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Abstract

This study is based on Rogan and Hammer's (2002) model of crisis negotiation and focuses on face message behaviour. Saving or losing one's face is an important issue in crisis negotiation. We suggest that the salience of face issues varies with the type of conflict phase, particularly escalation and de-escalation. Two indicators of face message behaviour were constructed. They are supposed to be sensitive to changes in face messages and to differentiate between different phases of conflict. To validate this supposition, the following assumptions were tested: Negotiators show more face supporting (honour) and less face threatening (attack) behaviour than perpetrators; the level of threatening behaviour is supposed to be higher in escalating than in de-escalating phases; the change from de-escalating to escalating phases should be more pronounced for a hostage-taker than for a negotiator. Ten escalating and seven de-escalating phone calls from an authentic hostage-taking were analysed with both measures to test these assumptions. Significant main effects (for both indicators) and interactions (for one of the indicators) were identified, partly confirming our assumptions. Results are discussed against the background of present theories and research.

Face Message Behaviour in Crisis Negotiation

Crisis negotiation aims at the management of severe conflict with persons who are threatening with violence against self or others. It is a special type of communication, characteristic for hostage, barricade, and suicide situations. Because of the wide variety of crisis contexts, the far-reaching consequences of ad-hoc decisions, considerable time pressure, and the extreme stress under which the conflicting parties interact, crisis negotiation is one of the most challenging and demanding tasks within police operations (McMains & Mullins, 1996; Rogan, Hammer & van Zandt, 1997).

Perspectives on negotiation

Many if not most of the interactions during crisis incidents are based on verbal messages, usually exchanged between the negotiator and the perpetrator by phone. Consequently, the different facets of verbal communication are crucial for analysing and understanding crisis negotiation. While the *instrumental* content of communication has always been considered a central component of negotiation, *non-instrumental* aspects gained considerably in importance during the past years. However, negotiation tactics have often been biased towards one of the two ends of a mistakenly assumed behavioural continuum, ranging from instrumental (rational) to expressive (emotional) acts (Hammer & Rogan, 1997). This is true, although there has been evidence from past research which suggests a more complex, multi-level approach to communication (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore & Valley, 2000;

Putnam & Roloff, 1992; Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994; Watzlawick, Beavin & Jackson, 1967). Thus, the influence of communication on *rapport building*, the dangers resulting from undermining (own or other's) *self-esteem*, or *emotional changes* as indicators for anticipating the opponent's further reactions deserve the same attention in crisis negotiation as instrumental aspects.

Rogan and Hammer recently developed a comprehensive model which takes these different perspectives on negotiation into account (Hammer, 2001; Hammer & Rogan, 1997; Rogan & Hammer, 2002). It closely relates to communication research conducted by Donohue and his colleagues (Donohue, Ramesh & Borchgrevink, 1991; Donohue, Ramesh, Kaufman & Smith, 1991; Donohue & Roberto, 1993). The central components of their model stress the importance of four conflict issues in crisis negotiation: *substantive interests, attunement, face,* and *emotion*. Taking the first letters of these components as an acronym, Rogan and Hammer introduced their analytical concept as the *S.A.F.E.-model* of crisis negotiation in the literature (Rogan & Hammer, 2002). The present article focuses on *face issues* in crisis negotiation, which are sketched out next.

Assessing facework

Face issues relate to the personal and social identity of individuals and are motivated by the desire to maintain a positive social expression of self and to avoid losing face. According to Rogan and Hammer (1994), *face* "is a concern for one's projected image that is both immediate and spontaneous and is tied to the dynamics of social interaction" (p. 217). Thus, face issues are not confined to mere self-perception. Instead, they imply self-presentation and impression management techniques used to generate an aspired self-image in others. In addition, they also relate to actions taken by others that affect one's own self-image in a positive or negative way. In this context, actions taken by individuals to maintain their own or their relational partners' faces are usually called *facework* (Goffman, 1967; Rogan & Hammer, 1994).

In their endeavour to operationalise facework, Rogan and Hammer (1994) developed a particular model for *coding facework behaviours* of perpetrators and negotiators in crisis negotiation. This model distinguishes three dimensions of face behaviours: The first dimension relates to the locus of a communicator's interest, i.e., it distinguishes between *concern* for self and for other. The second denotes the functional *valence* of messages. On this dimension Rogan and Hammer differentiate between the negative, neutral, and positive quality of acts with respect to face. Negative acts are called 'threat' or 'face-attack'. They are

expressed by intimidation, insults, and other devaluating or threatening acts. Neutral acts are supposed to have no impact on either the speaker's or the hearer's face. Finally, positive or 'face-honouring' acts include hedges, humour, approval and other reinforcing types of behaviour. The third dimension, *temporality*, relates exclusively to this latter type of acts. According to Rogan and Hammer (1994), face-honouring involves temporal aspects which relate to "the timing of an act and whether it functions to protect (defend) proactively against threats to self's or other's face, or to mitigate and restore either lost self's face or other's face" (p. 218).

Locus of Concern: self   other

Face Valence: threat honour   neutral   threat honour

Temporality: defend restore   defend restore

Figure 1   Three-dimensional model for coding facework behaviours (c.f. Rogan & Hammer, 1994, p. 218)

Rogan and Hammer put their model to the test in an exploratory study by coding perpetrator and negotiator verbal behaviour from three different types of crisis negotiation: a suicide, an emotional instability, and a domestic case. Their results show that negotiators were the primary users of '*restore other's face*' while perpetrators used mostly '*restore self's face*'. '*Attack other's face*' did not occur in their data. Finally, four out of five *'attack self's face'* behaviours occurred in the crisis situation which ended with the suicide of the perpetrator (Rogan & Hammer, 1994).

In view of the scarce empirical evidence for facework in crisis negotiation, these preliminary data seem both interesting and revealing. However, the authors concede some methodological weaknesses of their study. Thus, their coders reported difficulties to differentiate facework behaviour on the *temporality* dimension. Rogan and Hammer state in this context, that "almost all speech acts in an ongoing conversation may be interpreted as retroactive" when judged from a sequential interaction perspective (1994, p. 228). In addition, speaking turns repeatedly proved to be too long for assigning their content unequivocally to

one predominant facework category. Instead multiple coding or the use of smaller *coding units* would have seemed more adequate (Rogan & Hammer, 1994, p. 228).

These reservations need some extension with respect to *locus of concern*. While the importance of this dimension is widely accepted in literature (Goffman, 1967; Brown & Levinson, 1987; Lim & Bowers, 1991), the distinction between *self* and *other* seems neither exhaustive nor clear-cut. Thus, Ting-Toomey and Kurogi (1998) point to the necessity "to work on the measurement issues of 'self-face' behaviors, 'other-face' behaviors, and '*mutual-face*' behaviors" in future research (p. 216). Mummendey (1995) contends in his self-presentation theory that facework eventually relates to one's own self, even when actions are taken to support other's face. Finally, Rogan and Hammer (1994) fall back on the type of pronouns used (e.g., me, I, or you) when identifying the locus of a communicator's interest. While this operationalisation looks straightforward, it covers only part of the communication between negotiator and perpetrator since messages without a pronoun or statements introduced by "we" remain ambiguous with respect to this methodological approach.

Despite the aforementioned limitations, Rogan and Hammer's methodological way of systematically analysing facework gives a clear direction to further research. This seems especially true because it relates to a comprehensive, theoretically sound conceptualisation of crisis negotiation grounded in communication theory (Hammer, 2001; Rogan & Hammer, 2002). To get further evidence of its adequacy, we decided to apply central ideas of their approach to another authentic case of hostage negotiation. This case has recently been analysed with respect to a different conflict issue emphasised by the S.A.F.E.-model, namely affect and emotion (Bilsky, Müller, Voss & von Groote, 2005). Before sketching out the present study, however, we have to comment briefly on extraneous variables likely to affect studies on crisis negotiation, and on consequences for research design.

Extraneous variables and research design

One of the central problems researchers are confronted with when investigating crisis negotiation is the limited number of cases available for scientific analysis. Apart from the fact that crisis situations are rare events compared to everyday situations, many of them are not recorded or documented in a way that makes them suited to scientific analysis. In addition, bureaucratic barriers often impede the access to authentic cases, or even rule it out. Consequently, research on crisis negotiation has been restricted to a very limited database until today (Donohue, Ramesh & Borchgrevink, 1991; Rogan & Hammer, 1994; Taylor, 2002).

This restriction is not only problematic with respect to the representativeness of research results. It causes also problems when trying to group cases in order to compare different types of crisis situations, i.e., when studying the *between-variance* of cases or case-groups. These latter problems become obvious when considering the substantial differences between relevant situational variables (e.g., domestic, suicide, kidnapping, or barricade), personal (e.g., perpetrator, negotiator, hostages) or context variables (e.g., ideological or political motivation) encountered in the field.

In view of these problems, we abstained from comparing different cases in our former study (Bilsky, et al. 2005). Instead, we concentrated on the *within-variance* of a crisis situation, suggesting that much can be learned from the regularity of conflict dynamics of particular cases. The rationale of this decision was based on two assumptions: (1) Negotiations in hostage-taking are supposed to comprise qualitatively different *phases* (e.g., escalation and de-escalation) as known from conflict research (Rubin, Pruitt & Kim, 1994). (2) The *verbal behaviour* of negotiators and perpetrators is likely to vary depending on the *conflict phase prevailing* at that particular time. Given the promising findings in our study on affect assessment (Bilsky et al., 2005), we adopted this approach for studying facework.

The Present Study

More than ten years ago, Rogan and Hammer (1994, p. 217) stated that there was an absence of research exploring the communicative manifestations of *facework* in crisis negotiations. Literature of the past decade shows that the situation has not changed decisively since then. There is still a considerable lack of substantial findings necessary for formulating theoretically well grounded hypotheses to be tested empirically. Therefore, the nature of the present study is still *exploratory* and mainly *descriptive*. Nevertheless we will offer at least some general considerations of possible outcomes of this study and their interpretation.

The 'life and death confrontational dynamics of crisis negotiation' create conditions in which the level of emotional excitation is quite high, and both the perpetrator and the negotiator are likely to be concerned with face. This is even more likely when public exposure to significant reference groups comes into play (Rogan & Hammer, 1994). While these considerations apply to crisis situations in general, the salience of face issues is supposed to vary largely in the course of a crisis negotiation, depending on the conflict dynamics of the individual case. If so, the *within-variance* of crisis situations is of considerable interest.

During negotiations, escalations typically arise when parties understand the other's behaviour as a challenge to their own interests and goals, and when a compromise or a

solution of the underlying conflict is not in sight. Fear of missing one's goal is often associated with an anticipated *loss of face*. In such situations conflict tactics become more intense, and emotional excitation is likely to rise considerably, due to worries about missing one's goal. In addition, interactants may show a considerable amount of aggressive and hostile behaviour (Bilsky et al., 2005; Rubin et al., 1994), with *face threatening* acts being one special expression of such behaviour. Whether this happens or not will depend greatly on their social skills and their ability to cope with emotionally charged situations.

As regards social competence and negotiation skills, well trained professional negotiators are expected to strive for and guarantee rule-oriented, normative interactions, mostly free from pejorative statements. For many perpetrators, in contrast, crisis situations emerge more or less unforeseen. Being unfamiliar with handling such highly complex situations, they are more likely to show typical forms of conflict behaviour, accompanied by verbal aggressions and threats. This should be especially true for *escalative phases*. It is noteworthy in this context, however, that Rogan and Hammer (1994) did not observe any acts of *attacking other's face* in their study.

If an escalation occurs, a prominent task of the negotiator is to calm down the perpetrator and to convert the emotionally charged crisis negotiation into a normative interaction (Donohue, Ramesh & Borchgrevink, 1991). As the anticipated loss of face involves the risk of irrational acts and panic reactions, *supporting the perpetrator's face* is one means to avoid disastrous outcomes of negotiation. While a negotiator is supposed to show supportive behaviour of this kind throughout the negotiation in order to build rapport with the perpetrator, supporting the other's face should be especially characteristic of *de-escalative phases* of conflict. As regards the perpetrator, less threats and aggressions are expected during de-escalative phases. Instead, more self-honouring behaviour, i.e., defend self's face and restore self's face, may occur. Overall, however, face supporting behaviour remains a prominent task of the negotiator.

With these considerations in mind, we would expect that negotiators show more *face supporting* (honour) and less *face threatening* (attack) behaviour than perpetrators, both in escalating and de-escalating phases of negotiation. The overall level of threatening behaviour is supposed to be higher in escalating than in de-escalating phases. Finally, the verbal behaviour of negotiators - whether supportive or threatening - is supposed to be more balanced across different phases of negotiation than that of perpetrators. Testing whether these tentative assumptions hold is one objective of this study. Beyond that we intend to

provide additional descriptive material which may be helpful in designing further research in this area.

Method

Database

Data re-analysed in this study originate from a hostage-taking in a German prison. During this incident, two hostage-takers had several hostages in their power, trying to blackmail authorities into guaranteeing ransom, a getaway vehicle, and free passage. Four hours of negotiation were tape-recorded during this incident, comprising a total of 53 phone calls. Most of these calls were handled by only one of the hostage-takers, and by one negotiator.

Transcripts of these phone calls had been scrutinized with respect to escalation and de-escalation (cf. Bilsky et al., 2005, for a detailed description) and categorised accordingly into three categories - escalation, de-escalation, and other. Ten phone calls were assigned to escalation, and seven to de-escalation. These calls served as units of analysis in our study. Their duration varied considerably, with a minimum of one minute and a maximum of thirteen minutes.

Coding of face issues

While Rogan and Hammer (1994) coded negotiation behaviour on all three facework dimensions in their study, we abstained from doing so because of the conceptual and methodological problems explained before. Thus, we discounted *locus of concern* and *temporality*, but took a more sophisticated approach to the coding of *face valence*.

For the purpose of the present study, each of the 17 phone calls was partitioned into two types of coding units: The first one, subsequently called *macro-unit*, corresponds to talking turns as used by Rogan and Hammer (1994). The second resulted from partitioning talking turns into more fine-grained units of content (propositions), if possible. Each of these *micro-units* contains but one face-related message.

Like Rogan and Hammer, we distinguished three broad categories for coding macro-units, i.e., talking turns, according to face valence: honour face (HF), attack face (AF), and neutral (N; this category also includes statements unrelated to face issues). For every phone call (unit of analysis) and interactant, i.e., perpetrator or negotiator, the absolute coding frequencies per category were determined. However, as phone calls differed considerably in length, these frequencies were not suited for making comparisons. Rather, they provided the

basis for computing two macro-coefficients: *Honour Face (HF$_{macro}$)* corresponds to the relative frequency of face supporting acts; likewise, *Attack Face (AF$_{macro}$)* corresponds to the relative frequency of face threatening acts. These coefficients served as indicators of face valence on the macro-level.

In addition, and acting on Rogan and Hammer's suggestion to use smaller coding units, we specified three equivalent indicators for assessing face valence - this time, however, based on the categorisation of micro-units. Each of these indicators corresponds to the sum of categorisations into more concrete behavioural categories representing honour, attack, and neutral, respectively. Thus, approval, optimism, clarifications, liking, (retroactive) disclaimers and humour are categories of honour. Similarly, threats, disapproval, insults and refusal are categories of attack. Analogous to the macro-level, two micro-coefficients were computed: *Honour Face (HF$_{micro}$)* and *Attack Face (AF$_{micro}$)* correspond to the relative frequency of face supporting and face threatening acts coded on the micro-level.

To examine the applicability of the above categories, two coders categorised the transcripts of two phone calls (one escalative and one de-escalative, each including about 120 talking turns) on the macro- and on the micro-level after an intensive training. Inter-coder agreement was measured by Cohen's (1960) Kappa. Coefficients calculated for the macro- and for the micro level were $K = .64$ and $K = .75$, respectively. The observed difference in Kappa reflects the problems of categorising talking turns, already mentioned by Rogan and Hammer (1994). The final coding of all 17 phone calls was accomplished by the second author.

Data analysis

According to our assumptions about differences between face supporting and face threatening behaviours of the interactants in escalative as opposed to de-escalative phases of negotiation, data are analysed in the form of a 2 (hostage-taker vs. negotiator) x 2 (escalation vs. de-escalation) factorial design. However, in view of our restricted data base, the respective results are but explorative. This also applies to the four ANOVAs of macro- and micro-coefficients which serve mainly descriptive purposes.

<div align="center">

Results

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Table 1 summarises the information about both the design and the content analysis data, i.e., macro- and micro-coefficients, of the present study. As can be seen, phone calls vary con-

Table 1   Macro- and Microcoefficients of Facework

	Design			Facework					
				Macrocoefficient			Microcoefficient		
No.	Phone-call	Person	Phase	macro coding-units	face threatening (attack)	face supporting (honour)	micro coding units	face threatening (attack)	face supporting (honour)
1	16	n	e	41	0,15	0,83	70	0,29	0,61
2	17	n	e	49	0,04	0,88	83	0,25	0,71
3	20	n	e	9	0,00	1,00	14	0,21	0,64
4	21	n	e	13	0,00	1,00	22	0,38	0,57
5	22	n	e	28	0,18	0,79	49	0,31	0,69
6	23	n	e	17	0,06	0,77	21	0,10	0,71
7	24	n	e	35	0,34	0,63	61	0,30	0,62
8	29	n	e	56	0,13	0,86	106	0,25	0,71
9	37	n	e	78	0,13	0,87	141	0,25	0,67
10	53	n	e	30	0,00	1,00	68	0,18	0,75
11	16	h	e	46	0,43	0,5	103	0,36	0,53
12	17	h	e	50	0,34	0,58	140	0,31	0,64
13	20	h	e	9	0,67	0,33	14	0,36	0,57
14	21	h	e	12	0,83	0,17	17	0,56	0,44
15	22	h	e	31	0,61	0,39	55	0,40	0,58
16	23	h	e	19	0,47	0,53	55	0,39	0,57
17	24	h	e	35	0,29	0,54	74	0,43	0,51
18	29	h	e	57	0,46	0,51	165	0,42	0,52
19	37	h	e	78	0,41	0,54	215	0,37	0,54
20	53	h	e	28	0,32	0,68	62	0,19	0,69
21	25	n	d	55	0,13	0,86	90	0,10	0,84
22	26	n	d	59	0,18	0,82	82	0,22	0,74
23	30	n	d	29	0,04	0,93	46	0,04	0,83
24	41	n	d	64	0,19	0,81	111	0,21	0,77
25	47	n	d	36	0,19	0,81	71	0,21	0,69
26	48	n	d	41	0,12	0,85	67	0,15	0,79
27	49	n	d	69	0,09	0,9	117	0,17	0,72
28	25	h	d	58	0,19	0,72	144	0,31	0,63
29	26	h	d	52	0,27	0,62	152	0,31	0,59
30	30	h	d	32	0,19	0,75	77	0,20	0,74
31	41	h	d	60	0,13	0,87	152	0,24	0,71
32	47	h	d	42	0,1	0,91	166	0,32	0,56
33	48	h	d	42	0,24	0,76	143	0,22	0,66
34	49	h	d	72	0,13	0,88	251	0,25	0,62

Legend: h=hostage-taker; n=negotiator; e=escalative; d=deescalative.

siderably in size, ranging from 9 to 78 macro-units (calls 20 and 37) and from 14 to 251 micro-units (calls 20 and 49) per person.

Honour Face

A two-factorial ANOVA with HF_{macro} as a dependent variable revealed significant main effects for the factors person, $F(1, 30) = 32.27$, $p < .001$, and conflict phase, $F(1, 30) = 14.17$, $p < .002$, as well as a significant person x phase interaction, $F(1, 30) = 15,95$, $p < .001$. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was not statistically significant, $F(3, 30) = 1.61$, p = .21.

A second two-factorial ANOVA with HF_{micro} as a dependent variable revealed similar main effects for the factors person, $F(1, 30) = 29.69$, $p < .001$, and conflict phase, $F(1, 30) = 18.34$, $p < .001$. However, the person x phase interaction was not significant, $F(1, 30) = 0.04$, $p = .85$. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was not statistically significant, $F(3,30) = 0.163$, p = .92. Figure 2 summarises the above results.

Attack Face

As for face supporting acts, a two-factorial ANOVA with AF_{macro} as a dependent variable was conducted. This analysis revealed significant main effects for the factors person, $F(1, 30) = 27.13$, $p < .001$, and conflict phase, $F(1, 30) = 11.28$, $p < .002$, and a significant person x phase interaction, $F(1, 30) = 16.73$, $p < .001$. In this case, Levene's test for homogeneity of variances proved statistically significant, $F(3,30) = 3.02$, p = .05.

Finally, the two-factorial ANOVA with AF_{micro} as a dependent variable revealed significant main effects for the factors person, $F(1, 30) = 18.94$, $p < .001$, and conflict phase, $F(1, 30) = 15.44$, $p < .001$. As for face supporting acts, however, the person x phase interaction proved not significant, $F(1, 30) = 0.24$, $p = .63$. Levene's test for homogeneity of variances was not statistically significant, $F(3,30) = 0.24$, p = .87. A summary of these results is given in Figure 3.

Discussion

Although there is considerable evidence that conflict processes have many characteristics in common (Rubin et al., 1994) and that a single case reflects these commonalities quite well, it should be kept in mind that our data relate to just one single case. Instead of jumping to conclusions, it seems more appropriate, therefore, to stress the heuristic

value of our findings and to take them as a starting point for more specific questions to be answered by further studies.


Figure 2   Honour Face: HF_{macro} and HF_{micro}
         (a) unit of analysis: talking turn
   **(b) unit of analysis: proposition ($\leq$ talking turn)**

Figure 3 **Attack face:** AF_{macro} **and** AF_{micro}
        (a) unit of analysis: talking turn
        (b) unit of analysis: proposition ($\leq$ talking turn)

All in all, our tentative assumptions with respect to face supporting and face threatening acts are partly though not perfectly supported by this study. First, the negotiator's *face honouring* behaviour was clearly more pronounced than that of the perpetrator. This is

obvious from both indicators used in this study, and it holds for escalative and de-escalative phases of negotiation. Second, *face threatening* acts were less frequently observed for the negotiator than for the perpetrator. This finding is also in line with our assumptions and holds independently of the type of measurement or conflict phase. Third, the *overall level of threatening behaviour* resulted higher in escalating as compared to de-escalating phases, as expected. It should be noted in this context, that, on the whole, face supporting behaviour outnumbered face threatening acts. This finding corresponds to the results reported by Rogan and Hammer (1994).

However, evidence for our last assumption, suggesting a more balanced behaviour of the negotiator across different phases of negotiation, was mixed: When referring to the two *macro-coefficients*, the negotiator's verbal behaviour turned out to be more balanced across different phases of negotiation than the perpetrator's (cf., the significant person x situation interactions in the ANOVAs). When considering the respective *micro-coefficients*, however, results did not fit our expectations. Instead, behavioural differences between escalative and de-escalative phases proved equally distinct for perpetrators and for negotiators. This is true for both face-honouring and face-threatening acts. Interpretation of these deviations is not straightforward. Actually, macro- and micro-coefficients differ with respect to their level of aggregation. Thus, coding on the macro level relates to relatively broad coding units (talking turns), the categorisation of which is similar to a *gestalt* based rating task. In contrast, coding on the micro level is accomplished by assigning smaller coding units (propositions) to fine-grained behavioural categories, which are aggregated only in a second step into broader categories (honour, attack, and neutral). These methodological differences do not explain, however, why *person x phase interactions* could only be identified for macro-coefficients. As such interactions are crucial for interpreting negotiation behaviour, the choice of adequate indicators deserves considerable attention in future research.

Without overrating the present findings, one final remark seems indicated: Together with our former research (Bilsky et al., 1005), this study illustrates the *polyvalence* of verbal messages and points to the need for multilevel analyses of crisis negotiations. Thus, the same verbal material analysed for *facework* in the present study had been scrutinized for *affect issues* in our former research. However, affect and face are only two out of four dimensions distinguished in Rogan and Hammer's S.A.F.E.-model of crisis negotiation. It seems plausible to expect, that analyses focusing on an *attunement* or an *instrumental* frame could have reasonably complemented the present findings as well and would have pointed to other relevant aspects to be observed in handling crisis situations.

Of course, considering the polyvalence of verbal material is important beyond academic multilevel analyses. Negotiators have to decipher and evaluate the verbal messages of their opponent continuously in order to decide on which level of communication to react. Interpreting the other's statements as instrumental, for instance, while meant as a face message could have detrimental effects and result in an aggravation of the situation. Sensitising trainees as well as negotiators for the multiple facets of concurrent information contained in verbal messages is an important step towards considerate and responsible negotiation. Even if research on crisis negotiation is still scarce, using the few systematic approaches under discussion (e.g., Rogan & Hammer, 2002; Taylor, 2002) as a heuristic or a template for the training of negotiators seems promising.

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Appendix: Operationalisation of Face Valence: Honour Face (HF) and Attack Face (AF)

Macrocoefficients: HF_{macro} and AF_{macro}
Unit of Analysis: talking turn / coding of central message
Category   Valence

HF   Honour Face
  AF   Attack (threaten) Face
 	
  N   No facework category or functionally neutral statement

Honour Face: $HF_{macro} = \sum HF / (\sum HF + \sum AF + \sum N)$
Attack Face: $AF_{macro} = \sum AF / (\sum HF + \sum AF + \sum N)$

| |
|---|
| *Microcoefficients: HF_{micro} and AF_{micro}* |
| *Unit of Analysis:* proposition ($\leq$ talking turn) |
| *Category   Valence / Examples* |
| A   Approval, acceptance
  O   Optimism, disclosures
  C   Clarifications
  B   Benevolence, liking
  E   Extenuation, (retroactive) disclaimers
  H   Humour
        $\sum Honour = \sum A + O + C + B + E + H$ |
| T   Threats, intimidation
  D   Disapproval, criticisms, reprimands
  I   Insults, humiliation, derogation
  R   Refusal, repulse
        $\sum Attack = \sum T + D + I + R$ |
| N   No facework category or functionally neutral statement |
| *Honour Face:* $HF_{micro} = \sum Honour / (\sum Honour + \sum Attack + \sum N)$ |
| *Attack Face:* $AF_{micro} = \sum Attack / (\sum Honour + \sum Attack + \sum N)$ |

Figure 4 **Honour face: Macrocoefficient; unit of analysis = talking turn**
**Escalative phone calls.**

Figure 5 **Honour face: Macrocoefficient; unit of analysis = talking turn.**
**Deescalative phone calls.**

Figure 6   Attack face: Macrocoefficient; unit of analysis = talking turn. Escalative phone calls.


Figure 7   Attack face: Macrocoefficient; unit of analysis = talking turn. Deescalative phone calls.

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