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Neighbourhood Effects on Jihadist Radicalisation in Germany? Some Case-Based Remarks

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About twenty young people travelled from a small German former mining settlement named Dinslaken-Lohberg to become fighters with al-Nusra and ISIS. They drew particular attention, with media reports about "members" of what they termed the "Lohberg Brigade" killed in the fighting, or in air strikes by the anti-ISIS coalition, or in spectacular suicide attacks claiming many victims. Drawing on that case, the article explores how neighborhood can effect the emergence and persistence of radicalisation to jihadi neo-Salafism. The author presents a series of local elements that interfere with one another to strengthen each other's persistence and effects and thus promote the emergence and persistence of the radicalisation phenomenon at hand. The interference of elements is not an automatic but a social process, enacted by neighbors telling stories of conspiracy, of discrimination and recounting experiences of spirituality, heroism, masculinity, and femaleness. It is performed by neighbors setting, crossing and avoiding symbolic boundaries. And finally it is played by neighbors simply following their routines. The author shows how explaining space-related radicalisation processes means more than adding up spatial factors. His approach rejects the idea of isolating a single social fact – such as local structures, events, processes or social actors that existed, occurred or acted prior to the emergence of radicals in their neighbourhood – as definite cause for radicalisation.

Keywords: neighborhood effects, radicalization, neo-Salafism, jihadism, milieu, emergence

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1. Radicalisation in the Neighbourhood

Between 2014 and 2016 several hundred jihadists left Germany to fight in Syria or Iraq with the al-Qaeda offshoot al-Nusra Front or the so-called Islamic State. The discovery that about twenty young people had departed from just one small former mining town named Dinslaken-Lohberg drew particular attention, with media reports about "members" of what they termed the "Lohberg Brigade" killed in the fighting, or in air strikes by the anti-ISIS coalition, or in spectacular suicide attacks claiming many victims. Witness reports and other evidence suggest that young men from Lohberg participated in torture and executions, while the appearance of Lohberg jihadists in Islamist propaganda videos generated public unease. After part of the group returned to Germany to face prosecution, the media also showed great interest in their trials, verdicts and sentences. Especially following the Paris attacks in 2017, the question was how and why so many young men (and a number of women) from a settlement with just six thousand inhabitants on the outskirts of an inconspicuous German town could turn into jihadists. Are certain urban neighbourhoods in Germany serving as socio-spatial hotbed for neo-Salafist radicalisation, in the same way as Molenbeek-Saint-Jean in Brussels or the banlieus outside Paris?

At first glance the answer would appear to be no. For a start, with a population of six thousand Lohberg is very much smaller than Molenbeek (almost one hundred thousand). And Dinslaken-Lohberg is a small town, whereas in Belgium and France we are dealing with metropolitan settings, as well as very different histories of relations between majority and minority society and different national integration models. Another difference is that Germany – unlike France in particular – has never witnessed the kind of large-scale civil unrest among migrant youth upon which Salafist radicalisation processes could piggyback; this speaks against fears that we could be seeing the emergence of "French or Belgian conditions" (Loch 2009; also Castel 2009; Moran 2011).

Identifying a few obvious differences is naturally not enough to provide a proper answer to the questions posed above; we must dig deeper. This is a question for urban social ecology, which in the century since its founding has accumulated a mass of empirical knowledge about the ways in which socio-spatial and neighbourhood effects can affect the actions, attitudes, experiences and biographies of the inhabitants of urban spaces, for example in relation to experiences of discrimination, educational ambition, health, deviancy, social mobility, intergenerational poverty (Sampson 2012; Massey 2013; van Ham et al. 2012) or intergroup contact (Schönwälder et al. 2016, 9). Yet to this day we still know too little about exactly how such effects function, including which local mechanisms, peculiarities, side-effects, amplifiers and feedback loops interact and how (Sampson 2012, 64–47; exceptions include Schönwälder et al. 2016, 97–171; Hüttermann 2018; Hüttermann and Minas 2015). The fact that the latest research on neighbourhood effects brings together disciplines like psychology, medicine and sociology to illuminate effects and the processes that enable them demonstrates a belief that such effects derive from a complex causal milieu (Massey 2004).

However it still remains largely unclear whether social-ecological and socio-spatial models possess explanatory advantages over widely studied socio-structural variables such as education and income, and which these might be (van Ham et al. 2012, 3). The question of whether evidence exists for neighbourhood effects and how they arise has to be asked and answered anew for each new question of interest: from unwanted teenage pregnancies to diverse manifestations of violence. And so it is for the phenomenon of radicalisation of young Muslim men and women in urban contexts in Germany. Those are the starting points for the following case-based reconstructive analysis. The author will definitely not be supplying a definitive clarification of the relationships between place and radicalisation to a jihadi version of neo-Salafism; case-based arguments are generally unsuited for such purposes. But he would like to highlight that place does matter for understanding the emergence and persistence of radicalisation towards jihadist neo-Salafism as witnessed in Dinslaken-Lohberg.

2. Theoretical and Methodological Approach

Understanding the way space matters in the present context requires us to renounce traditional deterministic approaches of cause and consequence. Instead of seeking causal explanations we need to think in terms of a) the emergence of a social phenomenon (Wahlberg 2014; Luhmann 1997, 134–44) and b) the functional explanation of its persistence (Hüttermann 2003). With a view to our theme, this means that the interference of local spatial structures, local spatial processes and local events and their relationship to societal and transnational contexts constitutes a milieu of social elements that as a whole increases the probability of neighbourhoods (like Lohberg) experiencing radicalisation towards jihadist neo-Salafism. The focus of this epistemological approach lies in interference, emergence, and persistence, but not in causation in the classical sense. As a consequence, neighbourhood-related radicalisation towards jihadist neo-Salafism should be seen as different from the underlying interfering elements that broadly constitute an emergence-promoting milieu. This approach rejects mechanical understandings social phenomena. It is also far from suggesting that there is only one path to radicalisation towards jihadist neo-Salafism, and thus corresponds to the standard set by Randy Borum (2011a). This understanding ultimately prevents us from treating single social facts – such as local structures, events, processes or social actors that existed, occurred or acted prior to the emergence of radicals in their neighbourhood – as definite causes for radicalisation. In fact, the phenomenon of radicalisation goes far beyond – and departs from – its preconditions.

In the following the author presents a series of local elements that interfere with one another, strengthen each other's persistence and effects, and thus promote the advent

and persistence of the emergence-promoting milieu. The interference of local elements is not an automatic but a social process. It is enacted by neighbours . It is performed by neighbours setting, crossing and avoiding symbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 2002). And finally it is played out by neighbours simply following their routines.

The first local element of interest is the peculiar moral order that characterises neighbourhood life in Dinslaken-Lohberg. Core features are (a) self-perception as outsiders and (b) suppression of any intent to conduct intergroup conflicts in public. The sociogenesis of the local moral order reaches back into Lohberg's history as a coal mining settlement (see section 3., which supplies an introductory description of the area). The subsequent sections introduce other elements of the emergence-promoting milieu: the local youth culture, the combative everyday culture, the ethos of the warrior, and concepts of spiritual salvation, which are reinforced by the peculiar moral order of the neighbourhood. These elements in turn, strengthen and interfere with other elements to stabilise and even reinforce the local moral order. And if that were not enough, strengthening any single element seems to strengthen every single other element. A space-related milieu of emergence is thus constituted. This is the core idea of an emergence-promoting milieu that allows and assists things to happen and persist. The fact that an in extenso description of the complex interaction of all these elements would lead us beyond the scope of this or of any other single article does not prevent the author from gathering the most relevant elements of the causal milieu in the following sections. He believes that further research on space-related radicalisation processes might benefit from the underlying milieu-led epistemological approach.

Before turning to the case at hand, some core concepts should be addressed: radicalisation, neo-Salafism and lifeworld boundary regime.

The author understands radicalisation as a process of interaction in which social actors (not exclusively individuals) perceive themselves as being involved in a social conflict in the course of which they develop a readiness to apply deviant means for settling the conflict in their interest. Powerful social elites define which means are deviant. This definition seems to be at least compatible with the state of the art of relational radicalisation research (Borum 2011a, 2011b). It also encompasses the French controversy between those who explain jihadi violence as an outcome of the radicalisation of Islam (Gilles Keppel) and those who see it as a result of an Islamisation of radicalness (Olivier Roy) (Dziri and Kiefer 2017).

The concept of neo-Salafism underlying this article goes back to an accumulative definition recently elaborated by Rauf Ceylan (2017, 17–22). Ceylan enumerates thirty elements distinguishing neo-Salafism from other forms of Sunni Islam, the most important being: (a) youth movement character, (b) lay culture, (c) major role of lay preachers, (d) elements of legalistic/literalistic and charismatic fundamentalism, (e) missionary zeal, and (f) anti-Shia, anti-mystic and anti-Semitic orientation. The jihadi version of neo-Salafism also involves characteristics like martyrdom and f violence as a form of worship (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208 ff.).

In order to reconstruct intergroup relations in Dinslaken-Lohberg, the author makes use of the concept of the "lifeworld boundary regime", which includes the ensemble of symbolic boundaries embedded in the daily life of a neighbourhood. The author has already used this concept in various ethnographic studies on the development of intergroup relations (Hüttermann 2018). The concept builds on the observation that residents are embedded in daily routines. They do not usually experience administrative boundaries, but construct, observe and/or cross symbolic boundaries. The peculiar texture of symbolic boundaries consists of symbols, incorporation rituals, lifestyles, and/or atmospheres. If an ethnographer crosses such lines, as described in the following, he is able to explore their permeability. If he undergoes local rites des passage while approaching a group or organisation he will experience obstacles and resistance. This permits the reconstruction of intergroup hierarchies and transitions. Reconstructing the experiences of many residents navigating the local space, allows the researcher to trace the ensemble that constitutes the lifeworld boundary regime of the neighbourhood.

Finally some remarks on the data upon which this article is based: The study draws heavily on eight qualitative interviews with local experts (teachers, social workers, businesspeople, etc.) and fourteen narrative-biographical interviews with adolescents and young adults, about half of whom sympathised at least temporarily with Isis and/or al-Nusra. Some were relatives of those who joined al-Nusraa in Syria and Iraq. A great deal of data was generated via participant observa-

tions in a local martial arts club whose members were predominantly of Turkish origin. The observations lasted eighteen months (almost every weekend). Unlike the renowned Loïc Wacquant, the author of the present contribution thought better of participating in the sports club activities. Instead he sat or stood on the sidelines and chatted with members and visitors. He benefited from the circumstance that almost every young Muslim he encountered regarded him as a kind of "secret service man". This image seemed possess a certain attraction even for those young people who sympathised with ISIS: they simply had a strong wish to be seen.

3. Lohberg: Settlement Type and Local Moral Order

Dinslaken and its 67,452 residents (2011 census) are located geographically on the right bank of the Rhine on the northern margins of the Ruhr region. The municipal Social Report (Sozialbericht) from 2013 describes Dinslaken as a "medium-sized municipality with weak development trends" (Mrosek and Berger 2013, 16), attributable to the decline of the steel industry and the closure in 2005 of the Lohberg coal mine. Population forecasts in the same document predict a declining and ageing population, with tax revenues falling more sharply than can be compensated by budget cuts.

And the situation in Lohberg itself? If one compares the former mining community of Lohberg (2012: 5,821 residents) with the town of Dinslaken (about 67,000), a number of features stand out: Lohberg is comparatively densely populated (3,900 residents/km2 against 1,450/km2 for the municipality as a whole). In Lohberg 21 percent of households receive means-tested benefits, across the town as a whole just 8 percent. Aggregating benefit types, 22.3 percent of Lohberg residents depended on some kind of state transfer payments in the period covered by the 2013 Social Report (in the middle-class district of Dinslaken-Eppinghoven the figure was just 3 percent.) A comparatively small proportion of Lohberg's population is formally employed and about 40 percent of its unemployed are non-German nationals. During the same period youth unemployment in Lohberg (13 percent of twenty- to twenty-five-year-olds) was higher than in the town overall. Lohberg's school students are the least successful in the town. In Dinslaken as a whole 43 percent of secondary school students attend a selective academically focused school, the figure for Lohberg is only 21 percent. Educational failure, rather than success, defines the expectations of many adolescents there.

Finally, Lohberg also differs from the town as a whole and other comparable communities in terms of the political attitudes and voting behaviour of its residents. The local results of the 2017 Bundestag election are illuminating. First of all turn-out in Lohberg remained at the low level of 2013, about 50 percent (Dinslaken as a whole 74.5 percent) (Kommunales Rechenzentrum Niederrhein; www.krzn.de). More significant was the successful participation of the Allianz Deutscher Demokraten (ADD), which stood for the first time. The ADD is the German branch of the Turkish governing AKP; its election posters in Germany feature the portrait of Turkish President Erdogan. It gained 13 percent and 12 percent of valid votes respectively in the two voting districts relevant for Lohberg. If one remembers that fewer than half of Lohberg residents have a Turkish migration background and only those with German citizenship were able to vote, this would suggest that at least one quarter of persons of Turkish extraction entitled to vote in Lohberg supported the neo-Ottoman Islamist ADD. Considering further that about half of the Lohberg residents of Turkish extraction are not German citizens and have even closer ties to Turkey it can safely be assumed that considerably more than one quarter of Lohberg's "Turks" support the ADD. They are matched by an equally large segment of autochthonous German voters who prefer the far-right anti-Islam policies of the populist AfD. This constellation is not found in any other part of Dinslaken.

Leaving behind the world of statistics and entering Lohberg itself, the visitor might be forgiven for seeing the renovated workers' houses surrounding the market square as the epitome of the historical mining idyll, steeped in solidarity and pioneering spirit. While this might appear to be a throw-back to the supposed golden age of the garden cities movement – to which Lohberg belongs (Schollmeier 1990) – what we see here is not the glow of the good old days.

Even before the "guest worker" migration starting in the 1950s, Lohberg was shaped by its local civil society: alongside the members of the churches principally working class clubs and societies pursuing interests in sport, singing, music, football, pigeon breeding etc. These were people who had moved from many different parts of Germany. Interviews and discussions with older Lohberg residents suggest that the regional differences among the autochthonous German

population were salient in daily life. And significantly, although nostalgia about working class history and mining tradition might suggest otherwise, the local working class culture, based around the mine and the clubs, was never something symmetrical, cohesive and homogeneous but always characterised by segmentation and hierarchies.

The houses of the faceworkers and foremen, who saw themselves as an élite, were strictly separate from the houses of the ordinary workers. As reported by long-established residents, even in the 1960s the children of the two status groups were strictly forbidden from playing together, and certainly not allowed to cross the status boundaries marked by particular streets. The traditional hierarchies that prevailed underground were also salient above the surface. In certain respects they still shape the perceptions of older residents today, for example when an autochthonous German former miner describes his relationship to "the Turks" – not without sarcasm:

> "Equator"
> "On the other side of [Lohberger Strasse] – today I always say 'across the equator' there are almost only Turks ... our NATO partners."

The status boundaries that segregated housing were also reflected in the local organisations and church congregations, where leading positions were disproportionately filled by members of the mining élite. To this day, in 2017, social democratic members of that group insist on an exception to the party's principle of geographical branches. In order to avoid the indignity of interacting with lower-status colleagues they acquired the privilege of organising by profession within the SPD.

Even before the housing settlement was fully completed, Lohberg became the scene of a violent historical event. After the Kapp-Lüttwitz Putsch of 13 March 1920 in Berlin had been defeated by a strike movement, radicalised sections of the working class armed themselves. Workers in Lohberg were enthused by the strike movement and pursued revolutionary objectives against the Weimar Republic. In the course of these events Lohberg became a stronghold of the so-called "Red Ruhr Army", which set up an important command post in Lohberg (Litschke 1994, 125–29). Just a month later the workers' militia was brutally crushed by the "Freikorps" paramilitaries, which promptly conducted a mass execution of insurrectionary workers in Lohberg. The events were subsequently taboo in Lohberg, even within the working class, and ever since the district has been stigmatised within Dinslaken as rough, violent and seditious. Conversely, Lohberg residents regard Dinslaken with great mistrust: to this day they tend to avoid revealing tensions within their community to the town as a whole.

The fact that an ethos of denial or suppression of conflict has become the bedrock of Lohberg's local moral order is not just an after-effect of the collective trauma of the failed workers' uprising described above, but is also attributable to a fundamental peculiarity of mining communities. Mines are not just businesses like any other. Their directors and managers often see themselves not simply as the boss, but as the protector of their workforce with special moral obligations. Under an ethos shared with their workforce, the mine stands for a way of life, a male bond of solidarity uniting life underground and above into a homogeneous whole. This masculine ideal of denying or supressing conflict may have originated a desire to prevent accidents, avoid worsening mishaps and expedite disaster response. And in order to keep overground conflicts out of the working process, the said ideals also characterised life outside of work too. The ethos of suppression of conflict through male solidarity is deeply entrenched in mining, and further reinforced by the overground functioning of the political labour movement.

This ethos stood in permanent tension to the socio-spatial separation of regional, national and work-related status groups, but never in logical contradiction. Under functional aspects, separation and solidarity complemented one another in the sense that separation of interest groups served suppression of conflict and successful suppression of conflict could in turn serve as evidence of the benefits of male solidarity.

4. The Lifeworld Boundary Regime

4.1. The Grey Wolf

The lifeworld boundary regime upon which everyday life in Lohberg is based is characterised by separation, hierarchy and segmentation. This came to attention at the very beginning of the field research. In connection with his first interview appointment, where the author had arranged to meet his interviewee at Lohberg's central market square, a local warned him about the youth who hang around there; they might, the source said, assume his appearance and dress to identify him as a journalist and harrass him on account of

their negative experiences with the press. One very illustrative example of the ins and outs of the boundary regime is the author's encounter with a man who regards himself as the patron of the local Turkish population. The author found himself compelled to participate in an incorporation ritual in order to make progress with his field research. The background to this incident, which will be reconstructed briefly below, is that the author needed to establish the confidence of two young men of Turkish extraction before interviewing them. One of them, Erkan, was of interest because he was personally acquainted with a number of young men who had left Lohberg to join the jihad. The other, Kenan, came to attention as a former member of the emerging jihadist youth scene, parts of which went on to form the "Lohberg Brigade". Kenan himself had withdrawn in the course of the radicalisation process.

Weeks before the events described here below the author had met Erkan and Kenan in two preparatory meetings. But at this stage, despite the best efforts of a trusted intermediary, neither could be persuaded to grant the author – henceforth referred to as "the field researcher" – an interview. So the field researcher was rather surprised when weeks later Erkan conveyed an invitation to meet with a leader of the Lohberg "Grey Wolves", referred to here as Sedat. Erkan informed the field researcher that Sedat wanted to meet before deciding whether Kenan and Erkan should give him the interviews he wanted. The field researcher interpreted this as a potential breakthrough in what had to date proven largely fruitless efforts.

Only later was the field researcher to learn how Sedat came to occupy the role of a patron to these two young men. In 2013 Sedat played a role in enabling successful negotiations in Turkey between members of the Grey Wolves and members of the jihadist-Salafist Jabhat al-Nusra militia to buy the freedom of (at least) three young recruits from Lohberg and bring them back to their parents. The returnees turned out to be Kenan's brothers and cousins, so the respect he showed to the "patron" was rooted at least partly in gratitude. But at the time of the meeting the field researcher knew nothing of this. After repeated false starts he merely hoped this would finally produce the breakthrough he needed to reconstruct the internal perspective of the neo-Salafist radicalisation process in Lohberg.

Erkan and Kenan collected the field researcher at the appointed time and place and drove him to a Turkish tea house on the edge of a park in the northern part of Duisburg. To the field researcher's great surprise the two young men now adopted the formal "Sie" to address him. He wondered what had led to this switch. Did the pair want to create distance, in order to grill him more freely later? Anyway, in the car he apologised meekly for his faux pas. But when he suggested that he also return to the formal form himself, the pair declined politely but firmly: he was "a doctor" so it was right that way. The field researcher sensed and feared that this enhanced level of formality was preparing him for an encounter that would be very different from his research contacts to date. At the same time he comforted himself faintheartedly that the status accorded by his academic title and perhaps also his age, meant he could count upon a certain degree of deference, and perhaps this was what was reflected in the asymmetry of form of address.

Twenty minutes later they arrived at their destination, met Sedat and went straight into the pavilion-like café. As far as the field researcher could make out, there were no other guests on the premises at that time of day, namely early afternoon. The café was divided into a number of lounges to allow families and groups to meet in semi-public space while maintaining a degree of privacy and discretion. Sedat led the little group into one of the lounges. It appeared to the field researcher that they were entering the backroom of a backroom. As soon as he had sat down, "Sedat Abe" – as Sedat, the host, was now addressed by Kenan and Erkan – began with some formal but friendly smalltalk, but soon turned to the gist of the matter: the test of trust. When Sedat asked the field researcher what his research questions actually were his tone shifted, he appeared more matter-of-fact and his basically genial expression became serious. The field researcher answered Sedat's questions as well as he could, and could not but notice that Sedat was looking for an excuse to demonstrate his inside knowledge in the field of Salafist radicalisation. It appeared to the field researcher as though Sedat was waiting almost impatiently for an opportunity to underline his own status by presenting his knowledge and experience.

In the course of the conversation it became clear that Sedat assumed that the supposedly exhaustive information he supplied would suffice for his guest to conclude his research.

Meanwhile, frequent sideward glances towards Erkan and Kenan revealed that Sedat was checking whether his two protégés were suitably impressed. Before Kenan and Erkan he wanted to appear as someone who thinks nothing of sparring with an academic. In that he succeeded, as the field researcher remained rather meek and defensive in order to avoid confrontation and – hopefully – earn a degree of trust.

At some point the field researcher asked Sedat how he tackled the Salafists in Lohberg. The host began by pointing out that he knew some of them personally. First of all, he said, he researched their background, which was often criminal. And then exposed their clandestine financial interests and confronted potential recruits with this disillusioning information. For example, he said, he had discovered that Özkan Turkan, a member of the Lohberg Brigade who he referred to as the "commandant", had been involved in drug dealing and other dubious business. Phillip Bergner, who blew himself up in a suicide car bombing in 2014, had been nothing but a message boy for the drug dealers.

This was the point where the field researcher realised that Sedat perhaps did not possess as much experience with intervention and prevention as he claimed, because Salafists themselves make no secret of past involvement with violence, drugs and crime. Quite the contrary, these are part of the neo-Salafist conversion narrative that – like all conversion narratives – describes a "road to Damascus" experience. Telling admirers of Saint Paul the Apostle that he was once the sinner Saul of Tarsus does not reveal biographical contradictions that might awaken doubts; it merely confirms the message that repentance and conversion can still put any delinquent back on the right moral or spiritual track.

Towards the end of the discussion, after about two and a half hours, Sedat indirectly intimated that he had acquired his experience of prevention in an unidentified regional Turkish nationalist context. There, he said, he combined the role of a political leader with the functions of judge and executioner. To illustrate this he related a story about how he had threatened and punished a group of pimps in order to save a young woman from prostitution. The story began when he had been approached by a family whose eighteen-year-old daughter had disappeared. The family, he said, had tried to report her as missing to the police but the police had refused on the grounds that she was no longer a minor and was entitled to choose where to live. He had then found out where she was living; he had, he said, extracted her from a brothel. The parents had wanted retribution, so Sedat had arranged for the pimps to be punished. Of course he had not participated himself, he said: others had done the job. That is what he told the police who investigated him: that he had nothing to say about the matter. In fact, he said, his intervention had significantly improved his reputation with the police, which had suffered on account of earlier incidents.

When the field researcher asked how he had actually gone about "rescuing" the young woman, he told how he had entered the brothel in question with a machine-pistol hidden under his jacket. He could not remember when exactly he showed the weapon, he said. But when he finally had the brothel owners sat opposite him, he had taken the magazine out of the gun. There was one bullet in the barrel and a second he placed on the table as a "memento". Then he had said: "Give me the girl. If you don't give me her you'll have to shoot me dead here and now or I'll shoot you all. If you let her go with me I'll leave the bullet here on the table and I'll leave you in peace."

Even today, writing this text, the field researcher is uncertain what he should make of the veracity of this story. On the one hand it appears very clichéed, rather as if Sedat were retelling an episode from an old mafia film. With frequent glances to Kenan and Erkan, reading in their faces whether he was achieving the desired impression, he presented himself as a well-connected and powerful godfather, operating behind the scenes to right wrongs blamed on supposed police incompetence. His message: the upright, weak and fallen can rely on him for protection, especially if they are of Turkish extraction. He guards them from the dangers, temptations and intrigues of German society, following the eternal values of Turkishness and Islam. Sensing bragging, the field researcher doubted that Sedat actually possessed such means and influence; his claims appeared exaggerated, if not pure bluff. But in the course of his subsequent field research he often heard stories from young men concerning inconspicuous but successful vigilante justice against drug dealers seeking to operate in Lohberg. And that Sedat, as the field researcher later learned, had not only been an influential local public figure in the far-right MHP but had also been successfully prosecuted for offences involving firearms lent the story a certain degree of credibility after all.

But let us return to the incorporation ritual: Once Sedat had finished telling his story about rescuing the fallen daughter, he launched into a series of conspiracy theories: German politicians had an interest in the success of the Salafists and the IS, because they wanted to sell them arms; the supposedly democratic state, organised capital and the intelligence services were involved in these dubious deals. While admitting self-critically that all this must sound rather incredible, he asserted: "Where there's smoke there's always fire."

According to Sedat all these corruption processes and conspiracies by the political, economic and intelligence establishment were going on in Lohberg too. He went on to describe how he had once criticised two local politicians at a meeting about drugs because they had repeatedly joked about drugs and drug consumption and had not taken the problem seriously enough. He implied that they were profiting personally from dealing drugs to young people.

Sedat's conspiracy theories align with many other stories the field researcher heard from residents describing themselves as Muslims. Less educated Lohberg Muslims in particular told him that the 9/11 attacks in New York had actually been the work of Mossad and the CIA in order to turn the world against Islam. Others told that the Pope kept a secret version of the Bible in the Vatican, whose content was practically identical to the Quran. If this came to light they said, all Christians would become Muslims and the Pope would lose his power.

4.2. Devil or Rabbit?

A conspiracy theory concerning Lohberg itself encapsulates the depth of the gulf between local Muslims and non-Muslims. According to this story, the supposed urban developers – who were actually fronting for influential anti-Muslim circles – had erected a monument to the Devil to provoke and humiliate local Muslims. The narrative relates to a sculpture by the internationally famous Düsseldorf artist Thomas Schütte installed in autumn 2014 in the grounds of a new park created on reclaimed mining land, the Lohberger Bergpark. The title of the work is "Rabbit". But it is quite possible, on account of its specific form and not least its coat of bright red high-gloss paint, that one might be reminded of the Lord of Darkness. But the sculpture's interpretation as a deliberately hostile act intended to provoke local Muslims can only be understood in the context of the lived everyday boundary regime in Lohberg and the divisions between Muslim and non-Muslim.

To understand the degree of alienation between the municipality and the urban redevelopment agency operating in Lohberg on the one side and the majority of residents of Turkish extraction on the other, one need only take a glance at the marketing jargon used by the agency, KQL, to describe the "Kreativ.Quartier Lohberg" and compare it with the aforementioned conspiracy narrative:

> A profound statement
>
> In the scope of the art project "Choreography of a Landscape", Schütte has placed a four-metre-tall sculpture in the centre of the preserved thickening machine in the park. Schütte's monumental work "Rabbit" has been given a bright red high-gloss finish. The sculptural work appears like a "drop sculpture" on the central hub of the circular concrete basin – as if pulled out of a hat – to introduce the new and unexpected into the location's industrial past. Apparently unrelated to place, time or social context, the work nevertheless has something important to say about its industrial surroundings and the site's coal-mining past. Responding to the question of where, in view of the heavy burden of history, a new future can be invented for this place and above all its young inhabitants, the sculpture makes a statement that is equally light and audacious, challenging and playful, current and profound. Its striking form and colour are reminiscent of youth culture, scaling to alarming dimensions the monstrosity of video game characters. Yet rather like the work of a child it succeeds in conjuring the absolutely new into this spent space and lending it a new perspective.
>
> (http://www.kreativ.quartier-lohberg.de/de/kunst/kuenstler/schuette.php, accessed 29 September 2017)

The bizarreness of the contrast between the marketing narrative quoted here and the local conspiracy narrative reflects the gap between conspiracy discourse and adspeak, between subjectively experienced humiliation and subjectively intended enhancement of the "spent space" and finally between felt neglect and planned gentrification. Paraphrasing Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: "In Lohberg's distorted world even the best subjective intentions produce their opposite."

Figure 1: The Lohberg "Rabbit" (or Devil?)[1]

4.3. Symbolic Boundaries

Alongside malicious gossip among neighbours and colleagues, conspiracy narratives based on "information" confirmed by local figures of repute is perhaps the most important form of symbolic boundary-drawing. The conspiracy narrative directs participants' mistrust towards the West, German politicians, the Christian religion, the municipality of Dinslaken and ultimately their autochthonous German neighbours.

Even social workers of Turkish extraction complain about the rigidity of the local boundary regime and report access problems no less challenging than those experienced by the field researcher. Given that background, the fact that the author did in the end receive the blessing of a plainly influential local patron to conduct his interviews should probably be seen as the exception from the local rule.

The baseline of the boundary regime is partially defined by the right-wing extremists of the Grey Wolves, a fascist movement that played a role in radicalising young people in Germany into jihadism (Marwan Abou-Taam 2016). Lohberg is a stronghold of the Grey Wolves, who stage a kind of fair on the central market square every year. On 22 May 2016 an enthusiastic audience crowded round the stage to watch martial arts choreographies.

But other population groups and actors also participate in the production of the local boundary regime. Space permits only a cursory survey. First of all, the DITIB mosque affects the local boundary regime. On the one side, it encourages a kind of inner emigration among its congregation, who tend to be culturally conservative. Spirituality and nostalgia for the homeland go hand in hand here. The outcome is a kind of "transnational umbilical cord" that allows residents of Turkish extraction to derive succour from national pride and self-esteem. The anti-German and anti-Western conspiracy narratives of the Erdogan government gain their local foothold through the same channels. As armour forged from feelings of superiority they shelter identities injured by experiences of discrimination and disdain. The observation that the mosque responds absolutely spontaneously and reflexively to reputational risks attributable to its members by isolating itself (or even rejecting its own if this is felt necessary) must probably be understood in the context of "inner migration" to Erdogan's Turkey.

When for example a worshipper told a critical journalist that fanatical ISIS supporters came and went freely in the mosque and its football club without encountering criticism he was systematically cold-shouldered by members of the mosque association. In fact photographs of adolescents posing on the premises of the Lohberg DITIB mosque wearing T-shirts bearing ISIS propaganda and showing a single, raised index finger did circulate on social media (the latter being a gesture popularised by ISIS, supposedly communicating the absolute monotheism of Sunni Islam and its superiority over other world religions and other currents of Islam). Publication of the photographs in mainstream media caused a public scandal well beyond Dinslaken and led to the resignation of the mosque committee. But given that the same members were re-elected soon thereafter, no learning process (still less critical self-reflection) is discernible, at least outwardly. In fact the families of the Lohberg jihadists have to deal with massive rejection and exclusion by the majority of the local Turkish population. The mosque has never conducted – or

[1] Source: http://www.kreativ.quartier-lohberg.de/de/kunst/kuenstler/schuette.php accessed 5 March 2019

Figure 2: Basic outlines of the everyday boundary regime in Lohberg



even sought to hold – discussions of a pastoral or preventive nature in Lohberg (as of summer 2016).

On the other side, the football club Rot-Weiß Selimiye Spor (which was co-founded by the DITIB mosque) fulfils an important integrative function. At training children and young people encounter trainers and other players as role models, some of whom embody educational and career success outside Lohberg and the “ethnic reservation” and thus demonstrate that the experience of exclusion by the majority society is not in fact quite as hermetic as might sometimes appear. Another context of local engagement by the DITIB mosque also speaks for a fundamental capacity to transcend boundaries: it participates in an inter-religious dialogue moderated by the municipal integration officer, which hosts high-profile events focussing on the message of religious tolerance.

The discussion about the “equator” and the “NATO partners” demonstrated how everyday boundaries are drawn between the traditional, autochthonous German working class and those of Turkish extraction. Although presented in a jovial manner, this is ultimately a solid symbol of boundary-drawing and an indication of the deep social divide that has opened up in Lohberg, apparently determined by the cosmological order. Not even German and Turkish membership of the same military alliance, the phrase implies, can touch the fundamental irreconcilability of the cultures that encounter one another in Lohberg.

A civil society dominated by non-immigrants (autochthonous Germans) is also involved in the symbolic boundary-drawing. The discrimination experienced by many of those of Turkish extraction has already been mentioned. In interviews and discussions, informants with a Turkish migration background named teachers, business owners, local politicians, the aforementioned urban developers, established clubs and associations, social workers and the police as the principal sources of exclusion and humiliation. In this connection they are understood as representatives of the longer-established, German majority society, which is seen as hostile to Islam and to Turkish people.

If we avoid focussing too sharply on the smallest details or tracing every last friction and conflict, the situation can be portrayed as follows (Fig. 2):

The symbolic boundaries created by discrimination, malicious gossip and conspiracy theories generate the baseline of the local boundary regime, which runs between those of Turkish extraction and the actors of the majority society (the thick horizontal line). Symbolic boundaries are also observed between groups that adhere to classical right-nationalist Turkism and those who follow the Islamist neo-Ottomanism of the Turkish government (thick broken vertical line). These groups all surreptitiously circulate conspiracy theories directed against each other. Their influence and ideological contradictions are particularly pointed because – unlike in other comparable communities – Lohberg’s Turkish population possesses neither meaningful democratic, integration-oriented organisations nor prominent individuals capable of challenging the predominant siege mentality.

There is also a developing contradiction between one part of the local civil society that is composed largely of non-migrants with a positive attitude towards migration-related diversity and the local autochthonous German working class population. Until the final phase of the fieldwork the culture of conflict suppression kept this opposition largely concealed (in the graphic the thin vertical line). As described above, it was the local results of the 2017 Bundestag election that revealed this aspect.

5. Combative Everyday Culture, Warrior Ethos and Spiritual Salvation

An aggressive, macho everyday culture corresponding in part to industrial proletarian traditions and in part to imported

lifeworld structures was already established in Lohberg long before the emergence of a jihad-seeking group of young men. A talented fighter trained in the martial arts for example will command correspondingly high standing.

> Normality of violence and respect
>
> "And you said you were well liked?"
> "Yeah, because dad is and [incomprehensible] grandpa (…) they were miners, hard-working people. Went to every wedding, like."
> "Your father then?"
> "And grandpa. See they were really well-known in Lohberg. And dad and grandpa they were real fighters. Real proper like. If somebody stepped out of line, they'd show him. (…) Everyone invited him, weddings, any kind of party, celebration. Went didn't they. If I got married now you can bet at least fifteen hundred people would come."
> (Interview with a third-generation migrant of Turkish extraction)

According to the accounts of interviewees, teachers and social workers, physical violence is most prevalent against young men from other parts of Dinslaken or elsewhere who seek the romantic attention of the sister or cousin of a local young man. According to interviewees violent vigilante justice is also exercised in the form of assault and robbery against suspected drug dealers. In view of these facts, it is rather surprising that the extent of public violence recorded in the police crime statistics is no higher than in other parts of Dinslaken. This could however be attributable to inadequacies of the statistics (Müller 2000; Haug et al. 2008, 6ff.).

For clarity about the local culture of violence we must look not to the police statistics on crimes of violence, but instead examine a trait of the local culture that distinguishes everyday life in Lohberg from that in other parts of Dinslaken. What could be called a "righteous warrior narrative" circulates in Lohberg above all among young people of Turkish extraction. Young men in particular subscribe with great enthusiasm to the ethos it transports: the warrior who resolves conflicts using legitimate and spiritually justified force. The effect of this narrative arises simply through its mere existence, and not through a concentration of publicly visible or recorded incidents of violence. The specific about this narrative is that it propagates a way of life that melds the spiritual search for meaning with the fighting career of the warrior to create an ethical and metaphysical life model. The spirituality here is not drawn solely from Islam. Equally important are the Turkish mythology cultivated by members of the Grey Wolves and – above all among male adolescents – great admiration for the spiritually-oriented Asian martial arts. In Lohberg militant Neo-Salafism was able to lock seamlessly into the amalgam of ideas observed among the male youth: search for spiritual salvation, warrior ethos and sense of justice. It is a precept of combative male culture that young men inspired in this fashion – even in the event of victimisation – do not turn to the police and courts and consequently remain absent from the police crime statistics.

Among many interviewees of Turkish extraction, classic Asian martial arts films form a source of inspiration for melding the search for spiritual salvation with the warrior's process of enlightenment through direct experience of fighting. Some interviewees described their encounter with films of this genre (for example Bruce Lee films) and their protagonists as an almost religious experience. The protagonists are more than just movie heroes for many young men in Lohberg.

Let us consider Bruce Lee: In terms the martial arts world Bruce Lee stands for the Wing Chun variant of Kung Fu, which is in turn an element of Mixed Martial Arts (MMA). MMA is very popular in Lohberg. During his field research the author saw many cars displaying images, posters and other symbols advertising or otherwise relating to this extreme sport. His own participant observations – over a period of one year – of martial arts training in a local club specialising in MMA confirm that at least the fitness training attracts very large numbers of children and adolescents along with their parents. Some training sessions were attended by more than one hundred persons of all ages. As adolescent interviewees confirm, an interest in Bruce Lee, Jackie Chan and martial arts or Samurai films is enough to generate enthusiasm for the synthesis of fighting and spirituality.

Indeed, syntheses of warrior ethos and spiritual enlightenment are not as outlandish as might at first glance appear. For example the striving for self-improvement propagated in the Samurai code of honour, the bushidō (the way of warriors), recalls forms of mystic asceticism. In the ideas of the Samurai too, the warrior's search for perfection and justice is never only a conflict with an external enemy, but equally or even more so a struggle with the inner foe, the personal weaknesses and diverse temptations that may lead the individual to violate the code of honour. The same applies equally to Kung Fu, which was developed in a Chinese monastery. Both in the world of fighting and in the mystic current in Islam (which is incidentally present in Lohberg in the guise of a mosque of the Süleymancılar movement), a

deeply hierarchical understanding of honour (achieved through the individual's progression on a path of enlightenment) and the fear of losing both status and face a central role (Hüttermann 2002). Especially because the search for spiritual salvation and the warrior ethos embedded in Asian philosophy and concepts of honour are closer than sociologists, theologians and Islam experts would like to believe, gangsta rap stars like Bushido and Deso Dogg were able to juggle, aestheticize and instrumentalise elements from both worlds (Deso Dogg actually joined the al-Nusra Front and has since been declared dead several times). Their example also demonstrates that alongside apologetic films and literature, popular music's aestheticisation of violence is also capable of paving the way for a fusing of the Asian warrior ethos with the promise of salvation. Given that this aligns with the tastes of the generally young recipients the author encountered in Lohberg, this can create an individual psychological configuration upon which the neo-Salafist radicalisation must merely piggyback in order to be successful.

6. The Mining Effect, Fraternal Sociability and Speechlessness

Thus far six elements have been identified as having potentially expedited the formation of a group of militant Neo-Salafist Jihadists:

1. A historically rooted and locally reinforced moral order consisting of an ethos of suppression of conflict through male solidarity and
2. a self-perception as outsiders.
3. Discrimination experienced by young people who are perceived as Turkish.
4. Globalisation in the sense that 11 September 2001 dragged almost everyone into the vortex of a supposedly inescapable "clash of civilisations", along with the dissemination of new culturalistic theories of group inferiority. Globalisation has even reached Lohberg, not least with the successes of Erdogan, the Islamic State and global right-wing populism, and their respective repercussions among Turkish Muslims living there.
5. A rift between established and migrant whose roots derive from mining history, deepened by symbolic boundaries, conspiracy theories and culturalistic theories. And
6. A combative everyday culture, which is not untypical for traditional proletarian communities, but was reinvigorated in the 1960s and 1970s through traditions imported by chain migration (from Songuldak and Samsun). In its current development stage, achieved well before the appearance of the Lohberg Brigade, this combative everyday culture creates – not least through the influence of the Grey Wolves and pop/counterculture aestheticisiation of violence – a macho synthesis of warrior ethos and spiritual salvation that promises young men self-improvement and gender honour.

To round off the picture, mention must be made of (at least) three elements that are part of the spatial milieu: These would be (a) the "mining effect"; (b) the fraternal style of sociability; and (c) the phenomenon of speechlessness.

a) The concept of the "mining effect" introduces the closure of the coal mine in 2005, and connects this with a psychological mechanism currently being (re)discovered by research into neo-Salafist radicalisation. The latter is the observation that the (subjectively) traumatic loss or absence of the father apparently motivated some young jihadists in Germany to search intuitively for a substitute father figure. The absent or lost father reappears in the guise of an attentive and charismatic male leader figure – and/or a divine and omniscient metaphysical "father" (see for example Mansour 2015; critical Logvinov 2017). As yet unpublished biographical case studies conducted by the Institut für interdisziplinäre Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung confirm that this social-psychological mechanism can play a role in neo-Salafist radicalisation. When analysing court documents and biographical interviews with convicted neo-Salafists, Viktoria Roth, Nils Böckler and Fabian Srowig noticed that a significant number of cases were characterised by the loss of the father by death, illness or divorce. This was apparently processed biographically in the radicalisation process. Precisely this probably also applies to some of the young men who later came to form the "Lohberg Brigade". Other members of the group were also affected by the father's loss of employment (and face), and biographically influenced through the implosion of the father/provider role (withdrawal of father to local tea houses, addiction issues etc.).

I would argue that the pit closure (in 2005) bears a share of responsibility for this development. The closure meant the loss of the most important local workplace. Successive generations of workers had been able to rely on mining in Lohberg, whose significance to those who worked there, as out-

lined above, meant a great deal more than merely a job. Mining was never just as a business, but always also a way of life: brotherhood, male preserve, extended family and guarantor of the continuation of a patriarchal, hierarchical system of male dominance. Although this system did not collapse in a day, many migrant families relied on it until the pit closed and showed little interest in the labour market outside Lohberg. Many Lohberg residents with a migration background lost their jobs and above all a section of the men lost the respect hitherto shown them by their children, the type of respect that derives from the provider role. Teachers and youth workers reported that the respect shown by school students of Turkish extraction to their fathers collapsed during this period. One teacher complained that from this point he was no longer able to threaten that he would inform their father if they were poorly behaved or lazy. In one case the response was "You'll have to find him first!"

In a nutshell: The painfully protracted pit closure in Lohberg represented the crisis of a conservative way of life cultivated especially by the descendants of the "guest workers" from Samsun and Songuldak, which had long harmonised perfectly with the traditional ethos of a mining community. While many of the women continue to keep the household, some of the men felt they had been stripped of their gender honour. The resulting crisis of the family led in turn to a biographical crisis of the adolescent males. This is where the neo-Salafist radicalisation offered a quick fix.

The context described here, which the author would call the mining effect, is not deterministic. If it were, the so-called Lohberg Brigade would have had many more members than the twenty who joined it. Functional alternatives for resolving biographical crises do exist; the fusion of spiritual salvation and warrior ethos in neo-Salafism is not the only avenue to recognition and success. Such successes presuppose contact to other role models in sport or work, which naturally also exist in Lohberg.

b) The pronounced fraternal style of sociability in Lohberg represents another element whose effect is amplified in interaction with the elemets already listed. A style of sociability has emerged in Lohberg's migrant population (and to some extent beyond) that combines the local proletarian traditions of socialising in the workplace, in (sports) clubs, in the trade union or in the public house with traditional forms of local and family socialising. One could say that a local style of fraternal sociability has emerged in Lohberg. The points of contact for the fusion of the mining style of sociability with the conservative style of the migrants of Turkish extraction are the following commonalities: Firstly the male dominance inherent to both traditions, second the ideal of the family (where miners see themselves as a big family), thirdly the ideal of conflict supression and fourthly a sense of trust conditioned by spatial proximity. All these commonalities are here subsumed under the term fraternality and as such enter into the concept of the "fraternal style of sociability". The term "style of sociability" originates with Michael Vester (1997, 188f.), who used it to describe the modernised social structure of German society and its macro-group milieus. In the context of interest here style of sociability refers simply to the patterns of making and maintaining contacts within a community.

Almost all the spontaneous accounts in the narrative-biographical interviews with Lohberg residents begin in the expansive back courts of the housing blocks. Here the male children and adolescents in particular form cliques that continue to exist through school and on into apprenticeship and sports clubs (football or martial arts). Here in sight of mother or father or an older sibling is where at least the boys spent most of their childhood. Neighbours who grew up together draw on the local social capital accumulated in the process of primary and secondary socialisation for as long as possible. Extended family and neighbourly ties between parents and grandparents amplify this form of sociability; they are not decisive for fraternal sociability, but always act in unison with the familiarity engendered by spatial proximity – at the same time externalise mistrust. The male children and adolescents connect and bond through jointly shared time and jointly shared space in a manner that is formative. So it is usual to join a club (for example football or martial arts) as an entire clique rather than individually, and to change club in groups rather than individually too. The same pattern is found in the choice of secondary school, in the formation of groups within school classes and on the playground, and also for attending clubs outside Lohberg. While these forms of expression of fraternal sociability may not be terribly Lohberg-specific, others are all the more so. Thus the adolescent "fraternities", as mentioned above, frequently become entangled in conflicts and violence to "defend the honour" of a "brother's" sister or cousin who has been (accused of) flirt-

ing with a boy or man from a different quarter or town. The observation of an older teacher who had taught pupils from Lohberg for many decades is revealing. He remembers when he started teaching the male pupils from Lohberg called each other "Kumpel" ("mate", originally a fellow miner) or "Kollege" (colleague) and a generation later "Bruder" (brother) or "Alter" ("old one"). In recent years, he said, students had taken to calling each other "Akhi" , the Arabic for "brother". It is no coincidence that "akhi" is one of the most common forms of address in contexts of neo-Salafist radicalisation. With respect to five of her students who left Lohberg to join the "jihad", Lamya Kaddor observed in 2014: "Salafism has become a youth movement" (Lamya Kaddor, interview, DerWesten – Online-News-Portal der Funke Mediengruppe, 13 October 2014). The linguistic shift described above confirms this observation.

c) In the course of his field research the author gained the impression of a pronounced speechlessness especially among males of Turkish extraction in Lohberg. This was especially obvious in connection with topics touching on the moral field of guilt and shame. Two examples:

1. There are still parents whose children joined the civil war living in Lohberg. Some of the children are dead, some are in prison, others again are still in the warzone. Yet at the time when I conducted my interviews in spring 2016 the DITIB mosque had not even tried to seek a discussion with these families. It was much more concerned to distance itself from the jihadists by denying that they were real Muslims.

2. One young man had taken into his home two of his (biological) brothers who had joined the Salafist al-Nusra Front in Syria. He had had to spend all his savings and sell his business to buy their freedom, and that of a cousin. In an interview he related how his brothers often woke up screaming from nightmares. At that point (after two years) he still did not feel able to ask them why they left to join the jihad, still less to tell him what they experienced there. His problem was that he was afraid he would not be able to control himself in such a situation, and would do violent harm to his brothers. He feared this would tear the family apart.

What all these examples share is that it is impossible to imagine conflicts being conducted in a way that is advantageous for both sides, still less ultimately healing. Indeed in the course of his field research the author observed that conflicts are not conducted symmetrically and discursively but often more in the form of a "talking to" that a higher-status older brother, friend, associate or family member addresses to (or rather inflicts upon) his lower-status brothers, friends or colleagues, while the recipient defers in the moment. If status were equal this form of moralising, accusatory lecture would lead to conflict escalation.

Those who are tempted to spout quasi-academic half-knowledge about the supposed essential nature of Islam as a "warrior religion" (Max Weber) in order to "explain" the inability to resolve conflicts constructively should first pause and ask themselves what role the proletarian and mining tradition of supression of conflict might be playing.

7. Discussion

Many years before neo-Salafists appeared in Lohberg, people of Turkish extraction had been experiencing discrimination everywhere in Germany, and Dinslaken-Lohberg was naturally no exception. Long before a number of Lohberg residents turned into jihadists, the crystallising event of 11 September 2001 had cemented the narrative of a violent clash of civilisations, with more or less half-baked theories about superiority and the irreconcilability of Western and Oriental cultures brought into circulation – also in Lohberg. Many years before a neo-Salafist preacher like Pierre Vogel spoke in 2006 on the premises of the DITIB mosque, Lohberg had already acquired an outsider status and a visible and experienceable divide in everyday life had opened up between the established and migrants of Turkish extraction. Building on the entrenched hierarchy of the local mining community and drawing in particular on mutual conspiracy theories and life-world theories asserting inferiority of Muslims and non-Muslims, Turks and Germany, the local DITIB mosque, the Grey Wolves but also local societal actors and the established civil society have contributed to this development. Long before these events, the working class ideal of conflict supression inherent to mining tradition and the labour movement had shaped the moral order in the quarter and the town and established a culture of looking away that is still felt today. Long before these events a combative everyday culture, which was already characteristic for many traditional proletarian communities, had consolidated in Lohberg. It was reinvigorated in the 1960s and 1970s through traditions imported by chain migration (from Songuldak and Samsun). In its current development stage, achieved well before the ap-

pearance of the Lohberg Brigade, this combative everyday culture offers young men in particular a macho synthesis of spiritual salvation with warrior ethos. Long before Lohberg residents departed in small groups for ISIS territory, the fraternal style of sociability was locally entrenched, and ultimately influenced their departure. Probably also established long before the events in question, the everyday culture of speechlessness, which was able to build both on the mining and labour movement culture of supression of conflict as well as for example the traditional Islamic prohibition on strife (fitna) among fellow believers cultivated by DITIB among others. And then the years preceding the departure of the jihadists saw the – eminently foreseeable – pit closure mark the demise of a local institutional space that offered the infrastructural and economic preconditions for residents of Turkish extraction in particular (but also autochthonous Germans) to be able to live in Lohberg as if in a closed "guest-worker reservation". The break in the group biographies – of autochthonous Germans but above all of migrants of Turkish extraction – associated with the pit closure contributed materially and developmentally to young men in Lohberg developing a special susceptibility to the radical call of Neo-Salafism.

The list of socio-spatial elements (to some extent acting on the community from outside but acquiring their consequence through it) might lead the reader to wonder why more Lohberg residents were not captivated by jihadism. If one imagines that the fraternal style of sociability predominant among young males engenders widespread mistrust against everything from outside, and this mistrust is directed against the German society by AKP offshoots and Grey Wolves, and if one also remembers that the ensuing countercultural attitudes are amplified by the aestheticisation, moralisation and sanctification of violence, and if one finally also factors in the strengthening aspects mentioned here, then a picture emerges of an almost perfect self-referential closed social feedback mechanism that one might surmise could only produce jihadists en masse. If that has not been the case the reason lies in other modernising, compensating and intervening elements that the author had to set to one side here in the interests of distilling the quasi "pure model" of socio-spatial radicalisation in Lohberg.

What was found was that the jihadist radicalisation in Dinslaken-Lohberg was able to build on the socio-spatial milieu and its respective elements. Each considered on its own may appear insignificant, but in interference they comprise the socio-spatial socio-logic that contributed to the emergence of the Lohberg Brigade. These preconditions of radicalisation not only complement each other, they amplify one another. Thus for example experiences of discrimination are not simply supplemented by conspiracy theories; they grant conspiracy theories an aura of credibility that they cannot achieve on their own. Explaining space-related radicalisation processes means more than adding up spatial factors with multiple causes to identify a fixed effect. Where every single element contributes to strengthening each other element, all elements together constitute an emergence-promoting milieu. What emerges then feeds back to the persistence of all elements of this milieu, in a form where the ensemble of elements in turn contributes to the persistence of the emerged phenomenon.

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