their edited volume on recently emerged environmental psychology literature on place attachment, Kullasepp & Marsico (2021) provide qualitative evidence for the promise of globalisation. Accordingly, global attachment is a rising form of identification pattern among populations at and between the borders. This 'new global space' is confronting the physical and symbolic borders and going along with pro-environmental behaviour and activism. Besides, in a cross-cultural comparative study from the major EU countries and USA, Herzog-Punzenberger, et al., (2012) provided substantive evidence indicating that subjective identification of the minorities and migrant populations with their residence country is more critical for their political participation than their citizenship status. Besides, Fischer-Neumann (2014) found that political interest towards Germany is highest among bicultural Turkish postmigrants² only if they are aware of discrimination

² Although the history of Turkish migration goes back to the 1960s, the ratio of those naturalised via citizenship (e.g., Turkish-Germans) is still very low, and citizenship is not comprehensive enough to

against their in-group. In other words, the multiplicity of identities seems to be more effective for the political participation of minorities than the opportunity structures provided for them in diverse societies (Crul, Schneider & Lelie, 2012).

Dual identifiers, as a new social category, seem to reduce intergroup tension and foster cultural exchange via their position to bridge between groups they belong to, apart from democratizing the political landscape (Wiley et al., 2019). Empirical studies from both laboratory experiments and field researches from Israel, one of the most conflictual intergroup contexts, prove that dual identity is perceived as less threatening by Israeli Jews and Arabs (Levy et al., 2017). Accordingly, dual identifiers are seen as ‘gateway groups’ in intergroup relations and reduce adverse intergroup outcomes such as in-group bias, stereotyping, and anger (Love & Levy, 2019; Levy et al., 2019). This collective nature of dual identity that is nested into the political realm is also well documented in the literature on the psychology of crowds (Reicher 2001; 2004). Accordingly, once people shift their personal identity into a ‘collective’ one as in the case of migrants’ dual identities via imagined or physical communities, they do not only invest in but also benefit from their collective identities (e.g., biculturals) in the sense of cognitive, relational and affective transformations (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher & Drury, 2011). Thereby dual identity is not beneficial only for the political landscape and intergroup relations on an abstract or societal level, but also for the dual identity holders themselves.

Biculturalism or in other words, dual identification, reveals a variety of positive outcomes relative to other forms of acculturation orientations. In a meta-analysis study, driven from 83 studies across the globe, researchers defined three sets of positive outcomes associated with biculturalism (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013). In line with the expectation of the acculturation theory (Berry, 2006), researchers showed that bicultural individuals are

cover the diversity of migration flows from Turkey. We suggested “Turkish postmigrants” as an inclusive term to cover those who came to Europe from Turkey and their descendants regardless of whether they hold German citizenship or not.

more likely to exhibit psychological (e.g., life satisfaction, self-esteem), sociocultural (e.g., career success, social skills), and health-related adjustment (e.g., physical activity, health eating). Although the main reasoning for these positive outcomes comes from the double competency of cultures, Nguyen and Benet-Martínez (2013) also showed that the directionality of biculturalism-adjustment relation is bilateral. Accordingly, it is also possible that those who adjust better to a diverse society find it easier to hold dual identity compared to the others who have different identification patterns. On the other hand, Makarova and Birman (2015) tested the same hypothesis across education settings among minority students and confirmed that a bicultural identity is closely related to students' academic achievement. However, studies highlight that acceptance from the majority group is crucially important in sustaining psychological, sociocultural, and health-related adjustment (Baysu, et al., 2011; Fleischmann & Op De Weegh, 2021; Igarashi, 2019;).

On the other hand, the multiplicity of identity is not free from criticism. For instance, Verkuyten (2005) argues that there is a tendency in social sciences to celebrate and romanticise this 'in-betweenness' that goes beyond binary thinking of intergroup relations in social sciences. In fact, due to the power dynamic and history of intergroup relations, it is possible that for some minorities, the so-called 'third space' is not feasible. For instance, some minorities might refuse to be hybrid, hyphenated or dual just because they desire to preserve the existence of their cultural identity in the face of 'extinction' or domination by the majority. Although it does not apply to all contexts, we incorporate the main promises and evidences on the dual identity concept from closely related but diverse literature to reveal the psychological component of the structural and ideological transformation of cultural encounter conveyed by globalisation. Accordingly, dual identity act as a source of competence for the holders, as a gateway group for intergroup relations and as a collective category for the political realm to support individuals psychologically, socially, and politically. It also promotes diversity, cultural exchange, and social change towards a more democratic climate in society.

However, Turkish postmigrants' can be considered as one of those groups for whom the 'third space' is not feasible since their acculturation orientation towards biculturalism create an exception – at least based on the empirical result from Germany and Canada- despite all the positive outcomes and advantages of biculturalism (Ataca & Berry, 2002; Sam & Berry, 2006). In recent years, this early observation on the reserve towards an *integration* orientation among Turkish postmigrants is further increased and became an academic challenge for dual identity researchers (Simon, Reichert & Grabow, 2013). This constitutes a huge problem for realizing the EU states' integration policies towards a more cohesive society and for Turkish postmigrant communities that frequently depicted as 'failed integrators' despite their long history of migration (Amelina & Faist, 2008; Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Rahimi & Graumans, 2015). In the following section, we will trace this counterintuitive trend, what we call, 'the decline of dual identity' among Turkish postmigrants who constitute the universe of this dissertation.

2.3. *'Parallel Societies' and the Decline of Dual Identity*

Although the history of mass migration of the Turkish population to Europe goes back 1960s (see, *Section 4.1 in Chapter 1 below*), they have been portrayed as the least 'integrated' group among migrant groups up until the late 1990s (Mueller, 2006). Especially in Germany, they have been blamed for creating parallel societies (i.e., *Parallelgesellschaften*) within and beyond academic milieus, although scientific coherence and social relevance of the term was problematic in the first place and instead it represented a reaction to multiculturalism (for a broader discussion on the concept of 'parallel societies' see, Hiscott, 2005). Still, globalisation and multiculturalist sentiment give rise to more inclusive integration policies to embrace the diversity conveyed by migration populations (Kymlicka, 1995; Igarashi, 2019; Nesbitt-Larking 2014) and draw scholarly and political attention to structural and systemic obstacles producing a difference in integration and psychological adjustment among migrant populations (Faist, 1995; Sam & Berry, 2006). For instance, in 2004, the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index was introduced and

started to monitor member states of the EU (Citron & Gowan, 2005). Subsequently, the term 'transnational social space' was introduced by sociologists and anthropologists to define the social reality of migrant populations that, in fact, cover ties and networks between at least two states rather than solely residence country (Amelina & Faist, 2008; Faist & Özveren, 2004). Furthermore, transnationalism research arguably led to a paradigm shift towards human mobility (Faist, 2013) and contributed to the endeavour of enhancing the concept of nationhood and social integration (Faist, 2007).

In line with these developments in the political and social realm, parameters regarding social and economic conditions of Turkish postmigrants in their residence countries started to improve. More specifically, in Germany, where the overwhelming majority of Turkish postmigrants reside, job satisfaction, education possibilities, household income, intention to naturalise turned into an increasing trend, while fear of unemployment, perceived discrimination turned into a decreasing trend (Sauer, 2007). At the same time, Diehl (2006) provided the first empirical evidence to challenge the widespread misinformation on Turkish postmigrants' unwillingness or refusal to integrate. Drawing from longitudinal data, she showed that especially the second-generation is as secular as the other migrants from the EU. They are socially and economically more integrated than their parents and are interested in their country of origin as infrequently as other migrant groups. Diehl (2006) argued that the high level of ethnic identification among Turkish postmigrants "is accompanied by a tendency to compensate for their comparatively disadvantaged social status" (p.810).

Early social psychological studies also report a positive trend of Turkish postmigrants in various domains including the political participation. For instance, Gezici Yalçın (2007) examined the collective action participation among Turkish postmigrants to challenge their disadvantaged conditions and showed the interchangeability of perceived discrimination in personal- and group-levels. Although this study did not directly focus on dual identification or integration orientation of Turkish postmigrants, it is essential to show that both ethnic (e.g., Turkish) and national (e.g., German) identifications were positively

related to collective action intentions. In other words, civic participation was feasible for different degrees of dual identification (e.g., predominantly Turkish or German). Eventually, Bernd Simon and colleagues brought the dual identification to the centre of social integration debate. Based on a Turkish postmigrant sample in Germany, and driven from longitudinal as well as cross-sectional data, they showed that dual identification has a positive effect on politicisation above and beyond other social demographics as well as other forms of collective identification (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010). Besides, dual identifiers were more supportive for moderate in-group organisations but not for the ones that have a radical (e.g., religious or nationalist) agenda. Thus, they proposed politicisation via dual identification as a “scientifically intriguing, though perhaps politically contested, pathway to social integration” (Simon & Ruhs, 2008, p.1364).

Parallely, bicultural Turkish postmigrants are also celebrated by Turkey since they gain political importance due to EU-Turkey membership negotiations (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). For instance, Turkish postmigrants started to depict as ‘Euro-Turks’ who can bridge between Turkey and Europe, which in turn may contribute to the social integration of Europe and as well as the democratisation of Turkey (Kaya, 2005). In fact, Kaya and Kentel (2004) incorporated dozens of evidences from economic, social and behavioural/intentional aspects of social integration across different EU countries and postulated that so-called ‘bridging group’ (e.g., biculturals) constitute the predominant segment of Turkish postmigrants and they have a great potential to increase their number and influence.

Notwithstanding the early euphemisms about biculturalism among Turkish postmigrants, new reports and findings from the field during the last decade started to reverse this positive atmosphere. These researches led to questioning of the actual potential of the multiplicity of identities in various domains. First of all, contrary to the general assumption, Badea and colleagues (2011) showed that the country of origin is not solely a cultural artifact but an active agent for the acculturation orientations of the migrant populations. More specifically, based on diverse migrant populations in France, they showed that not only rejection by mainstream society but also a rejection by country of origin plays a

crucial role for acculturation, especially for the integration strategy that corresponds to biculturalism. Furthermore, Baysu and colleagues (2011) examined the effects of dual identification in the school settings in terms of academic achievement. They found that dual identification is beneficial only when students perceive a low level of discrimination. However, when perceived discrimination increases for dual identifiers, academic achievement follows a decreasing trend. Simon, Reichert and Grabow (2013) found a similar pattern when they elaborated on the subjective aspect of dual identification. More specifically, they asked their Turkish and Russian participants to assess incompatibility of their ethnic and national identities and create subgroups of high vs. low incompatible dual identifiers. Moreover, they found that a high level of incompatibility fosters political radicalism and intention to take part in violent activities.

Apart from these initial findings on the fragile nature of dual identification, more comprehensive data and robust methods shook the foundation of the optimistic premises of the dual identity concept. First of all, Frankenberg and colleagues (2013) reviewed the studies on psychological and sociocultural adaptation of young migrants in Germany and proposed that the best outcomes with respect to psychological adaptation evidently achieved by those with national identification (e.g., assimilation) rather than integration orientation. On the other hand, Leszczensky (2013) tested causality between national identification, which constitutes a crucial part of dual identification, and interethnic friendship, one of the indicators of social integration among migrant adolescents. He found no evidence for reciprocal effects between national identification and interethnic friendship. In other words, neither feelings of belonging to mainstream society affect contact preferences nor contact preferences affect feelings of belonging. Afterward, Schotte, and colleagues (2018) compared the effects of assimilation and integration on the academic achievements of young migrants via a comprehensive panel dataset funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). Accordingly, integration orientation failed to promote academic achievement while mainstream identification (e.g., assimilation) promotes school adaptation as well as academic achievement.

When it comes to bicultural Turkish postmigrants in Germany, there are some evidence contrary to the initial optimistic expectations about their increasing numbers (e.g., Kaya & Kentel, 2004). Sauer (2018) showed that biculturalism faces a decline among Turkish postmigrants (see, Figure 4). Based on an annual observation across a representative Turkish sample in Nord-Rhein-Westphalia, Sauer (2018) provided some descriptive information corresponding to the change in the above-mentioned empirical findings. Accordingly, there has been a positive trend towards biculturalism until 2011, as can be seen in figure 4 to the answers given 'also with Germany' and 'both country' options. However, this trend reversed after 2011 and reached its lowest level by 2017. Furthermore, Jugert and colleagues (2020) recently employed a longitudinal analysis to examine the formation and sustainability of dual identity among students of Turkish- and resettler-origin (i.e., Aussiedler). They did find some support for dual identification-sociocultural adaptation link; however, more strikingly, they found that while there was a rising trend towards dual identity until 2011, afterwards establishing and sustaining dual identity among two groups is getting more and more difficult, as can be seen in the decrease in 'also with Germany' and 'both country' options in particular.




Figure 4. Diagram showing the answers to the question of “*Which country do you feel belongs to?*” among Turkish postmigrants in North-Rhein-Westphalia-Germany between 1999 and 2017

Source: Die Stiftung Zentrum für Türkeistudien und Integrationsforschung (Sauer, 2018)

Derived from various social science literature, we summarised evidence on the functionality of biculturalism in the dawn of globalisation. Although the number and potentials of bicultural individuals enhancing, bicultural identity might become very fragile and ‘under the threat’ (Felischmann, Phalet & Swyngedouw, 2013), it can be a ‘liability’ or a ‘two-edge sword’ for the ones who hold it (Badea et al., 2011; Baysu, et al., 2011; Simon et al., 2013). Furthermore, dual identification seems to be only partly effective for the problems conveyed by the cultural transition despite being costly (Frankenberg et al., 2013; Jugert et al., 2020; Leszczensky 2013). Finally, it is facing a decline, especially for Turkish postmigrants in Germany, regarding its number and sustainability (Jugert et al., 2020; Sauer, 2018).

The central focus of this dissertation is to understand the reason behind, what we call, ‘the decline of dual identity’ and its consequences among Turkish postmigrants. Although biculturalism is considered as a phenomenon at the individual level, studies focusing on bicultural individuals indicate that this phenomenon is observed at the social and political level, especially in the country of origin and host country, at the intersection of variables such as social exclusion, political participation, and the ideology and interests represented by the cultures intended to be combined. Due to its multi-layered nature, in this dissertation, we propose a mixed methodological set of studies to dismantle the related constructs, to test previous empirical findings and to elaborate our understanding on potentials and pitfalls of dual identification regarding the fact that the predominant majority of Turkish postmigrants are or will, one way or another, become bicultural individuals. Before introducing our research questions and the studies conducted during the course of this dissertation, we will delve into the social psychological mechanism of dual identity and

its associations with other constructs in order to understand possible reasons and outcomes of the decline of dual identity.

3. The Social Psychology of Dual Identity

With the rise of globalisation in the late 1990s, bicultural individuals also draw the attention of cross-cultural psychology researchers due to a phenomenon called ‘cultural frame switching’. Researchers started to examine whether people respond to situational cues in line with its cultural content based on the assumption that the cultural meaning systems affects ideas, values, beliefs, and knowledge (D’Andrade, 1984). For instance, Hong and colleagues (1997) exposed the Chinese-American bicultural individuals both American (e.g., photos of an American flag, Superman) and Chinese (e.g., photos of a Chinese dragon, Stone Monkey) cultural priming visuals and showed that American primes activate more internal attribution, a characteristically Western attribution style, while Chinese primes activate a more external attribution, a characteristically East Asian attribution style. A dozen follow-up research conducted and confirmed that culture is not monolithic, but rather bicultural individuals may navigate cultural meaning systems by using different cultural cues (Hong et al., 2000). Based on these initial works and acculturation literature, Benet-Martínez and colleagues (2002) argued that bicultural individuals could not be the considered the same regarding to their capacity to blend different cultural meaning systems. More specifically, they suggested Bicultural Identity Integration (BII) as a moderator for cultural frame switching. While those who perceive their cultural identities as compatible (i.e., high BII) would respond to cultural primes more consistently, those who perceive their cultural identities as conflicting (i.e., low BII) would respond to cultural primes more resistantly. Researchers succeed in confirming their hypothesis, but more importantly, they prove that BII as a continuum operates at a cognitive level for those who possess more than one culture or identity. In other words, BII became the construct to define the phenomenon that an increasing number of people experiencing: the internal conflict or harmony of the values, attitudes, and expectations (Phinney, 1999).

Apart from the above-mentioned dual identity concepts coming from acculturation (Berry, 2006), self-categorisation (Gaertner et al., 2000), and collective identity (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010) approaches, all of which share the same assumption of the merging between two distinct identities, BII approach allows dual identity to be an analytically distinct construct that can be analysed along with other socio-psychological mechanisms (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). Eventually, Benet-Martínez and Harritos (2005) examined personal and social antecedents of BII and developed a more advanced tool to measure it. They operationalised BII as a process resultant of both affective and behavioural dimensions. BII has two dimensions as cultural conflict vs. harmony, and distance vs. blendedness. Accordingly, cultural conflict vs. harmony (e.g., perceived degree of (in)compatibility between cultures) is a product of acculturation stressors like discrimination and is also associated with neuroticism. Additionally, cultural distance vs. blendedness (e.g., perceived degree of (dis)association between cultures) corresponds to performance-related aspects of acculturation such as degree of exposure to other culture or language proficiency. Benet-Martínez and Harritos (2005) argue that BII fills an important gap in the literature since it provides an elaborate understanding of the reason and mechanism of psychological integration that has been disregarded for so long in acculturation research. They highlighted the simultaneous nature of dissociation and tension between cultures during acculturation.

In the following years, Huynh (2009) showed that emotional and behavioural elements of BII have diverse personal and social antecedents as well as outcomes that facilitate or hinder the integration of internalised cultures or identities. More specifically, perceived (in)compatibility (e.g., harmony vs. conflict) between cultures is rather subjective and driven more strongly by contextual pressure such as experience of discrimination and/or interpersonal problems. Besides, it is more effective for psychological well-being and adjustment such as depression, anxiety, and value conflict. On the other hand, perceived (dis)association (e.g., distance vs. blendedness) between cultures is rather objective and driven by behavioural engagement such as cultural exchange, language proficiency. And it is more effective for acculturation orientations but not for psychological adjustment (Huynh et

al., 2011). These findings are in line with acculturation theory, because Berry and colleagues (2006) already found that although the objective cultural difference is related to acculturation orientations, they do not affect psychological adjustment. In short, the BII approach postulates two independent domains as the determinant of dual identification, namely cultural (dis)association (e.g., distance vs. blendedness) that capture the organisation of the two cultures, and cultural (in)compatibility (e.g., conflict vs. harmony) that captures the feelings and attitudes toward those cultures (Huynh et al., 2011).

The cultural (in)compatibility concept received considerable support, especially from social identity researches. Researchers showed that subjective perception of identity (in)compatibility is determinative for psychological and sociological adjustment of migrant and minority populations with examples derived from various countries and contexts. For instance, Simon and colleagues (2013) found that when Turkish postmigrants perceived a higher level of incompatibility between their ethnic and national identity (e.g., German), they tend to participate in radical collective actions more that might lead them to drive away from conventional political participation further or increase their distance from mainstream society (e.g., isolationism, Simon et al., 2013). Furthermore, Schulz and Leszczensky (2016) tested identity (in)compatibility in school settings in Germany with four different migrant populations. They found that high incompatibility undermines interethnic friendship as an essential indicator of social integration. Lepshokova and colleagues (2018) tested identity (in)compatibility within context of the Russian society in terms of North Caucasian minority identities and confirmed that perceived compatibility predicts integration orientation, whereas perceived incompatibility predicts separation orientation. When it comes to psychological adjustment, Hirsh and Kang (2016) reviewed the neuropsychological literature on behavioural and cognitive conflicts, and proposed the identity conflict (e.g., incompatible identities) as a source of stress and anxiety. They also suggested a framework to solve the identity conflict in line with both the BII and acculturation orientation frameworks. Finally, Hutchison and colleagues (2015) applied the identity (in)compatibility concept into religious identities in the UK. They found that when Muslims perceived their religious identity and

national identity as incompatible, they distance from national identity and develop negative attitudes towards non-Muslims.

In conclusion, BII has some commonalities with previous social psychological conceptualisation such as identity compartmentalization (Baumeister, Shapiro, & Tice, 1985), identity synthesis (Schwartz, 2006) or social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002; Wiley & Deaux, 2011). However, it is an approach that theoretically more coherent, empirically well-grounded and practically much easier to implement due to its orthogonal domains that correspond to both subjective (i.e., affective) and objective (i.e., behavioural) aspect of biculturalism. Besides, it is more appropriate for the experience of bicultural individuals since, different from acculturation, 'biculturation' involves learning from both cultures simultaneously (Huynh et al., 2011).

These features of the BII approach make it a convenient theoretical framework in order to understand and examine the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants in Germany. We argue that the counterintuitive changes in the sense of belonging among Turkish postmigrants are rather related to the subjective aspect of acculturation, since their economic integration in Germany has a relatively long and progressive history (see, *Section 4.2 in Chapter 1 below*). Before contextualizing the case, we need to understand what kind of psychological variables are relevant to examine the subjective aspects of acculturation when it comes to ethnonational identification. Thus, in the following section, we review rejection-(dis)identification literature in order to provide more information about one of the well-known 'subjective' phenomena in acculturation as well as social identity research, namely perceived discrimination.

3.1. *Rejection from Majority*

Broadly speaking, social exclusion is one of the biggest obstacles of modernisation and democracy especially after freedom of physical and social mobility within and between groups, categories, and cultures (Makkonen 2002). It can take various forms such as misrecognition, prejudice, discrimination or humiliation. Besides, it can also be observed in

the intra-personal level up until the socio-structural mechanisms that prevents the right of equal access. In this dissertation, however, we are interested in minorities' perspectives on social exclusion and *rejection* from majority. Because, when disadvantaged groups such as minorities and migrants, are exposed to social exclusion practices due to their group memberships or their representations beyond personal features, their existence physically or emotionally rejected as unwanted or devalued (Wesselmann & Williams, 2017).

Furthermore, similar to social exclusion, rejection is also embedded into the socio-structural mechanisms that members of disadvantaged groups develop tools and strategies to detect and to cope with, and resist devaluation (Miller & Kaiser, 2001). We prefer to use rejection and focus on perceived *discrimination* due to the fact that the literature we are relying upon mainly conceptualise and operationalise rejection as subjective self-reported maltreatment to capture the influence of social exclusion on disadvantaged individuals. Moreover, the form and level of rejection shown to be effective for both negative and positive outcomes of dual identification (Badea, et al., 2011; Baysu, Phalet & Brown, 2011; Baysu & Phalet, 2019). Thus, in the following section, we will restrict ourselves to rejection-ethnonational (dis)identification associations among minorities since the explicit or implicit message of difference conveyed by discrimination might play an essential role in harmony and distance between identities and cultures (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012; Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016).

3.2. *Rejection-(Dis)Identification*

After a large body of literature examining social exclusion practices of dominant groups and their members during the 1990s, psychologists turned their gazes to the ones who suffer from social exclusion (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998; Croker & Major, 1989; Deaux, 2006). One of the essential approaches built on SIT's premises is the Rejection-Identification Model - RIM- (Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). Similar to the 'reactive ethnicity' approach (Rumbaut, 2008), RIM presumes that disadvantaged group members identify more with their in-groups to employ a group-based

coping strategy (Jetten et al., 2001). In other words, relying upon the (intergroup) *differentiation* mechanism of SIT, RIM interprets identification as a reaction to rejection for compensating adverse outcomes of devalued in-group membership (Verkuyten & Fleischmann, 2017). Accordingly, based on the so-called 'buffering hypothesis' (Greenberg et al., 1992), people are motivated to identify with their in-group in the face of discrimination to benefit from collective well-being and self-esteem proved by the social identity (see, Ethier & Deaux, 1994). On the other hand, Jasinskaja-Lahti and colleagues (2009) criticised RIM for taking perceived discrimination as an individual-level phenomenon, since in most cases, it occurs due to a group membership. Instead, based on the so-called 'discounting hypothesis' (Crocker & Major, 1989), they suggest the Rejection Disidentification Model (RDIM, Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009) that presumes group level perceived discrimination as an unfair treatment 'may protect well-being of people by allowing them to believe that they are not alone in their plight' (p.207). Accordingly, personal well-being results from discounting the self as a cause of unfair treatment via distancing (e.g., disidentification) oneself from the national identity; in other words, well-being is achieved as a result of removing the self as a cause.

Although these two models have different theoretical backgrounds and assumptions, both have received empirical support and criticisms to date. After the emergence of the RIM, apart from early correlational studies from African-Americans (Branscombe et al., 1999a), international students (Schmitt, Spears & Branscombe, 2003) and women (Schmitt, Branscombe & Kobrynowicz, 2002); Ramos and colleagues (2012) provided support for the model from longitudinal analysis and showed that causality between perceived discrimination and identification is not bidirectional. In other words, perceived discrimination is leading to identification but not the other way around. On the other hand, after initial longitudinal evidence of RDIM, Renvik and colleagues (2018) provide further support for the negative effect of perceived discrimination on national identity via cross-sectional data. Yet recently, Froehlich, Martiny & Deaux (2020) failed to

confirm RIM via longitudinal dataset from school children with a migration background including Turkish postmigrants.

Apart from the single model testing, there have also been attempts to examine both models simultaneously (e.g., dual-path model). For instance, one of the early examples was from the Turkish-Dutch sample with which Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) provided the first evidence of dual-path model between rejection and (dis)identification. In the following years, using a second-generation Turkish and Moroccan sample in Belgium and Sweden, Fleischmann (2011) further confirmed the dual-path model. Likewise, Mazzoni, and colleagues (2020) supported the dual-path model using a more significant sample across Europe. Studies testing the dual-path model of rejection-(dis)identification make it clear that subjective perception of being discriminated is determinative for both ethnic and national identification of minorities and migrants. Although ethnic and national identities are two independent constructs, one can expect to observe a change in dual identification due to perceived discrimination, primarily through the subjective aspect of dual identity, namely identity (in)compatibility (Huynh et al., 2011). In fact, Fleischmann (2011) has already shown that perceived personal discrimination increase incompatibility between ethnic and national identity among Turks and Moroccan in Europe. Still, the possible association between rejection-dual identification constitutes a relatively disregarded matter in previous social psychological research, though a considerable amount of qualitative analysis highlighted the reactive nature of migrants' identities (see, Çelik, 2015; Ehrkamp, 2005; Holtz Dahinden & Wagner 2013; Kunuroğlu et al., 2018; Skrobanek, 2009).

To our knowledge, the first attempt to examine rejection-dual identification relation conducted by Fleischmann and Verkuyten (2016). Although they showed that feeling at 'home' in residence society and positive attitudes towards dominant group members was negatively related to perceived discrimination, they failed to find significant direct relationship between discrimination and dual identification. In another study, Fleischmann, Leszczensky & Pink (2019) examined various forms of dual identity (e.g., religious-ethnic, ethnic-national, and religious-national) and found that the more frequent are the

discrimination experiences, the more they lead incompatible dual identity. More recently, Jugert and colleagues (2020) used a longitudinal design to examine the change of acculturation profiles (e.g., identification patterns) of adolescents with a migration background. They found that although perceived discrimination predicts integration profiles, it does not predict the change in time. In other words, the degree of perceived discrimination might be determinative for identification patterns, but it is not powerful enough to change established identification preferences.

Although this limited information on rejection-dual identification relation failed to support an association between them, following the BII approach, we argue that the change in dual identification of Turkish postmigrants corresponds to a subjective change in the incompatibility of their ethnonational identities rather than an objective experience of personal discrimination. Based on evidence on RIM, RDIM, and dual-path model of rejection-(dis)identification, we assume that subjective perception of discrimination will be associated with the change in feelings of belonging to Turkey and Germany. However, available rejection models contain certain methodological and conceptual deficiencies to explain the complexity of the dual identity phenomenon itself and the exceptionally rapid decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants' case that accompany a significant political and social change in Turkey and Germany. Before elaborating on the context of Turkish postmigrants' case, we will review inconsistent findings on RIM and RDIM to navigate in a more comprehensive framework and suggest a new and elaborated methodological strategy.

3.3. *Rejection as an Intergroup Stress and Coping Process*

Since RIM and RDIM are mainly focusing on how (dis)identification overcome adverse effects of social exclusion, the rejection concept is relatively taken for granted and reductionist. This is the case, especially for RIM, in which initial measurement of discrimination was on a personal level and despite updating measurements with group-based discrimination items, it has received inconsistent empirical support (; Froehlich et al.,

2020; Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2012). One of the first criticisms came from Jasinskaja-Lahti and colleagues (2009) and they argued that reducing group-based discrimination to individual experience was problematic since the group membership is the primary reason for most of the actual rejection experiences. On the other hand, Major (1994) showed that personal and group-based discriminations are incomparable since personal discrimination judgments caused by interpersonal comparisons whereas group-based discrimination judgments caused by intergroup comparisons. Furthermore, it is shown that the individual-group discrepancy is a consequence of discrimination. For instance, people tend to gain more self-esteem in the face of group-based discrimination in comparison to personal discrimination through higher identification (Bourguignon et al., 2006). Similarly, the discrepancy between individual and group discriminations also affects the level of ethnic identification (Armenta & Hunt, 2009).

Apart from the comparison levels, subjective perception of the scope and severity of discrimination is also essential to assess its outcomes (Major & O'Brien, 2005). Some cues and situations might intensify or alleviate the threat posed by a discriminatory action (Branscombe et al., 1999b). Thereby appraising the threat might affect how people perceive and report discrimination beyond and above objective experience (Kaiser & Major, 2006). For instance, Eccleston & Major (2006) showed different scenarios of identity threat to their participants varying in degree of controllability (e.g., personal control), stability (e.g., change in time) and severity (e.g., impact on life), and tested participants' self-esteem. They found that only severity appraisal was related to self-esteem by increasing it. According to Eccleston & Major (2006), this result shows that not the threats referring to the event but the ones referring to the cause are determinative for psychological outcomes. In the same vein, Greenaway and Cruwys (2019) recently proposed a source model for group threat. They argued that not only the degree but also the loci of threat (e.g., intra- vs. intergroup) conveyed by cues and situation might have opposite effects on human psychology and group relations. They suggested that researchers might isolate the causal effect of threat on "identification, categorization, and group relations and assess their relative perceived

severity” by distinguishing threat whether it is coming from inside or outside of the group (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019, p. 226).

Finally, together with the victims’ group membership as the cause of being a target of social exclusion, being rejected overtly or covertly includes at least one perpetrator to blame, which creates two loci for causal attribution, such as internal or external ones (Hewstone, 1989). For instance, Schmitt and Branscombe (2002b) experimentally showed that people tend to make more internal attributions in a group-based rejection scenario (e.g., sexism). Besides, adverse effects of the rejection differ according to relevant group membership, for example, men were more affected by external attribution, whereas women were more affected by internal attribution. Similarly, Costarelli (2007) focused on the role of causal attributions in the subjective experience of ethnic discrimination and found that attributions to in- or out-group might buffer or intensify the adverse effects of a group threat, depending on victim’s the degree of identification with ethnic identity.

This short review of inconstant findings on rejection-identification literature shows that different aspects of perceived discrimination have diverse psychological outcomes, including identification. Researchers showed that its level (e.g., individual vs. group), scope and severity (e.g., intra- vs. intergroup), and the loci of causal attribution (e.g., internal vs. external) make it methodologically challenging to isolate the effect of objective and subjective aspects of rejection phenomenon. Even labelling the maltreatment might be essential to assess the actual effect on reporting as well as the perception of the rejection (Kaiser & Major, 2006). According to Major, Quinton and McCoy (2002), empirical inconsistencies and theoretical disagreements stem from “a failure to differentiate among closely related but distinct constructs” (p.261). In their seminal work on antecedents and consequences of discrimination, Major and colleagues (2002) considered rejection as a *process* instead of as a state by applying Lazarus & Folkman’s (1984) transactional model of stress to the discrimination phenomenon. Instead of focusing on a sum of individual-level perception of rejection, such an approach allows researchers to examine the rejection process more elaborately. Because Major and colleagues (2002) define at least three phases

of the rejection corresponding to different psychological mechanisms: “... *exposure* [hereafter, Exposure] to prejudicial or discriminatory events is a stressor. Perceiving oneself as a victim of prejudice or discrimination is a primary *appraisal of threat* [hereafter, Threat]. And *attributing* [hereafter, Attribution] specific negative events to discrimination is a coping strategy” (Major et al., 2002, p. 261). In the following years, Major and O’Brien (2005) extensively reviewed the relevant literature and integrated identity threat approaches with transactional stress and coping model in order to develop a model of Stigma-Induced Identity Threat (SIIT). In this model, threat appraisal plays a crucial role in both coping and psychological outcomes. More importantly, in this model, not only the discrimination experience but also collective representations, situational cues, and personal characteristics of the victim are included in the process of rejection. This enhancement of the model provides a more realistic picture of the context of rejection, because rejection does not occur in a vacuum; it is embedded into history, society, and the situation (Tanyaş, 2019).

Furthermore, the primary importance of such an approach lies in changing our perspective about the victims of different forms of social exclusions such as racism, stigmatisation or discrimination. Although there is a large body of literature on adverse effects of social exclusion on disadvantaged groups and individuals (Kite & Whitley, 2016; Major & O’Brien, 2005), researchers also showed that victims are not solely passive receivers (Clark et al., 1999; Harrell, Hall & Taliaferro, 2003; Miller & Kaiser, 2001; Tanyaş, 2019). In contrast, racism/stigma-related stress involves assessing the severity of the threat towards the group and managing available personal and social resources to cope with that threat. For instance, Harrell (2000) postulated a multidimensional conceptualisation of racism-related stress for people of colour. And apart from affective and behavioural coping resources, she highlighted the importance of social support mechanisms that cover intracommunity and intergroup domains that are inevitable in minorities and migrants’ lives. Subsequently, Mellor (2004) classified previously suggested coping strategies and embraced them into a taxonomy consisting of self-protective, self-controlling and counter-attacking dimensions. According to this taxonomy, although the main objective of the victims by proceeding with

coping strategies is saving their cognitive, physical, and social energy, the ways individuals and groups choose these coping strategies are mostly context-dependent. In the same vein, Lewis et al., (2013) focused on gendered-racial microaggression and the coping mechanism of this specific disadvantaged group and showed that the form (e.g., microaggression) and the intersection of identities (e.g., gendered-racial) are determinative for the members of disadvantaged group while navigating themselves in the coping strategies.

In this brief literature review, we traced theoretical and methodological approaches that might be convenient for examining the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants. It became evident that instead of identity (dis)association (e.g., behavioral distance), identity (in)compatibility (e.g., affective harmony) correspond to the subjective aspect of the acculturation is more critical for feelings of belonging (Huynh et al., 2011). Moreover, rejection from majority constitutes the core of subjective feelings of ethnonational identification (Branscombe et al., 1999b; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Fleischmann, 2011). However, empirical inconsistencies and conceptual problems of perceived discrimination obscure or fail to reveal the relationship between rejection (dis)identification (Major et al., 2002). Besides, perceived discrimination disregards the resources and active role of disadvantaged groups and individuals, which is the case for minorities and migrants (Mellor, 2004; Tanyaş, 2019; Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). Thereby, instead of repeating previous deficiency of the available approaches, we introduce an elaborated mixed methodological framework to examine the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants in Germany since, as a transnational minority group, they are on the crossroad of resources from their communities as well as opportunity structures provided by the Turkish and German states (Amelina & Faist, 2008).

4. Contextualizing the Case

By reviewing the BII, RIM, RDIM and racism-related stress literature, we realized that contextualising and framing the social exclusion phenomenon is crucial in order to explain the reasons behind and the consequences of the rejection that the individuals and

groups are facing. Specifically for immigrants, the country of origin is shown to be more than a cultural artefact (Badea et al., 2011), but a source to challenge social and economic constraints conveyed by globalisation in their resident countries (Kaya, 2019). The same is valid for the various forms of social exclusion, including perceived discrimination (Bobowik et al., 2017; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Recently, André and Dronkers (2017) provided one of the first pieces of cross-cultural evidences of the role of the country of origin on perceived discrimination. Based on five waves of the European Social Survey, they analysed data about first- and second-generation migrants from 201 different countries living in 27 EU member states. After combining 'destination' variables such as labour market access, long-term residency, anti-discrimination policies and socio-cultural variables such as religion, generation, cultural distance, language proficiency, county of origin via multi-level regression models, they concluded that perceived discrimination varies as a function of the country of origin above and beyond all other variables. Besides, the effect of migration and anti-discrimination policies of residence countries became even less notable when taking personal characteristics and county of origin into account. Thus, contrary to the common assumption, migrants' cultural background and country of origin is more crucial than their destination country or residence society when it comes to rejection, more specifically perceived discrimination.

Secondly, (dis)identification components of biculturalism might be sensitive to variables related to the country of origin too. Because the idea of co-existence of the group and identities go beyond a single society, but rather it is embedded in a socio-political context that witnesses power asymmetries and collective interests (Chryssochoou et al., 2011). That's the very reason why Wiley and Deaux (2011) turned their attention to the performative sides of the bicultural identity. Accordingly, bicultural individuals have various options to perform their identities "in front of audiences who share one, both, or neither of the group memberships and who may be more or less willing to accept their self-categorisation" (p.51). Thereby, the performance of bicultural identity is very sensitive to other membership categories and their representation in everyday life. Apart from the

performance of bicultural identity, the strength of accommodating different identity categories depends on the representation of other identity categories as well. Because keeping those identities compatible, needs cognitive and emotional efforts. Chrysochoou and Lyons (2011) argued that although it is impossible to ignore the evidences on the identity (in)compatibility, it is not a mechanism, but a belief, shaped by the ideologies surrounding those who pursue to hold more than one identity. Likewise, Ramos and colleagues (2013) showed that ‘interaction goal’ of minorities are moderating the rejection-(dis)identification relationship, implying the importance of socio-political context for (in)compatibility of identity. Thus, as in our case, examining the change in dual identification requires considering ideological and political transformation around the identities that constitute the dual identity.

Following the same rationale, we believe that the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants cannot be understood solely with personal characteristics or opportunity structures provided by residence countries (Crul et al. 2012). Based on the sensitivity of the bicultural identity, more specifically, identity (in)compatibility, we need to address the meaning of rejection and of being a dual identity holder for our specific case. In order to that, we will delve into the history of Turkish postmigrants in the interplay of Germany and Turkey. Unlike other previous historical readings about Turkish migration’s economic and social aspect, in the following section, we will keep the cultural identity and belonging at the centre of our focus.

4.1. Turkish Postmigrants in Germany

According to European Statistical Office (Eurostat), Germany has, by far, the highest number of foreign-born (i.e., noncitizen born in Germany) and non-national (i.e., noncitizens live in Germany) population in the EU (Eurostat, 2020), making it one of the countries of the twentieth century with the most immigrants (Bade, 1995). The history of the migration of non-Germans goes back to the 1950s when enormous workforce was needed to rebuild the country’s entire infrastructure that was demolished during the World War II and

respond to the expansion of the emerging labour market during the industrialisation era (Kaya, 2019). The Federal Republic of Germany concluded agreements with eight Mediterranean countries, including Turkey, to mitigate shortages in specific industries (Kaya & Kentel, 2004). The so-called ‘guest workers’ were initially recruited for agriculture and construction sectors, aiming to solve labour shortages by giving them temporary, short-term residence and work permits (Abadan-Unat, 2002). However, this period lasted short and the programme stopped in 1973. The consequence was a “boomerang effect” on the policies towards foreigners in Germany (Bade, 1995, p.528) because of the hardening transnational inflow of workers that increased the numbers because of those who preferred to have their family in Germany (e.g., family reunification), opening the way for the former guest workers together with their family members to become the new immigrants in Germany by the 1980s.

Turkish migrants’ case and numbers started to differ from other guest workers due to two critical political developments in Turkey in connection with the rise of family reunification: the 1980 military coup d’etat and the emergence of the conflict with the Kurdish militia in the 1990s (Kaya & Kentel, 2004). Following the coup and the conflict, number of political asylum seekers increased in number along with those who were born in Germany. The number of Turkish postmigrants peaked around 1.8 million by the 1990s (Bilecen et al., 2015). Since then, non-EU nationals’ naturalisation³ (i.e., *einbürgerung*) became the subject of a public and political debate that resulted in several amendments. For instance, the Foreign Nationals Act in 1991 (*Ausländergesetz*) was the first attempt to break the principle of descent (*jus sanguinis*) and allow non-German residents to acquire citizenship in Germany; only if they renounced their previous citizenship (Kaya & Kentel, 2004). Subsequently in 2000, the Draft of a Law to Reform Nationality Law was accepted and for the first time in Germany, multiple citizenships were allowed until the age of 21 for the residents who were born in the country (McFadden, 2019).

³ The term refers to become a citizen in Germany. Thereby, throughout the text we used the term in terms of legal statuses of migrants unless otherwise specified.

Turkish postmigrants showed a massive favour to the amendments that the number of those who naturalised (hereafter, Turkish-Germans) constantly increased (Kaya & Kentel, 2004) and according to Federal Statistical Office (*Das Statistische Bundesamt*, Destatis) become the highest naturalised group numerically in Germany even by today (Destatis, 2020). However, after peaking in 1999, the trend toward naturalisation among Turkish postmigrants started to decrease. According to Federal Statistical Office, only 22% of 2.8 million Turkish postmigrants are naturalised up until now, plus it still following a trend of decline by today. Besides, although their numbers and average migration duration (32.3 years) remain the highest among all of the other minority groups (Destatis, 2020); the fact that 97.8% of them meet the requirements of naturalisation, they do not prefer to apply for German citizenships (Yıldırım-Sungur & Schwarz, 2021). Kaya (2019) proposed that the advantages of hyphenated, diasporic, transnational identities via denizenship statuses to explain the decline of naturalisation among Turkish postmigrants. On the other hand, McFadden (2019) focused on another aspect of the same phenomenon: the role of legislation in Turkey. Accordingly, in previous years, Turkey facilitated renouncing and reacquiring Turkish citizenship for its citizens abroad by pink and blue cards that correspond to an ‘almost-citizenship’ status. Through this kind of legal facilitation, Turkish citizens abroad were promoted to change their citizenship in residence countries without giving up their social and economic rights in Turkey. However, Turkey failed to respond to legislation regarding multiple citizenship status in Germany by making its citizenship non-renounceable and not solving problems about pink & blue cards favouring Turkish postmigrants (McFadden, 2019). That, in turn, made it more difficult and costly to renounce Turkish citizenship and lead to a decline in naturalisation process of Turkish postmigrants in Germany.

Both arguments above make it clear that Turkish postmigrants’ social integration and naturalisation are dependent not only on their legal status in Germany but also on their material and symbolic connections to Turkey. Accordingly, as much as factors related to the country of residence, the country of origin is an essential aspect of the transnational social

space where migrants try to establish and sustain social cohesion (Amelina & Faist, 2008; Bhatia & Ram, 2001). However, the elements of German-Turkish transnational social space were in a constant negotiation and transformation throughout the 20th century. Besides, some political scientist argues that recent legislation by Turkey goes beyond a failure and represents a change in mentality (Adar, 2019; Baser & Ozturk, 2019). Thus, a parallel historical reading that allow the interactions of those countries is needed in order to understand the dynamics of the problem regarding the current decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants.

4.1.1. The Historical Milestones of Turkish Migration

Periodisation of the migration history is a common practice in studies on Turkish migration (Abadan-Unat, 1995; Kaya, 2019; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Sirkeci, 2002) since the profiles of the migrant populations have been changed according to historical developments that took place both in Germany and Turkey. Researchers tend to divide Turkish migration to Europe into decades to examine economic, social and political factors determining the migration phenomenon. Kaya (2019), in his seminal work, turn his gaze to the arrival of migrants and examine how migrants re-construct their cultural identity throughout years and generations. Taking from Stuart Hall (1994), we also argue that cultural identity ‘is a matter of *becoming* as well as *being*’ (p.225). Thus, a periodisation based on the transformation of the cultural identity of Turkish postmigrants is a more appropriate strategy for this dissertation since our focus is not the motivation of (e)migration but the change of belongings, identity, and motivation to get naturalised in the mainstream society.

Kaya (2019) argued that, differing from non-migrants, migrants’ life is under “a complex interplay of local, national and global dynamics stemming from their countries of origin, countries of settlement, local contexts and global changes” (p.4). Thereby, without excepting the labels used to define them, the very definition of their identities and feelings of belongings have constantly been changing throughout the 20th century as they were challenged with structural socio-economic changes. He defined three periods consisting of

migrant-, minority- and transnational strategies and each of these represents a new cultural identity atmosphere for Turkish postmigrants. In the following sections, we will delve into these periods with a specific focus to Germany through a parallel reading of the history of both states.

4.1.1.1. *Rise of Industrialisation: The Workforce and Migrants.*

At the dawn of the post-war era, migration was a source of contentment in Germany. Industrialisation created a huge consumption demand that went parallel with a substantial increase in production and therefore the welfare state could bring hundreds of thousands of migrants to employ as workers (Kaya, 2019). Based on the previous informal and small-scale expert exchange experiences between Turkey and Germany, and with the legislation of travel rights granted to the Turkish citizens by the 1961 constitution, Turkey was an appropriate destination for Germany for exporting the much demanded ‘workforce’ (Abadan-Unat, 2002). Meanwhile, due to a failed land reform of the new republic, thousands of peasants became landless. They started to move to big cities that resulted in extreme unemployment and poverty in Turkey (Zürcher, 2005). Thereby, Germany’s bilateral labour recruitment agreement request was well received and overlapped with Turkey’s interest.

Although the initial agreement was based on a rotation principle where employers were supposed to work for a maximum of one year and return to Turkey with remittance and industrial work experience; however, that principle was never took effect. German employees were not keen to invest extra time and energy for a new worker, while Turkish employers were motivated to stay as much as they can, so that they could save enough to enable them to build an independent workplace back in their home country (Abadan-Unat, 2002). Kaya (2019) noted that the welfare-state granted work security, health support, and free education that made the social mobilisation as the new societal norm of industrialisation. Even though guest workers’ physical and social conditions were far from perfect, those who migrated to

Germany gained lots of economic and social capital compared to their relatives and social circles living in their home country.

During this time, the overall state policy of Turkey was to facilitate the flow of remittance and easy return of guest workers, which perfectly overlapped with the social mobility interest of the first wave of migrants (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013). Besides, Turkish guest workers benefited from unification rights and unemployment payments in Germany that secured relatively regular income for themselves. Turkish guest workers preferred to satisfy their social and cultural needs within their small-scale communities and distanced themselves from German society, mainly due to the language barrier and assumption of return (Abadan-Unat, 2002). Thereby, the first two decades of Turkish migration characterised by a migrant strategy relying upon the assumption of social mobility, welfare and temporality of migration for both German and Turkish sides.

4.1.1.2. *The Emergence of Neoliberalism: The Market and Minorities.*

Following the oil shortage in 1973, an economic crisis arose in Germany, leading to an increase in the unemployment rate. Authorities immediately stopped bilateral agreements and promoted the emigration of the guest workers (Abadan-Unat, 2002). These economic developments were a symptom of a more significant paradigm shift, namely neoliberal economic system identified with right-liberals such as Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK. Developing countries concluded upon a reform package based on Hayek's liberal economic model, known as 'Washington Consensus', in which the main aim was ultimately reducing the role of the state in the economy (Giroux, 2005). Expansion of the market through privatisation of essential domains of social life such as health, security, and education prioritised the individuals over 'society' who were expected to be responsible for their entire life as ethical and political subjects (Inda, 2006). Such a reconfiguration in the welfare states in Europe increased the importance of

communities by disintegrating society into small and more manageable constructs such as family, ethnocultural, religious and epistemic communities (Kaya, 2019).

On the other hand, Turkey passed through a parallel but more intensive political transformation process as well. With the rise of the Nationalistic Front governments (Sayari, 2010), the political and social conflicts escalated and ended in a brutal military coup d'état in 1980. In the same period, Turkey applied the Economic Stability Report suggested by Turgut Özal just before the coup that marked the beginning of the neoliberalisation of Turkey (Karadag, 2010). This historical overlap between monist state approach (Heper, 2006; Insel, 2014) and neo-liberalisation programs taking effect in Turkey created a 'Non-democratic Capitalist State' for the years to follow (Yilmaz, 2005). Such unprecedented changes created a new wave of political migration to Europe and decreased the motivation of migrants abroad about returning to Turkey. For instance, Abadan-Unat (2002) reported that Germany's emigration policy was used only by 5.4% Turkish guest workers. In a way, emigration policy naturally acted like a selection process where the old, unhealthy workers or those with family issues returned to Turkey, but the rest remained.

Neoliberalisation of the social state in Germany and the formation of a non-democratic capitalist state in Turkey made the Turkish guest workers more vulnerable to macro-political changes that push them into community life to feel safer and to become political agents. The Turkish workers needed to unite as a minority in order to demand their educational, social and political rights in Germany; on the other hand, due to military coup and political instability in Turkey, they became representatives of many political parties and movements. Turkish postmigrants in Germany constitute a segmented and heterogeneous diaspora with a strong community life ever since (Avcı, 2006; Ogelman, 2003; Sezgin, 2008).

4.1.1.3. *The Rise of Post-Industrialisation: Globalisation and Transnationality.*

The iconic collapse of the Berlin Wall, among others, marked the transformation of the global economic order into a global free market (Bagchi, 2018). It is also ironic enough that those living under the shadow of the wall for ages (e.g., Turkish postmigrants in Kreuzberg) did not go anywhere. Instead, most of them were further disconnected from the urban economy and became chronic ghetto dwellers (Kaya, 2001). Still, during this era, the Turkish postmigrants' lives and cultural identities had gone through significant changes.

During the 1990s, the number and the strength of transnational corporations increased and spread across ex-communist countries and this development overlapped with the advancement of computer and communication technologies. The interaction between technology and the free-market economy created a new virtue of interconnectedness aiming to bring together the far corners of the globe, putting them in service to generate new economical, social, and political processes known as globalisation (Powell & Hendricks, 2009). Globalisation walked arm in arm with post-industrialisation. A shift from mass production of goods to mass production of information took place, downsizing local employment opportunities and chipping away employment security. In parallel, the number and intensity of migration were fostered by globalisation and better information technologies, especially towards developing countries (Triandafyllidou, 2018). Germany experienced a sharper increase in immigration as a result of the reunification of Germany that allowed citizenship to ethnic Germans from the former Communist block and the new labour migrant agreements concluded with East European countries in the early 1990s (Bauer & Zimmermann, 1997). These new developments that emerged through globalisation hardened the economical and social conditions of Turkish postmigrants because of low wages and unemployment stemming from the job-market competition along with increasing insecurity and xenophobia (Candan, 2000). Simultaneously, post-industrialisation activated

another sociological phenomenon, namely localisation, that provided new opportunities and strategies for Turkish postmigrants to cope with globalisation's adverse effects (Kaya, 2001). Since the border-crossing of capital, cultures, and politics facilitated the possibility of contacting people from various ethnic and national backgrounds, especially in European metropolises like Berlin, Turkish postmigrants generated communities, religious or cultural centres, familial or economic ties that altogether corresponded to a non-state pool of actors surrounding their material and social life.

As this new situation of migrants sparked a debate in academia and beyond blaming the migrants for creating parallel societies (Borch; 2019; Hiscott, 2005), researchers in line with anthropologists like Arjun Appadurai and Linda Basch proposed a new concept to define the recent social phenomenon; transnational social space (see, Abadan-Unat, 2002; Faist & Özveren, 2004). Accordingly, transnational social space is a “relatively stable, lasting and dense sets of ties reaching beyond and across the borders of sovereign states” (Faist, 2004, p.2) in which the migrant populations symbolically, socially and materially live in, although they are located primarily on one country. This line of research established that Turkish postmigrants are not only influenced by policies, regulations, or institutions of Germany but also of Turkey thanks to physical and symbolic increases in accessing communication and travel between these two countries (Amelina & Faist, 2008; Ehrkamp, 2005; Kaya, 2007). Furthermore, this new transnational strategy of Turkish postmigrants increased individualisation and cosmopolitanism. It deepened various local and particularistic responses to the danger of unemployment, social exclusion, and poverty escalated via globalism (For a broader discussion, see Kaya, 2001). At the same time, Turkey has adopted a new pro-active diaspora agenda to mobilise and instrumentalise those living abroad through these new advanced transnational ties and networks (Arkilic, 2021).

4.2. *Diaspora Governance and Extraterritorial Authoritarianism*

Building upon developments set forth by globalization, like advanced communication and transportation technologies or an emerging cosmopolitanism among

migrants (Kaya, 2019), transnationalism research often celebrates the transnational social space that non-state agents such as grass-roots organisations or bottom-up movements challenged the integration pressure by the residence country (Faist & Özveren, 2004). Besides, the term transnationalism was proposed to define the new generation of migrants who can benefit from both their home and host countries, which in turn expected to generate higher cultural competence, better bicultural efficacy, advanced communication abilities or cosmopolitanism (Klingenberg, Luetz & Crawford, 2020; Vertovec, 2009). Likewise, when it comes to Turkish postmigrants, for instance, Kaya and Kentel (2007) argued that this new form of migrants, 'Euro-Turks' as they called them, can act as a bridge to connect Turkey with Europe that eventually might contribute to the democratisation of Turkey. Consequently, under such a positive atmosphere following multiculturalist sentiments during the 1990s, home states' diaspora policies were welcomed and promoted globally. For instance, Gamlen (2014), focusing only on the formal state offices dedicated to immigrants and their descendants, reported that diaspora institutions are spreading rapidly across the globe. Accordingly, in 2014, the number of diaspora institutions led by states was five times higher than in 1990.

However, according to Adamson (2020), the optimistic view on transnationalism and diaspora policies “downplays the extent to which diaspora politics can become oppressive and contain elements of transnational repression” (p. 151). For that reason, both state and non-state actors in transnational social space might employ authoritarian practices to mobilise or consolidate political power in the diaspora and weaken domestic opposition. Despite the level of transnationality of communities abroad, ordinary diaspora members can be subjected to various forms of threat and persecution from both state and non-state actors over and above being marginalised in their county of residence. In her seminal work on extraterritorial authoritarianism, Glasius (2018) admitted this one-sidedness in migration and diaspora literature. According to her, diaspora literature mainly dealt with identities or participation of extraterritorial populations in the home society, but “not on the perpetuation of non-democratic rule” (p.182). This one-sided perspective is widespread in

authoritarianism research, too. In political sciences, the primary orientation is still overwhelmingly domestic and territorial, mainly because of methodological nationalism obstructing theorisation (Wimmer & Schiller, 2003). Another reason for such an overlook in the literature is due to the fact that diaspora policies and institutions fall into the gap between domestic politics and international relations areas of political science (Gamlen, 2014).

On another note, newly emerged diaspora governance literature argues that authoritarian practices rely on a notion of state as a collection of people beyond a territorial unity (Adamson, 2020; Gamlen, 2014; Ragazzi, 2014). Glasius (2018) postulated a certain degree of tolerance or even facilitation between democratic receiving states and authoritarian sending states for their outreach into each other's territory, which in turn contribute to stabilising authoritarianism. Such a relationship based on mutual benefit between democratic and authoritarian states is sustained through a shared, consistent policy to include or exclude extraterritorial populations, not as citizens, but rather as subjects, patriots, or clients. This dissertation will employ Glasius's (2018) extraterritorial authoritarianism approach to review the transformation of Turkey's diaspora policy concerning Germany's migration policy.

4.2.1. Long-Distance Nationalism: Trans-Kemalism

Scholarly works predominantly focus on Turkey's diaspora governance and its transformation after the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi-AKP) came to power in 2002 (Aksel, 2014; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019a; Mencutek & Baser, 2018). Previously, the state apparatus was not as sophisticated as today and the scope of services provided to the migrants was relatively fewer. Still, Turkey had managed to implement a diaspora governance strategy adjusted with its domestic and international situation in congruence with the circumstances of that period. More specifically, Turkey's earlier policies sought to facilitate remittance transfers, contribute to Turkey's European Union (EU)

membership, and control Islamist and Kurdish political opposition (Aksel, 2014; Arkilic, 2021).

This diaspora policy had been grounded on modern Turkey's founding paradigm (i.e., Kemalism) and continued to be the official state ideology for the diaspora governance up until the AKP era (İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Mügge, 2012; Şenay, 2012). Trans-Kemalism, as Şenay (2012) called it, was the early approach of diaspora governance driven by economic concerns and secular nation-building as a version of long-distance nationalism. Regarding the economy, Trans-Kemalism prioritised national interest and homogenised migrants under the term 'distant workers' (*Gurbetçi*) based on the high unemployment rates in the country and assuming the flow of migrants to be temporal. Yet, in the following years, only a small part of the migrants returned home and their contribution to the country's economy, remained determining. For instance, in 1974, the amount of annual remittance was about US\$1.4 billion (İçduygu, 2006) that constituted 4% of the gross domestic product (GDP) (World Bank, 2020). As a response to the permanent residency of the migrants in Germany, Turkey implemented various strategies in line with Trans-Kemalism to keep migrants connected to the homeland, such as the right to dual citizenship, membership arrangements (e.g., the pink card for Turkish postmigrants), broadcasting state-led TV channel (i.e., TRT-INT), setting up special funds to channel remittance, sending teachers to prepare migrants children for their return (Aksel, 2014; Şenay, 2012). This strategic shift was also documented via language use in newspapers and parliamentary debates of the period that 'distant workers' became 'Turkish citizens abroad' (Aksel, 2014; Şenay, 2012).

Another essential apparatus for Trans-Kemalism, to build new ties and networks with Turkish migrants abroad was the Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereafter *Diyanet*) that used to be an essential institution for the secularisation of Islam under the Kemalist regime (Arkilic, 2021). Just after providing dual citizenship right for Turkish citizens abroad, *Diyanet* opened its first overseas office in Berlin in 1982 and established a national office in Cologne, namely Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (*Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği*, hereafter, *DITIB*). In this way, Turkey decided to build its mosques, send its imams,

and spread its Kemalist ideology via sermon (i.e., Hutbe) transmitted by DITIB. Trans-Kemalism as a top-down diaspora policy aimed to monopolise mosques and compete with other grass-roots religious groups for a more nationalistic, even militaristic vision of religion. Furthermore, DITIB was employed to keep other diaspora organisations under constant surveillance as allies (e.g., seculars) and enemies (e.g., Kurds, Leftist). Thus, Trans-Kemalism performed partly both of ‘diaspora integrating’ mechanism by investing migrants with various national membership privileges and responsibilities and ‘diaspora building’ mechanism by recognising some pre-existing diasporic communities (Gamlen, 2008). However, domestic, transnational, and international factors setting the ground for Trans-Kemalism came to an end by 2000 (Aksel, 2014; Arkilic, 2021; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Mencutek & Baser, 2018; Okyay, 2015).

4.2.2. Turkish Postmigrants as Soft Power: Neo-Ottomanism

Regarding the international factors, two substantial developments affected Turkish diaspora governance. First, the importance of annual remittance in Turkey’s GDP declined by the millennium. It shrank to 0.2% in 2008 (Mügge, 2012) in proportion to decreasing rates of unemployment, inflation, the budget deficit that reached the lowest record in the country’s history (Arkilic, 2021). Rapid economic growth in the international arena downplayed the economic benefit once generated by the migration and Turkish postmigrants abroad. Instead, Turkish postmigrants gained political importance due to EU-Turkey membership negotiations and became a matter of soft power under the title of ‘Euro-Turks’ (Adamson, 2019; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Kaya & Kentel, 2004). This situation led to institutionalisation of Turkish diaspora policy and the new aim was to promote residency of Turkish postmigrants in their receiving countries without losing Turkish citizenship and culture.

In the early 2000s, several committees focusing on problems of Turkish postmigrants were founded under the Prime Ministry (Aksel, 2014), and Turkish citizenship was made non-renounceable to inhibit the attraction of the EU citizenship granted by

residence countries (McFadden, 2019). Furthermore, in 2008, the Turkish government encouraged migrants to vote in national elections in order to promote political agency in and attachment to their homeland (Baser & Ozturk, 2019; Aksel, 2014; Mencutek & Baser, 2018). According to Baser and Ozturk (2019), the central importance of these developments marked the early 2000s is a change in mentality. Instead of a *nation-hiding* of previous diaspora policies, a *nation-branding* logic started to dominate the diaspora governance of Turkey. Secondly, the attacks of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror policy brought the religion to the forefront of the world stage (Adamson, 2019) that across Europe, labelling migrants evolved towards Muslim or Islam categories. Consequently, Islamophobia started to gain visibility in social life (Ramm, 2010). Thereby, Turkish postmigrants faced a new threat in their everyday lives due to their religion on top of insecurities conveyed by globalisation, grew more vulnerable to Turkey's diaspora governance by being considered as a source of security and pride (Kaya, 2019).

Subsequently, certain domestic factors started to affect diaspora policy under the AKP's prolonged administration that confronted with the global increase of Islamophobia across Europe. Securing economic growth increasingly and prioritising the Europeanisation of Turkey in its early years, AKP started to fight against Kemalist elites in all state institutions, including the army and consolidated its power (Yilmaz, 2016). At this stage, AKP also empowered previously stigmatised Islamist groups such as *Millî Görüş* (National Vision) and *Gülen* movement, while regenerating Diyanet's 'official Islam' from secular views towards a more conventional Sunni Islam. For instance, based on analysis of official sermons, Öztürk (2016) showed that a synchronisation took place between formerly polarised political positions of Diyanet and AKP during the AKP's governance. Following this new power dynamics back in Turkey, the relationship among diaspora institutions also changed. For instance, DITIB, as the official partner of the German government in German conference on Islam with the highest number of affiliated mosques across Germany (Rosenow-Williams, 2010), eventually shifted much closer to the more fundamentalist communities such as Islamic Community Millî Görüş (IGMG) and their state-backed

financial resources have been increased (Öztürk, 2016). In addition to improving the relationships between the conservative and religious communities abroad, Turkey specifically implemented new committees and centres of attraction in order to serve diaspora governance beyond Turkish citizenship. Such a change corresponded to a paradigm shift that took place in the late 2000s.

Standing on the pillars of aforementioned domestic and international factors, Turkey became a regional actor and took significant economic and political roles in the global league by the late 2000s (Okyay, 2015). New political elites of Turkey started to depict Turkey as the leader of the non-western world by underlining its image of being the successor of Ottoman legacy. The change in the political discourse that coupled Neo-Ottomanism with resentment towards the 'West' (Tokdoğan, 2020) had an immense effect on diaspora governance beyond domestic politics (Adamson, 2019; Hatay & Tziarris, 2019b; Kaya, 2019; Öktem, 2014).

First of all, the term 'diaspora' officially granted recognition to define the populations abroad and signalled a pro-active policy management (Aksel, 2014) as opposed to previous policies targeting Turkish postmigrants that were selective with an intention to monitor and control cross-border political activism. This new definition of population abroad widened the target group and set a new horizon for Turkey's diaspora governance. By re-labelling its population abroad, Turkey made a move to set up a 'diaspora building' mechanism in order to encompass not only citizens but also other cross-border Turkey-related ethnic, religious, and cultural groups (Gamlen, 2014; Baser & Ozturk, 2019). However, it may sound ambiguous, Okyay (2015), with her detailed assessment of the political economy of Turkey's diaspora governance during the 20th century, showed that this new "melanges of ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural-historical criteria' is, in fact, an expensive attempt to awaking a dormant kin-state" (p.169). Thus, Turkey's diaspora governance with AKP is not a simple reconfiguration of outreach policy towards its citizens abroad; rather, it constitutes an essential part of the new political paradigm stemming from the nostalgia of being a 'bigger' and 'better' empire (see, Yavuz, 2020).

AKP might be said to have renovated and improved the former institutions of Trans-Kemalism; on the other hand, it implemented new ones with particular aims and focus. For instance, the aid donation of Turkey to the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), as a Trans-Kemalist institution aiming to establish ties with Turkish-speaking republics and neighbouring countries, increased eight times and reached US\$1.800 per year by 2008. TIKA also expanded its territory from the Balkans to the Middle East and from South Asia to Africa; some are neither neighbour nor Turkish speaking anymore but ex-Ottoman lands (Aksel, 2014; Okyay, 2015). Another improved institution is Diyanet, whose organisational networks cover Western Europe, the post-Soviet Central Asian republics, Australia, and United States (Sunier & Landman, 2015). According to Öztürk and Sözeri (2018), the Diyanet's budget had an immense rise that in 2017 it was six times higher than in 2004. In addition to regular religious activities, Diyanet was equipped with a foundation, a TV station, halal certification and a university since 2011. All these improvements contributed to Diyanet's outreach abroad. Finally, Turkey improved and reformed lots of its transnational state activities through Turkish consulates — including pensions, health, social security and military duty-related bureaucratic matters — that the whole Turkish citizens benefit regardless of their religious, ethnic or ideological affiliation. It should be noted that external voting from consulates also was legalised and facilitated during this era and had a considerable impact on political engagement to home-state politics among Turkish postmigrants (see, Yener-Roderburg, 2020).

Without confining itself with the reformation of the old ones, AKP also generated new institutions and processes in line with the Neo-Ottomanism paradigm (Adamson, 2019; Aksel, 2014; Arkilic, 2021; Öktem, 2014). Among them, the most prominent and effective one is the Presidency for the Turks Abroad and Related Communities (*Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı-YTB*) that was established in 2010 under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The transformation of the diaspora governance projected directly to the title of the presidency and ethnicity and kinship rather than citizenship became the determining terms for the diaspora governance (Aksel, 2014). This new highlight on kinship

covers co-ethnicity, such as being Turkic, and historical ties that are predominantly associated with being Muslim (Adamson, 2019; Okyay, 2015). It coordinates not only institutions and activities regarding citizens abroad but also kin and related communities, international students and non-governmental organisations (Baser & Ozturk, 2019). According to Aksel (2014), YTB aims to improve cooperation with the population abroad and protect historical heritage, with a particular focus on Europe. For instance, based on analysis of YTB's quarterly 'Plus 90' (Artı 90 or +90), Öktem (2014) showed that the most prevalent theme is the debate of xenophobia and Islamophobia in Europe, especially in Germany. Such a particularised definition and focus for the diaspora governance align with the Neo-Ottomanism paradigm counting on resentment to the West and symbolic leaderships to the non-Western world. Another institution recently generated for diaspora governance is Yunus Emre Institute (YEI), representing the cultural diplomacy of diaspora governance. Like Goethe and Cervantes institutes, its specific aim is to promote Turkish-language education and increase awareness of Turkish culture among Turkish postmigrants. However, differing from YTB, YEI's 61 culture centres predominantly located in the Balkans and the Middle East, where not co-ethnic but kin/related communities live. According to Kaya (2013), the discourse around the YEI and its operations reflects a pax-ottoman sentiment that defines an alternative civilisation against the dominance of Western culture.

YTB and YEI, being the brand-new Turkish diaspora governance institutions, represent the two pillars of the Neo-Ottomanism paradigm. On the one hand, Turkey tries to attract its broadly re-defined diaspora populations around the resentment against the West through YTB. On the other hand, it tries to integrate its diverse and ambiguous diaspora population around an alternative civilisation led by Turkish culture via YEI. With a constructivist diaspora management fashion (Gamlen, 2008), AKP's new costly diaspora policy -in its early prosperous time- aimed to be inclusive with promises of being free from ethnonationalism (Öktem, 2014; Okyay, 2015). However, starting from 2011, a de-Europeanisation trend started to rise (Yılmaz, 2016), and the so-called 'long arm of Erdoğan'

became a problem for Europe, especially for Germany where the most Turkish postmigrants live (Sunier & Landman, 2015; Sydow, 2016).

4.2.3. The Rise of Authoritarianism: Islamist Nationalism Abroad

The aftermath of the failed coup in 2016, international developments (e.g., Syrian civil war), and domestic economic indicators went into a decline and as a result while the AKP government has lost its allies, Turkey has lost its prosperity (Akçay, 2018; Özbudun, 2015). Meanwhile, Turkey's political system faced more than one crisis; the Gezi uprising, renewed elections, and the escalation of conflict in the southeast become catalysts for authoritarianism. Some scholars call the new political system as 'competitive authoritarianism' (Çalışkan, 2018; Esen & Gumuscu, 2016) where AKP's moderate Islamism eradicated and it became a 'hegemony-seeking' party (Bashirov & Lancaster, 2018; Solomon, 2019). For the sake of political hegemony via a new executive presidency system, AKP created a coalition with the far-right Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*-MHP) to consolidate their power and suppress their opponents domestically and internationally (Taşkın, 2019). Moreover, by the victory of the AKP-MHP alliance, which marked the last nail in the coffin for Turkish democracy, Turkey adopted more aggressive policies in all domains of diplomacy, including diaspora management (Bashirov & Lancaster, 2018) which, in turn, led to a transformation of the Neo-Ottomanism paradigm towards a new form of Islamist Nationalism under a one-person ruled hegemony (Solomon, 2019; Taşkın, 2019).

Through this momentum towards authoritarianism, Turkey's ambitious diaspora policy became a problem for Europe, especially after Erdoğan's famous maxim 'integrate but not assimilate' in Düsseldorf (Gezer & Reiman, 2011). Firstly, because Turkish postmigrants' votes played a critical role in the referendum for the presidency system (Adar, 2019; Yener-Roderburg 2020) and sparked a public debate on the loyalty of Turkish postmigrants, especially in Germany, due to their voting preferences (Goerres, 2018). Secondly, the domestic conflict spread to the international arena where the government targeted and

persecuted its opponents via transnational institutions worldwide (Watmough & Öztürk, 2018). Last, but not the least, AKP's satellite political groups and parties such as the Union of International Democrats (UID) and Germanic Ottomans (*Osmanen Germania*-OGBC) emerged across Europe that possibly hindered Turkish postmigrants' political engagement in their residence societies or threatened other Turkish postmigrants' communities with their illegal activities (Arkilic, 2021).

The most striking change among Turkish postmigrants was observed in turnout rate in domestic elections. For instance, following AKP's aggressive policies, the voter turnout rate of Turkish postmigrants in Germany jumped from 18% in 2014 to 46% at the presidency referendum in 2017, which was the highest ever recorded (Yener-Roderburg 2020). Despite the long-distance consulates located across the country and the long duration of their migration, Turkish postmigrants showed a high interest in their home state's politics and nearly half of electorates attended in the presidency referendum. According to Adar (2019), socio-economic improvements and better service provisions seemed like evidences of being a 'strong country' and played a vital role to be taken as the source of pride and to vitalize the support among constituencies of AKP.

AKP's victory across Europe, especially in Germany, brought the issues of social integration and loyalty of Turkish postmigrants to the agenda again. Goerres (2018) argued that the actual ratio of support for AKP is relatively low in Germany when those who did not vote in the election are taken into consideration. Obviously, religiosity and being the second generation are critical factors for voting for AKP. Halm & Sauer (2019) focused on a general political interest towards Turkey and showed that high political interest is not hindering social integration; on the contrary, it is positively correlated with social integration in Germany. Still, Turkey's outreach is not free from influence for Turkish postmigrants' everyday life. For instance, based on representative cross-sectional data, Sauer (2018) examined feelings of belongings to Turkey and Germany for the last 20 years and showed that Turkish postmigrants identify with Turkey more than ever whereas their attachment to Germany is decreasing. Likewise, Hoffman and colleagues (2020) showed that Turkishness,

religion and passing down Turkish traditions are way more critical to Turkish postmigrants than identification with their resident country and society. Moreover, most of them are alienated from European politics.

All things considered, it may be concluded that Turkey's new diaspora policies are efficient and robust regarding the rise of political interest and support among Turkish postmigrants. Notwithstanding their political heterogeneity, Turkish ethnic identification is on the rise; meanwhile, political interest and engagement in their residence countries lose ground among Turkish postmigrants. Besides, outreach attempts of Turkey is overlapping with the rise of Islamophobia across Europe that in turn might influence appraisal of threat or rejection perception. However, in spite of scholarly attention from political sciences, social psychological investigation of underlying mechanisms of such a transformation among Turkish postmigrants is neglected in the literature. In this dissertation, we aim to test above-mentioned outreach assumptions via social psychological variables.

5. Summary and Research Questions

The idea of acculturation of migrants originates from a social assimilationist assumption which presupposes that social integration 'naturally' follows once their structural/economic integration is achieved (see, Gordon, 1964). However, Sam and Berry (2006) postulated that under the influence of two parallel forces, namely cultural maintenance and -interaction, acculturation is based on contact, reciprocal influences and bidirectional exchange between cultures. As a result of this exchange, the individual supposed to end up with accommodating those two cultures simultaneously (e.g., integration orientation) for the best adjustment outcomes.

The premise of integration orientation received support from both laboratory and field research via the dual identity concept (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner et al., 2000; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). Accordingly, the best practice to direct in-group bias towards a broader identity category consists of the groups' mutual distinctiveness through an internalised dual identity (Gaertner et al., 2000), which is generalisable to real-life settings

(González & Brown, 2006). Concurrently, the dual identity concept was celebrated as an antidote to essentialism and cultural homogeneity with the rise of globalisation and multiculturalism by the political scientists (Hoffman, 2008; Kaya, 2019; Kymlicka, 1995; Nespitt-Larking, 2014; Nederveen, 1995). In the following years, this political euphemism about dual identity received empirical support by a number of concepts/approaches such as transnationalism (Faist & Özveren, 2004), politicized collective identity (Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon et al., 2010), gateway groups (Levy et al., 2017) and psychological adjustment (Berry, 2006).

In the course of the multiculturalist turn, the life situation of Turkish postmigrants also improved, especially in Germany (Sauer, 2007). Extensive evidences on bicultural Turkish postmigrants were provided that challenged the general misinformation about their 'failed integration' (Diehl & Schnell, 2006) and indicated their promoted political participation (Gezici Yalçın, 2007; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Simon & Grabow, 2010) and revealed discrimination that hinder their adjustment (Skrobanek, 2009). At the same time, they gained political importance for Turkey and depicted as 'Euro-Turks' that can act as a bridge between societies and contribute to the democratisation of both countries (Kaya & Kentel, 2004). However, during the last decade, new reports and findings from different disciplines shook the foundation of the optimistic premises of the dual identity concept. In other words, we witnessed a decline in appealing to dual identity, especially for Turkish postmigrants.

Various researchers showed that dual identification of Turkish postmigrants was not related to social integration (Leszczensky, 2013), political participation (Simon et al., 2013; Fleischmann et al., 2013) or academic achievement (Schotte et al., 2018). Furthermore, a recent longitudinal analysis shows that, especially for Turkish postmigrants, it is becoming more difficult to uphold a dual identity during adolescence (Jugert et al., 2020). It is defined as a 'liability' or a 'two-edged sword', implying that dual identity is a cognitively costly construct and can be very fragile if it is not recognised or supported by the broader public (Baysu et al., 2011; Simon et al., 2013). More obviously, a decrease of dual

identity holders was reported through a cross-sectional dataset aiming to observe Turkish postmigrants living in North-Rhein-Westphalia in Germany. Sauer (2018) revealed that the feelings of belonging among Turkish postmigrants are changing in favour of Turkey, yet the numbers of dual identifiers are decreasing more than ever. The premise of this dissertation is to understand the reason behind and the consequence of the decline of dual identification among Turkish postmigrants.

The literature on the psychology of bicultural individuals (e.g., dual identifiers) reviewed above states that integrating two identities and cultures builds upon two pillars. One is *identity (dis)association* (e.g., distance vs. blendedness) that corresponds to behavioural and objective aspects of acculturation such as degree of exposure to other culture or language proficiency. The other one is *identity (in)compatibility* (e.g., conflict vs. harmony) that corresponds to affective and subjective aspects of acculturation such as acculturation stress and perceived discrimination (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005). Although both pillars are shown to be associated with acculturation orientation, identity (in)compatibility is particularly determinative for the psychological adjustment of immigrants (Berry et al., 2006; Huynh et al., 2011; Lepshokova et al., 2018). It has been shown that identity (in)compatibility, as a social psychological orientation, has the potential to influence political participation (Simon et al., 2013), intergroup attitudes (Hutchison et al., 2015); social integration (Schulz & Leszczensky, 2016), and psychological well-being (Hirsh & Kang, 2016).

Apart from other personal and demographic variables, we argue that the subjective aspect of acculturation might be associated with the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants since they witnessed significant political and social changes both in Europe and Turkey during the last decade. To be able to associate relevant psychological variables with the decline of dual identity, we need to focus on the levels and forms of rejection that are shown to be effective for ethnonational (dis)identification (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009) along with negative and positive consequences of dual identification (Badea et al., 2011; Baysu et al., 2011; Baysu & Phalet, 2019). Although

attempts to test the direct association between perceived discrimination and dual identification failed to support our assumption (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016; Jugert et al., 2020), it should be noted that available approaches contain certain methodological and conceptual deficiencies to operationalise rejection and perceived discrimination (Armenta & Hunt, 2009; Costarelli, 2007; Eccleston & Major, 2006; Kaiser & Major, 2006).

Drived from the transactional model of stress and coping, Major and colleagues suggested that *exposure* to maltreatment, *appraisal* of threat, and *attribution* to discrimination should be distinguished (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Besides, they include collective representations, situational cues, and personal characteristics of the victim in the rejection process that allow us to have a more realistic picture of rejection as well. Racism-related stress literature also makes it clear that discrimination does not occur in a vacuum; it is embedded in the historical, political, and social context where minorities learn and develop mechanisms to detect and respond to discrimination (Harrell, 2000; Mellor, 2004; Tanyaş, 2019). Thus, before examining the association between rejection and decline of dual identity, we need to contextualise and operationalise the rejection phenomenon for Turkish postmigrants. In the course of this dissertation, we propose to conduct a qualitative field study to distinguish the objective and subjective aspect of rejection and answer the following questions:

Research Question -1: How Turkish postmigrants in Germany make sense of the rejection process?

(1a) How they distinguish the objective and subjective components of rejection?

(1b) How they cope with the objective and subjective components of rejection?

Without losing sight of the rejection concept that needs to be contextualised, another essential dimension of dual identity is ethnonational identification. Cross-cultural comparison of various migrant groups' perceived discrimination across the EU members states underlines the determinative role of country of origin above and beyond 'destination' variables (André & Dronkers, 2017). Even though research on dual identity is limited

(Verkuyten et al., 2019), available evidence draws attention to the acceptance from majority group as well as by in-group for sustaining psychological, sociocultural, and health-related adjustment of bicultural individuals (Baysu et al., 2011; Fleischmann & Op De Weegh, 2021; Simon et al., 2013). Furthermore, Chrysochoou and Lyons (2011) argued that subjective perception of harmony or conflict between identities (e.g., identity (in)compatibility) is not a mechanism, but a belief embedded in the interest of those whose identities are pursued to be blended.

When it comes to the history of Turkish migration to Germany, the last decade is witnessed significant changes in the cultural identity of Turkish postmigrants that might influence their ethnonational identification. An important indicator of this change is naturalisation rates in Germany as it allows multiple citizenships (McFadden, 2019). In the early 2000s, the ratio of applicants of naturalisation suddenly plummeted down, and today, only 6000 people per year benefit from naturalisation right (Destatis, 2020), despite the fact that 97.8% of Turkish postmigrants meet the requirements of naturalisation (Yıldırım-Sungur & Schwarz, 2021). There are different arguments concerning the diminishing naturalisation rate (Kaya, 2019; McFadden, 2019), but many political scientists like Baser and Ozturk (2019) see this transformation as a “change in mentality” (p. 32).

Throughout the history of Turkish migration (Abadan-Unat, 2002; Kaya, 2001; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013), Turkish postmigrants employed different strategies such as *being migrants, minorities* and *transnationality members* in order to protect themselves from constraints of industrialisation, neoliberalisation and lately post-industrialisation (Kaya, 2019). Thanks to physical and symbolic increases in accessing communication and travel opportunities between the two countries during post-industrialisation (Amelina & Faist, 2008; Kaya, 2007), Turkish postmigrants’ political value exceeded their economic profit (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). These occurrences overlapped with the increase of transnational institutions and diaspora governance practices (Gamlen, 2014), which in turn, make them vulnerable to Turkey’s extraterritorial authoritarian practices (Glasius, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b).

Previously, the main principle of keeping economic and cultural connection with Turkish postmigrants used to be characterised with a *nation-hiding* logic (Baser & Ozturk, 2019), in which the predominant effort was aiming to recognise and facilitate the migration of humans and culture between the states (Aksel, 2014; İçduygu & Aksel, 2013; Mügge, 2012). The dominant paradigm of Turkey's diaspora governance, so-called 'trans-Kemalism' (Şenay, 2012), came to an end with AKP government. Both domestic (e.g., AKP's prolonged and consolidated political power) and international (e.g., the attacks of 9/11 and rise of islamophobia) developments transformed Turkey's diaspora governance ever since (Okuyay, 2015). The new paradigm based on neo-Ottomanism nostalgia (Yavuz, 2020) targeted a melange of ethnolinguistic, religious, and cultural-historical groups living abroad (Okuyay, 2015). The new ruling logic of diaspora governance becomes *nation-branding* where numerous economic, legal, and symbolic investments targeted Turkish postmigrants' cultural identity as if they were an extension or ambassador of the Turkish state (Adamson, 2019; Aksel, 2014; Arkilic, 2021; Öktem, 2014).

More importantly, after failed coup d'état in 2016, AKP lost its moderate Islamism agenda and turned into a hegemony-seeking regime (Bashirov & Lancaster, 2018; Solomon, 2019). Its relationship with the EU became jittery, especially when Turkish postmigrants were instrumentalised in the presidency system referendum in 2017 (Adar, 2019; Yener-Roderburg 2020). The new paradigm further accelerated its influence on Turkish postmigrants with the alliance of ultra-nationalists which is drawn attention in Europe due to aggressive policies such as transnational persecutions of opponents of the regime (Watmough & Öztürk, 2018), illegal activities of AKP's satellite groups and parties (Arkilic, 2021), and significant mobilisation of AKP voters abroad (Adar, 2019; Yener-Roderburg 2020).

In addition to studies on political and discursive transformation of diaspora governance of Turkey, some researchers examined Turkey's outreach through changing voting behaviour (Goerres, 2018; Yener-Roderburg 2020), political interest (Adar, 2019; Halm & Sauer, 2019) and identification (Hoffman et al., 2020) among Turkish postmigrants;

however, social psychological investigation on the mechanisms of such mobilisation and influence is neglected in the literature. Thus, driven from rejection-(dis)identification models (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009), the second premise of this dissertation is to test Turkey's outreach through subjective components of rejection and (dis)identification of Turkish postmigrants to answer following questions:

Research Question -2: How new diaspora governance of Turkey influence the feelings of belonging among Turkish postmigrants?

(2a) Which aspect of rejection influenced their ethnonational identification?

(2b) Which aspect of rejection increased their political interests in Turkey?

We are mainly interested in contextualising the rejection phenomenon and understanding the psychological mechanism behind the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants. Yet, it is also crucial to understand that not only the quantity, but also the quality of rejection revealed by the Turkish postmigrants' case may clarify previous findings in the literature. More specifically, available studies on perceived discrimination mainly assess its degree and level that concentrate on magnitude of rejection within the intergroup relations (Armenta & Hunt, 2009; Branscombe et al., 1999b; Eccleston & Major, 2006). On the other hand, an elaborate conceptualisation, as proposed in this dissertation, might be used to develop new methods and measures for rejection concept based on its quality, in other words, the composition of its subjective components (e.g., Threat & Attribution). Besides, with regard to our study sample, two critical sets of variables can be further examined with the revealed new forms of rejection.

According to Kaya (2019), post-industrialisation conveyed multi-layered insecurities drifting young generations towards essentialist movements such as white-supremacism and religious fundamentalism or social isolationism. Turkish postmigrants are especially vulnerable to these movements since they are torn between two significant political turmoils: the rise of Islamophobia in Europe (Ramm, 2010) and extraterritorial authoritarianism of Turkey (Glasius, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019a). On the one hand, engagement in

illegitimate groups and activities based on religion or nationalism might increase radicalisation (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Simon (2010) showed that identity incompatibility seems to delegitimise the general public and polity for immigrants and increase sympathy for radical action, especially amongst the Turkish postmigrants in Germany. Regarding AKP's satellite political groups like Germanic Ottomans ("Sons of AKP," 2017) and ultranationalist groups such as *Grey Wolves* in Germany (Bozay, 2016), it may be crucial to reveal psychological mechanism driving people to more radical forms of political action as a result of different forms of rejection. On the other hand, rejection, and identity (in)compatibility can increase disidentification from national identity and the general public (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009), which in turn, prevent political participation and expand cultural and social isolationism which is also the case for Turkish postmigrants (see, Simon et al., 2013). Regarding the low level of political participation of minorities across Europe (Lyon, 2008), understanding the underlying mechanism of depoliticisation of Turkish postmigrants might be necessary for Germany in order to develop more inclusive policies to respond to Turkey's outreach.

Some researchers examined the political participation of minorities, including Turkish postmigrants (Ataman et al., 2017; De Rooij, 2012; Gsir, 2014). However, they mainly described the overall situation through the demographic variables of their samples. Only a few studies examined (de)politicisation of Turkish postmigrants (Simon et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2015). Nevertheless, all these studies are relying upon the quantity of discrimination but not its quality. Thus, our third premise in this dissertation is to develop a more detailed methodology to measure different forms of rejection in order to answer the following questions:

Research Question -3: Do different forms of rejection influence the dual identification of Turkish postmigrants?

(3a) Do different forms of rejection increase or decrease their political participation?

(3b) Do different forms of rejection increase or decrease their resilience to violent extremism?

CHAPTER-TWO: EMPIRICAL PART

6. Research Methodology

Decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants is a complex phenomenon since it is related to a psychological mechanism (e.g., bicultural identity integration) that interacted with the socio-political context in a certain period of time (e.g., change of diaspora governance of Turkey) and location (e.g., German-Turkish transnational space). Above-mentioned research questions require a multi-layered examination to uncover both possible reasons such as process of rejection from mainstream society as well as outcomes such as identity (in)compatibility and political participation in Germany (Major & O'Brien, 2005; Wiley & Deaux, 2011). Thereby, we decided to employ a mixed methodology to contextualise the rejection concept through qualitative analysis of interviews with the sample (e.g., Study 1), to associate the contextualised rejection process with the change of dual identification that took place in time, through cross-sectional data gathered during the social change in question (e.g., Study 2), and finally, to reveal the causal relations between the contextualised rejection and (dis)identification under controllable settings through an experimental vignette study (e.g., Study 3).

6.1. *Research Design*

The history of mixed methodology, based on the integration of qualitative and quantitative research methods, goes back to the 80s, when researchers from different disciplines tried to bring together the strength of both methods to understand such complex phenomena (Bryman, 1988). Throughout the years, the experience and knowledge about mixed procedures were enhanced and researchers from various fields, specifically social sciences, were provided with fruitful applications (Greene, 2007). As in this dissertation, the mixed methodology is very efficient, especially when primary sources on certain phenomena are inadequate and may not be able to tell the whole story. Likewise, although Turkish postmigrants' rejection experience drew researchers' attentions, it is yet to be contextualised. Besides, political changes took place on a macro level that has been examined, but their

association with dual identification is not examined yet. Thus, in this dissertation, inadequate primary sources on the phenomena under investigation direct us to implement a mixed methodological design.

According to Creswell & Plano Clark (2018), mixed methodologies allow researchers to offset the limitation of a method by others' strength. Likewise, in this dissertation, although a qualitative assessment of the discrimination experiences of Turkish postmigrants might provide rich information about their rejection process, without employing quantitative methods with a bigger sample to develop a more comprehensive understanding of rejection-(dis)identification mechanism of the same group, the obtained initial information cannot be generalised. Relying on the compensation of different methods, mixed methodologies might have various rationales such as *triangulation* that aims to compare qualitative and quantitative findings, *complementarity* that aims to elaborate certain aspect of a phenomenon using qualitative or quantitative methods, or *development* that aims to use a set of findings from one method to direct or develop next set of findings of another method (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989). Following this typology, the purpose of the mixed methodology employed in this dissertation is *development* in which qualitative findings of the first study is being used in order to develop the conceptual framework for the second, and the limitation of the second study is compensated by the third that provide a complete picture of the phenomenon in the end. In other words, although each of the studies conducted in this dissertation already using diverse theoretical framework and methods, they are aligned at one purpose to develop a comprehensive answer to the main research question regarding the change in the dual identification of Turkish postmigrants.

Thereby, as the core design of mixed-method, we decided at the beginning of this dissertation to abide by an *exploratory sequential design* with a fixed procedure (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018), due to its advantages of following a structured research process, and a three-step research was planned and systematically implemented (See, Figure 5). Apart from the broad distinctions that were set between the steps of the study, due to the sequential nature of the design and depending on their novel research questions and methodological

requirements, initial findings from the qualitative field research were incorporated in the second study, and the findings obtained from the second study also contributed to the third one (Plano Clark, 2019).




Figure 5. Exploratory Sequential Mixed Method Design of Proposed Studies

Note: Prototypical logic of Qual → Quan mixed methods design, as adapted from Plano Clark, (2019).

6.2. *Sequence of Studies*

Following the research questions above (see, *Section 5 in Chapter 1 above*), a three-year mixed methodological procedure was realized with three consecutive studies where each study interactively contributed to the next one both conceptually and empirically.

In the first study, we focused on the rejection phenomenon to be able to answer the first set of research questions. Some studies on Turkish postmigrants have already postulated that perceived discrimination plays an essential role in re-ethnicisation (Skrobanek, 2009) and negotiation of identity (Holtz et al., 2013) as well as reactive ethnicity (Çelik, 2015). However, these studies are not free from methodological problems stated by racism-related stress and coping research (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). Available studies either label the experience of maltreatment prior to the research or measure personal and group-based discrimination simultaneously. Besides, these studies are lacking the conceptual and empirical distinction between objective

and subjective assessments of discrimination. We are only aware of one study reporting that fear of discrimination is much higher than the experience of discrimination among Turkish postmigrants (see, Kloek, Peter and Wagner, 2015) that highlight the importance of appraisal of threat among our study population as we assumed. Thus, as a neglected topic, it is important to elaborate and contextualise the rejection process among Turkish postmigrants, especially in order to find answers to the following research questions in particular.

To this end, we utilised Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005) in order to assess rejection as a process from an impersonal angle that allows us to incorporate unequal power relations during a discriminatory encounter together with ambivalent and contradictory attitudes one's response to rejection. (Tanyaş, 2019). We qualitatively examined how Turkish postmigrants make sense of rejection through their narration of individual, collective, and historical interactions with the dominant culture and society (see, *Section 7.3 in Chapter 2 below*). Then, we used the initial findings on Exposure, Threat and Attribution as a springboard in order to distinguish the rejection process among Turkish postmigrants to be used as a conceptual tool for further correlational and experimental studies of the following steps of this dissertation (see, Table 1).

In the second study, we traced the historical transformation of (dis)identification among Turkish postmigrants in order to associate the decline of dual identity with contextualised rejection concept in a specific time frame. The last decade witnessed a decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants and initial positive outcomes from biculturalism is questioned (Baysu et al., 2011; Fleischmann, et al., 2013; Jugert et al., 2020; Kaya & Kentel, 2004; Leszczensky, 2013; Simon et al., 2013; Schotte et al., 2018). Some political scientists underline the fact that the socio-political transformation took place in Turkey changed its diaspora governance from nation-hiding logic to nation-branding logic (Adamson, 2019; Aksel, 2014; Arkilic, 2021; Baser & Ozturk, 2019; Öktem, 2014) and it influenced Turkish postmigrants voting behaviours (Goerres, 2018; Yener-Roderburg 2020), political interests (Adar, 2019; Halm & Sauer, 2019) and identifications (Hoffman et al.,

2020). Recently, some social psychologists also examined the effect of religion and ideology on Turkish postmigrants' voting behaviours (Baysu & Swyngedouw, 2020). However, it remains as a valuable academic and scientific interest to study the kinds of individual-level variables were influenced by Turkey's outreach that in turn effect the changes in the dual identification and political interests of Turkish postmigrants.

Thereby, we aim to distinct objective and subjective aspects of rejection on dual identification via qualitative findings from the first study (i.e., components of rejection process). And relying on RIM and RDIM, we examined the association between newly emerged components of rejection and ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants through a correlational study using two waves of a repeated cross-sectional dataset from Germany, covering the political transformation that took place in Turkey (i.e., Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland, see, *Section 8.2 in Chapter 2 below*).

In the third study, we examined the causality between components of rejection and relevant outcomes such as dual identity, political participation and resilience to violent extremism. Previous field research and qualitative findings were used to generate experimental vignettes to specifically manipulate subjective components of rejection (i.e., Threat and Attribution) under more controllable settings (see, *Section 9.1 in Chapter 2 below*). More specifically, we elaborated the concept of perceived discrimination by using two levels of appraisal of threat (i.e., Generalised vs. Specific) and causal attribution (i.e., Out- vs. In-group). In this study, we used these two factors in order to create four different discrimination conditions that are distinguishable theoretically and empirically (Major et al., 2002; Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019; Hutchison et al., 2015). Accordingly, a rejection experience might be conceptualised as *Justifiable* (i.e., Specific Threat & In-group Attribution), *Perceived* (i.e., Specific Threat & Out-group Attribution), *Apprehensive* (i.e., Generalised Threat & In-group Attribution) and *Structural* discrimination (i.e., Generalised Threat & Out-group Attribution).

Furthermore, we tested the effects of these distinct forms of discrimination on the political participation and resilience to violent extremism. Previous studies on political

participation of minorities (Ataman et al., 2017; De Rooij, 2012; Gsir, 2014) were contented with descriptive results and demographic comparisons. On the other hand, studies of (de)politicisation of Turkish postmigrants (Fleischmann et al., 2013; Simon, 2010; Simon et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2015), mainly rely upon the degree of rejection via perceived discrimination variables. Through this experimental vignette study, we both distinguished the rejection and assessed its influence above and beyond demographic variables.

7. Study 1: Rejection from mainstream society and coping: A qualitative analysis on rejection process among Turkish postmigrants.

7.1. *Aim and Rationale*

Studies on Turkish postmigrants postulated that the perceived discrimination plays an essential role in re-ethnicisation (Skrobanek, 2009) and negotiation of identity (Holtz et al., 2013) as well as reactive ethnicity (Çelik, 2015). Yet, none of these studies shed light on how the rejection is perceived, localised, and conceptualised. Instead, they mostly focused on Turkish postmigrants' reaction to social exclusion through taking the concepts of discrimination and ethnic identification for granted. Besides, available studies barely distinguished the objective discrimination from the subjective concerns and fears (see, Kloek, Peter & Wagner, 2015) that correspond to a broader socio-political structure in which political climate and the interest of groups are in constant interplay (Wiley & Deaux, 2011; Reicher, 2004). In order to understand which kinds of psychological variables are accompanying the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants, first we need to elaborate and contextualise the concept of rejection among the sample.

Thus, in this study we examined how Turkish postmigrants make sense of rejection through their narration of individual, collective and historical interactions with the dominant culture and society. To this end, we utilised Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005) to assess rejection as a process from an impersonal angle that allows us to incorporate unequal power relations during a discriminatory encounter or fears and concerns circulating among the sample as well as ambivalences and contradictions of one's responses to social exclusion (Tanyaş, 2019).

7.2. *Data and Method*

This study draws on semi-structured, in-depth and focus group interviews with Turkish postmigrants that were carried out between March and December 2018. The sample is reached through a sensitive field approximation and consist of Turkish postmigrants who are connected to a cultural, ethnic, and/or religious community in Germany. Considering the

fragile political atmosphere and societal marginalisation in German-Turkish transnational space accompanying the changes in diaspora governance of Turkey (see, *Section 4.2 in Chapter 1 above*), we proceeded with a mixture of quota and snowball sampling in order to overcome the selection bias (Cohen & Arieli, 2011). Under the guidance of the municipal integration centre of Bielefeld, a medium-sized city in Nord-Rhein Westphalia, we selected interviewees with different political and religious beliefs. Then, we identified a single reliable contact as the gatekeeper for each community.

In order to reach a comprehensive sample across the study population (Salentin, 2014), we recruited interviewees from aggregation centres of the Turkish communities (see Table 1); such as two DITIP mosques (eight interviewees), a mosque associated to a Turkish-Muslim sect (*Süleymanlılar*, three interviewees), a Turkish nationalist organisation (*Grey Wolves*, three interviewees), two secular community centres (*ADD Kulturgemeinde*, five interviewees), two socialist youth organisations (three interviewees), and a university (five interviewees).

Table 1. Characteristics of Interviewees and the Distribution of Interviews

Interviewees	<i>N</i>	%/ <i>SD</i>	Interviews	<i>N</i>	%
Male	17	65,4	Focus groups	5	26,3
Female	9	34,6	Mosques	8	42,1
Family Reunification	7	26,9	Nationalist Organisation	2	10,5
2 nd Generation	6	23,1	Secular Associations	4	21,1
3 rd Generation	13	50,0	Socialist Organisations	2	10,5
Age (Mean)	35.3	10.8	University	3	15,8
Total	26	100,0	Total	19	100,0

Out of 14 individual and five focus group interviews (i.e., two to three interviewees), a total of 26 interviewees were recruited from eight institutions with a mean age of 35.3 (*SD* = 10.8). None of the interviewees was from the first generation of Turkish migration, but

eight of them came to Germany with family reunification (%26.9) within the last 15-25 years. While six of the remaining interviewees belonged to second-generation (%26.9), 13 of them belonged to the third generation of Turkish migration to Germany (%50). Finally, nine females (%34.6) and 17 males (%65.4) participated in the interviews.

As a fluent Turkish speaker, I conducted semi-structured interviews to ensure that being an in-group member might help to overcome social desirability effects (van Heelsum, 2013). We conducted interviews in Turkish, except for one of the focus groups where interviewees preferred to speak in English. Due to the sensitive political atmosphere within the Turkish communities, we principally avoided asking direct questions about political orientation. Also, to adequately cover the rejection process and to avoid priming interviewees, we avoid naming their experience, such as ‘discrimination’ or ‘prejudice’, unless the interviewees themselves used such terms. Interviews began with asking interviewees their personal history of the migration. We then mainly asked, *‘How would you describe the interaction of German and Turkish communities?’* to approach the social exclusion topic from a neutral perspective. We then supported the discussion with questions like *‘Have you had any negative personal experiences with Germans? What kind of negative experiences does Turkish postmigrants experience in Germany? What (or who) is the source (or agent) of these negative experiences in Germany?’* to uncover the objective and subjective aspects of the rejection as well as their causal attribution. The interviews, which lasted between 30 and 90 minutes, were recorded via a voice recorder and transcribed verbatim.

7.2.1. Analytic Strategy

We employed Qualitative Content Analysis -QCA- (Schreier, 2012) to analyse the corpus of data, which is more suitable to focus on a predetermined theoretical construct within a qualitative text (Mayring, 2014). QCA is a hybrid method that includes a qualitative assessment of latent content across a text and a mutually exclusive category structure that allows researchers to assess coding reliability (Schreier et al., 2019). A QCA process mostly

starts with an explorative research question linked to a theory and follow inductive and deductive codings based on a category system derived from the theory. Furthermore, when generated coding manual is mutually exclusive, as in our case, intercoder reliability is assessed by involving a second coder of at least ten per cent of entire codes (Mayring, 2014).

In this study, based on the conceptualization of the rejection process proposed by Major and her colleagues (2002); (1) we generated a codebook to classify the content into three predetermined categories deductively that correspond to three phases of rejection (i.e., Exposure, Threat and Attribution), after repeatedly reading five randomly selected interviews. Then, (2) we chose examples of excerpts to discuss the code structure and to generate themes and subthemes with peers experienced in qualitative analysis. After reaching an agreement on the theme structure, (3) we conducted the rest of the coding using the initial codebook with Atlas.ti-7 qualitative analysis software (Friese, 2013). Finally, (4) we reviewed updated codes and their definitions to fine-tune themes and subthemes that emerged from the data corpus. In the end, 177 excerpts were assigned to three categories, and six themes consisting of 13 subthemes throughout the data corpus (see, Table 2). Finally, (5) according to the codebook, a second coder re-coded randomly selected %10 of each subtheme, in total 23 excerpts into three-level (i.e., category, theme and subtheme). We reached a high degree of agreement (%79), with an interrater reliability coefficient $AC_1 = .752$ that shown to be robust to Kappa paradox by using Agree Stat 15.6 (Haley et al., 2008; Gwet, 2008).

Table 2. Components of Rejection Process: Generated and Confirmed Theme Structure

Categories	Themes	Subthemes	<i>n</i>	%	Definitions
Exposure			41	23.7	Exposure refers to articulations contain (1) physical or (2) vicarious encounter with a maltreatment (or lack of) due to group membership.
	Personal Experience		31	73.8	
		from a higher position	19	61.3	refers exposures that took place in setting characterized by power asymmetry.
		from an equal position	12	38.7	refers exposures that took place in a setting do not characterized by power asymmetry.
Denial		10	23.8	refers exposures contain refusal to frame a maltreatment as a personal experience.	
Threat			69	39.0	Threat refers to articulations of (1) fear, (2) anxiety, (3) concern on belonging a minority group in Germany.
	Specific		41	59.4	
		towards Tur. postmigrants	37	90.2	refers to threats that are driven from being Turkish and/or Turkish postmigrant.
		towards Turkey	4	9.8	refers threats that are driven from being in favour of Turkey or Turkish government.
	Generalised		28	40.6	
		towards Migrants	20	71.4	refers threats that are driven from being foreigner and/or migrant.
towards Muslims		8	28.6	refers threats that are driven from being a Muslim.	
Attribution		76	42.9	Attribution refers to articulations of a responsible (1) source or (2) an agent of social exclusion in Germany.	

Attribution-Out	48	63.2	
They (Germans)	26	54.2	refers to causal attributions to blame ethnic Germans for the social exclusion.
Society & System	16	33.3	refers to causal attributions to blame German society or institutions for the social exclusion.
The State (Germany)	6	12.5	refers to causal attributions to blame German state or political system for the social exclusion.
Attribution-In	28	36.8	
Withdrawn	12	42.9	refers to causal attributions to blame Turkish postmigrants' unwillingness to interact with mainstream society
Incompetence	9	32.1	refers to causal attributions to blame Turkish postmigrants' lack of capacity.
Deviancy	7	25.0	refers to causal attributions to blame Turkish postmigrants' deviant behaviours.

Note: Grand total of presented percentages exceeds 100 due to separate calculation of the frequencies within categories and themes. A sum of frequencies of subthemes is equal to the frequency of a theme and a sum of frequencies of themes is equal to the frequency of a category.

After finalising the coding for the individual interviews, we also coded focus group interviews according to the codebook and compared them with the initial findings. Accordingly, overall theme structure that emerged from the individual interviews confirmed by focus group data as well, except for two subthemes of Attribution category. Nevertheless, this finding contributes to our understanding of contextualised rejection process rather than hindering the proposed theme structure (see, *Section 7.3.2 in Chapter 2 below*). We then selected some vivid examples to report rejection process of Turkish postmigrants.

7.3. Results and Discussion

In this part, we present and discuss the findings that correspond to each category (i.e., components of rejection) revealed from the individual interviews regarding the prevalence of the themes and subthemes in the light of the literature. Then we present and discuss the findings from the comparison of interview methods regarding the overlaps and differentiations (i.e., Focus group & Individual).

7.3.1. Individual Interviews

7.3.1.1. Results on Exposure.

The main problem with the perceived discrimination concept is related to personal vs. group discrepancy (Armenta & Hunt, 2009; Bourguignon et al., 2006; Skrobanek, 2009). Researchers suggest assessing personal discrimination separately as the objective side of rejection from the mainstream society, whereby victims' in-group membership becomes the forefront of everyday interactions with the dominant group members. Moreover, a recent study conducted in Netherlands showed that personal experience of discrimination may remain very low despite the fact that the fear of discrimination is strong among Turkish postmigrants (Kloek, Peter & Wagner, 2015). That is why we paid particular attention to differentiate the perception of threat or fear of discrimination from personal experiences of maltreatment due to the group membership.

Thus, Exposure themes (% 23.7) consist of the personal experience of rejection (and lack of it) where interviewees articulate their physical or vicarious encounters with rejection (Harrell 2000). Besides, another subtheme emerged from the data that we called *denial* where interviewees state the lack of personal experience of maltreatment, although they admit that their in-group members' overall negative experience. We assign such excerpts under the *denial* subtheme following Mellor (2004) that denial of rejection defined as a self-protective coping strategy.

Regarding the personal experience, interviewees articulate different forms of *personal experience* (% 73.8) ranging from physical attacks to verbal insults without forming

a predominant subtheme. Still, the corpus of data allows us to generate codes that draw lines between various incidents. For instance, we figure out that not the content, but the context of the personal experience become important through which power asymmetries determine the meaning of the encounter with the dominant group members (i.e., Germans). The vast majority of the personal experience took place in schools or educational settings where teachers or authorities have the power and do not treat Turkish postmigrants equally as they treat the dominant group members. The quotation-1 from a 51-year-old second-generation male interviewee exemplifies the determinative role of power asymmetry for the victims of maltreatment.

Quotation-1-(51/M): *What the teacher told me was: ‘you came here as a worker, you won’t think of things like [being] an engineer, an architect. That’s why, in the same test with a German, let’s say a test you both cheated, I say so to be understood better, you could get four-five [grade] while he/she got two. And they [teachers] were saying this as it is: ‘Your position is definite [in the society]’. You are asked to remain in that position. That [experience] was very determinant for me.*

Overall, incidents in such context give the same message to the victims: their ‘inferior’ social position in society. In most cases, interviewees could not respond or face maltreatment due to their lack of power in such settings. They referred to such incidents as decisive or determinant for their entire lives, although the incidents belonged to their early childhood memories. Besides, educational settings like schools are mostly the first official and obligatory steps to broader society. Thereby, *from a higher position* (% 61.3), the subtheme exemplified in the quotation above constitutes the most widespread personal experience among the sample that almost all interviewees articulate at least once.

The other subtheme that we could differentiate from other kinds of maltreatment examples was *from an equal position* (%38.7). Incidents often occur between subjects who have relatively equal statuses in which the victim has a potentially greater chance to challenge or confront the maltreatment. Because experiences ‘*from an equal position*’ arise

in the form of bullying or insults from members of the dominant group who do not represent an established institute as in the case of a teacher or police officer, but themselves. In this way, the incidents accumulated under *from an equal position* exemplify subtle discrimination experiences defined as the daily racism micro-stressors by Harrell (2000) or microaggression by Sue et al. (2007). For instance, in quotation-2, a 45-year-old male interviewee who came to Germany 23 years ago because of financial problems is/was subjected to maltreatment from his German colleague in an equal setting where they share the same space (i.e., canteen).

Quotation-2-(45/M): *I myself have witnessed it in many areas. When I sit in the canteen with my Turkish friend and speak Turkish, someone from there, a German, shouts 'Wir sind in Deutschland!' (We are in Germany!) but when the English or French [people] speak among themselves, 'oh Guck mal, Englisch, Cool!' (Oh, look, English, cool). As if Turkish [language] came from another planet for these [people], as if this [Turkish] is not a language.*

In such cases, unlike the *'from a higher position'* subtheme, victims are more likely to choose to challenge such offences with legal, behavioural, verbal or, at least, cognitive efforts to protect themselves or their group (Mellor, 2004). As the quotation above reveals, interviewees are aware of the wrongdoing and put a cognitive effort to reassess their position against the maltreatment instead of behaving as a passive receiver. However, this way of exposure is relatively less common compared to the ones that comes from a higher position.

Unlike personal experience, a relatively small number of articulations were assigned under the *denial* theme (% 23.8) that interviewees admit the maltreatment against their in-group members but refuse to admit their personal involvement. Such responses to prejudice or discrimination defined as withdrawal/extreme escapism by Pettigrew (1964) and revisited by Mellor (2004). Similarly, we found that some interviewees usually admit that discrimination is a widespread phenomenon towards their in-group members, but they still did not experience any such incidents. For instance, in quotation-3, a 27-year-old third-generation female interviewee is informed that other in-group members are being

discriminated against. Still, she does not share the same experience with them, since she believes she has no pessimistic way of thinking.

Quotation-3-(27/F): *So [it's] personal, but I heard from others. For example, I heard that teachers made statements such as 'if I give you a good grade, I would be unfair to German families' when [my friends] got bad marks because they and their family were Turkish. But personally, I think such wrongdoing isn't done to me. It may also be because I myself am not a negative [pessimistic] person.*

While according to Pettigrew (1964), this way of coping focuses on the emotion regulation of the person, Mellor (2004) interpreted this kind of responses as self-protective coping. In our sample, too, interviewees employ denial as a self-protection mechanism by differentiating themselves from other in-group members via their personality, physical appearance, social environment, or even political views.

7.3.1.2. Results on Threat.

Theoretically, after exposure to maltreatment, the next step is to assess the threat regarding its possible danger in order to respond and cope (Major et al., 2002). In the same line, Harrell (2000) defined the threat phase as an internal mediator that potentially affects the response to racism-related stress. For example, Lewis and colleagues (2013) showed that Black women actively employ an appraisal of the threat mechanism to assess the situation to 'fight or flight' with gendered racial microaggression in their interpersonal interaction.

However, we argue that appraisal of threat is not restricted to interpersonal interactions, although racism or discrimination mostly occurs in the interpersonal domain. Originally Lazarus (1971) defined psychosocial stress as a socially situated psychological process that stimulates subjective stress. Besides, Tanyaş (2019) stated that current coping models of racism-related stress mostly neglect the background that "gives majorities the power and legitimacy to injure minorities" (p. 213). Similarly, minorities' awareness of their vulnerability is also missing in the coping models and all of their responses are reduced to an atomized psychological realm (see Major et al. 2002; Mellor, 2004; Miller & Kaiser, 2001;

Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). Racism and discrimination are always embedded in the everyday interactions between dominant and minority group members in the social, political, and historical milieus. Furthermore, most of the time, minorities are aware of their vulnerability before and beyond an interpersonal encounter with a dominant group member (see, Kloek, Peter & Wagner, 2015). Based on this rationale, in this section, we present results beyond the objective personal experience that include fear, anxiety, and concerns derived from the social, political, and historical aspects of migration (see, *Section 3.3 in Chapter 1 above*).

We found that threat (39 %) is more commonly articulated than Exposure and consists of two subthemes. The distinction between themes that emerged from the appraisal of threat might also be an essential factor for intergroup relations due to the fact that there is always more than one minority group who face with rejection. Recently, Greenaway and Cruwys (2018) focused on the perceived source of a group threat instead of various forms or content of social exclusion. They suggested that the consequences of a group threat on group relations will be affected by whether it is originating from the intergroup or intragroup comparisons. They also highlighted the importance of the social context in determining a group threat as inter- or intragroup. However, they did not elaborate on how these two primary sources can be assessed separately. We argue that the appraisal of threat can be functional for assessing the intergroup threats because the target of intergroup threat can be diverse, while its source tends to remain stable for historical minority groups. For example, throughout migration history in Germany, social exclusion practices were targeting Guest workers (*Gastarbeiter*), which generalised to all of the foreigners (*Ausländern*) and finally transformed into Islamophobia by early 2000 (for a broader discussion on the transformation of social exclusion practices, see, Kaya, 2019; Ramm, 2010). Since Turkish postmigrants are ethnic and religious minorities in their host societies, group threat is almost always an intergroup phenomenon depending on a reference category that goes beyond the in-group definition (e.g., Non-Germans, Muslims). Besides, Turkish postmigrants' very existence in Germany was based on an intergroup distinction (e.g., Guest

workers, Turks or Muslim) which abolishes their intra-group differences in the eyes of the dominant group members, which in turn, resulted in no articulations in our interviews, correspond to an intra-group threat. However, we found diverse appraisals on group threat with different targets.

The main subtheme that we found across interviews is *a specific threat* (59.4 %) that interviewees appraise the danger of discrimination or rejection from the majority group towards Turkish postmigrants. Interviewees mostly raised issues related to the negative reputation of Turkish postmigrants in Germany and how this prejudice creates a threat in their everyday lives. Interviewees mentioned having a Turkish name as a label they cannot change leads to a kind of specialised or niche threat that targets Turkish postmigrants much more than any other minority groups such as Russian, Polish, Italian. Although the range of incidents under this theme varies when it comes to different types of social exclusion practices, we accumulate threats that are repeatedly articulated on Turkish postmigrants' negative reputation under the subtheme of '*towards Turkish postmigrants*' (90.2 %). As exemplified in quotation-4 from a 51-year-old second-generation male interviewee, we see that Turkish postmigrants appraise the threat on an institutional level, in which Turkish postmigrants are located lower than other groups.

Quotation-4-(51/M): *Whether among the teachers, the police, or certain institutions, I would say towards foreigners ... but beyond them, very intensely seen towards Turks... I feel it [rejection] very intensively; I shall say it on behalf of myself too. For this reason, the foreigners' office is defined as 'foreigners' police' by many Turks.*

From subtle, everyday discrimination to job application rejections, all of the threats we accumulate under '*towards Turkish postmigrants*' refer mostly to social exclusion practices that specifically target Turkish postmigrants. Throughout migration history, German authorities, media, and academics draw attention to this group since social exclusion towards them has been widespread (Kaya, 2019; Mueller, 2006). At the same time, according to Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (FADA), they are the largest migrant group

staying the longest in Germany (FADA, 2020). Our findings show that interviewees are also aware of and sensitive to their special situations in Germany that put Turkish postmigrants at the bottom of the subjective social hierarchy and hinders the possible intergroup connections or solidarity as a coping strategy (Harrell 2000).

However, apart from the *'towards Turkish postmigrants'* subtheme that obstructs their everyday life and academic or social development, some interviewees perceive this threat more severely and personally. For instance, a few interviewees articulated a structural and malicious threat towards their worldview. In these instances, the threat is not only targeting Turkish postmigrants but also Turkey. We gather such articulations under the *'towards Turkey'* subtheme (9.8 %) where the threat against Turkish postmigrants is not a social problem but more likely to be a political or cultural 'war'. As shown in quotation-5, a 47-year-old male interviewee who came to Germany with family reunification interpret the problem related to the integration process of migrants as a malicious political attempt to disconnect Turkish postmigrants from Turkey.

Quotation-5-(47/M): *Turks living in Germany never give up their Homeland, neither their Turkishness, nor their flag, nor their fatherland. Nobody can afford to do this. No one should beat the air. No one... 'Let's make that moderate Islam or isolate them' ... All of these are useless efforts. Turks never give up their fatherland, [or their] flag.*

The concept of threat raised under the *'towards Turkey'* can be seen as a result of Turkey's diaspora shaping policies (Adamson, 2018; Hoffman et al., 2020) and its institutional and political attempts to instrumentalize the Turkish population abroad (Adar, 2019; Yener-Roderburg, 2020). Although proportion of *'towards Turkey'* subtheme is deficient among the sample, these findings show that diaspora shaping policies transform Turkish postmigrants' threat perception and turn *'specific threat'* sentiments into malicious intentions or a conspiracy against Turkey.

On the other hand, the *'generalised threat'* theme constitutes 40.6 % of all Threats, referring to a perception where all in-group characteristics such as ethnic, religious, and

cultural authenticities make interviewees a possible discrimination or exclusion target. The reference group here is the dominant group (i.e., Germans) for whom all non-Germans become possible targets of discrimination. Turkish postmigrants employed two different ways of articulation that assigned under the generalised threat theme. The most mentioned expressions collated under 'towards Migrants' subtheme, where all migrant groups are seen as the targets of rejection (71.4 %). For instance, in quotation-6, a 45-year-old male interviewee came to Germany with family reunification, is appraising a general threat as being 3rd class citizen and implying an inferior social position similar to the expressions raised in the Exposure theme in the previous section.

Quotation-6-(45/M): *Difficulties on this issue exist for almost 99%, 99% of those who live here. This is true for Turks, Arabs or any other group. German society, [is a society] that does not want to, [or] has difficulties in including another community or group into its structure. And when it does, that is, it [German society] values you as much as you appreciate your counterpart. Our worth for them [Germans] is still the 3rd class; beware, I am not saying the 2nd, the 3rd class citizen. By us, I mean the foreigners, foreigners in general.*

It is important to note that minorities can evaluate a personal experience or a socially embedded exclusion practice in the same way that reminds them their inferior position in the social hierarchy. With these examples of widespread expressions that we collate under the 'towards Migrants' subtheme, we see that Turkish postmigrants are not merely facing or perceiving discrimination as individuals but sometimes as historical subjects. Because the concept of *foreigners (Ausländer)* in the quotation defines guest workers and their offsprings in Germany, that has a connotation of hardship and exclusion from mainstream society. Framing the rejection as a general phenomenon or appraising the threat as something familiar across other groups can be addressed as a coping strategy. For instance, Harrell (2000) argued that validation of experience of racism or rejection can provide a sense of safety by way of having real or imaginary allies from other historically oppressed groups. Such an intergroup support mechanism can mediate racism-related

stress in order to reduce adverse outcomes as a critical consciousness (Burson & Godfrey, 2020).

Within the context of the intergroup support mechanism, Turkish postmigrants also see other Muslim groups as the target of the threat. We collect such articulations under the ‘*toward Muslims*’ subtheme, where interviewees raised their concerns or fear of being a Muslim instead of being a Turkish person. Such instances are very few across the data (e.g., only 28 % of Generalised Threat), especially considering the ratio of mosque community members in the sample. There is, however, a certain level of anxiety that being a Muslim is an obstacle to social and economic mobility in Germany. For instance, in quotation-7, a 50-year-old interviewee who came to Germany with family reunification expresses his concerns for her daughter, who wants to be a border guard.

Quotatin-7-(50/M): *Their [employee’s] first condition is that you will completely renounce Turkish citizenship, you will become a German citizen. She renounced; she became a German citizen completely. But I’m afraid of something; I am worried if they [employee] create a barrier because my daughter is a Muslim. She is very successful in her studies, a compatible German citizen from Turkish parents, growing up in Germany, a Muslim child. [She] doesn’t have anything illegal. My second daughter is the same. But I am afraid that they will create a barrier to us because we are Muslims.*

Here we see that, as a Turkish postmigrant, not being a Turkish citizen anymore, but being still a Muslim is an obstacle to getting a relatively high position in one’s job. We observe the fear of being devalued or staying in a ‘definite position’ is still the ultimate threat as a minority for the Turkish postmigrants in Germany. However, in the case of ‘*towards Muslim*’ subtheme, interviewees merge their ethnic identity with their religious identity. This finding is in line with Çelik’s (2015) observation on Turkish youth that religious background seems to be a reason for unequal treatment. These findings are not surprising, as Ramm (2010) demonstrated that after 9/11, Turkish postmigrants were ‘Islamised’ in the German public, accompanying raising Islamophobic sentiment across Europe. Appraising the threat

as a common phenomenon for all Muslims, which is a way of common in-group identity (Gartner et al., 2000) also might be seen as a way of coping, since it can provide a sense of safety via an imaginary or real sense of being in alliance with other oppressed groups (Harrell, 2000).

7.3.1.3. Results on Attribution.

The third phase of the rejection process is attribution, by which minorities intend to blame a particular agent for their negative experiences in everyday life due to their group membership. Attribution (42.9 %) includes explicit or implicit references to sources of negative experiences that happen over the course of their lives.

Theoretically, one can attribute the negative experiences to either internal (e.g., one's behaviour or characteristics) or external (e.g., institutional dynamics or others' prejudices, see Harrell, 2000) factors. The causal attribution in combination with threat has been operationalised in intergroup relations research (Hewstone, 1989) as an important component of ethnic prejudice among majority population (Becker, Wagner & Christ, 2011). Likewise, among minorities, an outgroup attribution compared to in-group attribution to rejection (Costarelli, 2007) and deprivation (Zagefka et al., 2013) are shown to increase in-group identification. Based on this theoretical distinction and the data corpus, we accumulate Turkish postmigrants' causal attributions under '*Attribution-In*' (36.8 %) and '*Attribution-Out*' (63.2 %) themes. Each theme has three subthemes with specific agents or sources. While some of these attributions have been identified in previous studies, as explained below, some seem to be unique to the study context.

When it comes to the most common expression of attribution, namely '*Attribution-Out*', interviewees extensively blamed ethnic Germans that is assigned to '*they/Germans*' subtheme (54.2 %). Here interviewees explicitly referred to a third personal pronoun to imply ethnic Germans when they complained about the rejection in their everyday lives. Most of the time, interviewees remembered insults and name-calling referring to Turkish postmigrants' inferior position such as blackhead (*Schwarzkopf*), garlic-eaters

(*knoublauchfresser*) and blamed the ethnic Germans for not acting against maltreatment or serving to racist ideology. Although the level of blaming ethnic Germans for prejudices, social exclusion and rejection differs considerably across the excerpts, paradoxically, it may also take very essentialist and prejudicial forms. For instance, in the quotation-8 from a 38-year-old second-generation male interviewee, being ethnic German was reduced to be a racist by highlighting neo-Nazi symbols and history.

Quotation-8-(38/M): *Every German has a skinhead hidden inside. There is racism [inside]. No matter how much. Whenever the subject [rejection] comes up, Germans immediately start to back each other. They [Germans] inevitably exclude you [Turks].*

In the *'they/Germans'* subtheme, interviewees portray ethnic Germans as people who are naturally gaining the favourable position within the ethnic hierarchy in the society and thereby contributing to unequal treatment that Turkish postmigrants are exposed to in their everyday lives.

On the other hand, some interviewees refer to *society & system* as the second widespread source of rejection (33.3 %). Interviewees mentioned the media, the public discourse, or the educational system as the social or institutional structures promoting social exclusion or obstructing social cohesion. In the *society & system* subtheme, Turkish postmigrants were not directly targeting the state on an abstract level, but systems or structures containing humans. For instance, as exemplified in quotation-9, according to a 30-year-old third-generation female interviewee, humans are the ultimately responsible agents of social exclusion, especially those in charge at a higher position that run the systems and institutions.

Quotation-9-(30/F): *In any way, I do not see such a thing [exclusion] in the macrostructure as a system, if we talk about the German state, absolutely [not]. I guess those social exclusions etc., [are] micro. For example, when you go to job interviews, it is actually forbidden; everyone in this country should have the same*

rights. Still, a couple of people in that [high] position can get that authority, and a [lay] person cannot do anything against it [exclusion].

In this subtheme of attribution, the focus is on the institutional system that either enhances or remains insensitive when it comes to reducing the existing structural discriminations by protecting specific positions and individuals that act against minorities in Germany.

Furthermore, occasionally interviewees openly mentioned the state or the government as the primary responsible social exclusion agent (12.5 %). We accumulate articulations referring to the state, government or policies as the source or the responsible agent of the social exclusion under the subtheme of *the State (Germany)*. As exemplified in the quotation-10 from a 28-year-old third-generation male interviewee, educational setback among the migrant groups explained by a state policy as German state purposely do not let students with a migration background get a better education, which in turn, keep migrants in their inferior position.

Quotation-10-(28/M): *The thing is, the thing... thing of the state, its purpose is; those with an immigrant background generally shall not graduate from high school, [or] go to university. So, there was a lot of things there... the gap. I mean, I'm making it up, some [one] from German family... was more likely to finish high school, to go to college. Immigrants did not have that [chance].*

In the second theme on the causal attribution, interviewees turn their gaze to their in-group to make sense of the social exclusion. We accumulate articulations referring to Turkish postmigrants' responsibility for social exclusion under the *Attribution-In* subtheme. In this theme, the most common subtheme is related to Turkish postmigrants' unwillingness to communicate or interact with mainstream culture (42.9 %). Following Pettigrew (1964) and Mellor (2004) on the concept of 'extreme escapism', we collate such causal attributions under the *Withdrawn* subtheme, where interviewees blame their in-group for not putting enough effort into the cultural exchange or introducing themselves to broader society. For instance, in quotation 11, a 28-year-old third-generation male interviewee stated that

Turkish postmigrants contribute to discrimination by purposely excluding themselves from mainstream society.

Quotation-11-(28/M): *In fact, nobody is telling you that you will definitely be a German [or] a Turkish. Everyone is in part [for instance], a Galatasaray fan... In part is Galatasaray fan; in part is Turkish, I am making it up, a nature lover. But frankly, I don't see so [with Turkish postmigrants]. If you talk to people who are involved in this kind of business, that is, people on the street, I don't see it. [Turkish postmigrants] feel obliged to choose. Necessarily wants to do something with themselves, to exclude themselves on purpose. Actually, they, I see that too, [Turkish postmigrants] themselves often discriminate.*

The complaints towards the in-group, include varying behaviours such as not learning German or sticking to their in-group. Such an understanding corresponds to the debate on 'parallel society' that implies migrants' unwillingness to integrate into the mainstream society (Borch, 2019; Hiscott, 2005). Withdrawal subtheme shows that parallel society sentiment has repercussions among Turkish postmigrants and is manifested by blaming their in-group.

The other common way to blame the in-group is focusing on the lack of capacity of the Turkish postmigrants. In such expressions, most interviewees are not happy with the current state of Turkish postmigrants' representation in the institutions and politics. However, instead of questioning the structural obstacles for the insufficiency of Turkish postmigrants' representation, interviewees complained about their in-group inefficacy. We accumulate such expressions under the *Incompetence* subtheme that constitute 32.1 % of all in-group attributions. For instance, a 51-year-old second-generation interviewee stated that foreigners, including Turkish postmigrants, are the primary social exclusion source in Germany due to their inability to prove themselves to the mainstream society.

Quotation-12-(51/M): *What do you think is the source of this kind of exclusion practices against Turkish postmigrants? As a personal opinion, one of the biggest*

reasons is that foreigners [Ausländern] cannot prove themselves in particular institutions and organisations. This is its primary source.

Finally, some interviewees blame their in-group members because of their unreasonable behaviours. The excerpts include blaming in-group members for inappropriate behaviours, like not being honest with the German state or being rude towards German neighbours. Still, overall expressions accumulate under the subtheme of ‘*Deviancy*’ imply a naturalisation problem of Turkish postmigrants into German society (25.0 %). For instance, a 58-year-old male interviewee who came to Germany with family unification uses an idiom to refer to Turkish postmigrants’ maladjustment in German society.

Quotation-13-(58/M): *Excuse my inappropriate language, they [Turkish postmigrants] do things in the bathroom that supposed to be done in the kitchen, [while they] do things in the kitchen that supposed to be done in the bathroom. When we fall into this situation, the foreigners [non-Turkish], the Germans, had [difficulties] to analyse us; they see us as contradictory. So, it [such cases] does not bring the children of these contradictory people, for example, to a safe place at work; does not let them go ahead.*

Overall, starting from a general unwillingness to specific behavioural deviancies, the in-group blame sentiment focuses on social, institutional or personal defects that lead to a general disharmony between Turkish postmigrants and mainstream society. Such a causal attribution assumes that some aspects of the Turkish postmigrants are not fitting into German society and need to be changed via social, political or educational interventions. Thus, it would not be false to say that in-group blame sentiment expects naturalisation (e.g., assimilating to the dominant culture and norms) from Turkish postmigrants in order to solve the disharmony between them and the German society.

7.3.2. Focus group Interviews

Focus group discussions are among the grounded methods in social sciences that facilitate access to group-level information (Krueger, 1994). It relies on group dynamics and

helps researchers focus on similarities and differences of the opinions or perceptions. According to Kaplowitz and Hoehn (2001), instead of being substitutes, focus group and individual interviews are complementary when it comes to cover a particular topic. Because of the nature of the phenomenon in question, namely the rejection process, we assume that group dynamics, as a social resource for minorities (Major et al., 2002; Harrell 2000), might affect Turkish postmigrants' perceptions and articulations of rejection (Kaiser & Major 2006). Thereby, we use both methodologies to compensate the black spots of both interview methods and saturate our findings.

Overall, our findings reveal that those three main components (e.g., Exposure, Threat, and Attribution) are also evident from focus group interviews, implying that our initial results regarding the rejection process confirmed by another interview method. However, the ratio of categories for focus group discussions and individual interviews differed from each other. More specifically, while the most mentioned categories in individual interviews were Attribution, Threat, and Exposure, respectively, the most widely mentioned categories in the focus group interviews were Threat, Exposure, and Attribution, respectively. Although the content of themes did not change significantly, the ratio of personal experience of maltreatment, as well as fear and concern related to being a minority member (i.e., Threat), increased in the group settings. Accordingly, independent from the political or religious background, group settings as intra-group support mechanism facilitates talking about a shared destiny (Harrell 2000; Mellor, 2004). According to Kaiser and Major's (2006) review, people tend to report less discrimination in the existence of a dominant worldview. On the contrary, as in our case of Turkish postmigrants, other in-group members' presence serves as a safe space to promote to talk about rejection (Lewis et al., 2013).

On the other hand, group settings also hinder to talk about some aspects of the rejection process, such as Denial and Attribution-In. For instance, although interviewees in the focus groups a few times mentioned their in-group as a responsible subject or source for the adverse incidents they are exposed in Germany, through the *Withdrawn* subtheme, they

did not articulate instances of *Incompetence* and *Deviancy* subthemes that are evident from individual interviews. A similar trend was also valid for the Exposure category, where interviewees in focus groups barely used *Denial*, while they tend to speak more about their personal experience of maltreatment. All things considered, blaming their in-group in the face of other in-group members for the rejection from the mainstream society was only possible through a stereotype regarding the in-group, which is about being a parallel society in Germany (Mueller, 2006). Interviewees employed 'parallel society' sentiment through *Withdrawn* subtheme but did not openly blame their in-group for their deficiencies in the face of other in-group members. These findings are still in line with the intra-group support mechanism proposed by Harrell (2000) and Mellor (2004) that other in-group members' presence not only promote to talk on the shared destiny of the group but also protect minorities from disruptive critics towards in-group features.

Taking these two findings from comparisons of the interview methods into consideration, as expected we reveal that Turkish postmigrants, independent from the political or religious background, distinguish physical or vicarious exposure to maltreatment, appraisal of threat through personal and social resources and finally causal attribution to discrimination through particular agents and source to overcome social exclusion's adverse effects (Harrell 2000; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Tanyaş, 2019).

8. Study 2: Belongings in Flux: A Repeated Cross-Sectional Analysis on Rejection and Ethnonational Identification of Turkish Postmigrants

8.1. Aim & Rationale

In the previous qualitative study, we contextualised the concept of rejection among Turkish postmigrants and distinguished Exposure, Threat and Attribution. Based on these initial findings, in this chapter, in order to be able to answer the second set of research questions raised above (see, *Section 5 in Chapter 1 above*), we (1) test decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants through a more representative and an independent dataset overlaps with change of Turkey's diaspora governance (see, *Section 4.2 in Chapter 1 above*) and we (2) examine the association between the contextualised components of rejection and ethnonational (dis)identification during the time in question. To this end, we use two waves of a cross-sectional repeated data set recruited from people with a migration background in Germany in 2008 and 2014.

8.2. Data & Method

8.2.1. Sample

We employ two waves of cross-sectional dataset recruited from people with a migration background in Germany (i.e., *Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland*) which was conducted by TNS Infratest Policy Research company with the request of the Press and Information Office of Federal Government (Müller-Hilmer et al., 2014). We choose these data sets mostly because of the detailed items related to discrimination that allow us to assess the components of rejection separately. Secondly, in both waves, selected migrant groups were weighted to ensure that the sample is representative of minorities living in Germany. And finally, the time frame of waves (i.e., 2008 & 2014) overlaps with the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants reported elsewhere (Sauer, 2018) as well as the change of diaspora governance of Turkey.

The sampling strategy is based on the so-called 'onomastic procedure' where the name and surname of the participants were checked according to the corresponding

migration background aimed to be contacted. And the survey is conducted by utilising computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). Overall, the number of people who choose Turkey as the country of origin were 633 (24.9 %) out of 2537 participants in 2008 and 460 (22.9%) out of 2001 participants in 2014. Descriptive statistics of the study population is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample in both Waves

Variables	<i>n</i>	Range	<i>M</i> or %	<i>SD</i>
Woman	1093	1-2	50.1%	
Born in Germany	1093	1-2	30.1%	
Turkish Citizen	1093	0-1	59.3%	
German Citizen	1093	0-1	44.6%	
Age	1091	18-85	39.34	12.70
Duration of migration	756	1-71	16.26	9.36
Family members	1093	1-16	3.71	1.54
Income	957	1-4	2.57	.97
Exposure	1052	1-4	1.81	.81
Threat	1093	0-1	.60	.49
Attribution-Out	1093	1-4	2.84	.94
Attribution-In	1093	1-4	2.54	1.09
Identification with Germany	1093	1-4	2.84	.86
Identification with Turkey	1093	1-4	2.95	.91
Political Interest in Turkey	1093	1-4	2.54	1.01
Political Interest in Germany	1093	1-4	2.39	.99

Note: Income measured in 1000€, authors' calculation, $N_{(total)} = 1093$.

8.2.2. Procedure

Since some items have been changed or replaced while some others were preserved in the second wave (i.e., 2014), we carefully evaluated all of the items and synchronised two waves of the data set (Rafferty, Walthery & King-Hele, 2015). We also recoded some of the items according to study purpose and replaced missing values with group means to increase the integrity of data set without manipulating the means. In the end, we created a merged data set consisted of 1093 participants. Finally, we used SPSS-24 software to analyse and JASP-0.14 software to visualise the results.

8.2.3. Measures

Identification and identity clusters: Combining identification towards two separate identities is a common way to assess dual identification. There is hardly any difference between this method and the explicit dual identity measures (Fleischman & Verkuyten, 2016). Thereby we use K-means cluster analysis based on two items separately measuring identification with Germany and Turkey with a 4-Likert type scale (e.g., *How strongly do you feel connected to Germany? How strongly do you feel connected to your country of origin?*) to create four dichotomous identity clusters in line with the four identity strategies derived from the acculturation framework (Berry, 1997; Sam & Berry, 2006). The mean of national and ethnic identification for *the strict-dual* identity (*high, high*) were 3.24 and 3.44, respectively; for the *national-dual* identity (*high, low*) they were 3.49 and 1.85, respectively; for the *ethnic-dual* identity (*low, high*) they were 3.72 and 1.68, respectively; finally, for the *low-dual* identity (*low, low*), they were 1.76 and 1.84, respectively. Most of the participants (44.7%) fell into the strict dual identity cluster. And a higher number fell into the national dual identity cluster (25.1%) than ethnic dual identity cluster (23.1%). And finally, the low dual identity cluster was least populated among the study population (7.1%).

Exposure: Derived from our theoretical framework, we differentiated between the components of rejection and chose an item in the first wave that measures the objective side of the rejection with a 4-Likert type scale (e.g., *Have you personally been discriminated*

against in the last two years in Germany because of your origin or religion?). However, this question was dropped from the second wave. Thus, we combined this item with a question assessing people's experience in various public services in Germany with a 4-Likert type scale (e.g., *Were your experiences with Police, Court, School, Municipal administration or citizens' office, Foreigners Office and employment agency positive or negative?*). We took the mean of these experiences from the public services as the Exposure score and reversed values since the items from both waves were presented with a descending order.

Threat: The second component of the rejection process is the appraisal of threat. The item used in both waves regarding the disadvantage of being a migrant in Germany was chosen for this study to correspond the construct of Threat (e.g., *Do you have the feeling that sufficient care is taken in Germany to ensure that people of foreign origin are not disadvantaged?*). This item presented in a categorical form and recoded into 0-1 dichotomic variable for the further analysis.

Attribution: To assess participants causal attribution to discrimination, we used the two items separately corresponding to in-group attribution (hereafter, Attribution-In) and out-group attribution (hereafter, Attribution-Out). In the Attribution-In item, participants were asked to rate a statement focusing on the responsibility of migrants for integration (e.g., *Foreigners who want to live in Germany permanently should become naturalised, i.e., become Germans*). This item was chosen because it highlights migrants' will on naturalisation and downplay possible options for coexistence other than being German citizen. It implies blaming foreigners for being a misfit if they don't want or try to become a German. In the Attribution-Out item, participants were asked to rate their degree of concern regarding ethnic Germans' hostility towards them (e.g., *Many Germans have something against foreigners*). These items were presented in a 4 Likert scale and reversed for the current study, because they were sorted in descending order in the original study. *Political Interest*: To assess participants' involvement into politics in their country of residence and origin, we employed two items used in the data set (e.g., *How strongly are you interested in the politics of the country from which you or your parents or grandparents immigrated?*

And *how strongly are you interested in the politics of Germany*). The items were presented in a 4 Likert scale and reversed for the current study, because they were sorted in descending order in the original study.

Demographics: Finally, we included items regarding characteristics of the sample such as birthplace (e.g., country), citizenship, age, gender, duration of migration (hereafter Duration), family members, and income (see, Table 1).

8.2.4. Analytical Strategy

A preliminary screening check on all of the items included in the current study indicated a nonsignificant proportion of the responses have missing data (e.g., ranging from 0.2 % to 2.7%). Therefore, we included all of the participants with a Turkish migration background from both of the waves and replaced missing values with the series mean except for the demographics in which some variables' missing values exceed 30% of all responses. Then we checked normality of distributions and equality of variance where most of the variables violated both of the assumptions. According to Lumley et al. (2002), *t*-test and linear regression are robust to the violation of normality and variance assumptions. Similarly, Schielzeth and colleagues (2020) provided evidence for mixed-effect models' robustness to the distribution violations. Thereby, we decided to apply parametric tests to the data in further analysis.

First, we used a chi-square test to examine the differences in categorical variables across the waves. Descriptive statistics based on the proportion of the categorical variables summarised in Table 4. Second, we run *t*-test for non-categorical variables to see whether there is a change during the time (see, Table 5) or not. Then, we run a multilevel linear regression analysis in order to see if demographics, the time between waves and components of rejection predicted ethnonational identification a three-step model (see, Table 6). Finally, we run a generalised linear mixed-effect model to test the contribution of the demographics and components of rejection to identification with Turkey while adjusting for the waves (see, Table 7).

8.3. Results

In both waves, distribution of the categorical variables remained the same in the sample except two of the identity clusters (see, Table 4). A chi-square test indicated that between waves participants had a similar ratio for gender [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 2.855, p = .091$]; both Turkish [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 0.962, p = .327$] and German citizenship [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 0.291, p = .589$]; birth place [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 1.278, p = .258$] (e.g., born either in Turkey or in Germany); low- [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 3.470, p = .062$], and ethnic-dual identity holders [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 1.335, p = .248$]. However, strict-dual identity holders were higher [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 10.442, p = .001$] whereas, national-dual identity holders were lower in the second wave [$\chi^2(1, n = 1093) = 13.839, p = .000$]. These findings show that the sample's ethnonational identification pattern has been changed across waves while citizenship, birthplace, and gender ratio remained stable.

After securing equally distributed characteristics that potentially could affect the ethnonational identification of the sample, we also compared non-categorical variables with a *t*-test analysis. Accordingly, the means of Age; [$t(1091) = -8.170, p < .001$], Income [$t(762) = -2.753, p = .006$] and Duration [$t(955) = -3.389, p < .001$] of the population in the second wave were higher than those of the first wave (see, Table 5). Secondly, comparison of the components of rejection showed that; Exposure [$t(1050) = -4.745, p < .001$] was higher while Attribution-In [$t(955) = 7.143, p < .001$] was lower in the second wave. Yet, Threat [$t(1091) = .274, p = .784$] and Attribution-Out [$t(1091) = .730, p = .465$] were stable across the waves. More importantly, the mean of identification with Germany remained stable across the waves [$t(1093) = 0.409, p = .683$] whereas, the mean of identification with Turkey was higher in the second wave than that of the first wave [$t(1093) = -5.093, p < .001$]. Finally, we see a similar trend when it comes to political interest; the mean of political interest in Germany remained stable across waves [$t(1093) = 0.112, p = .911$], whereas political interest in Turkey was higher in the second wave than that of the first wave [$t(1093) = -6.154, p < .001$].

Table 4. Distribution of the Baseline Characteristic of the Sample across the Waves

Comparison of the waves indicated that the main reason for the difference in dual

Characteristics	Waves	<i>n</i>	%	χ^2	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>
Woman	2008	303	47.9	2.855	1	.091
	2014	244	53.0			
Turkish citizen	2008	368	58.1	0.962	1	.327
	2014	281	61.1			
German citizen	2008	287	45.3	0.291	1	.589
	2014	201	43.7			
Born in Germany	2008	199	31.4	1.278	1	.258
	2014	130	28.3			
Strict-Duals	2008	257	40.6	10.442	1	.001
	2014	232	50.4			
National-Duals	2008	185	29.2	13.839	1	.000
	2014	89	19.3			
Ethnic-Duals	2008	138	21.8	1.335	1	.248
	2014	114	24.8			
Low-Duals	2008	53	8.4	3.470	1	.062
	2014	25	5.4			

identity clusters across the waves is the change in the ethnic identifications of the sample. Moreover, participants reported more experience of discrimination and less Attribution-In in the second wave. The *t*-test comparison showed that age, Duration and Income are not equally distributed across the waves that need to be controlled in further analysis. Finally, political interest in Turkey is rising with ethnic identification that can be an important correlate of change in ethnic identification.

Table 5. Mean Comparison of the Interval Variables across the Waves

Variables	Waves	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Cohen's <i>d</i>																																																																																																																													
Age	2008	633	36.74	11.77	-8.170	1091	< .001	-.501																																																																																																																													
	2014	460	42.92	13.08					Duration	2008	434	15.45	9.01	-2.753	762	.006	-.201	2014	330	17.33	9.72	Income	2008	585	2.48	.96	-3.389	955	< .001	-.225	2014	372	2.70	.99	Exposure	2008	633	1.71	.89	-4.745	1050	< .001	-.299	2014	419	1.95	.64	Threat	2008	633	.61	.49	.274	1091	.784	.017	2014	460	.60	.49	Attribution-Out	2008	633	2.85	.95	.730	1091	.465	.045	2014	460	2.81	.92	Attribution-In	2008	633	2.74	1.07	7.143	1091	< .001	.438	2014	460	2.27	1.06	Identification with Turkey	2008	633	2.83	.92	-5.093	1091	< .001	-.312	2014	460	3.11	.86	Identification with Germany	2008	633	2.84	.84	.409	1091	.683	.025	2014	460	2.82	.87	Political Interest in Turkey	2008	633	2.38	.99	-6.154	1091	< .001	-.375	2014	460	2.76	.99	Political Interest in Germany	2008	633	2.39	.97	.112	1091	.911
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At the third step, we conducted a multilevel linear regression to see if components of rejecting predict ethnic and national identification measures differently while controlling the effects of demographics and time. For this purpose, we used 'enter method' to add Age,

Duration and Income at the first block of the model and waves in the second block. And finally, we used 'stepwise method' to add Exposure, Threat, Attribution-In & -Out, and their interactions into the third block of the model (see, Table 6).

Accordingly, among the demographics, Duration and level of income explains certain amount of the variance in identification with Turkey [$F(3, 1089) = 15.77, p = .000, R^2_{(adj.)} = .039$]. While the Duration increases the level of identification with Turkey ($\beta = .02$), the level of Income decreases the same more effectively ($\beta = -.10$). Besides, both Duration and Income preserve their effects on identification with Turkey after adding waves in the second model ($\beta = .02; \beta = -.12$, respectively) and components of rejection in the third model ($\beta = .02; \beta = -.11$, respectively). In the second model explained variance of identification with Turkey increase to %6 by adding waves [$F(4, 1088) = 18.49, p = .000, R^2_{(adj.)} = .060$]. The effect of time between waves is positive on identification with Turkey ($\beta = .22$) and by far the most effective variable in the model. Finally, components of rejection and their interaction increased explained variance on identification with Turkey to %9 [$F(5, 1085) = 16.44, p = .033, R^2_{(adj.)} = .090$]. Among this variable, the most predictive one is Attribution-In which decreases identification with Turkey ($\beta = -.15$). On the other hand, Attribution-Out increases identification with Turkey ($\beta = .08$). Interestingly, the interaction of Threat with Attribution-In changes the main effect of Attribution-In and decreases identification with Turkey ($\beta = .04$).

On the other hand, the relation between predictors and identification with Germany is very different (see Figure 6). For instance, Duration and level of income still explain certain amount of the variance in the identification with Germany [$F(3, 1089) = 11.32, p = .000, R^2_{(adj.)} = .028$]. Yet this time around Duration decreases the level of identification with Germany ($\beta = -.11$) and the level of income increases the same ($\beta = .12$). And again, both Duration and Income preserve their effects on identification with Germany after adding waves to the second model ($\beta = -.11; \beta = .12$, respectively) and components of rejection to the third model ($\beta = -.12; \beta = .13$, respectively).

Table 6. Regression Results Using Identification Measures as A Criterion

	Identification with Turkey			Identification with Germany		
	1-Model	2-Model	3-Model	1-Model	2-Model	3-Model
	β / [95% CI]	β / [95% CI]	β / [95% CI]	β / [95% CI]	β / [95% CI]	β / [95% CI]
Age	.01 / [-.01; .01]	-.01 / [-.01; .01]	.00 / [-.01; .01]	.01 / [-.01; .01]	.01 / [-.01; .01]	.01 / [-.01; .01]
Duration	.02 / [.01; .02]	.02 / [.01; .02]	.02 / [.01; .02]	-.11 / [-.02; -.01]	-.11 / [-.02; -.01]	-.12 / [-.02; -.01]
Income	-.10 / [-.16; -.04]	-.12 / [-.18; -.06]	-.11 / [-.17; -.06]	.12 / [.06; .17]	.12 / [.06; .17]	.13 / [.07; .18]
Wave (2)		.28 / [.17; .39]	.22 / [.11; .33]		-.02 / [-.13; .07]	.02 / [-.06; .15]
Exposure (Exp.)			-.01 / [-.16; .87]			-.07 / [-.14; -.17]
Threat			.02 / [.71; .47]			-.05 / [-.79; .01]
Attribution-In			-.15 / [-.20; -.09]			.17 / [.09; .18]
Attribution-Out			.08 / [.02; .13]			-.04 / [-.19; -.02]
Threat X Attribution-In			.04 / [.01; .01]			-.02 / [-.12; .25]
Threat X Attribution-Out			-.01 / [-.71; .47]			-.17 / [-.12; -.06]
Exp. X Threat X Attribution-In			.02 / [-.02; .09]			.01 / [-.06; .05]
Exp. X Threat X Attribution-Out			.01 / [-.07; .03]			.03 / [-.04; .06]
(Intercept) <i>b</i>	2.840	2.598	2.719	2.714	2.743	2.617
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.039	.060	.090	.028	.027	.091
<i>df</i>	3	1	8	3	1	8
F	15.777	18.499	16.441	11.324	8.585	16.611
<i>p</i>	.000	.000	.033	.000	.534	.012

Note: β indicates the standardised regression weight, [95% CI] indicate lower and upper limits of the confidence interval, *b* represents unstandardized regression weight. **Bold** indices represent the significance level of $p < .05$, $p < .01$ and $p < .001$.

As expected from *t*-test comparison, the second model contains waves become insignificant, and explained variance of identification with Germany decreases to %2.7 [$F(4, 1088) = 8.58, p = .534, R^2_{(adj.)} = .027$]. Finally, the third model becomes significant again by adding components of rejection, and their interaction [$F(5, 1085) = 16.61, p = .012, R^2_{(adj.)} =$

.091] and explained variance on identification with Germany increases to %9.1. Among this block of variables, the most predictive main effects come from Attribution-In, increasing identification with Germany ($\beta = .17$). Also, Exposure decreases identification with Germany ($\beta = -.07$). Surprisingly, nonsignificant main effects of Threat and Attribution-Out become significant with their interaction, decreasing identification with Germany ($\beta = -.17$). As hypothesised, this analysis shows that (dis)identification of minorities with their national and ethnic identities has different antecedents. While national identification is affected by Exposure, ethnic identification is not affected by the same. Besides, Threat plays an important role as a moderator to change the direction of the effect of Attribution-In on identification with Turkey and Attribution-Out on identification with Germany.




Figure 6. Joint Display of Unstandardized Coefficients of Two Multivariate Linear Regression Models

Note: Figure is generated from standardised regression weight in Table 6. Interaction shown in dotted lines.

Finally, we run a generalised linear mixed effect model to examine the relationship between components of rejection and changes in identification with Turkey. As fixed effects,

we entered waves, Threat, Attribution-In and -Out to the model and intercepts for the Duration and Income as random effects since they significantly differed between the waves. Also, in order to reduce Type I error probability, we included by-Duration and by-Income random slopes for the effect of the fixed factors as suggested by Barr, Levy and Scheepers (2013). Finally, following Winter (2013), we estimated the significances level of fixed effects by using likelihood ratio tests of the full model with the hypothesised effects against the model without effects (i.e., null model).

Table 7. Generalised Linear Mixed Effect Model of Identification with Turkey

Identification with Turkey		Estimate	SE	df	95% CI	χ^2	p
	Intercept	.194	.61	1	-.11, .77	110.609	< .001
Fixed Effects	Wave (2014)	.071	.25	1	.10, .38	10.256	.001
	Threat	.070	.14	1	.01, .27	2.801	.094
	Attribution-Out	.037	.03	1	-.04, .10	.900	.343
	Attribution-In	.031	-.12	1	-.18, -.06	11.470	< .001
Random							
Effects	Duration	.018	.04		.01, .10		.042
	Income	.14	.01		.01, .14		.444

Accordingly, in line with the results from the wave comparisons, time emerged as the most significant and main effect of on the change of the identification with Turkey (see, Table 7). Waves correspond to the time frame of a 6-years, affect identification with Turkey by increasing it about .25 degree ($SE_{\pm} .071$) on a 4 Likert type scale, $\chi^2(1) = 10.256$, $p = .001$. And among the components of rejection, only Attribution-In contributes identification with Turkey. While interestingly, degree of Exposure does not contribute to the change in identification with Turkey, $\chi^2(1) = 11.470$, $p < .001$; Attribution-In significantly affects identification with Turkey by decreasing it about .12 degree ($SE_{\pm} .0319$). On the other hand, a random slope model of the analysis provided information on the role of Duration and

Income. Accordingly, only the Duration has a significant random effect on the identification with Turkey by increasing it about .04 degree ($SE \pm .018$) across time.

And for a better comparison of the fixed and random effects on identification with Turkey, we presented residuals of the significant relationships by model plots (see, Figure 7). Accordingly, Attribution-In has a fixed effect by decreasing identification with Turkey, shown with a declining trend in plots. Yet, Attribution-In affects Turkish postmigrants' identification differently; depending on the time they spent in Germany. For instance, in 2008, Turkish postmigrants with a medium Duration (e.g., between 10-25 years) have a higher level of identification with Turkey than the others. And this group of Turkish postmigrants is also affected by Attribution-In more extensively. Their identification with Turkey decreased more by Attribution-In in comparison to other groups of Turkish postmigrants in 2008. However, in the second wave, the difference between these groups vanished. The period between waves approximated their difference on the identification with Turkey that overall identification increased among all groups. More interestingly, Turkish postmigrants with a medium Duration aligned with the group who have a longer duration in Germany (e.g., more than 25 years) on a relatively stable pattern of identification with Turkey.




Figure 7. Fixed Effect of Attribution-In and Random Effect of Duration on Identification with Turkey

Note: Intercepts used to generate the flexplot are from Generalised Linear Mixed Effect Model in Table 7.

8.4. Discussion

In this correlational study, we aim (1) to test the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants and (2) to link contextualised components of rejection with ethnonational identification through an independent secondary dataset. Our results partly confirm the previous findings on the decline of dual identification among Turkish postmigrants (Sauer, 2018; Jugert et al. 2020). Accordingly, the number and ratio of the strict-dual identifiers (i.e., attached to both identity) increase, while national-dual identifiers (i.e., more attached to national identity) decrease between the waves. The concept of dual identity does not have to be restricted with just strict-dual identifiers since more ethnic or more national versions of dual identity also contain certain levels of combinations of both identities (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). From this point of view, dual identity is, in fact, increasing among Turkish postmigrants. However, when we carefully traced the change in ethnic and national identification separately, we found that feeling belonging towards Turkey is rising, whereas feeling belonging towards Germany remains the same. These initial findings indicate that the rise among dual identity holders is due to the rise of ethnic identification instead of a mutual rise of ethnic and national identification. Furthermore, the political interest of Turkish postmigrants is shifting in favour of Turkey. This finding is contradicting with Fischer-Neumann's (2014) observation on high political interest of dual identifiers in Germany. Her implication was based on a time frame covering 1993-2006 when multiculturalism as was widely acclaimed (Kaya, 2019) that in turn provide so called 'third space' among general public for the politicisation of biculturalism among Turkish postmigrants. However, it is evident from our data that this is not the case anymore. Political interest towards Germany remains the same in spite of the increased number of dual identifiers while political interest and ethnic identification increase simultaneously.

All things considered, the revealed increase in dual identity among Turkish postmigrants is one-sided in favour of ethnic identity and such a trend might gradually hinder dual identification and its positive consequences. Besides, regarding the crucial role of national identity on psychological adjustment of immigrant youth in Germany (Frankenberg et al., 2013), such a trend might be seen as alarming for the social and psychological outcomes of acculturation of Turkish postmigrants. In the same vein, apart from the income that contributes to national identification and hinders ethnic identification, both the time between waves (i.e., 2008-2014) and duration of migration in Germany are going against social integration assumption (Berry et al. 2006) and obstruct national identification of Turkish postmigrants in Germany. Considering the rise of ethnic identification and the accumulative body of research on Turkey's outreach policies toward Turkish postmigrants (see, *Section 4.2 in Chapter 1 above*), it is scientifically and politically strategic to uncover psychological variables accompanying the transition of ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants in favour of Turkey. Thereby, we elaborate the rejection process and examine the diverse effects of its components on ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants'

Following Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach (Major & O'Brien, 2005), we separately assessed the objective side of rejection as the *Exposure* (e.g., personal experience of discrimination), and the subjective side of rejection via appraisal phase as the *Threat* (e.g., danger of being discriminated) and the coping phase as *Attribution* (e.g., blaming out- or in-group). First, we found that the exposure is negatively associated with national disidentification as expected by RDIM (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009), but on the contrary to reactive identification (Verkuyten, 2008), as well as RIM (Branscombe et al., 1999a), it is not related to ethnic identification. In other words, the exposure of maltreatment leads Turkish postmigrants to disidentify from national identity, but it does not contribute to their ethnic identification. Thereby, although objective aspect of rejection might be crucial to promote national identification and to benefit from psychological adjustment in Germany

(Frankenberg et al., 2013), it cannot be associated with the increase of ethnic identity among Turkish postmigrants (Froehlich et al., 2020).

Second, we found that participants tend to identify with Germany and disidentify Turkey when they blame their in-group. On the other hand, blaming the out-group increase ethnic identification but has no effect on national identification. According to Major and O'Brien (2005) causal attribution is an important aspect of coping with rejection and discrimination. Blaming an out group is a better self-protective strategy than blaming the in-group (Major et al. 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). Previously, Costarelli (2009) demonstrated the distinct role of intergroup attributions on in-group favourable outcomes. Zagefka and colleagues (2013) previously found that in-group attribution hinder ethnic identification in the case of deprivation. Our findings confirm the hypothesis of in-group blame's negative effect on ethnic identification by applying the same mechanism to rejection phenomenon.

Third, we found that the appraisal of threat, as a subjective assessment of rejection, is not directly related to neither ethnic nor national identifications but it is very crucial for causal attribution and ethnonational identification relationship. More specifically, participants with a high threat perception disidentify with Germany despite of blaming their out-group (i.e., Germans). In the same way, participants with a high threat perception identify with Turkey despite of blaming their in-group (i.e., *Ausländern*). In line with Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach, these results reveal that appraising a threat can be detrimental for rejection process that in the case of Turkish postmigrants, it has potential to change direction of attribution on ethnonational identification. In other words, independent from the personal experience of rejection and causal attribution, concern and fear of rejection has the potential to hinder national identification and increase ethnic identification.

All things considered, our findings regarding the distinct role of components of rejection is in line with Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach and confirm the previous results on the fear of discrimination (Kloek et al. 2015) as well as causal attribution (Becker

et al., 2011; Costarelli, 2009; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b)). More importantly, our findings reveal an important aspect of the rejection-(dis)identification relationship by showing ethnic and national identification have different antecedents with different degrees, contradicting with a unidimensional perceived discrimination concept suggested by RIM and RDIM approaches.

The second set of results of this study shed light on the change took place in Turkish postmigrants' dual identification. Our findings from the generalised linear mixed model analysis show that only blaming in-group and duration of migration predict the change in ethnic identification. Although the blaming in-group corresponds to an implicit responsibility of naturalisation in Germany that drop by time, it preserves its predictable power on ethnic identification by decreasing it. When we look at the duration of migration in more detail, we see that the fixed effect of blaming the in-group in time influence Turkish postmigrants differently. More specifically, while new-comers' (e.g., less than ten years) ethnic identification is overall lower than others; early-comers' (e.g., more than 25 years) ethnic identification is high and more resistant to change. On the other hand, mid-comers' (e.g., between 10-25 years) ethnic identification is the highest and more sensitive to in-group blame. However, the difference between these groups diminished by the time. Mid-comers and early-comers aligned with each other while early-comers kept their ethnic identification lower than the rest. The random effect of the Duration on ethnic identification and its above-mentioned negative effect on national identification surprisingly shows that spending time in the country of residence goes against their national identification. Although, our analysis on the duration of migration does not differentiate between Germany-born and others, Jugert et al. (2020) recently reported a similar trend for third-generation Turkish postmigrants through panel data. The challenge of spending a long time in the country of residence can come from the accumulative social exclusion experiences (Çelik, 2015; Verkuyten, 2008). Yet, our careful assessment on objective and subjective aspects of rejection demonstrated that the exposure to maltreatment decreases national identity but not the ethnic identity that is the primary source of change in dual identification of Turkish postmigrants. Instead, we

observed a significant decrease in blaming in-group between waves that is the most crucial predictor of the change in favour of ethnic identity among Turkish postmigrants.

In short, in the line with the BII approach (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005), the change that took place in the ethnolinguistic identification of Turkish postmigrants is more sensitive to subjective aspects such as appraisal of threat and causal attribution than the objective experience of rejection.

9. Study 3: Antecedents of Dual Identification and Beyond: Diverse effects of appraisal of threat and causal attribution on the political participation and resilience to violent extremism among Turkish postmigrants

9.1. *Aims & Rationale*

In the previous study, we tested the objective and subjective aspects of rejection on Turkish postmigrants' ethnonational identification through a repeated cross-sectional data set. We found that the change that took place in ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants was due to the subjective aspect of rejection. More specifically, the increase in the ethnic identification was mainly and negatively predicted by the coping phase of rejection (e.g., causal attribution). Besides, appraisal of threat plays a critical role on their ethnonational identifications in spite of the locus of causal attribution (see *Section 7 in Chapter 2*). Although we found evidence for diverse effects of appraisal of threat and causal attribution on ethnonational identifications, the items used in the cross-sectional open-source dataset did not fully allow us to examine the levels of these components that was evident from the first qualitative study (see, *Section 7.3 in Chapter 2 above*). In the first study, aiming to contextualise the rejection process, we found that Turkish postmigrants differentiated rejection according to its appraisal as either *specific* to their in-group (hereafter, Specific) or *generalised* towards all migrants (hereafter, Generalised). They also were more likely to blame the out-group (i.e., Germans) than their in-group (i.e., Turkish postmigrants) for their rejection experiences as reported elsewhere (Costarelli, 2007; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b).

In this study, we aim to re-think the perceived discrimination phenomenon for the Turkish postmigrants in Germany and isolate the effects of subjective aspects of the rejection as shown in the previous study, it was the driving force of the change in their ethnonational identification. We rely upon Stigma-Induced Threat Model (Major et al., 2002; Major and O'Brien, 2005) and postulate that different combination of the revealed factors of appraisal of threat and causal attribution will result with different forms of rejections. More

specifically, we argue that a *perceived discrimination* is possible only when a specific group threat meets with an out-group attribution. However, theoretically, minorities can also perceive a generalised threat while they still attribute it to an out-group that we named *structural discrimination*. On the other hand, minorities can also attribute a specific threat to their in-group which we named *justifiable discrimination*. Finally, minorities can perceive a generalised threat and attribute it to their in-group which we named *apprehensive discrimination* (see, *Section 9.2 in Chapter 2 below*). Although some of these possible forms of rejection were discussed throughout the literature (Major et al., 2002), to our knowledge, no other study systematically distinguished and examined them previously.

Thus, based on previous studies that allow us to contextualise the subjective components of rejection, we seek (1) to distinguish and test the different combinations of components of rejection (i.e., Threat and Attribution) on dual identification with an experimental vignettes study. We also (2) examine the consequences of the combinations of these components of rejection such as political participation and resilience to violent extremism since social psychological research with disadvantaged groups mainly concern with the question of marginalisation in the face of rejection (Gezici Yalçın, 2007; Simon et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2015). To this end, we generate vignettes to manipulate appraisal of threat and causal attribution in a sample consisting of bicultural Turkish postmigrants.

9.2. Hypotheses

In this study, independent variable is rejection from mainstream society that has two factors (i.e., Threat & Attribution) with two levels (i.e., Specific vs. Generalised & In- vs. Out-group, respectively). And we are interested to examine the influence of the different combinations of components of rejection on dual identity, political participation, and resilience to violent extremism as dependent variables (see, Figure 8). With factors and dependent variables in the hand, one can generate 16 hypotheses. However, in this section, we only introduce and justify hypothesis that can be driven from the relevant literature for expected main as well as interaction effects of the components of rejection.




Figure 8. Conceptual Model of the Experimental Vignette Survey

Note: Dotted lines represents the interaction effects of the factor levels on the dependent variables

Acculturation research suggests that group-level threat is one of the main obstacles to developing an acculturation strategy of integration for minorities, the sole strategy that enables minorities to maintain their culture and increase their active participation in the residence society at the same time (Berry et al. 2006). Although the quality of intergroup interaction may lead to different forms and experiences of the threat, the essence of the group threat is the possible “harm that in-group may suffer at the hands of the out group” (Stephan & Renfo, 2002, p.198). Thereby, we expect to observe more detrimental outcomes from an in-group specific threat perception than a generalised threat perception. Specifically, dual identification, resulting from a successful acculturation process, will be negatively affected by the in-group specific threat (Fleischmann, et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2013). Especially the identity (in)compatibility that represent the emotional harmony between identities might be at peril in the face of a specific threat perception (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005). Since the conceptualisation of dual identity varies in the literature (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016), we will employ both explicit (e.g., identity

(in)compatibility) and implicit measures of dual identification (e.g., separate measures of ethnic and national identification). As such, regarding the main effect of appraisal of threat, we expect that:

H1.A. - Identity incompatibility will be higher among subjects who were allocated to the specific threat condition than those to the generalised threat condition.

H1.A1. - The ratio of strict-dual identifiers (e.g., highly attached to both identities) will be lower among the subjects who were allocated to the specific threat condition than those to the generalised threat conditions.

It is important to note that in the previous correlational study, we found that the change of dual identification among Turkish postmigrants was driven by the increase of ethnic identity while national identity remain stable. Thereby, in this study we also assume to observe changes in both ethnic and national identities. Thus, we expect:

H1.A1(a). - The ratio of ethnic-dual identifiers (e.g., predominantly Turkish) will be higher among subjects were allocated to the specific threat condition than those to the generalised threat condition.

H1.A1(b). - The ratio of national-dual identifiers (e.g., predominantly German) will be higher among subjects who were allocated to the generalised threat condition than those to the specific threat condition.

Furthermore, socio-political consequences of the specific threat perception might be detrimental for the bicultural individuals too. Simon and Klandermans (2001) stated that one of the pillars of politicisation of disadvantageous groups is the awareness of shared grievances that mainly conceptualised as group-based threat within the context of being migrant (see, Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Rejection from the mainstream society is also shown to be an important indicator of collective action participation among Turkish postmigrants (Gezici Yalçın, 2007). However, higher identity incompatibility leads Turkish postmigrants towards a more radical action and prevents them from conventional political participation (Simon et al., 2013). In line with previous hypothesis on identity (in)compatibility, here we also expect that:

H1.B. - Political participation will be lower among subjects who were allocated to the specific threat condition than those to the generalised threat conditions.

H1.C. - Resilience to violent extremism will be lower among subjects who were allocated to the specific threat condition than those to the generalised threat conditions

On the other hand, despite social exclusion and their disadvantageous position, minorities challenge mainstream society and increase their political engagement through various domains and networks (Ataman et al., 2017; Gezici Yalçın, 2007; Simon & Ruhs, 2008; Tanyaş, 2020). At this stage, causal attributions as a coping mechanism might affect the outcomes regarding intergroup relations (Becker et al., 2011; Major & O'Brien, 2005). For instance, Costarelli (2007) showed that in the case a group threat people experience more negative emotions when they make an in-group attribution. Thus, we expect that causal attribution, beyond and above threat manipulations, may influence identity (in)compatibility that represent the affective aspect of the dual identity (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005). Besides, in the previous correlational study, we also showed that in-group attribution hinders ethnic identification among Turkish postmigrants. One can expect that in-group attribution may promote the political participation in Germany to challenge with negative emotional load that is conveyed by blaming the in-group. As such, we expect that:

H2.A. - Identity incompatibility will be higher among subjects were allocated to the Attribution-In condition than those to Attribution-Out condition.

H2.B. - Political participation will be higher among subjects who were allocated to the Attribution-In condition than those to Attribution-Out condition

Finally, when it comes to interaction of the components, all of the dependent variables in this study might be influenced. Because, according to Simon and others (2013) minorities are burdened with the responsibility of holding two incompatible identities and that “dual identity precipitates a sense of anomia” (p.252). We assume that the same kind of anomia can be triggered by a dissonance between the appraisal of threat and the causal attribution. Due to the fact that any sort of discrimination has a potential target and agent, changing the causal attribution towards an in-group in the case of a generalised threat (i.e.,

Apprehensive discrimination) or appraising the threat specifically to an in-group in the case of an out-group attribution (i.e., Perceived discrimination) might create an ambiguity of responsibility that is one of the main reasons for the cognitive dissonance (Cooper, 2019). We assume that in the conditions where participants are exposed to ambiguity of responsibility more, their dual identification as well as their political participation will be badly influenced. As such, we expect that:

H3.A. - Identity incompatibility will be higher among subjects were allocated to the Apprehensive discrimination than those to Structural discrimination and the Perceived than those in Justifiable discrimination conditions.

H3.B. - Political participation will be lower among subjects who were allocated to Apprehensive than those to Structural discrimination and to Perceived than those to Justifiable discrimination conditions.

H3.C. - Resilience to violent extremism will be lower among subjects who were allocated to Apprehensive than those in Structural discrimination and to the Perceived than those to Justifiable discrimination conditions.

9.3. Data & Method

9.3.1. Design

The hypotheses derived above were tested using an Experimental Vignette Survey (EVS) that counterbalance the weaknesses of the traditional surveys and experiments by increasing internal and external validity of the research at the same time (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010). EVS is drawing researchers' attention, especially in the communication and political sciences, where the research subject is a part of everyday life that cannot be controlled in laboratories (see, Hameleers et al., 2018; Bos et al., 2020). Likewise, EVS allowed us to differentiate the levels of appraisal of threat and casual attribution that is practically difficult to decompound in the real-life settings and ethically challenging to recreate in a traditional experiment (see Costarelli, 2009; Major et al., 2002).

Based on previous qualitative and correlational studies, we revealed that among Turkish postmigrants, appraisal of threat has two different loci, namely *Generalised* and *Specific*, as well as causal attribution, namely *Out-group* and *In-group*. In this study, we preregistered (<https://osf.io/cjwny/>) and conducted an experimental vignette survey, by a 2 (specific vs. generalised threat) X 2 (in-group vs. Attribution-Out) design with a control condition, in order to test the main and interaction effects of appraisal of threat and causal attribution on the dual identification, political participation and resilience to violent extremism among Turkish postmigrants (Huck, 2012).

We examined two levels of appraisal of threat and causal attribution with vignettes generated adequate to the study context by picking two controversial topics on Turkish postmigrants that become a matter of public record in Germany. For the appraisal of threat, we relied on a well-known study on discrimination in Germany's labour market (see Kaas & Manger, 2010). And for causal attribution, we employed the 'parallel society' debate (see Mueller, 2006). The public awareness of both topics is high, especially among Turkish postmigrants and they are circulated widely through German and Turkish media (Donath, 2010; Ouassil, 2020).

9.3.2. Participants & Procedure

Due to the emergence of the global pandemic at the beginning of the data collection process, we decided to reach out to participants through social media platforms where Turkish postmigrant communities create private or public groups. Between May and September 2020, we systematically advertised the call for participation in over 70 different Facebook groups from diverse regions and cities across Germany. We selected Facebook groups where Turkish postmigrants are very active and come together for various purposes, such as information exchange, entertainment, dating and political and cultural activities.

Based on a prior power analyses for a medium effect size, we targeted to reach out to 255 participants. And we stopped data collection when the sample exceeded 460 participants, out of whom 260 participants filled out at least 60% of the survey that

correspond to at least one dependent variables after experimental manipulations. Based on our aim and hypothesis and with the approval of the Ethics Committee of Bielefeld University (No: 2020-026), we set three exclusion criteria to target bicultural individuals that only (1) people older than 18-years who define themselves as Turkish, and (2) whose, at least, one parents has a Turkish descent and (3) who was born in or came to Germany before the age of 6 were allowed to take part in the study.

After reading the consent form and answering three exclusion criteria items, participants randomly allocated to one of four manipulations or the control condition using Qualtrics survey software through an online advertisement. Then, they were asked to answer manipulation check items, identity incompatibility, ethnic and national identification, political participation and resilience to violent extremism measures, respectively. Each participant who finalised the survey and consented to share their email address got a voucher worth of five Euros as compensation for their participation. After carefully assessing the raw data, we succeeded to include 256 participants' answers in the dataset.

9.3.3. Measures

Manipulations: The basic stimulus material of all conditions was a vignette mimicking a news report from a fictional newspaper outlet called 'Göçmen' (i.e., Migrants). We produced five identical layouts depicting a piece of article from a website and subjects were allocated to read one of the five vignettes. For manipulating the appraisal of threat factor, subjects were misinformed by selectively being provided a study report on either a generalised threat (e.g., *German-sounding names favoured*) or a specific threat (e.g., *Turkish-sounding names are excluded*) against their in-group members during a job application in the German labour market. For the causal attribution factor, we used fabricated poll results from Turkish communities in Germany as if Turkish postmigrants were unhappy about either their out-group (e.g., *Germans' persistence on being a closed society*) or their in-group (e.g., *Turks' persistence on being a parallel society*). The text presented in vignettes is as follows with varied elements shown in bracket:

German job market is closed to [Turks] / [Migrants] because of [their negative reputation] / [intolerance in Germany]

Berlin, 7.1.2020- ...A study conducted by the Institute of Labour and Work Studies (IAA) on the discrimination in hiring shows that; a fictional person's CV on average is 24% [less] / [more] likely to receive a call-back when the person has a [Turkish] / [German]-sounding name (such as "[Fatih & Zeynep] / [Tobias & Charlotte]"). This means access to the German labour market is [closed] / [open] particularly for the [Turks] / [Germans]. Probably the results are not surprising for our Turkish readers! Because we know that Turks are suffering from [their negative reputation in Germany] / [Germans' intolerance to the cultural difference] that is still dramatically affecting all society. A current poll by the Centre for Migration Demographics (ZfMd) say that after 60-years-old migration history, Turks are raising their grievances about [their] / [Germans'] persistence on being a [parallel] / [closed] society.

Note that we used fictional institute names and support argumentations with numbers to make it clear that provided information was relevant and reliable throughout the text. Although presented pieces of information are not unique or piercing since they come from publicly accessible studies and news on the social exclusion phenomenon, we manipulated the locus of the factors in question, instead of the content. We presented the example of social exclusion in a very one-sided manner to trigger a group level threat as if it was either only towards in-group, but no one else (e.g., Turks, Turkish-sounding, Fatih & Zeynep) or it was towards any other minority groups by focusing the favouritism on the majority group (e.g., Germans, German-sounding, Tobias & Charlotte). Likewise, in the causal attribution section, we presented either parallel society sentiment to trigger the stereotypes about Turkish postmigrant communities (e.g., their negative reputation, being a parallel society) or the stereotypes about Germans (e.g., Germans' intolerance, closed

society). In the control condition, subjects read an equivalent text about the unemployment of graduates and the disadvantages of a single lifestyle which also contain a certain level of group threat and causal attribution, but none of the factors was related to ethnic discrimination or migration.

Manipulation checks: We used two items to assess manipulation on each factor, and screened means to exclude outliers and subjects with missing values that, in total, 43 subjects dropped from further analysis. The remaining 217 participants randomly allocated to five conditions that constituted the study sample. We run four univariate analyses of variance for each of the manipulation check items across the factors (i.e., Threat, Attribution and Control) and proved that the experimental manipulations deviated the group means from control conditions with a medium effect size (see, Table 8).

The first manipulation check assessed the appraisal of threat (i.e., *I think Turks are the target of discrimination more than other minorities in Germany*), and high scores corresponded to a more specific threat. Second manipulation check items computed from reversed scores of the first item as corresponding to a generalised threat perception. Experimental manipulation on appraisal of threat successfully deviated subjects' specific threat perception from the control group ($M = 4.26$, $SD = 1.27$), that those in specific threat conditions ($M = 5.21$, $SD = 1.10$) got higher scores than the ones in a generalised threat condition ($M = 4.95$, $SD = 1.36$), $F(2, 217) = 7.909$, $p < .000$ partial $\eta^2 = .068$. Besides, subjects' generalised threat perceptions deviated from the control group, too ($M = 3.73$, $SD = 1.27$). Those in the generalised threat conditions got higher scores ($M = 3.04$, $SD = 1.36$) than the ones in a specific threat condition ($M = 2.77$, $SD = 1.10$) although both scores were lower than the control condition, $F(2, 217) = 7.909$, $p < .000$ partial $\eta^2 = .068$. Accordingly, appraisal of threat manipulation worked in line with the expectation by significantly increasing specific threat perception compared to that of the control group. But surprisingly, the manipulation worked against the expectation by decreasing the generalised threat perception compared to that of the control group; nevertheless, it significantly deviated the mean scores of manipulated conditions from the control condition.

Table 8. Univariate Analysis of Variance for Manipulation Check Items across Factors

Manipulation checks items	Threat Conditions									<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>
	Specific			Generalised			Control						
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>				
1-Specific threat	5.21	1.10	92	4.95	1.36	92	4.26	1.26	38	2-217	7.909	.068	.000
2-Generalised threat	2.78	1.10	87	3.04	1.36	87	3.73	1.26	38	2-217	7.909	.068	.000
	Attribution Conditions									<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>
	In-group			Out-group			Control						
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>				
3-Attribution-In	2.67	1.06	88	2.51	1.16	88	3.13	1.21	38	2-217	3.957	.035	.021
4-Attribution-Out	5.33	1.06	91	5.48	1.17	91	4.87	1.21	38	2-217	3.957	.035	.021

The third manipulation check assessed the causal of attribution (i.e., *I think Germans are more responsible for discrimination than the Turks*) that high scores corresponded to high out-group attributions. Again, the fourth manipulation item calculated from the third item's reversed scores corresponded to an in-group attribution. Experimental manipulation on causal attribution successfully deviated subjects' Attribution-Out scores from those of the control group ($M = 4.87, SD = 1.21$) and those in Attribution-Out conditions ($M = 5.48, SD = 1.17$) got higher scores than the ones in Attribution-In conditions ($M = 5.33, SD = 1.06$), $F(2, 217) = 3.957, p = .021, \eta^2 = .035$. Besides, subjects' in-group attribution deviated from control group too ($M = 3.13, SD = 1.21$), although both of the manipulation conditions got lower scores than control condition. Subjects assigned to Attribution-In conditions get higher scores ($M = 2.67, SD = 1.06$) than the ones to Attribution-Out condition ($M = 2.51, SD = 1.17$), $F(2, 217) = 3.957, p = .021, \eta^2 = .035$. Accordingly, causal attribution manipulation worked in line with the expectation by increasing Attribution-Out compared to that of the control condition. But surprisingly, the

manipulation worked against the expectation by decreasing in-group Attribution, although it deviated the mean scores of manipulation conditions from those of the control condition.

Identity Incompatibility (Fleischman & Verkuyten, 2016): In order to capture to what extent the ethnic and national identities were seen as incompatible, we employed three items from the dual identification scale that corresponded to a conflicted dual identity. Throughout the items, subjects individually assessed an explicit misfit between the identities (e.g., *I am torn between two cultures: The Turkish culture and the German culture*). A high score implies a high incompatibility of ethnic and national identities (hereafter *Incompatibility*) that presented by a 7-point Likert type scale (Cronbach $\alpha = .72$).

Dual Identity Clusters (Postmes, Haslam & Jans, 2013): Combining two identification measures to deduce a dual identity is a common way to assess dual identification. Although it provides a more implicit measurement of dual identification, when it comes to statistical power, there is hardly any difference between this method and explicit dual identity measures (Fleischman and Verkuyten, 2016). Thereby, we use the two items separately measuring ethnonational identification with a 7-Likert type scale (i.e., *I identify with Germans & I identify with Turks*). Then, we conducted a two-step cluster analysis based on these two items in order to assign the subjects into dual identity clusters. Accordingly, 27.2 % of all subjects held a Strict-Dual identity (*high, high*) with a mean of 5.77 and 5.35, respectively; 28.6 % of the sample held a National-Dual identity (*high, low*) with a mean of 4.61 and 3.28 respectively; 35 % of the sample held an Ethnic-Dual identity (*low, high*) with a mean of 2.22 and 6.10 respectively and the rest, 9.2 % of the sample held a Low-Dual identity (*low, low*) with a mean of 2.38 and 2.38 respectively.

Political Participation (Ataman et al., 2017): Political participation was assessed with 11 items and three subscales corresponded to different domains such as online, civic, and direct participations. 'Online participation' with four items and a Cronbach $\alpha = .59$, focuses on social interactions with a political cause in digital platforms that is mostly more accessible for the young people (e.g., *Participating in an online-based protest (For instance, #metwo movement)*). 'Civic participation' with four items and a Cronbach $\alpha = .63$ focuses on

engagements in communities that take place in an institutional level (e.g., *Take part in concerts or a fundraising event with a social or political content*). Finally, 'direct participation' with three items and a Cronbach $\alpha = .57$, focuses on political engagement on an ideological level (e.g., *Distributing leaflets with political content*). In this study, participants were asked to report on to what extent they are willing to engage in any of political activities within the context of Germany by a 7-point Likert type scale, and the total score used as high political participation (hereafter *Participation*, $\alpha = .85$).

The Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism -BRAVE-14 (Grossman et al., 2017): We used BRAVE-14 to measure resilience to violent extremism among Turkish postmigrants. The scale is developed to assess the protective factors that foster young people's resilience living in harsh conditions. It is consistent of 14 items with a Cronbach $\alpha = .76$ and five factors such as 'cultural identity and connectedness' focuses on intra-group adaptivity (e.g., *It's important to me to maintain cultural traditions*), 'bridging capital' focuses on intergroup interaction capacity (e.g., *In general, I trust people from other communities*), 'linking capital' focuses on the relationship with formal authorities (e.g., *I trust authorities/law enforcement agencies*), 'violence-related beliefs' focuses on the cognitive tendency towards violence (e.g., *Being violent helps me earn the respect of others*) and finally 'violence-related behaviours' focuses on behavioural intention against violence (e.g., *I am willing to speak out publicly against violence in my community*). In this study, we used total scores of the scale (hereafter *Resilience*) where a high score represents higher resilience to violent extremism, and it is presented by a 7-point Likert type scale, Cronbach $\alpha = .59$.

Demographics: We included characteristics that might affect the above-mentioned dependent variables in the survey. Thus, categorical variables such as gender, primary language, family composition (e.g., parents' ethnicity), self-report generation, citizenship status, religion, and interval variables such as age and political orientation (e.g., 1-Left to 7-Right) constituted the final section of the survey.

9.4. Results

Before going into the analysis conducted in the course of this study, first we present characteristics of the whole sample (see, Table 9). Note that the number of females is higher than that of the males, and the ratio of Muslims is relatively low. This is because questions regarding demographics were at the end of the survey, resulting in approximately 13% missing data. Besides, we provided subjects with an option to refuse to answer demographic questions that also contribute to the loss of analysable data. For instance, %15.6 of the sample preferred not to answer the gender question. Apart from these points, we succeeded in reaching a sample that mostly defined themselves as the third generation, whose parents were mostly Turkish, held mostly German citizenship with a mean age of 29.

The mean political orientation is closed to mid-point of a 7-point scale ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.26$) and does not differ across conditions [$F(4, 135) = 1.993$, $p = .099$], implying that there is not a political bias in the experimental conditions. Besides, cross-condition comparisons showed that experimental conditions are balanced regarding the characteristics. None of the demographic variables significantly differ across conditions, implying that full randomisation is established and the conditions are balanced for further analysis. Regarding distribution of the dependent variables across all conditions, only Participation [$F(4, 205) = 3.567$, $p = .008$] and Resilience [$F(4, 200) = 5.880$, $p = .000$] significantly differed across experimental conditions that is further examined with variance analyses.

Table 9. Characteristics of the Sample and Mean Scores of the Dependent Variables.

Variables	% / M	Range / SD	df	Estimates	p
Male	27.6%	0-1	4	$\chi^2 = 2.621$.623
Turkish language (primary)	57.4%	1-3	12	$\chi^2 = 9.977$.618
Turkish parents (both)	80.4%	1-4	16	$\chi^2 = 23.569$.100
Third generation	59.1%	1-4	12	$\chi^2 = 11.168$.515

German citizen (only)	47.6%	1-3	8	$\chi^2 = 5.136$.743
Muslim	62.9%	1-4	12	$\chi^2 = 17.679$.126
Age	29.0	7.6	196	$F = .144$.965
Political orientation	3.35	1.26	135	$F = 1.993$.099
Incompatibility	4.46	1.41	217	$F = 1.557$.187
Strict-Duals	27.2%	1-4	12	$\chi^2 = 16.464$.172
Participation	3.30	1.10	205	$F = 3.567$.008
Resilience	5.12	.57	201	$F = 5.880$.000

Note. We used chi-square for the categorical and one way variance analysis for the ordinal and interval variables. Presented estimates and *p* values are coming from cross-comparison of five conditions.

In the following sections, we use 2 (specific vs. generalised threat) X 2 (in-group vs. Attribution-Out) two-way between groups analysis of variance to elaborate the main and interaction effects of the manipulation conditions on dependent variables. Study sample consists of 217 subjects who were allocated into five conditions as follows: Condition-0 as Control ($n = 38$), condition-1 as *Justifiable Discrimination* (e.g., Specific Threat & Attribution-In, $n = 43$), condition-2 as *Perceived Discrimination* (Specific Threat & Attribution-Out, $n = 49$), condition-3 as *Apprehensive Discrimination* (e.g., Generalised Threat & Attribution-In, $n = 45$) and condition-4 as *Structural Discrimination* (e.g., Generalised Threat & Attribution-Out, $n = 42$). The distributions of the subjects across the conditions are acceptable for cross-condition comparisons since the subjects are not leaning on one side of the conditions (see, Table 10).

Table 10. Means and Standard Deviation of Dependent Variables across Conditions

	Attribution						Total		
	In-Group			Out-Group					
Dependent Variables	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>
Incompatibility									

Specific Threat	4.69	1.37	43	4.54	1.44	49	4.61	1.41	92
Generalised Threat	4.70	1.36	45	4.13	1.35	42	4.42	1.38	87
Total	4.70	1.36	88	4.35	1.41	91			179
<hr/>									
Participation									
Specific Threat	3.28	.82	40	2.98	1.09	46	3.12	.98	86
Generalised Threat	3.77	1.22	43	3.38	1.07	41	3.58	1.16	84
Total	3.53	1.07	83	3.17	1.10	87			170
<hr/>									
Resilience									
Specific Threat	5.39	.48	40	4.86	.55	45	5.11	.58	85
Generalised Threat	5.02	.61	42	5.24	.56	39	5.13	.59	81
Total	5.20	.58	82	5.04	.58	84			166

We first present the result about identity incompatibility and dual identity clusters regarding the main effects of the factors as well as their interaction (i.e., H1-A / A1 / A1(a) / A1(b) / H2A & H3-A). Then, we present results about Participation regarding the main effects of the factors as well as their interaction (i.e., H1-B & H2-B & H3-B). Finally, we present results about Resilience regarding the main effect of appraisal of threat and its interaction with causal attribution (i.e., H1-C & H3-C).

9.4.1. Incompatibility

The first dependent variable that is examined is the identity incompatibility. A two-way between groups analysis of variance conducted to test the main effects of appraisal of threat and its interaction with causal attribution on the mean of identity incompatibility. The main effects of appraisal of threat [$F(1, 175) = .949, p = .331, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .005$] and causal attribution [$F(1, 175) = 3.152, p = .078, \text{partial } \eta^2 = .018$] could not yield to a significant level (see, Table 11). Still, some general trends across data are in line with the hypothesis on the main effects of appraisal of threat (i.e., H1.A) and causal attribution (i.e., H2.A). For instance, the dual identity incompatibility levels of subjects who were in specific threat conditions ($M = 4.61, SD = 1.4$) were higher than those in the generalised conditions ($M =$

4.42, $SD = 1.4$) but it was also lower among subjects who were allocated to Attribution-Out ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.41$) compared to those who were allocated to Attribution-In ($M = 4.70$, $SD = 1.36$). Interaction effects also were partly in line with the hypothesis 3.A, although there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis, $F(1, 175) = 1.007$, $p = .317$, partial $\eta^2 = .006$. For instance, although dual identity incompatibility means of subjects who were allocated to apprehensive discrimination ($M = 4.7$, $SD = 1.36$) was higher than those in structural discrimination ($M = 4.13$, $SD = 1.35$); it was not higher among subjects who were allocated to perceived discrimination ($M = 4.54$, $SD = 1.44$) than those who were in justifiable discrimination ($M = 4.69$, $SD = 1.37$).

Table 11. Threat x Attribution Two-Way Between Groups Analysis of Variance for Incompatibility

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>
(X) Threat	1	.949	.005	.331
(Y) Attribution	1	3.152	.018	.078
(X*Y) Interaction	1	1.007	.006	.317
Error	175			

Post-Hoc	Mean Diff.	<i>SE.</i>	Adj. 95% CI	
(X) Threat				
Generalised vs. Specific	-.20	.21	-.61 / .21	.331
(Y) Attribution				
Out-group vs. In-group	-.37	.21	-.78 / .04	.078
(X*Y) Interaction				
Structural vs. Perceived Disc.	-.41	.29	-.98 / .16	.161
Apprehensive vs. Justifiable Disc.	.01	.30	-.57 / .59	.984

Note. $R^2 = .027$, Adj. $R^2 = .010$, *p*-values are adjusted using the Bonferroni method.

Finally, although the generalised threat manipulation decreased the overall level of dual identity incompatibility (see, Figure 9), we are far from comparing the conditions due to

the insignificant results of the analysis. Yet, we can infer that explicit measure of the dual identity (e.g., incompatibility) was insufficient to differentiate manipulation effects with the available sample.




Figure 9. The Main and Interaction Effects of the Threat and Attribution on Incompatibility

9.4.2. Dual-identity Clusters

In order to test the hypothesis regarding dual identity clusters that correspond to an implicit assessment of dual identification, several chi-square analyses were run between dual identity clusters and experimental conditions. As expected in hypothesis 1.A1, we found that only the appraisal threat manipulation had a significant effect on the dual identity cluster, $\chi^2(3, 179) = 9.121, p = .028$ (see Table 12).

Based on an individual cell inspection through adjusted standardised residuals (Agresti, 2007), we failed to confirm hypothesis 1.A.1 and found that the ratio of Strict-Duals among subjects who were assigned to the specific threat conditions (28.3 %) is not lower than those in the generalised conditions (20.7 %). Still, we found that the ratio of Ethnic-Duals in specific threat conditions (40.2 %) is higher than those in the generalised threat condition (28.7 %) as expected by hypothesis 1.A.1(a). Likewise, as expected by hypothesis 1.A.1(b), the ratio of National-Duals in the generalised threat condition (41.4 %) exceeded the ones in the specific threat condition (20.7 %).

Table 12. Crosstabulation of Dual Identity Cluster across Threat Manipulation Conditions.

Dual Identity Clusters	Threat				Total	χ^2	<i>p</i>	
	Generalised		Specific					
	<i>n</i>	%	<i>n</i>	%				
Strict-Duals	18	20.7	26	28.3	44	24.6	9.197	.028
	(−1.2)		(1.2)					
National-Duals	36	41.4	19	20.7	55	30.7		
	(3.0)		(−3.0)					
Ethnic-Duals	25	28.7	37	40.2	62	34.6		
	(−1.6)		(1.6)					
Low-Duals	8	9.2	10	10.9	18	10.1		
	(−.4)		(.4)					

Note. Adjusted standardised residuals are shown in bracelets below clusters frequencies and percentages.




Figure 10. Distribution of Dual Identity Clusters across Threat Manipulation Conditions.

Moreover, adjusted standardised residuals of the ratio of dual identity clusters showed that the crucial contributor to the change in dual identity clusters is coming from National-Duals. Accordingly, while generalised threat manipulation increased the ratio of National-Duals and specific threat manipulation decreased the ratio of the same (see, Figure 10).

9.4.3. Participation

Turning next to the political participation, we run a two-way between groups analysis of variance to examine the difference between experimental conditions on political participation. We found that the appraisal of threat and causal attribution can influence all three kinds of participations: online, civic, and direct participations (see, Table 13). Yet here, we present only the results on overall political participation using the mean score of the entire scale that consist of 13 items (Ataman et al., 2017).

Table 13. Threat x Attribution, Two-Way Between Groups Analysis of Variance for Participation.

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>
(X) Threat	1	7.369	.043	.007
(Y) Attribution	1	4.354	.026	.038
(X*Y) Interaction	1	.066	.000	.798
Error	166			
Post-Hoc	Mean Diff.	<i>SE.</i>	Adj. 95% / CI	
(X) Threat				
Generalised vs. Specific**	.44	.16	.12 / .77	.007
(Y) Attribution				
Out-group vs. In-group*	-.34	.16	-.66 / -.02	.038
(X*Y) Interaction				
Structural vs. Perceived Disc.	.40	.23	-.05 / .85	.081
Apprehensive vs. Justifiable Disc.	.49	.23	.02 / .95	.039

Note. $R^2 = .069$, $\text{Adj. } R^2 = .052$, $** p < .01$, $* p < .05$ where p-values are adjusted using the Bonferroni method.

There is sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis for the main effect of Threat, $F(1, 166) = 7.369$, $p = .007$, $\text{partial } \eta^2 = .043$. As expected by hypothesis 1.B, the political participation among the subjects assigned to the specific threat conditions ($M = 3.12$, $SD = .98$) was lower than those who were assigned to the generalised threat condition ($M = 3.58$, $SD = 1.16$). Likewise, causal attribution also had a significant main effect on political participation [$F(1, 166) = 4.354$, $p = .038$, $\text{partial } \eta^2 = .026$] as expected. Accordingly, political participation was higher among subjects who were assigned to Attribution-In condition ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.07$), than those in Attribution-Out condition ($M = 3.17$, $SD = 1.1$).

These findings show that perceiving a generalised threat compared to a specific threat, promote more political participation in the mainstream society (e.g., Germany). At the same time, being critical about in-group among minorities promote political participation in the residence country. However, their interaction could not yield significant level implying these two factors act independently, $F(1, 166) = .066$, $p = .798$, $\text{partial } \eta^2 = .000$.




Figure 11. The Main effects of the Threat and Attribution on Participation

A post hoc test with the Bonferroni method showed that the differentiation between conditions is driven by a generalised threat and an in-group attribution. When subjects were primed to think about a general threat towards their migration background (i.e., Apprehensive and Structural discrimination), they engaged in all kinds of political activities in the residence country more than subjects in other conditions. Likewise, when primed to attribute social exclusion to their in-group (e.g., Justifiable & Perceived discrimination), they engaged in all kinds of political activities more than subjects in other conditions (see Figure 11).

9.4.4. Resilience to Violence Extremism

Regarding the negative outcome of the rejection process, we also assessed subjects' resilience to violent extremism in the case of different levels of Threat and Attribution via BRAVE-14 scale (Grossman et al., 2017). This scale has five subscales that integrate violent belief and behaviour as well as cultural and social capitals to comprehensively assess young people's resilience, especially those in a harsh social context. Based on the assumption stated in hypothesis 1.C & 3.C, we run a two-way between groups analysis of variance to compare the main effects of Threat and Attribution as well as their interaction on the resilience (see, Table 14). Accordingly, there is neither a significant main effect of Threat [$F(1, 162) = .006$, $p = .937$, partial $\eta^2 = .000$] nor Attribution [$F(1, 162) = 3.334$, $p = .075$, partial $\eta^2 = .019$]. We failed to reject the null hypothesis for H1C. However, as expected, interaction of factors showed a high level of significance across experimental conditions with a high effect size, $F(1, 162) = 18.877$, $p = .000$, partial $\eta^2 = .104$.

Based on a post hoc test with the Bonferroni method, we found that subject who were allocated to *Structural Discrimination* condition ($M = 5.24$, $SD = .56$) show higher level of resilience to extremism than those in *Perceived Discrimination* condition ($M = 4.86$, $SD = .55$). Likewise, those in *Justifiable Discrimination* condition ($M = 5.39$, $SD = .48$) show higher level of resilience to extremism than those in *Apprehensive Discrimination* condition ($M = 5.02$, $SD = .61$).

Table 14. Threat x Attribution Two-Way Between Groups Analysis of Variance for Resilience.

Source	<i>df</i>	<i>F</i>	η^2	<i>p</i>
(X) Threat	1	.006	.000	.937
(Y) Attribution	1	3.334	.019	.075
(X*Y) Interaction***	1	18.877	.104	.000
Error	162			

Post-Hoc (Bonferroni)	Mean Diff.	<i>SE.</i>	Adj. 95% / CI	<i>p</i>
(X) Threat				
Generalised vs. Specific	.01	.08	-.16 / .17	.937
(Y) Attribution				
Out-group vs. In-group	-.15	.08	-.32 / .01	.075
(X*Y) Interaction				
Structural vs. Perceived Disc.**	.38	.12	.14 / .62	.002
Apprehensive vs. Justifiable Disc.**	-.36	.12	-.60 / -.12	.003

Note. $R^2 = .122$, Adj. $R^2 = .106$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$ where p -values are adjusted using the Bonferroni method.

Post hoc comparison results make it clear that the resilience to violent extremism of the sample is not predicted by only one factor such as the appraisal of threat but needs to be assessed with the causal attributions (see, Figure 12). Resilience to violent extremism decreased when subjects were manipulated into perceiving the social exclusion as a general phenomenon for all migrants and a sentiment of in-group attribution (i.e., Apprehensive Discrimination). Likewise, it also decreased when subjects were manipulated into perceiving a specific threat towards their ethnic group with an out-group attribution (i.e., Perceived Discrimination). On the other hand, resilience increased in Justifiable Discrimination condition that corresponds to a specific threat towards in-group and an in-group attribution

to blame the same group for social exclusion. It also increased in Structural Discrimination condition that corresponds to a generalised threat including in-group and an out-group attribution to blame the dominant group members for social exclusion.

All things considered, throughout this experimental vignette study, we provided sufficient evidence to reject six null hypotheses out of the proposed eleven hypotheses (see, Table 15). Accordingly, as the explicit measure used in this study regarding identity conflict between ethnic and national identities of minorities, namely identity incompatibility is affected by neither appraisal of threat nor causal attribution among Turkish postmigrants that result in a failure to reject the null hypothesis of H1-A, H2-A and H3-A. However, we provide sufficient evidence for changing dual identification under the manipulation of appraisal of threat through a separate measurement for ethnic and national identification. While measuring the dual identification through an implicit method (e.g., dual identity clusters), we found that a more generalised threat perception led to a high ratio of National-Duals as expected by H1-A1(b) hypothesis. Besides, a more specific threat perception led to a high ratio of Ethnic-Duals as expected by H1-A1(a) hypothesis, but not a low ratio of Strict-Duals on the contrary to H1-A.1 hypothesis.




Figure 12. The Interaction Effects of the Threat and Attribution on Resilience.

We also provided evidence on the determinative role of Threat and Attribution on political outcomes, such as participation and resilience to violent extremism of minorities. As expected by H1-B hypothesis, a generalised threat perception led to a higher level of political participation. Furthermore, an in-group attribution led to a higher level of political participation in mainstream society as expected by H2-B hypothesis. Finally, we showed that the dissonance between Threat and Attribution led to a lower degree of resilience to violent extremism among minorities as expected by H3.C.

Table 15. Overview of the Hypothesis and Expectation

Hypothesis	Expectations	Null Hypothesis
H1 A - Incompatibility is higher in the Specific than in Generalised conditions	Condition 1&2 > 3&4	Not Rejected
A1 - Strict-dual identifiers are less among the Specific than Generalised condition.	Condition 1&2 < 3&4	Not Rejected
A1(a) - Ethnic-dual identifiers are more among the Specific than Generalised condition.	Condition 1&2 > 3&4	Rejected
A1(b) - National-dual identifiers are more among the Generalised than Specific condition	Condition 1&2 < 3&4	Rejected
B - Participation is lower in the Specific than in Generalised condition.	Condition 1&2 < 3&4	Rejected
C - Resilience is lower in the Specific than in Generalised condition	Condition 1&2 < 3&4	Not Rejected
H2 A -Incompatibility is higher in the Attribution-Out than Attribution-In condition.	Condition 1&3 > 2&4	Not Rejected
B - Participation is higher in the Attribution-In than Attribution-Out condition.	Condition 1&3 > 2&4	Rejected

H3	A - Incompatibility is higher in the Apprehensive than Structural and in the Perceived than Justifiable discrimination conditions.	Condition 3 > 4 & 2 > 1	Not Rejected
	B - Participation is lower in Apprehensive than Structural and in the Perceived than Justifiable discrimination conditions.	Condition 3 < 4 & 2 < 1	Not Rejected
	C - Resilience is lower in Apprehensive than Structural and in the Perceived than Justifiable discrimination conditions.	Condition 3 < 4 & 2 < 1	Rejected

9.5. Discussion

Using an experimental paradigm, this study aims to isolate the effect of subjective components of rejection on dual identification among Turkish postmigrants and related outcomes such as political participation in mainstream society and resilience to violent extremism (Ataman et al., 2017; Grossman et al., 2017; Sauer, 2018; Simon et al., 2015). More specifically, based on rejection-(dis)identification models (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Jasinskaja-Lahti, et al., 2009), we employed a Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005) to re-conceptualise the perceived discrimination via previously revealed Threat (i.e., Specific vs. Generalised) and Attribution (i.e., In- vs. Out-group) components of rejection and to test their main and interaction effects.

Instead of the well-known unidimensional perceived discrimination concept that implicitly contains a certain target and a perpetrator group (see Major et al., 2002; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b), we assumed that minorities might perceive not only different levels but also types of discrimination based on a combination of the appraisal of threat and the causal attribution. Based on theoretical and methodological critics on the concept of perceived discrimination (see, *Section 3.3 in Chapter 1 above*), we contextualised and elaborated rejection among Turkish postmigrants. Accordingly, apart from personal experience of rejection, minorities might appraise a group threat specific to their in-group or a more general threat to other minorities, including the in-group. Simultaneously, they

might attribute discrimination to an out-group or their in-group members. Accordingly, 'perceived discrimination' is only the case when the threat is *specific*, but attribution is toward an *out-group*. However, most of minorities live in an inter-ethnic context where different minorities live together with the same majority population (Verkuyten, 2005; Yalaz, 2015). Thereby a minority group member might perceive 'structural discrimination' when the threat is generalised towards other minorities, and attribution is toward an *out-group*. Or they might perceive an 'apprehensive discrimination' when the threat is generalised, but causal attribution is toward the in-group. Finally, they might perceive 'justifiable discrimination' when the threat is specific, and attribution is toward the in-group.

Using an online experimental vignette survey, we generated vignettes to manipulate appraisal of threat (e.g., Generalised and Specific) and causal attribution (e.g., Attribution-Out and Attribution-In) with a randomised and balanced sample. We, then, tested these different types of discrimination among a Turkish postmigrant sample. We could not support hypothesis (i.e., H1A) because participants' explicit assessment of their dual identity's incompatibility (i.e., the conflict between ethnic and national identities) was not affected by the manipulations. In other words, manipulating the appraisal of threat or the causal attribution did not differentiate the subjects from those in the control condition. Previously, Fleischman and Verkuyten (2016) could not support the same hypothesis a positive assessment of the duality measure known as 'integrated' dual identity. Here, we failed to confirm the hypothesis despite using conflicted dual identity items of the same measure. Our findings shows that not only the quantity (Fleischmann et al., 2019), but also the quality of discrimination is not related to the explicit assessment of dual identity. It's important to note that the measure used here is known as self-identified duality that correspond to a sense of the high level of importance driven from a more blended approach that focuses on the strength of the dual identity (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005). Accordingly, a dual identity is more than a sum of both identities and minorities might feel attached to both while they give very little importance to both of these identities (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007). Thereby, a dual identity's personal importance might be

independent of separate assessment of ethnonational categories and take hybrid forms (Kaya & Kentel, 2004; Nguyen, & Benet-Martínez, 2010; Verkuyten, 2006).

Yet, dual identities were also assessed as a strategy of integration to assign participants to the taxonomy of acculturation strategies using a statistical inference such as cluster analysis (Klandermans, van Skelenburg & van der Toorn., 2008; Jugert, et al., 2020; Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2013). Such a method based on a combination of scores from separate ethnic and national identification measures allows to distinguish different forms of dual identities and examine which identity cluster is psychologically dominant (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). In this study, we also employed this method and found that Threat manipulation affected the ratio of Ethnic-duals among the sample, supporting H1A1(a) hypothesis. In line with the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, et al., 1999a), a specific threat perception increased the number of ethnic-duals (e.g., predominantly Turkish) among the sample. Accordingly, when subjects were manipulated into perceiving a threat towards their in-group, they tend to show more attachment to their ethnic identity. Yet, likewise the previous attempt (Fleishman & Verkuyten, 2016; Jugert et al., 2020) and against our hypothesis (i.e., H1A1), the ratio of Strict-duals (e.g., feeling highly attached to both identities) were not affected by the appraisal of threat. In other words, we failed to extend the rejection-identification model's assumption to the dual identification concept.

However, in contrast to the rejection-disidentification model (Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, Solheim, 2009) but in line with our H1A1(b) hypothesis, we found that the number of national-duals (e.g., Predominantly German) increased with a generalised threat manipulation, although it still contains a group level threat. According to the rejection-disidentification model, a perception based on group level, unfair treatment would simultaneously decrease national identification of minorities. However, manipulating the appraisal of threat towards a more general rejection perception (e.g., Structural and Apprehensive discrimination) enhance national identification among the sample. This might be due to the fact that the rejection process of minorities contains coping mechanisms as proposed by racism-related stress researchers. Generalised threat perception may trigger a

'shared destiny' sentiment and lead to a real or imaginary intergroup support as a coping mechanism (Harrell, 2000; Mellor, 2004). Minority group members may feel more connected to each other through a shared destiny sentiment via a generalised threat perception (Burson & Godfrey, 2020) that, in turn, encourage national identification as the widest superordinate category as a common in-group identity (Gartner et al., 2000).

Following the same rationale, we expected that the Threat manipulation would affect political participation of the sample (i.e., H1B, H2B, H3B). Generally, xenophobia is hindering the political participation of minorities in Europe, especially from traditional political life (Ataman et al., 2017; De Rooi, 2011). Likewise, we found that specific threat perception, beyond and above personal experience of discrimination, can diminish Turkish postmigrants' political participation (i.e., H1B). On the other hand, we also showed that political participation can still be promoted even under a certain level of threat perception (Fischer-Neumann, 2014). For instance, subjects who were manipulated into appraising a more generalised threat tend to participate more in online, civic and direct political activities in Germany. Accordingly, xenophobia or, more broadly speaking, fear of social exclusion is less detrimental for political participation when it is perceived to be more general than being specific to a minority group. These findings support a politicised collective identity approach (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) that the politicisation of minorities is nested with shared grievances and a certain level of national identification. Recently, Yalaz (2018) showed that perception of disadvantageous position in inter-ethnic context is critical for political participation of Turkish postmigrants. A general threat perception might remind migrants their disadvantageous position in favour of political participation without endangering isolationism as in the case of specific threat (Simon et al., 2013). Our perspective contributes to the literature by distinguishing the concept of perceived discrimination that mostly shown to have detrimental outcomes for minorities. Furthermore, in line with our H2B hypothesis, we showed that casual attribution directly affects political participation. Subjects allocated to the in-group attribution conditions were more willing to participate in all kinds of political activities than those assigned to out-group attribution conditions. The diverse effect of

framing causal attribution for an intergroup grievance was associated with prejudice and anti-immigrant policies among the majority population (Becker et al., 2011; Bos et al., 2019). However, the difference in feeling the grievance or possible moderator between grievance and politicisation is a neglected topic among politicisation of minorities (Simon et al., 2015). The locus of attribution might be an essential factor for politicisation since it is a part of coping closely related to self-esteem, especially among disadvantaged groups (Branscombe et al. 1999; Major et al. 2003; Major & O'Brien, 2005). Based on social identity theory, one can expect that an in-group attribution might lead to a greater negative social identity and lower self-esteem, which might trigger social creativity (Blanz et al., 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) via political participation as in our case. On the other hand, an out-group attribution might hinder the political trust that results in isolationism from the dominant group and political participation.

Finally, our results also shed light on the adverse effects of rejection. Through the resilience to violent extremism concept (Grossman et al., 2017), we showed that subjective components of rejection are effective in both increasing and decreasing resilience among minorities (i.e., H3C). While the level of resilience decreased in the case of a dissonant combination of the appraisal of threat and causal attribution (i.e., Apprehensive and Perceived Discrimination), it increased when the combination of the rejection process component was dissonant (i.e., Justifiable and Structural Discrimination). Following Simon and others (2013), we argue that such a dissonance create an ambiguity of responsibility that creates a cognitive burden for minorities that can lead to more radical beliefs and behaviours.

CHAPTER-THREE: DISCUSSION

10. Overview

The studies conducted in this dissertation are not fully independent from each other, but rather they are implemented interactively throughout the entire dissertation (Greene et al., 1989). During the three-year research, starting from the field observations, using cross-sectional surveys and conducting a vignette experiment, we aimed to draw a more realistic picture of the counterintuitive changes of dual identification among Turkish postmigrant communities, which we called the decline of dual identity (see, *Section 1.3 in Chapter-1*). At the beginning of the dissertation, we abided by an exploratory sequential mixed methodological design in which the conducted studies compensated each other's limitation on answering the closely related but empirically different sets of questions (see, *Section 5.1 in Chapter-1*). More specifically, the purpose of using mixed methodology in this dissertation is *the development* of findings towards uncovering the underlying psychological mechanisms of rejection-(dis)identification of the Turkish postmigrants.

Throughout the step-by-step implementation of the studies, the findings of the previous step transformed the following studies. In this way, taken from Bazeley and Kemp (2018), a morphing strategy was employed for data integrations between different methods regarding conceptual frameworks and measurements (For the joint display of studies and findings see, Table 16). In each study's aim and rationale section, we already linked each study with previous ones and introduced the specific models and data to examine the specific questions under the relevant methodology. However, O'Cathain, Murphy and Nicholl, (2007) stated that integration of different methodologies and approaches "occurred mainly at the interpretation stage of a study" (p. 160). Interpretation involves looking across various results and findings (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018) to making an assessment of the 'gestalt' or whole "that is bigger than a simple set of isolated conclusions" (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2009, p.250).

Table 16. Procedural Diagram of Exploratory Sequential Mixed Method Design and the Joint Display of Findings

Timeline →	Study 1→ (March – December 2018)		Study 2 → (January – August 2020)		Study 3 (May – December 2020)
Method	Qualitative →		Quantitative →		Quantitative
Procedure	Individual & Focus group Interviews (N: 26)		Repeated Cross-Sectional Survey (N:1093)		Experimental Vignette Survey (N:217)
Purpose	Distinguishing the rejection process among the study population		Associating components rejection process with ethnonational (dis)identification		Manipulating subjective components of rejection
Integration of Findings	Qualitative Content Analysis		Wave-1 2008	Wave-2 2014	2 (Threat) X 2 (Attribution) Factorial Vignettes
Exposure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>From a Higher Position</u> ... <i>What the teacher told me was: ‘you came here as a worker, you won’t think of things like [being] an engineer, an architect.... And they [teachers] were saying this as it is: ‘Your position is definite [in the society]’. You are asked to remain in that position...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>From an Equal Position</u> ... <i>When I sit in the canteen with my Turkish friend and speak Turkish, someone from there, a German, shouts ‘Wir sind in Deutschland!’...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Have you personally been discriminated against in the last two years in Germany because of your origin or religion</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Were your experiences with Police, Court, School, Municipal administration or citizens’ office, Foreigners Office, and employment agency positive or negative?</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not examined
Threat	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Specific</u> ... <i>Whether among the teachers, the police, or certain institutions, I would say towards foreigners ... but beyond them, very intensely seen towards Turks... I feel it [rejection] very intensely...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Generalised</u> ... <i>Difficulties on this issue exist for almost 99% ... This is true for Turks, Arabs, or any other group. German society, [is a society] who does not want to, [or] enforced to include another community or group into its structure...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Do you have the feeling that sufficient care is taken in Germany to ensure that people of foreign origin are not disadvantaged?</i> 	Specific: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justifiable Discrimination • Perceived Discrimination 	Generalised: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Structural Discrimination • Apprehensive Discrimination
Attribution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Out-group</u> ... <i>Every German has a skinhead, hidden inside. There is racism [inside]. No matter how much...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>In-group</u> ... <i>[Turkish postmigrants] necessarily wants to choose. Necessarily wants to do something with themselves; to exclude themselves on purpose... [Turkish postmigrants] themselves often discriminate...</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Out-group: Many Germans have something against foreigners</i> • <i>In-group: Foreigners who want to live in Germany permanently should become naturalised, i.e., become German.</i> 	Out-group Att.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Perceived Discrimination • Structural Discrimination 	In-group Att.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Apprehensive Discrimination • Justifiable Discrimination

10.1. Interpretation

In mixed-method literature, different strategies emerged to integrate findings from diverse methods, instead of a certain conventional integration procedure. Bazeley and Kemp (2018) suggested that the level of integration should be appropriate to the study's goals and purposes. Researchers can simply make meaningful conclusions based on consistency or inconsistency of findings. On the other hand, integration might be carried out by linking, elaborating, modifying and complementing of different results (Bryman, 2007).

As shown in the joint display of findings at the Table 16, we started with an explorative qualitative field study in order to elaborate the rejection concept among Turkish postmigrants. Then, we used the initial findings as a springboard to associate previously contextualised components of rejection with the change of ethnonational identification of the same group with a more comprehensive sample recruited via a cross-sectional survey in Germany. Finally, we modified and re-conceptualised the perceived discrimination concept based on the Threat and Attribution (e.g., not Exposure) in order to examine the causal relationships between rejection and (dis)identification under more controllable settings. Thereby, interpretation of our results is directed by a modification purpose to switch between different methodologies, samples and perspectives. In the following sections, before laying out a whole picture of all results, we will provide a brief interpretation for each research question in order to connect the major findings that are used to inform the development of specific elements in the further steps of the dissertation.

10.1.1. Question-1: How Turkish postmigrants in Germany make sense of rejection from majority?

Although there are a few qualitative studies assessing how the Turkish postmigrants react to social exclusion (Çelik 2015; Ehrkamp, 2005; Holtz et al., 2013; Skrobaneck, 2009), contextualising the rejection from majority is a neglected issue in the literature. Derived from the Stigma-Induced Identity Threat approach (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005), we collected and analysed qualitative data from both in-depth and focus group

interviews and showed that a three-step rejection process is distinguishable for the sample (i.e., Exposure, Threat & Attribution). The Turkish postmigrants are physically or vicariously *exposed* to maltreatment and *appraise* the danger through personal and social resources and finally *attribute* the harmful incidents to particular agents or sources in order to overcome social exclusion's adverse effects (see, *Section 6 in Chapter-1*).

As expected, appraisal of threat characterised by fear, anxiety and concern of occupying an inferior position in the society, and the causal attributions characterised by blaming a specific agent or source for the maltreatment are more common articulations than the personal and objective experiences of rejection (i.e., Exposure). These findings align with Kloek and colleagues (2015) conclusions that fear of rejection is more widespread than the actual encounters regarding social exclusion practices for Turkish postmigrants. It is especially true in the existence of other in-group members since the participants in the focus groups make the most extensive use of the Threat. In line with racism-related stress literature (Harrell 2000; Mellor, 2004; Tanyaş, 2019; Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012), this finding shows that minorities are not only passive receivers of the social exclusion, but they also use intra-group social support to communicate their 'shared destiny' which, in our case, characterised by the fear of occupying an economically, socially, and politically inferior positions in the German society

On the other hand, instead of the source (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2018), the locus of the group threat seems to be more critical in assessing the danger of social exclusion among Turkish postmigrants (e.g., Generalised vs Specific). More specifically, as a form of critical consciousness, interviewees describe a generalised threat beyond and above their in-group (e.g., towards non-Germans). Such a threat perception can be seen as a potential intergroup support and coping mechanism (Harrell 2000) that not only in-group members, but also other minorities are seen as allies in the face of rejection from the majority (Burson & Godfrey, 2020). However, on the contrary, interviewees also perceive a specific threat in which the danger of rejection directed to particularly to Turkish postmigrants and/or Turkey (e.g., towards Turks). Although such a sentiment might be seen as a more intensive form of

intragroup solidarity mechanism (Mellor, 2004), it might also hinder the connections and interactions between the minorities (Burson & Godfrey, 2020) that, in turn, leads to social and political localism/isolationism (Kaya; 2019; Simon et al., 2013).

Finally, apart from widespread out-group attribution to the rejection (e.g., to blame Germans), Turkish postmigrants also blame their in-group for rejection. Although the frequency and the ratio of this sentiment was relatively low, comparison of the interview method allows us to find that the 'Withdrawn' subtheme that was still observable in the presence of other in-group members (i.e., Focus group interviews). Like Mellor's (2004) 'extreme escapism' concept, the *Withdrawn* sentiment corresponds to an unwillingness to interact with the majority culture and with the broader society. However, as an in-group attribution, the Withdrawn is a critique of in-group members for living in a 'parallel society' instead of willing to become a part of the German society. In this way, different from the other unique and personal accounts of blaming the in-group, the Withdrawn can be seen as a common internalised stigma (Crocker & Garcia, 2010)

As a consequence of contextualising the rejection concept, these initial qualitative findings allow us to compare the subjective and objective aspects of the rejection phenomenon in the following studies (Kaiser & Major, 2006). We argue that if Turkish postmigrants make sense of rejection mainly through appraisal of threat and causal attribution, then not only the magnitude of the rejection experience, but also subjective aspects of the rejection might be associated with the change in their dual identification.

10.1.2. Question-2: How new diaspora governance of Turkey influenced feelings of belonging among Turkish postmigrants?

The decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants (Fleischmann et al., 2013; Jugert et al., 2020; Sauer, 2018) is counterintuitive because they have a long and progressive history when it comes to education, political representation, and social integration (Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Kaya & Kentel, 2004; Kaya; 2019). Based on well-grounded social psychological approaches, we assumed that perceived discrimination in the country of

residence might be the primary driving force in respect to the change of their ethnonational identification (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009). However, the transnational social space that they live in is open to the influences of both country of residence and country of origin, for Turkish postmigrants in particular (Adamson, 2019; Amelina & Faist, 2008; André & Dronkers, 2017). A large body of research highlight the extraterritorial outreach policies of Turkey as a way of instrumentalising and mobilising them (Adar, 2019; Arkilic, 2021; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019b). However, the underlying psychological mechanisms for such a transformation are neglected as a topic in the literature.

The Bicultural Identity Integration approach that focuses on the individual orientation of biculturalism highlight the crucial role of identity (in)compatibility corresponding to emotional harmony between identities (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005; Huynh et al., 2009). Besides, identity incompatibility is detrimental for the political participation and isolationism of Turkish postmigrants (Simon et al., 2013). Thereby, we assumed that not the behavioural blendedness of ethnonational identities, but their harmony is in jeopardy under the socio-political tension. Besides, our previous findings on the rejection from the majority make it clear that the subjective aspect of the rejection is more widespread among Turkish postmigrants that might be associated with identity (in)compatibility. Thereby, in the second study, we traced the actual influences of Exposure, Threat and Attribution separately on the ethnonational identification and the political interest of Turkish postmigrants. This time, we use a comprehensive dataset that was conducted by the request of federal government (Müller-Hilmer, et al., 2014). This gave us the chance to test both the premise of the decline of dual identity in a relevant period (e.g., 2008-2014) and its associations with the components of the rejection through another positionality where the researchers were Germans. The distinguishing rejection concept provides a handful sets of insights both theoretically and methodologically.

First of all, we partly confirm the decline of the dual identity assumption and that the actual number of dual identifiers was increasing despite the number of national

identifiers (e.g., predominantly German) remain the same. Like Sauer's (2018) observation, we found that the crucial change in the ethnonational identification is driven by an increase in ethnic identity between 2008 and 2014. The same pattern applies to the political interest of the sample indicating that political interest towards Turkey is rising while political interest toward Germany remains the same. Besides, among demographic variables only the income and duration of migration were associated with ethnonational identification but in opposite directions. While income contributes to national identification and hinders ethnic identification as a way of individual economic mobility (Blanz et al., 1998), the duration of migration of those born in Turkey contributes to ethnic identification and hinders national identification. The findings regarding the duration of migration are contrary to Diehl's (2006) observations on the positive effects of duration on the national identification (i.e., German) of Turkish postmigrants. These findings show that although the actual number of dual identifiers is not affected, contradicting with the acculturation assumption, ethnonational identifications as well as political interests of Turkish postmigrants are changing in favor of Turkey after the 2008 (Sam & Berry, 2006; Kaya & Kentel, 2004; Nesbit-Larking, 2014). Such a transformation can be seen as an outcome of Turkey's effective diaspora governance policies that are evident from the political attitudes and interests (Adar, 2019; Hoffman et al., 2020).

Secondly, we further examined the antecedents of ethnonational identification of the sample using a three-phased rejection approach (Major et al., 2002; Major & O'Brien, 2005) and found that ethnic and national identification of Turkish postmigrants, in fact, have diverse antecedents. In line with the rejection-disidentification approach (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), while national identification is negatively predicted by the objective experience of discrimination, it was positively predicted by in-group attribution. However, contrary to the rejection-identification approach (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a), ethnic identification is not predicted by the experience of discrimination, but is only negatively predicted by in-group attribution. Besides, as expected, the appraisal of threat and casual attribution as subjective aspects of

rejection play crucial roles in the ethnic and national identification. A high threat perception increases ethnic identification when it combines with the in-group attribution and it decreases national identification when it combines with the out-group attribution. These findings support the stigma-induced threat approach (Major & O'Brien, 2005) and our assumption regarding the importance of the subjective aspects of rejection. Especially, the ethnic identification, which is in flux, seems to be more sensitive to subjective components of rejection, namely Threat and Attribution. Thus, significant interaction between Threat and Attribution led us to re-think the possible other forms of rejections that are evident from the combinations of its components, and that we further examine in the following study.

Finally, we tested the most resistant predictors to change in time and found that the in-group attribution (i.e., *Foreigners who want to live in Germany permanently should become naturalised, become Germans*) has a fixed effect on ethnic identification together with the random effect of duration of migration. It is evident from the data that in-group attribution decreases ethnic identification, although its level does not change across the waves. In other words, although the magnitude and the ratio of the in-group attribution do not change across the waves, its negative effect on ethnic identification increased. Besides, the random effect of duration shows that overall ethnic identification increases for all duration categories (e.g., ≤ 10 , 10-25, ≥ 25 years) and differences among them regarding the influence of in-group attribution vanishes in time. In the previous qualitative study, the in-group attribution was characterised by internalised stigma about unwillingness to interact with the majority. In the same vein, the selected item in this cross-sectional data corresponds to an assimilationist sentiment that implicitly blame foreigners if they do not want or show effort to become German (e.g., naturalisation). Our careful consideration of change over time shows that the assimilationist sentiment created a backlash that led to an appeal to Turkish identity. Our careful assessment of the change in time shows that assimilationist sentiment creates a reaction that led an appeal to Turkish identity (Rumbaut, 2008), as reported elsewhere (Hoffmann et al., 2020). Furthermore, under the legal pressure of both states that complicate dual citizenship (McFadden, 2019), such anti-assimilationist sentiment becomes

more and more influential by aligning different clusters among the population such as late and early comers.

Although this study allows us to test the premise of the decline of dual identity, we cannot examine the causality between postulated variables due to its correlational structure. Secondly, this study allows us to associate the revealed components of the rejection with the ethnonational identification of a Turkish postmigrant sample; still, the dataset we rely upon do not allow us to elaborate on the demonstrated components of rejection. For instance, we only had the chance to include a generalised threat (e.g., *Do you have the feeling that sufficient care is taken in Germany to ensure that people of foreign origin are not disadvantaged?*) but not a specific threat perception. Besides, the selected in-group attribution item covers the foreigners but not Turkish postmigrant specifically. Nevertheless, we use these results as a springboard in order to think of the possible combinations of components of rejection, instead of their unique effects on ethnonational identification.

10.1.3. Question-3: Does different forms of rejection has diverse effect on the dual identification of Turkish postmigrants?

The Perceived discrimination is a key concept for the ethnonational identifications of the disadvantaged groups that received empirical support from the laboratory (Jetten et al., 2001), correlational (Schmitt et al., 2003;) as well as field research from various groups, including Turkish postmigrants (Çelik, 2015; Kunuroğlu et al., 2018; Revnik et al., 2018; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Still, the perceived discrimination has been criticised for reducing different the psychological mechanisms into a unidimensional variable (Major et al., 2002). Besides, some researchers suggested to improve the concept due to the inconsistent results on the individual-group discrepancy (Armenta & Hunt, 2009), scope and severity (Major & O'Brien, 2005) and the attributional ambiguity of the received discrimination (Costarelli, 2007; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). Taking a bottom-up approach, we first contextualised and distinguished the rejection concept and then associated its components with the ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants via a secondary dataset. Previous

correlational findings showed that the Threat and Attribution show interaction on the ethnonational identification apart from their direct effects. Thus, at the last study of this dissertation, we aimed to re-conceptualise the rejection concept based on a combination of its subjective components (i.e., Threat and Attribution) and test the effects of the different forms of rejection on dual identification, political participation and resilience to violent extremism via an experimental vignette study.

Based on the seminal work of Major et al. (2002), we generated four types of rejection resultants from two factors (i.e., Threat & Attribution) and two levels (i.e., Specific vs. Generalised & In- vs. Out-group, respectively). We argued that the *perceived* discrimination is only possible when a specific threat meets with an out-group attribution. Nevertheless, people may blame their in-group for a specific threat that we called *justifiable* discrimination. Besides, based on our qualitative findings, we found that Turkish postmigrants perceive a generalised threat towards all foreigners in Germany that we called *structural* discrimination and generally blame the out-group for it. Still, people may also blame their in-group for the generalised threat that we called *apprehensive* discrimination. Such an elaboration provides us with a set of fruitful results, some in line and some contrary to available studies.

First of all, identity (in)compatibility is not affected by forms of rejection. Neither the main nor interaction effects of Threat and Attribution influence the harmony between the ethnonational identities of Turkish postmigrants. Although different from previous studies (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016; Fleischmann et al., 2019; Jugert et al., 2020), we focus on the quality of rejection and measure incompatibility dimension of dual identity; we still failed to associate identity (in)compatibility with rejection. However, we found evidence for such an association via the identity cluster method that measures dual identity through separate identification scales. Accordingly, the number of national-duals (e.g., predominantly German), but not strict-duals (e.g., equally Turkish & Germans), is sensitive to the appraisal of threat. More specifically, a specific threat perception decreases their number while a generalised threat increases the same. The resilience of strict dual identifiers

and identity (in)compatibility to rejection might be because of the conceptualisation of biculturalism. BII approach postulated that biculturalism is a separate category instead of a sum of ethnic and national identifications of minorities (Jugert et al., 2020). Thereby, the explicit measure of the dual identity might correspond to the importance of duality instead of its degree (Felischmann & Verkuyten, 2016). Still, in line with Jugert et al. (2020), we found that implicit measurement of dual identity (e.g., separate identification scales) is sensitive to different types of threat among Turkish postmigrants, apart from the level of threat (Baysu et al., 2011).

Secondly, we also found evidence for the diverse effect of the different forms of threat on the political participation of Turkish postmigrants. Previous research generally assume that group threat conveyed by discrimination is a hindering factor for the political participation of the minorities (Ataman et al., 2017; Lyon, 2008; O'Toole, 2015). We confirmed this hypothesis by showing that the group-specific threat (i.e., *Justifiable & Perceived* discrimination) is detrimental for not only one (De Rooji, 2012) but all kinds of participation (e.g., online, civic & direct). However, group threat constitutes one of the pillars of politicised collective identity (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) that can also accelerate the political engagement for the social recognition (Yalaz, 2015; Wright, 2001). Unlike previous research that focuses on the level of threat (Baysu et al., 2011; Gezici Yalçın, 2007; Simon & Ruhs, 2008), we showed that the form of threat also matters when it comes to high political participation of minorities. For instance, although a generalised threat perception (i.e., *Structural and Apprehensive* discrimination) contains a certain level of group threat, it still significantly increases all forms of participations among Turkish postmigrants. One possible explanation of this result is the inter minority alliance or intergroup support mechanism possibility that is implied by a generalised threat perception which might bridge the minority groups and lead to a legitimate political struggle against the majority (Burson & Godfrey, 2020; Harrell 2000).

Thirdly, we show that the locus of causal attribution is also determinative for the political participation of Turkish postmigrants. We found that seeing in-group as a cause of

rejection (i.e., *Apprehensive & Justifiable* discrimination) increased the political participation while seeing out-group as a cause of rejection (i.e., *Perceived & Structural* discrimination) decreased it. Attribution process is a way of coping with rejection (Major & O'Brien, 2005), because blaming an external source for rejection increases self-esteem and decreases depressive symptoms (Major et al. 2003; Branscombe et al. 1999), especially among disadvantaged group members (Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002b). Based on SIT, one can expect that the devaluation derived from an in-group attribution might result in a more negative social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As a result, Turkish postmigrants might compete and challenge the majority with increased political participation as a way of social creativity to overcome adverse effect of negative social identity (Blanz et al., 1998).

Finally, we found that the interaction of Threat and Attribution is only effective at orientation towards violent extremism. Since we were not focusing on the specific marginalised groups among Turkish communities, we measured the resilience to violent extremism, which is more relevant for vulnerable communities (Grossman et al., 2017). We found that when a generalised threat meets within-group attribution (i.e., *Apprehensive* discrimination), people are less resilient to violent extremism than with an out-group attribution (i.e., *Structural* discrimination). Likewise, when a specific threat meets with an in-group attribution (i.e., *Justifiable* discrimination), people are less resilient to violent extremism than with an out-group attribution (i.e., *Perceived* discrimination). The commonality in these results is the ambiguity of responsibility that the dissonant combination of Threat and Attribution decreases the resilience to violent extremism among Turkish postmigrants. We believe that ambiguity of responsibility, in the case of misfit between Threat and Attribution, lead higher cognitive dissonance, that in turn, result with an acceleration of violent attitudes and beliefs (Cooper, 2019; Maikovic, 2005).

10.2. Conclusion

Before starting this dissertation, my research interest in ethnic minorities' identity formation (Bayad, 2015; Bayad & Cesur, 2018) and ability to speak Turkish fluently is

appeared to be a strength to study the case of Turkish postmigrants in Germany. However, my initial encounter with the local migrant communities made me think about the challenge of 'being an in-group member' due to a lack of the experience of the transnational migration in my personal biography. I spend many weeks and months benefiting from seminal works of the key migration researchers to make myself familiar with the case while I kept interacting with the communities. I was surprised to see that the mainstream migration research is dominated by the motivation of (e)migration instead of the very experience of the migration and its influence on the migrants which were frequently raised by community members during the field research via complaints of being 'forgotten'. At that time, Turkish postmigrants, as one of the largest and oldest migrant populations in Europe (Eurostat, 2020), drew researchers' attention again due to their 'failed integration' (Diehl & Schnell, 2006; Rahimi & Graumans, 2015). In other words, migrants and their descendants either were the problem due to migrating to Europe or they were dared to be examined when they created a problem. Thereby, I decided to voice those who pass through the migration struggle to show how the problem is 'in between' as migrants but not solely external.

Such a perspective resulted in an emic approach that necessitates a critical stand against the acculturation theories due to their universalist assumption that psychological processes operating during acculturation are essentially the same for all groups (Berry & Sam, 1997). This assumption disregards the situated and contextualised migrant identities based on a self-concept assumed to be a natural property prior to the culture (Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Viruell-Fuentes et al., 2012). However, newly emerged biculturalism research shows that the self-concept of those who possess more than one identity is in the constant interplay between the different cultural cues (Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). Besides, the bicultural individuals constitute a new social category instead of being a sum of their ethnonational cultural heritage (Benet-Martínez & Harritos, 2005) where emotional harmony of those cultures (e.g., (in)compatibility) is crucial for the psychological adjustment (see, Huynh et al., 2011). This feature of biculturalism makes it sensitive to its socio-political environment

(Chrysochoou & Lyons, 2011) and fragile due to its performative dimension where the real or imagined audience become determinative for their identity (Wiley & Deaux, 2011).

Following the same rationale, in this dissertation, we showed that the decline of dual identity among Turkish postmigrants (Baysu et al., 2011; Fleischmann et al., 2013; Sauer, 2018; Simon et al., 2013) lay in the heart of the recent socio-political dispute that from the citizenship rights, up to daily political attitudes and they are torn between the diaspora governance of Turkey and integration policies of Germany (Adar, 2019; Amelina & Faist, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019a; McFadden, 2019). A careful assessment of the cross-sectional surveys and conducted vignette experiment clarifies that the number and the ratio of dual identifiers among Turkish postmigrants is not under threat. Instead, we present the first comprehensive evidence of a unilateral transition of ethno-national identity to Turkey and Turkish identity that has historically coincided with the transformation in Turkey's diaspora governance (Adamson, 2019; Adar, 2019; Baser & Ozturk, 2019; Okyay, 2015). In other words, from the last decade onward, we observe the consolidation of Turkish identity among Turkish postmigrants instead of a decline of dual identity.

According to Klein, Spear and Reicher (2007), people tend to consolidate their identity when either they have an insecure status in their in-group or their group has an insecure status in the intergroup system. Both of these conditions are simultaneously in play for the Turkish postmigrants in Germany. On the one hand, the populist authoritarianism in Turkey conveyed by a Neo-Ottoman legacy discursively constructs Turkish identity in opposition to the 'West' and asks loyalty to the cultural heritage in order to become a member of 'we' (Erçetin, 2021; Erçetin & Erdoğan, 2018). As a result, Turkish postmigrants who literally live in western European countries are at the edge of 'Turkishness' due to their uncertain position to lose the cultural ties and networks (Arkilic, 2021; Adamson, 2019). On the other hand, rising Islamophobia conveyed by populist movements across Europe (Kaya, 2019; Inglehart & Norris, 2016), 'Islamize' the Turkish postmigrants and misrecognise their history and contribution to the European societies (Hiscott, 2005; Ramm, 2010), that in

turn, give rise to localisation and essentialisation sentiments among Turkish postmigrants in order to cope with the new waves of social exclusion (Kaya, 2001).

Furthermore, although we failed to provide evidence for a change in identity incompatibility via explicit measures following previous researchers (Fleischmann & Verkuyten, 2016; Jugert et al., 2020), the current trend of ethnic identity consolidation has the potential to jeopardise Turkish postmigrants' social integration and cohesion in their resident societies. According to some social psychologists, identity incompatibility is not a psychological mechanism, but a belief stemming from a misfit between interest and ideologies representing those identities that are supposed to be blended (Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2011; Klein et al. 2007; Wiley & Deaux, 2011). Thereby, consolidation of Turkish identity that distance Turkish postmigrants from national identification may also be costly regarding psychological benefits of national identification for migrants in Germany (see, Frankenberg et al., 2013). Besides, such a one-sided change in the ethnonational identity might hinder political participation in residence society (Simon et al., 2013) and risk Turkish postmigrants' naturalisation process as it is declining more than ever (Destatis, 2020; McFadden, 2019; Yildirim-Sungur & Schwarz, 2021). Our findings regarding the persistent and negative influence of in-group attribution, that correspond to a willingness to interact with and be a part of the majority (e.g., become German) on the ethnic identification might provide some insight on drawback in the naturalisation of Turkish postmigrants in Germany (Kaya, 2019; McFadden, 2019). Researchers already showed that the fear of assimilation is very strong among Turkish postmigrants, especially after the 'integrate but not assimilate' maxim of president Erdoğan (Hoffmann et al., 2020). Apparently, such a sentiment fuel anti-assimilationist tendency that undermine the responsibility for naturalisation and equalise the naturalisation with the assimilation. Thus, those willing to naturalise increasingly distance themselves from ethnic identity since ideological misfit between German and Turkish identity is also increasing which is evident from legal constrains of dual citizenship rights of both states (Chryssochoou & Lyons, 2011; Kaya, 2019; McFadden, 2019).

Finally, our emic approach provides some insights on what possibly leads people to consolidate their ethnic identity. Above mentioned universalist assumptions also reduce the rejection experience into a unidimensional perceived discrimination concept as if independent from their cultural background, all the of the minorities and migrants as passive receivers of social exclusion and they pass through the same rejection process (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jasinskaja-Lahti et al., 2009; Major et al., 2002). However, both qualitative and quantitative research across the globe shows that migrants and minorities have diverse experiences as well as an understanding of the the rejection phenomenon (André & Dronkers, 2017; Harrell, 2000; Lewis et al., 2013; Mellor, 2004; Tanyaş, 2019; Viruell-Fuentes et al.2012). Following racism-related stress literature on contextualising the rejection phenomenon and employing stigma-induced identity threat approach (Major & O'Brien, 2005), we showed that the Turkish postmigrants mainly make sense of rejection through its subjective aspects such as the appraisal of threat and causal attribution. Besides, interestingly, the objective experience of discrimination is dominated by incidents in the school settings whereby most migrants officially step into in the resident culture (FADA, 2018). The discrimination-free schools are crucial for the academic achievements of minorities and their psychological adjustments (Baysu et al., 2011; 2016; Baysu, Valk & Alanya, 2018) that possibly influence their life satisfaction and success in the further steps of their psychological development. Likewise, in this dissertation, we found corrosive effect of the objective discrimination on the national identification which is closely related to the psychological adjustment of the migrants in Germany (Frankenberg et al., 2013).

On the other hand, the subjective aspects of the rejection are more effective for ethnic identification. Apart from the magnitude of rejection, we provide evidenced for the types of rejections to be associated with the ethnonational identification, in line with rejection- (dis)identification models (Branscombe et al., 1999a; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a. Accordingly, a threat perception targeting specifically the in-group is more detrimental for the national identification and fuelling the ethnic identification. However, contrary to these models, a generalised threat perception towards all minorities, including

the in-group, hinder the ethnic identification and promote national identification. Available approaches on the intergroup threat mainly focus on its source (Greenaway & Cruwys, 2019) or medium (Stephen & Renfro, 2002) that consider minorities as passive receivers (Tanyaş, 2019). However, our contextualised approach provides evidence for minorities' ability to re-frame the threat to cope with its adverse effects via intra- and inter-group social support (Harrell 2000). An appraisal of the generalised threat among Turkish postmigrants is a sign of inter-group alliance that increases the national identification in Germany (Burson & Godfrey, 2020). Following this argument, we showed that a generalised threat perception that is perceived as a shared destiny of minorities, also increases their engagement in the legitimate political participation in Germany (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Gezici Yalçın, 2007). Furthermore, the locus of attribution is also effective when it comes to political participation. When Turkish postmigrants feel their group is responsible for the rejection they are exposed to, they politically engage more in order to solve the emotional load of a negative social identity (Blanz et al., 1998).

These findings stemming from the elaboration of components of the rejection also allow us to generate new types of discrimination for Turkish postmigrants' case. Based on the level of the appraisal of threat and the causal attribution to rejection, we formulated four different types of discriminations (i.e., Justifiable, Perceived, Structural and Apprehensive) that most obviously are effective on the resilience to violent extremism. Apart from the abovementioned main effects of the components of rejection, we found that a dissonant combination of the appraisal of threat and the causal attribution are promoting resilience, while a consonant combination of them undermine the same. Framing the threat and attribution is already shown to be detrimental for political attitudes of the majority population (Becker et al., 2011; Bos et al., 2019), but to our knowledge, such elaboration of the rejection concept is the first attempt to shed light on the political engagement of minorities.

10.2.1. Recommendations

The main premise of this dissertation is to explore and understand the actual influence of Turkey's outreach policies on Turkish postmigrants' everyday life as well as to shed light on the underlying social-psychological mechanisms of transformation among their ethnonational (dis)identification. Thanks to this dissertation's mixed methodological design which allows us to elaborate on both (dis)identification and rejection perception of one of the largest minorities in Europe and our findings have a two-fold transferability regarding recommendations.

First, our perspective can be fruitful for policymakers in Europe to promote political participation and social integration of other Turkish minorities as well as educational scientists in Germany to generate new research questions and areas. Apart from structural problems of the German education system based on inappropriate school track placements (Faist, 1995), recently many researchers documented implicit and explicit prejudice of teachers, especially towards children coming from an economically disadvantaged or a migration background (Hacfeld et al., 2011; Glock & Karbach, 2015). On the other hand, notwithstanding counted on qualitative case studies, many field research on Turkish communities also showed that the objective experience of rejection is still one of the main problems for Turkish postmigrants and the incidents predominantly accumulated in the school settings (Çelik, 2015; Ehrkamp, 2005; Holtz Dahinden & Wagner 2013; Skrobanek, 2009). Besides, such settings embedded in a power asymmetry between the victim and the perpetrator of discrimination are more detrimental for psychological outcomes (Baysu et al., 2011; 2016; Baysu et al., 2018) as shown in this dissertation. Thereby, from an educational science perspective, alongside schools and teachers' educative and social mobility role, their impact on the representation of social order, state and society is neglected (Hummerich & Kramer, 2017). Thus, further research on the part of teachers and schools on the representation of German society would shed light on understanding not only their sociological but also social-psychological impact on vulnerable communities.

Furthermore, the subjective dimension of the rejection is more crucial for Turkish minorities' political engagement and (dis)identification. Although overcoming the social exclusion in the broader society is a multi-front struggle, our findings show that a transparent communication of the rejection and recognition of structural discrimination against minorities have the possibility to promote inter minority alliance and increase political engagement as well as national identification of minorities (Burson & Godfrey, 2020; De Rooij, 2012; Harrell, 2000; Herzog-Punzenberge et al. 2012). Otherwise, an appraisal of threat specific to in-group might emerge and spread among minority communities that are more sensitive to the extraterritorial influences hindering national identification as well as promoting cultural and political isolationism (Glasius, 2018; Hatay & Tziarras, 2019a). Thereby, beyond available discrimination monitoring investments, policymakers should focus on generating accessible mechanisms towards monitoring discrimination in public services, especially in schools where teachers are seen as the authority figures for the children that possibly obstruct the reporting of discriminatory incidents. Such a perspective and intervention can provide a more accessible political education and help to re-frame a subjective understanding of rejection -as a bridge to higher political engagement- and decrease the gap between majority and minority children on feelings of belonging to the school as well as the society.

Secondly, our elaboration of the rejection components based on the methodological critic of previous research result in a more nuanced and advanced method revealed a new set of of discrimination (i.e., Justifiable, Perceived, Structural and Apprehensive) perceptions. Such an approach can be academically fruitful for the researchers who are interested in social exclusion of the minorities since , the proposed types of discrimination might be applicable in other countries and settings regarding the fact that lots of the minorities live together with other minorities within a majority population. Such a perspective can contribute to the newly emerged intraminority alliance & solidarity literature, especially in the field of collective action and political participation (Burson & Godfrey, 2020; Kutlaca et al., 2020) as well as intragroup differences in the face of social exclusion practices.

Furthermore, although we restricted ourselves with (dis)identification and political participation variables in this research, the way in which minorities perceive the rejection from the majority might be associated with psychological well-being and academic achievement as it is the case with the unidimensional perceived discrimination (Harrell et al., 2003; Schmid & Muldoon, 2015). Further research on possible association between proposed types of discrimination and psychological outcomes can provide external validity of the proposed concept. Finally, extraterritorial authoritarianism practices as a newly emerged research field is not restricted to the Turkish postmigrants (Adamson, 2020; Glasius, 2018); our elaborated rejection-(dis)identification approach can be implemented with other migrant groups in future in order to understand how populations abroad are mobilised by the home state countries.

10.2.2. Limitation

Throughout this dissertation, several issues emerged as possible limitations that should be overcome or, at least, regarded in the following research.

- Although we conducted a qualitative research in a relatively diverse population of Turkish postmigrants, our sample is far from being comprehensive enough regarding the diversity of religion, generation, political affiliation and location of the Turkish postmigrant across Germany (Salentin, 2014). In a more comprehensive coverage or with a more specified samples, the concept of rejection as well as coping mechanisms with the rejection can be even further elaborated into the intersection of gender or generation. Such a perspective can be more prosperous for providing a more nuanced picture of the coping mechanisms of the Turkish postmigrants; here, we focused on the concept of rejection.
- The cross-sectional dataset that we are relayed upon is chosen because of its item structure that allows us to measure the components of rejection separately (Müller-Hilmer et al., 2014). However, there are other panel datasets in Germany that might provide a better understanding of the changes in ethnonational identification of

Turkish postmigrants with a longer period of observation. Further research might be fruitful to test and examine the revealed components of rejection on the ethnonational identification of Turkish postmigrants with a longitudinal design.

- In the experimental study of the thesis, we restricted the manipulations to the subjective components of exclusion, threat assessment and causal attribution, as it would not be possible to directly expose participants to ethnic discrimination for ethical reasons. In future researches, fabricated group memberships might be used in order to test the total combination of components of rejection and to elaborate the discrimination variable further.

10.3. Epilogue

The case of Turkish postmigrants, as investigated from the perspective of this dissertation, is expected to illuminate the social psychological understanding of rejection-(dis)identification relation together with the idea of a cohesive society in Europe. As the so-called Guest workers were not only a ‘work force’, but human beings with the pursuit of dignity, together with their descendants, Turkish postmigrants are not a passive receiver of rejection but an immense transnational community equipped with intra- and intergroup sources to fight against constraints of post-industrial society (Kaya, 2019).

This three-year research based on a contextualised emic approach revealed that the universalist assumptions on identity and rejection concepts disregard the perspective of those to-be-included into society (Bhatia & Ram, 2001; Tanyaş, 2019). Despite the fact that social exclusion is a common phenomenon for most minority groups, their subjective assessment of social exclusion has the power and capacity to transform unidimensional ‘perceived discrimination’. Based on the case study presented in this dissertation, we postulate at least four different types of discrimination (i.e., Justifiable, Perceived, Structural, and Apprehensive). A reconceptualization like the one proposed here may be practical for further research in order to understand diversity of reactions against

discrimination among minorities regarding coping, psychological adjustment, and inter minority alliance (Burson & Godfrey, 2020; Kutlaca et al., 2020).

Last but not the least, social-psychological investigation presented here showed that the reflection of the rejection into minority communities matters a lot for their psychological adjustment and ethnonational (dis)identification. Regardless of the magnitude and the form of rejection they are exposed, that aspect is required to be handled via intervention policies targeting the majority population as well as an entirely different perspective to handle. We have tried to demonstrate that reframing the rejection concept can help to promote political participation and national identification of Turkish postmigrants in Germany and it calls for a more transparent communication strategy regarding the structural discrimination observed in the society at large. Otherwise, leaving minorities alone in their struggle for recognition and overcome discrimination might fuel a specific threat perception via intra-group social support mechanisms that might be taken over by extraterritorial influences, as in the case of Turkish postmigrants (Adamson, 2020; Arkilic, 2021; Glasius, 2018).

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