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Structures and Events
A Dialogue between History and Sociology

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Contents

On the issue's cover photo:

Manuel Salvisberg: *Fragments of History*

The cover of the InterDisciplines is based on the middle element of the triptych »Fragments of History« by Manuel Salvisberg depicting the Swiss Arts Collector Ulli Sigg dropping Ai Weiwei's Coca-Cola urn. Performed in 2012, this act emulates a similar artwork by Ai Weiwei in 1995 (to whom Salvisberg and Sigg gave number 1/8 of the original triptych).

Editorial

Andre Meyer, Ramy Youssef, Lili Zhu

The relation between structures and events is of essential importance in both history and sociology. As fundamental concepts in both disciplines, they have influenced the scientific discourse between structuralist and interactionist theories as well as between structural and event history. While approaches of course differ in emphasizing different aspects of the relation of structures and events, focusing on social practices, cultures of commemoration or historical memories, as well as path dependencies and critical junctures, their communality seems to lie in the fact that structures and events can only be properly theorized and understood if the reciprocal nature of their relationship is taken into account. This issue of InterDisciplines thus deals with the topic of the complex and diverse entanglements between structures and events, ranging from the micro-level, where »local« events like the deliberate or accidental violation of behavioral norms can contribute to the perpetuation or disruption of normative structures, to the macro-level, where »global« events can disrupt or (re-)shape large-scale social, cultural, economic and political structures. In light of the topic's importance in both history and sociology disciplines, the selection of authors therefore includes contributions from both disciplines.

The articles in this issue are based on selected papers from the 7th Annual Seminar of the BGHS, which took place from June 29 to July 1, 2015 at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) at Bielefeld University. The Annual Seminar has provided a platform since 2009 for junior and senior researchers from different countries and disciplinary backgrounds to discuss their research. Each year, the topic of the conference is selected by the PhD students from the Bielefeld Graduate School in History and Sociology and the conference is organized by a team of PhD students. The 2015 conference, upon which this special

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issue is based, brought together a broad spectrum of work on the relationships between structures and events, with topics ranging from the abortion controversy in Poland to the development of capitalism in Nigeria. In five panels, 24 young researchers from 13 different countries presented and discussed their research. Keynote speeches were given by William Sewell from Chicago on »The temporalities of social life: Thoughts for the anthropocene«, and by Tobias Werron from Bonn on «Simultaneity as a historical-sociological problem«. In addition, Mathias Kepplinger (Mainz) gave a public lecture on »Events as topic of public communication«, which presented interesting insights on the role of the mass media on the construction and effects of events.

The six contributions in this issue of InterDisciplines represent but a few of the many fascinating insights provided during the 7th Annual Seminar. They cast light on the relationship between structures and events from various disciplinary and theoretical points of view and raise new questions, which may in turn become the subject of further research.

Ramy Youssef provides a comprehensive introduction to some common issues in theorizing on structures and events from a primarily sociological point of view. The predominance of the distinction between structure and agency in common sociological approaches, as he points out, has led to various conceptual obstacles for the understanding of events. Instead of assuming events to be objects or facilitators of actions, agency and structures themselves have to be understood as eventfully constituted. Events, however, are constituted by communication. Synthesizing various sociological and historical conceptualizations of events, the author suggests focusing on the communicative constitution of events for a thorough understanding of the interplay between structures, agency and events.

The interplay between structures and events depends not only on *when* events happen, but on *where* they happen. This becomes clear in **Ferdinand Nyberg**'s contribution, which provides intriguing considerations on the role of *space* as a mediator between structures and events. Analyzing the example of a drug raid in the United States in the late 1980's, it shows how a spatially situated event shapes, reproduces and mobilizes common sense in the discourse on drugs as a problem locatable

in social space. The perceived proximity or distance of an event like a drug raid plays a crucial role in the perception of a social problem as either »inside« or »outside« one's own lifeworld. The »place« of events may thereby not only convey a sense of the immediacy of a social issue but may also influence the assessment of possible policy options.

A problem on a global scale became apparent during the financial crisis in 2008, certainly one of the most salient events of the past ten years. It raised the question of how global structures of capitalism are embedded in their own particular temporalities and how politics deals with these structures. The authors Fernand Braudel and Michel Foucault may provide some answers to this question, as **Ceyhun Gürkan** convincingly argues. Comparing the two authors, his contribution highlights similarities as well as differences in conceptualizing the interplay of structures and events in the works of Braudel and Foucault. Although Braudel focuses on capitalism and Foucault on the history and practices of (neo-)liberal governmentality, the two approaches share some common traits in assessing structures and events, thus enabling a conceptual integration.

Analyzing the interwoven relation of structures and events in a historical case, **Mátyás Erdélyi** aims in his article to develop an understanding of the rhythm, sequence, and pace of educational change of the social transformation of the secondary education in Hungary in the period between 1867 and 1938. The article provides a perspective on the change in the educational system as the result of the interplay between the global structure of Hungarian secondary education, on the one hand, and »crucial« events (e.g., wars, policy changes, etc.) and »local« events, on the other. Focusing on the emergence and systematization of different types of secondary schools and their corresponding social functions, Erdelyi thus highlights the importance of singular events for the emergence of broader societal structures and concludes by arguing for the inclusion of the micro-, meso- and macro-levels in historical analyses.

The interplay between event and structure can also be observed in the narratives of cities' self-representations. Using case studies from recent media discourses, **Elena Dingersen**'s work sheds light on the modes of narrative reproduction of the self-images of Dresden and St. Petersburg.

In doing so, Dingersen brings in the question of temporal order in the narratives of both cities, as well as the correlation of the event/structure constellation with the regularities of the cities' development. The article provides a summary of forms of event/structure interplay that can be applied to the narrative constructions of Dresden and St. Petersburg. It further suggests that this research perspective can be extended to the analysis of other social structures of belonging and identification both in and beyond cities.

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On the social constitution of structures, actions and events

Ramy Youssef

Introduction

It seems difficult to imagine how empirical research in history and sociology could be properly conducted without any reference to events. As Paul Ricoeur (2012) has demonstrated, even the most radical attempts at writing »structural history« need to construct some kind of turning point or *quasi-event* for the sake of a plausible narrative. The same could be said of empirical sociological research, e.g. in the field of life course research (Abbott 2010, Chapter 8). However, theorizing events is somewhat difficult: »With events […] there is the genuine epistemological problem of generalizing the singular« (Wagner-Pacifici 2017, 21).

Particularly theoretical approaches focusing on the relationship between social structures and agency tend to put events in second place. This article therefore aims to address some obstacles to understanding events that are inherent in these approaches. Its critique is twofold: First, the relationship between structures and events is not to be understood as one of mutual causal conditioning and constraining, as it is usually the case with the relation between structure and agency. Instead, it has to be considered as one of meaningful reproduction and mutual constitution. Second, social actions cannot be properly understood in causal terms but rather, in Andrew Abbott's terms, as conceptual events summarizing several occurrences in a causal narrative. Therefore, this paper suggests shifting the focus from explaining causalities of action to the analysis of the communicative constitution of action as a socially meaningful event. It begins by identifying some basic notions of structures and events and suggests defining structures as expectations and events as novelties in the broadest sense.

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Subsequently, the relation between structures and events will be described as eventful reproduction of social structures. After elaborating on the relation between actions and events, the conclusion will be drawn that actions have to be considered semantic events rather than being described in causal terms.

Coming to terms with structures and events

The distinction between structure and agency lies at the heart of many sociological theories, although not all of them might describe themselves in this way. However, the point here is not to make the case for either side of this distinction, nor to suggest another way of mediating between structures and agency. Instead, a closer look at the distinction structure /agency itself will be offered to highlight some of the blind spots in it which will become apparent when events are taken into consideration. Of course, there are many sociological theories on the market, each of which has its own particular understanding of structure, agency and events. To remain compatible with as many approaches as possible, the following considerations and notions will thus have to be rather rough and abstract. They seek to highlight some generalizable problems of a common distinction and try to suggest a solution for them. For this purpose, common traits in defining structures, actions and events will be identified and synthesized.

It would go beyond the scope of this article to show how particular theories define social structures. But, following an overview offered by Douglas V. Porpora (1989, 195), at least four typical ways of understanding social structures can be distinguished:

1. Patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time
2. Lawlike regularities that govern the behavior of social facts
3. Systems of human relationships among social positions
4. Collective rules and resources that structure behavior«

Since all these possible ways to think of structures aim at specific problems in sociological research, it does not seem very promising to be able to find an inclusive notion of structure. Thus, rather than looking for an

encompassing concept, finding a lowest common denominator could be a practicable way to relate and compare various approaches. In this sense, the following considerations start from the premise that structures can be understood as social expectations. This understanding of structures is deeply rooted in classical sociological and anthropological functionalism (Martin 2009, 5–7). However, there is some evidence that it can serve as the lowest common denominator in the aforementioned sense: Expectations may become manifest as behavioral patterns or lawlike regularities, respectively, which become observable when actions and communications are repeatedly oriented toward unchanged expectations. They may be features of relationships, particularly when they are based on trust (Nickel 2009), reciprocity (Gouldner 1960) or expected social rewards (Blau 1964, 143–45). Collective rules may as well be considered a very specific form of normative expectation. In any case, so long as social life is considered meaningfully constituted, theorizing about structures will seem difficult without considering the role of expectations.

It was Max Weber who pointed out that actions do not become socially meaningful unless they are oriented toward the expected behavior of others (Weber 1979, 22). Without expectations it would be difficult to recognize a particular behavior as social action. Therefore, expectations are constitutive for social events like actions and communication, whereas social situations tend to become anomic without institutionalized expectations. Harold Garfinkel (1967) elaborated on what he called *background expectancies* and demonstrated impressively with breaching experiments how interactions plunge into crisis when certain expectations of social conduct are disappointed by unforeseen events. But the theoretical significance of expectations is not limited to the works of Weber and Garfinkel. On the contrary, attempts at developing a relational theory of agency also highlight the importance of expectations (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, 980–81), and its bridging capacity also becomes particularly noticeable in the field of science and technology studies (Borup et al. 2006; Brown and Michael 2003). Apart from that, it invites a dialogue among various approaches usually deemed incompatible such as

microsociology à la Garfinkel and game theory (Vollmer 2013b), making expectations, all in all, a valuable concept for further theorizing.

Broadly speaking, actions are usually defined as attempts at causing social effects attributable to individual or collective actors, whereas the notion of agency refers to the capacity to shape social structures by means of actions. Consequently, actions may have social effects but not all actions may have *structural* effects, that is, the capacity to change social expectations. Therefore, theories dealing with the relation between structure and action /agency show clear differences in assessing the probability of structural change caused by individual and collective actions. But it is not the aim of this article to take sides in this controversy. Instead, it tries to show that the whole idea of actions as *causes* of *any kind of social effect* is in general problematic. What is at stake here is not whether actors may cause structural change by means of action, but the assumption that action can be discussed in causal terms in the first place. The problems of this assumption will become apparent when events are taken into consideration.

The lowest common denominator for sociological and historical notions of events can be found with comparative ease. Events are usually defined by their »news value,« meaning that events represent novelty and variation against a background of redundant, ordinary routines that is taken for granted. However, opinions differ on the question of what degree of novelty is required in order to speak of events. At one end of the spectrum, events are defined as ruptures and significant transformations of social structures (Badiou 2003; Sahlins 1987; Sewell 1996; Wagner-Pacifici 2017). At the other, the threshold for events is quite low for authors like Michel Foucault (2013, 137) who considers mere communications and utterances events—although he occasionally referred to revolutions and uprisings as a particular kind of event.

While the notions of structures, actions and events were presented here as common denominators, at least two problems reside in the details and are solved in different ways by diverse approaches. One problem lies in the relationship between structures and events, the other concerns the

relation between actions and events. Both issues will be discussed in the following sections.

Structures and events: Transformation and/or reproduction?

A common way of pinning down the relationship between structures and events is, as previously mentioned, by defining events as moments of structural transformation. According to this approach, events would occur as revolutions, crises or innovations. From a research-pragmatic point of view, one need not search long for this solution. Structural differences can be found by comparing measurement results from two close points in time, and the critical event of interest can be assumed in the timespan between. Or the event is considered so dramatic (in terms of Turner 2006, 33–35) that it can serve as a starting point for identifying structural changes. In this sense, by means of »simple counterfactualism« (Martin 2011, 37–39) one could say that Europe would have developed entirely differently without the French Revolution or the invention of moveable-type printing.

On the other hand, not all salient and remarkable events of crisis or deviation necessarily have transformational effects on structures; some offer opportunities to make them visible in the first place (Durkheim 2013, 63). If nothing else, this is what Harold Garfinkel's breaching experiments have shown. Critical events of this sort do not represent the aforementioned understanding of transformative events in structure/agency approaches, although they contribute to the persistence of structures. Presumably, this is because the explanation of structural transformation is a constitutive problem for structure/agency theories (New 1994; Sewell 1992). In their framework, events stand for a short-term accumulation of actions causing structural change. Actions are then of particular explanatory value for structural change when they can be allocated as elements of disruptive, transformative events. In contrast, »ordinary« actions are considered mere elements of an eventless and inconspicuous social background noise. They may also have the potential to induce structural transformations, but of course less disruptively and more in processes of long-term change. Events thereby add some spice and variety to the

otherwise boring relationship between structure and agency. The problems of relating actions and events this way will be discussed later in detail. The question here is whether it is necessary to keep events so rare and define them quite so narrowly. Will this approach pave the way for an *eventful* history and sociology or could it be worthwhile considering alternatives at hand?

After a critical reading of contributions from William Sewell and Marshall D. Sahlins, Adam Moore (2011) suggested conceiving of events as elements of structural *reproduction* (see also Gilmore and O'Donoughue 2015; Ohnuki-Tierney 1995). This proposal enables us to continue the research program suggested by Sewell and Sahlins, but goes a step further and allows the inclusion of »uncritical« events as well. Apart from this, »making change our constant« (Abbott 2010, 255) by understanding events as reproductive elements is highly compatible with process-oriented approaches (Bennett and Checkel 2015; Onaka 2013). However, Moore leaves open the question of which events reproduce which structures.

In contrast to traditional structuralist positions, William Sewell has convincingly argued for assuming a plurality of structures rather than one singular social structure (Sewell 1996, 205–7). After all, not all events may transform a singular social structure of a given society. Instead, it should be assumed that particular events are relevant only for particular differentiated social structures according to their own selection criteria (see for example Galtung and Ruge 1965). This insight is of course a key assumption of theories of social differentiation. But starting from this premise, the question of to what extent which events are significant for the reproduction of which structures is left unanswered. If it is true that events reproduce structures, the latter have to replace past events continuously with new, subsequent events. This applies to conversations which desire new events, no matter how serious or trivial these events may seem. »So conversation can burn everything«, as Erving Goffman (1981, 38) would say. The same applies to protest movements mobilizing their adherents by organizing new events (Della Porta 2008) or to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), for which the end of the

Olympic summer games usually means the beginning of the preparation for the next summer games (Theodoraki 2007).

Two implications arise from these considerations. First, subsequent events do not vary arbitrarily but are connected by expectations. Depending on the social context, there are more or less clear expectations about what may be counted as an appropriate topic for conversation (Schank 1977). Analogously, the IOC does not usually spontaneously organize protests, nor are protest movements known for organizing Olympic summer games. Of course, structures do change: activist cells of a protest movement can, for example, transform into terrorist organizations (Youssef 2016). But whether particular events can be made analytically accountable for structural transformations is a different question.

A second implication of the considerations above is that if events reproduce structures, they can hardly be as rare as typically »big« singular events like summer games and protests. Furthermore, whenever Olympic summer games or revolutions are referred to as »events,« it is obvious that things are being estimated and generalized rather than analyzed. Andrew Abbott (1984) coined the term »colligation« for this phenomenon: events are conceptual abstractions of colligated occurrences and can be decomposed into measurable sequences of »smaller« such occurrences. The French Revolution, for example, consists of events like the storming of the Bastille or the decapitation of Louis XVI. Each of these events can again be decomposed into smaller units of analysis. Therefore, »the ›event‹ is defined in terms of the analyst's interest« (Martin 2011, 42). This already raises some doubts concerning the explanatory value of using common notions of events (and actions) as analytical units—more about this in a bit. But the point here is that if we think the dissolvability of events through to the end, events appear to be extremely volatile. Consequently, Alain Badiou suggested that »the being of an event is to disappear; the being of an event is disappearing. The event is nothing—just a sort of illumination« (Badiou 2003, 140). If Badiou is taken literally here, events have no temporal expansion, no permanence, and no duration. Instead, they can be characterized by their simultaneous appearance and disappearance. Any other notion would raise the question how an event

should be defined in terms of its beginning and its end, although beginning and end can also be considered particular events.

Events in the phenomenological sense proposed here are not substances or movable things, as Robin Wagner-Pacifici (Wagner-Pacifici 2017, 10–12) seems to suggest. They also do not carry any information in themselves but rather acquire their meaning by their relation to previous and subsequent events (Simmel 1916, 19). In other terms, the way events get their meaning is by being structurally related to other past or expected events. Socially meaningful events, thus, are not »existing« substances put together but emerge in a network of structurally related events, whereas conversely structures or expectations, as it were, are in turn being reproduced (or else transformed) by these events.

Not all occurrences out there are relevant for all structures. A particular occurrence, let's take an apple falling from a tree, may have no social significance at all. But this occurrence may be a topic of conversation conducted by bystanders or it may be observed as an inspiration for a scientific revolution. We thus have to deal with either structures of face-to-face interaction, which exploit a particular event for their reproduction, or with structures of science, for which this event becomes part of a narrative of a scientific paradigm shift. »[E]very event lies in many narratives at once. Every event has multiple narrative antecedents as well as multiple narrative consequences« (Abbott 2010, 192). Narratives, in this respect, are self-descriptions of structured processes referring to the same event but locating it in different chains of events.

Another point here is that the same event represents a difference, a novelty, however futile it may be, for distinct structures with their own distinct relevance criteria. From the point of view of these structures the event is therefore, according to Gregory Bateson (1972, 315), a difference that makes a difference. This may be the most general notion of an event one can possibly conceive of. But it is compatible with the notion of extremely volatile events as proposed here and it is especially suitable for quite heterogeneous research programs. For example, Bruno Latour describes actants as events in this particular sense, namely differences

that make a difference for other entities: »an actor that makes no difference is not an actor at all. An actor, if words have any meaning, is exactly what is not substitutable. It's a unique event, totally irreducible to any other« (Latour 2005, 153). Bateson's definition can be found in Luhmann's systems theory, in Anthony Gidden's theory of structuration (Giddens 1985, 14) and it is without more ado compatible with, for example, Foucault's notion of events (Flynn 2004, 214).

By broadening the concept of event and focusing on problems of structural reproduction, as proposed here, we get a higher density of observation and may provide answers to the overall question of the social constitution of structures and events. In temporal terms nothing can undercut the event, as it is defined by the simultaneity of its appearance and disappearance. The concept of event presented here now serves as the smallest possible unit of analysis and therefore replaces actions as analytical units. Instead, actions themselves have to be understood as eventfully constituted, as the following section argues.

Events as actions or eventful actions?

Given that the distinction structure/agency is a key element of many sociological theories, it aims to produce generalizable explanations by referring to relations of one-sided or mutual conditioning and reproduction between actions and structures (Hays 1994). But how do events fit in this framework? Structure/agency approaches consider events either singular actions or sequences of actions (Butts 2008; Griffin 1992; Sewell 1996). Often, events are also described instead as objects, as it were, to be controlled, created or influenced by agency (Coleman 1990, 133; Giddens 1985, 14; Goffman 1974, 22–23; Weick 1979, 148).

Understanding events as actions or sequences of actions raises the question of how, for example, natural disasters can be taken into account in sociological and historical research. The 1755 Lisbon earthquake would then not be an event because it does not represent an action in the common sense of the word (putting actor-network theory aside for a moment). This example also shows the conceptual shortcomings of considering

events as targets of interfering actions. The social relevance of this occurrence does not originate from the actions of the rather helpless Lisboans. One may ask, of course, how cooperation becomes possible under the conditions of such disasters (Vollmer 2013a). But this is a sociological issue which was not at stake for contemporaries like Voltaire, who was much more concerned with the intellectual consequences of the earthquake (Braun and Radner 2005). The social consequences of the Lisbon earthquake are usually being ascribed to an event which changed the experience of the world and contributed to the reframing of a particular world view.[1] Of course, this is only one particular instance of what Erving Goffman probably had in mind when he referred to processes of reframing (Goffman 1974).[2] Summing up, by referring to expectations, this framework enables us not only to discuss normative expectations but also to highlight the relevance of cognitive orders for social reproduction (Galtung 1959; Knorr Cetina and Cicourel 2014, 2–4).

Consequently, starting from the duality of structures and agency, the theoretical status of events becomes rather unclear. That is to say, structurally relevant events entail not only actions but experiences as

1 For Max Weber, world views (*Weltbilder*) can set actions on diverse ideational tracks and function as a switchman (*Weichensteller*) for social actions (for the nexus between revolutions and »cosmological visions« see also Eisenstadt 2006, 103–5; Weber 1989, 101). Within this framework, however, world views have an explanatory function as motivational factors for action. The framework thus conflates *categories of practice* with *categories of analysis* (Strand and Lizardo 2015). Considering world views as a kind of semantics seems more plausible in the framework presented here.

2 Goffman (1974, 13) explicitly denied that his work on frame analysis deals with social structures. According to him, it deals with matters that are secondary to them, namely individual experiences. Thinking of structures as expectations, however, makes Goffman's work invaluable for a deeper empirical understanding of how experiences reproduce and transform social structures.

well.[3] Thinking of natural disasters one might ask to what extent they are caused by human agency in the »Anthropocene« age and whether this kind of agency is available to our experience, or whether we can only deduce some kind of human agency by experiencing merely its effects (Chakrabarty 2012). Apart from that, it is crucial in many social contexts whether a particular event is being experienced or »enacted.« The semantics of responsibility, for example, »describes the addressability of a specific normative expectation to basic communicative entities« (Bora 2015, 458). It ascribes events causally to persons or organizations and it usually matches their actions, or else their omissions, with normative expectations. But in general, noone can be held responsible in legal terms for merely experiencing events without causing them by action or omission. A sociologist may then come to different conclusions by attributing agency by different criteria. However, these sociological criteria are usually not taken into account in practical definitions of social situations and do not serve as a basis for allocating agency, omission or responsibility in social practices.

At any rate, with events as starting points, agency and experience can both be considered ways of framing social behavior that are inevitably eventfully constituted.[4] But speaking of agency in causal terms leads to

3 It is of course one of Pierre Bourdieu's most noteworthy achievements to have taken the constitution of experience into consideration. Nevertheless, a theory of the event within this framework is just beginning to take shape (see Aisenberg 2008).

4 For Karl Weick (1979, 147–49), experience is a matter of action or *enactment*, respectively. »Experience is the consequence of activity. The manager literally wades into the swarm of ›events‹ that surround him and actively tries to unrandomize them and impose some order. The manager acts physically in the environment, attends to some of it, ignores most of it, talks to other people about what they see and are doing« (Weick 1979, 148). Contrary to that, one may say that »we no more *perform* our experience of acting than we *see* our visual experiences« (Searle 1994, 89). From another point of view one may ask as well whether a manager does not have to listen to the people he talks to. For the organization of social life and of conversation in particular, acting and experience are rather

aporia in the evenemental framework presented here. Agency is itself eventfully constituted, making it necessary to take a closer look at the relationship between events and actions.

I have previously mentioned that actions and events cannot be fully substituted for each other as units of analysis. But it is striking that events and actions are often described in analogous ways insofar as both can be considered products of colligations. Actions as well as events can be decomposed into particular »phases« or »stages« (Norman 2013, 40–42; Schutz 1989, 49–51). However, whereas events appear and disappear simultaneously, the same cannot be said about actions so long as they are being described in causal terms. In temporal terms, consequently, an action has to entail at least two distinguishable events, namely a particular act and its effect (Elster 2015, 3–5). This applies regardless of whether the starting point for action theories is the causal explanation of particular actions or whether they aim at reconstructing purposes, intentions, types or (inter-)subjective meanings of actions. The argument also does not depend on the order in which acts and effects occur, nor on the way causal links between these two events are established—be it through mechanisms, conditions, probabilities or other instances or metaphors of causation commonly referred to in contemporary sociology (Vaidyanathan et al. 2016).[5] But the mere distinction between causes and effects of actions raises the problem of temporal delimitation insofar as actions can hardly be separated from their causes and effects. In the growth medium of causality, the duration of action expands into a potentially endless temporal horizon. »The causes that have determined any individual event

sequenced and divided between participants (Goffman 1976; Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson 1974).

5 Of course, not all causal explanations link events with each other but instead some assume a figure-ground relationship (Vaidyanathan et al. 2016, 11) in the sense that, for example, structure X is the context or condition under which event Y is caused. However, explanations of this kind share the implicit ontological assumption that entities, structures or other kinds of causal backgrounds are not themselves eventfully constituted but constants.

are always *infinite* in number and *infinitely* varied in character; and the things in themselves possess no inherent criterion according to which some of them can be selected as the only part to be taken into account« (Weber 2012, 117; emphasis in original). The consequences of actions can as well be endlessly pursued, not only in causal series but in cascades if unintended side effects are taken into consideration (Merton 1936, 897). Actions are therefore neither singular events nor delimitable series of events, making their temporal status as units of analysis rather questionable.[6]

Until now, common theories of agency could not provide convincing answers for the question of the temporal constitution of actions. Instead, they have treated actions as final units of analysis although these are undoubtedly temporally dissolvable units.[7] Addressing this temporal problem is declared ex cathedra to be »simply an absurdity« (Weber 2012, 118). Instead, efforts in sociological research may focus on contexts, orientations, purposes, meanings, types and situational conditions of actions just as if actions unfold without consuming time themselves (see for

6 Emirbayer and Mische (1998) contributed some interesting considerations on time as context of agency as well as on temporal orientations of actors. However, they conceive of the relation between actors and structures in terms of *mediation* thus raising the question how the relation between actors and mediating instances is mediated in return.

7 Causality can also be conceptualized as a relation between causal qualities of objects (Chakravartty 2005). This notion of causality finds its clearest sociological expression in the situational logic of practice theories (cf. Pouliot 2014, 252–54). Social practices, accordingly, unfold in situations which are characterized by the simultaneous co-presence of diverse processors of social action like bodies and artifacts. In this framework, a problematic temporal horizon just gets substituted by a potentially endless material horizon, making it necessary to »break from narration—that is, temporarily suspend time in order to analyze, in a synchronic discursive mode, the skein of relationships that define the nature and the potentialities of the objects and persons about which a story may be told« (Sewell 2005, 219). Actor-network theory, however, *equates* time with materiality on a metaphorical level since mediators are considered equivalents to events in this framework (Latour 2005, 216).

example Parsons 1937, 482–83).[8] That's not surprising, since the problem cannot be solved by referring to action as a unit of analysis again without risking an infinite regress. Instead, it is circumvented by focusing on the matters of agency, rather than on its eventful temporal constitution. Thus, sociological theories of action can cut their units of analysis to size. The delimitation of actions, that is the scope of their »eventness,« does not vary with the social meaning attached to them but rather with the research question posed by the historian or sociologist.

Having said that, do we, as recipients of this kind of research, want to learn something about the way the analyst tailors his objects and gets surprised by his own analytical constructions? Or do we want to learn more about the objects of interest themselves by observing empirically how self-descriptions emerge out of eventful social practices and become socially meaningful? After all, not only sociological and historical research constructs actions and events. Social practices in everyday life also do not bother themselves with tracing back causes in endless temporal horizons. Instead, they take shortcuts and have their own ways of identifying events and of attributing causes and consequences to actions, as evidence from social psychology clearly shows (Crittenden 1983; Heider 1958, 246–48; Watzlawick, Bavelas, and Jackson 1967, 54–56).

Actions and events are therefore, in the sense of Giddens's *double hermeneutics* (Giddens 1997, 9–11), already meaningfully constituted and interpreted before they become objects of sociological and historical research. Taking the same line, Thomas Luckmann (1980, 50–51) pointed out that the interpretation of experiences and actions is a constitutive element of sociological data *and* part of historical life-worlds expressed and typified in respective contemporary everyday language. According to Luckmann, the task of sociology should therefore be to develop a formalized meta-language to describe how a particular historical life-world

8 Parsons notoriously did consider instrumental and consummatory dimensions in his AGIL paradigm. However, it is not quite clear how the unit act extends temporally, given that it has to sustain and balance all AGIL functions at once.

is being constituted by invariant structures bringing about historically varying typifications of actions and experiences. Invariant structures could be, for example, non-negotiable embodied and perceptual bases of conceptualization (Johnson 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 2010). Taking up the challenge, Omar Lizardo (2013) suggested an intriguing way of utilizing research on these bases from cognitive sciences for an analysis of abstract sociological concepts. The same could of course be applied to notions of »action« and »event« in everyday language as well as in sociological theories. However, I have to admit that I am not very familiar with the relevant debates in cognitive sciences. Instead, I will refer to invariant bases of communication to suggest a heuristic for comparing historically varying evenemental concepts.

Therefore, in the following section the argument will be presented that action is a reified social interpretation of communicative occurrences being colligated as events. By using actions as analytical units, consequently, most of sociological and historical research falls into the same trap of reification.

The communicative construction of events (and actions)

By characterizing events as simultaneously appearing and disappearing, sociological and historical research is released from the fruitless task of more or less arbitrary temporal delimitation. Particular events appear and disappear, making it difficult to say anything else about them. As soon as they have appeared and disappeared, they are intangible, inaccessible and unreproducible. This understanding of events is owed to a phenomenological perspective trying to figure out how the social realm is constituted temporally, and therefore brackets some assumptions that are taken for granted. Actors, matters or relations cannot be considered constitutive elements in this respect since they all are not particular events but *entities* with a »property of repetition, of being events that keep happening in the same way« (Abbott 2010, 273). But sociological as well as historical research cannot be satisfied with postulating the unrepeatability of particular events. Instead, such research can point out that the impermanence and uniqueness of events is not only a theoretical problem but a practical

one. In so doing, research has to make a virtue out of necessity by observing empirically how this problem is being solved in the social realm. Therefore, the *social, that is to say the communicative, construction of events* will be the main subject matter in this section.

The communicative construction of events has been discussed by various authors within different frameworks. Certain attempts at developing a narrative theory of history assume that events get their historical significance when plots integrate events into narratives (Ricoeur 2012; White 1980, 2008). Alain Badiou (2007, 201–3) coined the term *intervention* for the act of naming and interpretation, which makes an event part of the definition of a situation. Drawing on Austin's theory of performative speech acts, Robin Wagner-Pacifici (2017, 20–22) developed a framework focusing on the performative aspects of how events are being produced and made effective. All these approaches share the assumption that the social meaning of events is being produced retrospectively after a particular happening has occurred. They also seem to agree on the constitutive role of communication in making events socially meaningful. However, they also have a certain »agent bias« in common, meaning that they focus on problems of sending or actively »producing« communication rather than on problems of understanding. For theorists of historiography like Hayden White (1973), it is the historian who is considered the producer of a historical event. Badiou and Wagner-Pacifici also focus on the intervening subject (or the performing actor, respectively) as producers of events, although both consider the possibility of misunderstandings and resistance in the social production of events (Badiou 2007, 398). In any case, we are thrown back to the problems of agency and causality discussed earlier in this paper. Is the historical event being produced during research processes of a particular historian, or does it come into being by reading a particular book on history? When, in Wagner-Pacifici's framework, does an event-producing speech act end and when does its consequence begin? Is it not eventfully constituted itself? To avoid problems of this kind, it may be worthwhile to take Niklas Luhmann's theory of communication into consideration.

Socially meaningful events cannot be produced by one actor alone since it is essential that these events are understood by others as meaningful for them to become socially relevant. In an elevator, a short-term contact with sensitive body parts of a stranger may pass unnoticed by one of the affected individuals. It might well be noticed but be interpreted as an accident rather than as meaningful in any social sense. But it is only by means of institutionalized structures, in this case the social expectations in a public place (Goffman 1963, 139; Hirschauer 2005), that a particular kind of behavior may be identified as a noticeable social expression. It may thus be understood, for example, as a blatantly obvious advance. Thereby, however futile it may be, this event contributes to the reproduction of communicative structures. It appears and disappears, but it may serve as a reference point or as a construed beginning of a narrative ending with a marriage or a criminal charge. In both cases it may be important for the narrative to attribute not only intentions to actors in a particular situation but also to distribute roles, actions, reactions and experiences in retrospect. As mentioned before, not only action may be attributed in such narratives but also experience: Who can be held responsible for a bodily contact? Who was actively engaged in this event and who was just experiencing (or suffering from) an action? This is basically the stuff narratives are made of, including all kinds of conflicts, competitions, contingencies, ambiguities and intricacies involved in the interpretation of events, as Wagner-Pacifici (2010) shows with stunning sociological intuition using the empirical example of 9/11.

At any rate, no matter whether a communicative event is a terrorist attack or whether it merely refers to an attack (or an earthquake) and »copies« it (Wagner-Pacifici 2010, 1362–64): only if an event is understood as meaningful information and attributed to a communicative intention, that is a (non-)verbal message, does it become a communicative event and contribute to the reproduction of social structures. Therefore, Niklas Luhmann suggested defining a communicative event as a synthesis of three selections: information, message and understanding (Luhmann 1995, 137–39). These three selections cannot be determined by individual actors since they do not have the receiver's perception and attention at

their free disposal. Instead, events are synthesized by an emergent order with its own structures of selectivity. Therefore, the only way to find out whether a message is being understood is by means of a subsequent communicative event. In our fictional »crowded elevator« scenario, this may be, for example, a slap in the face or a »confirming allusion« (Schegloff 1996).

Another implication is that the merging of these three selections to a communicative event cannot be observed directly but only assumed hypothetically and in retrospect in practice as well as in research. These selections occur in a complex stream of social behavior which gets punctuated and interpreted retrospectively in the form of socially constructed events—a subject of intensive research in social psychology but still relatively unnoticed in history and sociology (Barker 1963; Bateson 1972, 170–72; Leeds-Hurwitz 1990, 97–98; Smith and Williamson 1977, 104–6; Watzlawick et al. 1967, 54–56; Weick 1979, 194–96). In this sense, and following Andrew Abbott (1984, 192–94), events can be described as conceptual and hypothetical assumptions about a particular sequence of occurrences. Communication constructs an event as an abstract hypothesis by colligating occurrences of messaging and understanding information. In contemporary society, these communicative events are usually semantically flagged as »actions.« A communicative event marked as action thus appears and disappears simultaneously. However, it should be made clear that the simultaneity of appearance and disappearance does not refer to any kind of objective time measure, but rather to the way events are handled in social practice. Each event signified as action can still be decomposed into various occurrences. These occurrences are then again transformed into colligated events which can be processed as simultaneously appearing and disappearing. But the temporal limitation of action or, as the case may be, its »atomization« does not vary with the analyst's interest but with the problem communicatively referred to in social practice. Again, the framework presented here re-describes analytical problems as practical problems. This, however, presupposes the development of a semantics of theory (communicative events) that is clearly distinguishable from a semantics of practice (actions).

The practical semantic of action not only constitutes the communicative event by »naming« it. Actions are also attributed to »actors« who endure the event and act as temporally stable carriers: »[S]ome materials are more *durable* than others and so maintain their relational patterns for longer. Imagine a continuum. Thoughts are cheap but they do not last long, and speech lasts very little longer. But when we start to *perform* relations—and in particular when we *embody* them […]—they may last longer« (Law 1992, 387). Apart from that, as mentioned before, the modern understanding of action as causation implies an endless temporal horizon, making it possible to relate an event with many other past and anticipated events. What is highly problematic for sociological explanations is functional for communication, which has much more leeway in integrating diverse temporal perspectives in a given present. This is particularly important in modern society where social spheres like religion, science, politics, the economy, etc. develop their own temporalities which may to some extent drift apart, making simultaneous temporal integration by one single act difficult to achieve. But the semantic of action makes it possible to focus on one problem by postponing others. It also allows long-term historical reflection, foresight, planning and the »lengthening of chains of actions«, as Norbert Elias (2010, 370) pointed out—with the important difference that this concept is not applied as an analytical category but analyzed as a semantic artifact of communicative self-description.

Conclusion

Considering the explanatory value of events has created new momentum in debates on the relation between structure and agency. However, the growing interest in events has also highlighted the necessity to reconsider the temporality of structures and actions. At least two obstacles arise when events become an element of theorizing on structures and agency. The first rather epistemological obstacle is a terminological conflation between categories of theory and categories of practice. This conflation leads on the one hand to theoretical inconsistencies, particularly when action is being described in causal terms and events are being considered as temporal accumulation of actions. On the other, it points at the

problem-solving capacity of a particular understanding of agency within social practices. In this sense, events and actions may be considered simplifying reifications with a social function rather than analytically promising terms. With the communicative framework introduced here, »agency« can be discussed as a contingent and historically variable category of social practice.[9]

The second obstacle is rather »ontological« and concerns the density of time. From the analyst's point of view, it seems rather unproblematic to call the French Revolution an event, although it may easily be decomposed into myriads of particular events. But with the same argument, the history of mankind may also be called an event. An approach focusing on the communicative construction of events and actions as an emergent process would avoid analytical problems arising from the density of time. Considering this approach makes an eventful analysis of social practices appear a worthwhile interdisciplinary undertaking in history as well as in sociology. Its application and further methodological refinement, however, will depend on both structures and events.

9 Starting from rather different assumptions, actor-network theory seems to agree on this point by coining the term *punctualization* for social practices of *translating* complex relational network-effects into individual agency (Law 1992).

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Nancy Reagan in the ghetto

On space as a mediator between structure and event

Ferdinand Nyberg

Introduction: A drug raid as a constitutive event

On May 4, 1989, the White House-sanctioned »Just Say No« anti-drug campaign arranged an event for schoolchildren in Los Angeles' Rose Bowl stadium. More than 20,000 children cheered as they watched performances by »Flintstone characters; the US Marine Band; McGruff, the Take a Bite Out of Crime Dog; drivers from the Mickey Thompson Off-Road Championship Gran [*sic*] Prix; and skits by Just Say No clubs.«[1] Nancy Reagan (former first lady since January of that year) gave the keynote speech. Amid vociferous shouts of »No!,« she echoed other speeches she had given in the past, calling for an all-out national boycott of drugs. She declared that »There's a big, bright world out there waiting for you!,« urging the children not to lose sight of real life and tangible experiences by experimenting with drugs. By way of illustration, she recalled a drug raid she had recently witnessed, saying how dearly she wished that those arrested on that day could have heard the »Just Say No« plea.

The drug raid in question is the subject of my paper. A recent article on American prohibitionist politics persuasively demonstrates the importance of space in motivating citizens to rally against perceived threats (Andrews and Seguin 2015). By analyzing quantitative data, the authors show that geography, and particularly the perceived proximity of a threatening group, plays a crucial role in encouraging communities to mobilize against drugs.

1 John Kendall, »›This Is Our Future‹: Nancy Reagan Leads Youngsters in Pledge Against Drug Use,« *Los Angeles Times*, May 5, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-05-05/local/me-2190_1_drug-mrs-reagan-los-angeles-county.

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I complement such readings by highlighting how discrete events, rather than diachronic demographic patterns, can focalize and frame social space.

By »space« and »spaces,« I mean those places and relations that form geographic reality. But »reality« does not here mean something that is »always-already there,« since the cultural imaginary plays just as big a role as physical landscapes in constituting space. Usefully, the adjective »spatial« often collocates with the noun »constellations,« producing the term »spatial constellations.« The term »constellation« particularly encapsulates my meaning. A »constellation,« after all, is a pattern we establish among any number of visible stars; the stars are really there, but the patterns we create are not automatic, natural, or self-evident. In a similar manner, spaces are concerned with the interplay between imagination and existence, as well as their mutual framing. As Susan Sontag writes in *Regarding the Pain of Others*, »to frame is to exclude« (2003, 46). In this dynamic of inclusion and exclusion, space tells stories—ones which depend on how spaces appear, what we ask from them, who the interlocutor is, and what we make of the answers that are given. In discourse about drugs, I claim, spaces have consistently contributed toward such meaning-making and the situation of agents.

Thus, rather than simply amounting to a necessary »setting« for what is ultimately a medical, social, or criminal issue, I claim that space has frequently come to act as a mediator between »events«—occurrences that appear to be situated specifically—and wider »structures,« understood as those sets of societal relations that help determine how reality is perceived and, in this case especially, what constitutes collective understanding. By »mediation,« I mean a process that reveals different characteristics and categories at once; through »mediation,« societal characteristics and categories are expressed, while they are also simultaneously (co-)produced in and through such »mediation.« When space acts as a »mediator,« then, it can highlight both the »exceptional« nature of an event (making the event interesting, compelling, etc.) and its context or structural »embeddedness.« In this way, space comes to both reflect and produce manifold patterns; spaces, Martina Löw writes, »point to the possibility of overlapping and reciprocal relations« (2006, 120) in society. It follows that the way in which

spaces are treated and believed to function matters a great deal in terms of how power relations are constituted, social arrangements are formed and dealt with, and—as is the case here—which policy measures are deemed appropriate for a given situation. It is precisely because spaces are apparently self-evident, real, and commonsensical, that they can mediate fitting responses; they do so by reflecting their structure in and through events, through which they make evident structurally contingent solutions to specific problems.

Space is not the only thing that mediates, mirrors, and produces structure through events relating to anti-drug efforts. For instance, the »reality« of the state is at least as spatial as it is ideational or legal—we encounter the state in post offices, through garbage disposal rituals, or at traffic lights—and similarly, society's relationship toward illegal or illicit drug use is frequently spatially mediated, even when it is nominally perceived as a medical or political issue. Because of the ubiquity of space, it makes sense to scrutinize relations between space, structure, and event on a broad, discursive plane. By analyzing social practices and societal iterations, or performances of constitutive knowledge, we can begin to approach the spatial dynamics of knowledge about drugs and drugs policy. As such, in this essay I rely on a wide pool of sources—including news reports, policy statements, and cultural productions—and focus especially on the tropes and themes—and effects of verisimilitude—that they collectively reproduce.[2]

2 To achieve this, I will not insist on or solidify the distinction between fictional and non-fictional material. This is partly owing to the broad range of sources I have selected, as noted above. Beyond this reason, and more so than might be the case in other historical instances, the 1980s war on drugs exhibited a symbiotic relationship between fact and fiction, in which »reality« greatly influenced »fiction« and vice versa. In part due to the war's long and comparatively low-intensity nature, policy measures and cultural productions alike informed people's perceptions of reality. Also, the Reagan administration and the Reaganite project, more so than other presidencies, were connected to Hollywood on both personal and policy levels. All these factors resulted in a cultural moment typified by »blurred lines.«

The drug raid described above is a good example of how space pervades issues—in this case, the fight against drugs—with diverse meanings that are inherently related to structural logics and how it can ultimately integrate singular events into a broader context. In this way, policy can itself become meaningful without the protagonists having to do much talking or give much in the way of explanation. This, in turn, normalizes a particular type of drug policy—a »war«—and neutralizes what might otherwise be considered a discriminatory, prejudiced, or even racist standpoint.

I demonstrate this by scrutinizing the event itself and drawing out the implicit spatial arrangements that would have been significant within the hegemonic imagination at that time. Space, I argue, played a determining role in defining cultural notions of inside and outside—understood as the parameters around which people assess values, identities, and concepts of community and belonging. (In terms of the American context, such practices are embedded within deeply-rooted racial and racist logics.[3]) Meaningful spatial categories—the *troika* of the »ghetto,« suburbia, and external foreign space—were expressed in and through the spatial dynamics of the event at hand.[4] These *narcotopias* helped express and produce meaning, and space was mediated by framing the event and bringing forth structurally contingent, commonsensical solutions. Before expanding upon this idea, I offer some historical context below.

3 Following common usage, throughout the essay I will refer to the United States of America in the adjectival form: »American.«

4 From this point on, owing to its relatively frequent use, I will not place quotations marks around the term ghetto. It is a concept and socio-spatial category with a long history, one that is related especially to institutionalized slavery and segregation in the American context, and to anti-Semitism in Europe. Wherever it is used, it is associated with exclusion, discrimination, and poverty. As such, it is a highly political term but, I think, to opt for a more »neutral« term would be misleading.

»Spaced-out America«: The war on drugs, Reaganism, and nostalgia

> Let's Make America Great Again.
>
> —Reagan-Bush presidential campaign election slogan (1980)

> I wish coke was still cola
> and a joint was a bad place to be [. . .]
> Is the best of the free life behind us now,
> Are the good times really over for good?
>
> —Merle Haggard, »Are the Good Times Really Over?« (1981)

Relating Reaganism to the ascent of the New Right is a standard approach to its historicization.[5] By the mid-1960s, America's middle class felt disillusioned. Among the contributing factors to this malaise were the experience of waning influence abroad, a stagnant economy, and societal change—particularly related to civil rights. One phrase—»the silent majority«—encapsulates the group who shared this emerging sentiment. Popularized by President Richard Nixon in 1969, the term simultaneously described disillusionment and strength, maintaining that the majority of Americans—out of respect or due to factional divisions—had, despite shared attitudes, failed to mobilize and voice their concerns during the tumultuous 1960s (Perlstein 2008, 748). Activists, demonstrators, and the counterculture, indeed anyone who seemed to disrupt prevailing norms, formed the »vocal minority.« But this silent faction, who considered themselves to be victims of circumstance and aware of what their country really stood for, would not take it any longer.

This new conservatism can be traced back to a few years before the emergence of Reaganism, particularly to events such as Barry Goldwater's 1964 election campaign, which proved to be a foundational moment. It was as a supporter of Goldwater that Ronald Reagan delivered a pivotal speech, »A Time for Choosing,« which expressed concerns about America's prosperity, claiming that it was not »something on which we can base our

5 For a historiography of the New Right, see Strub 2008, 183–94.

hopes for the future.«[6] America, the world's only bastion of freedom, was facing a fork in the road, and needed forceful steering in the right direction.[7] Two years later, Reagan ran for California Governor, and one of his campaign's central themes was bemoaning »the mess at Berkeley,« which was then a locus of activism and counterculture. It was a place, Reagan propounded, where students held »sexual orgies so vile I cannot describe them to you«; as governor, he vowed to »investigate the charges of communism and blatant sexual misbehavior on the Berkeley campus« (deMause 1984, 43). In 1980, at a point when he was still championed by the conservative countermovement, Reagan became president.

Yet collective attitudes and political movements do not arise autonomously out of objective or predictable collective misgivings. Indeed, to understand the growth of Reaganism in that manner would simply perpetuate the ideology's own reification of individual choice and reason. Instead, politics is an affective field, and people do not always support policies because they have decided after some deliberation that they are the correct ones. Rhetoric, dress, spectacle, and space, among other things, all play crucial roles in establishing attitudes. So feelings play a significant role, and they need to be produced and repeatedly vocalized. As Reagan's denunciation of Berkeley indicates, people and spaces can come to represent shared bonds among politicians and constituents, and this often occurs on a visceral level.

The feelings I am singling out here are sentimentality and nostalgia. Of course, Reaganism's appeal lay in concrete policies: a strong military, economic revitalization, federal cuts, and so on. Its supporters saw

6 Ronald Reagan, »Address on Behalf of Senator Barry Goldwater: ›A Time for Choosing,‹« October 27, 1964. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Wooley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=76121.

7 As an example of this, in his aforementioned speech, Reagan recalls two Americans listening to the hardships of a Cuban refugee. One commented, »We don't know how lucky we are.« The Cuban replied: »How lucky you are? I had someplace to go.«

Reaganism as the agent of a revival of America.[8] But its narrative (and, it follows, its appeal) was heavily colored by emotion, and specifically by a sentimental *leitmotif*. James Combs writes that, before Reagan's presidency, there was a »creeping feeling that the American story was close to being over and that the enchantment the idea of America had once connoted was now irrevocably lost« (1993, 27). America's domestic stagnation and apparent loss of power abroad was explained by looking back on the 1960s. The decade, it was put forth, had proven deleterious, resulting in an overreaching state, a loss of work ethic, and a dilution of American values. The country had lost its way.

Reagan was charged with, and took on, the task of renormalization. I characterize the associated narrative as »sentimental« because it was widely premised upon a theme, widespread in sentimental literature, of virtuous sacrifice. But it was also sentimental in its manifestly »nostalgic« wish for not just *reform* but a *return* to a better past. This should not be read with a derisory subtext; nostalgia is a particularly useful term here (if we accept that etymology can tell us something about a word's »meaning«) because it is a modern Latin calque of the German word *Heimweh*, which neatly ties the word to a specific space.

The nostalgic focus, which brings the home into political discourse, is noteworthy because it is largely in conflict with the American ideal of a non-spatial political culture. This notion, in simplified form, holds that America's self-conception relates to *ideas* more than is the case for many other national narratives. The American story, politicians and constituents agree, is connected to the Enlightenment, liberalism, liberty, ambition, and (sometimes) its Puritan heritage. From early on, space was considered to be almost a void; as James A. Morone writes, many citizens imagine that »in the beginning, Americans sailed away from old world tyranny and settled a vast, unpopulated land—the place almost thrust freedom

8 Scholars who applaud Reagan generally follow similar lines, claiming that he reinvigorated the economy, restored the military, and so on. Detractors still tend to agree on Reaganism's powerful invocation of American strength, as well as its ideological longevity. For a recent historiographic account, see Charles L. Ponce de Leon 2008, 303–14.

upon them« (2003, 5). When spaces explicitly feature in this narrative, they tend to be secondary to ideals: manifest destiny, westward expansion, America's spheres of influence, and so forth have traditionally been explained as processes of spreading the aforementioned values. The idea of space as a void has been a useful myth in that it has, on one hand, served imperial ambitions of control and settlement and, on the other, delegitimized and undermined claims of exploitation and injustice voiced by colonized peoples or other actors.[9]

If, within this myth, ideas of space proved implicitly crucial in establishing hierarchies and social relations, in the 1980s space played an often explicit role. But just as was previously the case, I claim, space acted as a mediator, both reflecting and producing circumstances, while neutralizing protest by making ideas of space seem natural, innocent, and rigid. In addition, just as before, I will show that spaces helped facilitate and bring forth ideas of familiarity and strangeness necessary for control and colonization. In the evident identity crisis of the 1980s, spaces came to play a central role, with certain geographical entities functioning as ontological agents that helped frame the »right« course of action.

To be sure, this spatial-nostalgic focus was not a top-down development: broader American discourse reflected themes of loss and desire for renormalization. Economists talked about making »cuts« and »sacrifices,« and restoring America's work ethic. President Reagan, curiously mirroring drug terminology, talked about »curing« America's economy and avoiding previous »quick fixes« and »artificial stimulants.«[10] On the popular-culture plane, Bruce Springsteen—hardly a figure associated with the New Right—remembered the »Glory Days« in a song of the same name

9 Elements of the motif of the void or savage space feature in the discourse of colonial conquest elsewhere. Anne McClintock (1995), for instance, shows the importance of this motif to British imperialism, stressing how assumptions about gender and class, and particularly the prevailing cult of domesticity, furthered the imperial project, abetted by a civilizing ideology.

10 Ronald Reagan, »Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,« January 25, 1983, Peters and Wooley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41698.

and lamented the state of his decaying hometown, while Merle Haggard complained that America's good times were over, remembering »when a girl could still cook / and still would« but also »when coke was still cola / and a joint was a bad place to be.«[11] The President—also conflating space, drugs, and decline—complained that Florida, America's »garden spot[,] had turned into a battlefield for competing drugpushers who were terrorizing Florida's citizens.«[12] These examples all share a common emphasis—sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit—on space. Whether it was decaying Main Street or the changing American home, America was clearly »spaced out,« as altered spaces and altered states metonymically represented an American identity that had changed. Now, how does this all relate to the war on drugs?

In the early 1980s, a number of »poison scares« made headlines across the country. In 1982, a series of articles reported that mass-produced painkillers had been laced with rat poison,[13] chocolate milk powder fortified with sodium hydroxide, tap water infused with cyanide, and orange juice mixed with insecticide (deMause 1984, 123). Before Halloween, newspapers warned that sharp objects and dangerous substances had been placed clandestinely into candy and pleaded for parents to keep their children at

11 Springsteen tied the fall from grace of his hometown, in part, to the racial strife of the 1960s. I am referring here to the songs »Glory Days« and »My Hometown,« both singles from the best-selling album *Born in the U.S.A.* (Columbia Records, 1984). The Merle Haggard song is the same one from which I quote in this chapter's epigraph: »Are the Good Times Really Over?,« a single from the album *Big City* (Epic Records, 1981).

12 Ronald Reagan, »Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy,« October 2, 1982, Peters and Wooley, *The American Presidency Project*, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085.

13 Most famously, the national media covered the so-called »Chicago Tylenol murders« of that same year, in which people died after ingesting pharmacy-bought painkillers.

home.[14] *New York Times* journalist Russel Baker recounted his five-week journey across a »beautiful autumnal America«:

> In Detroit they were finding razor blades in hot dogs sold at the grocery. In California somebody had laced eyewash with corrosive chemicals. In Chicago, capsules sold as headache remedies came packed with cyanide. In New York and its suburbs, not to be outdone, people spent the weekend inserting needles and pins into candy they planned to give children on Halloween.[15]

Most chillingly, in upscale Beverly Hills, front lawns were decorated with placards warning of an »armed response.« Worries about crime (shockingly, even President Reagan was shot in 1981) led many to advocate a stricter stance (Pratt, Franklin, and Gall 2011, 122–23). Many must have felt that America was losing its moral fiber or worse that America was losing its very *substance*—as illustrated by the poisoning of unsuspecting victims by foreign substances. That October, the President took to the radio waves to declare a war on drugs.

Actually, the war on drugs was not new. Richard Nixon first declared it in 1971, and his presidency was characterized by his personal zeal to combat drugs. Yet despite efforts to curb the amount of drugs flowing into the country—assisted by tougher policing and stricter sentencing—the war had little lasting power. Gerald Ford »simply did not share Nixon's intense anger at drug users« (Musto 2003, 258). Eleven years later, under

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14 DeMause uses the following as a representative example of a *New York Post* headline from the time: »Trick or Terror—Nationwide Poison Candy Alert: Keep Kids at Home.« Similar articles were published elsewhere. That same October, Ronald O'Bryan, who was convicted of poisoning his son with Halloween treats, was set to be executed. In morbid irony, he was the first person in Texas to be sentenced to execution (or poisoning) by lethal injection. The execution was, however, delayed by two years, so the distinction would ultimately belong to someone else.

15 Russel Baker, »America and the Rush of Madness,« *New York Times*, republished in *The Age* (Melbourne, Australia), November 9, 1982, http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1300&dat=19821109&id=7DVVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=hZQDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5471,3771543.

Reagan, it was declared anew; it would gain in force and enjoy more public exposure during his administration. Under Reagan, the drug war was part of the new direction of a resurgent America. His declaration was infused with action, boasting of current and future »dramatic […] results,« a »planned, concerted campaign,« a »beef[ing] up« of »law enforcement,« the use of »military radar« and »intelligence.« A »hot pursuit« would commence, the drug war signalling that, at last, America had »taken down the surrender flag and run up the battle flag.«[16]

The »war« descriptor itself is telling. Wars, the dictionary explains, are a state of »armed conflict« involving states or, sometimes, non-state actors (*New Oxford American Dictionary*; sv »war«). Moreover, they are typically understood as the *culmination*—the final and desperate measure—of disputes about territory or sovereignty (McLean and McMillan; sv »war«). In English, however, »war« is sometimes an indirect designation that serves as a metaphor (for example, cold war, gang war, race war, or trade war), which plays on connotations of violence and intensity. It is nonetheless wise to remind ourselves here that calling a country's anti-drug policy a »war« is by no means self-evident. Instead, doing so can serve a clear purpose: it can place all anti-narcotics efforts within a story that conforms to America's self-conception. That is, wars are not just strategical or tactical—or political in any other sense—but they are also ontological.[17] By establishing divisions between good and evil, us and them, wars can strengthen and form types of self-conception. Within the context of the 1980s war on drugs, these divisions would be inflected by ideas of space much more than other »wars as metaphor.«[18] As is the case for »real« wars, the notion was that the war on drugs had to be about territory. It would be fought in foreign countries, in inner cities and suburbs, and America would win street by

16 Reagan, »Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy.«

17 For more on war as ontological, see Michael J. Shapiro 1997.

18 Other metaphorical wars include the war on poverty, which certainly had spatial associations but was also heavily shaped by the economy and a renewed work ethic. The war on terror was definitely spatially conceived when it was fought abroad, but was not articulated in relation to domestic spaces to the same extent as the war on drugs.

street, neighborhood by neighborhood. But perhaps even more so than in »real« wars, where battles are actually fought over territory, spaces here became about identity, about privileged, normative insiders who had to be protected against threatening and aggressive outsiders. How might we trace the origins of this spatial focus?

In the 1970s, American attitudes toward drugs seemed to be at their most relaxed. Cocaine, widely considered harmless at the time, enjoyed an air of respectability and a certain glamor.[19] In 1978, it was revealed that Peter Bourne, President Carter's adviser on drug policy (who four years earlier had called cocaine »benign«) had snorted cocaine at the annual meeting of the National Organization for the Reform of Drug Laws (Musto 2003, 263). Granting active users entry to the White House under Reagan would, by contrast, have been unthinkable and considered a sign of open collusion with America's enemies. Perhaps no public figure represents this change better than the director Dennis Hopper. His 1969 film *Easy Rider* features two young and handsome (white) drug dealers and users, modern-day bandits riding motorcycles down lonely highways in old cowboy country. The film skillfully captures the late-1960s attitude (albeit subcultural) that associated drugs with romance and freedom, a freedom that is largely conveyed spatially. With wide, open spaces and empty roads that positively oozed Americana, in the film, drug use was conflated with American freedom. After a hiatus from filmmaking—partly as a result of his own drug-taking—Hopper made a Hollywood comeback with the 1988 film *Colors*, a police drama that was also set in the American Southwest. But this time the audience is faced with dusty, depressing, impoverished, and frequently claustrophobic urban spaces that have neither a center nor a periphery. Here the borders between good and bad, sobriety and intoxication, criminals and the police, Mexico and America, and war

19 During the 1970s, cocaine enjoyed unprecedented cultural capital: The *New York Times Magazine* compared it to champagne in 1974; three years later, *Newsweek* equated it to caviar and Dom Pérignon; and in 1981, the front cover of *Time* pictured a martini glass full of cocaine powder. Even the Drug Abuse Council compared it to a fine wine or liqueur (Agar 2003, 13).

and peace are always shifting and slipping. Here is a country so constitutionally diseased by drugs that the center of one of its largest cities—and one that is synonymous with glitz, glamor, and the American dream—has been turned into a war zone. It was into this city that Nancy Reagan ventured in April 1989.

»That these people have no lives«: Nancy Reagan in the ghetto, continued

At this juncture, let us return to the event at hand. As we have seen, speaking to a large crowd of children in Los Angeles, Reagan decided to relate an event she had recently been privy to that had apparently moved her deeply. About a month earlier—wearing sports shoes, blue jeans, and a jacket with the word »POLICE« written on the back and her first name printed on the front—Reagan had followed the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) into South Central Los Angeles. Department Chief Daryl Gates, a supporter of Just Say No and a founder of DARE (an anti-drug program through which officers teach schoolchildren abstention), had suggested that she should participate actively in anti-drug police actions, and so she personally accompanied them on the mission.

The event that she was about to witness was the storming, by LAPD's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team, of a known crack house (specifically, one in which the trade and use of crack cocaine occurs). The plan was for her to wait inside a local fire station during the action, but things were delayed and Reagan (who had »been on her feet all day«) ended up waiting in an air-conditioned motor home, which had »The Establishment« emblazoned on its hood.[20] As the storming took place, she and Gates were reportedly seen »munching« fruit salad, although they would later assert that she had watched the SWAT team enter the

20 Louis Sahagun and Carol McGraw, »Ex-First Lady Just Said Yes to Drug Raid: Nancy Reagan Regains Visibility as Crusader,« *Los Angeles Times*, April 8, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-08/local/me-1168_1_drug-raid.

building.[21] When it was over, she retouched her makeup and emerged to survey the results, touring the house and talking to the press. Police confiscated one gram of crack and arrested 14 people in the house.[22] They lay handcuffed on the floor as the former first lady walked around. She refrained from speaking to any of them, but as she passed by, one of them said »Hello, Mrs. Reagan.«[23] Reagan, who went on the raid because she wanted to see the conditions the users endured, said that »There were people on the floor. The rooms were unfurnished, small little rooms. It was very, very depressing. […] It's awful to see when you think that these people have no lives.«[24] The people in the house, by her estimation, were »beyond the point of teaching and rehabilitating.«[25] A crowd of about fifty residents gathered outside, some of whom used gang gestures, while others yelled »Hey Nancy Reagan. She's over here in the ghetto!«[26]

This coordinated event contains several »commonsensical« aspects. Reagan would have wanted to show her continued commitment to fighting drug

21 Louis Sahagun, »Former First Lady, Gates on Scene as SWAT Team Carries Out Drug Raid,« *Los Angeles Times*, April 7, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-04-07/local/me-1163_1_drug-raid.

22 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, enacted about a month after the televised address, introduced minimum penalties of ten years for possession of five grams of crack cocaine, while the same sentence applied to fifty grams of powdered cocaine. This sentencing disparity has been widely decried—while crack was mostly used in blighted urban areas, (expensive) powdered cocaine was mostly used by rich, white Americans. As Ronald signed the bill into law, Nancy stood beside him.

23 Bruce V. Bigelow, »Nancy Reagan Calls Raid on Cocaine ›Rock House‹ a Real Downer,« *Associated Press*, April 7, 1989, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Nancy-Reagan-Calls-Raid-on-Cocaine-Rock-House-a-Real-Downer/id-79be50abb626bfa2874bd1f8c229dbea.

24 »Nancy Reagan Goes on a Drug Bust,« *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 8, 1989, http://articles.philly.com/1989-04-08/news/26141510_1_nancy-reagan-drug-bust-movie-star.

25 »Nancy Reagan in on Bust,« *Greensboro News and Record*, April 8, 1989.

26 Sahagun, »Former First Lady, Gates on Scene.«

use, even after her husband's retirement, and going on a drug raid would certainly have been an gesture illustrating this intention. Moreover, it was already established practice for officials to personally follow officers on patrol.[27] Finally, Gates, who had helped found SWAT,[28] would have wanted to put a certain spin on the event. For years, his LAPD had battled drug peddlers and gang members with aggressive tactics, such as arresting nearly 1,500 people in a single weekend during the course of its notorious »Operation Hammer« (Klein 1997, 162). Exhibiting the necessity for SWAT's existence by emphasizing the risk involved in operations and the alien lives of the arrestees would have served him well, assuming the public would be spurred on to support increased funding through such a tactic. Additionally, it was rumored that Gates intended to run for Governor, and having Reagan advertise the merits of his initiative may have benefited that aspiration.[29] But beyond such machinations, the setting—and Reagan's characterization of it—shows that something else was occurring. An image of an outside space was being created, while simultaneously an inside space in need of protection was being realized. Through the use of space, appropriate measures for solving the drug problem could be established. I see Nancy Reagan's trip into the ghetto as a »constitutive event«—*namely* one that, by using space as a mediator, not only reflects a given set of circumstances but helps constitute both

27 For example, New York Governor Alfonse D'Amato and New York City mayor Rudolph Giuliani followed undercover New York Police Department (NYPD) operations in 1986 to highlight its work in relation to criminal trials; see »Top Officials Go Undercover to Underscore Drug Menace,« *Reading Eagle*, July 10, 1986, https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19860710&id=yxsiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=B6cFAAAAIBAJ&pg=5807,6177725&hl=en.

28 LAPD's SWAT was considered so effective that in 1980 Gates offered its services to President Jimmy Carter, when the latter was grappling with the Tehran hostage crisis. (An element of boasting, however, should not be discounted on Gates' part.)

29 A number of newspaper reports mention this. After his poor handling of the 1992 LA riots, however, Gates chose to retire, by which time a governorship must have seemed out of reach.

these circumstances and the actors—the insiders and outsiders—that give rise to the problem and solution. I explain this idea in further detail below.

The ghetto, heterotopia, and *narcotopia:* Or letting space express societal fault lines

Introduction—Definitions

Socio-spatial categories are often understood as natural. The distinction between public and private spheres, for instance—one which was realized in particular by the rise of the bourgeois order in Europe—is widely considered natural and innocent, despite having a clearly traceable history and despite being suffused with power relations. It is precisely their naturalized characteristics and apparent innocence that makes spaces ripe for analysis; through space, we may glance a society's ideological makeup and, especially, ideas and practices that relate to distinction, difference, and otherness. To this end, analyzing how a society distinguishes between and divides spaces may prove fruitful. Spaces, through the way in which they are constituted and function as mediators, both mirror and produce wider dividing practices.

A *heterotopia*—a concept conceived by Michel Foucault—is a space in which hegemonic conditions do not apply in the same way as they do in general society (1986, 22–27). Unlike utopias, which are imagined perfect spaces, *heterotopias* are simultaneously imagined and actually existing spaces that run counter to wider norms. For example, a graveyard is *heterotopic*: in this space, time apparently stands still and the behaviors that are commonly adhered to or performed lose their primacy (for example, it is acceptable for people to cry or act hysterically in graveyards). Foucault distinguishes between two types of *heterotopia*: those of crisis and those of deviation. The first refers to spaces that are occupied by people in crisis or in a position of liminality (such as military barracks or seclusion rooms for menstruating women). The second encompasses spaces that house deviant persons (such as prisons or psychiatric hospitals). (This distinction should best be seen as a generalized duality, which accommodates for a great deal of overlap.) Crucially, Foucault imbues space with specific forms

of behavior and, therefore, also with figures. To enter a *heterotopia* is to enter a space with predictable and specific character types. This matters a great deal, since *heterotopias* can thus function to stabilize identity—by situating victims and aggressors, insiders and outsiders, the normal and the deviant. It follows that *heterotopias* are not just geographical phenomena but are also largely about social roles, spatially contingent performances, and identities.

South Central Los Angeles can be configured as a *heterotopia* of both crisis and deviance. Many Americans would have recognized it as the location of the Watts riots or associated it with black militancy and gangsta rap.[30] Some would have taken the space as a byword for drug use and gang violence. Those unfamiliar with the crack house at the time of Nancy Reagan's visit were introduced to it by the Associated Press: »[t]he raid took place in the city's beleaguered south central section, where gangs such as the Crips and Bloods wage war on each other, often using semi-automatic weapons such as the AK-47 to carry out their vendettas.«[31] Here is a space in severe crisis, even in outright war. (The AK-47, surely the most iconic rifle in the world, is itself a symbol for unrest, rebellion, gangsterism, and communism.) Describing the area as »beleaguered,«

30 Gangsta rap, a subgenre of hip-hop, largely grew out of the ghettos in and around Los Angeles. During the latter half of the 1980s, vehement debates raged about the corrupting influence that gangsta rap might have on listeners, and South Central Los Angeles was put in the spotlight. A longer history of hip-hop would trace it back to New York and especially to the Bronx, where it often functioned—aside from entertainment—as a means of protest against urban decay and harrowing social conditions, conditions that continued with, and in many respects were exacerbated by, the regime of social cuts implemented by the Reagan administration. A compelling narrated history of hip-hop is provided by Nelson George (2005). For an account of hip-hop's place in broader discourses on the options for cultural resistance and the meaning of black authenticity, see Japtok and Jenkins (2011).

31 Bruce V. Bigelow, »Nancy Reagan Calls Raid on Cocaine ›Rock House‹ a Real Downer,« *Associated Press*, April 7, 1989, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1989/Nancy-Reagan-Calls-Raid-on-Cocaine-Rock-House-a-Real-Downer/id-79be50abb626bfa2874bd1f8c229dbea.

moreover, established it as simultaneously troubled and under siege or, in other words, as a *heterotopia* of both crisis and deviance.

I view the ghetto here as coming to form part of a social imaginary pertaining to drugs, one which I call—in a nod to Foucault—the *narcotopia*. The *narcotopia*, as is the case for *heterotopias*, is a space that helps situate the borders of normality and deviance, virtue and vice, and the proper course of action in dealing with drugs. It may take shape in manifold ways; a rough *troika* can be identified in the event I focus on here, which consists of the inside space of suburbia, the foreign space of the ghetto (in the domestic context), and the outside space of foreign countries. I explain this constellation below. As expressed through the event, space mediates carefully framed structural characteristics that help prescribe a very particular response to the drug problem.

Narcotopias hard and soft: Foreign countries, the ghetto, and suburbia

If the ghetto was beleaguered and under siege, it is telling that the AK-47 was used as a metonym for that situation. The rifle could bring an entire web of signification into the narrative, helping frame the ghetto's *narcotopian* qualities and those of the raid itself. The logic of the narrative was that drug-peddling gangsters were apparently roaming and controlling the streets of South Central, therefore suggesting that the war on drugs waged in response was a direct struggle for legitimacy and a monopoly of violence. Furthermore, it furnished the space with a strange interstitial quality, evoking associations that were simultaneously inside and outside of America (or an America turned inside out). A space on American soil had been taken over, enclosed, and besieged by outside forces. But what and who were these outside forces? (This is where drug-war spaces begin to express characters and identities.) To recycle a term from the (counter-)civil-rights struggle, »outside agitators« were frequently—implicitly or explicitly—identified as fomenting crisis by peddling drugs in occupied spaces. Such exteriorization directly relates to drugs' supposed foreignness (and their foreign trade routes) but also indicates a threat to the very foundation and spatial ordering of the state (and in American discourse, notions of exteriority are hardly innocent of racial difference). Debates concerning

whom neighborhoods belonged to, and who belonged in neighborhoods, appeared in several contemporary anti-drug cultural productions.

In an episode of *21 Jump Street* (a TV cop show), a group of youths, protesting the LAPD's inability to defeat the drug crisis, form a community watch organization named Street Rangers, an allusion to New York's Guardian Angels.[32] On patrol, the leader lectures the members that »These guys, the dealers, the buyers, they move in. A little or a lot, it doesn't matter—it takes the neighborhood away from the people. And pretty soon we've got graffiti, dopers hanging out, cars driving by all night, shootings, people afraid to come out of their own homes.« A black gangster confronts the group, nearly causing a disturbance: »You are the problem here,« he says. A Ranger objects, »The community is sick of…« but the gangster interrupts: »I am the community! Everybody on this street is the community. So you all are outsiders here. And that is where we want you—out!« In a terrible twist, the well-intentioned but frustrated activists end up resorting to the enemy's tactics, kidnapping someone they accuse of having murdered their leader Steve. The tied-up hostage is put on mock trial. Steve's brother speaks:

> »What kind of world do we live in? My brother gives his life protecting the people and these […] animals are selling dope and getting protected by the law? It's up to us to say no! We have to give some meaning to the sacrifices Steve made, which my family has to live with forever.«

A fixation on meaningful retribution starts to pervade the Rangers' activism, and their insistence on flaunting their »colors« begins to mirror a similar gang practice (in the same year, the gangster film *Colors* was released). These activists, fighting against drugs and a dangerous outside space, begin to adopt similar tactics and characteristics to the drug users and dealers. The threat the outside space poses here is evidently both spatial and foundational. In the ghetto, a parastate has apparently been established,

32 »Slippin' Into Darkness/Date with an Angel,« *21 Jump Street*, season 3, episode 2, originally aired November 6, 1988.

in defiance of government legitimacy and order, and the risk was that it would spread.

That the ghetto was continuously depicted in this way suggests that it was considered to be a space that was colluding with concrete outside forces, namely those foreign countries, often in Latin America, which largely supplied America with its drugs. In the 1980s, many cultural productions, especially films, imagined America undergoing an invasion. Most frequently, the invading party was the Soviet Union.[33] But in a number of cases, drug-peddling terrorists or organized cartels were shown subverting and attacking the country. To show that it is not a tenuous link I am making here—between the foreign and domestic drug war, foreign terrorists and the domestic ghetto—by way of illustration I offer an example from *48 Hours on Crack Street*, a CBS documentary that afforded television viewers a *vérité* look at the contemporary drug problem.[34] A concerned mother describes the situation in her neighborhood: »Noone in the neighborhood wants to live like this, and yet we find ourselves at the mercy of them. It's almost like the park is an armed camp and these are guerrillas or terrorists making these forays from the park in the neighborhood« says one. Another continues,

> The criminal elements, whoever they are, have taken over the neighborhood, and there doesn't seem to be a way […] of getting them out. […] Absolutely being overwhelmed, you know, these rats [from

33 Some examples include: the 1983 film *The Day After*, in which residents of Missouri and Kansas are subjected to a nuclear attack after a NATO-Warsaw Pact war breaks out; the 1984 film *Red Dawn*, where Soviet and Cuban armies take over the country, and a group of Colorado teenagers take up arms in response; or the 1987 TV miniseries *Amerika* in which the Red Army, following a bloodless takeover, occupies the United States for over a decade.

34 *48 Hours on Crack Street*, produced by *CBS News*, originally aired September 18, 1986, http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/48-hours-on-crack-street/.

> at least 1986 the drug problem was described as a »plague«[35]—FN] have come in through the pipes, and I'm sure there is the leader who is leading them, and our children are following them out.

As if to ensure that viewers realize the invasion is coming from the outside, another interviewee interjects that »It's not our children!« Apparently spontaneously, these interviewees draw parallels between drugs, foreign elements, guerilla warfare, and their own neighborhood. In Los Angeles, when the drug panic was at its peak, citizens were warned about Latin Americans stealthily invading the country. Absurdly, citizens were told to be on the lookout for »›suspicious‹ Latin Americans, especially ›polite, well-dressed‹ families or individuals with penchants for quiet suburban neighborhoods« (Davis 1990, 312). A strange invasion had taken place, with American streets now at the mercy of a complex combination of otherness, dangerous characters, and suddenly changing spaces.

Reagan's comments on the poor living conditions of the inhabitants of the crack house point to another idea. »The rooms were unfurnished,« she said, concluding that »these people have no lives.« To be sure, she was describing their living conditions honestly, but this fear of the disordered, chaotic domestic space also borrowed on a trope in which drugs debase the very idea of American life, which obviously relates to America's postwar »suburban moment« and what Robert Fishman in a 1987 book termed »bourgeois utopia«: the quiet, homogeneous, single-family house neighborhood. In a 1980 Pulitzer Prize-winning *Washington Post* article entitled »Jimmy's World« (which, it later emerged, was a fabrication), journalist Janet Cooke followed Jimmy, an eight-year-old heroin addict living in similar conditions to those Reagan had witnessed (had the piece been written some years later, the house would undoubtedly have been labelled a crack house; Jimmy's home is described as a »shooting gallery,«

35 In its March 17, 1986 issue, *Newsweek* seems to have been the first outlet to use the term. It featured a graph, entitled »A Coke Plague,« detailing American drug-use patterns over time. In June 1986, *Newsweek*'s editor-in-chief wrote an editorial entitled »The Plague Among Us,« furthering the drugs-as-disease topos. For a discussion of general news coverage on the crack scare, see James D. Orcutt and J. Blake Turner 1993, 190–206.

heroin's equivalent space).[36] Jimmy's world is one where faceless and nameless vagrants buy and inject heroin, and strangers help Jimmy to »get off« on a daily basis. But most terrifyingly of all, perhaps: it is Jimmy's stepfather who first introduced the little boy to heroin. At one point, after injecting Jimmy with heroin, the stepfather says—expressing his warped intentions—»Pretty soon, man, you got to learn how to do this for yourself.« Cooke further explains how this corruption began. It is not just drugs (although Jimmy's laconic mother admits that »Drugs and black folk been together for a very long time«) or economic deprivation but, as an expert informs,

> A lot of these parents (of children involved with drugs) are the unwed mothers of the 1960s, and they are bringing up their children by trial and error. […] The family structure is not there so [the children] establish a relationship with their peers. If the peers are into drugs, it won't be very long before the kids are, too.

Conditions, quite clearly, were bad. But where before these horrific spaces were imagined to be thoroughly *outré*, by the 1980s Americans were fretting that the drug scourge might spread.[37] Drugs were apparently becoming all too familiar and all too common. The outside spaces—the foreign countries and the ghettos that colluded with them—had ambitions of conquest.

Much like the guerilla warfare portrayed by the mothers in *48 Hours on Crack Street*, cultural productions continuously repeated the line that threats to the suburbs were being fended off. In an episode of the animated series

36 Janet Cooke, »Jimmy's World,« *Washington Post*, September 28, 1980, *The Washington Post Archives*, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/09/28/jimmys-world/605f237a-7330-4a69-8433-b6da4c519120/?utm_term=.a74c0ed8cf02.

37 For drug use as an outré phenomenon, think, for instance, of Jack Gerber's 1959 play *The Connection*, in which a group of users lie about in an apartment, waiting for a drug dealer to come, always remaining cut off from the »real« world. Think also of the 1971 movie *The Panic in Needle Park*, in which the drug scene was portrayed as subcultural, contained, and secretive, so cut off from the mainstream.

Rambo: The Force of Freedom (hereafter shortened to *Rambo*), Rambo visits Chopper, his suburban friend.[38] To Rambo's disappointment, Chopper's son Johnny is not there when he arrives; instead, the teenager, chased by a black sports car, comes racing down the street on his bicycle. Despite everyone's serious shock, Johnny refuses to divulge what had precipitated the chase. Later, when leaving the house, Rambo and Johnny take cover as the same car charges toward them, with one passenger firing a shotgun at them. It turns out that Johnny has a drug habit and owes his dealers money. This explains why valuables have recently been disappearing from Chopper's house; the home, in more than one material sense, has begun to disintegrate. Dismayed, Chopper says, »Why didn't I pay attention? This is my fault!« Rambo, with his hand on Chopper's shoulder, answers, »We're all at fault—all of us. We tolerate drugs, we put up with drug dealers. We've got to stop it.« Turning to Johnny, he adds »You can help me find the pushers selling dope to the kids. And you can tell your friends they don't have to do drugs—they can Just Say No.«

The pilot of *21 Jump Street*—the aforementioned detective series—has a strikingly similar opening, showing a family enjoying breakfast around their kitchen table.[39] They talk about mundane things (that serve as clear indicators of their class), such as the son's fledgling interest in playing the clarinet (in *Rambo*, Johnny has recently given up learning the guitar). Then comes the *coup de théâtre*: two black hoodlums suddenly burst through the kitchen's glass door, shattering the pane and startling the family. They are menacingly dressed, both sporting sunglasses, black leather gloves and, suggestive of their criminality, gold jewelry hangs from their necks; one wears a hooded sweatshirt, the other a red bomber jacket.[40] The latter, brandishing a shotgun, proclaims, »Stay quiet, stay alive!«

38 »Just Say No,« *Rambo: The Force of Freedom*, episode 58, originally aired December 8, 1986.

39 »Pilot,« *21 Jump Street*, season 1, episode 1, originally aired April 12, 1987.

40 While fashionable at the time, the bomber jacket would have stirred up associations of crime and, especially, racial strife: it was worn by some members of the Black Panther Party and, more notoriously, by neo-Nazis. The hooded sweater has long been associated with crime and

It turns out that the son owes them $6,000 worth of drug money and »Time's up.« To demonstrate the gravity of the situation, the hoodlum brandishing the gun shoots the living-room TV set. They demand that the father hands them the keys to the »Jag in the driveway … or we take li'l sister here to the prom.« After the two depart, the son pleads with his father not to call the police. (Explicitly here, a »vocal minority« attempts to convince the majority to stay silent.) But in all of these examples, the police and the adults do their job—they remember their roles once again—while the children learn to »Say No.« Finally, then, fears concerning space help to implement a general response, which I discuss in more detail below.

»What is to be done?«: Drugs, space, and the banal colonial response

As mentioned above, the ghetto's drug dealers and gangsters, whom Reagan wanted to see with her own eyes, were often framed as posing a direct challenge to state legitimacy. During the funeral of Oakland »drug king« Felix »The Cat« Mitchell, a television reporter lamented the fact that locals, including children, had come out to cheer on his procession and to give Mitchell a last goodbye, calling it a clear »advertisement for the other side.«[41] This »other side,« it was clear to many, needed containing, lest it spread and wholly undermine what America stood for. The response, again, would be largely spatial.

In the 1980s, the idea that drug use had become prevalent among all segments of society was continuously expressed. As such, to explicitly base policy or activism around class-based or racial logics and solutions would have proven contradictory and contentious. But through space, as I have tried to show, differences could be insisted upon without recourse

antisocial behavior, and it is an item of clothing that has deep racial connotations, as the controversy around the 2012 killing of Trayvon Martin—and the fact that he was wearing a hoodie—reminds us.

41 John Blackstone, *CBS News*, August 29, 1986. Retrieved from *YouTube.com*, »Felix Mitchell Junior: Drug Lord of East Oakland,« https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sDe2mlMJ95E.

to the specter of race. In addition, people and populations could, without a direct pronouncement, be categorized as either assailant or victim, in control or disoriented. To further emphasize this point, I briefly tackle the spatial aspects of the supposed solution to the drug crisis. Roughly speaking, and I am ignoring foreign battlegrounds here, the response was bifurcated, divided into a suburban response and another answer for the ghetto.

When the drugs scourge was fought in the suburbs, the official and grassroots reply was to take immediate and collective action. Parent groups were formed, policemen came to advocate DARE in schools, and students and teachers banded together behind the »Just Say No« slogan. Many teenagers themselves would have spontaneously begun to support abstinence, inspired by, say, the budding straight-edge punk scene (and the emergence of straight edge can hardly be read completely separately from growing mainstream intolerance). But ultimately, as the many television shows and films that tackled suburban drug problems show, solutions would be communal, voluntary, and iterative. The narrative was that, in the suburbs, drugs would force Americans to confront themselves, and demand for drugs would wither as soon as Americans remembered their true selves. Whether they had been exposed to drugs (yet) or not, citizens would ultimately prevail, fighting off the evil drugs represented, and reclaiming their bodies and neighborhoods.

Certainly, similar trends, particularly grassroots ones, can be found in the ghetto. (The »Crack is whack« slogan and the numerous rap artists who denounced drugs are indicative of this.) But in the hegemonic imagination, fighting the ghetto's drug problem required a wholly different approach. Unlike in the suburbs, where the American citizen knew deep down what was best for them, in the ghetto, a harder character type prevailed. Suburban characters, America's insiders, wouldn't, or couldn't, become one another's enemies; they were terrorized, victims of strange circumstances. By contrast, ghetto dwellers, like Jimmy's father, were considered to be agents of their own destruction. Here it is useful to recall our earlier discussion of war, since it is typically understood as a natural outcome of events, as the last but necessary resort. That white America repeatedly told itself that ghetto conditions resembled those experienced

in wartime served clear purposes. It was a comparison that enabled white America to rid itself of responsibility for the ghetto's troubles, while making warlike actions and tough punishments seem like the only moral policy that could most effectively reduce the harm drugs cause.

It is in this area that a colonialist gaze is in effect, through which the ghetto and blackness are viewed as a particular form of (domestic) otherness that must be liberated through violence. Just as was the case for drug-producing countries, the ghetto's homes and inhabitants needed to be saved from themselves through a determined offensive. When works from the time imagined America battling drug-producing countries, standard operating procedures were often ignored and it was thought that an increased use of force—unbound by threats or condemnations from local officials or the international community—would always lead to success. In the ghetto's drug war, standard operating procedures would also be sidestepped, ostensibly for the population's own good.

The focus on policing space could thus equip drug policy with a productive »banal colonialism.« I use the term »colonialism« because this space was, like the European model, couched in notions of liberation and uplift. And like Michael Billig's concept of »banal nationalism,« which comprises those habits, ideas, and forgotten reminders that sustain imagined communities (*nationalismproject.org* 2004), banal colonialism would tap into notions of foreignness already present in America. As was the case for foreign countries, the ghetto proved to be a legitimate target for intervention and pacification. As such, it was possible to talk about tougher policing and »liberation,« and drug-taking ghetto dwellers were not seen as innocent victims but instead as agents of their own destruction. Furthermore, banal colonialism, like its nationalist counterpart, legitimized and reinforced the systemic status quo. By spatially intervening in the ghetto and in foreign countries, suburban identity—as a stand in for American identity—would be reinforced and American space fortified.

Finally, the story, of course, returns to American insiders. The visit to the crack house could become part of that period's broader sentimental narrative and thus help spur America's identity-building anti-drug efforts. In the ghetto, there were no clear solutions that could be repeatedly

applied, but what the first lady had seen there was recounted to a stadium full of enthusiastic children. Just Say No's visit to the ghetto would establish meaning for the insiders as well, one that would further strengthen their foundations. And for the insiders, the formula would still stand: if the children would only hear the campaign's message, they would never end up like those docile bodies on that floor that were likely destined for prison. As before, the government would continue to do its job—hopefully with the ultimate result of bringing the outside within the inside's fold—but individuals had to support this activity through continued activism and permanent drug abstention.

Conclusion

Without doubt, the Reagan-era war on drugs had pernicious results. Tougher attitudes toward policing, combined with the enactment of sentencing disparities for crack and powdered cocaine, disproportionately and adversely affected African Americans and other minorities. Minimum sentencing laws and calls for judicial intolerance fortified the growth of a prison-industrial complex, the malignancy of which America is still experiencing today. The crackdown on drugs in the ghetto largely helped to establish what Loïc Wacquant (2000) terms a »new peculiar institution,« with the ghetto acting as a »social prison« and the prison as a »judicial ghetto.« When viewed through a spatial prism, however, I have argued that it is possible to measure how policies and societal attitudes function in the hegemonic subconscious. Assumptions about togetherness and otherness, which have a long pedigree in America, could be recruited and mobilized through ideas about space, helping to establish an effective narrative that pitted a moral inside and an immoral outside against one another. The Reagan administration cut federal drug-treatment expenditure, making many addicts more vulnerable in the process. The consequent ability to deliberately »other« groups of people, pinning responsibility for a malaise onto an outside or foreign body, could have partly led to the exoneration of officials. The administration's direct or indirect role in the production and trade of illegal drugs in and from Latin America, as well as its support of dictatorships who profited from this trade, may effectively have been concealed through the dissemination of a vocal, moralistic

anti-drug message. But a spatial focus shows how much policy acted within and through pre-established frameworks: what drugs came to express was already a story that had implicit beginnings and outcomes, and had been one long before Nancy Reagan entered the crack house.

Ultimately, I have intended to show that focusing on the spatial aspects of 1980s anti-drug discourse is worthwhile because—while it is possible to distinguish framing and performance from reception and dissemination—a study of spaces helps scholars to engage with the underlying premises and attitudes of policy and broader discourse. Moreover, while my paper has focused on the 1980s, I am partial to a »predictive« reading: that is, in some form, spaces, in particular *narcotopias,* will play a role in other periods and contexts of (anti-)drugs policy, and in drugs history in general. Focusing on such spaces allows scholars to move beyond assessments of cause and effect, and intentions *versus* results, permitting an interrogation of the culturally specific »ideological scaffolding« that has given meaning to drugs and made anti-drug efforts appear so commonsensical in nature.

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Braudel and Foucault on structure and event

Towards a new approach to (neo)liberalism and capitalism[1]

Ceyhun Gürkan

Introduction: History in a new light

Fernand Braudel (1902–1985) and Michel Foucault (1926–1984), two renowned French historians who exerted enormous influence on studies of the history of capitalism and (neo)liberalism, were not in regular dialogue despite living more or less at the same time. Their texts do however contain a few references to one another that are essential for recognizing common points and links between their historical approaches and problematics. For one, Braudel's historical sociology and Foucault's genealogical history share a long-view perspective and both advanced critical thinking on the crisis of the discipline of history in human sciences. Braudel's critiques of traditional history, which rely on heroic individuals and their successes and accounts in order to place surface-level events in a chronological time sequence, are the basis of his explorations into the history of modern economic civilization. In juxtaposition,

1 The early drafts of this paper formed part of the author's postdoctoral research on Foucault, governmentality, and public finance conducted in conjunction with the research group of Prof. Dr. Thomas Lemke with a focus on Biotechnologies, Nature and Society, Faculty of Social Sciences, Goethe-University. The project was funded by The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey as part of the 2219-International Postdoctoral Scholarship Program. I would also like to address my thanks to the two anonymous reviewers and Prof. Dr. Alfons Bora for their comments, critical remarks, and suggestions which helped to improve the content of the paper.

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inspired by Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogical critique of the history of origins, which regards human history as a progressive evolution, Foucault's critique of conventional history opens up a new horizon that enabled him to analyze his lifespan research triangle of »knowledge,« »power« and »subjectivation« starting from the times of the Roman and Greek civilizations through the *ancién regime* to the (neo)liberal age. As a result of their path-breaking and wide-ranging research into the history of human science, culture, and civilizations, Braudel and Foucault have become the most representative figures in the revolutionary turn of the discipline of history in the post-war period. Braudel sought to tread new pathways towards a transdisciplinary space in historical sociology by developing a long-term perspective based on new conceptions of time-scales, while Foucault's historical aim is associated with his critique of established notions of power and politics.

One of the common points of Braudel and Foucault is that their discussion and use of the structure and the event as analytical categories and methodological tools has played a constitutive role in the development of their revolutionary approaches to history, sociology, and politics. By extension, Braudel's and Foucault's historical views and methods establishing critical links between the structure and the event are the basis of their analyses as they venture into alternative interpretations of capitalism and (neo)liberalism. Braudel and Foucault recognize the history of capitalism and (neo)liberalism as centered around multiple societal power relations and long-term structures. Foucault puts emphasis on »the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality« (Foucault 1998a, 370), which also holds good for Braudel, who reaches the same conclusion about the non-finality of history through his structure-focused analysis.

Looking at the scarce mutual references of Braudel and Foucault, it is seen that both endorse the other's work and point to the links between their historical approaches and methods. These references give essential insights into their approaches to structures and events. In one, Braudel references Foucault, displaying the congruence or similarity of their conceptions of »civilization.« For Braudel, the history of a civilization

cannot be drawn around »turning points,« »events« and »heroes« (Braudel 1995, 26). Instead, long-term changes of the structural elements and limits of a civilization are related to its own past and other civilizations. The cultural, economic, religious or political exchanges between past and present—and between civilizations—can result in refusal or approval. Braudel considers Foucault's book *The History of Madness in the Classical Age* important because it illustrates how a subcutaneous structural element of the Western civilization has remained more or less unchanged into modernity despite changing attitudes towards the mad and the sane; »the triumph of reason« and »the public victory of rationalism and of classical science« (1995, 32).[2]

For Foucault, Braudel is significant in the new trajectory of the science of history. Foucault identifies four novelties in historical works of his time: new approaches to the periodization of history that do not focus only on critical events like political revolutions; new time-scales for the periodization of history, for which Braudel (2009) proposes »the short term,« which identifies the temporality of events, »the conjuctural« (cyclical time), and »the long term« (*longue durée*); transcending »[t]he old traditional opposition between the human sciences and history« (Foucault 1998b, 281); and finally the introduction of the varied »types of relationship and modes of connection« into historical analysis in such a way as to displace »the universal relation of causality« (1998b, 281) or, in Braudel's words, »game of ›causes‹ and ›effects‹« (Braudel 2009, 174). Foucault lends Braudel's name to the new project of historical analysis concerned with »the form of signs, traces, institutions, practices, works, and so on« (Foucault 1998b, 281).

2 Foucault's book on madness expounds on how the relation between reason and madness, the sane and the mad, in the West changed from the Middle Ages when the mad were regarded as »an emissary from God,« to the seventeenth century when the mad were regarded as »jetsam« to be imprisoned to keep them from threatening the »social order,« and finally to the nineteenth century when »they were treated more fairly, even kindly, because, they were recognized as ill« (Braudel 1995, 32).

Foucault credits these new developments, which are specifically focused on continuity, with helping to properly re-establish a connection between history and human sciences, but he is more concerned with discontinuities in history and »epistemological breaks« in human sciences. He characterizes the confluence of continuity and discontinuity as a »curious intersection« in the development of new ideas and approaches in the discipline of history (1998c, 298). Without specifying Braudel's name, Foucault refers to him as the watershed of this intersection (1998c, 298). If Foucault maintains a distinction between the two tracks of historical studies around the themes of continuity and discontinuity, he underscores that this does not mean that two opposite trajectories in historical analysis have emerged. Instead, »what has happened is that the notion of discontinuity has changed in status […] It has now become one of the fundamental elements of historical analysis« (1998c, 299).[3] Paul Rabinow's summary of Foucault's recognition of the Annales School is helpful as we proceed:

> He [Foucault] drew on existing resources, putting them to new uses. From the great French tradition of the *Annales* school of historical analysis, he retained a tradition of the *Annales* school of historical

3 There is also another point showing that Braudel influenced Foucault. Foucault (1980, 149) credits Braudel with introducing the subject of space and geography into historical analysis, admitting that Braudel and the first generation of historians of the Annales School influenced his use of spatial or geographical metaphors. »Geography,« writes Foucault, »must indeed necessarily lie at the heart of my concerns« (Foucault 2007a, 182). In the first volume of *Civilization and Capitalism: 15th–18th Century: The Structures of Everyday* (1981), Braudel explores the foundations of civilization; he directs his attention to urban and country houses, their architecture and building materials as well as their interiors, and to towns and big cities. Braudel also opens up a broader dialogue with geography in his works, in particular, in *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (1972), in which he links geography with politics. In regards to his analysis of power, Foucault seems to be more influenced by Braudel's political, economic and sociological insights into the spatial organization of civilization than his notion of the *longue durée* as the true time-scale that identifies the underlying structures of civilization.

> analysis [*sic*], he retained an emphasis on long-term and impersonal economic and social trends; from the equally distinctive French lineage of the history of science, he adopted an emphasis on concepts and epistemological rupture points. One could say, to simplify, that he sought to work at the nexus where the history of practices met the history of concepts. (Rabinow 1997, XI–XII)

Mitchell Dean (1994, 2), too, recognizes Foucault's works on »truth,« »power,« and »self,« which he describes as constituting »a Foucauldian triangle,« as a new gate to the terrain of historical sociology. In the following argument, Dean distinguishes Foucault's historical sociology, which is geared towards »problematising intellectual practice,« from »the progressivist theory,« which assumes a teleological historical drift, and »critical theory,« which develops an emancipatory theory against modernist dominations in social and intellectual spheres. Foucault's problematization of historical sociology refers back to Nietzsche's »effective history«[4] and attaches priority to »the dispersion of historical transformation, the rapid mutation of events, the multiplicity of temporalities, the differential forms of the timing and spacing of activities, and the possibility of invasion and even reversal of historical pathways« (1994, 4, emphasis added). As Dean rightly argues, Foucault's historical sociology built on the perspective of »critical and effective history« (1994, 12) taking as its point of departure the problematization of the present around the arrangements, configurations and organizations of knowledge/truth /rationality; power/domination/government; and subjectivity/self/ethics (that is, »the Foucauldian triangle«) and his approach is not totally

4 Or »wirkliche Historie« which stands in sharp contrast to »traditional history, in its dependence on metaphysics […] [which] is given to a contemplation of distances and heights: the noblest periods, the highest forms, the most abstract ideas, the purest individualities […] Effective history, on the other hand, shortens its vision to those things nearest to it-the body, the nervous system, nutrition, digestion, and energies […] It has no fear of looking down« (Foucault 1998a, 381). »The body—and everything that touches it: diet, climate and soil« (1998a, 375) constitute the historical objects and elements of effective history which is composed of events—natural and human.

inconsistent with that of Braudel, albeit varying contrasts do exist. Amongst them are Foucault's suggestion of »general history« against »total history« of the Annales School and, more importantly, his emphasis on the event against Braudel's discarding of the event as »a discrete atom« (1994, 38). Accordingly, what distinguishes Foucault's place in the sociological turn in history from that of Braudel and the Annales School is his recognition of the event as the method of historiography which he called »eventalization« (Foucault 2001c, 226), that is, »a construction of events« through which he was able to »breach self-evident continuity and teleological schemas« (Dean 1994, 41). All in all, a dialogue between Braudel and Foucault suggests that their historical methods and views, considered together, can serve well for analyzing the relations between structures, civilization, events, power, science, and discourse.

Rethinking structures and events in Braudel's historical sociology and the significance of Foucault for »eventful sociology«

The revolutionary turn in the use of history in sociological analysis instigated by Braudel ties in closely with his opposition to the conception of structure and event in a conventional historiography based essentially on a nineteenth-century Rankean narrative of events. Braudel's concern with the large-scale notions of structure, civilization, historical time, and the *longue durée* ties into his two primary aims. First, Braudel is concerned with overcoming the »general crisis in the human sciences« (Braudel 2009, 171). He aims to inspire a transformation in human sciences so as to replace the battle of the social sciences with the neighborhood of the social sciences. He argues that a new conception of time referring to a »precise idea of the multiplicity of temporalities and of the exceptional importance of the long term« (2009, 173) provides a foundation on which a possibility of a »common language in the social sciences« (2009, 202) can be built. A revolutionary change in the human sciences towards a transdisciplinary or unified and holistic social science in global terms can be constituted with a new long-term perspective. In this sense, the *longue durée* is not only a time-scale, measure or duration that explains deep structural foundations of civilization; as a perspective it is also the fundamental pillar of his objection against the idiographic epistemology

that sees events in their singularities and exceptionalities (Öziş 2010, 74) to the exclusion of the multifarious structural and historical relations and processes that engender them. Braudel is also diametrically opposed to any »single-factor explanation« (Braudel 1982, 402) that gives rise to nomothetic sciences which are ahistorical in character and presume general laws that govern individuals' conduct and mentality according to universal truths, as in neoclassical economics. »Sectorializing thought« advanced by idiographic sciences and »universalizing thought« by nomothetic sciences are the epistemological targets of Braudel's criticism from a perspective of the long term (Wallerstein 1995, 187–201). For Braudel, only historical analysis based on the long run can shackle the established epistemologies and create a new turn in human sciences. This turn, for Braudel, means establishing »a common program for the social science« on the basis of »the idea of multiple temporalities« (Braudel 2009, 189).

Second, Braudel's break with traditional historiography based on either nomothetic or idiographic epistemology is inextricably linked to his analysis of social reality. Social reality, for Braudel, is the composition and assembling of »the ceaseless constrains imposed by geography, by social hierarchy, by collective psychology and by economic need—all profound forces, barely recognized at first, especially by contemporaries, to whom they always seem perfectly natural; to be taken wholly for granted if they are thought about at all. These realities are what we now call ›structures‹« (1995, 27–28). In other words, structure implies »an organization, a degree of coherence, rather fixed relations between realities and social masses« (2009, 178). These multiple realities or structures constitute a civilization, »which can persist through a series of economies or societies, barely susceptible to gradual change. A civilization can be approached, therefore, only in the long term« (1995, 35).

Braudel characterizes civilization around multiple realities[5] or structures. His methodological discussion of multiple temporalities enables him to

5 Braudel identifies occurrences in material life with the notions of »realities,« »facts,« or »everyday details« which together form the constants and chains of the long-term history of structures. In his words: »Material life, of course, presents itself to us in the anecdotal form of

divide the social structure of civilization into varied social structures. »Each social reality creates its times and its levels of time« (2009, 200). Accordingly, the short term is identified with the event that comes about in a short period of time and »doesn't last long, disappearing almost as soon as one sees its flame« (2009, 174). Braudel cautions social scientists, especially economists »who are imprisoned in a very short present« and »trapped in this time bind« (2009, 183), not to fall into the »claws of the event« (2009, 184) because of its »capricious« and »deceptive« (2009, 175) nature. He adds the »cyclical phase« (*conjoncture*), »the cycle« or »the intercycle,« as the other time category. The conjunctural time exposes the »curves« and »oscillations« (2009, 177) which represent more or less stable and regular economic relations and developments. It is a longer duration (ten to fifty years) which denotes »the various rates of medium-term change« (1984, 17) and shorter than the *longue durée* (three to four hundred years) which »is made up of a succession of repeated movements, with variations and revivals, periods of decline, adaptation or stagnation—what sociologists would describe as structuration, destruction and restructuration« (1984, 621). It should be noted that if Braudel accords primacy to the long term and the conjunctural time over the short term of the event he believes that they »coexist« and »cannot be separated« (1984, 85). Put this way, they »are bound together […] The *longue durée*, *cyclical phase (conjoncture*), and events fit together easily« (2009, 19). As such, the long term being the fundamental perspective of historical analysis, the recognition of the coexistence and conjoining of these historical time categories with each other is essential for making sense of the interweaving of events and structures. Therefore, what is important for Braudel is a back-and-forth move »from the event to the structure, then from structures and models to the event« (2009, 201).

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thousands and thousands of assorted facts. Can we call these events? No: to do so would be to inflate their importance, to grant them significance they never had« (Braudel 1981, 560). For Braudel, events are different from facts and the details of everyday life and have, in relation with structures, certain impacts on civilization.

Thus, it is fair to say that Braudel is not ignorant of the significance of the event and its temporality for understanding changes in structures. In this sense, Braudel does not stick to a structure-obsessed global history approach. A closer critical reading of Braudel suggests that he lays out a global historical sociological perspective surrounding the symbiotic relationship between events and structures. That being so, Braudel's discussions of the coexistence of the temporalities of events and structures inspired new strides in historical sociology in the 1980s, which recognized the event as the analytical, methodological and theoretical unit. This new event-focused historical sociology is described as »eventful sociology« by William H. Sewell (2005), known for his much-read and well-regarded works on the historical sociology of events. Sewell's critical analysis of classical historical sociology elicits its event-oriented theoretical aspects; however, as will be discussed, Foucault's works, which assume »eventalization« as a method, have been understudied for the promotion of »eventful sociology.« Foucault took a position against what he called »de-eventalization« in historical sociology, by which he meant historical works whose research object proves to be »the most unitary, necessary, inevitable, and (ultimately) extrahistorical mechanism or structure available« (Foucault 2001c, 228). In contradistinction to »de-eventalization,« Foucault called for »eventful sociology,« which he described as »eventalization.«

> I am trying to work in the direction of what one might call »eventalization.« […] What do I mean by this term? First of all, a breach of self-evidence. It means making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness that imposes itself uniformly on all. To show that things »weren't as necessary as all that« […] Second, eventalization means rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, strategies, and so on, that at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal, and necessary. In this sense, one is indeed effecting a sort of multiplication or pluralization of causes. (Foucault 2001c, 226–27)

Foucault's »critical and effective history« suggests that the true and critical historical sense and research is not engaged with »origins« but the »genesis« of the numerous »entangled events« (Foucault 1998a, 381). In accordance with the view of Braudel, who regards history as »the sum of all possible histories« (Braudel 2009, 182), Foucault's genealogical history »as the vertical projection of its position« (Foucault 1998a, 382) aims at »liberating a profusion of lost events« (1998a, 374). Therefore, genealogical history is engaged with the multiplicity and contingency of events and their co-genesis and interwovenness as well as their inclusion of multiple relations and structural elements. On this basis of genealogical history, a single event in historical analysis can achieve its true historical significance. This is the game of power relations, the event being »a scene where forces are risked and confront one another where they emerge triumphant, where they can also be confiscated« (1998a, 385).[6]

> An entire historical tradition (theological or rationalistic) aims at dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity—as a theological movement or a natural process. »Effective« history, however, deals with events in terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations. An event, consequently, is not a decision, a treaty, a reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, the appropriation of a vocabulary turned against those who had once used it, a domination that grows feeble, poisons itself, grows slack, the entry of a masked »other.« (Foucault 1998a, 380–81)[7]

6 For an illustration of reading history as a game of power relations, see Foucault's elaboration of *Oedipus the King* (Foucault 2001a).

7 Foucault makes this point clearer in his short piece »The Art of Telling the Truth.« In a dialogue with Kant, Foucault explicates that Kant's »What is Enlightenment?' was the turning point in philosophy because it introduced »the question of the present, the question of what is happening now […] What is my present? What is the meaning of this present?« (Foucault 1988, 87, 89). With these questions on the »ontology of the present and ourselves« (1988, 95), a new interpretation of modernity in philosophy began for Foucault. It is events, neither the large-scale nor crucial events, but sub-events/undersized events which

This new conception of the event in genealogical history raises two criticisms in Foucault's oeuvre. One of them intersects with Braudel's transdisciplinary critical perspective against traditional historiography based on either idiographic or nomothetic epistemology. Braudel and Foucault place their historical perspective and methods in opposition to conventional narratives of events. Second, Foucault's genealogical history raises a political criticism, against the established systems of values and regimes of truth emerging from traditional historical analysis, that seeks to discover the origins of things. Foucault follows Nietzsche's critique of conventional history as the grid of truth production which contrives a way towards totalitarian politics gravitating around the single Truth with definite origins produced by metaphysics (Brown 2001). By means of the genealogical history, Foucault wants to open up a new horizon for politics, or better still, »the possibility of constituting a new politics of truth,« in other words, for breaking away from the conventional »political, economic, institutional regime of the production of truth« (Foucault 2001b, 133). He believes that only a genealogical history can, in his words, »afford us a model for a historical analysis of what I would call the politics of truth« (2001a, 13). All in all, the politics of truth is essential for a radical turn in politics in theory and practice as well as for critical theory and epistemology in historical analysis so as to trigger »the insurrection of subjugated knowledges […] that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations and disqualified

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are hardly recognized at first, construct the present. As Kant takes up the French Revolution, it was not the Revolution itself but not-easily-observable events around the great event that proved to be the signs for the progress of the mankind. For Kant, only those events which are of the nature of *rememorativum* (the rememorative sign), *demonstrativum* (the demonstrative), and *prognosticum* (the prognostic sign) (1988, 91) bear the features of being the sign of progress. These are the criteria for an event or a series of entangled micro events and practices that have the capability to construct the present in a continuous manner. Taking inspiration from Kant, philosophy or »the history of the present« (1995, 31) is eventful for Foucault and as such recognizes the inter-temporality of events having the above-mentioned characteristics, which open a critical political approach to our presence at present.

as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naive knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity« (2003, 7). The achievement of these two interrelated aims of Foucault's genealogical and archeological history or, in short, »critical and effective history« consists in a new sociological and political vision as outlined above.

On balance, Foucault's »critical and effective history« has strong potentialities to support »eventful sociology.« In a nutshell, »eventful sociology« has been recently promoted by Sewell's works (1996, 2005, 2008) as the new critical wave in historical sociology. Eventful sociology attaches great significance to the event »as a theoretical category« (Sewell 1996, 841) with an eye to opening up a new methodological way of conceiving the multiple temporalities of social life, which is seen as »eventful,« that is, »irreversible, contingent, uneven, discontinuous and transformational« (2008). This »eventful temporality« (2005, 100–102) thus considers Braudel's conception of the symbiotic relationship between events and structures by tipping the balance in favor of the event in order to identify how events transform structures which are now regarded as the outcomes of »human action« (2005, 111). In addition to its innovative methodological implications, eventful sociology is employed and promoted by Sewell (2008) to gain new insights into the cultural political economy analysis of the history of capitalism and the neoliberal configuration of capitalism at present. If one sees the history of capitalism from the standpoint of eventful sociology, it becomes clear that capitalism, being a social organization with an unprecedented institutional setting, has emerged from radical, contingent, entangled, and unpredictable events and human actions in a process similar to »creative destruction,« as Joseph Schumpeter (1950) would have it. This means that capitalism is an event of invention in human history and not an enduring certainty. Thus, eventful sociology politicizes the history of capitalism in the sense that its past, present, and future depend on radical contingent human actions and forces that would trigger radical challenges to and changes in established structures.

This eventful conception of the past and future of capitalism provides a firm ground for understanding the eventful character of neoliberal capitalism at present. After all, Sewell's (2008) discussion of structures and events ends with an attempt to analyze neoliberal capitalism from an eventful sociological perspective. Sewell (2008, 521–23) identifies the expansion of socially abstract capitalist relations into non-economic and non-capitalist spheres as the most characteristic of the neoliberal restructuring of capitalism in which financial logics and events are at the center, creating new ways of capitalist accumulation. In the final analysis, Sewell correctly distinguishes neoliberal capitalism's »hyper-eventful« (2008, 527), unpredictable, excessive short-term, crisis-ridden, manipulative, chaotic, and dynamic character in producing forceful effects penetrating the very capillaries of society, which, all things considered, enhances wide-ranging conflicts across society and the entire globe. Therefore, the birth and development of eventful sociology itself lies at the very heart of the neoliberal configuration of capitalism. At this juncture, turning back to the insightful analytical schemas proposed by Braudel and Foucault comes in handy. Braudel's analytical scheme deals with an economic system dominated and ruled by capitalism and that of Foucault is engaged in (neo)liberalism as the complex ensemble of modern technologies of the production of truth, power, and ethical regimes, which, considered together, will help us make further contributions to the eventful sociological analysis of neoliberal capitalism.

Towards an integrated analytics of structures and events in times of neoliberal capitalism

The historical and methodological approaches of Braudel and Foucault to structures and events present us with two distinct analytical schemas supporting an eventful sociological perspective that are illuminating and instructive for developing new understandings of the history of capitalism and neoliberalism as well as the current dynamics of the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. These are the tripartite schema proposed by Braudel, which envisions society as divided into three layers (»capitalism,« »the market economy,« »material life«) in a hierarchical order which is best pictured in the form of a »pyramid« (Braudel 1982, 91; Özveren 2005, 115) and

Foucault's »analytics of power« (Foucault 1978, 82, 90; 2003, 23) which focuses on micro-power relations and spaces, and his »analytics of government« (Lemke 2012, 25–40), which comprehends (neo)liberalism as governmental rationality and an assemblage of governmental technologies. The conception of modern society building on the idea of the coexistence of multiple economies and power/governmental relations means that economies include governmentalities and power relations on macro and micro levels, and vice versa. As such, these two analytics, in Braudel's own words, aspire to analyze society »in all the richness, complexity and heterogeneity of real life« (Braudel 1981, 25).

Braudel's analytics identifies three major economic realms with different temporalities: 1) capitalist economy is a contingent eventful and conjunctural sphere that more or less follows long-term strategic and lucrative business/commercial affairs. It is the homeland of revolutionary events, especially regarding industrial and financial innovations, conjunctural forceful events that influence the whole structure in a way that forces it to change radically and abruptly; 2) the market economy or the site of economic and social regularities in which opposite forces balance each other out; and 3) the material life, the realm of subsistence economy that flows away in the watercourse of the *longue durée*. Yet they are not distinguished only by different time frames. The scales and organization of economic transactions, agents, motives, actions and mentalities also play their roles in this partitioning of the societal system (1982, 22), which means that there is no single »social machinery« (1982, 166). Instead, Braudel envisions society as »a set of sets« (1982, 458).

Braudel characterizes material life as »infra-economy, the informal other half of economic activity, the world of self-sufficiency and barter of goods and services within a very small radius« (1981, 24). Material life bears resemblance to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*, »systems of durable, transposable dispositions, [and] structured structures« (Bourdieu 1990, 53). Material life mostly consists of rural life, still a daily reality for

almost half of the world's population.[8] Material life, which has the nature of inertia within the time frame of the long term, mostly escapes the attention of economists and historians. Material life seems to be a domain of, what Foucault (2001d, 379–80) would call, »non-event.« It is because of this fact that Braudel characterizes material life as a »shadowy zone« (Braudel 1981, 23).

The market economy exists as one economic order within which regular and visible transactions and relations take place between numerous buyers and sellers who do not have any monopoly power over the market exchanges. It consists of »transparent visible realities« (1981, 23), which do not necessarily lead to speculative transactions, because economic agents depend on competitively-determined prices via functional demand-supply mechanisms outside the control of individual enterprises. Thus, entrepreneurs earn modest profits in both commercial and production activities, almost at the level of normal profits in standard economic parlance. But this does not mean that »a microcapitalism« (1979, 62) does not exist in the market economy.

Moving up the layers of the pyramid towards its zenith through the »microcapitalisms« of the market economy, we face real capitalism. It occupies the smallest area, which, however, is the space of commanding height of economy in social hierarchy where the endless accumulation of power and wealth takes place. Capitalism is a »zone of turbulence« (1981, 24) for Braudel, in which pecuniary and commercial speculative affairs take place chasing after »super-profits« (1982, 405). It is the place where the rules are constantly bent and predatory strategies for »super-profits« are carved out. Capitalism is not always market-friendly. Quite the reverse, by and large it has a negative relation with the market economy, so much so that it constitutes an »anti-market« (1982, 136, 230). That is, it proceeds with constant rule-breaking strategies against the market. It is the sphere of »[c]ertain groups of privileged actors engaged in circuits and

8 According to the United Nations report *World Urbanization Prospects* (2014, xxi), fifty four percent of the world population lives in urban areas. By 2050, that number is expected to rise to sixty six percent.

calculations that ordinary people [know] nothing of« (1981, 24). Here is the place where the accumulation of power based on hierarchical relations is achieved. Therefore, if the market economy for Braudel is »a world of transparence and regularity […] open to free competition« (1982, 455), capitalism is a »sophisticated economy« that functions according to »calculations and speculation« (1982, 22) for lucrative and mostly speculative financial and commercial business affairs. As a »hyper-eventful« domain, capitalism is full of contingent and risk-laden events, which break out in the form of crises that force the structures of lower layers of the pyramid to change.

Braudel's tripartite schema of society, which is derived from his conception of social life around different time rhythms, has certain objections against the established views of economics on economic life. First, *contra* mainstream economists, social life cannot be analyzed based on an imaginary thinking that assumes society as exclusively composed of capitalism or the market economy to the exclusion of material life, which mostly considers capitalism and the market economy as one and the same thing. In line with this, Braudel, does not conceive capitalism as an all-pervasive economic and social system dominating the entire social order with its set of interests, considerations, ways of doing things, lines of reasoning, and economic and cultural life, which is one of the reasons for Braudel's contemplation of society as »a set of sets.« Braudel states that he is of the same mind as Immanuel Wallerstein and Rosa Luxemburg to the effect that capitalist and non-capitalist structures coexist (1984, 64–65). If capitalism is an invasive social system, it does not completely integrate with other social systems— material life and the market economy. Instead, it touches them obliquely. It prefers to be stay at the top of the social hierarchies. In his words: »The preserve of the few, capitalism is unthinkable without society's complicity […] For in a certain manner, society as a whole must more or less consciously accept capitalism's values. But this does not always happen« (1979, 63–64).

Be that as it may, what distinguishes the present form of capitalism under the neoliberal configuration of society and economy from its past liberal counterparts is the constant, emphatic and mostly forceful

extension of capitalistic market relations, attitudes and mentalities into the non-capitalistic market and social domains as far as the depth of material life which Braudel defines as a »layer covering earth« (1981, 23). As an example, as the result of growing financial debt relations and concomitantly the increasing use of biotechnologies, genetically modified and hybrid seeds, the transformation of the long-term agricultural structures, mentalities, habits of thought and techniques has resulted in an increasing disciplinarization of nature and farmers, as a study on Braudel and Foucault correctly argues (Carolan 2005). The distinguishing feature of neoliberalism for Foucault is its modeling of political government and social/material life on marketing. »The problem of neoliberalism is rather how the overall exercise of political power can be modeled on the principles of a market economy« (Foucault 2008, 131). In other words, »[o]ne must govern for the market, rather than because of the market« (2008, 121) as classical liberalism had formerly assumed. As German neoliberalism (ordo-liberalism) promotes, neoliberalism is »a framework policy« (2008, 140) that aims to »intervene on society […] in its fabric and depth […] so that competitive mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment« (2008, 145). Therefore, Foucault is more concerned with identifying the mechanisms of the dissemination of neoliberal governmental techniques, rationalities and norms throughout society than with making analytical distinctions between societal layers to detect their characteristics. However, what is missing in Foucault's rightful depiction of neoliberalism is its lack of awareness regarding the distinction between unpredictable, unregulated and unbounded (financial) capitalism and the structurally institutionalized competitive market economy as suggested by Braudel.[9] Integrating these two analytics can provide a powerful tool that is useful for understanding the configurations and changing patterns of structures and events under crisis-ridden neoliberal financial capitalism.

9 Contemporary studies in governmentality and biopolitics are focused on neoliberal and financial capitalism, see Collier (2011), Dardot and Laval (2014), Fumagalli and Mezzadra (2010), Hardt and Negri (2012), Lazzarato (2009, 2014, 2015), McMahon (2015).

The analytics developed by Foucault can be understood in two contexts: power and government. Through »the analytics of power,« Foucault, in opposition to a theory of power that builds on universal juridical conceptions as representations of the politically centralized sovereign state, is engaged in analyzing power relations in wide-ranging domains of society and the apparatuses that (re)produce power relations in micro domains. In his words, »the issue is to determine what are, in their mechanisms, effects, their relations, the various power-apparatuses that operate at various levels of society, in such very different domains and with so many different extensions?« (2003, 13). In this sense, there is no single domain of power, quite the opposite, what is at issue is »the existence of regions of power. Society is an archipelago of different powers« (2007b, 156), an expression which is close to Braudel's »society as a set of sets.« Therefore, in Foucault's analytics of power we discern a shift in the object of analysis from *the* power to multiple power relations across society. By means of the analytics of power, Foucault (1995) explores disciplinary forms, apparatuses, and institutions such as schools, prison, hospital, factories, and barracks which do not necessarily operate in a repressive way over subjects but instead through certain mechanisms of individualization, normalization, permanent modifications, interventions, hierarchization, surveillance, regular testing, isolation and confinement to construct malleable bodies for predetermined targets in which enhancing productivity comes first.

As such, the institutions of disciplinary power are not only the institutions of state power but also spread into the social body through family, army, police, schools, factory, hospital and through diverse local administration of collective bodies. In this sense, disciplinary power operates in the social body, orchestrating a spatial distribution of individual bodies to specific places. According to the techniques and procedures of disciplinary power, the artificial or institutional organization of the sexual, emotional, productive, biological, pedagogical, military aspects of the life of individual bodies consist in »a strict spatial partitioning« (1995, 195). In this sense, »[d]iscipline organizes an analytical space« (1995, 143) in order »to create a useful space« (1995, 144). This

goes hand in hand with a »detailed partitioning of time« (1995, 150) in order to create »a better economy of time« (1995, 148). This means the detailed partitioning of time and space by disciplinary institutions and techniques through which the energy of individual bodies is used and governed effectively and optimally for achieving certain ends without giving way to any disobedient feelings and behaviors. It is »to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost« (1995, 218).

Here, two points are important in relation to Braudel's analytical schema of society. First, Foucault too envisages the disciplinary modality of power and power relations as operating in a pyramidal hierarchical order for which he uses the metaphor of the »Panopticon« (1995). Yet, the tip of the pyramid is not the realm that produces and commands power relations.[10] Instead, an articulation between the layers of the pyramid is at issue, enabling the power relations to disseminate across societal system. Second, Foucault sees the disciplinary formation of society as the correlate of the capitalist structuring of society.[11] However, Foucault's conception of capitalism refers to industrial capitalism in which labor exploitation and productivity through disciplinary techniques are essential targets. On the other side, for Braudel, capitalism is not reducible to

10 »[T]his summit doesn't form the »source« or »principle« from which all power derives as though from a luminous focus (the image by which the monarchy represents itself). The summit and the lower elements of the hierarchy stand in a relationship of mutual support and conditioning, a mutual »hold« (Foucault 2007b, 159). Although capitalist and disciplinary formation of society proves to be a »pyramidal organization« that »gives it a head, it is the apparatus as whole that produces power« (1995, 177). But the tip of the pyramid comprised of the state and high finance has certain strategic governmental functions. It constitutes the boundaries and privileges by taking power relations under its permanent supervision (Lemke 2012, 31–32).

11 »The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, »political anatomy,« could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions« (Foucault 1995, 221).

industrial capitalism; even so, capitalism has no real home, something Foucault would argue for neoliberalism.

What interests Foucault in regard to capitalism is not so much the determined aim and action of the bourgeoisie to get hold of power as its concerted acts towards transforming the political power techniques in governing individuals as part of the population. Thus the political object and governmental rationality of disciplinary power needs to be reshaped by liberalism after the mid-eighteenth century according to a new governmental rationality formed by the supposed natural mechanisms and the »milieu« of the market economy.[12] In liberal governmentality, whose major form of knowledge is political economy, time becomes bound up with a series of events in »the market milieu« (2008, 259). And, in theory, or better still, in the liberal governmental rationality, artificially constructed and partitioned spaces are replaced with wide-open milieu in which natural population movements take place. This new articulation and configuration of time as event-bounded temporality and space as »milieu« in classical liberalism opened up a new type of government in the mid-eighteenth century.

12 The issue here for Foucault is not to propose and defend a liberal theory of the market as in mainstream economics, assuming that the market is natural and does not require any institutional inventions to function spontaneously as a self-regulating mechanism. What Foucault shows is that the logic, rationality, and techniques of the liberal art of government rest on this very teleological and ahistorical vision of the market. Compared with Karl Polanyi's (2001, 147) thesis that the market is not natural, but a product of a concerted and planned action of the state, the issue becomes problematic. Foucault himself would not be against Polanyi's thesis and institutional theory of the *laissez-faire* market economy, which expounds the actually existing history of market society, because the context of the former's problematization of the market is rather different. Polanyi is engaged in illustrating the invalidity of the *laissez-faire* myth by explaining the history and nature of the market society. Foucault depicts how this myth turns out to be the actual logic and rationality of liberalism in governing the state, society, and individuals. For an original Foucauldian critique of Polanyi in the context of classical liberal and neoliberal governmentality see Dardot and Laval (2014, 42–46).

In addition, Foucault points to three diverse conceptions of milieu in the sovereign, disciplinary, and security modes of power. Accordingly, »sovereignty capitalizes a territory, raising the major problem of the seat of government, whereas discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, and security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events« (2007a, 20). In Foucault's recognition of the milieu of a liberal government is a political *dispositif* that targets ensuring security by means of the free game of forces which are in constant circulation in the form of a free flow of events that neutralize and balance each other out. Hence, Foucault explores the milieu as an eventful governmental instrument in the liberal art of government. In liberal governmentality »reality is the correlate of the government« (2007a, 272), where reality refers to events, not to structures.

Liberal governmentality, therefore, is the cradle of changing structure of bio-power that modifies the disciplinary logic of power by shifting the domain of power from institutionally and artificially created and organized spaces onto the broad domain of the market. In contrast to the disciplinary mode of power, liberal government does not deal with the event by creating tight and permanent surveillance over time and space. Instead, liberalism lets the events take their natural course as formulated by the physiocrats through the expression of *laissez-faire, laissez-passer*. The reasoning is that in the natural milieu of the market, events are to reach an equilibrium where they neutralize and balance each other out, which naturally produces measures against security problems inherent to capitalist market economies (Folkers 2014, 93–95). Accordingly, liberal governmentality gives importance to the natural circulation of things and the population in the market milieu and assumes a time scale during which the natural flows and fluctuations of events occur more or less regularly in a rather short term. In the final analysis, liberal governmentality conceives social realm as »an indefinite series of events« (Foucault 2007a, 20).

Liberal governmentality accords privilege to probabilities, uncertainties, and consequences of events over pre-determined priorities (*consequentialism*). This requires a calculative rationality such as the *Tableau Economique,* as

opposed to a police state, which takes preventive measures to obstruct bad or negative events in advance. Therefore, what is at issue in liberal governmentality can be characterized as »the government of economic events« (Folkers 2014), the management of crises, risks and dangers. This ensures a least-cost or frugal government because, as Giorgio Agamben puts it, »governing the causes is difficult and expensive.« Therefore, »it is more safe and useful to try to govern the effects […] If government aims to the effects and not to the causes, it will be obliged to extend and multiply controls. Causes demand to be known, while effects can only be checked and controlled« (Agamben 2013, § 7). As such, the naturalness of events, which are the results of the natural movements of the population, and the market milieu prove to be the essential instruments of the liberal art of government. The market milieu is the most representative domain of the liberal conception of space—in contrast to the territorial conception of sovereignty and artificially constructed spaces of discipline—because it involves governing individuals through freedom. Last but not least, if the milieu of the liberal art of government has a natural character, it is still a »field of intervention« (Foucault 2007a, 21). The liberal state has certain mechanism and techniques to intervene in the natural milieu of the market economy and its events, formulated around the premise of »governmental naturalism« (2008, 61), exchange, and equality. It is Foucault's merit to have distinguished between the »governmental naturalism« of classical liberalism, which assumes a distance, not opposition, between the state and the market, and the constructivist nature of neoliberalism, which reduces the distance between the state and civil society (the market) by organizing social, political, and economic life around the premise of competition and entrepreneurial freedom, resulting in the »extension of market logic« (2008, 118) into non-economic spheres and relations.

In lieu of a conclusion

All in all, we are presented with two analytics by Braudel and Foucault, which, once considered together in the imaginary form of integrated analytics, are very helpful for providing guiding insights into approaching

neoliberal capitalism and its continuing crisis.[13] Braudel's tripartite schema is useful for distinguishing the peculiarities of capitalism, the market economy, and material life, and recognizing the pluralities of society in respect to economic and cultural structures and organization. Foucault's analytics of power and government is useful for understanding the different modes of power regimes. Foucault's triangle of modes of ruling comprises »sovereign,« »disciplinary,« and »security« modes of power. Just as Braudel argues, there cannot be a linear historical drift from the subsistence economy of material life to the market economy and finally the capitalist economy; for Foucault »there is not [a] succession of law [sovereignty], then discipline, then security [(neo)liberalism]« (2007a, 10). »The general economy of power in our societies« (2007a, 10), in Foucault's phrase, comprises these three modes of ruling and corresponding economic structures at the same time. Sovereignty, discipline and security as the modern »governmental management« constitute a »triangle« of the power regime we live in. [14]

13 I argue that the present world economic and political order in advanced and developing capitalist countries is still in crisis ten years after the great global financial crisis in 2008. The reasons behind this are numerous, but most notable, as recently delineated in the works of Wolfang Streeck (2014, 2016), are low rates of growth, rising inequality at the national and global level, the upsurge of public and household debt as a result of financialization and, consequently, the demise of democratic institutions that have governed capitalist economies over the post-war period, paving the way for technocratic and authoritarian modes of governing the economic and political order. Therefore, as Streeck argues, the continuing crisis of capitalism calls for rethinking sovereignty as part of the problem of the crisis of neoliberal government in the face of the crisis that goes beyond its economic scope in a way to destruct the political and social foundations of the post-war democratic capitalism without inspiring any imagination and expectation for a new democratic order.

14 Pierre Macherey (2015), reading Foucault's research into the analytics of power and disciplinary society in light of Marx's relevant chapters in *Capital* on labor as productive power, that is, »labor-power,« identifies three mechanisms in governing population: »Direction,« »supervision« and »mediation.« This bears a resemblance to Foucault's triangle of power regimes that together shape the present power order. Considered



together, direction or sovereignty is the »direct form of authority«; supervision as a lower-authority involves disciplinary techniques that enable power to circulate through multiplicities; mediation as the form of »the generalization of authority« constitutes a complex network of power regime among individuals, forging a path for subjectivation with a relative autonomy in the capitalistic market milieu within a security paradigm. Incidentally, Braudel (1984, 621) conceives of capitalism in a similar vein, arguing that mercantile, industrial, and finance capitalism do not represent the stages of a progressive and linear history of capitalism; rather together they form a capitalist order past and present in which unspecialized and flexible capitalist ways of gaining choose commerce, production, and finance in conjunction. Put together, mercantile, industrial, and finance capitalism correspond to specific power regimes in Foucault's scheme. Mercantile capitalism emerged at the beginning of the art of government in the age of Cameralism, police, and the state, in which sovereignty was reproblematized in line with the rising importance of government. Industrial capitalism added discipline and the liberal art of government to this previous form of a power regime. Finance capitalism, which is a historical form of capitalism *à la* Braudel, gives a new direction to liberal governmentality, today widely known as neoliberalism, in which »direction,« »supervision,« and »mediation« are combined selectively in a neoliberal power regime that relies on the paradigm of security or *securitization*. These different conceptualizations of capitalism and power suggest that they operate and co-exist in a complex web of interactions.

The above illustration provides helpful insights into Braudel's and Foucault's perspectives on structures and events in the context of capitalism and (neo)liberal government. First of all, as mentioned above, the temporalities of social life are central to Braudel's historical sociology. If we conceive of the issue of temporality in the context of Foucault's analytics of power and government, we recognize that each power regime has its own temporality or time horizon and rhythm. Whereas the power regime of sovereignty has a final point in time which spots the end of the sovereign state and another starting point for the new one, »an indefinite time« horizon underlies the state doctrine later perfected by the (neo)liberal art of government, in the sense that governments will always be present even if the states perhaps come to an end. Under the sway of a power regime ruled by a (neo)liberal government, if there is possibly an end to »the indefinite governmentality of the state« or »a revolutionary eschatology« full of revolutionary events, it could be carried out by civil society, not by the state (which would reopen onto another indefinite time horizon). This is the critical and revolutionary hope of Foucault for the next stage of civilization, in which he identifies the development of »counter-conducts« with »the right to revolution« against (neo)liberal governmentality. As for the temporality of disciplinary power, it justifies the disciplinarization of every single moment in time in the capitalist production of commodities and bodies. This also involves an infinitive time horizon in the sense that disciplinary power uses time to the utmost at the present. Disciplinary time also opens onto a final point in the indefinite time horizon where most profit is obtained. »The disciplinary methods reveal a linear time whose moments are integrated, one upon another, and which is orientated towards a terminal, stable point; in short, an ›evolutive‹ time« (1995, 160).

Second, therefore, Braudel's theory of plural social-economic temporalities and Foucault's conception of the plurality of time changing power regimes help us to develop a more comprehensive analytical framework through which to understand the relation between economy and power in general and the relation between capitalism and neoliberalism in particular. In this context, both Foucault and Braudel, the economic

order of the market and its governmental reason differ from that of capitalism. This allows them to distinguish the peculiarities of capitalism, which is now under the financial domination of private corporations and the state. The drawing above is also useful for imagining how financial power and governmentality permeates the structures beneath it. The actors, the multiple governmental reasons and apparatuses (*dispositifs*) are placed in a hierarchical order. Material life is the home of the daily lives of the population at large and is under constant formation by the neoliberal (financial) governmentality and the security mechanisms of the market supported by the state finance. The market as a realm of governmental reason and an economic life increasingly comes under the dominance of neoliberal governmentality and cuts itself off from material life and material interest of the population at large. But Foucault and Braudel do not have an optimistic and supportive view of the market economy in the sense that if capitalism did not exist, the market would provide favorable conditions for material life. They only want to picture the entire structure of civilization realistically. Accordingly, economic civilization and power regimes exist in multiple forms and different structures of economy and power coexist. From this integrated analytics, we also see that an event like crisis at the top of the pyramid spreads to the lower levels through different actors, networks, multiple governmentalities, practices, and instruments. Thus the integration of Braudel's historical analytics, in which the importance of events seems to lose its significance, with that of Foucault is helpful for recognizing how an event like crisis can force structures to change, as we observe today.

As such, third, capitalism, now under the dominance of financial accumulation, mechanisms, and logics, permeates the underlying structures or the lower layers of societies. Although for Braudel capitalism has always coexisted with other structures and touches them obliquely and its integration, especially with material life, is very slow, in neoliberal capitalism the situation has changed completely and the transformation of the market economy and long-term structures of civilization has been very swift, and destructive for many societies. Although the scale and mechanisms of transformation of material and social life configured in

the long term differ in developed and underdeveloped countries, as Braudel shows, civilizations are always in a constant tension between acceptance and refusal. We see this in the increasing movements of people throughout the world in the form of immigration or otherwise, which is mostly the result of the deterioration or quick transformation of the long-term structures of social and material life inspired by »hyper-events« like crises and wars/conflicts.[15]

All in all, regarding the historical background of modern society, Braudel, as an economic historian, focuses on the history of capitalism whereas Foucault deals with the genealogical history of (neo)liberalism. Both developed new definitions and expanded the research area of capitalism and (neo)liberalism. Braudel foregrounds the speculative and rule-bending aspects of capitalism and focuses on the relation of power and finance, which does not necessarily comply with the interest of the production sphere of industrial capitalism and the market economy. It is because Braudel identifies the essential aspects of capitalism in terms of its organizational structure, time frame, motives, and gains, and its relation with the state and the market economy, that his analysis is very helpful, considering the detrimental and profound impacts of the 2008 global financial crisis on economies, states and societies that continue to unfold. On the other hand, Foucault's analytics and »history of governmentality« (Foucault 2007a, 247) and »biopolitics« (Foucault 2008)

15 As David Harvey (2005, 160–65) states, »financialization« is one of the mainstays of neoliberal capitalism as a tool of »accumulation by dispossession« alongside »privatization and commodification,« »the management and manipulation crises,« and »state redistributions.« Yet, as I have shown in the context of Braudel's discussion of capitalism, finance has always been part of the history of capitalism. In line with this, Elmar Altvater makes an historical observation about finance capital and argues that whenever finance dominated capitalism, global wars and conflicts increased due to its destructive competition for economic sources. Altvater (1993, 139–46) states that, as historical cases show, growing national debt, leading to national bankruptcy, is a political and social project against modernization which uses political, and no less important I would like to add, military violence.

are increasingly gaining enormous significance after the 2008 financial crisis. Foucault himself saw the crisis of liberalism in the 1960s and 1970s as a crisis of governmental rationality and techniques. The recent crisis is now being interpreted as a crisis of neoliberal government in the literature of governmentality and biopolitics. Therefore, it is high time to reconsider the crisis as a crisis of capitalism and liberal governmentality in neoliberalism. Foucault (2008, 70) argues that, as history evinces, there can be a time lag between these two types of crises, which means that they do not necessarily overlap in time. So far, there have been ample cases and events that show that we are going through a joined crisis of capitalism and neoliberal governmentality.

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Crucial and local events in the long-term evolution of secondary schooling in Hungary (1867–1938)[1]

Mátyás Erdélyi

The present paper addresses the long-term evolution of secondary education in Hungary between the 1867 *Ausgleich* and the outbreak of the Second World War. The changes that occurred in this period could be summed up under the concept of the social transformation of the educational system, as formulated by now classic studies in the history of education. By and large, the social transformation of the educational system entailed the expansion of enrollments (in all levels of education), institutional diversification, systematization, and the convergence of educational and occupational structure (Jarausch 1983, 9–36). The research problem of the present paper is to describe and understand the interrelations of structure and events by focusing on educational change. By educational change I understand variations and modifications of the structure of the educational system: it includes the modification of the educational system from a quantitative perspective (enrollment numbers, number of institutions, specificities of the student body), from an institutional perspective (institutional diversification, systematization), and from a social perspective (the changing social function of the educational system). It is obvious that no system remains static, but rather the speed and direction of change are contingent and determined by various factors. These can be planned, e.g. educational laws and decrees, or spontaneous, for instance by founding new schools or by the public favoring one type of secondary schools over others. The effects of events can hardly be predicted, nor can the larger

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chain reaction in educational change, e.g. the famous *topos* concerning the fears of an intellectual proletariat and the ensuing anti-Semitism. The goal of this paper is also to give an account of the Hungarian educational system over the long term, in contrast to most studies that deal exclusively with the pre-war or the interwar period. The contribution of my paper is specifically to provide statistical data that has not yet been published in a concise manner, and to analyze and understand the relation of crucial and local events to the change of educational structure in the long run. Questions concerning the effects of the Great War, the 1920 *numerus clausus* or the 1924 law of secondary education can only be addressed if long-term empirical data is taken into account. In that way, we can better grasp how particular events influence the speed of educational change, how planned or spontaneous events generate change, and how crucial events and local initiatives contribute to structural change in the long run.

It is not the notion of global structure that will be problematized: by »global structure« I simply understand a set of macro-level indicators defined by now classic quantitative studies in the history of education. From an empirical standpoint, *inclusiveness*, *progressiveness*, and *segmentation* will serve to delineate the global structure of Hungarian secondary education over the *longue durée*, while I place special emphasis on the emergence and *systematization* of different types of secondary schools and their corresponding social function in the period under scrutiny (the three main types would be the Gymnasium, the Realschule, and the Handelsschule;[2] and on a different level the rise of women's education) (D. K. Müller 1980, 1981; D. K. Müller, Ringer, and Brian 1987; Ringer 1979). The present paper does not aim to question this conceptual framework, which has been applied to the study of secondary education in Central Europe on many occasions (Anderson 2004): to the Austrian part of the Monarchy (Cohen 1996), to the Czech lands (Kadlec 2013), and to Hungary (Karády 1997, 2012; Sasfi 2013, 2014). To problematize the relation between

2 Throughout this paper I use the term »Handelsschule« to denote a secondary school, called »felső kereskedelmi iskola« in Hungarian, that could be translated as »commercial high school,« and was also often called »Handels-Akademie« in the German context.

structure and events I analyze the relevance of two main types of »events« that influenced the long-term evolution of the educational structure, or, *vice versa*, »events« that could be instructive to demonstrate the resistance of structure vis-à-vis the former. First, I take into account those »crucial events« that are usually described as markers in the standard books on the history of education. For our purposes, the most important could be the 1867 *Ausgleich*, the 1868 law of public education, the 1883 secondary school law, and the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. It is evident that such »crucial events« often coincide with and might become markers in political history like the 1907 *Lex Apponyi* and the 1920 *numerus clausus*. Here, political and educational motives merge in both the making of these parliamentary acts and their historical interpretations. Second, I analyze the long-term effects of »local events« and their amalgamation, such as the establishment of a new type of school (e.g., the Pester Handels-Akademie in 1857) and local initiatives (e.g., associational life, pamphlets, publication of professional journals, engagement of local actors in the educational field). Overall, my paper assesses how the systematic comparison of structure (here understood in terms of quantitative indicators) and various types of events could contribute to interpreting the long-term effects of the latter, and their heuristic function in processes of social transformation.

Educational structure and »crucial« events in the educational field

The Treaty of Trianon, the numerus clausus of 1920, and anti-Semitism

Table 1 and Table 2 show a steady growth of institutions and enrolled students in the upper 4 grades of secondary education between 1870 and 1917. The speed of the growth is remarkable: the number of institutions tripled in less than fifty years and the number of students grew by almost four times, from 12,805 enrolled students in 1882 to 46,902 enrolled students in 1917. In comparison, the dualist period also brought a rapid but less significant growth in the Austrian part of the Monarchy: in 1880 there were 47,968 students enrolled in Gymnasiums (Gymnasiums and Realgymnasiums), and 17,967 students in Realschulen (Cohen 1996, 272) (all 8 grades), in addition to the 1,236 students enrolled in Handelsschulen

(in the 1881–1882 school year) (*Statistik der Unterrichts-Anstalten*, 1884, 24). By 1910, the number of enrolled students had grown more than twofold: there were 94,278 students in Gymnasiums (including women's Gymnasiums) and 4,828 students enrolled in the Handelsschulen on the secondary level (*Statistik der Unterrichts-Anstalten*, 1903, 69).

A major disruption was caused not by the Great War itself, though numbers grew during the war as well, but by the dissolution of the Monarchy and the territorial changes that ensued. Undoubtedly, the crucial event in modern Hungarian history was the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918 and the ensuing Treaty of Trianon in 1920 (Ablonczy 2015). Structurally, the system of secondary education was most influenced by the fact that a heretofore multi-ethnic and multi-denominational country became more homogeneous both culturally and ethnically (Lőkkös 2000). This meant a reduction in terms of the supply of secondary educational institutions: 91,455 students were enrolled in altogether 262 Gymnasia, Realschule, and Handelsschule in the second year of the Great War in the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy (excluding Croatia-Slavonia); in contrast, in 1921 there remained 144 secondary schools for male and 32 such schools for female students, and 63,845 students enrolled in secondary schools (Table 1 and Table 2). Even without a deep understanding of the country's economic inequalities, the scale of territorial changes and the decrease in the number of secondary schools might suggest that the core territories were more developed and better supplied with secondary schools than the peripheries inhabited by a predominantly non-Hungarian population. This is not only connected to the economic and cultural development of the country but also to the ideological goals of public education in the pre-war period, namely *Magyarization*, which resulted in severe under-schooling of non-Hungarian speakers. This type of under-schooling was a characteristic element in the Austrian part of the Dual Monarchy as well, serving there as a pretext for nationalist activists to create ethnic tensions (Cohen 1996; Judson 2006).

Table 1: Number of institutions in Hungarian secondary education (male only), 1870–1936

	Gymnasium	Realgymnasium	Realschule	Handelsschule	Total	Total N (male)
1870	84.3		13.3	2.4	100	83
1873	82.6		12.8	4.7	100	86
1876	71.7		21.7	6.6	100	106
1879	71.4		21.4	7.1	100	112
1882	71.4		19.3	9.2	100	119
1885	67.7		15.8	16.5	100	133
1888	67.1		15.7	17.1	100	140
1891	64.2		15.2	20.5	100	151
1894	64.6		14.6	20.9	100	158
1897	64.1		14.1	21.8	100	170
1900	65.3		13.6	21.0	100	176
1903	67.0		13.3	19.7	100	188
1906	68.3		12.6	19.1	100	199
1909	67.1		12.0	20.8	100	216
1912	65.7		11.4	22.9	100	236
1915	66.4		10.7	22.9	100	262
1917	64.4		10.1	25.5	100	267
1921	60.4		12.5	27.1	100	144
1924	16.3	42.8	13.3	27.7	100	166
1927	16.5	40.5	11.4	31.6	100	158
1930	16.8	41.6	10.6	31.1	100	161
1933	17.1	42.1	11.0	29.9	100	164
1936	16.9	43.4	10.2	29.5	100	166

Source: *Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv*, various volumes (1870–1936)

Table 2: Number of Enrolled Students in Secondary Schools (58 grades)[1] in Hungary, 1882-1936

	Gymnasium	Realschule	Handelsschule	Real-gymnasium	Female Schools	Total	Total N
1882	82.7	9.4	7.8			100	12805
1885	78.7	7.2	14.1			100	13483
1888	75.5	8.9	15.6			100	13518
1891	74.1	10.0	15.9			100	14501
1894	64.4	9.6	26.1			100	18432
1897	66.2	10.7	23.0			100	22136
1900	67.4	11.4	21.2			100	24832
1903	68.4	10.5	21.1			100	26544
1906	67.4	9.3	23.3			100	27655
1909	64.9	8.1	27.0			100	30771
1912	62.6	8.0	29.4			100	34735
1915	62.0	8.4	29.6			100	39779
1917	52.9	9.2	30.5		7.4	100	46902
1921	50.6	10.1	28.3		11.0	100	27738
1924	15.6	9.9	32.5	31.6	10.5	100	31008
1927	15.1	10.1	30.9	32.0	11.9	100	36018
1930	16.3	9.0	27.3	33.4	14.0	100	36725
1933	17.0	7.6	24.7	35.3	15.4	100	31210
1936	14.9	7.2	27.4	34.6	15.9	100	40335

Source: *Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv*, various volumes (1882–1936)

Changes concerning the denominational composition of secondary schools are more significant after the Great War. Table 3 shows the denominational composition of secondary school types in Hungary between 1870 and 1936. One major change was the disappearance of Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox students to the advantage of Roman Catholics. Since the Greek Catholic (predominantly Romanian and Ruthenian speakers) and the Greek Orthodox (predominantly Romanian and Serb speakers) populations had

only a few denominational secondary schools teaching in the vernacular, the two denominations did not represent a considerable weight in the school system; for example, as regards the Gymnasium sector the two »Eastern Christian« denominations represented 8.1% of all students in 1917, decreasing to 1.5% in 1921 (Table 3), while their proportion in the overall population was 12.8% in case of Eastern Orthodox and 11% in case of Greek Catholics according to the 1910 census, decreasing to 2.2% and 0.6% respectively according to the 1920 census. It is fair to assume that territorial changes affected the general inclusiveness of secondary education by excluding populations previously severely under-represented in secondary schools.

Table 3: Denominational Composition of Secondary Schools per School Type in Hungary, 1870–1936

Gymnasium									
	Roman Catholic	Greek Catholic	Greek Orthodox	Calvinist	Lutheran	Jewish	Other	Total	N
1870	43.2	6.6	5.9	21.0	12.2	10.2	1.0	100	29358
1873	44.7	6.4	5.4	19.0	11.6	12.2	0.8	100	27220
1876	43.5	5.7	5.0	18.1	10.9	16.1	0.8	100	27800
1879	43.4	5.2	4.7	15.7	10.6	19.4	0.9	100	32019
1882	44.4	5.0	5.0	15.4	10.9	18.3	0.9	100	33492
1885	46.4	4.8	5.1	15.0	11.1	16.8	0.7	100	32909
1888	46.5	4.8	5.6	14.8	11.1	16.4	0.8	100	33027
1891	45.2	5.3	5.6	15.7	10.7	16.7	0.8	100	34729
1894	44.8	5.4	5.5	15.9	10.0	17.6	0.9	100	39268
1897	44.4	5.2	5.4	15.9	9.8	18.3	1.0	100	43618
1900	43.9	5.0	5.4	16.0	9.6	19.3	0.8	100	48353
1903	43.8	5.0	5.1	15.9	9.5	19.9	0.8	100	51619
1906	43.2	5.0	5.4	15.8	9.3	20.3	0.9	100	54199
1909	43.8	5.3	5.8	15.6	9.1	19.7	0.6	100	58615
1912	45.1	5.1	5.5	15.6	8.9	19.0	0.9	100	63592

1915	45.3	4.8	4.8	15.1	8.7	20.5	0.8	100	67350
1917	46.6	4.0	4.1	15.3	8.4	21.0	0.6	100	68236
1921	52.8	1.3	0.2	18.9	7.3	19.2	0.3	100	37804
1924	56.3	1.4	0.2	20.6	7.6	13.6	0.3	100	13136
1927	59.9	2.0	0.2	23.1	6.0	8.6	0.2	100	13552
1930	60.7	1.9	0.1	23.3	6.1	7.8	0.2	100	14240
1933	60.7	1.9	0.1	22.8	6.4	7.9	0.2	100	13994
1936	59.5	1.9	0.1	23.3	7.3	7.7	0.2	100	14601

Handelsschule

	R.Cath.	G. Cath.	G. Orth.	Calv.	Luth.	Jewish	Other	Total	N
1882	25.1	0.2	5.2	4.9	4.1	60.3	0.1	100	1018
1885	34.7	1.1	3.2	6.6	5.2	49.0	0.2	100	1929
1887	38.4	1.1	4.0	6.7	6.7	42.9	0.2	100	2116
1895	34.6	1.0	3.6	5.9	6.2	48.6	0.1	100	4802
1898	33.8	1.1	4.0	6.3	5.9	48.8	0.2	100	5101
1900	32.8	0.7	4.6	6.0	5.8	49.8	0.3	100	5269
1903	34.0	0.8	3.0	5.7	5.6	50.5	0.4	100	5589
1906	32.6	0.7	3.9	6.2	5.8	50.6	0.2	100	6451
1909	32.5	1.0	4.0	6.7	5.9	49.8	0.2	100	8308
1912	34.3	1.1	4.0	7.7	5.9	46.8	0.3	100	10205
1915	36.8	0.8	3.2	6.9	5.9	46.1	0.3	100	11757
1917	41.2	0.9	3.3	8.1	5.9	40.3	0.3	100	14302
1921	49.1	1.0	0.3	11.3	5.6	32.4	0.3	100	7840
1924	51.8	0.8	0.2	11.4	5.6	30.0	0.2	100	10063
1927	55.4	1.0	0.2	11.9	5.4	26.0	0.1	100	11145
1930	58.3	1.2	0.3	13.5	5.4	21.1	0.2	100	10020
1933	60.8	1.4	0.4	14.0	4.8	18.3	0.4	100	7719
1936	60.8	1.4	0.2	12.9	5.0	19.4	0.3	100	11051

Realschule									
	R.Cath.	G. Cath.	G. Orth.	Calv.	Luth.	Jewish	Other	Total	N
1870	62.3	0.4	2.7	3.4	12.1	19.1	0.0	100	4883
1873	60.3	0.4	5.4	4.8	6.7	22.4	0.1	100	7310
1876	52.4	0.4	4.2	5.4	10.3	27.3	0.0	100	7196
1879	44.3	0.6	4.4	5.7	10.4	34.4	0.2	100	5809
1882	42.2	0.5	4.9	5.2	9.8	37.0	0.4	100	4925
1885	40.0	0.4	3.1	4.9	11.4	39.7	0.4	100	5038
1888	39.9	0.5	3.6	6.1	11.0	38.5	0.3	100	6306
1891	41.2	0.6	4.2	6.1	11.1	36.5	0.3	100	7390
1894	40.3	0.7	4.1	6.1	11.0	37.6	0.1	100	8674
1897	39.0	0.7	3.8	6.6	11.1	38.6	0.2	100	9539
1900	39.5	0.7	3.8	5.4	11.2	39.1	0.4	100	9669
1903	40.9	0.6	3.6	5.7	10.3	38.6	0.4	100	9881
1906	42.6	0.6	4.0	6.0	10.4	35.9	0.5	100	9540
1909	43.8	0.7	3.7	6.3	9.6	35.6	0.3	100	10410
1912	43.7	0.8	3.5	6.8	9.4	35.2	0.3	100	11660
1915	43.0	0.6	3.2	6.9	9.5	36.5	0.3	100	12348
1917	44.8	0.6	3.0	7.3	8.3	35.6	0.4	100	13394
1921	50.3	0.7	0.2	9.5	6.4	32.6	0.3	100	8445
1924	53.6	0.7	0.2	11.7	7.6	25.7	0.4	100	9316
1927	55.9	0.8	0.2	13.3	8.3	21.0	0.5	100	8413
1930	58.8	0.9	0.3	14.1	6.9	18.6	0.4	100	8013
1933	57.6	1.0	0.2	14.7	6.5	19.6	0.4	100	7009
1936	58.0	0.7	0.3	13.1	6.5	21.1	0.3	100	7029

Realgymnasium									
	R.Cath.	G.Cath.	G. Orth.	Calv.	Luth.	Jewish	Other	Total	N
1924	56.3	1.7	0.2	18.7	6.8	16.0	0.3	100	27980
1927	57.9	1.8	0.2	17.0	7.2	15.5	0.4	100	27345
1930	59.4	1.7	0.2	16.5	6.9	14.9	0.4	100	28919
1933	60.1	1.5	0.2	16.4	6.4	15.1	0.3	100	31154
1936	60.4	1.5	0.2	16.5	6.3	14.6	0.3	100	31984

Female High School									
	R.Cath.	G.Cath.	G. Orth.	Calv.	Luth.	Jewish	Other	Total	N
1917	38.7	0.9	1.0	13.1	8.2	38.0	0.1	100	10442
1921	46.1	0.6	0.2	13.1	7.5	32.3	0.2	100	9756
1924	47.2	0.7	0.1	14.8	7.6	29.4	0.3	100	10410
1927	48.1	0.9	0.2	15.5	7.4	27.6	0.4	100	10976
1930	51.4	0.9	0.2	16.1	6.7	24.4	0.3	100	13046
1933	50.0	1.0	0.2	16.1	8.2	24.2	0.3	100	14615
1936	51.3	0.9	0.2	15.9	7.6	23.9	0.2	100	16156

Source: *Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv*, various volumes (1870–1936).

The Great War and its consequences also had a crucial effect on secondary schools by fostering an anti-Semitic discourse and the legal discrimination of Jews in higher education following the 1920 *numerus clausus*. The 1848 and 1867 steps in Jewish emancipation quickly led to the increase in Jewish students in both secondary and higher education. For example, only 10.2% of students were Jews in 1870 in Gymnasium; that grew to 19.4% by 1879 and remained around one-fifth of all Gymnasium students until the interwar period (for the reasons for Jewish over-schooling: Karády 2000, 1990; Cohen 1990). By the turn of the century, Jews were massively over-represented in all secondary schools: 19.3% of Gymnasium students, 39.1% of Realschule students, and 49.8% of Handelsschule students were Jews,

while the proportion of Jews in the overall population was around 4.9% in 1910 (Table 3). This increase has to do both with »opening the gates« in secondary education (founding »state« Gymnasiums and the toleration of Jews in institutions supported by Christian denominations), and with the fact that Jews acted as agents of modernization in Hungarian economic and social life (thus the higher proportions in the Realschule and the Handelsschule).

In contrast, the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy made apparent the fall of the liberal consensus in both politics and social mentalities. The rise of anti-Semitism started at the home front during the war (Bihari 2005) and became an inevitable reality during the White terror in 1919–1920 and in the political upheavals surrounding the *numerus clausus* in 1920 (M. M. Kovács 1994; M. M. Kovács 2012). The *numerus clausus* was an anti-Semitic law; it limited the proportion of Jewish students in higher education to the proportion of Jews in Hungary overall. Since Jewish students were massively over-represented in higher education—in some faculties over one-third of students were Jewish before 1920—this law heavily influenced enrollment patterns at the expense and discrimination of Jewish students. In all secondary schools, growing anti-Semitism and the limitation of access to higher education for Jews resulted in a significant change in the milieu. For the Hungarian gentry, Jewish over-representation in Gymnasiums and higher education was alarming even in the pre-war era, as classical *Bildung*, a prerequisite for entrance to *gentlemanly* society, was readily associated with studying in the classical Gymnasium and less with the Handelsschule's practical curriculum. As a result, the proportion of Jewish students in the interwar era varied according to the prestige hierarchy of secondary schools: rising anti-Semitism influenced less the denominational composition of the Handelsschule (the proportion of Jewish students there decreased from 32.4% to 26% between 1921 and 1927 and to 18.3% by 1933), and of female high schools (the proportion of Jewish female students decreased from 32.3% to 24.2% between 1921 and 1933). The more prestigious the institution in the eyes of the public, the more dramatic the decrease: in the Realschule the proportion of Jews decreased from 32.6% to 19.6%, and in the Gymnasium from 21% to 7.8%.

When interpreting these figures, one has to keep in mind that Act XI of 1924 established the so-called Realgymnasium, a modern variant of the Gymnasium without the instruction of Greek and with a stronger emphasis on the natural sciences. The proportion of Jews stagnated in this institution throughout the interwar era at around 15%, this being another indicator that Jews were more inclined to attend »modernist« institutions (Handelsschule, female high schools, Realgymnasium) than the classical ones (Gymnasium). An equally important aspect is that the Handelsschule provided more career opportunities outside the public sphere, mainly as white-collar workers in banks, insurance and trade companies, industrial firms, etc., than the Gymnasium, whose primary function was preparation for higher education or state employment after the *Matura*. It has to be added to this picture that the absolute number of Jewish students in secondary schools did not decrease after the 1920 *numerus clausus*. One should also take into account the belated modernization of Christians in matters of secondary schooling in this regard. The number of Jewish students stagnated between 1920 and 1936, while the number of gentile students grew: for example, the number of Roman Catholic students in Gymnasiums and Realgymnasiums (after 1924) was 19,967 in 1921, 25,833 in 1930, and 28,025 in 1936, attesting that it was the *relative* weight of Jewish students that decreased in the interwar period.

The age-specific inclusiveness of secondary education in the long term (Table 4) provides an additional element to the structural changes of the educational system in the aftermath of the Great War. Inclusiveness describes how many people went to the higher grades of secondary schools (fifth-eighth grades) per 10,000 male inhabitants at the age of 15 to 18. The table shows a steady growth overall in the Dualist period, mainly due to the dynamic increase in the number of Handelsschule students. Again, enrollments in Austrian secondary education changed in a similar fashion in the period under scrutiny: the total enrolled Gymnasium, Realgymnasium, and Realschulen students per thousand in the 11–18 year age cohort grew from 19.52 in 1880 to 30.57 in 1910, excluding the Handelsschule

students (Cohen 1996, 56).[3] However, changes between 1910 and 1920 suggest a significant transformation in Hungary: the *inclusiveness* of secondary education almost doubled between 1910 and 1920. While only 412.6 per 10,000 male persons aged between 15 and 18 went to one of the three secondary institutions in 1910, the same number rose to 724.5 by 1920 (excluding the growth of female enrollments). It could thus be argued that the Treaty of Trianon and the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy *did not* significantly *change* the *progressiveness* of the system—progressiveness meaning how far down the social structure the schools reached at a given epoch; on the contrary, the overall inclusiveness of secondary schooling grew to a great extent due to the territorial changes of the country in 1918–1920. At the same time, it must be emphasized that these changes could not be qualified as a substantial *structural transformation* but rather a »mechanical« consequence of the territorial changes.

Table 4: Secondary School Students per 10,000 Boys at the Age of 15–18

	Male population (15–18)	Gymnasium	Realschule	Handelsschule	Real-gymnasium	Female High Schools	Male Students Together
1880	510,557	207.5	23.7	19.6			250.8
1890	536,475	200.2	27.2	42.9			270.3
1900	691,964	241.8	40.9	76.1			358.9
1910	745,731	267.7	33.5	111.4			412.6
1920	340,647	412.4	82.0	230.2		89.8	724.5
1930	329,217	181.8	100.6	304.4	372.3	156.5	959.1

Source: *Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv*, various volumes (1880–1936).

3 These numbers are not directly comparable to numbers in Table 4 because these are based on the number of students in all 8 grades of secondary education per the respective age cohorts, while Table 4 only included the highest 4 grades of secondary education and the 15–18 year age cohorts of population.

Legislation and secondary education

Educational laws and ministerial decrees represent »crucial« events in the history of education, but their influence on the structural transformation of the educational system is much less evident. The set-up of the Hungarian educational system is mainly the result of parliamentary acts and decrees that created new types of institutions (the Bürgerschule in 1868, the Realgymnasium in 1924), incorporated existing ones into the system (see below for the case of the Handelsschule), or made possible the education of hitherto excluded groups (e.g., female students). By creating the institutional framework for each secondary school, in this way making possible the systematization[4] of the educational field, acts and ministerial decrees seem to stimulate the numerical growth or stagnation of certain school types. For example, Act XXX of 1883, the first complex regulation of high schools in Hungary, codified and standardized the country's existing network of Gymnasiums and Realschulen. It was exactly this standardization that made possible the growth of schooling infrastructure: it created the framework for growing state influence in the form of the newly established »state-administered« Gymnasium; previously, the large majority of secondary schools had been administered by the Church (monastic orders, Christian Churches, and the so-called »Royal Catholic« schools that were financed by the funds of the dissolved Jesuit order). However, if one looks at Gymnasium enrollments per 10,000 inhabitants (at the age of 15–18) in the pre-war period following the 1883 secondary school law (Table 4), it can be argued that the extension of the system was barely faster than the growth in the population. All the more, the same regulation, by limiting the social functions of the Realschule, caused the stagnation of the latter type in the subsequent decades. A similar observation could be made concerning the effects of legislation on the Handelsschulen. In this case, the first ministerial decree in 1872 and the

4 Systematization is the process which leads to the constitution of an educational system. In the words of Müller, one is dealing with an educational *system* »only when the various school forms or educational institutions are interconnected, when the parts of the system are related to each other and their functions inter-defined« (D. K. Müller et al. 1987, 16).

subsequent ones provided the legal cadre, situated and legitimized the school type within the educational system, and thus made possible the dynamic numerical growth of Handelsschulen over the following decades. In that sense, systematization is a means to enhance the use of certain school types at the expense of others.

Table 5: The proportion of female students per secondary school type in Hungary, 1900–1936

Gymnasium	Realschule	Handels schule	Real-gymnasium	N of students in Female Schools	All Secondary School Students	Girls altogether	% of female students among all secondary school students	Gymnasium
1870	43.2	6.6	5.9	21.0	12.2	10.2	1.0	100
1873	44.7	6.4	5.4	19.0	11.6	12.2	0.8	100
1876	43.5	5.7	5.0	18.1	10.9	16.1	0.8	100
1879	43.4	5.2	4.7	15.7	10.6	19.4	0.9	100
1882	44.4	5.0	5.0	15.4	10.9	18.3	0.9	100
1885	46.4	4.8	5.1	15.0	11.1	16.8	0.7	100
1888	46.5	4.8	5.6	14.8	11.1	16.4	0.8	100
1891	45.2	5.3	5.6	15.7	10.7	16.7	0.8	100
1894	44.8	5.4	5.5	15.9	10.0	17.6	0.9	100
1897	44.4	5.2	5.4	15.9	9.8	18.3	1.0	100
1900	43.9	5.0	5.4	16.0	9.6	19.3	0.8	100
1903	43.8	5.0	5.1	15.9	9.5	19.9	0.8	100
1906	43.2	5.0	5.4	15.8	9.3	20.3	0.9	100

Source: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, various volumes (1900–1936).

Women's education and secondary education

Table 5 shows the proportion of female students in secondary schools, a statistic that was most influenced by ministerial decrees that gradually opened certain school types for women. The inclusion of female students in secondary and higher education started with a ministerial decree in 1895, allowing the enrollment of women as regular students at the Faculty of

Arts, the Faculty of Medicine, and the pharmaceutical course at the latter (Szegvári and Ladányi 1976; I. Müller 2001). Indeed, it was only a first step towards the full emancipation of women in higher education, which took place decades later, in the aftermath of the Second World War. This resolution in 1895 created a controversial situation: women could be admitted to universities when holding a *Matura* but there were no female high schools at the time (women could be only enrolled in Gymnasiums or Realschulen as non-regular students at the discretion of a specific institution). The first female Gymnasium was established a year later in Budapest: although there was a considerable demand for higher education (including the *Matura*), the social prejudices of the ruling elite (I. Müller 2006) simply prevented the further enrollment of women in many faculties. By 1912, there were three female Gymnasiums in the entire country. In this case, the Great War and a ministerial decree regulating the organization of female high schools in 1916 accomplished the integration of female schools into the field of secondary education. The effects of the Great War were palpable: female workforce was increasingly needed at the home front, making necessary the secondary and higher education of women. The 1916 decree on female high schools transformed at one go all post-elementary female schools into secondary schools offering the *Matura* (the 4-year curriculum was supplemented by 3 more years at the top). These two factors might explain the rise in the proportion of female students in secondary schools (Table 5): in 1909 the proportion of girls in secondary schools was 1.5% altogether (there were only two Gymnasia and three recently established commercial high schools for girls at the time), growing to 15.2% by 1917 (there were 47 female high schools and 11 commercial high schools for girls in 1917). The »real« growth of female students was more gradual, because the 1916 decree changed the status of many schools that had already existed prior to 1916.

This gradual growth could be connected to three school types: the women's Bürgerschule, the women's upper school, and the women's Gymnasium. The 1868 law of elementary education created the women's Bürgerschule (along with the male variant) (I. Müller 2000a; Kereszty 2010, 73–76). The Bürgerschule enrolled pupils at the age of 10 after 4 years of elementary

education. The number of these institutions grew gradually after 1868, reaching 294 in 1910, and enrolled 47,491 pupils (Magyar Statisztikai Hivatal 1910, 348). After the 1916 ministerial decree, which regulated women's secondary schooling, these Bürgerschulen formed the basis for future female high schools, since some of these were supplemented with 3 grades and became full-fledged secondary schools after 1916. The second type of institution, the »women's upper school« (*felsőbb leányikola*), came into existence, just like the Handelsschule, thanks to private initiatives. In Hungary the first female upper school was established in 1869 under the auspices of the National Women's Association in Budapest. State regulation started only in 1875 when the Ministry of Religion and Education introduced an official curriculum for female upper schools and initiated the establishment of the first state-run school (Kereszty 2010, 76–82). It had a 6-year curriculum (after 4 years of elementary education) and prepared pupils for their »practical« vocation in society. In 1886 there were 13 female upper schools in Hungary; this number grew to 35 by 1910 with 6,233 enrolled students (Kereszty 2010, 302–3). After 1916, the school was supplemented with a seventh year and institutions could choose between establishing the upper 3 grades as a »women's upper school,« a commercial school or a Realgymnasium, each with a slightly different curriculum. These schools were also granted the right to hold *Matura* examinations at the end of the seventh year. The third institution that was affected by the 1916 decree was the women's Gymnasium. It was also a result of private initiatives: the National Women's Association established the first women's Gymnasium in Budapest in 1896, followed by a few other »private« Gymnasiums through the Great War (I. Müller 2000b; Kereszty 2010, 86–90). The Austrian case also suggests that women's secondary schooling, prior to state legislation, was solely a matter of private initiative. The first women's *Lyceum* was established in Prague in 1863 (the first German-language institute in Graz in 1873), and the first women's Gymnasium again in Prague in 1890 was followed by one in Vienna in 1892. State regulation only came in 1900 (a temporary regulation) for the Lyceum; the ministry thoroughly regulated women's secondary education in 1912 by a decree (Albisetti 1999). Women's education is thus a case in point for the influence

of both legislation and private initiatives. Here, the functional adaptation of women's schools into secondary education took place all of a sudden after the 1916 decree; it was, however, preceded by gradual growth thanks to private initiatives and a growing societal demand. The 1916 decree as an event simply made visible a structural transformation that had been taking place for decades.

Local initiatives and structural change: The Handelsschule in Hungary

The case of the Handelsschule provides an occasion to trace structural changes at the macro-level that were initiated, formed and even coerced by local actors and institutions. Local initiatives are understood here as the outcome of changes induced by local actors and institutions, especially in contrast to changes induced by the state and state authorities. As opposed to the development of the Bürgerschule,[5] the establishment of the Handelsschule network was not part of a well-defined governmental project, but took place thanks to the blossoming of such institutions in various localities (A. Nagy 2014b, 2014a). The main reason behind these initiatives was generally that local municipal leaders, merchants, and industrialists wanted qualified personal for their urban capitalist endeavors (most importantly bookkeepers and other white-collar employees). Likewise, the history of the school type began in Hungary with the establishment of the Pester Handels-Akademie in 1857 at the initiative of the Chamber of Trade in Pest (Bódy and Szabó 1997; Bricht 1896). The birth of the Handelsschulen took place in a similar fashion all over the Habsburg Monarchy: in 1856 it was Eduard Pleschner, a merchant from Prague, who proposed the creation of a Handelsakademie to the local

5 The Bürgerschule or *polgári iskola* did not have antecedents before the 1868 law on elementary education, and was only incorporated into the law thanks to the efforts of Antal Csengery, a lawyer, politician, and advocator of the *Ausgleich*. The subsequent history of the Bürgerschule proved that governmental determination alone could not be enough to create a new school type: the 6-year curriculum could not be maintained because students left the school after 4 years, and the two higher grades had to be abolished (Göőz 1895; J. Kovács 1900).

trade association, while Bernhard Ohligs, a member of the *Handels- und Gewerbekammmer* in Vienna, even wrote a pamphlet to campaign for the matter (Dlabač and Gelcich 1910, 24–25; Ohligs 1856; Kleibel 1899, 68–141). There were 11 commercial high schools in Hungary in 1882, 37 in 1900, and 54 in 1912. This dynamic growth was halted by the dissolution of the Monarchy (the number of institutions decreased to 39 in 1921), and only reached 50 at maximum during the interwar period (Table 1).

In the nineteenth century, there were generally two forces competing for the control of the educational field, the state and the church, the influence of the former becoming overwhelming by the Second World War (P. T. Nagy 2011). However, the church could not play a decisive role in the field of professional education, and, over the *longue durée* this turned out to be a battle between local elites and the state, which sought to gain absolute control over commercial education. With the introduction of the first organization (and official curriculum) for commercial high schools in 1872, the state set off on a long road to take full control of the sector. This also happened by founding new institutions, through a greater financial commitment, and by the homogenization of the field, but a major influence was still exerted by local actors. Although the first institutions of commercial education were created in an associational setting, they also depended on state subsidies[6] and on the on-going process of social legitimization through special credentials and entitlements granted by the ministry of trade.[7] Still, only in the interwar period did state influence become overwhelming and local forces negligible: in 1920,

6 In the 1911–12 school year the total budget of the 51 commercial high schools functioning in that year was 2,982,185 K, which was mostly financed by tuition fees (1,409,731 K) and state subsidies (1,296,215 K) (Sásdy-Schack 1913, 109–10); in contrast, in the 1879–80 school year state subsidies were only 12,500 K, and 8 out of 12 schools did not receive any financial aid from the state (Kiss 1896, 101–14)).

7 The most important steps were the right of one-year voluntary military service for the graduates of commercial schools in 1869, and Act I of 1883 on the »qualification« of public officers that granted the same entitlements to gymnasium, Realschule and commercial high school *Abiturienten*.

all trade academies were merged into the University Faculty of Economic Sciences, and in July 1940 the last private institution, Pester Handels-Akademie, was nationalized by a ministerial decree. Thus, the state succeeded in gaining absolute control over this educational sector by the early 1940s.

Associational life played an important role as a counterweight to state influence; in the eyes of Handelsschulen advocates, it represented a double-edged sword: it was the source of funding and social legitimization, but equally a threat to the autonomy of the sector. In 1892, the teachers of the Handelsakademie in Pozsony (Pressburg, Bratislava) founded a monthly journal entitled »*Kereskedelmi Szakoktatás*« [Vocational Education of Trade] that later served as the official organ of all Hungarian commercial high schools. The Handelsschulen teachers in question later founded the official association of Handelsschulen; both the association and the journal became active advocates in the development of the field. To name just a few of their professional activities: the association took part actively in the reform movement in the 1890s and 1900s; propagated the publication of trade-related scientific books and textbooks; advised, sometimes with great influence, the founding and situation of newly founded institutions; kept fighting for ameliorating the situation of teachers in the field. Despite the growing state influence, local initiatives determined the evolution of the field: it was not the Ministry of Education that decided where and when to establish new institutions, but rather local actors pressured the Minister of Religion and Public Education to approve the founding of new institutions and then to grant state funding. The procedure usually took place as follows: local associations or the municipality decided to establish a Handelsschule and guaranteed its financial stability in the first years, then applied for state funding, and finally passed the administration of the institution to the ministry, thus making the school a »state-run« institution (Belóczy 1896; Novákovits 1901; Bún 1913).

Looking at the structural transformation of Hungarian secondary education between the 1870s and the 1930s, it can be argued that the aggregation of local initiatives had a lasting and significant influence on the system as

a whole.[8] In terms of inclusiveness and the institutional setting of secondary education, the accumulation of these local initiatives concerning the Handelsschule transformed the structure of the educational field. The inclusiveness of the system grew in large part thanks to students of the Handelsschule: half of its growth between 1880 and 1920 can be attributed to this type of secondary school. Until the 1924 secondary school law that created the Realgymnasium, the most important institutional change on the secondary level took place because of the Handelsschule, whose weight in the system grew from none to one-fifth of all secondary schools between the *Ausgleich* and the Great War, and later to almost one-third of all secondary schools in the interwar period. In terms of the convergence between the occupational and the educational system, the Handelsschule track became the most important catalyst. The curricula of the Gymnasium and the Realschule were not reformed substantially until after the Second World War, so it could not be accommodated to the exigencies of the emerging industrial sector. It is enough to allude to the lack of practical utility of Latin for most careers except for lawyers. In contrast, it was the Handelsschule that most fulfilled the needs of the modern economy: the teaching of bookkeeping, political arithmetics, and business correspondence (the core subjects at modern business schools) was rarely available outside the Handelsschule (law academies and the Technical University also taught some of them), so the Handelsschule

8 Naturally, the enumeration of local and micro-level factors that influenced the evolution of the educational system cannot be complete in the present study. One such factor that has been neglected is the influence of parental choice on schooling patterns (see for example Nath and Dartenne 2008). The prosopographical study of the educational market of a northeastern town in Hungary can demonstrate this influence at the turn of the century. The schooling path of children in different families of the same social class turned out to be so idiosyncratic that it is impossible not to give credit to parental choice. Only this can explain the variety of schooling patterns (similar to all sons of a given family) among, for example, petty merchants. Some of them did not send their children to secondary schools at all, some sent all their children to the local Gymnasium, and some of them to the local Bürgerschulen and to the Handelsschulen (Erdélyi 2017).

played the greatest role in terms of the functional adjustment of the educational system to the needs of economic modernization.

It is worth comparing the status of the Handelsschule in Hungary to other parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. Just as for women's secondary schooling, the Handelsschule was born thanks to initiatives in the Austrian part of the Monarchy. As already mentioned, both the Prager Handelsakademie in 1856 and the Wiener Handelsakademie in 1858 were established by the local associations of trade without any governmental aid at the beginning (Gstraunthaler 2012). The recipe was similar in other cases in Austria: schools were initiated locally and established with municipal funds and with the financial aid of the local bourgeoisie. The struggles of the Handelsschule were also quite similar to those in Hungary: lack of qualified teachers, lack of parity with other secondary schools, low salaries and no pension funds for teachers, poorly qualified first-year students, inadequate training for »practical life,« etc. (*Stenographisches Protokoll* 1907). Yet there is one important difference: the weight of the Handelsschule in Austrian secondary education is less considerable than in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. In contrast to the 54 Handelsschulen in Hungary in 1912, there were only 24 *höhere Handelsschulen* in the Austrian part of the Monarchy. The reasons for this difference must be sought in the palette of classical secondary schools in Austria and in Hungary: while Hungarian pupils could only choose between the Gymnasium and the Realschule, Austrian pupils had the choice between the Gymnasium, the Realgymnasium, and the Realschule, in addition to the *niedere Handelsschule*, a school type that did not exist in the Hungarian part of the Monarchy. In that way, these school types were able to cover many functions that, in Hungary, only the Handelsschule aimed at. The Realschule in Austria had a 7-year program of study until 1914 (in contrast to the Hungarian Realschule, which had an 8-year curriculum) and fulfilled a function similar to the Handelsschule in Hungarian secondary education (Cohen 1996, 119–26). In other words, it was more suited to prepare for careers in »practical life« in contrast to the »academic spirit« in the Gymnasium.

Summary

To sum up, one must emphasize the long-term effects of local events on the structure of secondary education. The rise of the Handelsschule was not due to an official government policy or any plan concerning secondary education, but rather the result of various local initiatives (of the local business elites and municipal elites). This means its numerical growth can be attributed to the accumulation of local events. In terms of the institutional diversification of Hungarian secondary education, the emergence of the Handelsschule produced the most far-reaching changes in the period under scrutiny. It enrolled a minor fraction of secondary school students in the 1860s, while between one-third and one-fourth of all secondary school students graduated from one of the Handelsschulen in the interwar period. The growth of the Handelsschule also meant a greater progressiveness in secondary education, since its student body was more heterogeneous than that in classical secondary schools. Lastly, the functional adjustment of the educational system was made mostly in connection to the Handelsschule on the secondary level: it provided professional training for employees of the urban capitalist enterprises; the modern private clerk was stereotypically a graduate of the Handelsschule (Komor 1931). One could even suggest that the development of the Handelsschule actually served as a substitute for a thorough reform of classical secondary schools. In the midst of far-reaching social and economic transformation, it was the Handelsschule that assumed the functions that the Gymnasium and the Realschule could not take over. The training of private clerks in banking, insurance, trade, and transportation was carried out by the Handelsschule, and that is why it was constantly under attack in the period under scrutiny: the original goal of the institution, i.e. to train tradesmen, was not fulfilled, because it was training employees for the emerging urban capitalist enterprises.

The other major change was the growing representation of women in secondary schooling. At the turn of the century the proportion of women in secondary schools was negligible; however, this proportion grew to one fourth of all secondary school students in the 1930s. In quantitative terms, the 1916 decree that regulated women's secondary education brought

about a dramatic growth in their representation. One could thus presume that, in this case, legislation brought about the structural transformation of the system. However, a »hidden« and gradual growth in women's schooling took place before 1916 in school types (women's Bürgerschule, women's upper school) that did not constitute part of secondary schooling before 1916, yet were transformed into secondary schools by the 1916 decree. The case of women's education supports a similar conclusion to that concerning the Handelsschule. Due to a rising social demand and local initiatives (mostly in case of the women's upper school), the structure of secondary education underwent a profound change: however, legislation was still needed to integrate the emerging school type into the school system. Finally, the two cases of »crucial« events taught a different lesson. The changes that the Great War brought about did not influence the educational structure as such; these changes weare simply the mechanical consequences of the territorial set-up of Hungary after 1920. Growing anti-Semitism and the 1920 *numerus clausus* had a significant influence on the structure of secondary education in the long run. The *numerus clausus* limited the proportion of Jews in higher education and thus influenced their representation in secondary schooling. It meant that, for example, the proportion of Jews in Gymnasiums decreased from 19.2% in 1921 to 7.7% in 1936. Still, just as in the cases of the Handelsschule and women's secondary schooling, structural change took place gradually and legislation merely influenced the direction of that change.

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The city as an assignment

From multiple pasts to a vision of the future

Elena Dingersen

Introduction[1]

Over the last decade, scientific discourse's epistemic interest in the city, and the role it plays in the economy, local culture, and societal development, has increased tremendously (see Lindner 2003; Massey 2006; Marcuse 2005; Swyngedouw 2004). In a globalized world of homogenization through economic, technical, and cultural networks, leading to alienation from the nation state, cities offer an experience of identification. According to the urban sociologist Martina Löw, this is an experience of cultural specificity, of being in a specific place (Löw 2013, 1). Furthermore, if one assumes that not only the state but also the city is a substantial cause of societal processes,[2] questions related to urban discourses and identities are more relevant than ever. My paper demonstrates the strategies of self-perception of two former royal cities, Dresden and St. Petersburg, whose turbulent pasts left a remarkable legacy, as they are foreign countries not only in a metaphorical sense, as David Lowenthal describes in his work »The Past is a Foreign Country« (1985), but also in a direct sense of the word. An interest in the role of memory, the imaginary, and visions

1 This article, including its empirical data, is based on the author's PhD thesis, which is concerned with the narrative construction of Dresden and St. Petersburg in public discourse from the 2000s to the early 2010. It is being prepared for submission to the Technical University of Berlin (TU).

2 Even though there have been some critical voices in German sociology against the notion of the sovereignty of the city, which has resulted in a reaction against establishing the city as an epistemologically grounded subject (see Häusermannn 2011), the relevance of the city for sociation (Vergesellschaftung) cannot be underestimated.

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of the future in shaping the local and its options for resistance informs the theoretical perspective, which draws on the sociology of knowledge and culture. The central premise of this perspective is that the symbolic, meaningful order of everyday reality must be taken seriously, since our perceptions of day-to-day life have real consequences, which in turn influence social reality (Thomas 1928). Therefore, this perspective particularly foregrounds questions related to the narrative construction of reality and, regarding the city, questions pertaining to the narrative constitution of urban social structures. According to theoretical approaches to the »urban imaginary« (Lindner 2006, 2008) and the »intrinsic logic of cities« (Berking and Löw 2005, 2008; Löw 2008), based on this perspective and outlined below, one of the key issues when conducting research on urban social structures is continuity and the development of narratively constructed self-images of cities and, thereby, the temporal order of urban discourses (Löw 2013; Frank et al. 2014).

The self-images position the cities in the configuration of past, present, and future; inter alia by means of the relations between short and long durations, the selection of actions recognized as relevant events, and the ascription to these events of structural effects or impacts. Therefore, the topic of this issue of *InterDisciplines*, which deals with the relations between events and structures and more generally with the temporal structuring of narratives, is of central interest to this paper, as it explores the cities' strategies for narrating their histories and thereby organizing and arranging its processes.

To summarize, this research aims to trace the modes of reproduction of the urban structures of Dresden and St. Petersburg, drawing on empirical examples of the cities' most dominant narratives. The main research question concerns the construction of these cities' self-images in public discourses with reference to the temporal order and the interplay of events and structures in urban narratives. The article begins with an outline of my theoretical approach to the city, which engages phenomenologically with urban reality, on the basis of common knowledge, and which conceptualizes the city in a relational way as a socio-spatial form that organizes

and regulates urban processes.[3] This approach highlights those elements relevant to understanding how the city »works,« highlighting the key role of the research subjects mentioned above. The implementation of the theoretical framework within the empirical case studies that follows demonstrates the narrative construction of Dresden and St. Petersburg in the mid-2000s. These constructions are built along lines of temporality and difference, in each case manifesting strategies for shaping the idea of the city or, to put it differently, the perception of the city as an entity, a »Gestalt« or as the »whole« (Berking 2012). The final section explicates two arguments. First, it brings the temporal patterns of the narratives of each city, which evolve mostly from the narratives' event/structure constellation, into correlation with the regularities of the city's historical development. It is then able to formulate an answer to the main research question: What are the relevant, historical modes of reproduction of (the narratives of) these cities.[4] Second, the article ends with a summary of the variety of forms of event/structure interplay, applied in this case to the narrative constructions of Dresden and St. Petersburg, showing the potential of this interplay to constitute (urban) identities.

Theoretical positions

The city as research subject

To justify more thoroughly the focus of this research on the self-representations of Dresden and St. Petersburg, and, on, how they are perceived as entities within these narratives, it is necessary to briefly explain why it is important to analyze cities as discrete subjects in their own right, and thereby trace the modes through which they are reproduced.

There are several approaches in urban studies, such as, for instance, Helmuth Berking and Martina Löw's »intrinsic logic of cities« (Berking

3 These processes are described in the next chapter.

4 For reasons of space, this article can only provide insight into some relevant reproduction modes in relation to these cities, but it does not claim to outline the logic of reproduction in all its complexity.

and Löw 2008), as well as the approach of the cultural anthropologist Rolf Lindner (2006, 2008). These theorists attribute a capacity to create and impact upon people to the city; this capacity is based on the objectified ideas and the residents' perceptions of the city. If people perceive cities as being variously attractive, tolerant, or worth living in, they will act on the basis of this knowledge and, as a result, this perception will manifest itself through external action. If cities are seen to be a stronghold for certain subcultures or as sites of certain industries, the presence of these subcultures or industries will increase and strengthen over time (Frank et al. 2013, 204). The urban reality thus acts as a social fact (Durkheim 1982 [1895]) in relation to city dwellers, who at the same time produce this reality.

The question of the reproduction of such perceptions—pertaining to everyday knowledge about the city—draws on an understanding of the city from the point of view of spatial theory. According to the intrinsic logic of cities approach, urban space is comprehended as a institutionalized process of social constitution of space. The modern city is, therefore, a space-structuring form of sociation, characterized by densification and the inclusion of heterogeneous elements. Each city thus possesses its own unique modes of organization and regulation of densification and heterogenization, developed over a long period of time. In this reading of the city, local specificity, which is normally traced in urban identity research, is comprehended as a result of these two processes:

> City does not comprise face-to-face, neighborhood, identity, central business district or habitus. All of these content-related ascriptions would be premature, and so would be even a comparative perspective. The local differences between the »city of love« and the »city of music,« let's say between Paris and Vienna, have to be analysed first of all as effects of the internal and in this sense local processes of densification and heterogenization. (Berking 2012, 318)

Thus, cities distinguish themselves through their management of diversity, and each city regulates the coexistence of a great number of different elements in a unique, historically established way. Capturing the modes of this process and thus the »intrinsic logic of the city« is therefore the key to comprehending »how things are done« in a specific city, whether

it concerns political culture, time management, notions of success, relevant urban networks, judgements of taste, behavior in public spaces, or systems of value (Berking and Löw 2008). The proponents of the »intrinsic logic« claim that this approach to the city, in contrast to others (Häußermann and Siebel 1978, 2004), takes local specificities into account, which are intrinsic principles of local urban processes and are crucial for the success of urban development and planning policies such as the implementation of new facilities for public squares, the establishment of a new music festival, the process of greening, the building of a river crossing or transport infrastructure, and so on.

Considering the city from the point of view of densification and heterogenization or, to put it differently, considering collective dispositions for »how things are done,« builds a bridge back to the city as an object of everyday knowledge or to the urban reality that is formed by our perceptions of and ideas about it. According to Lindner, cities are narrative spaces that contain stories about meaningful personalities and relevant events, myths about heroes and scoundrels, as well as parables with burdens to bear and virtues to espouse (2008, 86). Thus historically saturated perceptions, images, and ideas form the imaginary of the city. Individuals experience the city by first of all imagining it on the basis o already existing »templates« in the form of narratives, myths, symbols, and images. These are objectified in local urban culture and accumulate over time. They limit the horizon of possibilities for perceiving and thinking about the city. Verbal as well as non-verbal actions of city dwellers draw upon these templates, to the extent that we act according to what we can or can't imagine in the city. The city can be thus experienced through collective perceptions, which are historically pre-structured and condensed over time in its »urban imaginary« (Lindner 2006, 2008). The »urban imaginary« should be thought of as an organized entity that simultaneously organizes the perception and practice of city dwellers.[5]

5 The idea that the imagination plays a huge role in shaping the city, and that the reality of the city is negotiated by imagining it, has already been proposed (see, among others, Strauss 1961; Suttles 1984; Donald 1999). Lindner, however, refined it and conceptualized the urban imaginary as a

In terms of the role played by the historically established reading of relevant modes of storytelling, events, and symbols, this approach clearly shares common ground with the tradition of social memory studies. Classical notions within this field, such as Maurice Halbwachs' concept of »collective memory« (1950) or Jan Assman's notion of »cultural memory« (1992), focus on the social contingency of individual memory, the narrative building and symbolic institutionalization of collective visions of the past in society, and claim these visions as a basis for the negotiation of identity. Discussion of the »urban imaginary« is concerned with the ways that city dwellers come to imagine the city as an entity on the basis of »cultural memory.« Such imagining also aims to link structure to practice.

Not only do the imaginary realms of the city and its self-representations have creative effects on reality (and vice versa), but, according to this approach, each of these realms contains implicit principles of »how things are done.« Helmuth Berking, taking up the concept of the urban imaginary, draws an analogy between this effect and the maxim »every teaspoon reflects the entire sun,« concluding that one can discover the structuring principle of the »whole of the city« in each and every (historically established) representation thereof (2011, 21). Every draft of the whole of the city, its every visualization and self-definition in symbolic reality and, in our case, in public media narratives, points to the principles that routinely organize everyday life in the city.[6] Related to Dresden and St.

local *Gestalt*, which informs social practices, cultural dispositions, and the city's materiality.

6 To identify the historical self-image of a city is, however, to distinguish it from an image that is created by the city's marketing campaigns. The crucial difference is that the first kind of image establishes itself over a long period of time as a result of socio-historical processes and therefore cannot easily be manipulated. The city images produced by marketing technologies can, in contrast, experiment with different content. But there is surely a connection between these two phenomena. It can be assumed that marketing experts, since they are under the influence of the city and the way it forms the identities of its residents, take up the already established key figures, features, models, and ideas in one form or another, adjusting them to the relevant context and the zeitgeist. At the same time, if new ideas do not correlate with the city's imaginary,

Petersburg, there is a universe of works that capture their mythology, from different areas of study such as sociology, cultural anthropology, and literary studies.[7] These texts seize on the central, but also marginal, myths of these cities, thus revealing the principles of narration that surround them. Here are some of these overarching principles at a glance: Dresden is the cultural city, the baroque city, the royal city, Florence on the Elbe, or the victimized city; St. Petersburg is the royal capital, the cultural capital, the city of the three revolutions, and the city of Fjodor Dostoyevsky and Alexander Pushkin. However, the question of the handling of time in the historical representations and structures of the cities, as well as the question of their narrative constitution through temporalities andevent/structure relations has still been insufficiently addressed. Yet, since both cities experienced radical social, political, and economic changes and transitions in the twentieth century, it is reasonable to assert that this issue deserves more attention and will offer interesting results.

How urban studies can profit from the event/structure debate

As previously mentioned, dealing with temporal patterns in urban narratives of past, present, and future—which is one of the crucial points for comprehending how a city »works«—means first dealing with the interplay between short and long durations of time. The analysis is concerned with tracing the way city dwellers distinguish relevant from irrelevant events, inscribe causality in the relations between events and structures, and thus conceptualize their interplay in urban narratives. At this point, the terms »event« and »structure« should be clarified.

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they tend to fail (Frank 2011). It would, however, be wrong to assume that this vision doesn't allow opportunity for innovation in city planning, marketing, and so forth. The core argument is that ideas—innovative or traditional—will be »repelled« by the city and will not last long if they do not align themselves with or are contradictory to significant modes of thinking about the city and practicing it (Frank 2011).

7 To name a few examples, see for Dresden: Löffler (1955), Christmann (2004), Lindner and Moser (2006), and Fuchs (2012); for St. Petersburg: Anziferow (1922), Lotman (1992), Tchuikina (2003), Toporow (2003), and Gladarev (2011), among many others.

The »event« has been a contested term in historical studies for decades. The »1968« discourse in France criticized the domination of structures in the work of Fernand Braudel (1992 [1958]) and in the structural history propounded by the Annales school. In the 1970s, Edgar Morin (1972) and Reinhart Koselleck (1989 [1973]) announced »the comeback of the event,« which has since gained a special place in social history. The social sciences also addressed this issue (most explicitly in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and Niklas Luhmann), but unlike historical discourses, no broader theoretical debate was inspired by the »event/structure« problem, although it certainly is one of the central challenges of social theory, alongside the »practice-structure« problem. It was surely the events of 1989–91 in Eastern Europe that made historians and social scientists revisit these notions and reconceptualize their correlation in the 1990s. Two theoretical discussions, initiated by both historians (Hettling and Suter 2001) and sociologists (Greshoff and Kneer 1999), depict the evolution of the notion of the »event,« as well as the different ways of embedding it in theory of socio-structural change. The authors point out that the differentiating criteria, which produces the event/structure dichotomy, lies in the temporal dimension: events are temporally fixed, whereas structures last. The social scientists and historians, who have their points of divergence in and outside their professional fields, reject the hierarchical position of long durations above short durations, the asymmetry of the event/structure dynamic, and assert instead their complementary relationship.

In terms of the conceptual frames, this article is especially interested in sociologically relevant ideas, but it is also eager to profit from inter-disciplinary viewpoints. Therefore, the paper turns, first, to an overview of the classic sociological texts[8] for different interpretations of the issue presented in Greshoff and Kneer's volume (1999). If one can make a rough generalization, events and structures can be defined as follows: the event is a social action, interaction, or collaboration with a few actors, on

8 These include Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu, Giddens, Schütz, Berger, Luckmann, and Luhmann.

the one hand, or a communication, on the other. Either way, it is collectively perceived and has structurally relevant outcomes. Structure can be seen as a form of expectation: prescriptions, regulations, norms, values, rights, morals, traditions, or alternatively, as long-lasting, repetitive courses of action, procedures, or regular interactions. To sum up, structure is a »long-lasting must« and/or a »regularity« (Greshoff and Kneer 1999). Concerning the question of the benefit the Greshoff/Kneer debate affords the intrinsic logic perspective or, potentially, the other way around, one should start by taking a closer look at the fundamentals of the intrinsic logic approach. Inspired by the idea of the emancipation of the local, it made an epistemological about-turn by overcoming the subordination of the local to the global. Thus it is a cognitive shift, challenging the »good old« epistemological hierarchy that the intrinsic logic approach and the event/structure debate, as I see it, have in common. Even though the shifts have different premises and refer to different dimensions—respectively to spatial and temporal hierarchies with no direct correlation between them—both cases question the asymmetrical relation of the global and the long-lasting versus the local and short-term as the relation between the stable, powerful, and total versus the fragile, powerless, and individual elements of the totality. Both intrinsic logic and the event/structure debate highlight the creativity of elements, which are very often disempowered in discourse, as discussed above. To overcome these spatial and temporal hierarchies, one must consider a greater variety of different possible causalities in the interpretation of social happenings, and a greater variety of different possible readings of social processes and the way individuals can deal with them.

Furthermore, the temporal construction of the city's self-image is one of the crucial aspects of negotiation of identity. The relations between long-lasting and short-term durations, and the causalities that are narratively inscribed in them, are therefore foregrounded in existing research. On this account, the issues that are problematized by the event/structure debate, which contains a variety of views, can therefore be fruitful in making my analysis sensitive to urban »technologies« of ordering temporal elements and creating a vision or an outline of the city.

The aims of this empirical study are to see which of these »technologies,« perspectives, including those provided by the event/structure debate, urban societies take to deal with the ambiguity of historical events and structures and to see which causalities the narration inscribes in memory. It will observe how the narratives of Dresden and St. Petersburg differentiate, by means of temporality, between the socially stable and instable as well as the invariable and variable, and how they thus conceptualize the interplay of events and structures. This focus on interplay shows the way that urban communities envision their cities as entities, as the whole, while signifying at the same time, as mentioned earlier, their modes of reproduction. It can be productive to consider these new potential aspects of temporality in urban narration in terms of the development of event/structure theory.[9]

Guidelines for the empirical analysis

The choice of two cities as the objects of enquiry in this paper aims less to differentiate between their intrinsic logics by means of comparison than to detect the relevant urban structures of the cities by analyzing their narrative constructions. The overlap found in these two cases, despite differences in national context and size, will then be reflected on in conjunction with the particularities of their contrasting historical development.

The focus on the architectural politics of Dresden and St. Petersburg in the case studies is a good choice for pointing out some relevant principles of local distinctiveness, of how things are imagined, dealt with, as

9 As a side note, to clarify the correlation between the imaginary, texture, and event and structure, one can reformulate the research question in the following way: What kind of the whole of the city do the imaginaries of Dresden and St. Petersburg present if one examines their texture—comprising largely narratives—from the perspective of event and structure relations? It is these relations between long-lasting and short-term durations that depict the figure of cities and point out their modes of reproduction. These relations ultimately form the urban imaginary—conglomeration of ideas and perceptions of cities—to a great extent.

architectural heritage is one of the key areas of identification for residents of both Dresden and St. Petersburg.

Regarding identification, with which the city imaginary is concerned, identity and auto/biography studies have repeatedly highlighted how self-perception, whether by a person or a community, organizes itself narratively along lines of temporality and difference (see Kraus 1996; Lucius-Hoene 2002; Meuter 1995; Widdershoven 1993). In addition, urban research, especially when it is interested in the specific local order of cities, points out the significant role temporality plays in identity constructions, in so far as self-reflection for the most part goes along with locating cities in the nexus of past, present, and future (Frank et al. 2014). At the same time, this urban social memory provides a city with frames of reference through which it can differentiate itself from other cities or subjects in the past, present, or future, but also from itself (Frank et al. 2004).

Consequently, both the temporal order and differences built into narration are the right »locations« for analytical and empirical engagement with the urban imaginary; the question is what kind of temporal order and what forms of differentiation are typical for the two given cities.

In media discourses about Dresden and St. Petersburg, the subject of the analysis in this paper, difference is produced essentially via two modes: the cities are constituted through references to themselves in the past, as well as through interactions with other actors, namely with their own residents. As for the temporal dimension, it is entangled with both of these modes. As a result, I am going to examine the self-perception of the two cities along lines of temporality on the one hand, and in terms of self-referentiality and interaction on the other. Special attention will be paid to the narrative order and functions of events, to ascriptions of meaning and causality, and to events as a system of references that produce structures.[10]

10 In fact, the construction of the historical narratives of both cities and its correlation to their reproduction modes were explored in an earlier publication by the author (Dingersen 2014). However, a more thorough

The narrative construction of Dresden and St. Petersburg

A brief overview of the case studies[11]

Dresden and St. Petersburg position themselves in public discourses[12] as former royal cities with an immense historical and cultural heritage, including the most popular architectural masterpieces of baroque,

engagement with their temporal orders is presented in this paper, which is honed by the event/structure discourse. It explicates some of the more relevant patterns of relation between short and long durations and shows the organization of cities' narrative architecture and self-perception in a more systematic manner.

11 Since the details of both cases are not so relevant for the ideas I highlight in this paper, the overview is confined to basic information, in order to save space for more relevant issues. This paper focuses on the narrative strategies of the cities, which refer mostly to the discourses of opponents of the projects but, at the same time, represent the quantitatively dominant parts of the statements from both discourses. All translations from German and Russian into English are by the author.

12 The notion of public discourse is understood from the standpoint of Rainer Keller, who combines the perspective of Michel Foucault with the socio-phenomenological tradition of the sociology of knowledge. Discourse is comprehended as being socially contingent and based on the knowledge of everyday life and its associated routines, historically variable; and, most importantly, capable of constructing reality by imposing rules as to what may or may not be said (Keller 2004).

As far as the question of which interest groups use which strategies to struggle to define these discursive rules and negotiating their meanings, the following should be noted in advance: this paper traces the challenging question of whether there are intrinsically produced regularities, patterns, modes and, therefore, broadly »structural issues« that can be recognized in the shaping of the cities' reality. The focus on this wide-ranging epistemological perspective, on the other hand, leaves the political dimension out of consideration due to lack of space. For the same reason, the counter-narratives, which present alternative blueprints for Dresden and St. Petersburg, are not considered in this paper. They are surely required for a depiction of the complexity of the cities' imaginaries but are, nevertheless, fairly irrelevant when it comes to sketching the most significant narratives that shape the whole of the cities.

rococo, and neoclassicism from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, which are concentrated in their historical city centers. The renaissance of historicism after the end of the socialist era in Germany and Russia in 1989–90 made these images symbolic of the two cities and, therefore, bound the identification of their residents tightly to them. For more than twenty years, Dresden and St. Petersburg have been arenas for ongoing public conflicts over building projects proposed near historical city sites. My examples of narrative structures and discursive practices, which will demonstrate the constitution and functioning of the self-perception of these cities, are two long-standing, internationally known conflicts that took place in the mid-2000s. They provide the wide range of empirical data, in the form of media content that appeared in the press, on TV, and on the internet. These conflicts concern the Waldschlösschen Bridge in Dresden and the controversy around the Okhta Center or Okhta Skyscraper in St. Petersburg.

The Waldschlösschen Bridge in Dresden was proposed by the city administration and aimed to resolve the lack of transport infrastructure in that part of the city by building a crossing over the Elbe to the north-east of Dresden. However, it led to an eruption of protests from the city's residents and gained attention from national and international actors, all of whom were concerned about the possible damage to the views over the historical center of Dresden, which is recognized as a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Completed in August of 2013, despite all the protests, the Waldschlösschen Bridge cost Dresden its status as a World Heritage Site and still remains a very controversial issue among the populace of Dresden. The case of the Okhta Skyscraper has much in common with this story. This business center was planned by the city administration and the oil concern GAZPROM at a location that was close enough to the historic center to damage the panorama as well as to put the city's UNESCO World Heritage Site status at risk. Due to massive protests by St. Petersburg's residents, it was relocated far away from the historical city center and is now in the process of construction.

Temporality and self-referentiality

By drawing on different periods of or events from the cities' biographies, the narratives about Dresden and St. Petersburg, aim only to contextualize the current events historically. Similar to a biographical narration, the discourses of both of these cities compare Dresden and St. Petersburg to their past »selves.« The narrativization of the continuities and ruptures in the visions of the cities constructs their »identity«; for instance, through different ways of claiming the authenticity of the city's present, which is always done with regard to its »proper past.« Thus the temporality or temporal references of Dresden are organized in a way that highlights the existence of a »proper« or »genuine« self-image and its destruction through historical circumstances, but they are also organized in a way that leaves no doubt that the restoration and reproduction of this self-image is needed, as the following statement from a protester implies: »And of course I was often in Dresden during the GDR time. The famous view with the Church of Our Lady [Frauenkirche] was not yet completed, of course.«[13] The narratives of Dresden are saturated with the words »again« or the prefix »re-«: »Dresden has become world class again with the title [of World Heritage Site], after it was forced into provinciality by two dictatorships.«[14] The »real« Dresden was damaged and has not been completed since then, as it is still in need of supplementary elements. The architectural reconstruction of Dresden was concerned with the reparation of its »identity«:

> Art lovers all over the world watched Dresden: 60 years after its terrible devastation through the bombings during war, the Church of Our Lady was revived in October 2005. The image of the old Dresden shined again: the soft swing of the Elbe and the city

13 Heidrun Hannusch, »Dieser Blick gehört der ganzen Welt,« DNN-Interview mit Wolfgang Thierse, Bundestagspräsident a. D., zum Dresdner Weltkulturerbe-Streit, *Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten*, April 7, 2006, 13.

14 Heidrun Hannusch, »UNESCO-Titel: Weltrang nach Provinzialität,« *Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten*, January 13, 2006.

> center, over which floats the widely visible light sandstone dome of the church.[15]

The narrative conveys the self-image of Dresden as a long-lasting repetitive process of re-presentation—and therefore as a structure. The idea of the »authentic« self-image is shaped here by emphasizing a certain event: the accomplishment of the restoration. This event forms the structure by signaling its repetitive nature, excluding any capriciousness in this process, but rather—as something that brought balance and harmony—underlying its normativity and regularity. In the narrative of St. Petersburg, which also claims the authenticity of the city's present, temporalities are organized in a different way—namely in a linear fashion, for example, by stressing what appeared first chronologically. The following argument against the Okhta building »weaves« together the city's »identity« out of the events, whose positioning serves as evidence for the existence of a »genuine« core of city images:

> There wasn't so very much that was built in Petersburg during the time of Peter [Tsar Peter I, the founder of the city]. Nevertheless, the plan for the city was so brilliant that it grew somehow from the inside. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in the era of Pushkin, the Palace Square and the Alexander Column appeared. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the great Russian Jugendstil appeared. Thus, as a result of leaps across three centuries, Petersburg became Petersburg before it became Petrograd and Leningrad. What are we going to contribute to this city at the beginning of the twenty-first century?[16]

This genesis of the city, as well as the claim for authenticity, is accompanied in both cases by overcoming obstacles. The »in spite of« pattern represents the next city biography strategy that organizes events and historical periods, ruptures and continuities, and brings them together for the production

15 Alexander Wendt, »Autobahn durchs Paradies,« *FOCUS*, July 12, 2006, accessed September 30, 2015, http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/weltkulturerbe_aid_111818.html.

16 Andrej Bitov, »Bomby nad gorodom,« Flyer, 2009.

of a self-image. As such, the German art historian Heinrich Magirius has said that »Dresden has so far managed, despite many disasters and not least because of its generous scenic location on the Elbe, to preserve and to recapture its identity,«[17] Here is a similar statement from another author:

> After the war and the dictatorships of the twentieth century, the city managed to regain its past gloss and international attention and to perform a concert along with other European cities.[18]

The demolition of the historic center of Dresden as a result of the airstrikes of the Western Allies from February 13–15, 1945 is the central, albeit not the only, anchor point in the narrativization of Dresden, which constitutes its self-perception as a city that overcomes. Thus it has been emphasized that the current »cultural identity« is an inherent one, which »survived the Nazi regime as well as the GDR time.«[19] This shows, interestingly, that both the short duration of bombardment in February 1945 and the long duration of political regimes are part of the symbolic event architecture of the Dresden narratives.

A similar narrative pattern concerning the process of overcoming—a pattern which also organizes itself, significantly, around the experience of suffering in the Second World War, namely the Siege of Leningrad—can be found in the discourse about St. Petersburg. Along with the blockade disaster, the confrontation with political regimes also plays a crucial role here in the self-understanding of the city as one that overcomes:

> Leningrad experienced terrible pressure from the Bolshevik authorities after the war, as it was insistently turned into a »city of provincial

17 Susanne Beyer, »Denkmäler: Angriff auf das Unsichtbare,« *Der Spiegel*, July 2, 2007, 157.

18 Reinhard Decker, »Dresdner Appell zum Erhalt des Welterbestatus,« June 15, 2009, accessed September 30, 2015, http://www.welterbe-erhalten.de/unterschriftenliste.

19 Valeria Heintges, »Wenn Dresden stur ist, sind wir es auch,« *Sächsische Zeitung*, May 10, 2008, 9.

> fate.« But under these circumstances, despite such pressure, Leningrad managed generally to preserve its historical image.[20]

Particular attention was devoted to the conflicts during the late Perestroika period as the authorities of Leningrad began a partial modernization of the historical center and resolved to demolish some of its historical buildings, including the Angleterre Hotel, which was the formal residence of the famous Russian poet of the beginning of the twentieth century, Sergey Yesenin. The discourse positions the city dwellers' fight for the Angleterre Hotel as the next major, symbolically relevant experience of resistance and defense of the city after the Siege of Leningrad. These wartime and Perestroika events are often used as the benchmark for narrativization of current events, as the following statement evidences: »Only two buildings were ruined on the Nevsky [central avenue in St. Petersburg] during the war, and in the last few years, six buildings have been ruined.«[21] Here is another example from the press:

> Maybe it is way too long ago […] 1987—»Angleterre.« […] So many things have happened since that time, we've lost so much in our city. […] After the gloomy totalitarian regime had collapsed, we were so young and hoped that we could save St. Petersburg, where many generations of our ancestors lived. But we couldn't do it… What have we lost? A few hundred of the unique buildings […] but, most importantly, those buildings that made St. Petersburg St. Petersburg.[22]

The process of overcoming in St. Petersburg spreads out temporally into the past, but also into the future and is accompanied by a permanent state of being in danger. In both cities, the events figure as challenges to the »identity structure,« which construct the latter by challenging it.

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20 Gustav Boguslavskij, »Gazprom-test,« *Novaya Gazeta*, September 6, 2007, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/3699/.

21 Tat'ana Lichanova, »Otkrytoe pis'mo Walentine Matwienko,« *Novaya Gazeta*, July 2, 2007, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/3294/.

22 Ibid.

At the same time, there are aspects of urban self-representation, such as belonging, whose temporality is structured mostly by events. Narrative coherence is constructed by drawing parallels between past and present events or by recourse to the »initial point« of the current event, as the following statement from the call for a demonstration against the bridge shows:

> The »Call from Dresden« of February 13, 1990 for the reconstruction of the Church of Our Lady already contained the idea of registering [Dresden] in the UNESCO World Heritage Site list. Through our demonstration, we're going to bring these two places to mind: the view over the Waldschlösschen and the city skyline, and their restored and intact beauty. Just as the »Group of Twenty« did in the autumn of 1989, we are suggesting a symbolic donation of 1 euro for the preservation of our heritage.[23]

Bringing together past and present events makes »the identity structure« coherent and attributes new meanings to it. The logic, allowing consideration of the »Call from Dresden« alongside civil protest against damage to the historical image of Dresden, as well as the actions of the »Group of Twenty« alongside contemporary practice of preservation of heritage, creates a self-image of Dresden that outlives political transformations.

Personal biographies and »narrative identities« draw a line between the past and the present particularly convincingly, linking »then« coherently to »now« and creating logical consistency for historical coincidences, as the following example from the St. Petersburg press shows:

23 Olaf Böhme et al. »Welterbe erhalten: jetzt! Aufruf zu Demonstration am 25. März 2007,« Flyer, März 2007. The »Call from Dresden« aimed to gather financial support for the reconstruction of the Church of Our Lady. The »Group of Twenty« organized itself spontaneously during the demonstrations in Dresden in October 1989 in order to negotiate with the local authorities concerning political issues of the day; it legitimized itself as the representative of Dresden's citizenry by collecting one mark from each of their supporters.

> Not all of those who have seen the bombings of the Second World War, and St. Petersburg in ruins, are in the cemetery. Those who have seen the walls of the Angleterre fall are still alive.[24]

Furthermore, de-rationalization or mystification represents a common method in the discourse about St. Petersburg, in order to build historical parallels and, by doing so, ensure the meaning and coherence of a range of interpretations of the city.

> On September 8, sixty-six years had passed since the beginning of the Siege of Leningrad. On the same day, a city dwellers' demonstration for protecting the historical image of the northern capital[25] is going to take place. It is a good occasion to think about why these events coincided with each other.[26]

In this case, the events of the Siege of Leningrad and the demonstration for protecting historical image serve as a medium that manifests some regularities. These events are a reference to something that transcends the given facts and the explanation for which lies beyond them.

Temporality and interaction

The narrative constitution of the entities Dresden and St. Petersburg occurs not only by reference to selected fragments of their biographies but, as mentioned previously, also by the interplay between the cities and their residents.

It is about social exchange, which is constructed in discourse through different means, such as the short-term here-and-now acts of everyday life (for instance, city dwellers doing something at a particular moment), as well as by general actions that occur in unspecified time (for example, the city generally having an effect on its inhabitants). The discourse is

24 Lichanova, *Novaya Gazeta*, July 2, 2007.

25 Another common name for St. Petersburg.

26 Boguslavskij, *Novaya Gazeta*, September 6, 2007.

also constructed by long-term actions of an outstanding nature, specifically events.

In the discourse about Dresden, an exchange of gift and action is the common element. The city's residents are positioned as recipients of the gift: »the Dresdeners was gifted the scenery that historical buildings are embedded in.«[27] Due to the embedding of Dresden's historical center in the Elbe Valley, and the beneficial combination of the natural and the artificial in the landscape, Dresden »has inspired artists and poets over the centuries.«[28] The effect or influence of the city is, however, not only about creating inspiration but also about raising awareness or educating, as the Dresden writer Thomas Rosenlöcher declares:

> The main path where we [Dresdeners] acknowledge each other lies along the Elbe meadows, stretching out across the city. Walking here, a Dresdener becomes aware of the fact that a built environment can also be determined by beauty—he can feel the harmony of the triad of city skyline, river scenery, and mountains lying further away.[29]

As a result, a Dresdener gets to know the beauty of the built environment which, combined with the refined scenic attributes, defines quality of life in the city. This phenomenon evokes something subtle and barely measurable, which is, nevertheless, relevant enough for residents of Dresden to fight for it during the Waldschlösschen Bridge conflict: »They feel that not only the landscape has been ruined here. Something invisible has been seized: a feeling.«[30] The discourse shows an invisible, emotionally charged relation between Dresdeners and their city. The fact that the refined beauty of Dresden causes a »feeling of happiness« rhetorically reinforces the emotionalization of the relation.

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27 Landeshauptstadt Dresden, 2005, Bürgerentscheid Waldschlösschenbrücke, 6.

28 Andrea Pals, op-ed, *Elbtal-Kurier*, December 12, 2005, 6.

29 Thomas Rosenlöcher, »Ihr zersägt Eure Enkel! Warum wir Dresdner uns noch immer gegen die Waldschlösschenbrücke wehren,« *Die Zeit*, February 7, 2008, 39.

30 Beyer, *Der Spiegel*, July 2, 2007, 157.

For residents of St. Petersburg, it is important to pass the city on intact to their children, so that they can experience the city as previous generations did, namely as the city that educated them. It is not only symbolic meaning that is ascribed to this aspect of education, as living in St. Petersburg is not only about the aesthetic plane or acquiring taste, but also about general socialization as the following statement from a preservationist from St. Petersburg shows: »This city has its own will, its own mentality, and it brings people up; we are to some extent a product of this city, its servants.«[31]

In light of these statements, the following narrative pattern concerning the role of both cities in the lives of their residents can be recognized: dwellers of Dresden and St. Petersburg are favored with lots of gifts, but they are also educated and socialized by their cities. The relationship is, however, not asymmetrical: taking requires giving and so the gifts from these cities require preservation efforts or action from their residents, speaking in terms of the »gift versus action« exchange. This part of the exchange, exemplified by the civic engagement narratives, is dominated by events.

The histories of both cities are characterized by numerous precedents for civic engagement concerning the architectural heritage of the cities. It was representatives of the educated bourgeoisie (*Bildungsbürgertum*) (however controversial their political position in German history since the time of Augustus II the Strong may be regarded),[32] whose culture, way of life, and attitude were significantly marked by their opposition to the political regime in the GDR. Drastically restricted civic engagement could, however, develop relatively freely in the field of heritage preservation,

31 Tat'ana Lichanova, »Boi za oboronu Peterburga,« *Novaya Gazeta*, August 20, 2009, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/5229/.

32 In relation to different perceptions of the notion of Bildungsbürgertum in Dresden, see Knebel (2007).

which was less constrained by ideological pressures and state control.[33] This was, for example, the case in civil protests against the demolition of the baroque building by the architect Daniel Pöppelmann between 1981 and 1982, or later in the efforts of the civil society group *IG Äußere Neustadt*, which argued for a historically sensitive renovation (Anders 2009, 34) and protested against the wrecking of the buildings in Neustadt, the city district on the right bank of the Elbe.

The preservation movement and the traditions of »city activism« or »city protection,« as they call it in St. Petersburg can, according to the sociologist Boris Gladarev, be seen as a reaction to extensive social transformations in the city and dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century, when the first capitalist rebuilding of the urban space took place. The next waves of activism unfolded at the time of the revolution, and the civil war that erupted afterwards in the 1920s, as well as during the Perestroika period (Gladarev 2011). This last wave of engagement is of special interest, as it shaped not only St. Petersburg's history of heritage preservation but also contributed to the political history of the city. The preservationists of Leningrad built the first »bottom-up« movement in Soviet Russia, whose public demonstrations and protest campaigns in the mid-1980s affected the politics of the authorities. They avoided political rhetoric, but caused changes through their unusual and, therefore, symbolic presence in the public space of Leningrad alone (Gladarev 2011).

The end of the 1980s marks a milestone in both city biographies, and this period is also referenced in current discourses. Thus the Dresdener standing in front of the Church of Our Lady, who demonstrated against the bridge in March 2007, reminded Thomas Rosenlöcher of the crowd that stood in the same place in December 1989. This time it was about preserving beauty:

33 For more about the so-called culture of retreating (Rückzugkultur) and the milieu of the bourgeois refugee (Refugiumsbürgertum) in Dresden, see Rehberg (2008).

> Where can you hear something like that, that more than twenty-thousand people gathered […] to demonstrate for the sake of beauty? That is definitely an expression of Dresden's specialness.[34]

The writer highlights the value-oriented attitude of Dresdeners, who have more than once brought humanitarian and cultural values to the fore and were ready to protect them against the ideological or utilitarian interests of politics.

In comparison to Dresden, the Okhta conflict is characteristic of the »St. Petersburg way of life«[35] as a motive for distinct civic engagement both at the end of the 1980s and today. It is about »a unique hierarchy of values, which doesn't place comfort at the top.«[36] The city's residents are ready to sacrifice their comfort to keep this order in St. Petersburg: »You can't treat us like that! We won't let the demolishment happen—you can't buy us with a well-fed life!«[37]

The discourse on St. Petersburg also offers some additional means to constitute the city as a subject of relations. The dwellers of St. Petersburg feel »love for their city«[38] as well as »pain, if it is being ruined.«[39] The Okhta conflict requires them to show their »loyalty toward St. Petersburg«[40] and that means not letting others »betray the city.«[41]

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34 Rosenlöcher, *Die Zeit*, February 7, 2008, 39.

35 Tat'ana Lichanova, *Novaya Gazeta*, August 20, 2009.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ljudmila Ėl'jaševa, »Pis'mo tem, kto ne ljubit Peterburg,« *Novaya Gazeta*, May 12, 2008, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/4265/.

39 Boris Višnevskij, »Gazoskrëb v tumane,« *Novaya Gazeta*, May 13, 2010, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/5833/.

40 Boguslavskij, *Novaya Gazeta*, September 6, 2007.

41 Tat'ana Lichanova, *Novaya Gazeta*, August 20, 2009.

Such a sincere and loyal attitude toward St. Petersburg treats the city as if it was a vulnerable personality with a range of feelings and emotions, which therefore requires a sensitive approach. This moralizing attitude to the city can best be seen in the following statement of the famous preservationist and urban activist Nikolai Žuravskij, who argues, adapting the words of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, that »We are forever responsible for what we've rescued.«[42]

Thus, the narrative of social exchange between two cities and their residents consists of long-term events and short-term simple actions, moralizes the relations between actors, and as a result provides interesting insights into the event/structure complex, and shows the city to be a resident's assignment.

The city as a resident's assignment

Embedding the city in history has ethical implications. The Dresdener's assertiveness is particularly honorable, that's why it is a »moral duty« of the city's residents to ensure its survival and protect its heritage. Being a Dresdener means, therefore, to be constantly aware of the assignment to preserving this heritage and carrying this burden for a lifetime: »the burden of being a Dresdener.«[43] If one looks back at the history of the city, it becomes clear that »the Dresdener […] embodies an effort of resistance.«[44]

The contextualization of St. Petersburg as a city with severe past(s) also calls upon a sense of obligation from its dwellers to pay tribute to the sufferings of the city and to acknowledge its accomplishments. Furthermore, the discourse about St. Petersburg emancipates the city, claiming it as »an inspiring« or »uniting factor,«[45] which has throughout history

42 Sergej Vasil'ev, »Čelovek goroda,« *Novaya Gazeta*, December 24, 2009, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/5522/.

43 Rosenlöcher, *Die Zeit*, February 7, 2008, 39.

44 Ibid.

45 Boguslavskij, *Novaya Gazeta*, September 6, 2007.

repeatedly mobilized its dwellers to action. For instance, the city »united the people, suffering in the days of the Blockade, into a living organism, a civil society,«[46] and it »mobilized people for the sake of rescuing the historical image of the city«[47] for the present.

The city is mostly depicted in both discourses on the city as a process and product of the ongoing efforts and accomplishments of its dwellers throughout urban history. The theme of handing over responsibilities and duties—to love and care about the city—to the next generation exemplifies this very clearly. Rosenlöcher commented on the demonstrations against the bridge in the following way:

> Surprisingly, many of the offspring of Dresden with Dresdener offspring of their own in buggies. […] And besides many of those, whom I've known since '89 […] as I saw them, I knew it was about us. It was about our perseverance.[48]

The phenomenon that should be recognized here is the civic engagement tradition based on regionally specific socialization with its own moral attitudes and practices.

According to the discourse about St. Petersburg the symbolic exchange between the city and its dwellers should also be maintained here in order to preserve the distinctiveness of this city and to avoid the fate that »future generations will not live in a unique city, but in a chaotic accumulation of building constructions«[49] and will »get to know St. Petersburg only from archive photos.«[50]

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46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Rosenlöcher, *Die Zeit*, February 7, 2008, 39.

49 Valerija Strel'nikova, »Jurij Mamin: bašnju na ochte stroit grjaduščij cham,« *Novaya Gazeta*, September 10, 2009, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/5274/.

50 »Obraščenie orgkomiteta,« *Novaya Gazeta*, September 11, 2008, accessed September 30, 2015, http://novayagazeta.spb.ru/articles/4515/.

Seeing the city as an assignment updates moral vocabulary such as the give-and-take relationship, loyalty, and gratefulness on the one hand and memory on the other. These are the notions that extend the temporality of self-perception in two directions—into the past and into the future. The moralizing is thereby produced largely, although not only, through events, which serve as a system of reference for arguing the necessity of loyalty and thankfulness in relation to the city. The city dwellers' promise of loyalty, to engage with the ideas of French philosopher Paul Ricœur (2006), connects different pasts with future visions of Dresden and St. Petersburg and thereby ensures the continuity of their self-images throughout a long period of time. These self-images or, generally speaking, the narrative of the city as an assignment and other moralizing patterns—reproducing the established classification of social and cultural norms, »must-haves« and »no gos« in terms of social relations and cultural lifestyle, spatial organization and architectural images—thus aim at maintaining the symbolic social order of Dresden and St. Petersburg.

Below, I provide an overview of symbolic exchange in terms of events and structures, offering an interpretation of this interplay as a form of interaction between the cities and their residents. This interaction unfolds throughout urban history and resembles, therefore, an »event,« stretched out in time. This »event« is a repetitive and, therefore, expected action, in terms of both the impact of the cities on their residents and the caring attitude of the residents, especially in their responses to anticipated threats. This means that the narrated exchange can be also seen as a structure, which arises within or is realized only by these short- and long-term actions.

Moralization as a resistance strategy for the maintenance of city order

The models of interplay between events and structures to be found in public discourses about the two cities, and the causality ascribed to these relations, demonstrates several narrative strategies for constructing the self-images of Dresden and St. Petersburg as entities showing the whole of these cities.

By referring to the different pasts of the city, the narration can construct historical events in a cyclical way, building a loop from the proper self-image, skipping over the wrong one, before returning to the proper one once again, letting events form »urban identity« as a structure by »restoring« it. The events can be ordered in a linear way, using the beginnings of the city to define the authenticity of certain of its self-representations. A popular, structure-engendering strategy for both cities, considering their pasts, is to construct the structure of »identity« by challenging it through numerous critical events, such as wars, revolutions, and other ruptures in the continuity of the self-image. Finally, the selection of past and present events, placed together, establish coherent connections between past and present, serving as a medium for the transcendent structure, which only reveals itself through events. To sharpen the effect of the event/structure interplay here, it should be highlighted that the narrative construction of the cities along temporal and self-referential lines demonstrates the composition of events, which constitute the cities as entities, as the whole, primarily by mapping them as figures that are capable of action. The whole of both cities presents itself as malleable and manageable on account of its own strengths and, regarding the long history of challenges and processes of restoration faced by each city, as assertive figures capable of resistance.

In the case of interaction between the cities and their dwellers, which is, beside self-referentiality, a way to narratively build the whole of the city, the narration deploys events as a tool to show the interaction among the actors mentioned. At the same time, it is this selecting and bringing together of events—mostly cases of protest and other forms of civic engagement to protect the »proper« vision of the city—which embeds the narrative construction of Dresden and St. Petersburg in their histories and, thus, takes part in the process of emotionalizing and moralizing the cities' relations with their residents. Incorporated within a structure of mutual give-and-take, the selected events create the perception of these cities as a moral duty for the city's residents and future generations and, therefore, form a stable structure of »urban identity.« A closer sociological look at these moralizing narrative patterns in the context of urban history

suggests, on the one hand, that these patterns fulfill a historical function in the cities' modes of reproducing themselves and, on the other hand, sheds light upon the similarities in the narrative construction of the two cities despite their differences in size and national cultural background.

How can one interpret the fact that relations between cities and their dwellers are depicted using the moral vocabulary of giving and taking, loyalty, thankfulness, and duty? According to the German sociologist Georg Simmel, give-and-take relations and social exchange, which are based on gratefulness, fulfill the function of maintaining social solidarity in situations that are not legally regulated, as is the case for the economy (Simmel 1908). If one projects this idea of the regulating symbolic function of social exchange onto the narratively depicted interplay of relations between Dresden, St. Petersburg, and their respective dwellers, an interesting perspective on the evolution and aims of these relationships emerges. What has provided for the preservation throughout their history of those aspects of the cities that have mapped the essence of Dresden and St. Petersburg and have been extremely important and dear to their residents, such as historical city views and architectural scenery? These aspects experienced revolutions, wars, political regimes with new, ideologically motivated visions of the city's image, neoliberal modernization of the cityscapes in the post-socialist era and so on. Legal orders and frameworks, which exist at specific historical points, could not save the cities from threats or interventions. Beyond cases of lawbreaking, violence, and emergencies, ideologically or economically motivated political will in Dresden, as well as in St. Petersburg, has always found a way to circumvent or adjust the law, thus exposing historical panoramas and architectural sites to danger and unbalancing the negotiated »values« and images. From this standpoint, it can be assumed that by mapping the whole of Dresden and St. Petersburg as figures, which creates the moral obligation to take care of them, similar to the figures of one's family members, the narrative about the social exchange between these cities and their residents constituted itself as a narrative strategy for overcoming diverse crises.

This strategy can be seen as a socio-ethical supplement to existing legal regulations, which should theoretically protect cities and their heritage from risks, but is often insufficient, as history attests repeatedly in such different national contexts. It is about the creation of solidarity among the urban community in order to encourage the »right« way of dealing with their city—solidarity that has advantages at critical times. Sociologically perceived, the narratives of the give-and-take relationship, duties, assignment and the promise of loyalty aim to reproduce the symbolic order of Dresden and St. Petersburg, including the relevant classifications such as what it means to be a Dresdener or a St. Petersburger, what is supposedly right or wrong, imaginable or non-imaginable for these two cities.

Translated into urban practice, this perception has different articulations for instance in the areas of urban development and architectural policies. Most notably, each of the cities meets the challenge to be perceived as an entity through its striking self-referentiality. This aspect highlights the capability of the city to handle urban development issues on its own, without expecting external aid or delegating management and responsibilities to actors from »abroad.« The negative and positive connotations of the multiple pasts of each city are fixed and represent the basis for the city to organize itself and consequently shape a definite, intentional vision of itself. The future of both former royal cities and cultural capitals has been therefore depicted as successfully malleable, however it is barely negotiable and seen from the perspective of the past. The ambivalence of the situation exemplifies in both cases marketing of the city, which, on the one hand, promotes Dresden and St. Petersburg in terms of their rich historical heritage and, on the other hand, vainly tries to transform the disparities between tradition and modernity into a productive interplay—for at the moment the past dominates city development narratives at the expense of the future.

Finally, as a side note, the common mode of narration developed historically by two cities due to their comparable local distinctiveness, despite their different national origins, proposes a vision of a particular type of historical city. It is a city distinguished by emotional bonds to its

cultural heritage and with resilient narrative reproduction modes, formed as a reaction to the challenges of architectural interventions.

Events, structures, and identity narratives

Returning to the event/structure complex, it should be said that, as the case studies of Dresden and St. Petersburg have shown, it is relevant to observe the way societies or local communities narrate and, by doing so, conceptualize relations between events and structures, including causalities that are ascribed to them, and the composition of events, which confirm or confront each other. Whether or not the constitutive function of events can be assumed to illustrate and prove or challenge and mediate a structure, it is clear that the perspective of the event/structure interplay exposes the narrative patterns of the (collective) actor and the actor's strategies of reflecting on itself. Whether or not structure presents itself in the narrative as something that also exists beyond events in a similar way to »identity,« or »superficial historical power« or, on the contrary, as something that exists only at the moment of an event, as is the case for symbolic exchange, this focus shows how actors' self-perception and modes of reproduction function.

Generally speaking, the event/structure relationship in both case studies is constructed in a rather complementary manner: a structure such as »urban identity« is seldom presented as something external to events, and events are not only illustrations of a more global phenomenon. On the contrary, they are significant points in time, challenging and thereby establishing the existence of structure. Noteworthy here is the fact that the economy of narrative identity construction requires dealing with certain long-term periods as if they were short-time actions. Thus, the entire temporal spans of dictatorships, for instance, stand alongside the events of the Second World War or the protest actions of the preservationists. Especially interesting from the point of view of the event /structure complex is its ambivalence, demonstrated by the exchange between cities and their residents. As mentioned earlier, as a form of interaction stretched out over time, the symbolic give-and-take relationship is narrated as an event. At the same time, this exchange is a repetitive

process, realized in discourse mostly by events over the course of urban history and therefore it is a structure, which arranges the reproduction and continuity of a certain vision of Dresden and St. Petersburg.

To conclude, the narrative constitution of the cities as subjects by means of self-referentiality—namely by referring to their multiple pasts—as well as through symbolic exchange and moralization, both created through the interplay and duality of event/structure relations, have become significant modes of the discursive reproduction of Dresden and St. Petersburg.

The focus on narration, constructed by event-structure relations, proved itself in contemporary case studies to be a successful analytical tool, demonstrating the modes of imagination and knowledge production of both cities at work. The contribution of the event/structure interplay to a narrative constitution of the city as an entity, which was highlighted in this research, shows that the event/structure-perspective can be useful for analyses of other social structures of belonging and identification both in and beyond cities.

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