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**Crowdsourcing and Digitalization of Electoral Integrity: A Comparative  
Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda**

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**Crowdsourcing and Digitalization of Electoral Integrity: A Comparative  
Analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda**

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## List of Abbreviations

AfriCOG	Africa Centre for Open Governance
AIM	African Independence Movement
AIME	Artificial Intelligence for Monitoring Elections
AMNUT	All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika
ANC	African National Congress
ASP	Afro-Shiraz Party
BVR	Biometric Voter Registration
CCEDU	Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CEMOT	Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania
CEW-IT	Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CPI	Corruption Perceptions Index
CRECO	Constitution and Reform Education Consortium
CS	Constituency Supervisor
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
CUF	Civic United Front
DAI	Digital Adoption Index
DEMGroup	Democracy Monitoring Group
DP	Democratic Party
EAC	East African Community
EASSy	Eastern African Submarine Cable System
EC	Electoral Commission
EIP	Electoral Integrity Project
EISA	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa
ELOG	Elections Observation Group
EMBs	Electoral Management Bodies
EU EOM	European Union Election Observation Mission
EVID	Electronic Voter Identification
EVT	Electronic Voter Transmission
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
GNDEM	Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICTs	Information and Communication Technologies
IDEA	Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IDI	ICT Development Index
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IREC	Independent Review Commission
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KE	Kenya
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission of Human Rights
KPU	Kenya People's Union
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party

LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre
LTOs	Long-Term Observers
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDS	Most Different Systems
MDSD	Most Different Systems Design
MSS	Most Similar Systems
MSSD	Most Similar Systems Design
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCCR	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NEC	National Electoral Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NLD	National League for Democracy
NRM	National Resistance Movement
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
PCP	People's Convention Party
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PEI	Perceptions of Electoral Integrity
PNU	Party of National Unity
PR	Proportional Representation
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
RTS	Results Transmission System
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SEACOM	Southern and Eastern Africa Communication Network
SODNET	Social Development Network
SODNET	Social Development Network
STOs	Short-Term Observers
TACCEO	Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union
TCRA	Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority
TEMCO	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TEOC	Tanzania Election Observation Centre
TRS	Two-Round System
TZ	Tanzania
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UG	Uganda
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UPC	Uganda Peoples' Congress
URT	United Republic of Tanzania
UTP	United Tanganyika Party
V-DEM	Varieties of Democracy
VL	Verification Liaison
ZNP	Zanzibar Nationalist Party
ZPPP	Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party

# **1 Research Introduction**

## **1.1 Introduction**

It has been observed, that “democracies have emerged in increasing numbers since the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century” (Berg-Schlosser 2007a:17), in which the waves of democratization, especially “the third wave” (Huntington 1991), resulted in electoral democracies in the form of “universal-suffrage elections” (Lijphart 2005), in order to create legitimacy for a political system, peaceful change in power and to enhance political stability (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005; Kersting 2007a). Admittedly, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the idea of representation transformed democracy from a ‘doctrine suitable only for small and vanishing city-states to one applicable to the large nation-states of the modern age’ (Dahl 1989). On this basis, monitoring these contests of modern liberal democracies has become a norm for domestic, regional and international monitoring groups to evaluate the quality of electoral processes (Hyde 2011a, 2011b). “Norms” in monitoring contests are referred to as “standards about the appropriate conduct of elections” (Norris 2013b:577). Monitoring global norms/standards in electoral procedures under various types of regimes such as democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies can be judged free, fair and credible or vice versa, either by invited traditional/established election monitors or more recently digitally-enabled ordinary citizens as observers and reporters of electoral incidents.

On one hand, the most important force for elections with integrity in democracies is citizen pressure in the modern world, and citizen observers have “made critical contributions to improving the quality of elections. Citizen groups are increasingly playing a front-line role in advocating for electoral reform, monitoring election violence and educating citizens about elections” (Global Commission 2012:102). Moreover, “active oversight and supervision ensure that participants in an election process are held accountable, promote transparency, establishes the credibility of the electoral process, and help ensure compliance with the legal framework” (ACE Encyclopaedia 2013:10; see also Diamond and Morlino 2004). In addition to citizen pressure, given the growth of digital participatory tools and democratic innovations, multiple actors such as civil society, non-governmental organizations, technology developers, electoral authorities, courts, international, regional and democracy assistance groups, state leaders and representatives heavily supplemented domestic pressures for monitoring electoral contests (Kelley 2008).

On the other hand, ordinary citizens are ready to participate in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents. So, one is likely to ask who is engaging them to harness the intelligence and creativity of “wisdom of the crowd”? Who is engaged in monitoring and reporting of electoral incidents, especially with regard to newly developed technologies? This begs another question how can civil society organizations (cyber crowdsourced initiators) engage ordinary citizens in promoting and protecting the integrity of elections by ensuring participation, transparency and accountability in the electoral procedures? It has been argued, that in the present age citizens are no longer satisfied with only voting and leaving the voting stations, or participating in the “invited space”, rather citizens want to have a more active role, specifically in the “invented space” (Kersting 2012a, 2013a, 2014). Now, citizens are invited by civil society to participate in the invented space to monitor and communicate information on the electoral process using digital technologies (Diamond 2010; Kersting 2012a, 2013a; Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015). As a result, digitalization of electoral integrity using invented space stimulates the emergence of citizen-oriented monitoring and reporting of electoral incidents across the whole cycle. The case of *Uchaguzi* Kiswahili for ‘election’ crowdsourcing platform is an example of digitally empowered citizens to participate in democratic process. As a result, *Uchaguzi* platform promotes novel forms of digital crowdsourced collective action<sup>1</sup> in monitoring the integrity of elections, in most of the East African countries.

The notable goal of monitoring organizations and citizen-based initiatives is to guarantee and promote integrity of democratic process by ensuring adherence to the standards of elections. And, “countries around the world share major challenges in meeting international standards of electoral integrity” (Norris 2013a:563). African countries are not an exceptional case because they are “latecomers to democratization” (Bratton and Mattes 2001:107). That said, the conduct of electoral democracies has a turbulent history: the prevalence of elections fraud and malpractices (Bratton 2008; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015), and the debate of incompatibility of liberal democratic project in Africa (Ake 1991, 1993; Shivji 1994; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 1997). Additionally, the conduct of periodic elections in some of the African countries did not mark the “moment of transition to democracy” (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015:3), but it is considered that ‘the third

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<sup>1</sup> “Collective action” entails the capacity of political entrepreneurs [civil society election monitoring organizations] to overcome resource barriers by using comparatively inexpensive information technology tools in pursuit of political objectives (see Bimber 2003:5). Digitalizing electoral integrity through crowdsourced collective action is a paradigm shift from traditional mode to modern or hybrid form of monitoring and reporting electoral contests championed by civil society using omnipresent digital tools.

wave of democratization has also reached the African continent' (Berg-Schlosser 2008a:269), with some examples of "democratic consolidation" such as Benin and Ghana (Hadenius and Berg-Schlosser 2007). Just as the "outcome of the third wave of democratization remains in doubt" (Dahl 1971:32), world-wide "electoral representative democracies are highly criticised" (Kersting 2013a:271) and in legitimacy crisis (Kersting 2015c). At this point, "Africa has followed rather than led other continents in giving birth to the reform movements that have installed elected governments, multiparty systems, and more open societies around the world" (Bratton and Mattes 2001:107).

On one hand, concerns about fraudulent acts have been raised in most of the electoral democracies and yet, the problem of elections with integrity is under-explored (Global Commission 2012; Vickery and Shein 2012; Norris 2013a, 2014, 2015). That said, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda like any other developing or transitional democracies face similar problems, and other challenges related to the conduct of elections. On the other hand, diffusion of digital tools for participatory democracy such as Uchaguzi software, and methods like crowdsourcing- and existence of fraudulent elections, calls for measures such as undertaking research as an attempt to analyse the magnitude of the problems and propose corrective interventions. This is increasingly important because growing digital technologies and volunteered geographic observation information change the way of reporting the conduct of elections across the electoral cycle. Lately, volunteered citizen monitors and civil society co-produced election observation data (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014), but to harness the power of crowdsourcing and its full potential, we need to understand the process, outputs or citizen voices and setbacks in order to inform the future deployment of citizen monitors and reporters in promoting the integrity of electoral democracies.

There is an understanding that "after the wave of democratization, political inclusion of the population has remained mostly limited to voting" (Kersting and Sperberg 2003:179), but recently digital technologies expand a wider range and spaces of participation in electoral processes (Kersting 2014, 2015c). In this regard, non-partisan civic groups using crowd-monitoring technologies is an important ingredient in promoting participation and elections with integrity in the transitional or developing democracies and even "developed democracies" (Norris 2014). This is because "election-monitoring organizations attempt to defend citizens' right to vote, as well as their right to information about the electoral process...election observation not only exposes problematic elections, but also builds public confidence in the ability to hold credible elections, thus establishing the legitimacy of the

governments that the elections produce” (Schuler 2008:145). The case of post-election violence in Kenya 2007/2008 and Zimbabwe 2008 is considered as the example of lack of confidence and trust of the electoral results due to “electoral fraud and executive abuse” because electoral violence is the outcome of rigged elections (Diamond 2015:145).

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) and increasing crowdsourced method make elections free and fair because across nations “perceptions of the integrity of elections in developing countries are positively correlated with internet use” (World Bank Group 2016:172). In the case at hand the process of promoting elections with integrity require ICT-enabled citizen voice that can help to curb illicit act of election stakeholders such as officials of electoral authorities, candidates, political parties, citizen supporters and media, among others. Additionally, crowdsourced method may be better engaged with different crowd monitors such as “active defined” and “active undefined” citizen observers and reporters, as well as “passive listening” to the social media networking sites on what is going on at the grassroots regarding the conduct of elections. This is because Norris (2014) observed “ordinary citizens are indeed aware of many types of electoral malpractices” across the electoral cycle.

There is an understanding that international election observers “not only publicize electoral fraud but sometimes help prevent it. Out of fear of being caught by foreign observers, political authorities may abandon plans to rig elections” (Carothers 1997:19), and if election monitoring missions cooperate closely with digitally empowered citizens might detect, deter and mitigate electoral fraud in real-time. The network of monitoring organizations in deploying crowdsourced method enables understanding of the different and specific tricks of manipulating elections, and ensures dissemination of the incidents that will build voters’ confidence of the electoral results. Accordingly, it has been argued that digital “crowd-sourcing methods have the potential to improve the quality of election monitoring by complementing existing approaches” (Fung 2011:193), and can act as a powerful tool of observing and communicating positive and negative feedback of electoral process.

The trend towards free, fair and peaceful elections has increased the demand for digital crowdsourcing to engage citizens in the protection of their votes, livelihoods and welfare of communities (Bader 2013; Hellström 2015). The idea behind crowdsourcing is the timely detection and near-real time provision of information of electoral incidents and response (Fung 2011; Bader 2013). Election monitoring and promotion of electoral integrity depend upon, among other things, partnerships among electoral stakeholders and the degree to



which election observers evaluate the conduct of election across the electoral cycle (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014, 2015), and the extent to which non-partisan civic groups use crowdsourcing methodology for monitoring, generating and real-time reporting of electoral events. Given the ubiquity of mobile technology and other creative innovations, crowdsourcing method via ICT tools can address critical problems of electoral integrity (Schuler 2008; Livingston 2011). The growth of “mobile phones and other information technologies have dramatically reduced the cost of information. This in turn allows motivated persons to pursue solutions to endemic political ills...that would have been, in the absence of the lower costs, too difficult to sustain” (Livingston 2011:11). Mobile phone technologies and other digital communication channels may help to improve election integrity, but not panacea for all problems of electoral politics (Livingston 2011).

On one hand, problems of electoral integrity are not just for developing and transitional democracies; it is a global challenge (Birch and Carlson 2012; Norris 2014, 2015). Evidence shows that “electoral malpractice is a problem that afflicts virtually all countries in the world to some degree” and most of the elections conducted in the world are “marred by some degree of fraud, manipulation or other electoral crime” (Birch and Carlson 2012:2). On the other hand, digital crowdsourcing system is one of the methods for capturing and communicating election observation incidences across the electoral cycle in near-real time (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014). The deployment of citizen observers via ICTs can be a better way to complement blatant outputs of traditional election observers claimed to have a narrow scope in detecting election fraud (Grömping 2012), because “in reality, the ability of many observer missions to detect fraud, beyond blatant ballot-stuffing, is weak” (Carothers 1997:19), and “reached awareness of the potential enshrined in citizen observation is further underlined by the usage of new digital tools, particularly crowdsourcing techniques” (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013:94).

Crowdsourced data are shared in an open-source platform viewable by the public in a timely fashionable way, to see what is happening in different parts of the country. This is the real case of *Uchaguzi* platform launched in 2010 and deployed in Uganda 2011, Kenya 2013, and Tanzania 2015 general elections. *Uchaguzi* crowdsourced technologies play an increasingly innovative role in the ways electoral stakeholders observe, generate and communicate incidents of electoral integrity in establishing the credibility and/ or incredibility of the electoral processes. And any attempt to engage the crowd in observing and reporting incidents aimed to promote free, fair and credible conduct of electoral

processes. Therefore, crowdsourcing method advocated by “non-partisan election observation and monitoring organisations can contribute significantly to improving the democratic quality of legal frameworks for elections, the conduct of election processes and broader democratic development” (GNDEM 2012:3).

Crowdsourcing has been a central concern of non-partisan monitoring organizations and other advocates of democracy to engage citizens as observers and reporters of the electoral events (Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015). In this initiative, there is collaboration in generating, processing, validating and communicating observation data using digital tools that also guarantee the anonymity of the crowd observers and reporters. For ordinary citizens to promote the integrity of electoral process it depends on the appropriate usage of electronic devices and the quality of generated observation reports (Pran and Merloe 2007). Notably, the ‘ongoing revolution on the sector of ICT and potential effect of citizen monitors has expanded considerably and citizen observation is a means to detect election fraud and malpractices’ (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013; Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014). The case of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda shows that ordinary citizens were engaged in generating election observation data. But the extent to which this engagement can generate quality reports on both positive and negative experiences of the elections, largely depends on sorts of multiple actors, among others, electoral management bodies, government enforcement institutions, citizen observers, technology developers, non-partisan civic groups and news media (Diamond 2010; Norris 2014). Other stakeholders such as democracy assistance groups, communication service providers and operators also play their role to meet the broad goal of promoting the integrity of electoral democracies that guarantee genuine and free expression of the will of citizens.

Digital crowdsourcing (or “liberation technologies” in Diamond’s terms) claimed to be a powerful tool for participation, ensuring transparency and accountability and for detecting positive and negative events of the electoral process. Accordingly, digital crowdsourced method enables “citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, mobilize protest, monitor elections, scrutinize government, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom” (Diamond 2010:70). In these initiatives multiple actors such as ordinary citizens, civil society and other agencies play a role in the process and their role and powers need to be determined (Norris 2015:50). It is on this backdrop, this exploratory research sets out to use “case-oriented research” (Ragin 2005) or “small-N comparative

study” (Berg-Schlosser 2012:32-40), to analyse Uchaguzi crowdsourced process focusing on the actors engaged in the “invented space” to monitor electoral processes (Kersting 2012a, 2014) across the electoral cycle (Norris 2014, 2015), and citizen-generated voices through ICT instruments. This is because ‘one needs to look at both process and outcome to gauge the full picture on the quality of the electoral’ (Elklit and Reynolds 2005:149), or adherence to the global norms on democratic elections. Additionally, this research seeks to find out whether engaged crowd-monitors were able to detect negative and positive electoral incidents, as well as challenges faced and potential of crowdsourced method in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 elections.

## **1.2 Background conditions**

“The rapid spread of the internet since the 1990s has led to high expectations for democracy. The internet has been presented as a means to more transparency in political life and new forms of political communication; especially with regard to elections, the core process of modern democracies, the internet has promised concrete and speedy advantages” (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004:3). The idea of using ICTs in democratic processes is not new because from late 1990s the idea of using technology in political processes has significantly increased to enhance democratic processes (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004; Kersting 2015a and Norris 2001, 2002). What is new and interesting, however, is digitalization and increasing emphasis that has been placed on the concept of crowdsourcing monitoring of elections (Howe 2006, 2008; Sharma 2010; Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Tuccinardi and Balme 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Grömping 2014; Hellström 2015). In this case, in an environment plagued by problems of electoral integrity, digital crowdsourcing method may facilitate identification of problems and formulation of appropriate intervention to detect, deter and mitigate electoral fraud and other irregularities (Bailard and Livingston 2014).

Historically, from 1990s this period saw the collapse of state socialism and the emerging of capitalism (Banda 2010), and transition of African states from authoritarian systems of government to liberal forms of democracy (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting 1996). But it has been argued that transitions from “authoritarian rule can lead anywhere” and as a result “produce regimes that hold elections and tolerate some pluralism and interparty competition” (Schedler 2002:36) or using “single-party structure” (Berg-Schlosser 1984a). The transition from authoritarian state and strong man presidency in Africa to plural politics

began in what Huntington (1991) refers to as the “third wave of democratization” - the shift from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time.

After the inceptions and renewal of multi-party systems, the conduct of elections has spread to the democratic countries worldwide (Hadenius and Berg-Schlosser 2007; Hyde 2011b), and the conduct of elections under liberal democracy have become a global norm (Hyde 2011a; Norris 2014). But elections have been an “instrument of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance” (Schedler 2002:36). In African countries, democratic transition and competitive national elections were re-introduced during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Similarly, the installation of liberal democracy is characterized by periodic elections. For example, Kenya and Tanzania amount for more than two decades and one decade in Uganda of multi-party electoral democracies. Competitive periodical election is a significant feature of liberal democracy and it seeks to serve as a legitimizing tool of the elected government (Schuler 2008).

Table 1.1 Some requirements for a democracy among a large number of people

For the opportunity to:	The following institutional guarantees are required:
I. Formulate preferences	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom to form and join organizations</li> <li>2. Freedom of expression</li> <li>3. Right to vote</li> <li>4. Right of political leaders to compete for support</li> <li>5. Alternative sources of information</li> </ol>
II. Signify preferences	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom to form and join organizations</li> <li>2. Freedom of expression</li> <li>3. Right to vote</li> <li>4. Eligibility for public office</li> <li>5. Right of political leaders to compete for support</li> <li>6. Alternative sources of information</li> <li>7. Free and fair elections</li> </ol>
III. Have preferences weighted equally in conduct of government	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Freedom to form and join organizations</li> <li>2. Freedom of expression</li> <li>3. Right to vote</li> <li>4. Eligibility for public office</li> <li>5. Right of political leaders to compete for support</li> <li>5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes</li> <li>6. Alternative sources of information</li> <li>7. Free and fair elections</li> <li>8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference</li> </ol>

Source: Dahl (1971:3).

According to Dahl (1989) the current democratic theory and practice of liberal democracies can be traced from Greek perspectives, republicanism, representation and logic of political equality. Robert Dahl insists that the ‘responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as equal politically is a basic characteristic of

democracy'. As regards the transition to liberal democracies, Dahl (1971) offers some of the necessary requirements and institutional guarantees for electoral democracies or "polyarchies" (see also Dah 1989). Table 1.1 above presents requirements for democracies which must exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy.

Dahl's concept of 'polyarchy' allowed him to make a distinction between an ideal system of democracy and institutional arrangements. The concept of polyarchy is based on the principle of representative rather than Athenian democracy, and constitutes regular and free elections. Therefore, polyarchy is defined as "a regime in which opportunities for public contestation are available to the great bulk of the population" (Dahl 1971:202). Robert Dahl concept of "polyarchy" was an elaboration of Schumpeterian definition of democratic method as "institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter 1950:269). Accordingly, the concept of polyarchy implies that:

Political leaders are responsive to the largest part of the citizenry by means of regular and fair elections, freedom of political thought and organization, possibilities of legal opposition, a certain separation of powers with an independent judiciary, and the institutionalized guarantee of the rule of law. It also presupposes certain social-structural and political-cultural conditions that thus far have been only broadly defined and that include a relatively egalitarian social structure and a more participatory political culture. In Africa, polyarchic forms of government were installed by the colonial powers in a majority of states at the time of independence, generally following either the Westminster or the French presidential model (Berg-Schlosser 1984a:128-130).

There are classic liberal freedoms that are part of the definition of public contestation and participation. These include: 'opportunities to oppose the government, form political organisations, express oneself on political matters without fear of governmental reprisals, read and hear alternative points of view, vote by secret ballot in elections in which candidates of different parties compete for votes and after which the losing candidates peacefully yield their claim to office to the winners' (Dahl 1971:20). Free and fair elections "elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon" (Dahl 1989:221), and electoral democracy must be 'sufficiently free from manipulation to allow for de facto competition, resulting in alternation in power if citizens so desired' (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015:5).

The minimal requirement for democratic transition to liberal democracy is the holding of competitive, free and fair elections under conditions of civil liberties and political rights whose verdict is generally accepted by the major political actors (Bakari and Mushi 2005).

At this point, liberal democracy is a “political system marked not only by free, and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, separation of powers, and the protection by basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (Zakaria 1997:22). The conduct of periodic multi-party elections more often involves official recognition of basic political rights and civil liberties (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). According to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 offerings rights to: ‘periodic elections at regular intervals; universal suffrage which includes all sectors of society; equal suffrage, in the idea of one-person, one-vote; stand for public office and contest elections; all eligible electors to vote; the use of a secret ballot process; genuine elections and that; elections should reflect the free expression of the will of the people’.

On one hand, if elections are to be “truly meaningful, free, and fair, there must be some degree of civil and political freedom beyond the electoral arena so that citizens can articulate and organize around their political beliefs and interests” (Diamond and Morlino 2004:21). On the other hand, ‘the boom in comparative democratic studies has been accompanied by significant disagreement over how to define and measure democracy’ (Diamond 2015:142). In this respect, using the case of Freedom House index of democracy:

strictly speaking, this is not an ‘index of democracy’ as such but both the ‘political rights’ (including competitive and fair and free elections) and the ‘civil liberties’ indicators (concerning freedom of information, organization, religion, the absence of arbitrary repressive measures by the state, etc.) cover important dimensions of democratic systems. It must be noted, however, that again these are basically subjective measures, the reliability of which cannot be well controlled by outsiders (Berg-Schlusser 2004a:253).

Political rights include ‘the rights to vote, to stand for office, to campaign and to organize political parties’, and civil rights encompasses ‘personal liberty, security, and privacy; freedom of thought, expression, and information, freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association, and organization’ (Diamond and Morlino 2004:26). In this case, the crowd watchdogs “can be considered as specialised human rights defenders focused on civil and political rights, which are central to achieving genuine elections. Genuine elections require respect for the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms” (GNDEM 2012:3).

Given these conditions of civil liberties and political rights, Freedom House measures the level and status of freedom in the world. Freedom House measures the freedom by providing rating score for each country on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free), and finally provide assessment on the basis of “free”, “partly free” and “not free”. But Berg-

Schlosser (2008a:271) observed that Freedom House is “purely ‘subjective’ index that has been criticised for a certain American bias and lack of transparency”. Table 1.2 Freedom House proxy indices on political rights and civil rights for East African countries shows that in Uganda political rights ranked 6 from 2014 - 2016 for worst score and freedom status declined from “partly free” in 2014 to “not free” in 2015 and 2016 due to ‘increased violations of individual rights and the freedoms of expression, assembly, and association, harassment and abuses particularly for opposition supporters and civil society groups’ (Freedom House 2016). While Kenya and Tanzania freedom status for the period of 2011-2016 scored “partly free” and varying score of political rights and civil liberties.

Table 1.2 Political rights, civil liberties and freedom status

Year	Political Rights (PR)	Civil Liberties (CL)	Freedom Status
Kenya			
2011	4	3	Partly free
2012	4	3	Partly free
2013	4	4	Partly free
2014	4	4	Partly free
2015	4	4	Partly free
2016	4	4	Partly free
Tanzania			
2011	3	3	Partly free
2012	3	3	Partly free
2013	3	3	Partly free
2014	3	3	Partly free
2015	3	3	Partly free
2016	3	4	Partly free
Uganda			
2011	5	4	Partly free
2012	5	4	Partly free
2013	5	4	Partly free
2014	6	4	Partly free
2015	6	5	Not free
2016	6	4	Not free

Note: Political Rights and Civil Liberties score explanation: 1= most free and 7= least free

Source: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/>

Liberal democracy project in Africa resulted to a mixed discussion among researchers and scholars that African continent has a long way to go to achieve liberal democratic aspirations (Afrobarometer 2009), and cannot and will not work well in Africa (Ake 1993; Diamond 1997; Mukandala 2001). This is because African states are characterized by modern features of bureaucratic state that is constrained in theory by constitutions, electoral laws and regulations as well as impersonal rules and standards with informal reality of personalized, unaccountable power and pervasive patron-client ties (Diamond 1997). This implies the introduction and re-introduction of multi-party system in Africa, is more

characterized by hitches due to the inheritance nature of political systems, which of course, were built by colonial powers during colonization period (Berg-Schlosser 1994).

The current wave of plural democracy in Africa is made necessary and demanded by the current needs of international capitalism, that it cloaks itself in legality rather than legitimacy (Mukandala 2001). That is why Ake (1993) observed that liberal democracy is failing because it is not suitable for Africa, and it does not take into account social and economic realities of Africa such as Africa's social pluralism, poverty, relatively low level of literacy, and the emphasis in rural communities on solidarity and cooperation. In the similar vein, Shivji (1994) remarks liberal democratic project in Africa cannot be sustained without the vision of social emancipation guided by a grand social theory. But it is observed that "the question of the feasibility of more democratic forms of government in Africa has stirred renewed interest in recent years. Even though there is no agreement on a precise definition of the several "types" of democracy which may exist or the broader social and economic conditions which may bring them about, political realities in Africa tend to be analysed in a much more differentiated manner which leaves room for more distinct variations" (Berg-Schlosser 1989b:111).

Moreover, it is argued that one would expect Africans to "1) be unaware of the concept of democracy; 2) have distinct cultural understandings of its content; 3) be unsupportive of regimes based on competitive principles; 4) prefer alternative political regimes; and 5) be unsatisfied with the performance of democratic regimes in practice" (Bratton and Mattes 2001:107). Yet, it is worth asking "what role, if any, should the West play in the democratization of Africa? Like development, democratization is not something that one people does for another. People must do it for themselves or it does not happen. And the question of the role of the West in the democratization of Africa has arisen only because Africans have become more committed to the quest for democracy and are struggling determinedly to attain it" (Ake 1991:38).

Given the emerging debate about liberal democracy project in Africa, it is worth echoing Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:268) who remarked that "democratization in Africa is a long-term institution-building project that is fraught with obstacles and constantly threatened with reversal". As a result, the third wave of democratization in Africa has given "birth to new forms of authoritarianism that do not fit into our classic categories of one-party, military, or personal dictatorship" (Schedler 2002:36). Therefore, Africa is characterized by a diversity of political regimes and is 'neither consolidating nor fully



democratic' (Afrobarometer 2009). Most scholars of democracy have agreed that it "makes sense to classify regimes categorically – and thus to determine which regimes are democracies and which are not" (Diamond 2015:142-143). But the positive trend towards the third wave is that the struggle for liberal politics in Africa opened up a political space for competitive politics after decades of voters' limited opportunities for choices, participation and competitive election due to the domination of one-party system (Hermet 1978).

In addition, established periodic electoral contests give voters' opportunities to choose leaders and give them the right to rule them, because competitiveness of the elections is essential in democratic processes (Schumpeter 1950). But to some scholars like Schedler (2002) the established periodic elections are "elections without democracy" that violate democratic norms, for the representative to obtain legitimacy and satisfy external and internal actors to continue capturing state power. The space of plural politics increases the likelihood of election fraud and malpractices in multi-party electoral democracy. The electoral processes are marked by fraud and malpractices which affect public confidence in the integrity of elections and the legitimacy of the ruling regime (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005; Birch 2008).

Since 1990s the spread of multi-party electoral democracy in Africa started to increase from nearly 20 percent in 1980s to almost 92 percent in 2012 (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). Figure 1.1 shows the increase in the number of African regimes that hold de jure multi-party elections. Data shows most of the African nationals introduced liberal democracies, and the spread of multi-party elections opens up a door for a competitive electoral process for capturing government offices. The presence of different political parties and individuals contesting for public office creates the need for monitoring the electoral process to ensure adherence to the principles of democratic elections. The conduct of periodic competitive elections seems to influence the prospects for democratization (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005; Lindberg 2006) because since the "development of a political system that allows for opposition, rivalry, or competition between a government and its opponents is an important aspect of democratization" (Dahl 1971:1). Yet, there is ample evidence of de jure multi-party elections in Africa and it is reasonable to argue that "participation of active citizens in the process of political decision-making lies at the core of any democratic system" (Berg-Schlosser 1980:211).




Figure 1.1 The Spread of multiparty elections in Africa

Source: Van Ham 2012 (cited in Van Ham and Lindberg 2015:13).

The introduction and re-introduction of multi-party elections leads scholars to suggest different ways of measuring periodic elections and democratic development such as increased competition and participation (Dahl 1971, 1989), liberalization and increased participation (Held 2006), levels of political competition, participation and civil, as well as political liberties (Sørensen 1993), and competition between candidates, freedom of voters and the effect of elections on government policies (Hermet 1978). At this point, an electoral democracy is essential because it promotes citizen participation in a competitive environment that provides choices of candidates and parties. Mobilization of citizen participation in an electoral process, especially by civil society organisations is “playing a crucial role in the transition process and more so in the consolidation of democracies” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:20). As regards the prospects of the spread of democracy around the world, “we know a great deal about what can be done to improve the vitality of democracy by stimulating voter participation” (Lijphart 2005:50), and a “right for political education and freedom of information based on independent and critical media as a major source” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:18).

Currently, the rate of citizen participation in political process has been increased because of the advent of technology which was viewed as a “revival of an idealised Athenian democracy” (Kersting 2012a:11), as a citizen was conceived as part and parcel of the polis-city state. The growth rate of online and offline participation offer opportunities of Athenian style of democracies to re-connect citizens with other election stakeholders in the modern liberal democracy (Breindl 2010; Kersting 2012a). Digital tools open-up invented space (Kersting 2013a) that facilitate partnerships among electoral players such as civil society organizations (CSOs), citizens, election authorities, technology developers, government enforcement watchdogs and media. Additionally, the use of ICT instruments for monitoring and reporting provide space for non-partisan election monitoring organizations and ordinary citizens (the crowd) to co-produce election observation data, especially positive and negative experiences of electoral procedures. It is digital tools that empower citizens to take part in election observation thereby generated data are geo-located, validated, shared and sometimes visually mapped in real time in open-source platform.

In the networked era which is characterized by a shift from traditional media to new digital tools, participation, trust and confidence of citizens is a means of sustaining integrity of electoral process (Carothers 1997). Digitalization underlined the need for citizen participation for the conduct of elections to be free, fair and credible democratic processes. And it is evident that “the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state is one in which the whole people participate; that any participation, even in the smallest public function, is useful; that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general degree of improvement of the community will allow; and that nothing less can be ultimately desirable than the admission of all to a share in the sovereign power of the state” (Mill 1914:217). The shift from invited space to digital invented spaces creates less controlled forums of participation in electoral politics (Kersting 2014).

Digital technology is seen as a powerful tool of open communication channels between key democratic institutions and citizens (Kersting 2009). The rationale behind collaboration of partners is to promote the power of voices of citizens, and in democratic events, the crowds are very often engaged as watchdogs of electoral processes by civil society organizations (Diamond 2010). Vibrant and engaged non-partisan civic groups are capable of expressing the public concerns and the extent to which elections are conducted in a timely manner. The partnerships between CSOs and ordinary citizens gained momentum after the inception of multiparty electoral democracies and the rise of digital technologies

for monitoring issues of human rights, principles of freeness and fairness, credible electoral process, among others. This was the case of Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) in Kenya, Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) in Uganda, and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) in Tanzania to monitor elections using crowdsourcing method. CSOs initiatives of election monitoring in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were complemented by the technical assistance and training offered by international institutions such as National Democratic Institute (NDI). In fact, literature shows that National Democratic Institute has a notable record of fostering “domestic observation efforts in a number of countries and has done much to establish non-partisan domestic monitoring as an accepted part of the international electoral scene” (Carothers 1997:27).

Digital technology has contributed to crowdsourcing, and advocates bottom-up approach of participation of large pools of citizens in electoral matters through invented spaces (Kersting 2015c). Digital crowdsourced in capturing and disseminating incidents aimed at promoting the integrity of electoral procedures. At the core of the concept of crowdsourcing is the idea that a large pool of “undefined” reporters through “open-call” (Howe 2006, 2008) will be engaged in observing the conduct of elections that will result in a more full participation and confidence, as well as legitimacy of the elections results (Fung 2011; Grömping 2012; Tuccinardi and Balme 2013; Hellström 2015). The move toward crowdsourcing allows a wider use of technology that enables citizens with mobile-cellular phones or internet access to expose any kind of wrongdoing anywhere and anytime during electoral processes.

Due to an increase and on-going adoption of digital tools in developing and emerging democracies, crowdsourcing method can be seen as one of the complementing factor to the problems of electoral integrity, non-free and unfair conduct of elections, exclusion of citizens in politics and other electoral malpractices that liberal democracy is facing. The use of technologies in political activities revived expectations and reinvigorates a society disengaged in electoral democracy. Thus, crowd-monitoring and digitalization of electoral processes is oriented towards electronic possibilities to strengthen promotion of electoral democracy (Kersting 2012a), and for citizens to communicate between themselves and other advocates of democracy (Wojcik 2012), in a timely manner to publicise illicit acts of electoral stakeholders and good conduct of electoral process.

### **1.3 Motivation of the research**

According to Norris (2015:49-59) the key puzzles in the study of electoral integrity is the question of ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘where’, and ‘when’, as well as the key question of ‘why’. In relation to ubiquity crowdsourced monitoring integrity of electoral procedures leaves many questions unanswered, among others, with regard to the process, citizen-generated voices/outputs, potentials and challenges. In this regard, many considerations have motivated the researcher to analyse crowdsourcing method in monitoring electoral integrity. Because there has been a shift in the logic of monitoring electoral contest, the paradigm shift<sup>2</sup> from “few” established monitors to “many eyes” of ordinary citizens in the invented space (Kersting 2012a). In this context, emerged crowdsourced method favoured the use of invented spaces that has been championed and controlled by civil society as an initiative to contribute in the promotion of elections with integrity. Thereby, emerging digital crowdsourcing and citizen-generated voices motivated the researcher to analyse “the crowd, the task at hand, the crowdsourcer or initiator of the crowdsourcing activity, what is obtained by them following the crowdsourcing process, the type of process, the call to participate, and the medium” used to generate citizen voices in promoting integrity of elections (Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Fuevara 2012:198).

A certain gap in the crowdsourcing method has also attracted the attention of this research. Literature acknowledges crowdsourcing method in monitoring integrity of electoral procedures, and points the need for analysis of this new emerging method. Also, literature considers digital crowdsourcing method as a crucial emerging method for co-production and rapid dissemination of election observation data (Meier 2011a, 2011b). However, the gap still remains on the modes and methods, as well as unexplored citizen-generated voices in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2016 and Uganda 2011 general elections. This area motivated the researcher to analyse crowdsourced process and citizen voices using comparative approach and most similar systems designs. In addition, advocates of digitally empowered citizens want to know, if citizen-generated voices through digital technological tools had an effect in terms of monitoring and generating positive and negative election

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<sup>2</sup> The growth diffusion of digital communication technology tools and crowdsourced method changed the way users interact, generate, communicate and share information with others (see Schuler 2008; Diamond 2010; Livingston 2011) or the way ordinary citizens monitors and reporters are engaged by civil society to generate positive and negative election observation reports (see Fung 2011). This is because it has been argued that web 2.0 is creating new environment for engaging “many eyes” rather than “talented few” (see Surowiecki 2004) and the “collective wisdom of crowds” in mapping electoral incidents for the integrity of democratic elections.

information (Fung 2011; Meier 2011a, 2011b, Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Grömping 2014), just to mention a few of them. One would also hope that enabled citizens could support promotion of electoral integrity, so that “citizen observation groups can also play a long-term confidence-building role throughout the electoral cycle, a function beyond the remit of international observers” (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013:97).

Of recent is the fact that the focus of many non-partisan election monitoring organizations is citizen engagement as watchdogs of electoral processes using digital tools. Diffusion of communication technology in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda capture the attention of the researcher, and interestingly technology developers are main partners in crowdsourcing method such as Ushahidi team, who developed Uchaguzi platform for elections as a customized version of Ushahidi software. As a result, this kind of partnership in crowdsourcing electoral integrity challenges the notion of digital divide in most of the developing and emerging democracies, in particular in Africa that is considered deficient in respects to the digital communication technologies (Ekine 2010; Livingston 2011). This research seeks to find out how the case of digital crowdsourcing illustrates the resource poor countries can engage in promoting election integrity by using simple mobile ICT of short message services or mobile short code (Ekine 2010), and how the connected crowds can observe, generate and share electoral incidences with wider audiences.

For decades, elections observation and monitoring in developing or fledgling democracies have been carried out by established international election observation missions and domestic observers. The observers examine the conduct of electoral processes to check whether they comply with the agreed international principles of democratic elections in order to establish confidence and legitimacy of the elected government (Kelley 2008, 2009; Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014, 2015). The presence of observers in an election is “generally seen as a means of promoting security and credibility, and a deterrent to fraud” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014). Contrary, conclusions and discussions in the literature suggest that there have been less successful stories for the election observers to prevent fraudulent elections (Carothers 1997; Msekwa 2002; Makulilo 2011; Norris 2014), and even “election monitors sometimes endorse elections to protect the interests of the member states or donors or to accommodate other compelling but tangential organizational norms” (Kelley 2009:766). And other “observers prefer not to issue a verdict. They just identify irregularities and provide recommendations for improving the electoral system” (Makulilo 2011:243). But it is evident that “during the last decade the picture provided by

these reports has become increasingly muddled by the proliferation of international election monitoring groups, producing divergent assessments of the same contest” (Norris 2015:29). In this respect, an emerging crowdsourced method in monitoring integrity of elections warrants further investigation because analysis of the citizen-generated voices can divulge some information on the power of citizen observers on capturing incidences across the electoral cycle. And crowdsourcing platforms is a “rapidly emerging source of data, which holds considerable promise for future research” (Norris 2015:34).

Additionally, it has been observed that “the greatest failing of election assessment to date has been the tendency to see election quality in bimodal terms. The election is either good or it is bad; or, when a fudge is required, it is ‘substantially free and fair” (Elklit and Reynolds 2005:149). In this case, “election observers make judgements on the basis of largely impressionistic and incomplete evidence centred on the conduct of the vote and count on election day”, also, “observation missions (often from abroad and with their own government’s lead) ‘call’ the result an election in a politicized way, detached from the reality of the process itself” (Elklit and Reynolds 2005:149). Elklit and Reynolds observation left a space which has to be packed by other methods, especially crowdsourcing citizen-oriented monitoring and reporting of election cycle using digital communication and information technologies.

Elections are complex processes and across the range of electoral cycle, electoral fraud and other irregularities can intentionally or carelessly take different forms, thereby the radar of traditional domestic or international election observers cannot detect (Grömping 2012). But “in some, failures are intentional; elsewhere, they arise through happenstance, although it is tricky to nail down which is which” (Norris 2015:3). The electoral cycle approach “acknowledges that flaws can arise at any stage of the process” (Norris 2015:12). That is the reason why “flawed or even fraudulent elections still occur frequently despite the presence of international observers” (Carothers 1997:21). The recent initiatives to engage the crowd on the ground via technology to observe positive and negative experiences of elections aimed at filling this gap and address the problems of electoral integrity. The motivation for analysing crowdsourced and citizen-generated voices in the three countries comes from the fact that crowdsourcing citizen-based monitoring can detect and deter possibilities of different tricks of illicit acts of electoral stakeholders to intentionally or carelessly commit fraud and other election irregularities in a large “menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002).

Literature indicates that democracy assistance group tends to send international observers rather than investing resources in and offering support to the domestic monitoring groups (Carothers 1997). The problem of international observation mission is their tendency to focus on short-term and stays on election-day events (Bjornlund 2004). Capacity building of domestic observers may create power to the citizens who become actively engaged in monitoring the elections and holding transparent and accountable electoral process (Carothers 1997; Diamond 2010). This “domestic election monitors, if properly organized and prepared, have important advantages over foreign observers. They can much more easily turn out in very large numbers, usually in the thousands. They know the political culture, the language, and the territory in question, and consequently they are capable of seeing many things that short-term foreign observers cannot” (Carothers 1997:26).

Since the inception of the third wave, election monitoring has been controlled by few groups of traditional established observers to judge either the contested elections were free, fair or credible. But lately the emerging crowdsourced technologies and especially with the use of increasing ubiquity of mobile phones in developing and emerging democracies, monitoring contests is now observed and controlled by both ‘few’ and ‘many’ in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents across the electoral cycle (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014), and election processes actually begin with pre-election period such as registration of voters, through the whole of the electoral cycle (Elklit and Svensson 1997; Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). Monitoring election-day and less campaign events, election fraud and other irregularities which may have been committed during any of the phases or step of electoral cycle, will have escaped the eye of the traditional monitoring groups. Therefore, a real plus with idea of crowdsourcing and digitalization of electoral incidences will be a “quick detector and pointer” that operates over large areas and capable of producing big data in a broad range of electoral cycle and near-real time feedback.

Jørgen Elklit remarked that: “regrettably enough, electoral fraud and electoral malpractice are still things to be concerned about as the two continue to distort electoral processes and electoral integrity in many countries around the world” (see foreword the work of Vickery and Shein 2012:1), motivated the researcher to analyse this emerging method of crowdsourcing monitoring of elections. It is undeniably that the presence of established election observers does indeed add credibility to the quality of the election (Msekwa 2002), but traditional election observers do not go every place to keep an eye on what is happening, they mostly tend to concentrate on the activities of voting and counting



of ballots (Lehoucq 2003; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015), and “the numerous teams of [international] observers who stay for only a short time around election day are unlikely to see beyond the obvious” (Carothers 1997:19). In this regard, this motivates analysis of crowdsourced method in order to check whether citizens who engage in monitoring through invented spaces have the ability to observe and expose illicit act and good conduct of election stakeholders across the electoral cycle.

Based on the understanding of problems of electoral integrity in the developing and fledgling democracies, most analyses are conducted using expert surveys index, proxy indices, public opinion polls, and analysis of established observers reports (Lehoucq 2003; Birch and Carlson 2012; Ichino and Schündeln 2012; Grömping 2014; Norris, Elklit and Reynolds 2014; Norris 2015, Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). But rich observation information generated by digitally enabled citizens, which is another source of data, is yet to gain thorough attention of researchers and scholars. Accordingly, many big election data are not documented in academic field to acknowledge the contribution of “the crowd” observers in promoting electoral integrity. Scholarly work has raised the question crowdsourcing monitoring of elections is another alternative source of election observation information, and yet unexplored (Norris 2015), and the need to analyse crowdsourced method to establish its contribution in generating positive and negative experiences of elections (Fung 2011). With this regard, this empirical gap attracted the attention and motivated the analysis of crowdsourced data in comparative perspective.

In relation to that, no study has yet analysed crowdsourced process and citizen-generated voices in Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 platform, Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 platform and Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 platform. In this regard, this thesis using comparative perspective focuses on classifying, counting and analysing largely unexploited sources of big election data on the Uchaguzi crowdsourced datasets - generated by citizen observers and reporters, through digital devices and open-source software. The sources of citizen-generated voices are from civil society election monitoring organizations such as CRECO in Kenya, TACCEO in Tanzania and CEW-IT in Uganda. As regards, the analysis of crowdsourced method in comparative perspective will demonstrate if there was a degree of convergence and divergence in the crowdsourced elections monitoring by digitally-enabled ordinary citizens.

#### 1.4 Objective and research questions

The aim of this research is to contribute to the understanding of crowdsourced method in promoting electoral integrity by monitoring global norms governing democratic elections.

This is exploratory study guided by the following major research questions:

- i. How digital crowdsourced method used to engage citizens in observing and communicating electoral incidents?
- ii. Do crowdsourced elections monitoring detect positive and negative electoral incidents? And if so, what are the evidences?
- iii. In what ways do digital crowdsourced complement traditional method of observing electoral processes?
- iv. What challenges, if any, were encountered in digital crowdsourced monitoring integrity of electoral procedures?

Table 1.3 Research framework and approach

Analytical framework	Invented and invited spaces (Kersting 2012a, 2013a, 2014). Hybrid crowdsourced monitoring Electoral cycle (Norris 2014, 2015)
Methodological approach	Small-N comparative study /case-oriented research (Ragin 2005; Berg-Schlosser 2012:32-40).  Most similar systems design (MSSD) (Przeworski and Teune 1982; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; Berg-Schlosser and Quenter 1996; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009; Berg-Schlosser 2012; Moses and Knutsen 2012).  Uchaguzi datasets analysis (CEW-IT, CRECO and TACCEO), document and website analysis and qualitative semi-structured face-to-face interviews.

#### 1.5 The conceptual framework

Monitoring integrity of elections is characterized by the existence of different stakeholders such as established domestic and international observers who are invited by the government through electoral authorities to participate in observation process and offer comprehensive reports on the conduct of electoral process (Kelley 2008, 2009). Domestic observers such as non-partisan monitoring organizations after accreditation, engaged citizen monitors in the invented space to share their experiences with regard to the conduct of elections. Technology developers collaborate with non-partisan civic groups to run digital crowdsourcing and crowdmapping platforms, and media for disseminating incoming verified observation data, as well as other democracy assistance groups to offer capacity-building and financial assistance for promoting the integrity of the electoral process.

The mechanism of digital crowdsourced watch is to engage hybrid form of participants in order to collaborate in production and dissemination of information for the integrity of elections. The engagement of “undefined” crowdsourcing method often guaranteed anonymity of observers and reporters in the course of observing, generating and reporting electoral incidents through digital tools established for receiving observation data. This is because “the risks associated with crowdsourcing are perhaps most pronounced when the crowd is asked to share sensitive information that can be used to criticise the government, such as election or service delivery monitoring” (Hellström 2015:4).

The presented conceptual framework will focus on answering the questions on: crowdsourcing process of engaging different crowd-monitors, the call for participation in the invented space and citizen-generated voices on detecting positivity and negativity of elections across the electoral cycle. In this attempt, three parts are presented: The first part presents citizen participation in the invented space. The section is informed with a hybrid model of participation or participatory rhombus (Kersting 2013a), and the main focus is on citizen participation in representative democracy as formalised and constitutionally documented sphere of electoral democracy (Kersting 2012a). The second part is devoted to crowdsourced method using Uchaguzi framework focusing on the type of the crowd monitors, and is built on the idea of hybrid crowdsourcing monitoring, and the final part presents crowdsourced monitoring across the electoral cycle focusing on Norris (2014) electoral cycle model.

### **1.5.1 The invited and invented space**

Most government reacted by providing more democratic space and implementing new instruments for participation such as *invited space*. Political systems implemented new invited space such as referendums, round tables, forums etc. Some of these new experiments were dominated by political parties and formal institutions. In this case, the people were still not satisfied, and found their own channels to express their interest using *invented space* as an answer to this hierarchically dominated intervention...The question is whether these new structures can become sustainable forms of deliberation and open democracy, but it can be shown that new elites emerged (Kersting 2012a:15).

The growth of ubiquity of online and offline communication technologies opens up spaces for citizen participation in democratic processes (Kersting 2017). The new forms of participation are being implemented by government (invited space) and by civil society organizations (invented space) (Kersting 2017). It has been observed, that the demand for citizen participation in democratic space led to reactions by most governments, as a result

provided invited space (Kersting 2012a). But the invited space (using top-down approach) offered by government ‘fail to attract the attention of the crowd because they seem too static, are too centrally controlled, or do not offer direct benefits, reputational gains or other incentives to potential contributors’ (Bott et al. 2014:13). Accordingly, digital invented spaces controlled by citizens and civil society provide amplified opportunity to the citizens as potential contributors, to share their information with regard to electoral process.

In a similar vein, it has been argued that people are still not satisfied with the invited space offered by the government (Kersting 2012a:15), as a result citizens in collaboration with non-partisan civic groups found an invented space to create more spaces for participation in democratic process (Kersting 2013a). Non-partisan civic groups opted for crowdsourcing technologies for monitoring the integrity of elections because citizens are more aware of the conduct of electoral process (Norris 2014). Digital tools are used for collecting crowd observation, ideas and suggestions through crowdsourcing method. As regards, the invented space by civil society, normally ordinary citizens are invited to participate in monitoring and reporting of the electoral process in the space which is already formalized. Invented space is characterised by new digital, online instruments (Kersting 2013a:270), and connected the crowd as election watchdogs as call to participate by the crowdsourcing initiator (crowd-sourcer). Figure 1.2 shows that citizens can participate in democratic spaces into four different political spheres: participation in representative sphere, participation in direct sphere, deliberative participation and demonstrative participation.

Citizen participation in *representative democracy* can be seen as the “default case of liberal democracies” (Kersting 2013a:272). This is because participation in representative democracy began in the third wave of democratization, the period of transition from one-party to multi-party electoral system. In this form of electoral democracies citizens are given opportunities to participate through voting of their representatives. And “the larger the proportion of citizens who enjoy the right, the more inclusive the regime” (Dahl 1971:10). This is due to the fact that “institutions of representative democracy are mostly highly formalised and defined in the constitution or in a legal framework” (Kersting 2013a:273). Online instruments in representative participation range from voter information, online voter registration, voter identification, and candidate watch through digital crowdsourcing and crowd-monitoring systems. The problem of elections with integrity is obvious in a representative form of democracy especially fraudulent electoral processes (Bailard and Livingston 2014). To overcome some of these problems and challenges in the representative

democracy in a timely fashion way, online and offline hybrid crowdsourcing systems can be used to share the incidences with larger communities of voters and key electoral democracy stakeholders for response and feedback action (Bader 2013). The crowd participation in the invented space offer an important frame of reference for a number of questions such as who are the actors invited to participate in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents? How were invited actors engaged? In what ways did invited citizens generate observation data? What were most reported problems by the invited crowd-monitors in the invented space?




Figure 1.2 Hybrid and blended democracy

Source: Adapted from Kersting (2012a).

Citizen participation in other spheres such as *demonstrative sphere* can be seen as an informal participation (Kersting 2012a), and demonstrative participation is often associated with the invented space rather than the invited space. This includes different illegal wave of violent protest like Kenya 2007-2008 and Zanzibar in 2001 post-election violence. The two examples are the results of claimed fraudulent or manipulated presidential election results (Kiai 2010; Diamond 2015). Another example is violent demonstrations of “walk-to-work” protest in Uganda 2011 which was peaceful to violent demonstrations against the high cost

of living. The form of protest in Uganda emerged followed the 2011 general presidential election results, whereby the protest involved opposition parties. The raise of participation in demonstrative sphere is a result of carelessness, weaknesses and challenges of representative democracy, that seek to fill the gap before the next election cycle. It is also a way of expressing dissatisfaction with the conduct of democratic elections and other process, and demonstrators through illicit network air their voices by pointing out the malpractices and other irregularities.

On one hand, the focus of participation in *direct democracy* is “not on the election of incumbents” rather on policy-decision making process (Kersting 2013a:273). This is because direct democracy is defined as a “direct participation in the issue-oriented to decision-making process” (Kersting 2007a:33). On the other hand, the representative and direct democracies are “both confronted with waning interest in politics. These types of democracy are not mutually exclusive political participation instruments, rather they are two sides of one coin and complement each other” (Kersting 2007a:33). Also, citizen participation in *deliberative sphere* focuses on consensual deliberative decision-making or instrument of “dialogue-oriented political participation” (Kersting 2008), and “with normative rigor applied to highly elaborated rational discourses also has elitist elements” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:17). Deliberative democracy can articulate protest (Kersting 2013a). It “may produce higher rationality but not broader democratic control. The high normative standard includes empathy; political tolerance and a strong orientation to common consensus within a public reflective discourse but, neglect the articulation of particular interests” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:17).

In the context of this research, the focus is on citizen participation in the representative sphere of democracy because in this sphere elections are the key instrument of political engagement. And it can be argued that “crowd is wise” (Surowiecki 2004) and capable of solving complex problems of electoral integrity in representative democracy. Invented space provides a high degree of autonomy compared to invited space (Kersting 2015c). Here participation in the invented space is at the co-production and dissemination of big election monitoring data. With regard to the use of invented space by non-partisan civic groups in monitoring elections under representative democracy, the question is how citizen-based monitors and reporters were engaged to observe, generate and report electoral incidents? What types of crowds were engaged in the invented space by non-partisan civic groups in the process of observing and reporting electoral incidents? To what extent do civil societies

in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using digital technology tools were able to pinpoint problems of electoral integrity and/ or to report positive feedback of electoral processes?

### **1.5.2 Hybrid crowdsourced elections monitoring**

Non-partisan civic groups in the process of election monitoring are responsible for formulation of collaborative networks of observers and reporters from different background to watch the conduct of elections. This is marked by the fact that “at its root, electoral integrity is a political problem” and inclusiveness, transparency and accountability are all fundamental to develop public confidence in electoral and political processes (Global Commission 2012:16). Similarly, “greater transparency strengthens public confidence in the process and encourages the population to participate in different steps of elections” (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013:97). Therefore, credible and peaceful conduct of elections under representative democracy comes from bottom-up and “more often than not, however, the struggle come from the bottom up, when citizens and civil society organisations demand elections with integrity. The passion, mobilization, and pressure of citizens create the political incentives for leaders to act democratically. Either way, the integrity of elections and the legitimacy that flows from them must be home grown and protected. Elections with integrity, as the embodiment of democracy and self-determination, must be locally owned” (Global Commission 2012:16).

In order to promote elections with integrity there is a need to use “technology, domestic NGOs and social media” (Norris 2014). In addition, citizen engagement on the ground as co-production has an important function especially when it comes to the monitoring of the elections. It can be argued that civil society organisations are profoundly a main locus for public to make collective decision, and to promote common good of the public. Various stakeholders, especially non-partisan civic groups use digital technologies to collaborate with other advocates of democracy and to engage ordinary citizens in sharing election observation data. This marked the case of Uchaguzi platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for crowdsourcing election monitoring that encompasses various types of “the crowd” and other electoral stakeholders.

Figure 1.3 show hybrid crowdsourced observers in one way or the other may detect, deter and mitigate the integrity of elections. The hybrid crowdsourced system involves bounded or trained, and unbounded or untrained, as well as passive citizen monitors (Section 4.4). For these three groups of election observers to generate their observation

information, there is a team responsible for receiving data at the established election situation room data center for processing the data, especially in establishing the authenticity of the incoming reports, collecting data from social networkers, geo-locating, categorizing, approving and mapping approved data for public view in the dedicated Uchaguzi crowd-mapping platform. Citizen-generated information are analysed and shared with key stakeholders like government watchdogs for further action and compiling recommendations for reform in the future election cycle. But, in order to promote the integrity of elections through crowdsourcing method, the process requires e-readiness of ordinary citizen who are connected, either through online form of communication like social networks, emails and weblogs, or SMS-based services. Crowdsourcing e-observation facilitates timely delivery of the verified incidents to the relevant authorities for action and feedback.




Figure 1.3 Uchaguzi hybrid crowdsourced monitoring of elections

Source: own drawing

Hybrid crowdsourced monitoring is an implicit and explicit interaction among citizen observers - and crowdsourcing initiators connected by the process of election monitoring and generating information, as well as incoming information verification process which accelerates co-production of credible election observation data. In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the election watch involves hybrid approach of observation whereby different types of citizen observers were engaged in observing electoral process, particularly bounded and unbounded citizen observers and reporters who were invited to share observed incidents via established medium of communication channels. The crowdsourcers through digital media



team could capitalise on passive observers and reporters on the social media networks, and accept the challenges of verifying shared information and authenticity of the reports posted on the users networks (Grömping 2013). Yet “it remains difficult to establish how far online postings reflect the general views of ordinary citizens, since partisan activists are probably far more likely to express political opinions online” (Norris 2015:34). As this research set to analyse citizen-generated data, the crowdsourced data stored by the crowd sourcers may be very well informed with hybrid form of crowd-monitors and one could analyse the extent to which type of the crowd-monitors was more active than the other. Acknowledging the fact that bounded and unbounded streams of crowdsourcing have been deployed, the hybrid observation will be more effective and efficient through ICT instruments for engaging observers and data verifiers (Bardall 2010).

Hybrid crowdsourcing is directed towards a large group of defined and undefined citizen in the form of an open-call using digital technologies (Howe 2006, 2008; Sharma 2010). The use of digital technologies is to amplify the voices of citizens’ observers and reporters through sharing their observation data in an open digital platform. With this regard, a partnership among electoral stakeholders to invite citizens to submit observation data in the Uchaguzi invented space is indispensable given the growth rate of online and offline communication tools of participation. Uchaguzi invented space for hybrid crowd-monitoring of elections, geo-tagging incoming reports and crowd-mapping approved reports for public view would not function without invitation to a set of stakeholders, in particular citizen observers, volunteers for processing and verifying incoming reports, digital humanitarian team and government watchdogs for responding to the generated data.

### **1.5.3 The electoral cycle**

Mackenzie and Robinson (1960) cited in Hyden and Leys (1972:391) observed that “no human observer can ever grasp the whole life of a political system in action, but more can be learnt in a space of about three months during an election than in any other comparable period”. But election is studied as an aspect of the whole electoral system or cycle. According to ACE Electoral Knowledge Network there are many phases to the electoral process, and in an election, these include “the design and drafting of legislation, the recruitment and training of electoral staff, electoral planning, voter registration, the registration of political parties, the nomination of parties and candidates, the electoral campaign, polling, counting, the tabulation of results, the declaration of results, the

resolution of electoral disputes, reporting, auditing and archiving. After the end of one electoral process, it is desirable for work on the next to begin: the whole process can be described as the electoral cycle”<sup>3</sup>. International election observer groups have been mostly criticised for obvious reporting of election-day observation incidents (Carothers 1997; Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014).




Figure 1.4 The electoral cycle

Source: Norris (2014:34).

In electoral cycle “a range of electoral malpractices can occur at any stage in a sequential process (not limited to fraudulent acts on polling day and its aftermath), requiring multidimensional components” (Norris 2013a:564). This raised the following question: can crowdsourced method observe elections across the electoral cycle? The goal of electoral democracies stakeholders such as non-partisan civic groups to engage citizen in election monitoring is to detect electoral incidents across the cycle. In order to declare that the elections were free, fair or vice versa; the incidences on the electoral cycle need to be monitored, reported and shared to all stakeholders (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014, 2015). Thus, in figure 1.4 steps of electoral cycle are conceptualized in terms of eleven sub-dimensions of electoral process. Norris (2014) conceptualization of electoral cycle is to include broad determinants of electoral integrity throughout the electoral process.

<sup>3</sup> <http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/electoral-management/electoral%20cycle.JPG/view> [Accessed 08 May 2015]

Continuing monitoring of election is the way monitors and reporters can evaluate the conduct of elections through steps in order to establish the process of election was credible or not (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014).

Norris (2014) describes several steps of the electoral processes, these include: pre-election phase that involves steps such as electoral laws, electoral procedures, boundaries, voter registration, and party as well as candidate registration. Another step is campaign phase that comprises campaign media and campaign finance. Also voting phase which includes: voting process and lastly, post-voting phase: that involves vote count, vote results and electoral management bodies. The steps are usually arranged sequentially. With this regard, the role of the crowd-initiators is to deploy citizen observers across the range of electoral cycle to generate observation data of both positive and negative side of the electoral process. Overall well disseminated electoral events may act as the catalyst to persuade key electoral stakeholders (electoral authorities, law enforcement agencies and humanitarian groups, among others) to act on a particular problem. Also, disseminated information may be used to build confidence to the public about the integrity of the contests and legitimacy of the elected government (Kersting 2007a, Kelley 2008, 2009; Mattes 2014; Norris 2014, 2015). That is why deployment of digitally enabled crowd-monitors likely can play an important role at some stage of electoral processes, and establish what constitutes credible or acceptable electoral results, which is evidently will be the basis of elections with integrity. Therefore, the reason behind the analysis of the crowdsourced citizen voices is because “by combining rigor and objectivity with the ability to reach a very large public through several stages of the electoral cycle, these platforms could become extremely powerful tools to evaluate not just the quality of elections, but the state of democracy in a given country at any given moment in time” (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013:99).

## **1.6 Research contributions**

This thesis contributes to the digital crowdsourcing, election monitoring and electoral integrity scholarship in different ways. A growing body of work on modern liberal democracies demonstrate monitoring of electoral contest is a significant factor on ensuring adherence to the agreed standard and principles of democratic elections. The focus of this thesis on digital crowdsourcing method is to support this initiative of monitoring the quality of electoral process, and contribute by showing how crowdsourced systems can complement other methods of monitoring electoral democracies, and widening scholarship of elections with integrity. And it has been the case that ordinary citizens in the invented space have the

ability to monitor and expose illicit act of election stakeholders in real-time that obviously go beyond the radar of long established election observers.

Admittedly, international norm of election monitoring has a significant influence on promoting the integrity of electoral processes and adherence to the principles of democratic conduct of elections (Hyde 2011a; Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). But “many international groups prefer to send out their own high-profile, exciting missions around the world rather than engage in the unglamorous and painstaking work of helping local groups to do the work themselves” (Carothers 1997:27). Almost 80 percent of all national elections are now monitored, though “many leaders invite foreign observers and orchestrate electoral fraud in front of them” (Hyde 2011a:356). Additionally, nearly 90 percent of the state worldwide chose their national leaders through elections under multi-party politics (Global Commission 2012). That is to say the invited established election observation groups tend to go to areas that are more accessible and sometimes with probability of election fraud and other irregularities (Msekwa 2002; Grömping 2012). Bailard and Livingston (2014:353) observed sometimes “elections observers tend to focus on accessible and relatively safe urban areas, clearing the way for widespread fraud in rural areas”. But in most cases election fraud or electoral malpractices are incidents that happen stochastically without a recognizable pattern. The tactics of ‘electoral fraud and other form of manipulations change over time in different regimes and different contexts’ (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). Based on this trend, Norris (2014) remarked “the standards of democratic elections with integrity are not static, key electoral stakeholders need to adapt and respond to contemporary developments in the conduct, monitoring and reporting of electoral incidents”. This study focusing on digital crowdsourcing monitoring in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda will contribute to the understanding of ICT-enabled citizen monitors, and analyse the power of citizen-generated voices, which go beyond the scope of traditional observers.

This thesis claims that crowdsourcing method of monitoring and reporting the conduct of electoral process in near-real time may also contribute and influence elections with integrity in various important ways besides established election monitoring missions (see Chapter 4). This has been the case in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and it might be the case in other regional East African countries and, Africa in general, and even the case in the next election cycle for the three countries. But the method and outputs of citizen-generated voices is undocumented in academic terms, and little is known about the potentiality of crowdsourced monitoring of elections in the three countries. This is the area this dissertation

contributes by analysing and documenting crowdsourced systems in the three countries. Also, thesis contributes to the crowdsourced monitoring of elections literature by offering new insights on election monitoring and promotion of electoral integrity.

The role of civil society election monitoring organizations and ordinary citizen observers on the conduct of electoral processes is acknowledged (Global Commission 2012). Yet, there is a gap in the existing literature about the analysis of citizen voices in relation to the integrity of electoral processes (Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014). Thus, to analyse digitally enabled citizen voices in comparative perspective will uncover crowdsourcing process involved in capturing and communicating observed incidences, actors involved in the *Uchaguzi* invented space, medium used to generate crowd data, and mechanisms used in validating incoming information for data integrity. The analysis will add value to the understanding of what ordinary citizens on the ground can contribute to the monitoring process, especially in strengthening the integrity of elections across the cycle. The analysis will also contribute to the understanding of this emerging area of digital crowdsourcing systems in monitoring elections, especially remarkable crowdsourced voices on the integrity of elections.

Much of the crowdsourced citizen-generated monitoring data do not come to the fore due to the lack of its analysis and dissemination. In other words, little is documented on the crowds generated data that can be best used to establish the credibility and/ or incredibility of the elections, and to address the shortcomings in various stages of the electoral cycle in the future. This research will fill this gap by analysing whether or not engaged crowdmonitors were able to bring front positive and negative side of the conduct of electoral process. Additionally, to make a comparative analyses between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform, is to see how each country compares to the other there are lessons that might be learned and shared to each country and other regional East African Countries in their future elections. Admittedly, “comparisons may help to identify best practices that should be more generally adopted” (Fung 2011:194). Therefore, the research findings will be used as a framework to serve as alternative interventions for monitoring integrity of elections, and for further research in digital crowdsourcing method.

Also, the use of most similar systems design that focuses on finding dissimilarity among similar systems using small-N comparative study (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; Berg-Schlosser and

Quenter 1996; Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2005; Berg-Schlosser 2012), will serve as a provoking tool to other researchers into conducting large-scale studies on crowdsourcing systems and digitalization of elections monitoring, and even using “most different system designs” (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Evidence show that analysis of the norm of election monitoring has mostly concentrated on the established monitoring groups reports and limited studies on the analysis of citizen observation of electoral process. As a result, efforts are indispensable to analyse citizen observation data, otherwise valuable citizen-generated information that may build citizen confidence and trust on the conduct of elections, and legitimacy of the elected government may be lost.

### **1.7 Structure of the thesis**

This thesis is organised into ten chapters. Chapter One covers introduction and background to the research, motivation of the research, research questions and relevance. The chapter also encompasses the conceptual framework, especially the concepts of invited and invented space, hybrid crowdsourced monitoring and electoral cycle. Therefore, each of these chapters captures and presents an important dimension of this research as follows:

Chapter Two gives an overview of the political history and transition to electoral democracy in form of one party system, multi-party politics and electoral democracy under multiparty system in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - to show the extent to which the three countries transform in implementing global norms on democratic processes, especially UDHR and ICCPR. It also surveys electoral democracies and voter turnout in multiparty politics, as well as the role of electoral authorities in promoting elections with integrity.

Chapter Three provides an overview on the concept of electoral integrity and election fraud. The overview includes research on electoral integrity and electoral fraud, context of election monitoring as well as snapshot of established observer reports in monitoring the conduct of elections for the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections.

Chapter Four deals with an overview on the digital crowdsourced monitoring of elections, and it included definition and types of crowdsourcing monitoring of elections. It is in this chapter as well that why it matters for crowdsourced election integrity in the networked era, the reasons has been provided. It also introduces Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform for citizen election watch in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Chapter Five introduces the state of digital participatory technologies as enablers for citizen participation in democratic process. This chapter presents global trends in digital technologies, and specific case of digital communication technological tools in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The chapter highlights by providing evidence to the diffusion and use of internet, mobile phone technology, fixed telephone, social networks and mobile money transfer system, as well media freedom and ICT use in electoral process.

Chapter Six details research methodological procedures deployed in this exploratory study. It also states the rationale for the choice of most similar systems design and selection of cases for comparative analysis. In addition, the chapter presents research methods, data processing and analysis, as well as scope and delimitation of the research.

Chapter Seven analyses and presents evidence of digital crowdsourcing in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections. Especially the chapter analyses crowdsourcing methodology, crowdsourced citizen-generated data, and the comparison of crowdsourced data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Also, the highlights of the limitation of Uchaguzi crowdsourced datasets in the three countries are presented.

Chapter Eight analyses and discusses specific key findings of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing method on detecting threats to electoral integrity, namely detection of election fraud. The analysis and presentation of election fraud data uses four major phases of electoral cycle include: pre-election fraud, election campaign fraud, election-day fraud and post-election period fraud data.

Chapter Nine presents challenges encountered during crowdsourcing process and potential of digital crowdsourcing for monitoring electoral integrity, as well as creation of synergy in in this new age of crowdsourcing monitoring systems.

Chapter Ten being the final chapter consists of introduction, establishing similarities and differences of digital crowdsourcing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This chapter also presents summary of results, and given the leapfrogged in area of mobile phones communication, this chapter offers some possible conclusions for crowdsourcing monitoring of elections in East Africa and Africa in general. It also presents an agenda for digital crowdsourcing in advancing electoral integrity.

## **2 The Political Context in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda**

### **2.1 Introduction**

Since 1990s Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have undergone major transition with the re-introduction of multiparty politics. From 1990s it was a period that led ‘many to think that there is something intrinsically new about competitive electoral process in Africa’ (Cowen and Laakso 2002). This is due to the fact that before the ban of multi-party system, many African states under British colonial administration such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had multi-party politics with universal franchise (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990). Now, it is re-installation of liberal democratic principles (Dahl 1989) with hopes that citizens have the power of their votes to decide about the office holders. However, “Africa, it has been claimed, has its own unique history and traditions and the introduction of democracy, an alien concept, premised on the misconception that democracy is solely a Western creation, stems from confusion between the principles of democracy and their institutional manifestations. The principles of democracy include widespread participation, consent of the governed, and public accountability of those in power; these principles may prevail in a wide variety of political arrangements and practices, which naturally vary according to historical conditions” (Ake 1991:34). Samuel Huntington on the distinct historical waves of democratization remarked that:

The first, long wave of democratisation began in the early nineteenth century led to the triumph of democracy in some 30 countries by 1920. Renewed authoritarianism and the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s reduced the number of democracies in the world to about a dozen by 1942. The second, short wave of democratisation occurred after the Second World War again increased the number of democracies to somewhat over 30, but this too was followed by the collapse of democracy in many of those countries. The third wave of democratisation that began in Portugal has seen democratisation occur much faster and on a scale far surpassing that of the previous two waves. Two decades ago, less than 30 percent of the countries in the world were democratic; now more than 60 percent have governments produced by some form of open, fair and competitive elections (Huntington 1997:4).

The year 2014 marked the fortieth anniversary of Portugal’s Revolution of the Carnations, which inaugurated what Samuel Huntington dubbed the “third wave” of global democratization” (Diamond 2015:141), and the third wave was the “most powerful and affected countries in many parts of the world in the 1970s and 1980s” (Lijphart 2005:37). This chapter reflects on the historical perspective to analyse the political history and transition to democracy in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; because “any assessment of



contemporary processes of democratization has to begin with an overview of the background conditions of modern democracies and some of their historical, regional and cultural specifications” (Berg-Schlosser 2007a:16). The discussion in this chapter has revealed the general trend of different forms of political governance of one-party state, authoritarian state, military government, no-party democracy and the third wave as a political model which has been reached in various countries in the African continent (Berg-Schlosser 1984a; Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990; Barkan 1993). Kenya and Uganda is not an exception “a great number of the new democracies which emerged after the last “wave” of the early 1990s are characterized by strong ethno-linguistic, religious or similarly strong regional cleavages” (Berg-Schlosser 2007c:30).

The transition and inception of multiparty system and politics of representation show political democracy is an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter 1950:269). The principle of democratic autonomy indicates ‘individuals are free and equal to determine the conditions of their own lives - they should enjoy equal rights in the specification of the framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of others’ (Held 2006). Elections are used to provide legitimacy to the political system by giving people opportunity to choose their leaders who will reign over them in specified period (Dahl 1989; Huntington 1991). Schumpeter (1950) argued ‘liberal democracy does not mean and cannot mean that the people rule, but that democracy means that the people have the opportunity of accepting and refusing those who have to rule’.

The conduct of competitive electoral process and voter’s choice is centrally used to justify the adoption of multiparty electoral system and ‘it is a cardinal precept of liberal democratic theory and practice’ (Cowen and Laakso 2002). The adoption of competitive electoral process provides avenues for the citizens to participate in the process of voting among the competing parties and candidates (Cowen and Laakso 2002.). During one-party politics, elections were viewed as “elections without choice” and ‘legitimation of state authority’ (Hermet 1978). Whereas under liberal democracy, political practices provide for political representation, participation and accountability through regular competitive elections held under conditions of civil and political liberties guaranteed by the rule of law (Dahl 1971, 1989; Berg-Schlosser 2004a; Lijphart 2005). The success of basic characteristics of liberal democracy always depends on freedom, right to vote, competition,

free and fair election as well as the responsive of the government to the preferences of its voters (Dahl 1989).

In Africa “democratization has been extraordinarily rapid” (Zakaria 1997:28). But “around 2006, the expansion of freedom and democracy in the world came to a prolonged halt. Since 2006 there has been no net expansion in the number of electoral democracies, which has oscillated between 114 and 119 (about 60% of the world’s states). The number of both electoral and liberal democracies began to decline after 2006 and then flattened out” (Diamond 2015:142), and the decline was 59% of electoral democracies and 40% of liberal democracies in 2010 (see Figure 2.1). One problem is the “crucial difference between liberal democracies and electoral democracies. The latter have some of the trappings of democracy, such as universal-suffrage elections, but their elections are not free and fair because the necessary civil liberties are lacking” (Lijphart 2005:38), but “being a mini-state strongly helps a country become and stay a liberal democracy” (Diamond 1999, in Lijphart 2005).




Figure 2.1 The growth of democracies in the world, 1974-2013

Source: Diamond (2015:143).

In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda the electoral democracy that guarantees protection and promotion of civil rights as well as political liberties, the countries have signed many international and regional treaties that focus on the standards and principles on the conduct

of democratic elections. For example, international treaties like Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948, International Covent on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966 and International Covent on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of 1966 which both came into force in 1976. Also, regional treaties such as African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted 2007 and African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights of 1981 as well as Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa of 2002, and each country national constitution that incorporate fundamental civil and political rights and freedom. Therefore, the comparative perspective of the three countries will offer an insights and trends of electoral democracy using a historical approach – a shift from one-party state to the re-installation of pluralist politics.

## **2.2 One-party systems**

The decision to amend Westminster model of constitution after independence in Tanzania and Kenya was to create a more powerful Presidency in the country, but retained the electoral system of plurality first-past-the-post of the British colonial administration (Berg-Schlosser 2008b). The Interim Constitution of 1965 legally declares Tanzania as a one-party state under the domination of one party politics until 1992. While in Kenya from 1969 opposition political parties were not allowed to operate till 1982 when the constitution declared it one-party state (Barkan 1993). Similarly, after the 1986 military coup led by Yoweri Museveni under the umbrella of National Resistance Movement (NRM) Uganda also declared a no-party democracy until 2005 (Mwenda 2010). The reasons for the demise of multiparty politics inherited from Westminster model of constitution after independence are broadly similar in most of the African countries such as national unity is the most stated reason for the independent African states to adopt one-party state and no-party arrangement (Berg-Schlosser 1994). Also, tribal, ethnic groups and religious sectarianism pointed out as a threat to the unity and prosperity of the country (Barkan 1993; Mamdani 1993; Oyugi 1997; Kasfir 1998; Berg-Schlosser 2008a).

### **2.2.1 Kenya**

Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the development of democracy has been having mixed results, and on the eve of, Kenya adopted Westminster model of constitution, but undergone a series of major amendments (Berg-Schlosser 1984a, 1984b). At independence there were several political parties among others, Kenya African National Union (KANU) and Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), and the politics of political parties are

ethnic-based (Berg-Schlosser 1980; Aywa 2015). Thus, the parties like KANU membership comprised of one of the largest ethnic groups like Kikuyu and Luo, while KADU involve smaller ethnic communities many of which feared domination of larger groups in which after independence' they struggled to protect their interest (Oyugi 1997).

Kenyan political scene has been a battle on how to share the 'national cake' between the major ethnic groups in the countries. According to the Kenya National Population Census (2009), there are around 42 ethnic groups in Kenya. The major groups whose population exceeds 10 percent are: Kikuyu (17.15%), Luhya (13.82%), Kalenjin (12.86%), Luo (10.47%) and Kamba (10.07%). In this case, none of the ethnic groups are large enough to dominate another (Berg-Schlosser 1984a, 1984b). That is why Kenya has been governed by neo-patrimonial and consolidation of ethnic politics and strong presidency like Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap Moi (Ochieng 1989). Dahl (1989) has shown that politics is about the existence of power and authority and thus involves the political process of the shaping and sharing of power. In the same vein, Held (1995) holds the view that politics is about power, about the forces which influence and reflect its distribution and use, and about the effects of this on resource use and distribution. To this argument, therefore, at the time of Kenyan independence the first President Jomo Kenyatta who was a Kikuyu and Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was a Luo adopted ethnically driven politics (Berg-Schlosser 1989b). Later President Daniel Arap Moi who was Kalenjin used his Presidential power as 'opportunity to create wealth and power of himself and his tribe' (Ochieng 1989).

Due to the politics of survival, hatred and ethnic driven, in 1964 KADU was dissolved and its members joined the ruling party KANU which paved way for the de facto single-party system partism (Berg-Schlosser 1989b). In this period, the government introduced a series of constitutional amendments that centralised power to create a powerful presidency (Barkan 1993). On the other hand, in 1966 some critics within government resigned their positions to form a new political party called Kenya People's Union (KPU) led by Oginga Odinga (Chege 2010), but in 1969 the government banned all of its activities and some of its leaders were detained (Kanyinga 2014). This gave an opportunity to the ruling party KANU to dominate the political system, as it influenced the National Assembly in 1982 to change the constitution, and Kenya declared a de jure one party state (Barkan 1993).

In 1963 elections in Kenya held with the principle of 'one man, one vote' and KANU political party secured victory. In the same year, Kenya won its independence after a long period of British colonial administration and became a Republic in 1964. Thus, in 1969

President Jomo Kenyatta was elected as unchallenged presidential candidate under a single party election (Berg-Schlosser 1989b). Following in 1974 Kenya held another election and KANU won the elections. The conduct of election was on the basis of unopposed candidate, in this case the 1979 election Moi was elected as unopposed candidate and the same applied to the 1983 and 1989 elections which was the last election under the dominance of one-party politics. Therefore, Kenya remained one-party state until 1991 when pressure through people's struggle for democratic change, which piled on to the government to reverse constitutional provision and provide for a return of multi-party democracy' in the country (Kanyinga 2014; Aywa 2015) in order to satisfy the donors (Barkan 1993).

### **2.2.2 Tanzania**

The modern United Republic of Tanzania (URT) is formed from two states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The state of Tanganyika declared its independence in 1961 under the British Westminster model of multi-party politics. During the first year of Tanganyika's independence, government determined to replace the office of prime minister with an elected president. As a result the Independence Constitution of 1961 was replaced by Republican Constitution of 1962. Zanzibar gained independence in 1963. In 1964 the two sovereign states merged to form the URT which demanded the enactment of the Interim Constitution of 1965 until the permanent constitution of the URT of 1977 and amendment in 1984 to provide for a Bill of Rights to the Constitution of URT in 1985.

At the time of independence there were four registered political parties in Tanganyika, namely Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), United Tanganyika Party (UTP), African National Congress (ANC) and All-Muslim National Union of Tanganyika (AMNUT). United Tanganyika Party was established in 1956 under the sponsorship of the British colonial administration in support of the multi-racial policy, but unlike Kenya and Uganda, the British unsuccessfully – failed to install channels of tribalism and ethnicity through political parties (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990). After independence, three more parties were registered: People's Convention Party (PCP), African Independence Movement (AIM) and Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP). In Zanzibar at independence in 1963 there were four registered parties: Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP) and the Umma Party. Thereafter, the 1964 revolution, other political parties were banned and ASP became the only party. TANU the leading political party to independence went from dominant mass movement to ruling party

as Tanganyika moved from colonialism to an independent state and ASP in Zanzibar. In 1977 the two political parties TANU and ASP were amalgamated to form Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) “Party of the Revolution” (Nyirabu 2002).

In 1965 the Interim Constitution was amended to establish one-party state that creates more power of the executive as opposed to the other branches of the government and to create more strong presidential system (Baregu 2000). The first President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere was a pioneer of the one-party politics and “a firm believer in one-party rule” (Nyirabu 2002) and the ideology of “Ujamaa” (means socialism). Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa was an ideology which aspired to transform the nature of Tanzanian society and was an indigenous and domestically focused ideology (Mazrui 2000). In this regard, Berg-Schlosser (1984a:130) asserts that a socialist regime reflects “an ideology that pursues a noncapitalist and more self-reliant road to development”. Nyerere (1968) in supporting one-party state remarks that “with rare exceptions the idea of class is something entirely foreign to Africa. Here, in this continent, the Nationalist Movements are fighting for freedom from foreign domination not from domination by any ruling class of our own. To us the other party is the colonial power. In many parts of Africa this struggle has been won: in others it is still going on. But everywhere the people who fight the battle are not former overlords wanting to re-establish a lost authority; they are not a rich mercantile class whose freedom to exploit the masses is being limited by the colonial powers, they are the common people of Africa”.

Most of the political parties that were established before the independence shared the same goal that guided by political logic of nationalist movement of opposing colonial rule and the struggle for the free sovereign state and, after independence, they became opposition political parties. TANU leaders pioneer the move towards one-party state as a way of promoting African democracy (Liundi 2002). In this case, to support and legitimizing the move to one-party state in Tanzania Nyerere (1968) remarked “on the 14<sup>th</sup> January, 1963, I made public the decision of the National Executive of TANU that Tanganyika should become a democratic One Party State. At the same time, I made it known also that I had been empowered by the National Executive to appoint a Presidential Commission which would be charged with the task of considering the changes in the Constitution of Tanganyika and the Constitution of the Tanganyika African National Union, and in the practice of Government that might be necessary to bring into effect a democratic One Party State in Tanganyika...I am happy to tell you that I have now appointed the Commission...In order to avoid misunderstanding, I think I should emphasize that it is not the task of the

Commission to consider whether Tanganyika should be a One Party State. That decision has already been taken. Their task is to say what kind of One Party State we should have in the context of our national ethic and in accordance with the principles which I have instructed the Commission to observe”.

During single party politics elections were designed to ensure the construction of socialist state and make sure that each constituency gets a representative (Shivji 1994). In this period, the supremacy of the party reflected in the electoral processes. There was no permanent voter register instead a compulsory door-to-door registration was conducted by ten-cell leaders (Hyden 1969). The registration qualifications in the 1960s were to be a Tanzanian citizen and who is 21 years old and above. From the 1970s to date the registration regulations and qualification were changed from 21 years to 18 years of age and above. Election campaigns were designed to achieve the goals of stability in order to enhance socialist ideology. Parliamentary aspirants were required to campaign on the basis of the party manifestos with an emphasis on what the party could do but not an individual candidate (Shivji 1994). Candidates were not allowed to spend their own resources for election campaigns and no tribal languages were allowed to be used other than *Kiswahili* as a neutral language. To promote unity and sense of togetherness among voters, candidates were restricted not to make appeals on race or ethnicity (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990).

For presidential elections, the National Executive Committee of the party nominated a single candidate, and voters had to cast a “Yes” or “No” vote (Shivji 1994). For the candidate to win had to score 50 percent of total votes casted, otherwise the party would immediately recommend for another candidate. Elections in a single-party system, presidential candidate got more of the required votes. From 1965-1980 in all parliamentary elections, voters had an opportunity to elect their constituency representative from the list of two candidates with a *hoe* or *axe* symbol. Single party elections were exclusionary and did not change the regime in power, but to some extent were competitive (Hermet 1978). For instance, in constituency elections voters had a choice between candidates. In general, in one-party era, socialism was a central theme of democratic struggles and the policy documents of Arusha Declaration of 1967 committed Tanzania to socialist ideology. Thus, the Constitution of 1977, Article 3 (1) stated clearly that ‘Tanzania is a socialist democratic state and it will be a single party state’, while Article 3 (2) provided that all political activities should be under the auspices of the party, and the URT Constitution of 1977 was adopted in order to justify the supremacy of the party during one-party state era.

### **2.2.3 Uganda**

Uganda gained her independence in 1962 under Westminster system of government which operates on the principles of majoritarian and Montesquieuian doctrine of the separation of powers. Like Kenya and Tanzania, the history of political parties in Uganda traced back in 1950s during the struggle for independence from British colonial power. The earliest political parties were Uganda Peoples' Congress (UPC), Kabaka Yekka (KY), Democratic Party (DP) and Uganda National Congress (UNC). The period between 1950s - 1960s was considered as the period of pseudo-multipartyism (Mugaju 2000). During this period, no struggle for independence or building democratic space rather was Machiavellian style of scrap for power as an end than a means to an end. The argument of Grace Ibingira (1980) as cited in Mugaju (2000) admitted that "during the struggle for independence, the critical issue was not Uganda's freedom or the foundation and consolidation of multiparty democracy but who was to inherit the mantle of power from the departing colonialists and what security there would be for each of the diverse ethnic groups in the new state" (p.18).

Prior to the independence, elections were not much valued due to the fact that the colonial government was one handling the affairs of the country. British administration saw the politics of Uganda through the lens of Buganda as they collaborate against other ethnicities (Kasfir 1998; Mutibwa 2010). But following the recommendation made in the report of the Constitutional Committee in 1959, the colonial government organized direct elections in Uganda in 1961. The report demonstrated that 'direct elections should be held as soon as possible and certainly not later than early 1961'. Democratic Party (DP) and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) contested in the 1961 election which led to the formation of the first internal self-government headed by Democratic Party. During British colonial administration in Uganda, the special status was given to the Kingdom of Buganda, and as a matter of fact, Buganda was a state within the larger state of Uganda (Nsibambi 2014). To echo the words of Berg-Schlosser (2008a:276) "the division of Africa by the European powers after Berlin conferences in 1884 and 1885 then created, for the largest part, entirely new political entities. This led to a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual composition of societies in most states". Like any other big tribe such as Kikuyu in Kenya, in Uganda any politicians who want to win the national elections to occupy state power cannot ignore Buganda which is nearly 25% of the population of Uganda (Nsibambi 2014). Tanzania has no single major tribe which has tended to dominate others like Baganda in Uganda and Kikuyu in Kenya,



despite the total number of tribes in Tanzania are around 120 with Sukuma as the largest tribe in Tanzania (Hyden 1969).

Furthermore, between 1960s and 1980s political parties in Uganda used ethnicity and regional cleavages to propagate divisions (Berg-Schlosser 1994). Thereafter, the ban of political parties in 1969 was to build strong democratic values, practices and democratic institutions. In this case, Milton Obote regime was characterised by increased of “political persecution, human rights violations, and ethnic exclusion, which heightened the feelings of alienation and exclusion among the Baganda” (Nsibambi 2014:10). In 1967 under Milton Obote the country established a Republican Constitution trying to build a socialist state guided by *The Common Man’s Charter* influenced by Julius Nyerere’s *Arusha Declaration* (Mazrui 2000). In 1971 the Republican Constitution was ended by the military coup led by General Idi Amini. One of the referred reasons for the 1971 military coup led by Idi Amini was that Obote had suppressed multipartyism and imposed a one-party dictatorship. Therefore, on the face of it, the Amini military junta was committed to the restoration of multiparty democracy, and one of the junta’s promises was to hold elections as soon as it was convenient. Idi Amini soon became life president and all talk about multiparty politics was quickly forgotten’ (Mugaju 2000).

However, “some military rulers act as temporary caretakers and make genuine attempts to return their countries to civilian rule”, but later Idi Amini “seeks to establish their power permanently” (Berg-Schlosser 1984a:131). But in April 1979 was defeated and overthrown by dissidents with the assistance of Tanzania defence forces because of Kagera invasion (Mamdani 1993; Kasfir 1998). The Tanzanian troops reinforced the overthrow of Idi Amini largely because there was a land conflict in Kagera region in which belong to Tanzania on the border between Tanzania and Uganda. This is because of the “artificial state boundaries originally drawn by the colonial powers” (Berg-Schlosser 1984a:125). This period of military government was characterised by lack of electoral events, but rather the country encountered a period of tyrannical and brutality to indigenous Ugandans as well as expulsion of Uganda Asians minority (Mamdani 1993; Mwenda 2010). After the 1964 referendum on the matter of the lost counties, Uganda went without any national elections for over 16 years that is from 1964-1980. Following the overthrow of the Idi Amini military regime in 1979, the government organized indirect elections, which were eventually conducted on December 1980 (Kasfir 1993; Mwenda 2007).

The election of 1980 was characterised by gerrymandering, ballot-box stuffing, coercion, violence, and harassment, intimidation and fraud (Barkan 1993; Commonwealth Observer Group 2011). But this saw the second Milton Obote administration start from 1981-1985 with a rigged elections by UPC party (Muhumuza 1997). This exhibited that the victory of DP political party was reversed by the Military Commission that declared UPC party as a winner of the 1980 elections. It is therefore, argued the electoral fraud and malpractices of 1980 election which returned Uganda under civilian rule on party-based politics incited Yoweri Museveni to turn to bush for guerrilla war as they claim that they wanted to re-establish democracy in the country (Kasfir 1998). In 1985 was a military coup of the overthrow of Milton Obote second government. Thereafter, the 1986 saw a guerrilla war supported by Buganda and other Ugandans and in turn Yoweri Museveni installed as a President of Uganda and, took the control of state power, and rejected party politics, and invented a form of 'no-party democracy' (Mugaju 2000; Mwenda 2010).

The NRM under Yoweri Museveni when came to power in 1986 started a process to compile a new constitution which was finally formed out as the 1995 Uganda Constitution (Mwenda 2010). Following declaration of the Constitution in October 1995, an Interim Electoral Commission was established and conducted the first direct presidential and parliamentary elections and, it was the first ever after the war that brought President Yoweri Museveni to power. The 1996 elections were conducted under "movement political system" of 'no-party democracy' as individual political parties were not permitted to pose challenges to the NRM (Muwanga 2005; Makara 2014). Article 70 (1) of the Constitution of Uganda of 1995, defined movement political system as a 'broad-based, inclusive and nonpartisan that conforms to the principles of participatory democracy, accountability and transparency, accessibility to all positions of leadership by all citizens and individual merit as a basis for election to political offices'. The 1996 election was not free from intimidation and legal obstacles to bribery (Muhumuza 1997). The voter turnout according to IDEA data set shows that in 1996 election the turnout rate was 72.6 percent of the 8.4 million registered voters.

### **2.3 The transition from one-party systems to the multi-party politics**

It is not my purpose here to make a case for polyarchy. It is enough if I have shown that important consequences will follow from reducing the obstacles to public contestation and increasing the share of the population entitled to participate. A great many people will agree, I think, not only that these consequences are important but they are also desirable, that the benefits often (if not always) outweigh the adverse consequences, and that the net gain in such cases is well worth striving (Dahl 1971:31).

There are stories of successful democratic transitions to liberal democracy in Africa and cases of democracies in poor countries (Hadenius and Berg-Schlosser 2007) and positive trend in African context that have become electoral democracies (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Diamond 2008). It is arguable “elections per se are not enough to guarantee a successful democratic transition in Africa today” (Barkan 1993:85). But “it is widely assumed that a high level of socioeconomic development not only favors the transformation of a hegemonic regime into a polyarchy but also helps to maintain – may even be necessary to maintain – a polyarchy. To what extent is this assumption correct?” (Dahl 1971:62) and, “if the theory that democracy emerges as a result of economic development is true, transitions to democracy would be more likely when authoritarian regimes reach higher levels of development” (Przeworski and Limongi 1997:159).

If we consider the argument of socioeconomic development as a driving factor to transition in African context, the process of democratic transition from late 1980s and early 1990s would have been more of a myth than reality. Literature indicates “controversy continues about whether economic development increases the likelihood of transition to democracy” (Geddes 2007:317; Berg-Schlosser 2004b). As a result, “it seems obvious that there are different paths to democracy and that democratization is not a one way street. Economic development can be an important facilitator because groups supporting and resisting the democratic transition are linked and connected in economic networks, which work as cross-cutting factors” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:18-19). And “rather than being a prerequisite, economic development can be a condition favouring the emergence of democracy and an associated factor that increases its sustainability” (Berg-Schlosser 2007a:20). In this case, ‘elections are but one event in the long process of establishing a political culture and institutions supportive of democratic rule’ (Barkan 1993:85).

“What appear superficially to be changes of regime are sometimes not really changes in regime at all, but simply changes in personnel, rhetoric, and empty constitutional prescriptions” (Dahl 1971:17). African countries have undergone “changes in regime” through transition from one-party politics or different forms of authoritarian regime and military dictatorships to multi-party system in different period (Berg-Schlosser 2008a). In practice, the installation and pressures for the third wave generally began in the late 1980s and early 1990s in African states. This was a period of transition to neoliberal project and expansion of democratic space through competitive multi-party elections (Shivji 2009). This period, countries started to declare the establishment of many political parties and the

observance of participation, competitive elections with civil and political liberties (Dahl 1989). The transition goes hand-in-hand with the amendment of the constitution for the adoption of multiparty system that marks an end era of one-party state in the country. Also, transition to pluralist politics in some countries includes dismantling of a de jure and de facto one-party and military states and abolition of life presidencies through constitution (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997; Mpangala 2004).

Historically, the shift from one-party state to multipartyism was triggered by the end of the cold war between the East and West as it had an impact on the political and socio-economic of the world (Chand 1997), and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda being part, affected by this change. The transition expected to mark an end to mono-partyism and transform the practice of competitive politics to the rule by the people which is the fundamental principles of democracy. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have signed Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and ICCPR of 1976 which provide universal accepted principles to the citizen to participate in democratic elections. And “elections, although criticised as liberal representative democracy instruments, are the most important institutions for political mass participation” (Kersting 2012b:6). For example, UDHR of 1948 Article 21 (1) provides that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives”. While Article 21 (3) states that: “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by a secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”. Also ICCPR of 1966 Article 25 provides the same rights and opportunities that: “Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions; (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; and (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country”.

In sum, transition from one-party to multi-party politics in Uganda and Kenya was characterised by ethnicity sectarianism and religious divisions in Uganda (Oyugi 2004). For example, religion was the major source of conflict and instability in Uganda as British and French led religious groups vied to capture the minds of Ugandans (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990). As Nsibambi (2014:3) argued “political parties were founded on a religious

basis. The quarrels and wars were between three religions: Protestants, Catholics and Muslims. The Protestant, who were helped by the British, won the religious contest and became the dominant party in Buganda politics, and thus received the lion's share of the spoils". For the case of Tanzania "single-party structures help to embrace a variety of ethnic and other interests" (Berg-Schlosser 1984a:126). The penetration of ethnicity and religious institutions in politics was carefully handled in the struggle for independence and transition to pluralist politics (Msekwa 2002). The speech by the first elected President under multiparty election in Tanzania, Benjamin Mkapa as quoted in Msekwa (2002:56) pertinently argued that "in making the transition to multi-politics, we always had the apprehension that it could lead to a resurgence of tribal and religious sentiments and differences among our people, thereby undermining the national identity and cohesion we have worked so hard to develop and nurture. But thanks to the political maturity of most of our people, these fears never materialised. Despite the verbal and written diatribes, amplified too often by a too free press, there has never really been a serious threat to the political unity and cohesion of our country, as well as the peace and concord which our people have now become use to".

### **2.3.1 Kenya**

Kenya restored political pluralism in 1991. This was a paradigm shift from what had largely been a de facto one-party state since 1969 and a de jure one party state since 1982. The demand for the transition to multiparty politics in Kenya traced as back as in 1990 due to the enormous pressure for the renewal of multiparty system that was abolished by KANU (Oyugi 2004). On the contrary, the opponents of multiparty politics argued re-introduction of multipartism in the country would lead to 'alliances forged along ethnic lines' (Oyugi 2004) because President Moi defending his rejection of multiparty politics argued "legalization of opposition parties would usher in tribal conflict and destroy national unity" (Barkan 1993:90). But due to the increase of pressure exerted on, KANU, it convened a meeting that established a review committee of the party purposely to collect views from the citizens on how the party (KANU) should be reformed (Barkan 1993).

Following the trend of pressures from within and outside it was noted that in 1991 most of the donors withdrew their budgetary support aid as a way to pressurize the government to re-introduce multiparty politics in the country (Oyugi 2004). Also a coalition of intellectuals and church leaders, among others, formed an alliance to challenge KANU one-party

domination in the country (IRI 1992). As a result, in December of 1991 in a special conference of KANU, President Moi convinced members to agree to re-introduce multiparty system and the amendment of the constitution to introduce presidential term limits of the office (IRI 1992; Kanyinga 2014). Therefore, in the first multiparty election that was held in 1992, the incumbent candidate President Daniel Arap Moi under KANU was elected. Transition and conduct of electoral democracy in Kenya is what Hadenius and Berg-Schlosser (2007:107) observed “democracy in Africa, to a great extent, has been about balancing ethnic demands and ensuring that a wider range of groups are included”.

### **2.3.2 Tanzania**

After 27 years (1965-1992) of one-party politics, the multi-party system was re-instated in 1992. It is of interest to note that following the recommendation by the Nyalali Commission, Article 3 of the Constitution of URT 1977 was amended to make the declaration of multiparty state in Tanzania. Article 3 (1) of Constitution of URT 1977 stated clearly that “The United Republic of Tanzania is a democratic, secular and socialist state which adheres to multiparty democracy”. The ruling party CCM accepted the Commission recommendation and ended its political monopoly. Later on May in 1992 the parliament endorsed the recommendation to the transition to multiparty politics’ and constitutional amendment (Nyirabu 2002; Chaligha 2005). Historically, the shift to pluralistic political system was marked by the appointment of the Presidential Commission in 1991 on single or multiparty political system in Tanzania better known as the “Nyalali Commission on party systems”. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere who was the champion of one-party state, in 1990 expressed the need to shift to pluralist politics (Chaligha 2005). This was the case “Nyerere, the architect of one-party rule, made an acrobatic U-turn and proclaimed that it was no longer reasonable to discuss the introduction of multi-party politics in Tanzania...like the rest of the world, would be affected by the democratic changes sweeping across the globe and thus he advised his party and government to be primed for the changes...when you see your neighbour being shaved, wet your head to avoid a dry shave. The one party is not Tanzania’s ideology and having one party is not God’s will. One-party has its own limitations” (Nyirabu (2002:102).

One of the Nyalali Commission Terms of Reference was to coordinate the views which were being expressed by the public in the on-going debate on whether to retain the one-party political system or introduce a new multi-party system, and make recommendations to

the government. In other words, the Nyalali Commission of 1991 enquires to know if the majority of Tanzania's preferred the continuation of a single-party system or the establishment of a multiparty system (Nyalali Commission 1991). The Commission in 1991 collected citizens' views throughout the country and the results were that the majority (77%) of Tanzanians preferred the continuation of a single party system, while (21%) of the citizens favoured re-introduction of multiparty system, and (2%) of them did not have independent opinion. Despite the rejection of transition to pluralist system, the Nyalali commission clearly recommended for the transition to multiparty system, and suggested that Tanzania should abandon the single party politics. Many of those who rejected the decision did so fearing that the multiparty politics would bring conflicts in their society which had lived in peace and tranquillity for many years (Msekwa 2002; Nyirabu 2002). The majority were uninformed of how actually multiparty would affect their life. Thus, the support of multiparty system was necessary to maintain peace and tranquillity on the view that if the (21%) were to be simply ignored they will not accept and keep quiet; rather they would probably resort to other unconstitutional means (Nyalali Commission 1991).

Additionally, the main reasons for the transition from one-party state to multi-party politics in Tanzania includes; inter alia, limits of one-party system which provided a narrow space for political participation, the emergence of new social political groups such as religious groups and other organizations like professionals and environmental activists that began to exert pressure for democracy, the crisis of the state following policy shift of cost sharing, budgetary constraints and bureaucratic inefficiency that led to legitimacy crisis, Western pressure through IMF and World Bank, donor agencies like USAID and SIDA (Mpangala 2004; Chaligha 2005; Shivji 2006). Similarly, Baregu (2000) shows that the forces for political transition in Tanzania emerged in the late 1980's due to the 'crisis of political legitimacy and demands for competitive political system'.

### **2.3.3 Uganda**

Like any other east African country, the end of an era of pluralist politics in Uganda was justified in the interests of national unity, reconciliation, stability and reconstruction (Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango 2000). What is worth noting is that unlike Tanzania and Kenya, the political history of Uganda is informed by various systems of one-party state, military dictatorship, movement democracy and multiparty political system. The 1995 Constitution of Uganda Article 69 (2) recognises 'movement political system' which turn

Uganda into no-party political system. In 2000 Uganda held referendum on the multiparty and movement political system (Kersting 2009). The results of 2000 referendum show that (51%) of the 9.6 million registered voters turned out to vote for the referendum. Out of the turnout rate, (91.3%) of the citizens preferred and voted for the movement system, while (8.7%) voted for multiparty system of government (Muwanga 2005; Commonwealth Observer Group 2011).

Historically, soon after independence Uganda descended into chaotic situation, violence, instability, war and economic crisis which undermined the practice of pluralism, what Mugaju (2000) described as “the rule of the gun had replaced the rule of law”. The history of multiparty politics in Uganda since independence up to the 1990s existed only in theory that Uganda had multiparty political system from 1960’s. Examples of the breach of the principles of democratic elections like rigging, intimidation, fraud, military intervention, harassment and violence; the military regime of Milton Obote and Idi Amini, the no-party democracy and movement politics under Yoweri Museveni, make a long history of multiparty political system in Uganda to be more in theory (Mwenda 2007, 2010).

The moves to the demand for transition to more practical multiparty politics emerged after 2001 election in Uganda. Just like Kenya and Tanzania, there was both domestic and international pressure to re-instate multi-party politics in the country. Therefore, the transition in Uganda is a result of the debate of arguments for and against multiparty system in the context of the historical, social, economic and political experience of post-colonial Uganda. That is why Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango (2000:2) observed “the advocates of no-party democracy have consistently argued that a poor and backward country like Uganda, recovering from decades of state-sponsored violence, war, economic decay and moral degeneration, cannot afford the luxury of multipartyism”. But scholars argued that “in the 2000 the influence of the ruling elites was strong. The need for a further referendum in 2005 indicates the interest of the population in a multiparty regime. It might also be the result of a campaign conducted by the government of Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni” (Kersting 2009:14). Accordingly, Uganda held another referendum on the political system. The outcome of 2005 referendum as presented Table 2.1 shows that (92.4%) of Ugandans favoured restoration of multi-party political system, while (7.5%) voted against the introduction of multiparty system. Therefore, in 2005 Uganda re-introduced pluralist politics after long decades of theoretical existence of plural model of political system and movement political system under no-party democracy.



Table 2.1 The results of 2005 multiparty referendum

Option	Number of Votes	Percentage
Yes	3,643,223	92.4%
No	297,865	7.6%
Turnout rate	3,941,088	47.3%

Source: Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) (2012:5).

#### 2.4 Electoral democracy under multi-party system

Since the inception of multi-party system, elections have become increasingly regular and frequent and almost all African elections have been contested. But the negative trend of many of the electoral processes have been ‘arbitrarily limited, manipulated or deliberately rigged’ elections (Diamond 2008). The transition to multiparty electoral democracy engineered the expansion of space for the enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and regular competitive elections guaranteed by the rule of law (Bakari and Mushi 2005), and enhanced the space for participatory democracy in voting process (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004). In this transition, “when a one-party hegemonic regime is rapidly replaced by a polyarchy: the hegemony of the single party suddenly gives way to two or more competing parties” (Dahl 1971:23-24). And the state loosened its grip on political space and allowed proliferation of political parties and human rights organisations, as well as civil society organizations to promote participation and citizen voices.

Since the inception of multiparty electoral democracy - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have consolidated an electoral culture of periodic conduct of elections after every five years. The president is elected for a five year term in office before another general election cycle. Unlike Tanzania and Kenya, in Uganda 2005 there was a debate among members of parliament about abolishing term limits for the presidential post to pave way for President Museveni in the office (Mwenda 2006, 2010). The 1995 Constitution of Uganda provided for two term limits. But the amendment of the constitution in 2005 Article 105 (2) declares no limit on the terms of the President, as Article 105 (2) states that “a person may be elected under this Constitution to hold office as President for one or more terms as prescribed by this article”. It can be argued that “democracy without constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the abuse of power, ethnic divisions, and even war” (Zakaria 1997:42-43). The process of constitution amendment in 2005 has been perceived as being characterized by bribery and intimidation by the President. Mwenda (2006:3) remarked that “President Museveni is in his 22<sup>nd</sup> year in office

and counting. In 2005, he openly bribed members of parliament, blackmailed and intimidated others to amend the constitution and remove term limits on the presidency so that he can run again, and again, and again. And each time, he steals the elections, using the army and security services”.

The principles and standards for democratic elections are enshrined in the country’s constitution such as the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 Chapter four: the Bill of rights, and Chapter Seven: representation of the people. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 Chapter One, part III: Basic rights and duties and, Chapter three, part II: members, constituencies and election of members. Also the 2005 Constitution of Uganda chapter four: fundamental and other human rights and freedoms, and chapter five: representation of the people.

#### **2.4.1 Kenya**

Right from the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1992 through the 1997 general elections, the number of political parties went up to 27 in 1997. This is partly because of the pre-election agreement by the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) in 1996 (Andreassen and Barasa 2011). Until 2013 there were many registered political parties with the total number of 59 (IEBC 2013). Interestingly, many of the political parties do not go beyond one election cycle as they fragment immediately after elections or have their leaders moving on to form new parties (Aywa 2015). For example, Party of National Unity PNU of the former President Mwai Kibaki is no longer a registered political party in Kenya (Commonwealth Observer Group 2013). Therefore, in a critical view of Kenya political parties’ history and electoral process reveal that ethnicity and the tribal inclination cards are always played by politicians during electoral contests (Andreassen and Barasa 2011).

The 1992 general elections in Kenya were dominated by KANU as the first competitive multiparty elections in Kenya. This election saw Daniel Arap Moi emerge the winner with about (36.8%) of the cast votes. In the second election in 1997, KANU the ruling party under President Moi was re-elected with (40.12%) of the casted votes, but with narrow majority seats in parliament. And in the third election held 2002, opposition parties formed an alliance and came together under a new party called National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) to compete against the ruling party KANU. An incentive for coalition building is the first-past-the-post electoral system, which makes it possible for the presidency and parliamentary seats to be won by a small proportion of votes cast. In the 2002 general

election, KANU suffered a disastrous defeat by Mwai Kibaki of NARC winning as the President with (62.20%) of the cast votes against (31.32%) of KANU. But, the coalition government lasted for less than a year before disintegrating into two factions as a result of failure to 'honour the memorandum of understanding with the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) under the leadership of Raila Odinga' (Andreassen and Barasa 2011; Aywa 2015).

In the 2007 general elections two main coalition parties dominated the process of election: Party of National Unity (PNU) of the incumbent Mwai Kibaki and his main competitor Raila Odinga under the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Though, coalitions were formed on ethnic inclinations, the ODM opposition party accused the government (under the incumbent Presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki) of favouring only the Kikuyu population (Chege 2010; Kiai 2010; Andreassen and Barasa 2011). The re-election of President Mwai Kibaki of the PNU party with (46.42%) of votes was contested by Raila Odinga of ODM party who had (44.07%) of the casted votes. The Commonwealth Observation Group report reveals that Electoral Commission of Kenya did not ensure integrity in the process of tallying votes which led to questioning the validity of the election results (Commonwealth Observer Group 2008). The disputed election results sparked violence countrywide. To end unprecedented violence, a national accord was signed in 2008 between Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga to pave way for the formation of the Grand Coalition government with Mwai Kibaki as the President and Odinga as the Prime Minister.

Independent Review Commission (IREC) report of 2008 better known as Kriegler report chaired by Judge Johann Kriegler, a retired Constitutional Court Judge in South Africa, pointed out that there were too many electoral malpractices (ethnic sentiments, hate speech, vote buying and selling) and during electoral campaigns, political parties consistently lacked respect for laws, regulations, and the electoral code of conduct was deliberately violated. And IREC report recommended the establishment of a new electoral body, independent and with more power that could give it more authority and beyond state manipulation. The report remarked that some of the Kenya's local and ethnic-based FM radio stations remained responsible for inciting negative emotions such as hate speech during call-in program (Kriegler report 2008). Additionally, the findings of Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) 2008 or known as Waki Commission under the chairmanship of Justice Philip Waki, found out that a total of 1,133 people were killed as a consequence of the post-election violence and a total of 3,561 suffered injuries, 117,216 private properties were destroyed and 491 government properties were damaged between

December 2007 and February 2008. The Waki Commission concluded that ‘serious irregularities occurred in voting and counting in both opposition and pro-government strongholds and in the tallying of results by the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)’.

The general election of 2013 witnessed 59 political parties contested and eight Presidential candidates were involved with the formation of alliance along ethnic lines (EU EOM 2013). But what is interesting was the strategic alliance of ‘the two main ethnic communities that fought one another in the post 2007 election violence, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin grouped together into a political alliance, to form Jubilee alliance’ which finally won the Presidential election of March 2013 (Kanyinga 2014). The Kikuyu represented by President Uhuru Kenyatta and Kalenjin by the Vice President William Ruto. The coalition of the two rival groups clearly validates the emergence of ethnic-based politics in order to maintain the status quo and to capture the state power.

The electoral system in Kenya operates under first-past-the-post system or winners takes all, but the 2010 Constitution of Kenya, Article 138 (4) provides for additional requirement for the presidential candidates to obtain 50+1 of the votes casted, also to attain (25%) of votes in at least half of the 47 Counties. Article 138 of the Constitution (4) states that ‘a candidate shall be declared elected as President if the candidate receives (a) more than half of all the votes cast in the election; and (b) at least twenty-five per cent of the votes cast in each of more than half of the counties’. And for the 2013 general elections, registered voters were 14,352,533 and total votes cast were 12,330,028; thus the turnout rate was (86%) (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2013).

Table 2.2 Summary of 2013 Presidential election results

Presidential Candidate	Coalition/Party	Valid Votes
Uhuru Kenyatta	Jubilee Alliance/TNA	50.51%
Raila Odinga	Coalition for Reforms and Democracy/ODM	43.70%
Musalia Mudavadi	Amani Coalition/UDF	3.96%
Peter Kenneth	Eagle Alliance/KNC	0.60%
Mohammed Abduba	Alliance for Real Change	0.43%
Martha Karua	National Rainbow Coalition-Kenya	0.36%
James Ole Kiyiapi	Restore and Build Kenya	0.34%
Paul Muite	Safina Party	0.10%

Source: [www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/election-results](http://www.iebc.or.ke/index.php/election-results)

Therefore, Table 2.2 presents out of the eight competing parties, Jubilee Alliance got (50.51%) of the casted votes, followed by the main competing party ODM with (43.70%). ODM political party claimed the election results were rigged and manipulated (Chege 2010; Kiai 2010). ODM together with Africa Centre for Open Governance (AFRICOG) filed a

Court case in attempts sought to invalidate the election and instigate the organization of fresh presidential elections. Also, there was a petition from Jubilee supporters, who challenged the 'inclusion of rejected votes in the final tally of the presidential poll' (Carter Center 2013). But 'the Supreme Court gave a unanimous decision of rejection of all petitions and confirmed the results of the presidential election' (Carter Center 2013:62-64).

#### **2.4.2 Tanzania**

Since 1992 after the constitutional amendment to plural electoral democracy Tanzania has successfully undertaken five consecutive multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections from 1995-2015. The re-introduction of multiparty system in 1992 culminated the parliament to pass the Political Parties Act No.5 of 1992 and it was accented by President in 1992 and the office of Registrar of Political Parties was created to undertake the registration of new political parties. As a result from July 1992 to November 1993, a total of 13 political parties were registered (Chaligha 2005). What is interesting under multiparty electoral democracy, in all general elections, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) which is a ruling party since one-party system, succeeded to maintain the presidential power, as well as large share of parliamentary and council seats. Literature shows that there is a lot of issues yet to be addressed, among other things, weak opposition parties, unfair playing field, unequal resources for elections, independency and impartiality of the National Electoral Commission is still questionable, corruption and sometimes intimidation or use of force in elections and one-party dominance in national legislature (Hyden 1999; Mukandala 2001; Babeiya 2011; Makulilo 2012).

Nearly all elections in Tanzania have been using first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system under single member constituency. It is worth indicating that the first multiparty presidential election in 1995 used absolute majority electoral system. The law was changed before the 2000 general election from absolute majority to simple majority which continues to date. The change of the electoral system contributed by the strongest opposition contender from a political party NCCR led by previously Member of Parliament and cabinet minister of the ruling party during the 1995 first multi-party election in the presidential position (Hyden 1999). The change of electoral system from majoritarian to simple majority is regarded as the manipulation of electoral laws to favour the incumbent party to maintain state power (Hyden 1999).

The ruling party CCM victories in 1995 and 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections on the mainland and Zanzibar were tainted by irregularities such as violence; vote rigging and mismanagement of the voting and vote counting process (TEMCO 2005). So, in 2000 post-election atmosphere in Zanzibar was tense as the main opposition party Civic United Front (CUF) accused the ruling party CCM of electoral fraud. The malpractices and fraud of 2000 elections necessitated the establishment of MWAFKA II accord of 2001 (agreement to restructure Zanzibar Electoral Commission in terms of its composition). But the negotiations to legitimize the 2005 general election results in Zanzibar remained deadlock until July 2010 referendum which led to constitutional amendment that created two vice-presidential positions to be divided between the CCM and CUF political parties (TEMCO 2010). Unlike past elections, the opposition party CUF accepted the 2010 election results in Zanzibar due in large part to a July 2010 Zanzibar referendum that provided for the creation of government of a national unity after the poll.

The number of political parties participated in the 2010 Presidential election was seven: Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) 'Party for Democracy and Progress', Civic United Front (CUF), African Progressive Party of Tanzania (APPT), National Convention for Construction and Reform Party (NCCR), Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and United People's Democratic Party (UPDP). Since the adoption of multi-party system, the electoral process has been dominated by the ruling party CCM. And in 2010 the National Electoral Commission registered a number of 20,137,303 million voters, and the total persons voting were 8,626,283 that are (42.84%) of turnout rate (Commonwealth Observer Group 2010). Therefore, the incumbent candidate for the ruling party CCM was re-elected with (61.17%) of the casted votes, followed by the opposition parties CHADEMA (26.34%), and CUF candidate received (8.06%) of votes.

The 2015 was the fifth elections in Tanzania since the re-introduction of multi-party electoral politics in 1992. The ruling party CCM emerged with (58.46%) of the total votes using first-past-the-post electoral system. One of the opposition political parties CHADEMA got (39.97%) of the valid votes, while other parties received somewhat similar percentage of the electoral votes (Table 2.3). In general, the 2015 general elections witnessed eight political parties contesting for presidential post. The major competition was between CCM (the ruling party) and CHADEMA (the main opposition party) in mainland Tanzania. It is noteworthy that in mainland Tanzania, the opposition party CHADEMA was supported by other three political parties for the presidential post namely: Civic United

Front (CUF), National Convention for Construction and Reform Party (NCCR) and National League for Democracy (NLD).

Table 2.3 Summary of 2015 Presidential election results

Presidential Candidate	Party	Number of Votes	Valid Votes
John Pombe Joseph Magufuli	CCM	8,882,935	58.46%
Edward Ngoyai Lowassa	CHADEMA	6,072,848	39.97%
Anna Elisha Mghwira	ACT	98,763	0.65%
Chief Lutalosa Yemba	ADC	66,049	0.43%
Hashim Rungwe Spunda	CHAUMMA	49,256	0.32%
Kasambala Jankai Malik	NRA	8,028	0.05%
Machmillan Elifatio Lyimo	TLP	8,198	0.05%
Fahmi Nassoro Dovutwa	UPDP	7,785	0.05%

Source: [www.nec.go.tz/trend-categories/results](http://www.nec.go.tz/trend-categories/results)

Unlike Kenya, the Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992 does not provide room for the political parties in Tanzania to form alliances to contest in the conduct of electoral process. Here some of critics argue that this is weakening the power of the opposition parties to form alliance for the purpose of punching out the ruling party CCM from state power (The Guardian 18<sup>th</sup> July 2015). In Kenya the alliance of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) successfully removed KANU out of power in 2002 under multiparty elections. The national legal instruments used in the conduct of elections in Tanzania includes: the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, Elections regulations 2010 and Elections Act. No. 1 of 1985 with amendment, Local Government Authorities Act of 1982, Election Expenses Act of 2010 and Newspaper Act of 1976.

### 2.4.3 Uganda

In Uganda the first multiparty presidential election was held in 2006 followed by 2011 and 2016 electoral contests. The 2006 election saw complaints about voters registration process, vote counting, and tallying of results in which results were contested in the Court of law by the opposition leader, Kizza Besigye (Makara 2014). The election observer groups reported serious irregularities and shortfalls in the conduct of elections such as lack of a level playing field, harassment of opposition candidates, lack of balance in media coverage and the use of financial and material inducements (Commonwealth Observers Group 2006; EU EOM 2006; see also Mwenda 2010). The Commonwealth Observer Group (2006) on the presidential election observed ‘Electoral Commission is non-compliant with a number of electoral laws’ for example; the principles of free and fair elections were compromised by bribery, intimidation, violence and partisan harassment and partial conduct by some electoral officials in some areas of the country. Hence, this justifies the continuing demands

for the reforms of the composition of Electoral Commission in the second phase of pluralist politics (Sekaggya 2010, 2015).

The 2011 elections results witnessed the incumbent candidate, Yoweri Museveni of the National Resistance Movement being re-elected with about (68.38%) of the casted votes. The main opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye (Forum for Democratic Change – FDC) followed with about (26.01%) of the votes cast. But other opposition political parties obtained a single-digit percentage of the casted votes. The tremendous decline of the votes of the opposition parties explains the fact that those who do not want Museveni have tended to shun the polls yet those who want him are always willing to cast the vote for their “man” (The Independent 14 June 2015).

Table 2.4 Summary of 2011 Presidential election results

Presidential Candidate	Party	Valid Votes
Yoweri Museveni Kaguta	NRM	68.38%
Kizza Kifefe Besigye	FDC/IPC	26.01%
Mao Norbert	DP	1.86%
Olara Otunnu	UPC	1.58%
Beti Olive Kamyua Namisango	UFA	0.66%
Abed Bwanika	PDP	0.65%
Bidandi Ssali Jaberu	PPP	0.44%
Samuel Lubega Mukaaku Walter	Independent	0.41%

Source: [http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec\\_results/2011\\_Pres\\_dis.pdf](http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/2011_Pres_dis.pdf)

The electoral processes of Uganda 2011 election found with lack of adherence to the global principle norms of democratic conduct of elections because elections were marred by violence, bribery of voters, misuse of incumbency advantages, abusive language, and intimidation of voters, outright electoral malpractices, actual vote counts and the slow process of registration of voters (Golaz and Medard 2014). In all the first and second elections, President Yoweri Museveni emerged as the winner as presented in Table 2.4. Like Tanzania with CCM, since NRM gained control of the government office in 1986 no other political party has successfully gained control or won the presidential post.

## 2.5 Voter turnout in multi-party electoral democracy

One of the mostly used indicators of liberal democracy is the trend of periodical and conduct of competitive elections. The conduct of competitive election is where there is competition of candidates, different policy manifestos, participation, and freedom of choice and observance of civil and political rights as well (Dahl 1971, 1989; Hermet 1978; Sørensen 1993). Also give electorates opportunities to participate and vote in competitive



election in a secret ballot box. With re-introduction of pluralist politics voters' turnout on election-day is also expected to be high. The expectation is that the presence of different candidates from different political parties, offering different policies manifestos will provide a wide range of choices to voters. The conduct of multi-party elections and voter turnout in Kenya 1992 (66.81%) and 1997 (83.86%) general elections and Tanzania 1995 (76.67%) and 2000 (84.43%) elections distinguished as 'relatively competitive elections' because of the high rate of voter turnout and the expectation of voters that the ruling party could be 'dislodged from power' (Cowen and Laakso 2002). But, the 1992 and 1997 in Kenya the ruling party KANU was re-elected and in Tanzania till now the ruling party CCM continues capturing state power.

The analysis of voter turnout since the re-introduction of multiparty elections in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is to have a clear overview of participation rate of voter in voting process. The implementation of multiparty electoral democracy gives voters opportunities to elect their leaders, and hold them accountable in the ballot box. There are some evidences for high and low voter turnout in the three countries. Reflection of Mugaju (2000) regarding the voting process and re-introduction of multi-party system reveals that it provides more room and options for voters to go to the ballot box and vote among the competing parties. But election observation reports in Uganda 2011 election noted that people were allowed to vote even though their names were not found on the register (EU EOM 2011). Also, there was massive 'disenfranchisement of voters by deleting their names from the Voters' Register without their knowledge or being heard' (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011:10). In Tanzania there was tension between party supporters of buying and selling voter cards (Commonwealth Observer Group 2010; TEMCO 2010). The same as in Uganda, there was "don't care attitude" in Tanzania 2010 general election which leads to low voter turnout, but also contributed by voter card buying, voter register anomalies and legal restrictions in polling stations (TEMCO 2010).

It is reasonable to argue that "the decline in voter turnout is especially disconcerting because it is gradually undermining the democratic legitimacy of representative institutions. I believe that a critical threshold occurs when fewer than half of the eligible voters participate" (Lijphart 2005:49), and this was the case in Tanzania 2010 general elections with voter turnout of (42.84%) of the registered voters. Generally, there is an increase and decrease of voter turnout in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in the conduct of multi-party electoral democracies or 'there have been ups and downs' (Kersting 2007b). Table 2.5 in the

first multiparty elections the turnout was higher than half of the eligible voters such as (66.81%) in Kenya, (76.67%) in Tanzania and (69.19%) in Uganda. And in the second multiparty elections, there was increase in Kenya (83.86%) and Tanzania (84.43%) of the eligible voters, while Uganda decrease to (59.29%) in 2011 elections, and Kenya 2002 election was (57.18%) and Tanzania decrease to (42.84%) in 2010 general elections. In Kenya 2013 election the turnout went high up to (85.91%) and Tanzania 2015 went up to (67.34%) and Uganda (67.61%) in 2016 of the total registered voters.

Table 2.5 Voter turnout for Presidential elections (percentage)

	1992	1995	1997	2000	2002	2005	2006	2007	2010	2011	2013	2015	2016
Kenya	66.81		83.86		57.18			69.09			85.91		
Tanzania		76.67		84.43		72.23			42.84			67.34	
Uganda							69.19			59.29			67.61

Source: [www.idea.int/vt/](http://www.idea.int/vt/)

There is no compulsory voting in Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya that can make voter turnout high. But the trend of voter turnout in Uganda for the 2011 election suggests that the reason for voter apathy is due to the fact that “voters divorce” themselves from political processes when their interests are not served (Golaz and Medard 2014). They remain merely enlisted on the register and when elections come they never bother, and that creates distrust in the electoral system, which breeds a “why-bother” attitude in the minds of voters (The Independent 14 June 2015). In addition, criticism on voters register and difficulties in locating polling stations was pointed to be a problem of low voter participation in voting process. Golaz and Medard (2014:77) observed that in Uganda for the 2011 election the “common problems all over the country was finding the polling station where the register holding your name was located-a number of disenfranchised voters due to this tedious process...which may account for low participation”.

## 2.6 The role of electoral authorities in promoting electoral integrity

“The explanations for flawed and failed contests considered so far emphasize the wider contextual environment, far removed from conducting any specific elections. An additional plausible argument focuses more directly on the structure, capacity, and ethos of the electoral authorities charged with administering elections. These are the front-line agencies embedded within the broader societal, international, and constitutional settings for electoral governance. Ideally, for contests to meet global norms electoral officials should ensure that they deliver public services meeting international standards” (Norris 2015:133). In this

regard, Norris (2015:138-144) identified three types of electoral authorities namely: Governmental, Mixed and Agency or Independent models (Figure 2.2). According to Pippa Norris *Governmental model* is used in many established democracies, especially in several European states, and electoral administration is handled by local and national government officials, with courts handling any disputes. Authorities responsible are the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice, Home Office and other department of state. This is the case for the German Ministry of Interior, the Swiss Federal Chancellery, Swedish Electoral Authority and the case of United States, among others, and even, was used to manage elections in post-independence former colonies such as Uganda and Nigeria, but there has been an increasing tendency in transferring the responsibilities to the independent agencies. Governmental model exists in countries where “elections are organized and managed by the executive branch through a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local authorities. Where EMBs under the Governmental model exist at national level, they are led by a minister or civil servant and they are answerable to a cabinet minister. With very few exceptions they have no “members”. Their budget falls within a government ministry and/or under local authorities” (Norris 2015:140, see also Wall et al. 2006). Examples of countries that used the Governmental model include: Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland, Tunisia, and UK (for elections but not referendums) (Wall et al. 2006:7).

*Agency model* or *Independent model* encompasses the transfer of “responsibilities for election management from government departments to legally independent administrative agencies, with chief executives composed of experts or partisan members, which operate at arm’s length from the executive” (Norris 2015:142). The rise of Agency model facilitated by the adoption of “new public-sector management reforms” world-wide that entails the transfer of several functions from central government department to specific administrative and regulatory structures in the government’ (Norris 2015). And for the case of election administrative agencies, different countries established independent bodies for managing the conduct of elections with “organizational structure, legal mandate and administrative functions” (Norris 2015). The independent model of electoral management is mostly used in many new and emerging democracies such as South Africa, Thailand, Uruguay, India, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Indonesia, Armenia, among others (Wall et al. 2006:7).




Figure 2.2 Types of electoral management bodies

Source: Norris (2015:139).

*Mixed model* or *hybrid model* of electoral management fall into two categories of electoral authorities, thereby in mixed model of electoral management there are usually two component EMBs, and dual structures exist: ‘a policy, monitoring or supervisory EMB that is independent of the executive branch of government (like an EMB under the independent model) and an implementation EMB located within a department of state and/or local government (like an EMB under the Governmental model) (Norris 2015). Under the Mixed model, elections are organized by the component governmental EMB, with some level of oversight provided by the component independent EMB’ (Norris 2015:143, see also Wall et al. 2006). Examples of Mixed model of electoral bodies is Japan, Spain, France and many former French colonies, particularly in West Africa such as Mali, Senegal and Togo (Wall et al. 2006:8).

The return of pluralistic system in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda necessitated the establishment of independent model and administrative structures to manage and supervise competitive multiparty elections, and establishment of electoral authorities and the office of the Registrar of Political Parties. The established structures operate and perform their major tasks within the legal framework of the particular country. The names of electoral management body in the three countries differ from one country to another, this is the case of Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC: <http://www.iebc.or.ke>) in Kenya, National Electoral Commission (NEC: <http://www.nec.go.tz>) in Tanzania, and Electoral Commission (EC: <http://www.ec.or.ug>) in Uganda.

In Kenya, Article 88 of the Constitution of 2010 has established election body called “Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission” (IEBC). In discharging their functions, the IEBC is required to be autonomous, impartial or an independent institution. The members of the commission established as an independent body by the 2010 Kenya Constitution, members are appointed by long, rigorous and transparent consultation process of selection panel carried out to elect the commissioners, which end up with an approval of legislature and President (Aywa 2015). In Tanzania, “National Electoral Commission” (NEC) was established in 1993 under Article 74 (1) of the permanent Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977 to be an independent institution. Members of the National Electoral Commission are appointed by the President. The Constitution of the URT of 1977 Article 74 provides the power of appointment of the President to the members of the NEC. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, in Tanzania there is no legal requirement for the President to seek input from the legislature or to be supported by the legislature. In this context, the power of the President to appoint members of the commission raises a contentious debate about impartiality. And since the President is a Chair of the ruling party, will appoint members who are loyal to him (Makulilo 2015). Article 74 (11) of the Constitution emphasized, “the Electoral Commission shall not be obliged to comply with orders or directions of any person or any Government department or the views of any political party”.

In Uganda, the first “Electoral Commission” (EC) was comprised of eminent local elders and traditional leaders. Under this commission, several elections were conducted: the first one being the limited Uganda Franchise and representation to the Legislative Council (LEGCO) of 1958. And in May 1997, the Parliament enacted the Electoral Commission Act of 1997, which established a permanent Electoral Commission. The electoral commissioners

are appointed by the President with the approval of legislature. Interestingly, members of the Electoral Commission can be removed by the President if they are incapable of accomplishing their responsibilities or for acts of misconduct (Commonwealth Observers Group 2011). In addition, commissioners of the EC have no ‘security of tenure’ as a result the ruling party leaders uses this gap to manipulate the functioning of the Electoral Commission (Makara 2014; Sekaggya 2015). The appointment of members of the EC by the President with the approval of the parliament has been criticised because the parliament is dominated by the majority of NRM members (Commonwealth Observers Group 2011).

Table 2.6 Electoral management design

Country	Model of EMB	Lists of EMBs	Name of EMBs	EMB member	Term of Office	EMB member selected by	Chair appointed/elected by	Party or expert membership
Kenya	Independent	One EMB	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission	9	6	Selection panel, legislature President	Selection panel, legislature, President	Expert
Tanzania	Independent	One EMB	National Electoral Commission	7	5	President	President	Expert
Uganda	Independent	One EMB	Electoral Commission	7	7	President with the approval of legislature	President with the approval of legislature	Expert

Source: <http://www.idea.int/elections/emd/electoral-management-design-database.cfm>

The EMBs are mandated to organise, supervise and manage the conduct of electoral process under the newly established system of multiparty elections. The office of the Registrar of Political Parties is solely responsible for administering the registration of political parties. The draft of the East African Community Protocol on Good Governance Article 7 (1) on democracy and democratization processes spells out that “partner states commit themselves to the principle that the exercise of public authority emanates from the will of the people through regular, transparent, free and fair elections”, and Article 7 (3) of the draft protocol states that “the promotion and institutionalization of democracy, democratization processes and good governance shall be by:- establishing Independent Electoral Management Bodies that are adequately funded from the Consolidate Fund”.

In the management of electoral processes, the EMBs are required to produce credible process, and acceptable results perceived as free and fair by all electoral stakeholders. Free and fair elections enhance electoral democracy by promoting the popular will of the people and legitimise the winning political party in the electoral contest. In conducting free and fair elections, the EMBs are required to be independent, non-partisan and voters must see them impartial in implementing their responsibilities (Makulilo 2015). But EMBs in East African

countries - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda faced serious problems in organising and conducting free, fair and credible elections (Aywa 2015; Makulilo 2015; Sekaggya 2015).

For example, Uganda 2011 general elections were regarded as a test for the Uganda Electoral Commission to run credible elections, but failed to control malpractices and fraud in managing the conduct of the elections and the “Supreme Court rule that EC had failed to implement the laws in its administration of elections and perceived as partisan and sympathetic to the ruling party” (Makara 2014:110-111). In Kenya 2013 elections after post-election violence in 2007/2008 which Diamond (2015) regarded as a result of “executive abuse”, the 2013 general elections was a test of new IEBC established under a new 2010 Kenyan constitution. Observation reports point out that “throughout the electoral preparations, the IEBC retained the electorate’s trust. Conversely, the IEBC’s inconsistent decision-making mechanisms drew it into a series of delays. Overall though, EU observers found that the IEBC and its staff succeeded in overcoming the technical and operational difficulties that arose on Election Day to ensure that the integrity of the vote was protected” (EU EOM 2013:1). In Tanzania 2015 general elections, “although the NEC provided updates on electoral preparations through regular press conferences, these measures were insufficient to build confidence amongst political parties about the NEC’s transparency” (EU EOM 2015:6).

The electoral management bodies have the broad mandate, *inter alia*, the registration of voters, delimitation of boundaries into constituencies, the supervision of party nomination of candidates, election campaigns, voting and declaration of final results as well as to provide guidelines and code of ethics for election observation and monitoring in line with the Declaration of Global Principles for Nonpartisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors. EMBs play the key role of *registration of voters* which is one of the primary and expensive exercises in the conduct of electoral process. The registration of voters for the Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 were conducted using Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) machines. The role for the electoral authorities in each country to register eligible voters is provided in the country’s constitution. For example, Article 74 (6) (a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 states that the responsibilities of the Electoral Commission shall be: “to supervise and co-ordinate the registration of voters in Presidential and Parliamentary elections in the United Republic”. In Kenya Article 82 (c) of the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 states “continuous registration of

citizens as voters”, while Article 61 (e) of the Constitution of Uganda of 2005 states “to compile, maintain, revise and update the voters’ register”.

The EMBs in improving the management of the conduct of the electoral processes perform the role of the *delimitation of boundaries* for the purpose of parliamentary and local elections. For example, in Tanzania the criteria for delimitation of the constituency boundaries are under Article 75 (1-6) of the Constitution of URT 1977 and sub-section (3) articulated that “in demarcating the boundaries of constituencies, the electoral commission shall take due account of the availability of means of communication and also geographical conditions of the area intended for demarcation into constituencies”. In Kenya, the Constitution of Kenya 2010 Article 82 (a) and Article 89 (2) states that “the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission shall review the names and boundaries of constituencies at intervals of not less than eight years, and not more than twelve years, but any review shall be completed at least twelve months before a general election of members of Parliament”. The Uganda Constitution of 2005 Article 61 (1) (a) provides that the electoral commission has to “demarcate constituencies in accordance with the provisions of this constitution” and Article 63 (1-7) of the constitution of Uganda 2005.

Unlike Uganda and Kenya, there is no independent candidate in Tanzania. In Tanzania candidates contest through political parties, and are nominated and elected based on their political parties. In the nomination process, EMBs observe the democratic systems used to nominate candidates within the party and to handle complaints against the nomination process. Unlike Kenya, in Tanzania the presidential candidates, rejected nominees by the election authority ‘do not have the right to appeal the decisions of the commissions, since such decisions are final and conclusive’ (EU EOM 2010). This is contrary to the agreed and signed International and regional principles of democratic elections. To stand as an independent candidate for election in Kenya is provided in Article 85 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and in Uganda Article 72 (4) of the Constitution of Uganda 2005.

The electoral management bodies through their officers in different levels of administration coordinate the campaign events of political parties and independent candidates for the case of Kenya and Uganda in order to ensure adherence to the electoral conduct, campaign code of conduct and security to avoid clashes among candidates and political parties in campaign meeting venues. Thus, in coordinating the campaign programme, the officers invite key stakeholders, political parties, in particular to agree on the campaign schedule and for security arrangement of the meetings. Also, EMBs are



required to set polling day, polling stations and vote counting exercise. After counting exercise, the results are declared and displayed at the polling stations. Therefore, in order to minimize complaints and promote transparency of the counting process, each of the political party's agents in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are issued with a copy of the elections results in the polling and counting stations (Aywa 2015; Makulilo 2015; Sekaggya 2015).

In addition, it is the responsibility of the EMBs to announce the final election results. In Tanzania there is no fixed timeframe for the declaration of the official results by NEC and this resulted to a lot of 'tension and suspicion' (Commonwealth Observer report 2010). And the presidential results cannot be challenged in the court of law - the decision of the NEC is final. Article 41(7) and Article 74 (12) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, and Article 41 (7) states that "when a candidate is declared by the Electoral Commission to have been duly elected in accordance with this Article, then no court of law shall have any jurisdiction to inquire into the election of that candidate". But in Kenya and Uganda the country constitution provides room for challenging the official results of the presidential post in the court of law. Article 140 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states "A person may file a petition in the Supreme Court to challenge the election of the President-elect within seven days after the date of the declaration of the results of the presidential election". Also Article 104 (1) of the Constitution of Uganda 2005 provides that "subject to the provisions of this article, any aggrieved candidate may petition the Supreme Court for an order that a candidate declared by the Electoral Commission elected as President was not validly elected".

## **2.7 Chapter summary**

This chapter has offered a general overview of political context in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in relation to, among others, UDHR and ICCPR global standards and principles that governing democratic conduct of electoral processes. The chapter presented political history and transition to democracy in the three countries from one-party system to multi-party political system. The cross-country analysis of democracy indicates the points of convergences and divergences in terms of one-party politics, transition to multi-party politics, the conduct of multi-party elections, electoral system, and terms limit of the president, appointment of members of electoral management bodies, voter turnout and the role of electoral authorities as well.

The analysis of electoral management bodies responsible for coordinating electoral processes in the three countries showed that both three cases developed independent model for managing the conduct of elections. However, in Kenya and Uganda the appointment of members of the electoral authorities are appointed by rigorous and transparent consultation process end up with an approval of legislature and President, but in Tanzania members of the electoral commission are appointed by the president, which raises question about impartiality of the members and integrity of elections in general. In this context, the chapter showed that there are issues which still remain a challenge to the conduct of elections with integrity, specifically adherence to the international standards on democratic conduct of elections - such as independency of electoral authorities and the role of incumbent in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and specifically in Tanzania the right to challenge president-elect in the Court of law remain a challenge.

Additionally, analysis showed the conduct of electoral processes are marred with disputed or flawed election results in Kenya 2007 and 2013 general elections, as well as Tanzania 2015 elections and failed electoral process in Uganda 2016 general elections (Norris et al. 2016b). Also, problems of voter registration, as well as counting and declaration of election results are still critical challenge in the three countries, and the chapter also demonstrates the use of tribal card in electoral politics in Kenya, and regional politics in Uganda, and non-prevalence of ethnicity in electoral process in Tanzania, and these are some of the stumbling block to the promotion of electoral integrity in the modern liberal democracies, especially with regard to the adherence to international standards and principles on democratic conduct of elections.

## **3 Electoral Integrity**

### **3.1 Introduction**

In the modern age, election is one of the cornerstones of liberal democracies, and periodic and credible conduct of elections is necessary for a country to be considered democratic. The aim of this chapter is to present the concept of electoral integrity and election fraud, as well as context of monitoring electoral procedures. On one hand, electoral integrity ‘denotes positive side of the electoral process, while on the other hand, absence of electoral integrity is the negative side of the electoral process or fraudulent elections, and it is through monitoring of the electoral contests that one can establish election quality across the electoral cycle’ (Norris 2014). The aim of monitoring electoral process is to unpack positive and negative experiences of the elections in order to promote the integrity of electoral processes. In this case, the power of digitally empowered citizen monitors in most of the developing democracies is complementary to the traditional election monitoring data. This chapter also highlights international observer reports in terms of positive and negative feedback of the elections using European Union Election Observation Mission reports for the three countries in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections.

### **3.2 Overview of electoral integrity**

In order to “understand why flawed or failed elections matters, we can turn to the notion of electoral integrity, a concept...gradually gaining in popular usage as an all-encompassing way to conceptualize many related issues” (Norris 2014:8). Global Commission (2012:6) defines elections with integrity as “any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle”. Similarly, according to Norris (2014:21) electoral integrity refers to “agreed upon international conventions and universal standards about elections reflecting global norms applying to all countries worldwide throughout the electoral cycle, including during the pre-electoral period, the campaign, on polling day and its aftermath” (see also Norris 2015). And any attempt violates these international commitments and global norms called ‘electoral malpractices’ (Norris 2014). The two concepts “elections with integrity” and “electoral integrity” are fundamentally centered on

the principles and standards which are universal norms of democratic conduct of elections on the whole sequential steps of the electoral cycle. In the context of this research the two concepts, will at times, be used interchangeably.

According to Global Commission (2012:6) to hold elections that adhere to agreed democratic principles of elections should at least overcome major challenges in order to promote the integrity of elections. These challenges are:

- Building the rule of law to substantiate claims to human rights and electoral justice;
- Building professional, competent electoral management bodies (EMBs) with full independence of action to administer elections that are transparent and merit public confidence;
- Creating institutions and norms of multiparty competition and division of power that bolster democracy as a mutual security system among political contenders;
- Removing barriers – legal administrative, political, economic, and social – to universal and equal political participation; and
- Regulating uncontrolled, undisclosed, and opaque political finance.

Most countries around the world conduct and organize competitive elections (Hyde 2011a). It has been the practice since the onset of democratic principles, for the integrity of electoral process to be judged by traditional international, regional and domestic election observer groups (Elklit and Reynolds 2005). But recently ‘many eyes’ of trained and untrained citizen monitors have been massively deployed and engaged using digital tools to observe and report matters of electoral integrity (Grömping 2012). The role of monitors is to oversee the conduct of electoral process and adherence to the formally recognized international standards and principles for democratic elections (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). In the conduct of competitive elections - electoral management bodies with full independence of action are “responsible for ensuring that elections are both technically credible and perceived to be free, fair, and credible” (Global Commission 2012:6).

The international standards apply to all countries worldwide that signed and/ or ratified Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and violations of any of the sequential steps in the electoral cycle will undermine the universal standards of elections (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). The role of election watchdogs is to monitor adherence to these principles in the sequential steps of the electoral cycle. Monitoring integrity of electoral procedures is expressed as “systematic, comprehensive and accurate gathering of information concerning

the laws, processes and institutions related to the conduct of elections and other factors concerning the overall electoral environment; the impartial and professional analysis of such information” (OSCE 2005:2). Election monitoring groups observe broad categories of ‘pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election period’ in order to offer informed judgement of the integrity of the electoral contests and recommendations for interventions in the future election cycle (Norris 2014).

For the integrity and observation of adherence to the international standards and principles of elections - various African states have signed and ratified different international commitments on the standards of democratic processes. These include international instruments such as UDHR of 1948 which is universally applicable to all United Nations member states, and ICCPR of 1966 which creates obligations for civil and political rights to all countries that have entered into the treaty (see also Freedom House data - chapter one Table 1.2 on political rights, civil liberties and freedom status in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda). Additionally, there are regional instruments such as African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in 1981, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance adopted on 2007 and Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa of 2002. These instruments can be used to overcome the challenges of elections with integrity and act as a transformative instrument to the conduct of competitive free, fair and credible elections in the representative sphere of democracy.

In addition to the international and regional instruments, the national governments constitutions are enshrined international and regional commitments, especially remarkable UDHR of 1948 Article 19 and ICCPR of 1966 Article 19. The national constitutions provide freedom of opinion and expression, the right to seek, receive and impart information concerning whether elections were genuine, somewhat tainted or fraudulent through any media including electronic technologies to the conduct of elections. This is the case for UDHR Article 19 which stated that: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”. Similarly, ICCPR Article 19 stated that: “(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference”, and (2) “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”.

International obligations of electoral integrity from UDHR of 1948 Article 21 (3) states that “the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”. This is further stipulated in the ICCPR of 1966 Article 25 (a) and (b) as follows “(a) to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors”. Evaluating genuineness of elections is to “indicate the completeness of compliance with international obligations governing elections and ‘guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors’ preconditions legitimacy of electoral processes” (Tuccinardi 2014:37).

Table 3.1 International obligations for elections

Obligations for elections	
1. Right and opportunity to participate in public affairs	11. Freedom of assembly
2. Right and opportunity to vote	12. Freedom of movement
3. Right and opportunity to be elected	13. Freedoms of opinion and expression
4. Periodic elections	14. Right to security of the person
5. Universal suffrage	15. Transparency and the right to information
6. Equal suffrage	16. Prevention of corruption
7. Secret ballot	17. Rule of law
8. Freedom from discrimination and equality under the law	18. Right to an effective remedy
9. Equality between men and women	19. Right to a fair and public hearing
10. Freedom of association	20. States must take necessary steps to give effect to rights

Source: Tuccinardi (ed.) (2014: 38).

Table 3.1 presents a snapshot of international obligations for election adopted from the work of Tuccinardi (2014) ‘International Obligations for Elections: Guidelines for Legal Frameworks’. The guidelines presented twenty international obligations as key building blocks that will promote elections with integrity. International obligations for elections encompasses, *inter alia*, participation through political parties, civil society organisations and other citizen initiative, opportunity to vote only to reasonable restrictions such as minimum age qualification, opportunity to be elected as a candidate as well as free choice of

candidates and right to stand independently of party affiliation, and regularity in the holding elections at intervals, but also voters should be free from any coercion to disclose how they intend to vote or how they vote (Tuccinardi 2014).

Table 3.2 The chain of democratic choice

	Dimensions of choice	Normative premises of democratic choice	Strategies of norm violation
1	The object of choice	<i>Empowerment</i> : Democratic elections involve the delegation of decision-making authority.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Reserved positions</i>: limiting the scope of elective offices</li> <li>• <i>Reserved domains</i>: limiting the jurisdiction of elective offices</li> </ul>
2	The range of choice	<i>Freedom of supply</i> : Citizens must be free to form, join, and support conflicting parties, candidates, and policies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Exclusion of opposition forces</i>: restricting access to the electoral arena</li> <li>• <i>Fragmentation of opposition forces</i>: disorganizing electoral dissidence</li> </ul>
3	The formation of preferences	<i>Freedom of demand</i> : Citizens must be able to learn about available alternatives through access to alternative sources of information.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Repression</i>: restricting political and civil liberties</li> <li>• <i>Unfairness</i>: restricting access to media and money</li> </ul>
4	The agents of choice	<i>Inclusion</i> : Democracy assigns equal rights of participation to all full members of the political community.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Formal disenfranchisement</i>: legal suffrage restrictions</li> <li>• <i>Informal disenfranchisement</i>: practical suffrage restrictions</li> </ul>
5	The expression of preferences	<i>Insulation</i> : Citizens must be free to express their electoral preferences.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Coercion</i>: voter intimidation</li> <li>• <i>Corruption</i>: vote buying</li> </ul>
6	The aggregation of preferences	<i>Integrity</i> : One person, one vote. The democratic ideal of equality demands weighting votes equally.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Electoral fraud</i>: “redistributive” election management</li> <li>• <i>Institutional bias</i>: “redistributive” electoral rules</li> </ul>
7	The consequences of choice	<i>Irreversibility</i> : Elections without consequences do not qualify as democratic.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Tutelage</i>: preventing elected officers from exercising their constitutional powers</li> <li>• <i>Reversal</i>: preventing victors from taking office, or elected officers from concluding their constitutional terms</li> </ul>

Source: Schedler (2002:39).

For elections to qualify as democratic, they must take place in an open environment where civil liberties and political rights are not subject to repression (Schedler 2002). Electoral procedures must be free and fair or credible to be democratic, or in other words, they should adhere to democratic standards and principles. And democratic elections are mechanisms of social choice under conditions of political rights and civil liberties (Schedler 2002). According to Schedler (2002:39) for a country to qualify as democratic, “elections must offer an effective choice of political authorities among a community of free and equal citizens”. This is following Dahl’s (1971:2) democratic ideal that requires all citizens to enjoy ‘unimpaired opportunities to formulate their political preferences, to signify them to one another, and to have them weighed equally in public decision making’. In this case,

Schedler (2002) pointed out elections may be considered democratic if and only if they fulfil each item on the list summarized in Table 3.2. This means that any break in the chain and premises of choice violates democratic standards and principles for electoral integrity.

### 3.2.1 Research on electoral integrity

In defining the concept of electoral integrity, Norris (2014:8) observed that “many studies concentrate narrowly on blatant acts of fraud occurring on polling day, such as ballot stuffing, false returns, or inaccurate electoral registration. They are all clearly problems, but it is not obvious that these practices are necessarily more serious flaws than more complex issues, such as, for example, systematic imbalance in the campaign airwaves, the abuse of campaign finance regulations to benefit incumbents, legally sanctioned partisan gerrymandering of district boundaries, or restrictive ballot access requirements”. Strategies for measuring quality of elections include expert surveys such as Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) and Transparency International, formal reports of election-related crimes such as cases of fraudulent act; the forensics analysis of electoral statistics such as vote share and turnout rates, and the analysis of reports published by established observers, media reports and events data such as “newer techniques based on Big Data analysis” (Norris 2015), public opinion polls such as Afrobarometer, proxy indices such as Polity IV and Freedom House index of political rights and civil liberties, and natural or field experiments as well (Birch and Carlson 2012; Norris, Elklit and Reynolds 2014; Norris 2015).

Van Ham and Lindberg (2015) using varieties of democracy data set measured the quality of elections in Africa from 1986-2012. Using expert survey they asked experts to evaluate each election in their country of expertise to measure the overall election quality. The survey required them to indicate whether the elections were “free and fair”, “not at all free and fair” or “not really free and fair” and “ambiguous quality”. The findings show the following responses: free and fair election (42%) and either being not at all free and fair or not really free and fair election (30%) and ambiguous quality (27%). In measuring the quality of elections “free and fair must be clearly defined and distinguished from other preconditions of democracy”, and on one hand “Freedom entails the right and the opportunity to choose one thing over another”, while on the other “fairness involves both regularity (the unbiased application of rules) and reasonableness (the not-too-unequal distribution of relevant resources among competitors)” (Elklit and Svensson 1997:35). Figure 3.1 shows the quality of elections in Africa has increased over time, ‘yet even in



2012, a substantial proportion of elections still display problems that undermine the extent to which they can be considered free and fair' (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015:14). On one hand, this data show that the average quality of the conduct of elections in Africa has increased over time, especially from 1990s despite the problems that still undermine the quality of elections to be considered free and fair (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015).



Figure 3.1 The quality of elections in Africa, 1986-2012

Source: Van Ham and Lindberg (2015:15).

Robert Mattes (2014) measured electoral integrity and democratic legitimacy in Africa by using Afrobarometer public opinion surveys data to explore two broad issues addressed by the following questions: “how do individual Africans form their evaluations about their elections? Do people’s evaluations of their elections translate into attitudes about the democratic regime or state institutions, or into relevant citizen behaviors such as community activity, contacting representatives and officials, protest, or support of political violence?”. The findings show that ‘elections matter-at least with respect to citizens’ views of the democratic regime and state, and their level of political engagement. Even in Africa, where there are low levels of formal education, communications infrastructure, and news media use, people are able to distinguish between low- and high-quality elections. Africans are

better able to recognize electoral integrity when elections occur without violence and when they themselves actually take part in the elections' (Mattes 2014:226).

Public opinion polls data conducted by Afrobarometer, among others, measured the level of freedom of expression (see Table 3.3), freedom association (see Table 3.4), right and opportunity to vote (see Table 3.5), as well as freeness and fairness of the elections (see Table 3.6) and trust on electoral authorities (see Table 3.7). In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda on the freedom of expression, for those who reported were completely free to say what they think in 2011/2013 shows (54.9%) in Kenya, (75.6%) in Tanzania and (51.6%) in Uganda, compared to not at all free (4.6%) in Kenya, (1.7%) in Tanzania and (4.5%) in Uganda. For the round 2014/2015 survey showed that about (53.4%) in Kenya, (70.9%) in Tanzania and (65.5%) in Uganda reported the elections were completely free, while (4.7%) in Kenya, (0.9%) in Tanzania and (2.8%) in Uganda reported that the elections were not free at all. The surveys show in Tanzania there is high adherence to freedom of opinion and expression compared to Kenya and Uganda (see Table 3.3). Likewise, the findings indicate that the freedom of association is high in Tanzania, followed by Kenya and Uganda (see Table 3.4), and the issue of right and opportunity to vote was high in Tanzania (89.6%) in the 2011/2013 round, but in the 2014/2015 survey in Uganda (84.6%) of respondents reported that they were completely free to vote (see Table 3.5).

Table 3.3 Freedom of expression

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Not at all free	4.6%	1.7%	4.5%	4.7%	0.9%	2.8%
Not very free	13.8%	4.9%	11.5%	12.7%	3.4%	8.8%
Somewhat free	25.2%	17.6%	31.7%	27.9%	24.6%	22.2%
Completely free	54.9%	75.6%	51.6%	53.4%	70.9%	65.5%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: Freedom to say what you think.

Source: Afrobarometer round 5 2011/2013 and round 6 2014/2015.

Table 3.4 Freedom of association

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Not at all free	2.7%	0.9%	4.3%	3.1%	0.6%	2.0%
Not very free	10.6%	2.4%	8.3%	9.4%	1.6%	4.9%
Somewhat free	16.2%	9.2%	27.0%	21.9%	18.4%	15.5%
Completely free	70.9%	87.1%	59.4%	62.5%	79.0%	76.0%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: In this country, how free are you: To join any political organisation you want.

Source: as Table 3.3 above.

Table 3.5 Right and opportunity to vote

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Not at all free	1.6%	0.5%	2.9%	2.1%	0.4%	1.4%
Not very free	6.7%	1.2%	7.3%	4.3%	1.3%	3.1%
Somewhat free	10.6%	8.4%	22.1%	15.3%	17.1%	10.1%
Completely free	79.0%	89.6%	67.2%	76.6%	80.8%	84.6%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: In this country, how free are you: To choose who to vote for without feeling pressured?

Source: as Table 3.3 above.

Also citizens were asked to rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election because “individual perceptions of the freeness and fairness of the election make a very substantial contribution to people’s sense of whether they are satisfied with, and living in, a democracy” (Mattes 2014:220). Table 3.6 show about (34%) in Kenya (3.8%) Tanzania and (10.7%) of respondents in Uganda reported that the election was not free and fair, while (28.5%) in Kenya, (8.3%) in Tanzania and (19.5%) in Uganda indicates election was free and fair, with major problems. Responding to the view that the elections were completely free and fair (16.5%) in Kenya, (54.3%) in Tanzania and (31.8%) in Uganda reported that the elections were free and fair. According to the surveys data, the certification of free and fair conduct of election in Tanzania was high for the 2010 general election. But the finding shows in Kenya the response rate was low because of the 2007-2008 post-election violence caused by fraudulent electoral results.

The 2013 Kenya election based on 2014/2015 surveys, the election was rated to be completely free and fair (34.3%) and (18.1%) reported election was not free and fair compared to (34.0%) of the 2011/2013 surveys. Also, 2014/2015 surveys (46.9%) of respondents in Uganda reported the election was completely free and fair, while in Tanzania (43.0%) reported that the elections were completely free and fair. The measure of freedom of expression and the percentage of respondents reported completely free and not at all free imply there is ample opportunity for the general public to offer their evaluations of the electoral contests. The response rate on the trust on electoral authorities presented in Table 3.7 is somewhat similar in Tanzania (26.5%) and Uganda (26.7%) for those reported trust “a lot” the electoral commission for the 2014/2015 survey, and different responses for “not at all” in the three countries for the 2011/2013 and 2014/2015 surveys.

Table 3.6 Freeness and fairness of the last national election

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Not free and fair	34.0%	3.8%	10.7%	18.1%	5.4%	9.4%
Free and fair, with major problems	28.5%	8.3%	19.5%	16.0%	10.5%	9.4%
Free and fair, but with minor problems	14.8%	29.6%	32.0%	26.7%	32.7%	21.7%
Completely free and fair	16.5%	54.3%	31.8%	34.3%	43.0%	46.9%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx] was it:

Source: Afrobarometer round 5 2011/2013 and round 6 2014/2015

Table 3.7 Trust on electoral authorities

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Not at all	8.2%	12.8%	21.7%	26.7%	8.2%	18.5%
Just a little	22.2%	20.1%	32.1%	22.2%	19.1%	21.9%
Somewhat	26.8%	34.8%	22.8%	24.0%	40.7%	26.6%
A lot	26.1%	27.3%	19.9%	21.7%	26.5%	26.7%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: How much do you trust the electoral commission?

Source: as Table 3.6 above

The concept of electoral integrity can be monitored through a range of comparative evidence and analytical techniques (Norris, Elklit and Reynolds 2014:37), such as analysed public opinion polls and expert interviews. But to “supplement these existing techniques and sources of evidence, the Electoral Integrity Project has developed a systematic comparative method for assessing electoral integrity by implementing a global survey measuring expert perceptions of electoral integrity” (Norris et al. 2014:38). This, Electoral Integrity Project (EIP) measures the Perception of Electoral Integrity (PEI) world-wide across the electoral cycle, and asks experts to evaluate elections using 49 indicators, and EIP has “established a new rolling survey gathering evaluations of electoral integrity from independent elections experts” (Norris 2015:13). EIP shifted the focus from election-day event in evaluating the quality of the contests to process-oriented using expert perceptions index to measure the conduct across the electoral cycle. Also, EIP measure electoral integrity in all types of regimes such as autocracies (not free), hybrid regimes (semi-free), and democracies (free) based on Freedom House classification (Norris 2015).

Levels of PEI Index score “very high” (70+), “high” (60-49), “moderate” (50-59), “low/‘flawed” (40-49) and “very low / ‘failed” (less than 40). Using PEI index in Kenya is

41 for the 2013, Tanzania 44 for 2015 and Uganda 37 for 2016 general elections (Norris et al. 2016a). In terms of the quality of presidential elections in Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 general elections is classified as low or ‘flawed’ (40-49) and Uganda 2016 elections is classified as very low or ‘failed’ (less than 40) (Norris et al. 2016a). Table 3.8 presents perceptions of electoral integrity data generated from EIP index data set for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The data shows the rank of elections out of the 153 countries surveyed by mid-September 2016 – Kenya ranked 128, Tanzania 123 and Uganda 135. According to PEI index, the 49 score are summed and then standardized to a 100 point scale, in this case the PEI index for Kenya is 41, Tanzania 44 and Uganda 37. While the PEI index type is categorized as very low 0-40 (1), low 40-49.9 (2), moderate 50-59.9 (3), high 60-69.9 (4) and above 70 very high (5). For example, integrity of the election, the experts were asked the following question: “overall how would you rate the integrity of this election on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 10 (very good)?” For the case of Freedom House data on political rights and civil liberties, countries are graded between 1 (most free) to 7 (least free). Freedom House category 1.0 to 2.5 are considered “free” (but PEI category is 2 for “free”), 3.0 to 5.0 “partially free” (but PEI category is 1 “partially free”) and 5.5 to 7.0 “not free” (PEI category is 0 for “not free”) (Norris et al. 2016b).

Table 3.8 Perceptions of electoral integrity

	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Election year	2013	2015	2016
Rank of election	128	123	135
PEI Index	41	44	37
PEI Index type	2	2	1
Electoral integrity of the election	4	5	3
Freedom House political rights	4	3	6
Freedom House civil liberties	4	3	5
Freedom House (PEI category)	2	1	0

Source: Norris et al. (2016b).

Figure 3.2 is the world map of the country covered by EIP by mid-2016. Each colour on the map represents the PEI index of the elections in different countries such as green for very high and high in a country like Cape Verde, Rwanda and South Africa, yellow for moderate, red for low / flawed such as Kenya and Tanzania and very low / failed for Uganda, Burundi and Zimbabwe. As regards PEI index in East Africa, Rwanda is leading with 64, followed by Tanzania 44, Kenya 41, and then Uganda 37, while Burundi 24. But the reasons why a country like Rwanda that is labelled “autocratic” is rated higher in the PEI Index than hybrid regimes or some democratic regimes is unknown (Norris 2015).




Figure 3.2 Perceptions of electoral integrity index (PEI), mid-2012-mid 2016

Source: Norris et al. (2016a) 'The Year in Elections, Mid-2016 Update' (PEI 4.5).

Problems of electoral integrity are not mostly coincident, but sometimes are created by the electoral stakeholders (Vickery and Shein 2012). Non-partisan election monitoring organisations and crowd-monitoring systems may detect and prevent planned or coincidence fraudulent practices and other illicit conduct of electoral stakeholders. Digital crowdsourcing method may complement traditional election observation because the “number of observer organizations has expanded and diversified during the last decade, however, published reports nowadays differ in their evaluations of the same contest, providing little consensus about the outcome” (Norris 2014:9).

### 3.3 Overview of electoral fraud

“Anyone familiar with the often-messy business of monitoring elections knows that vote fraud can be a very complicated, shadowy, and slippery affair that causes domestic and international observers to pull their hair out by the handful. Much practical knowledge and painstaking methodological analysis have gone toward devising methods that allow monitors to distinguish massive fraud from widespread but unsystematic irregularities, but the results so far are hardly conclusive” (Schedler 2002:38-39). Electoral fraud is viewed as the “clandestine and illegal efforts to shape election results” (Lehoucq 2003:233) and seem to be a serious problem in the conduct of electoral democracies. The problem of fraudulent elections is acute in developing and new emerging democracies, but even in developed or

some long standing democracies around the world (Lehoucq 2003; Birch and Carlson 2012). This is because “every elections is “manipulated”, even in the most democratic states, in the sense that all contain legal mechanisms, vote thresholds, and formula that translate votes into seats, determining winners and losers. What makes some types of manipulation arguably either unacceptable (such as vote buying) or acceptable (such as legal gender quotas) requires a broader normative theory” (Norris 2014:8).

Volumes of literature have addressed the question of electoral fraud, among others, Schedler 2002, Lehoucq 2003, Birch 2011, Birch and Carlson 2012, Ichino and Schündeln 2012, Vickery and Shein 2012 and Van Ham and Lindberg 2015. Electoral fraud involves:

“the introduction of bias into the administration of elections. It can take place at any stage of the electoral process, from voter registration to the final tally of the ballots. It covers such activities as forging voter ID cards, burning ballot boxes, or padding the vote totals of favored parties and candidates. Invariably, though, it violates the principle of democratic equality. Fraudulent practices distort the citizenry’s preferences by denying voting rights to some citizens, while amplifying the voice of others” (Schedler 2002:44-45).

Any illicit act to interfere election process is a “violation which serves to substitute personal or partisan gain...for popular control by all” (Birch 2011:14). According to Birch (2011) pointed out that the process of manipulating the conduct of elections involves manipulation of electoral institutions, manipulation of vote choice and manipulation of electoral administration.

The term electoral fraud has been defined differently in literature. Electoral fraud is defined as “intentional deliberate wrong-doing by election officials or other electoral stakeholders, which distorts the individual or collective will of the voters” (Vickery and Shein 2012:9). Here election fraud includes a set of possible stakeholders such as media, political parties, voters, candidates, government officials and other state institutions. But electoral malpractice is defined as “the breach by an election professional of his or her relevant duty of care, resulting from carelessness or neglect” (Vickery and Shein 2012:10). Vickery and Shein (2012) observed the difference between electoral fraud and electoral malpractice lies on the ‘deliberate or intentional acts’ (fraud) and ‘negligent’ (malpractice). Still the problem remains on how to differentiate “intentional” and “unintentional” fraud and malpractice. That is why Norris (2014:9) refers the term electoral malpractice to “violations of electoral integrity”. Table 3.9 presents elements of electoral fraud and electoral malpractice by considering possible actors, action, intent and result.

Table 3.9 Elements of electoral fraud and malpractice

		Electoral Fraud	Electoral Malpractice
Elements of the definition	Possible actors	Election officials, other public officials, voters, political parties, candidates, media	Election officials (including full-time and ad hoc workers performing official duties related to any stage of the electoral process)
	Action	Actor knowingly interferes with the electoral process	Actor is negligent or careless in carrying out his or her election-related responsibilities
	Intent	The action or omission is committed deliberately	The interference results from carelessness/neglect (gross negligence may rise to the level of criminal malpractice, regardless of whether intent is proven)
	Result	Distorts the will of the people. This may manifest itself as interference with individual votes, or in overall vote counts that impact the result or results of the election	May lead to irregularities in the electoral process, some of which may prevent the election outcome from reflecting the will of the people

Source: Vickery and Shein (2012:12).

Following the emergence of “third wave” and multi-party democracies, elections are marred with illicit act of interfere to the electoral process (Vickery and Shein 2012), which affects the will of the people and legitimacy of the new government (Elklit and Reynolds 2002). Though, studies have acknowledged “the fundamental difficulty with the study of election fraud in its measurement – it may take many forms and those involved typically with to hide these illicit activities” (Ichino and Schündeln 2012:292). Election fraud may refer to any illicit conduct and interference of the process of election, meticulously planned by different election actors such as candidates, officials of electoral authorities, citizen, political parties and media in the pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election phases. Electoral fraud, stakeholders, knowingly, violating the conduct of political competition (Lehoucq 2003), and distort the quality of managing elections (Elklit 1999; Elklit and Reynolds 2002). Tools of measuring electoral contests such as expert surveys, public opinion polls drawn from a representative cross-section of the population, domestic and international election monitor reports, and lately crowdsourcing- is to complement each other method in detecting, deterring and mitigating illicit interference of election stakeholders in the electoral process, and establishing the quality of the contests.

### 3.3.1 Research on election fraud

Birch and Carlson (2012:2) used the term electoral malpractice as “electoral crimes and sub-standard practices that result in failures or refusals to act (i.e., inability or denial to provide necessary oversight); acts of deception (i.e., providing false or misleading information), acts



of coercion (i.e., intimidating or forcing a voter or other electoral participant to behave in an involuntary manner), and/or acts of destruction (i.e., physical violence toward individuals or institutions)”. In order to put the term into context, Birch and Carlson study on electoral malpractice used expert surveys to collect data from Africa and Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, Asia, Western Europe, North America and Australasia. They found that electoral malpractice is a “serious problem across the world, but electoral malpractice is seen as more of a problem in Africa and the Middle East than other regions of the world” (Birch and Carlson 2012:4).

Table 3.10 presents some of the findings of the study conducted by Birch and Carlson (2012) on the problems of electoral fraud or manipulation in general. From the data it is evident that electoral campaign and vote count, as well as tabulation are extremely serious (37.7%), followed by voting day operations (28.3%), while voter registration was reported to be serious (34.5%), voting day operations (33.3%) and verification or announcement of results (28.3%). Electoral calendar implementation was found to be extremely serious (1.7%), and not very serious (37.3%). The presented findings is an alarm that still developing or fledgling democracies are facing various problems in conducting credible democratic elections, thus intervention to curb problems and challenges is indispensable, especially citizen-oriented monitoring using digital tools and other established mechanisms.

Table 3.10 Problems of electoral fraud or manipulation

Phase	Extremely serious	Serious	Somewhat serious	Not very serious	Not at all serious
Legal framework	26.7%	28.3%	16.7%	16.7%	11.7%
Electoral calendar implementation	1.7%	16.9%	27.1%	37.3%	15.3%
Voter registration	22.4%	34.5%	22.4%	13.1%	6.9%
Electoral campaign	37.7%	27.9%	19.7%	11.5%	3.3%
Voting day operations	28.3%	33.3%	20.0%	13.3%	3.3%
Vote count and tabulation	37.7%	23.0%	23.0%	6.6%	9.8%
Verification/announcement of results	20.0%	28.3%	28.3%	11.7%	15.0%
Electoral disputes adjudication	23.3%	25.0%	28.3%	11.7%	10.0%


Note: For each of the following phases of the electoral cycle, please indicate how much of a problem you believe electoral fraud, crime and/or manipulation generally are:

Source: Birch and Carlson (2012:5).

Ichino and Schündeln (2012) studied on electoral irregularities. Their interest was to examine the causal effect of domestic election observers on the extent of pre-election irregularities in voter registration in 2008 Ghana general elections. Their study examined pre-election period of voter registration which is an important step in the electoral cycle to establish the integrity of elections in detecting and deterring misconduct of contested

elections. They studied pre-election activities, especially voter registration because “problems with voter registration are quite common in transition elections and new democracies, and this can create significant doubts about electoral outcome and the legitimacy of the new government” (Ichino and Schündeln 2012). Also, “political parties have strong incentives to inflate the voters register with their own supporters, even where they are unable to fabricate elections results outright or to widely intimidate voters and opponents, which is precisely where the election would likely to be characterized as “free” and fair” (Ichino and Schündeln 2012:293). With the use of a combination of data from experiment and official sources for analysis, they found that in new democracy like Ghana, “political parties appear to evade observers, who deter some but displace substantial irregularities in registration” (Ichino and Schündeln 2012:306).

Graph 3.1 Types of irregularities and manipulation in African elections, 1996-2012



Source: Van Ham and Lindberg (2015:16).

Van Ham and Lindberg (2015) in an attempt to measure different types of irregularities and manipulation in African multiparty electoral democracy using varieties of democracy data set, asked experts to evaluate the presence of a number of irregularities and form of manipulation occurring in elections. The analysis of the findings show that vote buying (65%), electoral management bodies about (60%) and other irregularities (60%) are the serious problems in African elections (see Graph 3.1). The study concluded that “even if the

quality of elections in Africa has improved overall, many of them continue to suffer from different types and varying levels of manipulation” (van Ham and Lindberg 2015:17).

Findings on vote-buying shows corruption in elections continues to be a problem in developing and emerging democracies, and arguably the recent growth of mobile money transfer system in developing and less developed countries can be claimed to be a new way of transferring and receiving bribery in vote-buying without being easily identified. It can be argued that in developing democracies, especially in East African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the growth rate of mobile money transfer system can be a new form of implementing corrupt practices for vote-buying in elections on one hand, while on the other hand, crowdsourced citizen-based monitoring can be a new future hope for combating such practices in electoral processes because ordinary citizens as potential voters are the main bribed groups. In this, ordinary citizens may voluntarily report all illicit practices of voting-buying during electoral process.

Spring2014 Pew Research Survey shows corruption is a problem within East African countries. For example, in Kenya (77%), Tanzania (90%) and Uganda (87%) of the respondents expressed corruption is a very big problem in their country. In general, a median of (75%) across 34 countries in the survey reported corrupt political leaders are a very big problem. Pew Research findings are somewhat close to the Gallup (2014) survey, where the perceptions of citizens (88%) Tanzania and (88%) in Uganda reported corruption to be widespread in the government, while (66%) in Kenya and (51%) in Tanzania, of the respondents approved a country’s leadership.

Table 3.11 presents Transparency International data about expert perceptions of corruption index which serves as a reminder that corruption is impediment to the integrity of electoral process. Equally, it can also be argued that mobile money transfer breaks the barrier and easily facilitates secret dealings and bribery that continue to ravage societies during elections. In this respect, corruption perceptions index (CPI) score for Kenya was 27 in 2012, 27 in 2013, 25 in 2014 and 25 in 2015, where 0 means a country is perceived as “highly corrupt” and 100 means it is perceived as “very clean”. Score for other countries such as Tanzania was 35 in 2012, 33 in 2013, 31 in 2014, 30 in 2015 and Uganda 29 in 2012, 26 in 2013, 26 in 2014 and 25 in 2015. While Kenya ranked 139, Tanzania 117 and Uganda 139 in 2015 out of the 175 countries. No country has a perfect score and two-thirds of countries score below 50 and this indicates a serious world-wide corruption problem (Transparency International 2015).

Table 3.11 Corruption perceptions index (CPI) 2012-2015

Country	Rank 2012	Score 2012	Rank 2013	Score 2013	Rank 2014	Score 2014	Rank 2015	Score 2015
Kenya	139	27	136	27	145	25	139	25
Tanzania	102	35	111	33	119	31	117	30
Uganda	130	29	140	26	142	26	139	25

Source: <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>

The perceptions indexes suggest efforts are required to clean-up corruption by building mechanisms of transparency and accountability of money in electoral processes. It is important to note that governments in realising the persistent problem and influence of money in elections, countries such as Tanzania enacted the Election Expenses Act, No. 6 of 2010 that makes provisions for controlling the use of money in election campaigns, reporting and accountability of money in elections, offences and penalties as well. The Act provides disclosures of funds before election campaigns, limit of election expenses, restrictions of foreign funding to election expenses, organizations to disclose sources of funds and expenses for nomination process. Section 7(1) election expenses means “all funds expended or expenses incurred in respect of the conduct and management of nomination process, election campaign and election by a political party, candidate or government”.

Kenya enacted Political Parties Act No. 11 of 2011 and Political Parties (Amendment) Act, 2016. The political parties Act provides funding and accounts of political parties, publishing sources of funds, declaration of assets, liabilities and expenditure in relation to elections as well as offences related to sources of funds. Section 23 states “there is established a Fund to be known as the Political Parties Fund, which shall be administered by the Registrar”. In Uganda enacted Presidential Elections Act (Amendment) No. 14 of 2010 section 64 (7) and Parliamentary Elections Act (Amendment) No.12 of 2010 section 68 (7) state that “a candidate or an agent of a candidate shall not carry out fundraising and the giving of donations during the period of campaigning”. The presidential and parliamentary elections acts prohibit politicians in providing money to potential voters. It is observed that “the use of money in elections has become a culture in Uganda and voters have become accustomed to receiving bribes for their votes” (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011:19). Despite the enactment of election expenses, political parties Act and presidential, as well as parliamentary elections acts ‘there are still a million miles away before corruption can be effectively dealt with’ in electoral process (Babeiya 2011).

It is arguable that an increasingly growth rate of mobile money transfer system in East African countries is a threat to the conduct of genuine electoral processes on one hand, but on the other hand, it can be argued that the emerging role of crowdsourcing citizen-based is a new way to combat negative use of money in elections. Cash payment system has largely been replaced by ICT tools, particularly mobile money transfer system, and poses countless challenges to monitor and prevent in elections cycle. Given the growth penetration rates of mobile phone - users can effectively use as a device of protecting the integrity of elections through reporting incidents of bribery and vote-buying by SMS-based system. Also institutionalizing crowdsourced monitoring using digital technologies can be a mechanism that will allow connected citizens everywhere to report act of bribery in electoral process.

### **3.4 Context of elections monitoring**

The expansion of international election-monitoring activities in the 1980s and 1990s was a direct reflection of the growing support for democracy world-wide (Chand 1997:544). The global wave of democratization, transformed election monitoring and become widely accepted as global norms, and established democratic standards of evaluating the quality of electoral contests. This is because “democracy is now perceived to be the only legitimate form of government; to some extent this is clearly the product of the demise of the Soviet Union and the mushrooming of democracies around the world” (Chand 1997:545). This facilitated the emergence of election monitoring groups in order to observe adherence to the established standards of conducting democratic elections (Kelley 2008).

Election monitoring started in the 1960s and spread rapidly late 1980s and early 1990s to observe the conduct of elections in emerging and transitional democracies (Chand 1997; Bjornlund 2004). International observer missions has now become widely accepted as a universal norm in elections monitoring so that the “few states that fail to comply, by banning access to international observers, are signalling in advance that contests will be stolen, manipulated, or fraudulent without a fig leaf of legitimacy” (Norris 2014:28). On the other hand, the “norm is not that all governments should invite monitors; the larger goal is for states to attain democratic maturity and therefore graduate out of the practice” (Kelley 2008:223).

The inception of multi-party elections goes hand-in-hand with a number of initiatives of monitoring the conduct of democratic elections. It is within this category that election monitoring groups become one of the tools for generating and reporting electoral incidents

in order to promote the integrity of elections. Monitoring contests of elections found to be the “best-established, most visible and often best funded type of democracy related assistance” (Carothers 1997:18), but digital crowdsourced monitoring is “cost-effective relative to traditional international election monitoring” (Callen and Long 2015:379).

The practice of traditional monitoring of the electoral integrity is not a new phenomenon, since the inception of electoral democracy or Samuel Huntington “the third wave” paves the way for the rise of election observation missions, and other sources of measuring the quality of the contests. Given the importance placed on the elections, monitoring periodical conduct of elections has become a standard measure and defining feature of modern liberal democracy. The catchphrase “free” and “fair” have become a standard evaluation by election observation mission for the elected government to gain international legitimacy (Chand 1997; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Kelley 2008), and “democratic legitimacy” (Kersting 2012b). It is “the free expression of whose will provides the basis for authority and legitimacy of government” (OSCE 2005:1), and “continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens” (Dahl 1971:1).

Since the global norm of election monitoring began in 1990s, and also witnessed sharply increased multi-party electoral democracies, elections monitors and reporters are quite informed with Dahl’s (1971) list of requirements for democracy (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2 – Table 1.1). Now it is a global norm for liberal democracies and governments to invite election observers so as to comply with international recognized practices of democratic elections (Hyde 2011b). The adoption of liberal democracy and the norm of elections monitoring such as international, regional and domestic mission assesses the adherence to the principles of democratic elections on “freeness and fairness” of the process, and to ensure the electoral process reflects the “will of the people” (Elklit and Svensson 1997; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Norris 2014).

Monitoring of electoral processes emerged in various countries to validate the elections in terms of being free, fair and credible or vice versa across the electoral cycle (Elklit and Svensson 1997; Hyde 2011a). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1998) the increase of election monitoring between 1989 and 1994 shows twenty one founding elections in Africa out of twenty nine countries studied, were deemed to have free and fair electoral contests. Thus, election monitors are responsible for evaluating the entire electoral cycle in terms of national and international democratic standards and principles of elections (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). This is because in the evaluation and reporting of one step

of electoral cycle, especially voting-day event, observers tend to report only blatant incidents of electoral fraud and malpractices, in which resulted partial certification of the electoral process in terms of free and fair contest (Norris 2014, 2015).

There are various international and domestic guidelines for election monitoring. The international conventions, treaties and agreement are the guidelines for the member states, regional and country constitution, electoral regulations, election Act and electoral procedures. For example, international observation mission standards of monitors reached in the United Nation (2005) and endorsed Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers. The declaration provides that:

“International election observation, which focuses on civil and political rights, is part of international human rights monitoring and must be conducted on the basis of the highest standards for impartiality concerning national political competitors and must be free from any bilateral or multilateral considerations that could conflict with impartiality. It assesses election processes in accordance with international principles of genuine democratic elections and domestic law, while recognizing that it is the people of a country who ultimately determine credibility and legitimacy of an election process” (OSCE 2005:1).

Domestic election observation groups in 2012 endorsed the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors. The declaration states that:

“Non-partisan citizen observers and monitors can be considered as specialized human rights defenders that focus on civil and political rights, which are central to achieving genuine elections. Genuine elections require respect for the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including association, peaceful assembly, expression, media freedom, movement, security of person, equal protection of the law for prospective voters and those seeking to be elected, as well as providing effective remedies when electoral related rights are violated” (GNDEM 2012:3).

The international and domestic election observation groups seek to promote the integrity of elections by detecting, deterring and exposing irregularities and fraud and mitigating potentials for election violence and building public confidence and legitimacy of the elected government in the office (OSCE 2005; GNDEM 2012). In this case, the code of conduct by International IDEA (1997) pointed out that inviting domestic (or citizens) organizations / observers in monitoring electoral contests can: form a valid view of electoral process in order to determine its legitimacy, help to build public confidence in the

management of the electoral process and improve the prospects for democratic country, as well as promote democratic conduct of the electoral process, and contribute to preventing conflict during electoral processes.

### **3.4.1 Established election monitoring mission reports**

As the cold war ended “Western states increasingly made clean elections a prerequisite for bestowing legitimacy on governments, and international organizations pressured governments to hold elections and invite international monitors” (Kelley 2008:230). On one hand, literature acknowledges the positive contribution of international election observers indicating “a basic function of election observation is detecting and, if possible, deterring electoral fraud. Election observers have indeed helped draw attention to fraud in many countries” (Carothers 1997:19). It is an obligation for the country, especially electoral management bodies to invite the groups of election observers (international, regional and domestic) to monitor, and capture a comprehensive picture of the conduct of the elections (Chand 1997; Kelley 2008; Hyde 2011a). Invited election monitors assess whether the conduct of the electoral process suits the agreed international standards and principles of democratic elections in which such a country committed to follow.

On the other hand, established elections monitors have become standard measures for determining the credibility of electoral processes. Conversely, established election observation missions have been criticized for inefficiency, biased and politicized reports and failing to prevent electoral fraud or malpractices (Carothers 1997; Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Kelley 2008, 2009, 2010; Norris 2015). The duration of observation missions consisting of “short stays around the election day are fundamentally flawed” (Elklit and Svensson (1997:64), and these observers tend to pay attention to the events of election-day (Carothers 1997; Elklit and Reynolds 2005), to address most directly factors on election-day such as secret ballot, votes counted equally and free from intimidation (Kelley 2010).

In Kenya 2013 general elections following an invitation from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) was present in Kenya from 19 January to 4 April 2013 to observe the 4 March general elections. The EU EOM deployed 65 observers from 26 EU member states, as well as Norway and Switzerland across the country to assess the whole electoral process in accordance with international and regional commitments for elections and laws of Kenya (EU EOM 2013:3).



In Tanzania 2015 general election following an invitation from the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania through National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC), the EU EOM deployed an election observation mission that was present in Tanzania from 11 September to 8 December 2015. The EU EOM deployed across the country 141 observers from the 28 EU member states, as well as from Norway, Switzerland and Canada to assess the entire electoral process in Tanzania (EU EOM 2015:11).

For the case of 2011 Uganda general elections, an invitation from the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Electoral Commission (EC), the European Union established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to observe this election. Its mandate was to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the electoral process. The EU EOM consisted of seven core team members, 34 long-term observers and 68 short-term observers selected from the 27 EU member states as well as Norway (EU EOM 2011:5).

The review of international election observation missions focuses on the report of European Union as one of the international election observation missions in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. European Union election observation mission was selected for analysis because the mission is active and had a long history in observing and providing observation reports around the world (Commission of the European Communities 2000).

As shown above the international election observation mission has been criticized on their initiatives to send huge group of observers on election-day that set an alarm the promotion of elections with integrity goes beyond blatant reports of election-day events, especially polling station incidents – and international observation mission has been criticized for failure to capture positive and negative incidences across the electoral cycle. Therefore, using Norris (2014) electoral cycle especially electoral phases and stages, analysis of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) will unpack the reports in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections, and see whether the observation mission was able to generate information across the electoral cycle.

The snapshot of the reports as presented in Table 3.12 will show the ability of the observation mission to observe incidences across the electoral cycle, as well as positive and negative side of the electoral procedures. The analysis of the EU EOM report shows that the observation mission was present in Kenya from 19 January to 4 April 2013 (EU EOM

2013), Tanzania from 11 September to 8 December 2015 (EU EOM 2015) and Uganda from 15 January to 10 March 2011 general elections (EU EOM 2011). From this data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - it shows the observers from the observation mission were not present in the field during the pre-election phase to observe activities such as boundaries, voter registration and party registration process, as well candidate selection. For example, in Kenya biometric voter registration began on 18 November 2012 and lasted for 30 days. The provisional lists were displayed for the public at the local level from 14 - 28 January 2013 for verification (Commonwealth Observer Group 2013:11-12), and the observation mission arrived on 19<sup>th</sup> January 2013. For the case of Tanzania voter registration using biometric technology was conducted in December 2014, and February to August 2015. But with exception in Tanzania, the EU deployed Election Expert Mission (EEM) between 8 May and 24 July 2015 to assess the BVR process (EU EOM 2015:19).

Furthermore, in Uganda a general update of the National Voter Register (NVR) took place from 3 May to 18 June 2010, when new registrants were given a receipt of their registration. From 11 to 31 August 2010 revised lists were put on public display, during which time challenges could be filed with parish tribunals. The period between 3 and 13 September 2010 was allocated for displaying and confirming the proposed deletions, additions and corrections (EU EOM 2011:19). Therefore, with exception of Tanzania, from the observation of EU EOM reports regarding voter registration it is reasonable to argue that “several months before the vote, the first foreign observers arrive, a few people from Western Europe who settle in to monitor the electoral process from start to finish” (Carothers 1997:17), and “tend to give to election day itself, which is actually just one part of a long process that also includes the passage of the election law, the registration of parties and candidates, the preparation of voter lists” (Carothers 1997: 22). These also implies that information regarding pre-election incidents were collected by international election observers through consultation and appointment with key domestic election stakeholders such as electoral management body officials, established domestic observers and candidates, as well as political parties and civil society organizations (Carothers 1997). This further implies that some election information across the electoral cycle captured by the international observer mission is not first-hand information from the field.

The EU EOM to Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections, despite acknowledging the observers was mandated to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the elections, in their final reports, the observer mission could not provide their overall

certification of the electoral process, either using standard language of “free, fair, credible” or “flawed elections” apart from pointing positive and negative incidents. In Tanzania 2015 election report, EU EOM reported that “CEMOT’s platform assessed that the elections were generally free and that the results reflected the will of the people” (EU EOM 2015:26). Arguably “a sharp condemnation by foreign observers of a flawed election could precipitate serious violence or political instability, observers inevitably seek to avoid this outcome, even if it means soft-peddalling their findings” (Carothers 1997:25). Table 3.12 is a snapshot of the EU EOM reports in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 elections.

Table 3.12 European Union Election Observation Mission reports in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
		Kenya 2013 general election	
		Positive side of elections	Negative side of elections
Pre-Election	1. Electoral laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Observed calm election campaign with respect for freedom of expression, assembly and movement for political parties and candidates (p.18)</li> </ul>	
	2. Electoral procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Throughout the electoral preparations, the IEBC retained the electorate's trust (p.1)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IEBC's efficiency sometimes hindered by the lack of a consistent decision-making process (p.12)</li> <li>Some isolated cases of destruction of campaign materials (p.18)</li> <li>Isolated outbreaks of violence (p.18)</li> <li>Intimidation of women candidates and their supporters (p.18)</li> </ul>
	3. Boundaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The number of legislative constituencies was increased to 290 (p.10)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>43 of the 290 constituencies do not meet the requirements (p.10)</li> <li>Counties were demarcated with insufficient regard for equality of vote (p.10)</li> </ul>
	4. Voter registration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>IEBC published provisional figures and citizens were able to check their registration details in person at registration centres, online or by SMS (p.14)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The application of technology was not a success (p.1)</li> <li>Registration from the diaspora was very limited (p.14)</li> <li>Voter register's reliability was called into question (p.14)</li> </ul>
	5. Party registration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Candidates who had complaints sought legal redress through the channels accorded by the Kenyan legal framework (p.17)</li> <li>No candidates were rejected by the IEBC for integrity reasons (p.17)</li> <li>Certification of presidential candidates by the IEBC took place without major problems (p.17)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Late amendments to the Elections Act-difficult for parties and IEBC to attain the high standards for the nomination and vetting of candidates (p.1)</li> <li>Nominations for political party primaries took place rather chaotically amid accusations of rigging (p.16)</li> <li>Some candidates who won their High Court bid to be on the ballot were still excluded (p.1)</li> <li>One presidential candidate intended to run for a Party of</li> </ul>

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
			Democratic Unity (PDU) was disqualified for failing to show up on time (p.17)
Campaign	6. Campaign media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IEBC maintained a useful website and communicated frequently to the public (p.13)</li> <li>• The widely broadcast presidential debates were a positive element (p.18)</li> <li>• Election received extensive coverage in the media (p.21)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Jubilee coalition and the CORD alliance enjoy more media coverage and clearly having more financial resources (p.18)</li> <li>• During the campaign, some journalist were intimidated or prevented from conducting their work (p.24)</li> </ul>
	7. Campaign finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections Act and Political Parties Act elaborate the electoral legal framework (p.7)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Assembly failed to pass in time campaign financing Act (p.7)</li> <li>• An unequal playing field was noticeable throughout the campaign (p.18)</li> <li>• The handing out of money to voters was directly observed by the EU EOM during rallies (p.18)</li> </ul>
Election-day	8. Voting process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The voter turnout was 85.9 percent (p.32)</li> <li>• IEBC put all polling station results forms on its website (p.32)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ballots in four wards were misprinted-county assembly elections -postponed (p.12)</li> <li>• Voter register on election-day did not enable consistently reliable records of registered citizens, nor of how many had voted (p.15)</li> <li>• On election-day, polling was marred in Coast and North Eastern regions by attacks which in some cases involved significant loss of life (p.29)</li> <li>• The secrecy of vote was not sufficiently protected (p.30)</li> </ul>
Post-Election	9. Vote count	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Counting took place in a peaceful atmosphere (p.30)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Party agents and election observers were not given adequate access to the tallying processes ( p.2)</li> <li>• Not all party agents received a copy of the results forms (p.30)</li> <li>• The processing of official results lacked necessary transparency (p.2)</li> </ul>

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
	10. Post-election	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supreme Court judges, in a unanimous verdict, dismissed the Odinga and Africog petitions, ruling that the elections were conducted in accordance with the Constitution and the law</li> <li>• The Supreme Court allowed the petition and ruled that the rejected votes do not have to be included in calculating the final tallies in favour of each of the presidential candidates (p.39)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CORD challenged the validity of the election results and undertook to seek legal redress at the Supreme Court (p.33)</li> <li>• Petition was filed by three citizens asking the Supreme Court to rule on whether the IEBC should have included rejected ballots in its final tally of presidential results (p.39)</li> </ul>
	11. Electoral authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The allocation of staff in the polling stations was generally adequate (p.11)</li> <li>• IEBC launched civic education and voter information in every ward of the county (p.13)</li> <li>• Voter information were well designed in English and Swahili (p.13)</li> </ul>	
		<b>Tanzania 2015 general election</b>	
		Positive side of elections	Negative side of elections
	1. Electoral laws		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There are number of constitutional limitations on political rights and freedom of association which are not in accordance with international principles for democratic elections such as ban on independent candidates, freedom of association, and inability to challenge presidential election results (p.5)</li> <li>• Number of laws such as Statistics Act and the Cybercrimes Act, include provisions that can be used to arbitrarily restrict freedom of expression, access to information and limit media functioning (p.7)</li> </ul>
Pre-election	2. Electoral procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National Electoral Commission (NEC) showed sufficient levels of preparedness for the administration of the electoral process (p.6)</li> <li>• Candidates and parties campaigned vigorously, and respected the campaign regulations (p.6)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NEC did not provide for full transparency regarding their decision making processes, and stakeholders' access to scrutinise the commissions' activities was not always granted (p.6)</li> </ul>

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
	3. Boundaries		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• NEC conducted delimitation of constituency shortly before the 2015 elections. The new boundaries do not take into account the principle of equal distribution of the electorate amongst the constituencies (p.6)</li> </ul>
	4. Voter registration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Introduction of a new biometric voter registration (BVR) was granted with a high participation of citizens (p.19)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problem encountered with the finalisation of the voter registers (p.16)</li> <li>• Mechanisms are not in place for the participation of the Tanzanian diaspora (p.19)</li> </ul>
	5. Party registration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The requirements for the registration of political parties are reasonable and in line with international and regional commitments related to freedom of association (p.21)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The right of political parties to form a coalition is not provided by law (p.21)</li> <li>• Registration of candidates to stand for presidential, parliamentary and council elections must be members of a political party (p.22)</li> <li>• Two party candidatures for presidential post from the Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA) and Chama Cha Kijamii (CCK) were rejected for not complying with procedural requirements (p.22)</li> </ul>
	6. Campaign media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some private media showed relatively balanced coverage of the campaigns (p.7)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The state media (Television, radio and Daily News) failed to provide equitable and fair coverage of the campaigns, as they focused on coverage of the ruling party (p.30)</li> </ul>
Campaign	7. Campaign finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The 2010 Election Expenses Act requires the political party and candidates to disclose all funds received for election expenses (p.22)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Imbalance in the electoral playing field. CCM party's use of what were formerly state resources and assets (p.6)</li> </ul>
Election-day	8. Voting process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The conduct of voting was positively assessed in 96 percent of the polling stations observed (p.35)</li> <li>• Political parties were allowed to appoint one party agent for each polling station (p.35)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EU observers reported inadequate protection of the secrecy of the vote (p.35)</li> <li>• Observers reported cases of ballot papers not being sufficient in 11 polling stations and protocols missing in 13 stations (p.35)</li> </ul>

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
	9. Vote count	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There was deterioration in the levels of transparency and credibility of the tallying process (p.8)</li> <li>• Counting at the polling stations conducted in the presence of political party agents and observers</li> <li>• Copies of the results forms were publicly displayed and given to party agents (p.36)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Despite frequent requests, a visit to the central data centre was not granted (p.16)</li> <li>• NEC was not able to ensure a consistent implementation of tallying procedures throughout the regions (p.8)</li> <li>• Delays in the tabulation process at constituency level raised tensions around some tally centres (p.37)</li> </ul>
Post-election	10. Post-election		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 51 parliamentary election petitions have been submitted to the Union High Court and 155 petitions challenging local council results filed at the magistrate courts in the Union (p.35)</li> <li>• Delays in announcement of parliamentary results – violent incidents occurred and police dispersing crowds outside tally centres using tear gas (p.37)</li> </ul>
	11. Electoral authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The performance of polling staff was mostly assessed to be good and very good (.36)</li> </ul>	
		<b>Uganda 2011 general election</b>	
		Positive side of elections	Negative side of elections
Pre-election	1. Electoral laws	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The 2011 Ugandan general elections showed some improvements over the previous elections held in 2006 (p.5)</li> <li>• Campaign period was conducted in an atmosphere in which the freedoms of assembly and association were generally respected (p.22)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Uganda Police Force has not yet embraced its constitutional role as an impartial enforcer against breaches of electoral law (p.7)</li> </ul>
	2. Electoral procedures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The electoral campaign and polling day were generally conducted in a peaceful manner (p.5)</li> <li>• Timely publication of complete lists of constituencies and polling stations (p.17)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral process was marred by avoidable administrative and logistical failures led to an unacceptable number of citizens being disenfranchised (p.5)</li> </ul>
	3. Boundaries		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Equality of the vote is not respected by current constituency delimitation (p.5)</li> </ul>



Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
	4. Voter registration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Timely provision of the National Voter Register to political parties (p.17)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Voter register was criticised and there were inadequate safeguards against fraud (p.6)</li> <li>• High number of citizens found that they were not registered where they expected (p.7)</li> </ul>
	5. Party registration		
	6. Campaign media		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The state-owned broadcaster, the Uganda Broadcasting Corporation (UBC), failed to comply with its legal obligations to treat each presidential and parliamentary candidate equally (p.7)</li> <li>• Threats against the freedom of press, coupled with limited critical reporting of the incumbents' record in office (p.7)</li> </ul>
Campaign	7. Campaign finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The 2005 Political Parties and Organisations Act regulates the financing and functioning of the multi-party system (p.21)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Campaign spending and monetisation of the election – distribution of money and gifts by candidates, especially from the ruling party (p.6)</li> <li>• The incumbency's use of state resources (p.24)</li> </ul>
Election-day	8. Voting process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Polling stations opening procedures were largely peaceful (p.37)</li> <li>• Party agents were present in all cases observed (p.37)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of incidents of violence and intimidation on election day (p.5)</li> <li>• Poor application of basic procedures revealed inadequate training of polling station staff and implied insufficient safeguards against fraud (p.7)</li> <li>• Voting and counting, it is regrettable that for the most part the process was flawed (p.37)</li> <li>• Polling stations observed recording a lack of some essential materials – seals for ballot boxes (p.37)</li> <li>• Some ballot boxes were not properly sealed (p.37)</li> <li>• Voting basins were not effective for ensuring secrecy of the vote (p.37)</li> <li>• People were observed being allowed to vote despite not being on the voter register (p.37)</li> <li>• Others were denied the right to vote despite being on the</li> </ul>

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Positive and Negative feedback of Elections	
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• register (p.37)</li> <li>• Some voters found that someone had already voted in their name (p.38)</li> </ul>
	9. Vote count	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Results were published by polling station on the Electoral Commission website, in line with standards for transparent elections (p.7)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tallying of results party agents and observers had difficulty viewing the data entry process in one third of the cases (p.7)</li> <li>• Cases observed, declaration of results forms had been signed by party agents before they were completed (p.38)</li> <li>• There were numerous reports of vote rigging mainly by means of ballot stuffing and changing results at polling stations or District Tally Centres (DTC) (p.39)</li> </ul>
Post-election	10. Post-election		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dispute resolution – the use of state resources, bribery and even ballot stuffing went largely unpunished (.8)</li> </ul>
	11. Electoral authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor communication resulted in many people not being aware of the new polling stations (p.18)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Electoral Commission did not enjoy widespread trust (p.6)</li> </ul>

Source: EU EOM 2011 (Uganda); EU EOM 2013 (Kenya) and UE EOM 2015 (Tanzania).

### **3.5 Chapter summary**

This chapter dwelt on the discussion of electoral integrity, electoral fraud and election monitoring. The chapter presents studies on electoral integrity, electoral fraud and analysis of established observers' reports. Some studies show that problems of electoral integrity, or election fraud and other irregularities are a serious problem in African electoral democracies (Birch and Carlson 2012; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). It has been further revealed that problems of electoral integrity have been measured through a range of different studies such as public surveys data, expert perception index and analysis of traditional elections observation reports (Birch and Carlson 2012; Norris 2014; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). Overview of EU EOM in the three countries shows observer mission was very much interested in observing negative feedback of the electoral processes (Table 3.12). Most of the electoral incidents focus on positive and negative feedback, with a higher number of negative reports than positive incidents. However, in some of the stages, the observer mission captures one side of the electoral stages, either negative or positive events. For example, in Kenya 2013 general elections, the EU EOM reported positive incidents for electoral laws and electoral authorities. For the Tanzania 2015 elections, the EU EOM reported negative incidents for electoral laws, boundaries and post-election events, and positive incident for electoral authorities. While in Uganda 2011 election negative reports were reported for boundaries, campaign media and post-election, no positive or negative incidents were reported for party registration.

Lastly, some conclusions can be drawn from the presented studies on electoral integrity. First, studies show there are problems of flawed elections in Kenya and Tanzania, while failed election in Uganda. Presented studies acknowledged problems of fraudulent elections in Africa, and Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - not an exception because of the reported electoral fraud and other irregularities. The problems of electoral integrity, specifically flawed elections in Kenya and Tanzania, and failed election in Uganda (see Figure 3.2) has henceforth prompted this study, therefore to focus on analysing crowdsourced data as an alternative source of electoral integrity data

## 4 Sourcing the Crowd for the Greater Election Integrity

### 4.1 Introduction

It is arguable that the invention of omnipresent digital communication technologies has revitalised the conduct of elections in developed, developing and emerging democracies. Digital technological tools have largely changed the way of monitoring and communicating elections information in a timely way, and even digital crowdsourcing systems makes it easier to observe the conduct of electoral processes, and share observation data in real-time. In this case, this chapter presents a growing interest on ubiquity crowdsourcing systems of election monitoring and different typologies of crowd-monitoring of elections. This interest of crowd-monitoring techniques manifests itself in the digitalization of elections observation data in an open-source platform. This chapter also highlights some evidence on crowdsourcing elections monitoring and why it matters in the digitally networked technology. Another part is devoted in introducing invented Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections, as well as digital communication technology tools used by the invited and engaged crowd observers and reporters in generating elections observation information.

### 4.2 Crowdsourcing defined

There have been multiple definitions of the term crowdsourcing. The term coined by a journalist Jeff Howe in 2006 *wired* magazine, describes the term as the process by which many (undefined) can be involved to accomplish tasks that were once performed by few individuals. In the business context, crowdsourcing is used as an alternative term to “outsourcing” as a process of gathering information from the crowd with diverse skills. But in monitoring and reporting the electoral process - the term crowdsourcing focused on a group of people, who voluntarily seek to accomplish significant goal of monitoring elections. By using digital technology tools and ‘open-call’ in inviting citizens to participate in the specified activities offer opportunity to carry out the tasks of problem solving from a large group of ‘undefined’ individuals. In one of the definition Jeff Howe (2006) indicated:

The term crowdsourcing, represents the act of a company or institution taking a function once performed by employees and outsourcing it to an undefined (and generally large) network of people in the form of an open call. This can take the form of peer-production (when the job is performed collaboratively), but is also often undertaken by sole individuals. The crucial prerequisite is the use of the open call format and the large network of potential laborers

Jeff Howe offers more inclusive definition by pointing crowdsourcing “to be taking place any time a company makes a choice to employ the crowd to perform labor that could alternatively be performed by an assigned group of employees or contractors, even if the company is just now putting up a shingle. In other words, crowdsourcing needs not require an active shift from current employees (or again, contractors) to the crowd; it can start with the crowd”. Jeff Howe used two versions of definitions of crowdsourcing; first, crowdsourcing as “the act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call” (Howe 2008:99); and second, crowdsourcing as “the application of open source principles to field outside of software” (Howe 2006). The different explanation offered by Howe placed emphasis on engaging *large group of people* in the form of an *open call* to collaborate in performing the tasks. The possible type of media for engaging the crowd is through digital communication technologies that enhances participation of different groups of people in crowdsourcing systems.

Similarly, Sharma (2010:1) defined crowdsourcing as “the act of outsourcing a task to the crowd, is one of the most important trends revolutionizing the internet and the mobile market at the present”. This definition, considers the growing internet and an increasing use of mobile technologies and other electronic devices as an enabler to cyber crowdsourcing method. Given this trend “the internet allows inexpensive decentralized and widely distributed “information” within and among organizations as well as between the organization and citizens. The internet also allows “communication” i.e. an information exchange between individuals and groups” (Kersting 2005:3). The possibility of engaging the crowd to contribute in solving complex problem is facilitated by digitally empowered citizens on the ground through modern means of information and communication technology instruments (Kersting 2005, 2012a).

Bailard and Livingston (2014:355) defined crowdsourcing “the mobilization of the general public-the crowd- to perform what are usually small, incremental tasks that, taken together, accomplish significant goals”. While Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara (2012:197) defined crowdsourcing as “a type of participative online activity in which an individual, an institution, a non-profit organization, or company proposes to a group of individuals of varying knowledge, heterogeneity, and number, via a flexible open call, the voluntary undertaking of a task. The undertaking of the task, of variable complexity and modularity, and in which the crowd should participate bringing their work, money,

knowledge and/or experience, always entails mutual benefit. The user will receive the satisfaction of a given type of need, be it economic, social recognition, self-esteem, or the development of individual skills, while the crowd-sourcer will obtain and utilize their advantage what the user has brought to the venture, whose form will depend on the type of activity undertaken”.

Crowdsourcing is a broad term that denotes different tasks, in different context and in different organisation performed by different groups of individual citizens, through different medium of communication and which resulted into collective action in problem solving. Crowdsourcing systems can be used for political decision-making at the local, national and regional level (Kersting 2013a, 2015a), for monitoring incidences of electoral integrity (Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Tuccinardi and Balme 2013, Bailard and Livingstone 2014, Arias et al. 2015; Lazarus and Saraf 2015; Shayo and Kersting 2017), for participation (Hellström 2015), for transparency (Bertot et al. 2010) for reporting violence and disasters (Meier 2011; Bock 2012; Trujillo et al. 2014), and planning process (Brabham 2009). Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara (2012) provided a more comprehensive definition of crowdsourcing. In the narrow sense of Estellés-Arolas and González-Ladrón-de-Guevara definition, crowdsourcing in this study must be understood as the activity (what the crowd should do), in which engaged different players to perform the activity of observing and communicating electoral incidents using digital tools, and real-time data are verified and shared in a digital platform for the public to see what is said by the crowd with regard to the conduct of the electoral process.

It has been argued that in the crowdsourcing process “the crowd” in complex problem solving process is more “smart” than the “talented few” that can play a transformative power of today’s world of information-rich society in proposing, monitoring and reporting various outsourced tasks and events (Surowiecki 2004). James Surowiecki scrutinized various cases and found that citizens’ group decision or what he called “crowd wisdom” was much superior to individual experts and, citizens are “often smarter than the smartest people in them”. Surowiecki provides the following example to illustrate the point:

After all, think about what happens if you ask a hundred people to run a 100-meter race, and then average their times. The average time will not be better than the time of the fastest runners. It will be worse. It will be a mediocre time. But ask a hundred people to answer a question or solve a problem, and the average answer will often be at least as good as the answer of the smartest member. With most things, the average is mediocrity. With decision

making, it's often excellence. You could say it's as if we've been programmed to be collectively smart (Surowiecki 2004:11).

The use of digital crowdsourcing process making “everything cheaper, faster, smaller and easier to use by placing creative power in the hands of the crowd rather than in the hands of professionals” (Howe 2008), where each participant contributes a small portion, and these contributions are later integrated to provide a solution to a larger problem (Arias et al. 2015). In the context of election monitoring, the crowd are invited by civil society, in collaboration with technology innovators and other set of electoral stakeholders to participate and contribute in the crowdsourcing platform by observing and reporting electoral incidents using different established communication channels. Crowds are engaged in the invented spaces through networked of partnership of election stakeholders. The crowd initiators deploy digital tools such as sms, smartphone applications, emails account, social networks accounts such as Facebook and Instagram and microblogging #hashtag such as Twitter, and web-based form for the crowd to share their observation reports. In crowdsourcing methodology - the crowd are the primary source of information generated through ICT instruments. It is the ability of the crowd at the grassroots to capture and communicate observed incidences in timely manner to the crowdsourcers digital systems. Citizen-generated data are “sometimes” verified by human operators before posting them on the crowdsourcing platform and sometimes they are posted in real-time (Grömping 2012).

### **4.3 Crowdsourced election monitoring**

The term “crowdsourced election monitoring” was used by Bailard and Livingstone (2014), and it has also been labelled as “citizen election observation” Tuccinardi and Balme (2013) and “popular election observation” Fung (2011). Crowdsourced election monitoring and other related terms are used to explain the process of engaging ordinary citizens as observers and reporters of positive and negative feedback of the elections using digital communication technology tools. And in near-real time generated observation data are geo-tagged and visually mapped in open-source platform. The crowdsourced election monitoring is a popular concept which has gained attention to authors, especially in monitoring and reporting of electoral processes, among others, Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Tuccinardi and Balme 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Grömping 2014; Hellström 2015.

Fung (2011:194-195) defined crowdsourced election monitoring as a system in which “any individual can register an observation about an election and that observation is pooled with other individuals’ observations to create a public depiction of the reality of the election

that is offered back to the public and to election officials in real-time on election day”. Incoming observation data are shared to the other members of the public in near-real time once the incident is certified to be genuine in the crowdsourcing platform. In this case, initiatives by non-partisan election monitoring organizations is to engage ordinary citizens to create the possibilities of observing election across the electoral cycle and in a large area, and sharing observation data in timely fashion (Bader 2013).

The emerging crowdsourced technologies for monitoring and promoting elections with integrity changes the perception that integrity of electoral processes is determined by the province of specialised few like established election observation groups. The success stories of election monitoring are driven from below by non-partisan election monitoring organizations and citizen pressure using modern communication technologies (Fung 2011; Global Commission 2012). This is because “no one knows everything, everyone knows something...and all knowledge resides in humanity, digitization and communication technologies must become central in this coordination of far-flung genius” (Lévy 1997 cited in Brabham 2008:80). The power of citizen observers and reporters via digital technologies to capture and communicate negative as well as good experiences in the conduct of elections in near-real time is a plus in crowdsourcing systems. The rationale behind crowdsourcing technologies is to address problems of electoral integrity and complement other methods of monitoring electoral contests.

Election monitoring has become an international norm to hold credible democratic elections (Hyde 2011a). And the role of civil society organizations and citizen participation in democratic process to protect the integrity of elections derives its legitimacy from Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 Article 21 (1, 2 and 3) stated that “(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right to equal access to public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will -shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures”. And International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 Article 25 (a, b and c) stipulated that “every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal



suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors; (c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country”.

Equally, Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organization point out that election observation and monitoring by citizen organizations is “independent, systematic and comprehensive evaluation of legal frameworks, institutions, processes and the political environment related to elections; impartial, accurate and timely analysis of findings; the characterization of the findings based on the highest ethical standards for impartiality and accuracy; the offering of appropriate recommendations for obtaining genuine democratic elections; and advocating for improvements in legal frameworks for elections, their implementation through electoral related administration and removal of impediments to full citizen participation in electoral and political processes” (GNDEM 2012:6).

ICT tools are part of the standard repertoire of instruments of a range of electoral stakeholders such as election management bodies, international observers, domestic watchdog organizations and citizens themselves (Grömping 2012). The recent wave of ubiquitous online instruments for crowdmonitoring of elections, civil society has the potential role to play in establishing a medium of receiving observation reports as well as publicity and outreach of crowdsourcing methodology. And “government should join with like-minded states and partner with their own civil society organizations to embrace specific commitments on electoral integrity” (Global Commission 2012:8).

Regarding the role of civil society organizations - Wolfgang Merkel highlighted four major roles that a civil society can fulfil in strengthening democracy. These includes: citizens’ protection from arbitrary state rule (called Lockean function), to support the balance of powers and rule of law (called Montesquieuian function), to recruit political leaders and educate citizens (called Tocquevillian function) and to institutionalise public sphere as a medium of democratic self-reflection (called Habermasian function) (Merkel 2004:45-47). Similarly, non-partisan election monitoring organizations perform two major goals: first, to “defend citizens’ rights to vote” by placing trained and accredited election observers in polling stations. The second goal is to “ensure that citizens realize their right to information about the electoral process” (Schuler 2008:145).

Crowdsourced and traditional observers aimed at enhancing standards of democratic elections in order to build public trust by promoting integrity of elections (Grömping 2011).

Though, it is clear that digital crowdsourcing method is a different process than systematic election monitoring (Grömping 2012), but “linkage and trust” is one of the most important criteria for the success of crowdsourcing (Sharma 2010). Crowdsourced and traditional election monitors cannot work in isolation for the monitoring of the integrity of electoral processes, rather hybrid approach is required to engage the crowd in capturing and communicating the conduct of elections. Election monitoring process through crowdsourcing and digitalization involves different players, from different backgrounds to make positive contributions in establishing integrity and trust of the elections reports and feedback to the public (Grömping 2011). It is arguable crowdsourcing method is not a ‘silver bullet’ and ‘magic pill’ which will address all the problems and challenges of electoral integrity, rather “crowdsourcing harnesses the power of today’s communication technologies to liberate the potential which exists in large pools of people” (Howe 2008).

Theoretical deficits of traditional election monitoring in terms of small number of observers have been often observed including, their coverage level and released of observation reports in several months later after the election process (Carothers 1997). Citizen participation in election observation and real-time data sharing has inevitably complemented the work of traditional observation missions (Bader 2013; Hellström 2015). The assumption is that the more citizen observers and reporters are deployed in observation process, the greater the number of quality incoming observation reports, and the likelihood in promoting and preventing integrity of elections. Also, the larger the proportions of ordinary citizen observers and reporters of the conduct of electoral process the more inclusive in monitoring democratic events. The broad picture of the conduct of elections through incoming observation reports, likely can promote integrity of elections and general public may understand the situation of the conduct of elections in the country.

#### **4.4 Types of crowdsourced monitoring of elections**

This part presents different types of crowdsourcing, namely: bounded, unbounded and passive crowdsourcing. These typologies of crowdsourcing in the context of elections are used by the crowd sourcers/initiators in the process of engaging ordinary citizens to observe and assess the quality of electoral processes. This entails assessing, observing, capturing, generating and exposing positive and negative experiences of elections using established digital channels of receiving and processing incoming observation information. The crowdsourcers may engage all streams of crowdfeeders in their systems, or initiators may opt for one or two types of the crowd depending on their ability and capacity to handle and

process the large volume of incoming information. Figure 4.1 is a presentation of the three types of crowd-monitors, who are digitally-enabled for collaborative production and dissemination of election observation information. The three types of crowd-monitors are used for monitoring, generating and reporting bad and good feedback of electoral process, and citizen-generated and approved data are visually mapped in a crowdmapping platform.




Figure 4.1 Types of crowd-monitors of elections

Source: own drawing

Figure 4.1 shows passive crowd-monitors, who generate election observation information in the undedicated online crowdsourcing platform such as social media networking sites. But digital volunteers through data mining from online forums or social networks can capture and generate shared information on the online forums. It is arguable that passive crowdsourcing group, comprises majority of the citizen observers and reporters. Unbounded crowd-monitors are engaged through “open-call” to participate in the monitoring and reporting process. Unbounded monitors are invited in the invented space to generate observation data in the dedicated crowd-monitoring platform, but their incoming information are processed for verification by crowd data verifiers. Bounded crowd-monitors are recruited and trained observers to actively participate in monitoring and reporting, as well as verifying incoming reports from unbounded monitors in the field. Unlike passive and unbounded monitors, bounded observers comprise few crowd-monitors, who are also called “trusted” observers, and notably, there is predictability of the reporting structure from

bounded observers. The following part presents three main types of the crowd-monitors in the context of monitoring and reporting electoral contest.

#### **4.4.1 Bounded crowd-monitors**

The term “bounded crowdsourcing” was used by Meier (2009) to distinguish the approach from other methodologies like snowball sampling used in statistics for information or data collection. There are different names to this type of crowdsourcing such as trained, trusted, and defined citizen monitors. According to Meier (2011) bounded crowdsourcing “is to start with a small number of trusted individuals and to have these individuals invite say 3 additional individuals to join the project - individuals who they fully trust and can vouch for”. Bounded crowdsourcing as the method of recruiting trusted network of people is cheaper than the conventional way of recruitment because participants are recommended and attracted by those within their already established network (Meier 2009).

Crowdsourcing initiators work with a group of trained observers and reporters, usually recruited members of established civil society organizations or grassroots non-governmental organizations with a common goal and a common reporting mechanism and framework (Grömping 2013). The rationale for recruiting a bounded group of observers is because “not all citizens can be included in the political process” (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005:29). The process of recruiting bounded observers - purposive approach or snowball method is used to create a trusted network, as well as data verifiers from among members of civil society organizations, government enforcement agencies, media and other election watchdogs so as to generate trustworthy information of electoral incidents and to avoid data bias, data discrimination and false data (Meier 2011). A bounded method increases the likelihood of electoral transparency, accountability and reliability of the crowdsourcing observation reports (Bardall 2010), and also “enhances the quality of data by introducing password protection and limiting the set of users” (Bardall 2010:5).

Institutionalization of bounded crowd-monitors is for monitoring process to be conducted competently and professionally based on the democratic standards or principles of elections (Brabham 2008). The process of generating and reporting the electoral incidents involve both online and offline instruments of participation (Kersting 2012a, 2013a), online method such as SMS-based system, social networks, email, mobile applications and web-form. A bounded group with other sorts of citizen observers collaborate in election watch to capture, generate and communicate verifiable and trustworthy election observation data. It is

noteworthy that during crowdsourcing process “the function of [bounded crowd-monitors] needs to be clearly established, in such a way that it is difficult for [trusted crowd-monitors] to introduce noise into the solution of the problem at hand” (Arias et al. 2015:188). Established election monitoring missions usually deployed trained observers using strict methodology, that include systematic training of Long-Term Observers (LTOs) and Short-Term Observers (STOs), and a design of detailed questionnaires and forms, and clear codes of conduct that can guarantee the success of an observer mission (Grömping 2012). This is also the same case with recruiting and training long term bounded monitors at various stages of the electoral process, and short-term observers on election-day event. To this reason, the values of election monitoring are intensely dependent on the quality of the work of observers through genuine observation data on the conduct of electoral process. Therefore, the impact of election monitoring to electoral process and to the public sphere lies in its ‘articulation of the need of citizens to be informed about the trustworthiness of political actors and the electoral process itself’ (Grömping 2013).

#### **4.4.2 Unbounded crowd-monitors**

Unbounded crowdsourcing simply means that digital communication technologies can be used by anonymous individuals to monitor and report electoral incidents in a digital crowdsourcing platform. Crowd generated observation reports are treated as “untrusted reports”, in which the reports require authentication to determine the genuineness of the incidents before sharing in the crowdmapping platform for public view. This form of crowdsourcing monitoring of elections entails invitation by the crowdsourcers to participate in the invented space. This is the open-call to participate by the crowd sourcers for the ordinary citizens on the ground to submit their feedback observation regarding the conduct of elections across the country. Election observation data are generated through established medium of receiving election reports. Invited crowdmonitors are guided by the crowd sourcers on how to write and send their message, and how to report to the election situation room dedicated for processing observation data. This type of crowdsourcing is also better known as untrained, undefined, open, untrusted crowd-monitors, who voluntarily participate in monitoring and reporting observed incidents with crowd initiators.

The crowd initiators through the use of available and accessible digital communication technological tools encourage members of the public to participate in sending observation reports via different established channels. The crowdsourcers used different types of media,

among others, radio, web-blogs, social networks, Television channels and flyers to disseminate invitation call for crowdsourcing election observation. Election observation reports generated by unbounded crowd-monitors are subjected to geo-location and verification processes to establish the credibility of the information. To handle the volume of reports from unbounded crowdsourcing: “hybrid program could be developed that allows both bounded and unbounded crowdsourcing to take place with a single project, thereby realizing the benefits of both approaches” (Bardall 2010:5). This is due to the fact that bounded crowdmonitors play different roles in election monitoring process: to generate unbiased or credible election observation reports and to verify incoming reports from voluntarily unbounded crowd-monitors. It has been argued that unbounded citizens have a greater diversity and are able to capture incidents that go under the control of trained observers and even the radar of traditional elections monitoring groups (Grömping 2012). It is further argued that established election observers cannot cover all locations in the country and are only present shortly before and after the election periods (Kelley 2010), the same for the bounded monitors are few compared to the unbounded crowd-monitors.

#### **4.4.3 Passive crowd-monitors**

Passive citizen observers share election observation reports in different media platforms not necessarily the medium established by the crowd-initiators for receiving election observation data. The passive group has different ways of observing and exposing election incidents without using, for example, the key words or hashtags designed by the crowd digital volunteers for tracking election observation events on the social media platforms. With the use of their own different key words, this passive group share electoral incidents with other users of the same platform or on their network. The crowd sourcers through digital media team can filter the data shared in the social media ecosystem. Digital media team collect information of electoral incidents from online platforms, or through ‘listening’ to what is being reported in social networks. The digital team collect information from network users pages in the sense that, any time social networks users write anything regarding the conduct of elections in the online forums, in particular by using specified key words by the digital group, it goes to the radar of digital online team, and the incidents will be reported in the data set or election monitoring iHub. The social media team, apart from the key words used for reporting and generating observation data from unbounded stream of reporters, considered other key words for searching election-related information from the social media platforms.

Conversely, Estellés-Arolas and González-Landrón-de-Guevara (2012:194) argued passive group of observers and reporters is not a crowdsourcing initiative. They offer an example of “a user uploading a video to YouTube and sharing it is not a crowdsourcing initiative, while it is when a user uploads a video to any given platform to participate in initiatives” (p.194). But this group is called ‘passive’ crowdsourcing, who are also engaging in electoral matters in their own way. Mechanisms are established by network of crowd sourcers and digital volunteers to capture the relevant and informed reports of electoral conduct in different online platforms, in order to be shared to the other members of the public. The role of digital media team is to filter the work of this group and be able to see this passive citizen group of observers are generating electoral reports that can be shared in their crowdsourcing platform. It is arguable that passive or “uncritical” crowd-monitors is a group that can complain about misconduct of electoral process in a wrong channel, and sometimes they know could have gone a step further by sharing information with relevant offices, rather than complaining in their online networks. With regard to passive or uncritical citizen observers two premises can be generated: one, the uncritical citizen might be unaware of the established channels of reporting election observation events; or second, they are quite aware of the established system of election observation and reporting structure, but they feel that would be helpful and secure for them to share observation incidents within their own networks.

Passive citizen observers are unengaged group of the monitors in the crowdsourcing process and that could possibly be the majority of ordinary citizens on the grassroots. This group of observers do not report incidents to the crowdsourcers, or calling and even sending messages to the medium established and advertised by the initiators, but the group complain in their own online initiated networks, illicit act in the electoral process. Example given by Estelles-Arolas and Gonzalez-Landrón-de-Guevara (2012) implies that passive crowdsourcing is not feeding directly into crowdsourcing systems and they are not directly accountable to the crowd initiators, but they take the incident in the social media networking sites. Passive citizen observers indirectly engaged in the crowdsourcing technologies, through their own networks by feeding in the crowdsourcers system through digital online team. Therefore, crowdsourcing elections monitoring ‘data collection can either be carried out through open or unbounded crowdsourcing (more informal, citizen generated data where participation is non-discriminatory and, in principle, anyone is allowed to submit reports), through bounded crowdsourcing (more systematic and organised method that trained

volunteers, workers or observers undertake), and passive crowdsourcing (data mining from social networks) or from a combination of both' (Hellström 2015:3).

#### **4.5 Crowdsourcing in the digital age and why it matters**

Digital crowdsourcing and “the possibility for citizens to consult political information [especially with regard to election monitoring data] is the most widespread function delivered by the new information and communication technologies. Information can be disseminated more effectively, and the democratic objectives of transparency, for example, can be achieved more easily” (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004:4). Crowdsourced method for observing, generating and reporting election information was initiated in 2010 in the East African countries, especially in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The method was introduced by the partnerships of election stakeholders such as non-partisan monitoring organizations, namely CRECO in Kenya, TACCEO in Tanzania and CEW-IT in Uganda, in collaboration with Ushahidi/Uchaguzi technology developers. The partnership launched Uchaguzi platform for election watch in East Africa region. The aim of the platform is to assist in the creation of a more rapid capturing and disseminating electoral incidents digital technological tools for early alert warning system in monitoring process. Additionally, it brings in the voices of citizens to the electoral monitoring through crowdsourcing methodology (CRECO 2013).

Crowdsourced integrity of elections different from other crowdsourcing practices like in business model, where the method may be perceived as “outsourcing” or a process of exploiting citizen intelligence by company or organization for profit making (Brabham 2008), in election monitoring, crowdsourced is used voluntarily for detecting and deterring problems of electoral integrity, which in one way or the other, has effect and impact in the conduct of elections. In monitoring elections crowdsourced is used to solve problems of electoral integrity and to ensure credibility of the elections in order to promote trust and legitimacy of the elected leaders (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014). Initially, crowdsourcing emerged in business model as a way of collecting ‘smart ideas’ from the undefined group of people to solve problems related to business (Howe 2006, 2008). The central concern of crowdsourcing method is to direct problems to the undefined group through open call approach in such as way their idea will be useful for action in addressing outsourced problem. Underlying such concern crowdsourcing method has been used in monitoring to address problems of elections with integrity. Citizens are engaged in observing and generating related reports of positive and negative experiences of elections.



This trend is used in developing or transitional democracies using digital communication technologies (Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015; Lazarus and Saraf 2015).

The spread of modern liberal democracies leads to competitive elections and participation of voters in voting process (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004). And it has been argued that “if a country holds competitive, multiparty elections, we call it democratic” (Zakaria 1997:25). Though, it is arguable that the notion of competitive election is found among “adherence to “thin” Schumpeterian conceptions of democracy” (Norris 2014:7). However, it is worth to mention that liberal democracy opens up doors for election monitoring groups to observe the adherence to the democratic standards and principles of elections because “monitoring can increase fairness in elections” (Callen and Long 2015:356). Since then, election monitoring has become a global norm (Hyde 2011b), we have witnessed the number of electoral democracies that has been increasing from almost (5%) in 1985 to nearly (52%) in 2012, but contrary to expectations – there is a decline in the percentage of elections that are free and fair (Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 shows as the numbers of electoral democracies are increasing, the certification of elections that are free and fair has been decreasing on the other hand. The level of free and fair elections decreased from nearly (70%) in 1991 to almost (40%) in 2012. The trend suggests the conduct of electoral democracies has been encountered with incidences of electoral fraud, or violation of agreed standards of conducting elections. In an environment of free and fair election the “electoral rules and their implementation leading up to an election enable all adult citizens to be registered, to exercise their right to vote, and join political parties and to campaign freely” (World Bank Group 2016:171-172). The opposite of this can lead to electoral malpractices, and finally manipulation of the electoral process and certification of non-free and unfair electoral contests (Table 4.1). On one side, as the percentage of elections that are free and fair has been decreasing from (73.8%) in 1991 to (38.0%) in 2012, on the other side, the percentage of elections that are not free and not fair has been increasing from (7.1%) in 1991 to (34.7%) in 2012. This implies that the electoral contests are marred with fraud and other irregularities. Also, there are instances of elections that are not free and fair, and free and not fair, as well as not free and not fair in the modern electoral democracies around the world (see presentation of data Table 4.1).




Figure 4.2 Democracies and elections, 1985-2012

Source: World Bank Group (2016:172).

Table 4.1 Democracy has spread, but so have election irregularities

Year	Number of electoral democracies	Elections that are <i>free and fair</i>	Elections that are <i>free and not fair</i>	Elections that are <i>not free and fair</i>	Elections that are <i>not free and not fair</i>
1991	28	73.8%	2.4%	16.7%	7.1%
1992	34	64.1%	5.7%	13.2%	17.0%
1993	35	60.6%	4.5%	19.7%	15.2%
1994	39	57.7%	4.2%	25.4%	12.7%
1995	37	54.1%	5.4%	24.3%	16.2%
1996	37	50.0%	4.9%	26.8%	18.3%
1997	38	54.1%	2.4%	28.2%	15.3%
1998	37	46.5%	1.2%	24.4%	27.9%
1999	38	53.7%	1.1%	18.3%	26.9%
2000	37	53.2%	1.0%	15.6%	30.2%
2001	39	59.2%	1.0%	9.7%	30.1%
2002	41	61.0%	2.7%	7.1%	29.2%
2003	40	61.4%	3.5%	7.0%	28.1%
2004	46	57.7%	5.4%	5.4%	31.5%
2005	49	51.7%	5.2%	7.8%	35.3%
2006	52	48.5%	6.9%	11.5%	33.1%
2007	51	45.5%	10.6%	10.6%	33.3%
2008	54	44.7%	13.3%	14.0%	28.0%
2009	52	45.7%	11.8%	17.0%	25.5%
2010	52	45.2%	11.6%	15.8%	27.4%
2011	54	39.3%	10.4%	17.0%	33.3%
2012	52	38.0%	8.3%	19.0%	34.7%

Source: World Bank Group (2016)<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Data limited to low-income, lower-middle income and upper-middle income countries, for which election data are available. Available from <http://www.worldbank.org/wdr2016>

Digital crowdsourcing or liberation technologies is a promising method in monitoring, capturing, exposing and publishing electoral irregularities or manipulation and positive incidences on the conduct of elections (Diamond 2010). It is arguably the problems of electoral integrity or illicit acts of election stakeholders that lead to the elections that are not free and not fair can be easily detected by the network of digitally empowered citizens' observers and reporters of the electoral incidents. Because the growth of "information technology has changed who can gain access to and deliver information. Now, everyone in a network can simultaneously share information" (Livingston 2011:10-11). The use of invented crowdsourcing platforms helped to promote participation and integrity of election because "although not evaluated, the use of crowdsourcing by Ushahidi and its successor Uchaguzi, combined with civil society monitoring, advocacy, and partnerships with government, has helped curtail election violence in Kenya" (World Bank Group 2016:172).




Figure 4.3 Internet use and perceptions of electoral integrity, 2015

Source: World Bank Group (2016:172).

Also, digital crowdsourcing in other countries such as Mozambique, short message services were used by citizens to report electoral irregularities, and in Afghanistan the monitoring of voting process at the polling stations using "cell-phone photographs of vote totals in polling stations reduced electoral fraud in the vote aggregation process" (World Bank Group 2016:172). Figure 4.3 presents the correlation of perceptions of electoral

integrity and internet use, but it is worth noting that data are limited to low-income and upper-middle income countries for which election data were available by 2015. The graphical presentation shows digital communication technologies make election freer and fairer, because of the positive correlation between internet use and perceptions of electoral integrity score in most low-income and middle-income countries (World Bank Group 2016).

Figure 4.4 is the test of the digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity score in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Middle East for the data available up to the mid-September 2016. The aim of analysis is to show whether perceptions of electoral integrity correlates with the adoption of digital technologies, and thus may strengthening elections with integrity using crowdsourced technologies. The results show in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda there is somewhat relationship between digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity. Kenya is somewhere in the middle in the digital adoption index compared to Tanzania and Uganda, and Kenya is about in the middle of electoral integrity. But there is moderate level of digital adoption index in Tanzania and Uganda, and integrity of election is somewhat above the middle in Tanzania, and below the middle in Uganda.




Figure 4.4 Digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity, 2016

Source: World Bank Group (2016) Digital Adoption Index data; Norris et al. (2016b) Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Score, (PEI-4.5).

It is worth noting that the matrix used electoral integrity data of different types of regimes such as democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies irrespective of low, middle and high income countries and developed, developing or transitional democracies, because problems of electoral integrity is a challenges to all regimes (Norris 2014, 2015). This is the case of perceptions of electoral integrity index in autocratic country like Rwanda is 64, compared to democratic countries such as United States with 62 index and Austria 77 index of electoral integrity, meaning “high to very high electoral integrity” (60+) (Norris et al. 2016a).

There is a growing evidence of mobile ICT world-wide whereby citizen in all types of regimes can use mobile short code and short message services to generate and report events across the electoral cycle. This is because crowdsourced citizen-based technologies may be used to create fear to the stakeholders in manipulating elections, knowing that there are “many eyes” watching their illicit act in interfering electoral process. In addition, figure 4.4 shows the adoption of digital technologies there is a likelihood of promoting electoral integrity using available ICT infrastructure to the people, business and government. Citizen participation in democratic process will promote and increase participation for ordinary citizens and take part in safeguarding the integrity of elections as key stakeholders in the process (World Bank Group 2016).

There are various reasons as to why citizens should be engaged in the invented spaces through digital technologies including among other things: to promote peaceful conduct of elections (Bertot et al. 2010; Bock 2012; Trujillo et al. 2014), enhance citizen participation in democratic spaces (Fung 2011; Kersting 2012a, 2013a, 2014; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015; Lazarus and Saraf 2015), and citizens are more aware of many incidences of the conduct of elections (Norris 2014), but also citizens are everywhere so they can be able to expose many electoral incidences (Bader 2013; Grömping 2014) and capable of observing across the electoral cycle (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014, 2015). Though, there is a growing recognition and literature of this basic deployment of citizen sensors on electoral processes (Bardall 2010; Fung 2011; Bader 2013; Grömping 2013, 2014; Tuccinardi and Balme 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Arias et al. 2015; Hellström 2015; Lazarus and Saraf 2015) just to mention a few; we remain poorly informed about the process and outputs of crowdsourcing techniques, and whether crowdsourced techniques capture and communicate both negative and positive feedback act of electoral process. This is because one central question for those who build popular election-

monitoring platforms is “whether such efforts should aim to identify problems only – and so whether users should only report negative experiences – or whether they should also report positive experiences and rate their voting experience overall” (Fung 2011:2005).

There are initiatives of different scholars attempted to examine crowdsourced method in monitoring electoral process. The work of Bailard and Livingston (2014) explored the capacity of new information and communication technologies in facilitating crowdsourced monitoring of elections, especially in promoting accountability in the 2011 Nigerian election. They observed that “controlling for a number of factors, we find that the number and nature of crowdmap reports generated by citizens is significantly correlated with increased voter turnout in the 2011 Nigerian presidential election as a result of providing officials with improved information about the functionality of local polling stations” (Bailard and Livingston 2014:349). The study serves the positive contribution of crowdsourcing method and how ICT instrument can be used to share actionable election information from the grassroots to inform the authorities such as electoral management bodies about electoral process. They found that the result of deploying “crowdsourced information led to the reallocation of resources to specific polling stations (those found to be in some way defective by information provided by crowdsourced information) in preparation for the presidential election” (Bailard and Livingston 2014:350).

Bader (2013) assessed the collective ability of the citizen contributors in the 2011-2012 Russian elections, and found information contained on the crowdsourcing platform “when properly analysed, enhances our insight into how elections in Russia are manipulated” (Bader 2013:1). The question addressed was how effective is crowdsourcing as a tool for collecting credible information about election fraud? Especially observers were effective in detecting fraud in polling stations on election-day. Therefore, generated reports before election-day phase were left out in the sample of the reports used in the analysis.

There are limited studies and articles on crowdsourcing monitoring method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Available literature in Kenya mainly focuses on crowdsourcing prevention of election violence using information and communication technologies. This was a study by Bock (2012:124) who observed “georeferencing events data create the potential to identify violence or potential violence at a specific location. Ushahidi is a leader of using crowdsourcing for early warning at a local level”. In their part, Trujillo et al. (2014) explored how ICT contributed to the mitigation of election-related violence in the 2013 Kenya elections. They observed that a notable characteristic of the Kenyan 2013 elections

was the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in various public and private efforts to address the threat of violence related to the elections (Trujillo et al. 2014:109).

In Uganda the work of Hellström (2015) examined how and under what conditions access to ICT tools such as mobile devices and crowdsourcing platform can be useful for political participation, especially key factors that influence users' and concerns users have with respect to using mobile phones and crowdsourcing platforms. The study found with expanded mobile coverage and access to mobile devices and services in mind, and using the concept of open crowdsourcing, the platform such as UgandaWatch was launched prior to the 2011 general elections with the intention to meet the demand, to offer increased equality of political participation, and to advance efforts toward increased citizen engagement in Uganda (Hellström 2015). Open crowdsourcing platform like UgandaWatch in 2011 general election complement traditional ways of observing and reporting political activities.

In Tanzania, the work by Shayo and Kersting (2017) attempted to analyse the ability of trained crowdmonitors to detect pre-election activities, especially voter education and mobilization activities of women, youth and people with disabilities to participate in the electoral processes during 2015 Tanzania general elections. They studied the role of trained crowdmonitors, and left other types of crowdmonitors such as unbounded and passive crowdsourcing in their analysis using Uchaguzi Wetu 2015 crowdsourcing platform. The findings show technology usage and invented space enhances crowdmonitoring in generating pre-election observation information that goes beyond the radar of international election observation mission, specifically European Union Election Observation Mission.

Despite the fact that studies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have explored the use of ICTs in electoral process and violence still crowdsourced monitoring needs to be analysed in the three countries. This is because none of the studies have analysed citizen-generated voices in the *Uchaguzi* systems related to the detection of positive and negative conduct of elections across the cycle, especially remarkable the ability of crowdmonitors in detecting election fraud. It is still not clear what groups of crowd were engaged, and how they were engaged in reporting the actions of electoral stakeholders as well as observation information generated by each group of crowdmonitors. Given the rapid growth of crowdsourced technologies, more participatory innovative styles are developed, more citizen election monitors and reporters are engaged, more observation reports are generated and more reports are mapped in open source platform in real-time for public to see what is happening

and, “there is little doubt that the future will bring more, perhaps many more, popular election-monitoring projects” (Fung 2011:207). Therefore, understanding the crowdsourced method and citizen-generated voices for the previous citizen engagement in monitoring will be an important ingredient in the future digital crowdsourcing system in the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and even other regional East African countries.

In addition, studies have analysed whether the presence of established observers in certain electoral districts successfully “reduces, or simply displaces, fraudulent practices. Whereas a growing body of scholarly and evidence-based applied research has evaluated the effectiveness of international monitors, far less systematic work has assessed the impact of domestic monitors, media watch, and “crowd-sourcing” social media initiatives, as well as many other strategies and programs” (Norris 2014:200). There is little evidence on the literature as to whether studies have addressed process and outputs of crowdsourcing techniques, challenges and potential of digital crowdsourcing method. That is why this research puts forward that “research can help future efforts address some of the main challenges facing popular election monitoring: participation bias, gaming, constructive comparison, and integration with regulatory and news organizations” (Fung 2011:204). The surveyed literature that have focused on the developing or transitional democracies (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015) are yet to analyse citizen-generated voices across the electoral cycle, and observation reports generated by different streams of crowdmonitors in the invented spaces. From this trend, it is clear that, there are issues that need further analysis in crowdsourcing method using comparative approach.

On one hand, literature acknowledged the role of crowdsourcing technologies, but on the other hand, concluded there are still issues research needs to address (Fung 2011). And given the rapid growth of digital communication technologies in developing and emerging democracies, especially diffusion of mobile technologies in East African countries, non-partisan election monitoring groups together with other election stakeholders are continuing to engage ordinary citizens in sensing election incidents (Hellström 2015). The fact that there was invented Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform for elections watch in East Africa using ICT tools in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections, ordinary citizens must be empowered and permitted to “seek, receive, and impart information on the election process in order to establish the credibility of elections, which requires that election processes be transparent and accessible to observers. Thus, it is only when the electoral



process is transparent and when citizens have information about the conduct of the election that citizen fully exercises their right to vote” (Schuler 2008:145).

Evidence presented in Table 4.2 indicates that digital communication technologies on citizen empowerment have made elections freer and fairer by improving voter registration and reducing errors in voting, and by better monitoring them to curb electoral fraud and violence (World Bank Group 2016:171). With emerging crowdsourcing method, citizen observers can certainly promote and protect the integrity of elections. Citizen engagement in elections using digital technologies helped in detecting and preventing illicit networks of stakeholders who in one way or the other intended to rig the electoral process (Bader 2013). But digital technologies may give corrupt politicians and other elites “new ways of manipulating information to their advantage in election campaigns” (World Bank Group 2016:171). ICT tools can be used by ordinary citizens to reduce errors and detecting fraud in voting process as well as lack of election information.

Table 4.2 The impact of digital technology on citizen empowerment: A scorecard

Channel	Impact of technology	Main problem to address	Do digital technologies solve the problem?
Free and Fair elections	<b>H</b>	Lack of information; high transaction costs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes, monitoring reduces errors and fraud in voting</li> </ul>
More informed voting	<b>M</b>	Information asymmetries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Yes, for blatant abuses of office; no, for less newsworthy public service failures</li> <li>• Increase ability of elites to manipulate information</li> </ul>
Greater citizen voice	<b>L</b>	Collective action failures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Effective only when governments are already willing to listen to citizens</li> <li>• Must be complemented by office mobilization by civil society groups</li> </ul>

Note: Channels are arranged by degree of technology impact. L=low; M=medium; H=high

Source: World Bank Group (2016:171).

Digital crowdsourced method is a new way for collective action in capturing and communicating the conduct of the electoral process (Bader 2013). Little research works look at the value of crowdsourced citizen-based observation data. This study will put forward generated observation data from different types of citizen observers and reporters, regarding the conduct of elections in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Learning from experience of those earlier studies (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Grömping 2014; Hellström 2015; Lazarus and Saraf 2015), the present research extends the focus from established observers reports and experts surveys data to analyse big election data generated by the citizen-oriented monitoring in comparative perspective. Having access to the

Uchaguzi crowdsourced datasets in the three countries, and using semi-structured interviews, as well as documents analysis, crowdsourced method and citizen-generated voices will be analysed and documented in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

#### **4.6 Introducing digital Uchaguzi crowdsourcing cases**

Monitoring of electoral procedures by non-partisan civic groups has evolved significantly in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014). According to Global Commission (2012:42) non-partisan citizen groups have “successfully monitored elections in over 90 countries, and have made critical contributions to improving the quality of elections. Citizen monitoring groups are increasingly playing a front-line role in advocating for electoral reform, monitoring election violence, and educating citizens about elections”. Uchaguzi crowdsourcing project is a launch to a regional effort to bring transparency and citizen participation to elections in East Africa, and non-partisan civic group partnerships, coupled with technology teams that worked closely with each other, is the primary reason for Uchaguzi and this initiative will help provide guidance in how to proceed down a path of strategic and continuous improvement in monitoring electoral contest (CRECO 2010).

Uchaguzi is a product of Ushahidi software that was initially developed to map reports of violence in Kenya after the post-election crisis at the end of 2007 and beginning of 2008. Ushahidi platform has grown from a simple information website to a fully-fledged platform that specializes in developing free and open source software for information collection, data visualization and interactive mapping of geo-tagged information. During and after electoral violence in Kenya 2007-2008, there was a lack of information flow about post-election violence, and as a result, Ushahidi software was developed to gather information from various places through text messages, emails and other web-based forms in order to display it on a google map so that the public can see what is happening. Ushahidi platform in 2008 was initiated to perform as a violence prevention tool by monitoring and reporting hate speech and mapping incidents of violence in Kenya (Omenya 2013).

It is worth noting that crowdsourcing technologies can assist in monitoring and rapid reporting of election events and early warning in electoral monitoring processes (Bader 2013; Bailard and Livingston 2014; Hellström 2015). The use of ICT-based in the monitoring of electoral processes in East African region was initiated in 2010 by civil society organizations, technology developers and other stakeholders (CRECO 2010). The programme of monitoring elections called “Election Watch for East Africa 2010-2013” was

initiated under the brand name of Uchaguzi to promote citizen participation in election observation using digital technologies (CRECO 2010; Omenya 2013; Omenya and Crandall 2013). This was a result of collaboration of different partners in the area of ICT, governance and election monitoring to map out common interests and concerns, possible interventions and formulate roadmaps through which each stakeholder could engage in the elections processes (CRECO 2010; Omenya 2013).

Uchaguzi web platform was initiated to serve various stakeholders such as observers, civil society organizations, community-based organisations and citizens as a platform for mapping election events (Omenya 2013). Additionally, Uchaguzi was a collaboration of Hivos Foundation and Sodnet as well as other partners from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Omenya and Crandall 2013). The aim was to develop a digital crowdsourcing platform for electoral stakeholders to send and receive reports of what has been witnessed to a data center to be verified, processed and displayed on a map in near-real time. Uchaguzi used to enable voters to monitor and report electoral matters, among others, hate speech in campaigning, vote counting and results, polling station logistics, materials, equipment and ballot issues across the electoral cycle (IDEA 2014a).

Uchaguzi platform for election monitoring was agreed to be implemented in different periods in the three countries of the founding East African Community with the theme of upcoming elections in Tanzania 2010, Uganda 2011 and Kenya 2013 (Omenya 2013). The Constitutional Referendum in Kenya 2010 was a pre-test of Uchaguzi platform that was to be used in the electoral processes for the East African countries (CRECO 2010). After the Constitutional Referendum in Kenya 2010, Uchaguzi platform was deployed in Tanzania 2010 general election and serve as a reflection to Uganda 2011 and Kenya 2013 general elections. In the process of developing Uchaguzi as a customization of Ushahidi platform, members from civil society organizations were involved from each partner country such as CRECO in Kenya, CEW-IT in Uganda and TACCEO in Tanzania. And non-partisan election monitoring groups deployed a hybrid model of crowdsourcing and ICT-enabled citizen monitors. Therefore, Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda used to visualize elections related incidences before, during and after e-day and intervene where possible through sharing generated and verified data with relevant authorities for actions and feedback.

Initiatives for digital crowdsourced monitoring of elections for sensing electoral incidences match with Larry Diamond (2010) concept of “liberation technology”. In other

words, the concept of liberation technology is similar to Uchaguzi in the sense that it “enables citizens to report news, expose wrongdoing, express opinions, monitor elections, deepen participation, and expand the horizons of freedom” (Diamond 2010:70). It can be rightly argued that Uchaguzi crowdsourcing method in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections serve as an example of Larry Diamond concept of liberation technology as “any form of information and communication technology (ICT) that can expand political, social, and economic freedom. In the contemporary era, it means essentially the modern, interrelated forms of digital ICT - the computer, the internet, the mobile phone, and countless innovative applications for them, including “new social media” such as Facebook and Twitter. Digital ICT has some exciting advantages over earlier technologies. The Internet’s decentralized character and ability (along with mobile-phone networks) to reach large numbers of people very quickly, are well suited to grassroots organizing” (Diamond 2010:70).

#### **4.6.1 Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 election**

The launch of *Uchaguzi Kenya 2013* crowdsourcing platform aimed to empower citizen to monitor, generate and report the conduct of elections to ensure freeness, fairness, peaceful and credible electoral process (Omenya 2013). The inclusion of citizen monitors through Uchaguzi and its possibilities of crowdmapping voices of citizens offer a means for promoting integrity of electoral processes. This means that Uchaguzi brought forth a new era of partnerships between electoral stakeholders and ordinary citizens. Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 was launched by Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), Ushahidi, Hivos Foundation and support from Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) (Omenya and Crandall 2013).

CRECO as the main crowdsourcer in Kenya is a network of civil society organizations that belong to the broad human rights governance and democracy category of NGOs (Omenya 2013). CRECO’s membership comprises 25 civil society organizations united under the vision of a just society. CRECO membership is drawn from urban and rural-based NGOs working in eight provinces of Kenya (CRECO 2013). CRECO has been engaged in the electoral component of governance work and, in 2010 during referendum on the constitution - in partnership with Ushahidi and the Social Development Network (SODNET) carried out monitoring of the constitutional referendum. This exercise piloted the use of crowdsourcing and ICT as a complement to traditional observation of democratic

process. CRECO members such as Citizen Coalition for Constitution Culture (4Cs), Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION), and Community Based Development Services (COBADES) were part of monitoring process.

#### 4.6.1.1 Digital communication channels

The web platform for Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 was [www.uchaguzi.co.ke](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ke) (figure 4.5). There were various digital technology tools initiated for the citizens to send their observation reports related to negative and positive events. These media of generating observation data were used by both bounded and unbounded citizen observers. But bounded monitors and reporters were registered with SMS short code number in the Uchaguzi system as “trusted” monitors and source of credible observation information.




Figure 4.5 Screenshot of Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 crowdmap

Source: CRECO (2013:16).

Digital tools used for citizen participation in election observation included SMS-based system, by which the citizens sent short messages to the short code number 3002 which was only designed for members of the public within Kenya. Another tool was Twitter by which the public sent tweet through twitter @uchaguzi with the hashtag #uchaguzi. Citizen monitors and reporters could also use Facebook page named:

facebook.com/UchaguziKenya2013; by sending an email to: reports.uchaguzi [at] gmail.com and by using smartphone applications, either using iOS platform by installing the free Uchaguzi application for iPhone and iPad or using the android platform by installing the free Uchaguzi application for android-powered phones and tablets; and also citizen observers can send their reports using Uchaguzi web-form. Sharing observation and citizen-generated information about the conduct of the electoral process the following channels were used: Twitter - @uchaguzi, Instagram - #uchaguzi #kenya365, and Google+ Uchaguzi page. Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform was divided into sub-groups such as online digital response teams, media monitoring, translation, SMS reports, report management, verification, geo-location, mapping and technology team.

#### **4.6.2 Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 election**

*Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015* crowdsourcing platform was deployed for monitoring and crowd-mapping incoming reports and geo-tagging incidents of electoral processes. Like Kenya, Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 platform was powered by Ushahidi software. The crowdsourcing monitoring of election in Tanzania was initiated and deployed by Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) under its programme called Tanzania Election Observation Centre (TEOC) used to monitor and report events of election and near-real time mapping of the generated and approved reports. TEOC is information and communication technologies centre established by TACCEO and Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) with a common objective of monitoring the 2015 Tanzania electoral process. According to TACCEO (undated) the objectives of establishing TEOC are as follows:

- i. To establish a one point of election information access hub where citizens can access information about the electoral process in Tanzania through establishment of partnerships with other information sources such as media houses and the citizens themselves.
- ii. To empower citizens to observe and monitor their own elections, establish platforms to amplify their voices when they report on election issues happening in their communities, issues which can thereafter be forwarded to the responsible authorities for action, and
- iii. To establish a virtual space where citizens can meet and discuss the going-on election; airing out their views, asks, demands, satisfactions and dissatisfactions.

Sharing about what is currently going on in their areas and how they think the process can be improved or made better to ensure a free and fair election.

It is worth mentioning that in Tanzania 2015 general election there were two crowdsourcing platforms for monitoring the conduct of election. The *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform was solely used for receiving observation report from bounded/trained citizen observers and reporters (Shayo and Kersting 2017). The platform was limited to bounded citizen and not for other unbounded members of the public to submit their observation reports. Interestingly, the platform was jointly run by TACCEO and Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) for observing, generating and reporting election incidents via mobile SMS-based services and magpi mobile application. TEMCO is a leading traditional domestic organisation with a long history and experience of monitoring all the multi-party elections in Tanzania. The first multiparty election was held in 1995 and TEMCO was the domestic election observer that plays the role of monitoring the conduct of election across the broad range of electoral cycle, and assisting in improving the fairness, freeness and credibility of the elections. Also, TEMCO conducts opinion polls-to bring on board public opinion on various political matters in Tanzania. TACCEO deployed *Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015* crowdsourcing platform for both streams of citizen monitors and reporters (bounded and unbounded). But *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform was used to generate structured data for pre-election and election-day from group of trained monitors deployed jointly by TACCEO and TEMCO (Shayo and Kersting 2017).

Initially, the partnership between TACCEO and TEMCO known as Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania (CEMOT) was to involve the use of trained and untrained crowdsourcing monitoring of election. The platform advertises the type of media that could be used for submitting the reports from the public through Twitter account: Twitter hashtag #uchaguziwetu15, Facebook page named: uchaguziwetu2015, Instagram account named: uchaguziwetu2015, YouTube account named: uchaguziwetu2015 and email account to: sema [at] uchaguziwetu2015.org. But, the initiative ended up with producing data from trained observers in the field for pre-election and election-day incidents. As one ICT team member described that the project of engaging other streams of crowdsourcing failed because of the uncoordinated efforts and last minute nightmares of engaging a large group of people without clear established strategies. The generated data from trained observers on *Uchaguzi Wetu 2015* platform were crowd-mapped on election-day, and thereafter, the platform rarely could be accessed online.

#### 4.6.2.1 Digital communication channels

As regards the 2015 general election, TACCEO created different mediums to access some of the collected and shared observation information, and channels of receiving incoming observation data from the field observers and reporters of the electoral process. These channels includes crowdsourcing platform [www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz](http://www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz); Uchaguzi 2015 TV [www.uchaguzitv.info](http://www.uchaguzitv.info); Twitter <https://twitter.com/ChaguziTanzania> and Facebook page <https://www.facebook.com/chaguzitanzania>. In addition, crowd initiators established various channels through which observation data could be submitted. These data were subjected to verification process.

For the ordinary citizen monitors to submit their observation reports, several types of online media were created to give them access and opportunity to share their observation. These includes by sending short message services to number 0758606162 or 0653775995, or by using mobile applications through installing mobile application for iPhone and android users in their smartphones. Also citizen monitors could send email to the address [uchaguziinfo \[at\] gmail.com](mailto:uchaguziinfo@gmail.com) or alternatively, fill web form available on the crowdsourcing platform. The social networks accounts were created for collecting incoming reports such as Twitter follow by @ChaguziTanzania, sharing reports using hashtag #TaarifazauchaguziTanzania, and Facebook page – Taarifa Za Uchaguzi Tanzania.

Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 platform was designed to receive citizen observation reports and disseminate submitted reports as well. The ICT infrastructure designed in figure 4.6 was used as a one-stop sourcing of Uchaguzi election observation information aiming at promoting citizens journalism as well as mainstreaming the marginalized voices. It was also used, to support and promote the use of crowdsourcing systems to motive ordinary citizens to participate and amplify their voices for the Tanzanian 2015 general elections (LHRC and TACCEO 2016).

Figure 4.6 one-stop sourcing of the Uchaguzi Tanzania platform - public users of the platform have different options to access the crowdsourcing platform for observation reports from the field, by watching Uchaguzi TV used to collect citizen opinion regarding the process of elections, to access approved and shared citizen-generated reports on the Twitter account and Facebook page created by the crowd-sourcer.





Figure 4.6 Screenshot of one-stop sourcing of Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015

Source: <http://www.uchaguzi.info.tz> [04 January 2016]



Figure 4.7 Screenshot of Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowdmap

Source: [www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz](http://www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz) [04 January 2016]

Figure 4.7 shows Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform for geo-tagged generated observation data by citizen monitors and reporters from different places in the country. The users of Uchaguzi Tanzania crowdsourcing platform can read the uploaded reports, look for location of the incoming reports, can submit reports, and anyone can register in the platform to get alert of hot spot information like violence and demonstration

### **4.6.3 Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 election**

*Uchaguzi Uganda 2011* platform for crowdsourcing method was implemented by Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) to monitor the 2011 Ugandan general elections. Civil society showed itself to be vibrant and committed to supporting the democratic process. The Electoral Commission “accredited 39 domestic observation missions. Of these, Democracy Monitoring Group and Citizens Election Watch in particular carried out long-term observation and provided a regular platform to improve citizens’ awareness of the process” (EU EOM 2011:8). CEW-IT set up a customized version of the Ushahidi called Uchaguzi Uganda which was used to monitor incidences of electoral offences and visualization of crowd generated observation data (Hellström and Karefett 2012). CEW-IT was established in 2010 in the run up to the general election of Uganda 2011 with an aspect of ICT to get near real life reporting on issues that are happening and real time feedback action and response.

Uchaguzi Uganda platform provided citizens an opportunity to monitor the conduct of elections and offer data on the conduct of electoral processes via communication technology tools, especially sms-based system and web-form system. CEW-IT as a crowdsourcing CSOs had the role of receiving generated observation data, processing through verification, and providing feedback to the crowd based on the observations of the reported incidents of electoral processes through crowdmapping platform. Although “CEW-IT did carry out classic election observation, its main strength was its participation in the management of two web-based platforms, such as [www.uchaguzi.co.ug](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ug) and [www.ugandawatch2011.org](http://www.ugandawatch2011.org), both of which enabled observers and members of the public to post observations through sending text messages, using mobile phone (EO EOM 2011:33). Like in Tanzania, in Uganda there were two crowdsourcing platforms used to monitor the conduct of electoral process. The other platform was UgandaWatch2011 crowdsourced operated by Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGGroup). DEMGroup engaged citizen monitors and reporters to share their observation in the UgandaWatch2011 platform. But different from Uchaguzi,

UgandaWatch2011 also focused on collecting statistical data for voting and results from polling stations known as Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT). On election-day, DEMGroup deployed about 5250 observers in the polling stations across Uganda (EU EOM 2011).

#### 4.6.3.1 Digital communication channels

The crowdsourcing web platform for Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 general election was [www.uchaguzi.co.ug](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ug) (Figure 4.8). Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 general elections witnessed two main established communication channels for submitting observation data from citizen observers and reporters. The communication channels deployed were mainly sms-texting services and web-form. No evidence of social networks uses during 2011 general elections on the Uchaguzi crowdsourced citizen-generated observation reports.




Figure 4.8 Screenshot of Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 crowdmap

Source: [www.rwenzoripeoplesvoice.org](http://www.rwenzoripeoplesvoice.org) [23 May 2015]

## 4.7 Chapter summary

This chapter presents an overview of crowdsourced elections monitoring in the digital age. The chapter presented the concept of crowdsourcing that take into account the use of open call to invite large group of people to participate in election monitoring using digital participatory technologies. The three types of crowdsourcing briefly presented herein include: bounded, unbounded and passive crowdsourcing. The chapter also reviews some

literature on crowdsourced election monitoring. The rationale for digital crowdsourced elections monitoring were presented with some evidence. In addition, this chapter introduced digital Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and highlighted how Uchaguzi technology helps to engage ordinary citizens in monitoring and reporting the conduct of democratic processes in the three countries.

The analysis of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing cases in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda showed that Uchaguzi open-source software was developed for monitoring elections in the three countries. The software was used in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections. The initiators of Uchaguzi platform were civil societies in the three countries collaborating with Ushahidi technology team in Nairobi, Kenya. Uchaguzi platform in the three countries was deployed for uploading and visualizing approved reports from the crowd observers in the field. Thus, Uchaguzi software in the three countries election cycle was an online invented space for collaborative production and reporting tool of positive and negative electoral incidents. Crowd-initiators developed different communication channels for receiving observation from citizen observers. For example, in Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 elections, crowdsourced initiators designed tools like social networks accounts, mobile sms, mobile short code number, web form, email and smartphone applications, but in Uganda developed mainly two channels – mobile sms-texting and web form services.

This chapter also presents why it matters to source the crowd in monitoring electoral process in the digital age, in order to promote adherence to global norms on democratic elections. This is because crowdsourcing system is facilitated by the rapid growth of electronic devices, especially mobile phones in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - used by citizen observers to communicate sourced activities of monitoring integrity of electoral processes. Given the growth diffusion of digital participatory technologies and innovation, the following chapter will offer an overview of digital tools that can be deployed as enablers for ordinary citizens to participate in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents.

## **5 Mapping Digital Participatory Communication Technologies**

### **5.1 Introduction**

Before this research can plausibly argue that digital crowdsourced method to engage citizens in monitoring - generates electoral incidents to promote electoral integrity, this chapter must confirm digital communication tools and innovation, is in fact, available, accessible and usable by the people. Importantly, digital technology tools is ubiquitous new form of political engagement and inclusion, especially in monitoring and communicating electoral incidents, apart from participation in the norms of voting. In this regard, this chapter explores and compares infrastructure and widespread use of digital communication technology tools in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. But before presentation of specific cases of digital technologies in the three countries, this chapter offer a global-regional overview of digital participatory technologies. The comparisons produce useful knowledge about digital technology diffusion in East Africa used by political entrepreneurs for political engagement. This analysis and comparisons provide an understanding that widespread use of and access to digital tools, especially mobile phones technology is enhancer for crowdsourced monitoring of election integrity in developing democracies, and inclusion of ordinary citizens in electoral politics. The diffusion of digital tools suggest specific type of technology can effectively and efficiently be used for inclusion in politics, and to offer the reason why certain form of technology was used in the three countries for crowdsourced method. Thus, one aim of using digital tools and methods in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents has been to improve election integrity by engaging citizens to share their feedback with regard to the conduct of electoral processes in their respective country.

The focus of this chapter is on digital technologies and its usage. Mapping of digital tools helps in understanding specific election information generated by crowdsourced citizen observers using communication technologies (Chapter 7). In this case, this chapter presents overview of global trends in digital communication technologies, and focuses on mapping communication technology tools in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The analysis focuses on digital divide on internet, mobile and fixed telephone subscriptions, the use of social networks, especially Facebook and mobile money transfer system as well. The chapter further present survey findings on the access to and use of ICT tools. Additionally, the chapter examine access to news media such as internet news, television, radios, social networks and newspapers.

## 5.2 Digital divide or digital inclusion?

The foundation of technological determinism based on the fact that any society is changed by development of technology (Chadwick 2006). In this regard, Chadwick (2006) observed two perspective of technological determinism: first, pessimistic technological determinism which claims that development of digital communication technology tools does not change the socio-political class, rather produces the new form of divide and hierarchy in the society. Second, optimistic technological determinism which expected that the benefits of digital technology tools promote wider and more open communication forms than traditional print or mass media. In this, digital technology is enhancer for inclusion in political processes. Drawing on optimism - digital technologies promote fundamental change to all in social and political activities, in which lead to a more inclusive democratic society. Technology diffusion is expected to reduce digital exclusion to digital inclusion in democratic system, and to make a better environment for political engagement in modern liberal democracies. The potentiality of digital participatory technology tools is to enable ordinary citizens to be participants in political activities and for the context of this research to be observers and reporters of electoral incidents across the whole electoral cycle. Therefore, any evidence of adoption and usage of digital technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, is based on optimistic perspective on technology in promoting and protecting the integrity of elections.

The emergence and use of digital instruments underlined the need for transparent, interactive, and inclusive electoral processes in order to promote integrity of elections. Electoral stakeholders have realized digital communication technologies; have a potential role to play not only for advancing transparency, accountability and integrity, but also for citizen engagement in electoral politics (Diamond 2010). Consequently, in most developing democracies, elections are characterized by irregularities and manipulation of voters' choices, unfair rules, corruption and rigging, as well as intimidation and post-election violence which leads to power sharing as noted in countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 (Diamond 2015; Van Ham and Lindberg 2015). To address the problems of fraudulent elections, online participatory democracy tools can be used for crowdmonitoring in order to help in detecting any illicit networks of manipulating electoral processes. Given the concept of digital divide and growing deployment of crowdsourced information via digital tools, the ICT infrastructure needs to be underscored. Especially the state of digital technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - that have been used to empower ordinary citizens to participate in monitoring and reporting integrity of elections.

Digital divide is used to explain the gap in access and use of ICT infrastructure. And scholarship on digital technology and politics show existence of the digital divide, a gap between those “online” and “offline” (Bimber 2003). Mapping spread, access and use of ICT tools will provide a rationale behind crowdsourcing technologies for monitoring electoral contests. It will be the reasons for non-partisan election monitoring organisations to use available and accessible participatory digital technologies to engage ordinary citizens in mapping electoral incidents and sharing feedback action in a dedicated digital platform. This is the case of Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections using Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform. Realizing the power of ICT to generate big election data from ordinary citizens, from areas likely the established observers may not get access to observe the contest, crowdsourcing method using simple technology, may capture and expose a range of election observation data.

Digital divide used to illustrates the existing gap or differences between and within region(s), and countries as well as groups of people (rich and poor, educated and uneducated or computer literate and illiterate, young and old), households and geographical areas (metropolitan, urban and rural). Especially it is “digital divide of the haves and the have-nots of the latest information and communication technology and of internet access” (Kersting 2012a:36). In other words, digital divide is widely used to describe the gap between those who are digitally empowered and literate in using the technology, and those who are not equipped and illiterate in using and accessing the information and communication technologies (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004, Kersting 2012a).

Norris (2001) offers three different aspects of mapping digital divide. Such aspects are: *global divide* – that describes the difference between industrialized and developing societies in terms of access to and use of technology. *Social divide* that entails divide within different societies, especially between the information rich and poor within each nation; and *democratic divide* within the online community between those who do and those who do not use internet resources to engage, mobilize, and participate in public life. Therefore, it is difficult to generalize about digital divide unless we see “how the technology interacts with a broader environment set by each country’s social, economic, and political system” (Norris 2001), and inequality of use of and access to digital communication technology tools.

It has been observed that nowadays, “democratic innovation seems to be generated mostly in the global South and in the young democracies” (Kersting 2012a:276). Different digital tools are available in young democracies for capturing and transmitting election

information (Kersting 2014). Some of the emerging new technological tools such as mobile ICT and social networks have been used to observe and report the conduct of elections, and even used as mobilization tool to online potential voters to participate in the electoral politics (Shayo and Kersting 2016; Shayo 2016). Notable widespread use and access to digital technologies plays role in monitoring and promoting democratic process. This is evidenced in literature which shows that “democracy-and democratization - can no longer be effectively studied without some attention paid to the role of digital information technologies. Not only does the character of this infrastructure have an impact on the opportunity structures for political change and the range of possible outcomes, but the technologies themselves support new forums for political discussion” (Howard 2011:132). The diffusion of new modern technology, especially with regards to mobile phone technology and internet - are dramatically changing the electoral processes by creating opportunities for civic engagement in electoral politics in connection with other stakeholders (Bardall 2010). In countries that follow democratic principles “elections are celebration of democracy and considered the backbone of democratic processes that should ideally be trusted by everyone and not just a selected few, and this is important, in particular when it comes to using ICTs in elections” (IDEA 2014b:2).


### **5.2.1 Global trends in digital communication technologies**

Global changes and growth in ICT has been accompanied by optimism for a democratic revival, though doubts for new digital divide are emerging (Norris 2001; Kersting and Baldersheim 2004; Kersting 2012a). The rapid growth of mobile-cellular subscriptions world-wide showed “the future is already here - it’s just not evenly distributed yet. Yet we are getting closer. Cellular telephony has been the most rapidly adopted technology in history” (Livingston 2011:9). On one hand, the global trend of ICTs shows a significant rapid increase of digital technologies; while on the other hand, some technologies show there is a slow increase of penetration rates of information and communication technologies. Graph 5.1 show an increase in mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions of 99.7 which is a projection data (\*) for the 2016 - and slow increase trend of fixed-broadband subscriptions of 13.7 per 100 inhabitants. And there is a fast growth of mobile-broadband subscriptions from the year 2014 (37.2) to the year 2015 (47.2) per 100 inhabitants which means that with the number of fixed telephone “worldwide having fallen over the past decade owing party to fixed-mobile substitution” (ITU 2015:2). The estimated number of internet users by 2015 that was to be covered by 2G internet mobile cellular network was 95.3 per 100 inhabitants



and was to be growing nearly the same as that of mobile cellular phones subscriptions 96.8 per 100 inhabitants (ITU 2015). ITU (2016) statistics shows that globally individual use of the internet stands at 47.1 per 100 people compared to 11.9 fixed broadband subscriptions, while active mobile broadband subscriptions is 49.4 per 100 inhabitants (graph 5.1).

Graph 5.1 Global ICT developments, 2001-2016 (per 100 inhabitants)



Source: ITU (2016).

Table 5.1 demonstrates digital divide means that half of the world population is still offline as an individual using the internet (47.1%), and household with internet access (52.3%); while (84%) of household connected in Europe, compared with (15.4%) connected in the African region and (66.6%) in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Internet penetration rates in various regions present a different story with (81%) in developed countries; compared with (40.1%) in developing countries; and (15.2%) in Less Developed Countries. It is obvious that there is a decline of fixed-broadband subscriptions in all regions of the world on one hand, and an increase of mobile-broadband subscriptions on the other hand. In developing countries the mobile broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants continues to grow, and now it has reached the subscriptions of 40.9, compared to fixed-broadband subscriptions of 8.2. In Europe mobile-broadband subscriptions is 76.6, compared to 30 subscriptions rate of fixed-broadband. The world mobile broadband subscription is 49.4 and fixed broadband is 11.9 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants.


Table 5.1 Digital divide by regions, 2016

	Individual using the internet	Household with internet access	Mobile-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants	Fixed-broadband subscriptions per 100 inhabitants
Europe	79,1%	84,0%	76.6	30.0
The Americans	65,0%	64,4%	78.2	18.9
CIS	66,6%	67,8%	53.0	15.4
Arab States	41,6%	45,7%	47.6	4.8
Asia and Pacific	41,9%	46,4%	42.6	10.5
Africa	25,1%	15,4%	29.3	0.7
World	47,1%	52,3%	49.4	11.9
Developed	81,0%	83,8%	90.3	30.1
Developing	40,1%	41,1%	40.9	8.2
LDCs	15,2%	11,1%	19.4	0.8

Source: ITU (2016).

In addition, “the current information environment is characterized by growing abundance, scalability, and near-ubiquitous networking capacity, even in part of the world that have come relatively late to the explosion in digital technology” (Bailard and Livingston 2014:354). In this case, graph 5.2 shows that developing and less developed countries demonstrated rapid change in mobile-cellular subscriptions whereby over 90 in developing and 60 in less developed countries per 100 inhabitants have access to mobile cellular phones, contrary to fixed telephone and broadband. But the gap remains between developed and other developing or less developed countries in terms of access to mobile cellular, mobile broadband, and fixed telephone, as well as fixed broadband.


Graph 5.2 ICT access by development status, 2015



Source: ITU (2015).

Graph 5.3 presents internet penetration rate for men and women in different regions, and statistics shows that internet penetration rates are higher for men than women in all regions of the world. But the gap in the America is not significant for men (65.6%) and women (64.4%), while Africa the gap for men is (28.4%) and women is (21.9%). In developed countries the gap is (82.3%) for men and (80%) for women, while that in developing countries is (45%) men and (37.4%) women; and (18%) men and (12.5%) women in the less developed countries, but the global gap is (51.1%) men and (44.9%) for women.

Graph 5.3 Internet penetration rate for men and women, 2016



Source: ITU (2016).

In addition, global digital communication technologies have spread rapidly in the world. Figure 5.1 present the diffusion of digital technologies across countries as measured by the digital adoption index by businesses, people and governments with gross domestic product (GDP). This figure presents evidence that businesses, people and governments are more connected with digital technologies. In this case, digital technologies make it easier for communication and information sharing and even for digital products. Given this trend of digital revolution, countries such as Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda use technology in order to promote better services, for overcoming digital payment (mobile money transfer system), to promote inclusion of citizen in electoral politics (crowdsourcing method), to solve complex problems in business (outsourcing), and engaging citizen in monitoring public service delivery (digital citizen-sourcing monitoring). Therefore, diffusion of digital communication technologies and participatory innovation, namely internet and mobile phone technology, as

well as other digital technology tools are used in collecting, storing, analysing and for rapid dissemination of information (World Bank Group 2016).




Figure 5.1 Diffusion of digital technologies across the countries

Source: World Bank Group (2016:3).

### 5.2.2 Digital technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda

In East Africa, Kenya has a population estimated at 46.05 million and GDP growth (5.6%), Tanzania 53.47 million and GDP growth (7.0%) and Uganda 39.03 million and GDP growth (5.0%). And the population age distribution 15-64 in Kenya is (55.3%), Tanzania (51.6%) and Uganda (49.4%) of the total population by the year 2015 (World Bank 2015). Table 5.2 presents data on ICT development index by the year 2015. The ICT Development Index (IDI) combines 11 indicators to measure and monitor developments in ICT. The measure includes access sub-index that comprises indicators such as fixed telephone subscriptions, mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions, and international internet bandwidth per internet user, households with a computer, and households with internet access. The use sub-index involves indicators such as individuals using the internet, fixed broadband subscriptions, and mobile-broadband subscriptions, while skills sub-index captures indicators like adult literacy, gross secondary enrolment, and gross tertiary enrolment (ITU 2015:39-40). Globally, Korea Republic is ranked 1 with IDI 8.93, while at the bottom there is Chad which ranked 167 with IDI of 1.17. At the regional level, in Africa Mauritius is a leading country at the top ranked 1 and globally ranked 73, while Kenya ranked 8 regionally and 124 globally, Uganda ranked 21 at the region and 149 global rank, and Tanzania ranked 27 at regional level and 157 at the global rank (ITU 2015).

Table 5.2 ICT development index, 2015

	IDI Rank	Regional IDI Rank	IDI access sub-index	IDI use sub- index	IDI skills sub-index
Kenya	124	8	3.30	1.76	4.97
Tanzania	157	27	2.48	0.27	3.58
Uganda	149	21	2.35	1.10	3.81

Source: <http://www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/idi/2015/>

The fibre-optic cables installation in East Africa is a digital revolution that connects all East African countries. The on-going investment in ICT infrastructure aimed to address the existing problem of access to internet – for digital inclusion of digitally excluded population. For example, fibre-optic submarine cables such as Eastern African Submarine Cable System (EASSy), Southern and Eastern Africa Communication Network (SEACOM) and Seychelles Submarine Cable along the East African coast will connect East African countries. It is worth noting that Tanzania and Kenya have fibre optic stations that supply the services to landlocked countries. Tanzania provides connectivity to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zambia and Malawi (URT 2016). Therefore, the governments’ initiative of installing fibre optic cables to reach a large number of populations is a strategy of connecting the unconnected population within the countries (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3 Population that can only be reached by fibre optic network, 2012

Country	Country population	Beyond 10km reach of fibre network	Beyond 26km reach of fibre network	Beyond 60km reach of fibre network
Kenya	45,010,056	26,035,410	12,337,080	3,697,767
Tanzania	49,639,138	34,373,440	27,809,987	18,479,967
Uganda	35,918,915	28,040,939	17,430,476	6,291,249

Source: Commonwealth Telecommunication Organisation (2012).

The National Information and Communication Technologies policies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda initiated and promoted the use of digital technologies. For example, the ICT policy of 2006 in Kenya was revised in 2016 because of the changes in the ICT sector that had been taking place since 2006. The National Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Policy of 2016 recognizes the achievement of an information society and knowledge economy is the main priorities of the government, and states ICT is a developmental tool that should be widely accessible to and utilized by the general population. Like Kenya, Tanzania revised the 2003 National ICT Policy in 2016. This is because the “ICT landscape has changed since 2003, requiring a relook at the Policy framework to reposition Tanzania to better meet emerging opportunities while contending


with their associated threats” (p.vi), and the ICT industry in Tanzania has witnessed major technological changes. Tanzania National ICT Policy of 2016 is formulated within the context of “national vision statements guided by the Tanzania Development Vision 2015, which recognizes that ICT is central to a competitive social and economic transformation” (p.vi). In Uganda, the Information Technology Policy of 2012 states that “in the transformation of the rural economy into an information society, knowledge economy and the information age, a combination of sociological, political, economical and technological factors are important to bring about changes to the social system, the scope of this transformation is global” (p.iii). In the three countries the national ICT policy recognized the role of ICT in transforming political, social and economic activities, and the need to foster the use and access to information technology.

Studies attempts to measure digital divide in terms of penetration rates of internet access, usage level for social networking sites, emails, text messaging, receiving and sending mobile money and penetration of mobile-cellular phones, ownership of mobile phone as well as fixed-telephones, among others such International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Gallup and Pew Research Centre. Also, Afrobarometer surveys measure digital divide in terms of technology use to access newspapers, watching television, listening to radio, using social networks and accessing internet news as well as ownership of technology devices such as mobile phone.

For example, Pew Research Center (2015) released survey report for the spring2014, and one of the survey question asked respondents, among other things: their use of cell phones for texting, taking pictures, making or receiving payments, getting political news, accessing social networks and getting health information. Table 5.4 is the results of a survey conducted in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The survey revealed majority of respondents said that they use mobile phones for text message. This was reported by (88%) in Kenya, (92%) in Tanzania and (60%) in Uganda. Across the seven countries in Sub-Saharan the median of (80%) of cell phones owners reported using the device for texting. This is followed by taking pictures or videos as reported by (54%) in Kenya, (53%) in Tanzania and (37%) in Uganda. As regards growing of mobile money transfer system in East Africa and Africa in general, the survey collected information on making or receiving payments via mobile phones. The findings show that (61%) in Kenya, (39%) in Tanzania and (42%) in Uganda make or receive payments through cell phones. With regard to accessing social networks sites, data shows in Kenya (28%), followed by Tanzania (19%) and Uganda (14%)

of the participants have access to social media platforms. Generally, the survey data found that age group 18-34 were more active in sending text messages in Kenya (93%), Tanzania (97%) and Uganda (66%), while age group 35+ in Kenya (83%), Tanzania (84%) and Uganda (52%) reported to use sms text services (Pew Research Center 2015).

Table 5.4 Common use of cell phones



Source: Pew Research Center 2015, Spring2014 Global Attitudes Survey. Q74a-h


### 5.2.2.1 Internet usage

According to ITU (2014) report of internet use it was estimated that by the end of 2014 there would be closer to three billion global internet users which count for about (40%) of the population worldwide. Two thirds of them would be from developing countries with most of the difference made by mobile-cellular phones connections. By the end of 2014 estimated (44%) of the world's household would be connected to the internet, especially in Africa one out of ten households would be connected to the internet.

ICT penetration rate in East Africa demonstrates a significant increase of technology in the region. The internet arrived in East Africa mid 1990s such as Kenya and Tanzania in 1996, Uganda in 1997. Line graph 5.4 of internet usage shows that in Kenya there was an increase rate of internet users of 0.05-14 per 100 inhabitants from the year 1998-2010. But in four years later 2010 - 2015 there was nearly three times increase from 14.00-45.6 per hundred inhabitants. In Tanzania, there was an increase rate of 0.01-2.90 in 1998-2010 and

three years later 2010-2015 from 2.90-5.35<sup>5</sup> per 100 inhabitants. In Uganda 1998-2010 there was a growth rate of 0.07-12.50 per 100 inhabitants and 12.50-19.22 in 2010–2015. Given the current initiative of fibre optic cables in Kenya and Kenya, that also connect to the neighbouring countries, time series data suggest considerable growth of more internet users.

Graph 5.4 Internet users per 100 inhabitants




Source: <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>

Spring 2013 Pew Research Survey shows that while there is limited internet reach in the developing world, once people are connected and have access to internet, they begin to integrate it into their daily lives. The survey showed at least (20%) of the respondents had access to and use internet daily in 15 of the 24 countries (Pew Research Center 2013). Majority of adult internet users in emerging countries are daily users of internet, and data show adult internet users or reported smartphone owners who had access to internet several times a day, once a day or at least once a week or less in the countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (Table 5.5). The adult reported had access to internet several times a day was higher (48%) in Tanzania, compared to Kenya (44%) and Uganda (27%). But at least once a week or less of those adult internet users access the internet was higher in Uganda (53%), Tanzania (35%) and Kenya (34%) of the respondents (Pew Research Center 2016).

<sup>5</sup> In contrast, according to the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority (TCRA) quarterly reports of March 2016, there were 17.3 million internet users, representing a penetration of 34%, and increase trend of internet penetration from 12% in 2011 to 34% in 2015. Available online from: <https://www.tcra.go.tz/images/documents/telecommunication/CommStatMarch16.pdf>



Table 5.5 Adult internet users or reported smartphone owners



Note: Based on those who say they use the internet at least occasionally (Q70) or report owning a smartphone (Q72)

Source: Pew Research Center (2016).

### 5.2.2.2 Mobile phone technology


ICT has been embraced in African countries as a tool of communication, information and engagement of people in political activities, and mobile phones technology has continued to attract a sufficient number of users and the growth continues to be stronger than in other regions (ITU 2014). It is evidenced that mobile technology “far outpacing adoption rates of other technologies, including the internet” (Livingston 2011:9). Mobile phones have increased in East Africa countries and the subscriptions rates reach nearly all people in urban and rural areas, but with variation in penetration and data access. For example, in urban and rural areas, young people are often the ones who manage the mobile phone kiosks that offer a variety of services such as selling airtime, making phone repairs; unlocking phones, mobile money transfer and payments, as well as charging mobile phones because of the low rate of electricity power supply in rural areas (Sambira 2013).

ITU (2014) reported that mobile-cellular is the fastest growing technology and Africa takes the lead in its growth from (10%) in 2010 to almost (20%) in 2014. ITU report shows Africa is one of the regions with the strongest mobile-cellular growth and estimated subscriptions rate would reach almost seven billion by the end of 2014. With seven billion mobile-cellular phones subscriptions, the global penetration rate will reach (96%) of the world’s population and the penetration in developing world will reach (90%) compared with (121%) in developed countries. The share of population living in rural areas is often high reinforcing urban-rural digital divide, but ICT performance is better in urban areas where access to ICT infrastructure, usage and skills is more favourable (ITU 2014). Besides, the

success story in ICT development is linked to progress in achieving some of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as a facilitator of ICT development programs (ITU 2014).

MDGs subscriptions data of mobile phones shows that in 2015 the subscriptions rate in Kenya was 80.6, Tanzania 75.8, Uganda 53.5 per 100 inhabitants. Mobile technology subscriptions rates suggest transformation of East Africa countries to be mobile information-rich society. This is because mobile subscriptions per hundred inhabitants indicate ‘ICT is now in the hand of ordinary people’ (ITU 2014). Graph 5.5 indicates that there were rapid increases of subscriptions rate per 100 inhabitants from 2010 - 2015 such as 61.03 – 80.6 in Kenya, 46.66–75.8 in Tanzania and 37.74-53.5 in Uganda. This is a promising trend of mobile-cellular penetration and subscriptions to the majority of the population that can enhance access and use of the available mobile technology in political, social and economic activities in the respective country.

Graph 5.5 Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants



Source: <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>


Furthermore, Spring2013 Pew Research Center reported penetration of mobile phones is omnipresent around the world and they are used more than just phone calls. And mobile phones are globally used for text messages, take picture or video and for accessing internet and sms-based money transfer system in developing countries. The Spring2013 estimated that in 22 out of 24 countries most cell phone owners send text messages and at least half of cell phone owners use their devices for taking pictures or video in 15 nations. For example,

in Kenya (82%) responded they own mobile phone and (91%) send text messages, while (48%) take pictures or video and (68%) get political news via their mobile-cellular phones. In Uganda, (59%) own cell phone, (62%) send text messages, (27%) take pictures or video and (23%) get political news (Pew Research Center 2013). The growth of mobile technology in East Africa has increased the number of users on one hand, while on the other “significant political effects have resulted from the growth of mobile telephony” (Livingston 2011:10). This is the fact that ‘introduction of mobile phones in Africa transforms people’s ability to communicate. Unlike in the West, where there was already an existing network of communication through landlines, mobile phones in Africa provide communication where previously there was none’ (Ekin 2010).

### 5.2.2.3 Fixed telephone

“Fixed telephone lines – is fast becoming less essential because of the growth in mobile networks and fixed-mobile substitution” (ITU 2015:40). According to the Millennium Development Goals data graph 5.6 shows decrease rate of landlines subscription rates per hundred inhabitants from the year 2010-2015 in Kenya from 0.93 - 0.18, Tanzania 0.39-0.27, but in Uganda there was a decline from 2011 to 2013, and start increase from 2013 to 2014 by 0.84, but in 2015 went down to 0.81 per 100 inhabitants. ITU (2014) reported that Africa generally has the lower fixed-broadband than (0.5%) of its population and the global trend of fixed-telephone penetration rate of ICTs lag behind.

Graph 5.6 Fixed-telephone subscription rates per 100 inhabitants



Source: <http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx>

While ‘mobile networks in sub-Saharan Africa have spread rapidly, landline penetration in the seven countries surveyed is close to zero’ (Pew Research Center 2015:7). And the growth rate of fixed-telephone has been much slower in East Africa, but rather it expressed a move to invest in mobile-cellular phones technology. The spring2014 global attitudes survey shows that people who have landlines in their house in Kenya (3%), Tanzania (2%) and Uganda (1%). In this regard, fixed-telephone penetration rate compared with mobile phones reflects a declining in the three countries.

#### **5.2.2.4 Social networks**

Social networks are communities connected in the World Wide Web to communicate and collaborate (Kersting 2012a). Social networks have increasingly spread and been accessed worldwide through mobile phones more than conventional computers with internet connections. Globally, social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube, Blogs, Flickr, LinkedIn and Google+, among others, are one of the most popular online platforms. Social media platforms are designed to maintain open, transparent and two-way communication and citizens expect government institutions like election management bodies to disseminate information via ICT instruments where they are present (IDEA 2014a). Now “we are living in the middle of the largest increase in expressive capability in the history of the human race. More people can communicate more things to more people than has ever been possible in the past, and the size and speed of this increase, from under one million participants to over one billion in a generation, makes the changes unprecedented” (Shirky 2008:105).

For example, Facebook was launched in 2004 as one of the social media sites on, but lately the platform has been immensely deployed in political communication activities. Two years back before the launch of Facebook, Norris (2002) aptly remarked ‘in post-industrial societies the younger generations, in particular, have become less willing than their parents and grandparents to channel their political energies through traditional agencies exemplified by parties and churches, but are more likely to express themselves through a variety of more ad hoc, contextual and specific activities of choice, increasingly via new social movements, internet activism, and transnational policy networks that offer alternative avenues of engagement’.

Social media like Facebook reported to have 1.65 billion monthly active users globally and 1.09 billion daily active users on average as of March 2016 (Facebook newsroom

2016), and Facebook has become a central platform for political communication to millions of online users. Approximately (84.2%) of daily active users are outside the United States and Canada. Given an increasing growth of mobile technology 1.51 billion monthly active users of Facebook platform use their mobile phones (Facebook newsroom 2016). Compared to Twitter microblogging platform which is reported to have an average of 313 million monthly active users as of the second quarter of 2016, and (79%) of users are outside United States and (83%) of active users on mobile phones (Statista 2016).

Moreover, obtaining accurate and timely figures for digital technologies, especially remarkable social networks user is not a precise task as “data generated by private companies such as Facebook, Google or Twitter tends to overestimate the usage” (Kersting 2012a: 38). This is because “companies often use subscription rates and ignore the tendency to double inscriptions, where people are using more than one user-id” (Kersting 2012a:38). The number of Facebook users in Kenya stands at 5 million, Tanzania 2.7 million and Uganda 1.8 million by 15 November 2015 (Internet World Stats 2016). But the number of social network users might have increased following the fact that tiGo mobile network operator has launched what it refers to as “Internet.org”, the site that gives its users free access to some popular websites such as a Facebook platform for a limited time or data bundle in Kenya and Tanzania.

Recently, we have witnessed surfing of the mobile internet data via smartphone devices for Facebook and Twitter that has gained popularity in sharing political activities. The strategy of Facebook to split costs of internet access with mobile network operators aimed to make increase of online platform users. The same approach is adopted by Google in providing a free internet access and addressing language barriers by making it multilingual in order to attract more users of the website (Sambira 2013). In some of East Africa countries such as Kenya and Tanzania mobile network operators have launched free data access for mobile users. For instance, the launched Internet.org application in Tanzania and Kenya subscriber breaks data barriers of access to internet data, and the sim-card subscribers will have access to internet data without charges for some websites such as Facebook, BBC News, Wikipedia and JamiiForums, among others (Facebook newsroom 2014).

The Spring2013 Pew Research Survey covering 24 countries estimated that in 14 of 24 nations surveyed, at least half of 18-29 years old, of the respondents reported to be online. In the surveyed country there were double digit age gaps between adults under age 30 and

those 50 and older, and in 19 countries the gap was more than (30%) points. Further, it shows that the young and college graduates are likely to use their mobile phones for internet usage and access to various websites. Median of (38%) among social networkers share views about politics using social media sites. Internet usage in Uganda by the age of 18-29 (18%), 30-49 (9%) and 50 and above (5%), while those who engaged in social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter at the age of 18-29 (12%), 30-49 (4%), 50 and above (1%), and in general (23%) of the surveyed share political information. In Kenya, (76%) of the respondents indicate once they are online they engage in social networking sites like Facebook, Twitter, Myspace, Google+ and Instagram and (68%) of them share views about politics (Pew Research Center 2013). A country like Tanzania was not covered in the Spring2013 survey on social media use. But Spring2015 global attitudes survey show that (76%) internet users, they used social networks such Facebook and Twitter. In Africa (76%), Middle East (86%) and Latin America (82%) compared with (71%) in the U.S and (65%) across six European nations, who said they used social networking sites (Pew Research Center 2016). Especially adult internet users, who had access and using social networks in Kenya (82%), Tanzania (78%) and Uganda (76%), said that they used social networks such as Facebook and Twitter (Pew Research Center 2016).

#### **5.2.2.5 Internet and mobile use by age**

Digital divide in terms of age can be measured by using Afrobarometer survey data on the use of internet and mobile phones and ownership of mobile phone as well. Table 5.6 shows the breakdown of age in the survey was 15-29, 30-49, and 50 and more. It is found that age group 15-29 often use internet everyday by the following percentages in the three East African countries, Kenya (21.8%), Tanzania (10.4%) and Uganda 8.0%). But the use of mobile phones for age group 30-49 was found to be more active, and data shows that in Kenya (84.9%), Tanzania (73.6%) and Uganda (59.7%) used mobile phones every day. In Uganda (63.1%) of age group 15-29 used mobile phone every day. In addition, the ownership of mobile phone for the age group 30-49 in Kenya (88.6%) and Tanzania (76.6%) own mobile phone, while in Uganda reported (68.4%) of age group 15-29 own mobile phone compared to other categories. The use and ownership of mobile phone devices is an enabler for participation and sharing of information.

Table 5.6 Internet and mobile use by age

	Age = 15 - 29			Age = 30 - 49			Age = 50 and more		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	53.8%	77.4%	74.3%	65.4%	88.9%	88.3%	87.5%	92.2%	90.4%
Less than once a month	3.3%	2.1%	2.5%	2.5%	1.6%	1.6%	1.6%	0.6%	1.1%
A few times a month	4.3%	3.0%	2.7%	5.6%	1.0%	1.7%	1.0%	0.8%	0.4%
A few times a week	16.3%	6.3%	8.0%	11.6%	2.5%	1.9%	2.6%	2.8%	0.7%
Everyday	21.8%	10.4%	8.0%	14.0%	5.5%	2.6%	3.9%	2.2%	0.4%
Note: How often do you use the internet? Kenya N.2397, Tanzania N.2386 and Uganda N.2400									
	Age = 15 - 29			Age = 30 - 49			Age = 50 and more		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	7.2%	16.2%	23.0%	5.4%	15.1%	23.5%	13.8%	23.3%	39.7%
Less than once a month	1.3%	0.7%	1.8%	0.3%	1.2%	3.4%	0.5%	0.8%	4.9%
A few times a month	1.9%	2.5%	3.1%	2.1%	1.4%	2.4%	4.2%	3.2%	2.7%
A few times a week	6.9%	10.3%	8.6%	7.3%	8.6%	10.7%	11.2%	8.2%	10.5%
Everyday	82.7%	70.3%	63.1%	84.9%	73.6%	59.7%	70.4%	64.2%	42.0%
Note: How often do you use mobile phone? Kenya N.2397, Tanzania N.2386 and Uganda N.2400									
	Age = 15 - 29			Age = 30 - 49			Age = 50 and more		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
No, don't own	16.1%	25.1%	31.5%	11.3%	23.4%	33.4%	21.3%	32.4%	49.8%
Yes, do own	83.9%	74.9%	68.4%	88.6%	76.6%	66.5%	78.7%	67.6%	50.2%

Note: Which of these things do you personally own? Mobile phone. Kenya N.2397, Tanzania N.2386 and Uganda N.2400

Source: Afrobarometer round 6 2014/2015.

### 5.2.2.6 Mobile money transfer system

The liberalization of communication sector led mobile network operators, banking and other financial institutions to empower mobile phones users to do a number of socio-economic and political activities through their mobile phone device. Especially mobile money transfer has undergone transformative changes in developing countries. In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda mobile money system offers services, among others, domestic personal-to-personal (P2P) money transfer, airtime top up, utility bill payment, merchant payment, insurance services, international remittances, loan disbursement or repayment, link to banking products like balance check from bank account, money transfer and withdraw from bank and other bulk payments.

It can be argued that the subscriptions rate of mobile phone leads to the growing use of mobile money systems in the three countries. Now we live in an era where money is on the mobile phone and transactions are twenty four hours. And majority of the ordinary population in the rural areas do not have bank accounts. Now banks have resorted to make sure they had mobile money services. In this context, one can deposit money to the bank account from mobile phone, and transfer money from bank account to a mobile phone, and even, in the ATM machines for most of the banks, one can withdraw cash from registered mobile sim-card number via ATM machines. Some banks have introduced mobile center services, whereby the bank account holder can go to the mobile money kiosks and withdraw or deposit to the bank agents, without going to the bank main offices or branches for transfers or withdraws.

Historically, in the three countries mobile money service was initially launched in Kenya in 2007 with Safaricom network operators, and a year later in Tanzania 2008 with Vodacom as *M-Pesa* ('M' means 'Mobile' and 'Pesa' means 'Money' hence, Mobile Money), and in Uganda was introduced in 2009 as *MTN Mobile Money* by MTN company. The launch of M-Pesa in Kenya and Tanzania is affirmed as the most successful and productive digital innovation in Africa so far (Sambira 2013), that later was launched in other countries by different mobile operators, with different brand name. Kenya was named as a leading country in the world in mobile sms-based money transfer services, with the total value of transactions made by mobile money transfer in the year 2013 around \$24 billion, more than half of the country's per capita income (The Economist, September



2014), while in Tanzania the transaction value of mobile money transfers for the period of July, 2013 to April, 2014 amounting Tanzanian shillings 28.3 trillion (URT 2014).

Spring 2013 Pew Research reports that making and receiving payments through mobile money transfer in developing countries is one of the common mobile cellular phone activities and is much more common in African region. For instance, in Kenya nearly seven-in-ten Kenyans and (68%) of those who own a mobile-cellular phone regularly use their mobile device to make or receive payments, and in Uganda (50%) make or receive payments. But spring 2014 survey found adult cell phones owners who make or receive payments through mobile phones in Kenya (61%), Tanzania (39%) and Uganda (42%). Substantial growth rates of mobile phones and mobile money transfer in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda expressed the mobile technology can grow without the help of external assistance. Because as a number of mobile subscriptions is increasing, it is likely there will be an increase in the number of those who make and receive mobile money services as well. In addition, the mobile sms-based money transfer system can be a driving factor to the rapid growth of mobile phone subscription rate in East African region.

It is interesting to note that during election observation process in the 2015 Tanzania general elections, mobile money services played a key role in transferring money to the Long-Term Observers (LTOs). This research found out that mobile money services help long term trained observers in the field to receive, and even to transfer money from their bank account to their mobile phones. In some of the rural areas there is a limited access to their respective bank services where they have opened bank accounts. For example, one of the crowd initiator in Tanzania pointed out that – “sometimes, we received a call from our observers in the field requesting to disburse their allowances in their mobile phone numbers, claiming they could not get ATM bank services in the constituency where they were observing. In order to access the services they have to travel to the city for banking and their banks yet to accept mobile money transfer service”. In this respect, mobile money transfer service was found to be a convenient way to the trained citizen observers who observe and report election incidents in the rural areas. Additionally, activities of monitoring electoral incidents, mobile money system facilitated and enabled election observers even to pay transport services, especially the common transport service of motorcycle better known in Kiswahili as *bodaboda* in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and *bodaboda* service providers accept mobile payment services.

### 5.2.3 Media freedom

It is reasonable to argue that “freedom of information as a structural prerequisite is as important as political education or political socialisation” (Kersting 2007a:35), and “media are essential to democracy, and democratic election is impossible without media. A free and fair election is not only about the freedom to vote and the knowledge of how to cast a vote, but also about a participatory process where voters engage in public debate and have adequate information about parties, policies, candidates and the election process itself in order to make informed choices. Furthermore, media acts as a crucial watchdog to democratic elections, safeguarding the transparency of the process. Indeed, a democratic election with no media freedom, or stifled media freedom, would be a contradiction in terms” (ACE Encyclopaedia 2012:9). The state commitments to international convention and treaties, regional commitments and national constitutions pioneered freedom of the press, information and speech. ICCPR of 1966 and UDHR of 1948 Article 19 respond to the developments of massive technological change that created opportunities for freedom of information and expression. Article 19 of the UDHR and more or less similar terms under article 19 of ICCPR states: “everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers”. In an attempt to measure the level of freedom of the press, Freedom House data uses scores to rate each country’s freedom of the press as “free”, “partly free”, or “not free”. Table 5.7 shows data from Freedom House for the period of 2011 – 2016 rating the three countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda “partly free” on the freedom of the press.

Table 5.7 Freedom of the press

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Kenya	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free
Tanzania	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free
Uganda	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free	Partly free

Source: <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press>

In addition, Afrobarometer through public opinion polls asked whether newspapers should be free to publish views and ideas without government control. Table 5.8 present the findings for the two round of the survey, 2011/2013 and 2014/2015. The data shows that more than half of the respondents in Tanzania (51.9%) and Uganda (57.4%) for the survey conducted 2011/2013 agree very strongly for the media to publish any views and ideas

without government control, while in Kenya (38.4%) were in favour of this option. But the response of those agree very strongly for the 2014/2015 surveys in the three countries went down such as Kenya (32.2%), Tanzania (26.2%) and Uganda (39.4%), and the response falls under agree with media to publish without government control as well as government should have the right to control the media.

Table 5.8 Freedom of newspapers to publish

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Agree very strongly with 1	38.4%	51.9%	57.4%	32.2%	26.2%	39.4%
Agree with 1	21.0%	21.4%	22.4%	22.3%	27.2%	14.1%
Agree with 2	16.9%	9.9%	6.0%	20.7%	27.0%	20.9%
Agree very strongly with 2	18.8%	15.7%	12.1%	21.8%	16.7%	24.0%
Agree with neither	2.1%	0.6%	0.6%	1.3%	0.2%	0.3%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: Statement 1: The media should have the right to publish any views and ideas without government control

Statement 2: The government should have the right to prevent the media from publishing things that it considers harmful to society

Source: Afrobarometer Surveys Round 5 2011/2013 and round 6 2014/2015

Therefore, digital technological instruments have potential role to play and to become an effective tool for monitoring electoral management processes (IDEA 2014b). New ICTs inspire democracy and freedom around the world by offering equal opportunities in representing political freedoms (Bardall 2010). The use of ICTs in elections depends on the measures of multiple actors to connect the crowd with online tools and the freedom of media of the country to share voices of citizens and other political activities. Any deliberative measures of using electronic devices especially for crowdsourcing monitoring and reporting require a mutual collaboration among different players such as government, elections authorities, mobile service providers, media, networks operators and technology innovators as well as citizens as users of the ICTs products and democracy assistance group.

### 5.2.3.1 The use of news media

It has been observed, that “information becomes vital to democracy in myriad ways: in the processes by which citizen preferences are formed and aggregated, in the behaviors of citizens and elites, in formal procedures of representation, in acts of governmental decision making, in the administration of laws and regulations, and in the mechanisms of accountability that freshen democracy and sustain its legitimacy. None of these elements of the democratic process can operate apart from the exchange and flow of information among

citizens and their associations and organizations, among citizens and government, and within government itself” (Bimber 2013:11-12). The emerging ICT tools leads to various channels of communicating information to the general public and for the users to communicate information to the government, and even government response to the users. The fact is that after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, also witnessed the mushrooming of media houses such as radio stations, Television channels and newspapers. However, “traditional broadcast and radio are no longer the uniquely pervasive forms of media they once were, especially in modernizing capital of the developing world. This has had immense implications for relations between the state and civil society, as well as the meaning of contemporary citizenship” (Howard 2011:132).

Spring2014 Pew Survey on the influence of media shows media such as television, radio and newspapers gets positive ratings from the respondents (95%) in Tanzania, (88%) in Kenya and (94%) in Uganda. According to the survey the media is appreciated in Africa where a median of (88%) said it is had a positive influence. Also, one of the focus areas of Afrobarometer surveys public opinion polls is on the use of news media both online and offline media. The Afrobarometer surveys is a comparative public opinion surveys that measure citizen attitudes toward political, social and economic matters using a common survey instrument and methodology in Africa (Mitullah 2012). In this case, Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda up to round six for the year 2014/2015. One of the questions Afrobarometer covered is: “How often do you get news from the following sources: internet, radio, television, newspapers and social media?” The response recorded was based on: never, less than once a month, a few times a month, a few times a week, every-day, missing or unknown and don’t know. Afrobarometer measuring access of different sources of news from citizens through survey-based method is one way of presenting the extent to which individual citizens make use of available, accessible and affordable ICT devices to gather and share information.

*Access radio news:* Zuckerman (2007) argued “compares to the mobile phone in terms of pervasiveness and accessibility in the developing world is the radio. Indeed, considered together, radios and mobile phones can serve as a broad-distribution, participatory media network with some of the same citizen media dynamics of the internet, but accessible to a much wider, and non-literate audience”. Data presented in Table 5.9 on access to news via radio services indicates to be higher in all countries but with varying degrees, whereby those who had access to radio news every-day for 2011/2013 in Kenya stands at (68.2%),

Tanzania (52.2%) and Uganda (64.3%). For 2014/2015 of the survey found there was a slight increase in Kenya and Tanzania and decrease in Uganda for those who access radio every day for news as follows: Kenya (68.4%), Tanzania (54.6%) and Uganda (58.5%) of the surveyed respondents.

Table 5.9 Access radio news

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	9.9%	16.5%	7.7%	10.7%	15.4%	16.2%
Less than once a month	2.1%	3.0%	1.7%	1.0%	0.9%	3.4%
A few times a month	3.6%	4.6%	5.0%	2.4%	5.1%	4.2%
A few times a week	15.9%	23.7%	21.2%	17.5%	23.9%	17.6%
Everyday	68.2%	52.2%	64.3%	68.4%	54.6%	58.5%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: How often do you get news from the radio?

Source: Afrobarometer Surveys round 5 2011/2013 and round 6 2014/2015.

*Access Television news:* A comparison of access to radio and television news shows that television as a source of news media is not a popular channel like radio to those who access news every day. Table 5.10 reports the following data for 2011/2013 of the Afrobarometer survey in Kenya (33.3%), Tanzania (16.6%) and Uganda (15.6%), while for the survey 2014/2015 in Kenya (32.7%), Tanzania (21.4%) and Uganda (10.9%) access television news every day. The number of respondents getting television news decreased in Kenya from (33.3%) to (32.7%) and Uganda (15.6%) to (10.9%) and in Tanzania increased (16.6%) to (21.4%).

Table 5.10 Access television news

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	40.3%	54.7%	65.9%	45.1%	49.6%	74.7%
Less than once a month	5.0%	7.9%	5.9%	2.8%	5.8%	4.2%
A few times a month	5.9%	8.2%	4.6%	5.8%	9.3%	4.0%
A few times a week	14.9%	12.5%	7.6%	13.4%	13.9%	5.7%
Everyday	33.3%	16.6%	15.6%	32.7%	21.4%	10.9%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: How often do you get news from the Television?

Source: as Table 5.9 above

*Access newspapers:* The rate of accessing news from newspapers source is much lower compared to radio and television for the everyday readers of the newspapers in the three countries. The data indicate countries had a lower response rate in both round five and six of the surveys. For example, Table 5.11 for 2011/2013 shows in Kenya the percentage of those who have access to newspapers was (9.9%), in Tanzania (7.5%) and Uganda (4.9%) and

round six 2014/2015 in Kenya it was (8.9%), in Tanzania (9.0%) and Uganda (3.6%) for those get news everyday from newspaper source. The number of those who responded never gets news from newspapers increased in Kenya from (51.7%) to (55.2%), and Uganda (61.4%) to (72.4%), while there was a decrease in Tanzania from (59.9%) to (57.1%).

Table 5.11 Access newspapers

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	51.7%	59.9%	61.4%	55.2%	57.1%	72.4%
Less than once a month	8.5%	12.2%	9.1%	7.8%	7.0%	8.1%
A few times a month	11.6%	9.4%	9.5%	11.9%	10.1%	8.4%
A few times a week	17.4%	10.7%	14.8%	16.0%	16.7%	7.0%
Everyday	9.9%	7.5%	4.9%	8.9%	9.0%	3.6%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: How often do you get news from newspapers?

Source: as Table 5.9 above

*Access internet news:* Radio, television and newspapers are more of old channels of accessing news, while emerging internet and social media networks create more space for news sharing among online users through citizen journalism. As regards the use of internet to access online news, Table 5.12 shows majority never access internet news in both two rounds such as round five in Kenya (77%), Tanzania (85.4%) and Uganda (84.4%) and for round six 2014/2015 Kenya (69.6%), Tanzania (86.3%) and Uganda (83.9%).

Table 5.12 Access internet news

	2011/2013			2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	77%	85.4%	84.4%	69.6%	86.3%	83.9%
Less than once a month	5.1%	3.8%	2.8%	2.3%	1.7%	1.7%
A few times a month	4.1%	3.3%	3.0%	3.5%	1.3%	2.0%
A few times a week	6.6%	3.7%	4.9%	9.1%	4.0%	3.0%
Everyday	6.0%	1.4%	1.4%	14.4%	5.9%	3.8%
(N)	2399	2400	2400	2397	2386	2400

Note: How often do you get news from the Internet?

Source: as Table 5.9 above

*Access social media News:* survey data round six 2014/2015 was the first time Afrobarometer asked questions on the social media use to get news. Table 5.13 findings for those who access news everyday through social media indicate the following percentage of users in Kenya (15.5%), Tanzania (5.2%) and Uganda (4.3%). The number of those who responded never getting news from social media was high in both countries like Kenya (70.1%), Tanzania (88.2%) and Uganda (84%). Comparatively, internet and social media found not to be common channels of accessing news in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Table 5.13 Access social media news

	2014/2015		
	Kenya	Tanzania	Uganda
Never	70.1%	88.2%	84%
Less than once a month	1.8%	1.2%	1.4%
A few times a month	2.6%	1.2%	1.5%
A few times a week	8.5%	3.1%	2.3%
Every day	15.5%	5.2%	4.3%
(N)	2397	2386	2400

Note: How often do you get news from the social media?

Source: Afrobarometer surveys round 6 2014/2015

### 5.2.4 ICT use in elections

In the modern democracies, there is an emerging use of information and communication technologies in the management of electoral process. But the transition to ICT instruments in electoral processes is one of the challenges in developed, developing and emerging democracies. The use of technology in an electoral process provides timely results and more efficiently, though the use of technology in election is an expensive event in any type of regimes in building stakeholders confidence of the electoral process. Thus, to produce acceptable results, free, fair, and credible elections the EMBs of the three countries in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda slowly make a step towards the use of technology in elections.

Table 5.14 Technology use in electoral processes

	Kenya 2013	Tanzania 2015	Uganda 2011
Voter Registration data	Biometric voter registration; fingerprint scans and photos	Biometric voter registration; fingerprint scans and photos	Biometric voter registration; fingerprint scans and photos
Voter registration check	Web interface	Web interface and mobile phone	Web interface
Voter Identification	Electronic Voter Identification Devices (EVID), Fingerprint	Voter roll and valid voters card	Voters roll and valid voters card
E-Voting	No e-voting used in 2013 election	No e-voting used in 2015 election	No e-voting used in 2011 election
Processing of Results	Electronic tabulation system – polling station online connected to central level	Electronic tabulation system	No electronic tabulation system
Open source software in election administration	Never been considered for security issues and sensitivity of the data	Never been considered - used closed systems like electronic results management system	Never been considered for security issues

Source: <http://www.idea.int/elections/ict/index.cfm>

Though the three countries have not yet adopted voting technology, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 Article 86 states that “at every election, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission shall ensure that - (a) “whatever voting method is used, the system is simple, accurate, verifiable, secure, accountable and transparent” and (c) “the results from the polling stations are openly and accurately collated and promptly announced by the returning officer”. The Constitution of Tanzania of 1977 and Constitution of Uganda of 2005 do not state any possibilities of introducing voting technology. Table 5.14 presents a snapshot of technology use for voter registration, checking registration information, voter identification during voting, processing results and the use of open-source software in administration of elections.

### **5.3 Chapter summary**

This chapter map new digital technologies infrastructure in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and levels of usage using surveys data. This thesis argues in order to achieve the goal of citizen engagement in the digital invented spaces; there must exist evidence of digital participatory tools that digitally-empowered ordinary citizens and, examples of technology usage by people and even usage by government and businesses. This chapter showed that existence of different types of digital tools may also shape different practices of crowdsourced technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Evidence showed that in Kenya there is a high adoption rate and usage of digital tools, compared to Tanzania and Uganda. But there is somewhat similarity in mobile penetration rate in Kenya and Tanzania, followed by Uganda. To the greater extent the three countries share similar stories on the recent rapid development on mobile phones technology, as well as mobile money transfer systems in the East African region. Since the focus of this research is on new digital technology tools as an enabler to crowdsourced method in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents, analysis of ICT infrastructure was indispensable in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in order to develop a picture of available tools for citizen engagement in digitalizing electoral processes.

The continued subscriptions rate of mobile phones technology in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is a gesturing of boundless potentials for citizen participation in political activities and enabler for improving transparency, accountability as well as inclusiveness in promoting and protecting elections with integrity. Analysis showed Kenya is leading in mobile phone adoption, followed by Tanzania and Uganda. But for the case of internet penetration per 100 people, Kenya also is leading, but followed by Uganda and then



Tanzania. The gap of internet adoption is high in each country, compared to adoption of mobile phones. For the case of fixed telephone subscription rate, data showed decrease in subscription rate in the three countries.

Despite the existing gap in digital divide in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda – the three countries demonstrates that they are at the centre stage in the development of digital participatory technologies and innovation. The case of Ushahidi open-sourced software and Uchaguzi software developed in Kenya is an example of technology revolution, and the software has been used in the three countries for monitoring and visualizing electoral incidents. And the existing ICT infrastructure, especially remarkable mobile ICT for texting services and mobile social media applications are increasingly enabled ordinary citizens to participate in political activities and monitoring electoral contests. Mapping of digital participatory technologies showed that there are various communication channels for receiving and disseminating information, though online channels such as internet and social networks found to have low rates of usage by citizens. Therefore, despite the fact that there are various perspectives on the influence of digital communication technologies in political context (Chadwick 2006), the optimistic technological perspective and the many advantages of digital participatory tools in election monitoring and reporting, and even sharing election related information in different digital online platforms, can help to engage citizens on electoral politics. In this case, surveyed digital communication technology tools in terms of adoption rate and usage, suggests amplified opportunities in political participation that may help to bridge disconnection of ordinary citizens in democratic processes.

## 6 Methodological Procedures

### 6.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and justifies the methodological procedures employed in this research, namely most similar systems design, methods (qualitative semi-structured interview, documentation and datasets analysis), and comparative cases such as Uchaguzi Kenya, Uchaguzi Tanzania and Uchaguzi Uganda. This chapter presents research design on most similar and most different systems design. This is followed by the selection of cases and justification for selection of three countries for small-N comparative analysis. Then research methods used for collecting primary and secondary data are presented. Also, this chapter highlighted data processing, analysis and scope and limitation of the research.

### 6.2 Research designs

According to Lim (2010) any attempt to establish a comparative method is strategic and is done for a purpose and in a conscious manner. On this basis “comparing...can help open your eyes to the world - including or especially your *own* world - in a manner that simply would not be possible otherwise. Of course, a new found “vision” does not come automatically. Many people can look at the world around them and see absolutely nothing new. Worse still, they may look around the world merely to confirm already closely held, but incorrect or distorted, beliefs. Learning to compare, therefore, entails more than just a capacity to look at a “foreign” place. It also requires a willingness to understand and evaluate differences (as well as similarities) in an open-minded manner” (Lim 2010:31). This implies that a comparativist should employ scientific approaches to study a phenomenon systematically and extensively. Because comparison “is a key operation to any empirical scientific effort” (Rihoux and Ragin 2009: xvii). Comparative method is carried out to explain new observations and meaning, in this case, a comparativist should endeavour to be objective as much as possible. This is because in any pre-biases about a phenomenon, there is likelihood to run into erroneous conclusion. Comparativist ultimately has better grounds than most people for deciding what to believe and how to act reasonably (Sartori 1991).

### 6.2.1 Most similar systems and most different systems design

This part presents a method of comparing few countries of most similar systems and most different systems design. Scholars have detailed the concept of “most similar systems” design and “most different systems” design in comparative analysis (Przeworski and Teune 1982 [1970]; Lijphart 1971, 1975; De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; Berg-Schlosser and Quenter 1996; Berg-Schlosser 2012; Moses and Knutsen 2012).

Figure 6.1 presents a visualization of two research designs; that is, “Most Similar systems with a Different Outcome” (MSDO), and “Most Different systems with a Similar Outcome” (MDSO). According to Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (2009:22-23) each circle represents a case, and the intersections represent their commonalities. For instance, Berg-Schlosser and De Meur (2009) point out “most similar systems” commonalities of the cases are indicated by the white area, whereas the shaded areas “indicate their remaining idiosyncrasies in which the reasons for the different outcome may lie”. And for “most different systems” the white areas indicate their specific conditions, whereas the “shaded areas for two or three cases respectively indicate their remaining commonalities in which the reasons for the same outcome may be sought” (p.22-23).




Figure 6.1 Most different and most similar systems designs

Source: Berg-Schlosser (2012:36).

#### 6.2.1.1 Most similar systems design

It should be noted that in most similar systems (MSS) design means that two or more cases are relevant for comparison to the extent that they share some elements in common. In this context, units are considered and selected as optimal samples for comparative inquiry if they are similar (Przeworski and Teune 1982:32 [1970]). As Lijphart (1971:687) puts it “similar

on the variables which one wants to treat as constants, but dissimilar as far as those variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each other”.

The MSS design is concerned with matching up and then comparing two or more systems that share a whole range of similarities (MSDO in figure 6.1 above). The characteristics that the system share in principle can be held as “constant” and can hence be considered irrelevant in explaining a particular social or political phenomenon that occurs in one, but not both cases (Moses and Knutsen 2012). And having “controlled for” a range of variables, the comparativist can focus on finding a significant dissimilarity between the two or more systems, which can then be put forward as the causal factor or key independent variable (Lim 2010:34). According to Przeworski and Teune (1982:39 [1970]) “most similar systems design is based on a belief that a number of theoretically significant differences will be found among similar systems and that these differences can be used in explanation”. The “most similar systems” design is related to Mill (1981 [1891]) “method of difference”, whereby the method of difference “establishes the absence of a common cause or effect, even if all other circumstances are identical” (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009:2). Mill’s method of difference seeks to identify the key features that are different among similar countries and which account for the observed political outcome (Landman 2008:70). Echoing the words of Mill (1981:388 [1891]) method of difference is “by comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does not”. And method of difference compares political systems that “share a number of common features as a way of neutralizing some differences while highlighting others. In other words, case selection is used in a way to control for causal effect” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:99).

“It is often assumed that countries situated in the same region (for example, in Latin America, the Middle East, East Africa) have so many significant variables in common that it is meaningful to compare them with respect to selected variables” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:101). It is due to this reason that Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990) employed most similar systems design to analyse political stability and development in the three countries that are similar in East African region, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In their study, Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990) established that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda with respect to cooperation in the East Africa community, climatic conditions, natural resources, ethnic composition and type of colonial development, among others, the three countries are comparable with most similar systems design.

### 6.2.1.2 Most different systems design

Alternatively, when systems have more dissimilar features a comparativist employs the “Most Different Systems” (MDS) design. Under this comparative method, a comparativist finds two or more systems which are different in most respects, except for the variable (s) to be investigated. It must be noted that unlike in the MSS design, variance on the dependent variable is not required, and “most different systems design centers on eliminating irrelevant systemic factors” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:35 [1970]). In other words, most different systems design “seeks maximal heterogeneity in the sample of systems, is based on a belief that in spite of intersystemic differentiation, the populations will differ with regard to only a limited number of variables or relationships” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:39 [1970]). This design related to Mill (1981 [1891]) “method of agreement” that seeks to identify features that are the same among different countries in an effort to account for a particular outcome (Landman 2008:70). Mills (1981:388 [1891]) method of agreement is “by comparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs”. The method of agreement “controls for variation on the basis of case selection: the investigator merely begins to collect cases of a particular phenomenon in an attempt to find common explanatory factors in cases that are otherwise quite different” (Moses and Knutsen 2012:103).

The difference between the two strategies of MSS and MDS designs should not be overemphasized (Berg-Schlosser 2012). Admittedly, that both “strategies can result in the confirmation of theoretical statements and both can combine intrasystemic and intersystemic levels of analysis” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:35 [1970]). A comparative method has prejudices such as its bias, even though it does not entirely focus on qualitative analysis (Moses and Knutsen 2012). Under this way, a comparativist tends to look at cases as whole and to compare whole cases with each other or “comparable cases strategy” (Lijphart 1975). On one hand, comparativist gives less priority to quantitative methods, while on the other hand, there are initiatives given the current development of statistical methods for comparative analysis, especially remarkable Crisp-Set, Multi-Value and Fuzzy-Sets for qualitative comparative analysis for large-N statistical “variable-oriented” (Berg-Schlosser 2012). The second disposition is to value “inter-pretivism” and “thick description” (Geertz 1973) and context as well. This means paying attention to historical processes or “macro-historical comparison” (Ragin et al. 1996) and practices that shape contemporary events in which decisions, events unfold, and the struggle for power occurs, and historical events matters as an essential link for comparativist (Lim 2010:18-19).

### 6.2.1.3 The choice of most similar systems design

It is worth noting that when comparing few countries, selection of cases should not be arbitrarily determined (Moses and Knutsen 2012), and it is important to develop systematic criteria based on specific assumptions. Failure to observe this procedure leads to the problem of “over-determination” in which a researcher is biased to choose cases that are most likely to support or validate the argument is trying to “test” or assess (Lim 2010:56). This amounts to predetermine the results and to be blunt. This is usually not intentional, and it is frequently unavoidable in comparing three cases, but it is nonetheless a potentially “serious methodological problem” (Lim 2010:56). Because of this problem, it is difficult to make strong theoretical conclusions solely based on a few cases in a comparative analysis (Moses and Knutsen 2012), but the researcher can establish “possible generalization” (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990). Therefore, it is noteworthy to argue that the choice of research design for this study is “most similar systems” design because:

The MSDO design (most similar, different outcome) in this respect is mostly applicable for “very small-N” situations, where paired comparisons or the systematic matching of very few cases (often just three or four) may lead to a narrowing down of the “conditions of occurrence” for exploratory purposes, in order to identify some factors that may possibly be responsible for the respective outcome (Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 2009:22).

Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990) used most similar systems design for a comparative analysis of political stability and development in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This is to say, using the same logic of most similar systems design, this research draws some experience from the work of Berg-Schlosser and Siegler for the purpose of analysing digital crowdsourcing systems in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 elections in order to improve the integrity of the electoral process. At this point, it is reasonable to argue “acting effectively in the world requires getting the causal relationships right. Research design matters...the first step must therefore be to get the research design right” (Aday et al. 2010:6). That is why it stands to reason that since the current study is about comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using most similar systems design, there are issues and lessons to learn from the work of Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990).

Therefore, the choice of comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is purposive, in the sense that, most similar systems approach was deployed to identify the three countries for scientific analysis. As indicated earlier, the logic of most similar systems design was based on the fact that the comparison of two or more systems design shares

some similarities, and generates different outcomes. Thus, the unit of analysis for a comparative study should be carefully chosen for the similar systems design. For the choice of the research design in the small-N comparative study “it is important to note, however, that such procedures, like all qualitative comparative methods, should never be applied in a purely mechanical way” (Ragin et al. 1996:755).

### 6.3 Selection of cases

At the outset of any investigation, therefore, an area of homogeneity must be defined which establishes boundaries for the selection of cases. Cases must “parallel each other sufficiently” and be comparable along certain specified dimensions. The specification of relevant cases at the start of an investigation amounts to an explicit or implicit hypothesis that the cases selected are in fact alike enough to permit comparisons. In the course of the research, the boundaries of the investigation may shift as more is learned about the similarities and differences among cases (Ragin et al. 1996:752).

In other words, “each empirical field of study can be described by the cases (“units”) analysed, the characteristics of cases (“variables”) being considered and the number of times each unit is observed (“observation”)” (Berg-Schlosser 2012:32). In this research, selection of cases for comparative analysis is purposively determined on the basis of the most similar systems, specific assumptions and selection criteria for various reasons. As observed by Landman (2008:28) intentional selection of few countries for comparison “achieves control through a careful selection of countries that are analysed using a middle level of conceptual abstraction”. In a similar vein, Sartori (1991:244) observed that “comparing is controlling. To be sure, one may engage in comparative work for any number of reasons; but the reason is control”.

Although there is no specific way of selecting the cases for comparison, one general standard, is at least to be aware of the methodological logic and theory or “conscious thinker” (Sartori 1970:1033). This is discussed by Berg-Schlosser et al. (2009:7) that “theories also guide the selection of cases, in the attempt to include both the important or typical cases and the more paradoxical or contrary ones” (see also De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; Berg-Schlosser and Quenter 1996; Ragin et al. 1996; Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2005). This study is about small-N comparative research of the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, using most similar systems design. Therefore, in this research “the ‘most similar systems design’ refers to what is listed below as ‘paired comparison’ ( $C_2V_j$ ) and the ‘comparative method’  $C_1V_j$  in the narrower sense of the term” (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994:194; see also Berg-Schlosser 2012). Figure 6.2 presents how

qualitative comparative analysis can be located in a two-dimensional matrix listing numbers of variables (V) and numbers of cases (C) (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009:4-5; Berg-Schlosser 2012:33).




Figure 6.2 Types of comparisons

Source: De Meur and Berg-Schlosser (1994:195); Berg-Schlosser (2012:33).

Since this research focuses on three countries, the study fits well on the small “l” of comparative method  $C_1 V_j$  (see Figure 6.2 above – De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994) using most similar systems design. And this study uses three cases - Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, therefore, it does not qualify to use statistical method  $C_m V_i$  principally used for large “m” comparative cases and few variables oriented research (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994; see also Berg-Schlosser 2012). It has been argued, that for the small-N research “it is very difficult to pass tests of statistical significance when Ns are small” (Ragin 2005:92). This is because “the demands and assumptions of quantitative methods are very difficult to meet in small-N situations” (Ragin et al. 1996:750). But this study deliberately applied some correlation method on the digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity using data from Electoral Integrity Project and World Bank Group data sets. The aim is to see whether or not there is a relationship between digital adoption index by businesses, people and government and perceptions of electoral integrity in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

“Comparative methods in political science are often applied at the ‘macro-level of political systems, that is, at the total (nation) state level and different aspects observed of the whole system” (Berg-Schlosser and Cronqvist 2005:154). In this case, “comparative



political analysis at the macro-level of political systems can reduce the inevitably high complexity of such comparisons by the systematic matching or contrasting of cases, depending on the particular problem” (De Meur and Berg-Schlosser 1994:193). Sampling of cases in this study involved country level using most similar systems design, and selection of non-partisan election monitoring organizations that deploy digital crowdsourced method in assessing and observing national elections in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The country level was the broader context within which non-partisan civic groups and other election stakeholders such as technological innovators operate. The underlying methodological logic behind this criterion is that non-partisan civic groups operate in open systems that offer amplified opportunity to invite ordinary citizens in the digital invented spaces in order to interact with their environments across the country. Through such interaction, they are shaped and re-shaped by the specific country laws and digital technologies infrastructure. Being non-partisan civic groups, their activities, social bases, size, mobilization strategies, and membership support the changing nature of the environment within which they are located. It was on this backdrop, criteria were used to select three countries for comparative analysis in East African region. The presented criteria section 6.3.1 shows that Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda qualified for comparative analysis on the digital crowdsourcing method, and in this respect, countries such as Burundi and Rwanda were not included in this analysis, though they are members of East African community, and within the same region. This is due to the fact that “selection of cases must be based on compelling theoretical and substantive criteria because the inclusion or exclusion of any single case may significantly alter the investigator’s conclusions” (Ragin et al. 1996:752).

### **6.3.1 The rationale for selection of cases for comparative analysis**

The comparative method in a more narrow sense of the term (looking at a still relatively small number of cases with many variables) has to be distinguished, in particular, from the statistical or macro-quantitative method which proceeds on the basis of a large number of cases with regard to relatively few variables...The primary consideration in delimiting cases for a small-N comparative study is the *dependent variable*... A second consideration concerns the extent of diversity within the selected universe. In this regard, a maximum of *heterogeneity* for a minimum number of cases should be achieved (Berg-Schlosser 2012:34).

Berg-Schlosser and Siegler (1990) in their comparative analysis of political stability and development in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda suited for ‘Small-N’, they used most similar systems design. These scholars brilliantly stated that “with regard to certain central factors e.g., geographic and climatic conditions, availability of natural resources, ethnic

composition, type of colonial development, international economic dependencies, a period of institutionalized cooperation in the East African Community, they show considerable similarities, indicating that a systematic comparative analysis, in the sense of a most similar systems design may be particularly rewarding” (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler 1990:2). Comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is because the countries somewhat share social, political and cultural values.

“Comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis. It sharpens our power of description, and plays a central role in concept-formation by bringing into focus suggestive similarities and contrasts among cases. Comparison is routinely used in testing hypothesis, and it can contribute to the inductive discovery of new hypothesis and to theory-building” (Collier 1993:105). The historical outlook of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda reveals that these countries have emerged from one-party authoritarian whether de jure one party state like Tanzania and Kenya or de facto like in Uganda (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). These three countries underwent varying degrees of authoritarianism and Uganda is slightly different as it went to the extreme compared to other neighbours’ states because of the eruption of tyrannical government and numerous military coups and wars which are seen as “rule of the gun” (Mugaju 2000). Yet there is ample evidence that the three countries experience model of regimes change before transition or re-introduction of multi-party systems such as plebiscitary one-party system in Kenya, competitive one-party system in Tanzania and military oligarchy in Uganda (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997).

It is obvious that colonial administration and, in this case, British colonial rule was undemocratic and violent. This, “British rule meant not democracy – colonialism is by definition undemocratic – but constitutional liberalism” (Zakaria 1997:29). It was not entirely devoid of African participation especially during its last days. British colonial rule, through indirect rule system, allowed African traditional leaders to handle day-to-day administration of the colony. For one reason, Europeans were few to administer the whole colony. The indirect rule assisted them to reduce costs of administration and to concealment legitimacy. This was the case in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda till the time of independence under Westminster constitution. Furthermore, in Africa “polyarchic forms of government were installed by the colonial powers in a majority of states at the time of independence, generally following either the Westminster or the French presidential model” (Berg-Schlosser 1984a:130). In this regard, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are closely related through a shared history such as colonies of British indirect rule system; struggle for

independence under Westminster constitution model which provided a space for first phase of pluralist politics, and later from early 1990s was the second phase of pluralist politics in Kenya and Tanzania, while Uganda from 2000s. Therefore, selection of cases considers whether the struggle for independence was by constitutional peaceful means, armed struggles or revolution. And when constitutional means were used, democratic institutions were initially instituted, though at minimum levels, and this allowed the operation of civil society groups. Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya grant their independence under Westminster model of constitution in 1961, 1962 and 1963 respectively.

The countries were selected for comparative analysis by considering electoral democracy and the use of technology such as Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform for election monitoring and reporting systems. Uchaguzi platform as open source software was agreed to be used in the three East African countries commonly referred to as “Uchaguzi Watch in East Africa” in Tanzania 2010, Uganda 2011 and Kenya 2013 general elections (Omenya 2013). And later Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform was deployed in Tanzania 2015 general elections. The other two countries: Burundi and Rwanda, who are also members of the East African Community (EAC) in the East African region, were not part of the Uchaguzi Watch in East Africa project (Omenya 2013). Therefore, criterion for the case study selection is the persistence of election watch using crowdsourcing technologies and under the brand name of “Uchaguzi” as an open platform for mapping citizen monitors and reporters generated election observation data and geo-located of incoming election information. The three countries in the East African region have civil society organisations that are partners in the election watch project (CEW-IT in Uganda, CRECO in Kenya and TACCEO in Tanzania) with the aim of promoting integrity of elections through citizen monitors with the use of different online digital communication technologies.

Given the historical nature, trend of political democracy and cultural ties in Rwanda and Burundi, the two countries are not included in this comparative analysis. Though the focus of this study is on digital crowdsourcing method in promoting the integrity of electoral process, still there are factors and reasons that obstruct the process of including Burundi and Rwanda in this study such as electoral system designs, language, citizen engagement in election observation and freedom status of the countries. The three countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) share cultural ties such as language (English and Kiswahili); political institutions such as EAC founded in 1967. And Kenya and Tanzania altogether with Uganda revived the EAC in 1999 as a regional intergovernmental organisation which

originally founded in 1967, but declined in 1977 (Mukandala and Killian 2004). Burundi and Rwanda joined the three founding states in 2007 and became member of EAC. In which of now, member states are fast-tracking the integration process of East Africa political federation. Also, the three countries share conflict in the Great Lakes Region between and around Lake Victoria (Mukandala and Killian 2004).

In addition, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to a greater extent share data on electoral system design such as electoral system family, electoral system for national legislature, legislative size (directly elected), legislative size (voting members) and electoral system for the president (Table 6.1). For example: the case of electoral system family, the three countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) share plurality/majority system, while Burundi and Rwanda share proportional representation (PR) system.

Table 6.1 Electoral system designs

Country	Electoral System Family	Electoral System for National Legislature	Number of tiers	Legislative size (directly elected)	Legislative size (voting members)	Electoral System for the president
Burundi	PR	List PR	1	100	100	TRS
Kenya	Plurality/Majority	FPTP	1	337	350	TRS
Rwanda	PR	List PR	1	53	80	FPTP
Tanzania	Plurality/Majority	FPTP	1	239	357	TRS
Uganda	Plurality/Majority	FPTP	1	238	Minimum 375	TRS

Source: [www.idea.int/esd/search.cfm](http://www.idea.int/esd/search.cfm)

Also, for the case of electoral system for national legislature, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda share first-past-the-post (FPTP), while Burundi and Rwanda share List PR. The FPTP systems are used mostly in African commonwealth states and two-round systems, used mainly in the former French African colonies (Kersting 2007b). The legislative size of the directly elected members for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is not less than 200 members, though Kenya is more than 300 members, while Burundi and Rwanda is less than 200 members, and even, Rwanda less than 100. For example, the number of legislative size (directly) elected in Burundi is 100 and Rwanda 53. And in Kenya legislative size directly elected number is 337, Tanzania 239 and Uganda 238. The number of legislative size voting members is not less than 300: for Kenya 350, Tanzania 357 and Uganda 375, while is less than 200: for Burundi 100 and Rwanda 80. The electoral system for the president in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is Two-Round System (TRS) and Burundi share similar TRS with the three countries, while Rwanda is FPTP. In addition, perceptions of freedom status in the world by Freedom House ratings, ranked Burundi and Rwanda as “not free”, while Kenya

and Tanzania are “partly free” and Uganda up to 2014 rated as “partly free”, but from 2015 and 2016 rated as “not free” (Freedom House 2016). Therefore, comparative analysis of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is essential for understanding process and outputs of citizen-oriented election monitoring using the case of Uchaguzi watch in East Africa project.

The process of identifying non-partisan election monitoring organizations goes hand-in-hand with the selection of countries for comparison. This means that three non-partisan civic groups were identified and selected in the three countries, one from each country. These are CRECO in Kenya, TACCEO in Tanzania and CEW-IT in Uganda. These non-partisan civic groups were the ones that struggled and championed for engaging the crowd in election monitoring process by capturing and communicating electoral incidents. The initiatives of crowdsourcing technologies were initiated by them in collaboration with technology innovators and other electoral assistance groups. The identified and selected non-partisan election monitoring groups have similar strategies and framework for engaging the crowd and as presented and explained above, the selected non-partisan civic groups are in the network of Uchaguzi Election Watch in East Africa. This means also, election watch project excludes other two East African countries of Burundi and Rwanda.

As regards implementation of Election Watch in East Africa with the use of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform, that Tanzania was the first country to initiate the project in 2010 general election, followed by Uganda 2011 and Kenya 2013 election, and again used in the 2015 Tanzanian election. The network of Election Watch in East Africa, as part of a broader collaboration of the CSOs in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and technology developer called Ushahidi created Uchaguzi platform for sharing and crowdmapping election observation data in near-real time. The selection of cases of three countries and the network of non-partisan election monitoring organizations are comparable using most similar systems design or Mill’s method of difference. The use of most similar systems design for comparing the three countries and the work of citizen monitors and reporters through crowdsourcing method will contribute to our understanding of the power of ordinary citizen to promote the integrity of elections by detecting positive and negative experiences of elections across the electoral cycle.

The study is based on the main assumption that, crowdsourcing monitoring of elections via digital communication technologies determines detection of electoral incidents, and therefore, promotion of electoral integrity. Indeed, citizen engagement in election observation events underlying the analysis at the country level, because the crowd is

everywhere and can observe and generate election reports across the country. Based on this assumption, crowdsourcing using open-call to an undefined group of citizen monitors, were invited to submit their observation reports on positive and negative conduct of elections irrespective of their geographical location. And increasing ubiquity of mobile technology plays a role of facilitating interaction between citizens and crowdsourcers in promoting participation in election monitoring. Through such interaction, stakeholders collaborate in generating information on the conduct of electoral process that is worth sharing with other members of the public in Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform in real-time.

It is observed that “all scientific observations are both variable and case-based. Here, the accent lies on the small-N situations where each case is given direct consideration in the explanation of phenomena. For this reason, both the selection of cases and the selection of variables must be guided by theory” (Ragin et al. 1996:762). This research is an attempt to analyse crowdmonitors of the electoral integrity; especially engagement of ordinary citizens in the digital invented space, and invitation of different groups of citizen observers to report their election observation in the electoral cycle. And “popular election monitoring makes possible empirical comparison of varied experiences from across the country in order to ascertain which practices actually create efficient, equitable, and satisfying elections” (Fung 2011:204).

Variables are selected for analysis and, comparison of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The variables are selected from four phases of electoral cycle such as pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election phases (Norris 2014), especially for election fraud data. The first pre-election phase comprises variable like manipulation of vote registry. The campaign phase encompasses other variables such as vote-buying, voters threatened with violence and voter intimidation. The third is election-day phase, this includes ballot-box stuffing, secrecy of the vote, multiple voting and voting fraud, and finally post-election phase that involves variables like miscounting of votes, intimidation of counting officials and observers as well as election triggered violence after voting. In addition, analysis involves indicators such as political context, digital participatory tools, crowdsourced initiators, actors in crowdsourcing process, categories of observation data, verification process of the incoming reports and citizen-generated reports based on the four phases of the electoral cycle, as well as feedback and response mechanism in the three countries.

#### 6.4 Research methods

Some research on the study of ICTs in the political context (Norris 2001), electoral integrity (Norris, 2014, 2015) and crowdsourced elections monitoring (Bailard and Livingstone 2014; Grömping 2014) used quantitative methods with large number of cases that generates statistical data. In this research, due to the small-N comparative approach with most similar cases, this study used comparative method to analyse crowdsourced systems and citizen-generated reports in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This is because there is limited scholarly analysis of the emerging digital crowdsourced monitoring of elections and unexploited source of citizen-observation data. To analyse potentiality of crowdsourcing method, this study employs semi-structured interviews, Uchaguzi datasets analysis and document analysis. These methods were used to provide in-depth analysis of the crowdsourced process in the three countries and understanding of citizen-generated reports during electoral processes. These multiple methods of data collection were used in this study in order to answer all research questions:

- i. How digital crowdsourced method used to engage citizens in observing and communicating electoral incidents?
- ii. Do crowdsourced elections monitoring detect positive and negative electoral incidents? And if so, what are the evidences?
- iii. In what ways do digital crowdsourced complement traditional method of observing electoral processes?
- iv. What challenges, if any, were encountered in digital crowdsourced monitoring integrity of electoral procedures?

For this research to provide a basic familiarity with digital crowdsourcing, this is an exploratory study of this new interest of crowdsourced monitoring of elections. Crowdsourcing of elections is relatively a new method in countries categorized with digital divide in the form of accessibility, availability, affordability and usability of ICTs as well as problems of elections with integrity. Given the rapid growth of mobile ICT in developing or fledgling democracies, became an enabler for civil society organisations to outsource monitoring of elections to the ordinary citizens through ICT. This is the case in the countries like Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2010 and 2015 as well as Uganda 2011 elections using *Uchaguzi* web system, Nigeria deployed *ReclaimNaija*<sup>6</sup> platform for 2011 and 2015 elections; Russia

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<sup>6</sup> <http://reclaimnaija.net>

in 2011-2012 elections used *Karta Narusheniy*<sup>7</sup> web-based; Mexico used *Ushahidi Cuidemos El Voto*<sup>8</sup> for 2009 elections, Burundi deployed *Ushahidi Amatora mu Mahoro*<sup>9</sup> platform for 2010 elections, Sudan using *Sudan Vote Monitor*<sup>10</sup> web-based for 2010 elections and Thailand deploying *Thai Election Watch*<sup>11</sup> platform for 2011 elections, among others. The above examples of elections deployed crowdsourcing platform for monitoring elections using different medium of communication for receiving incoming observation data such as mobile phones, especially smart phones apps and short code services for short messages, e-mail and web form, as well as online social networks accounts and hashtags. Mobile ICT for sms is widely used in crowdsourcing and handling incoming election monitoring data from ordinary citizen monitors.

The purpose of this exploratory study is to gain ideas and insights into crowdsourcing process and outputs of citizen-oriented election monitoring using digital communication technologies. The goal is to find out what is going on, especially in the Uchaguzi systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and the results will provide significant insights into Uchaguzi crowdsourcing method by providing some indication on how or in what ways ‘the crowd’ were engaged to observe, generate and share election observation incidences, who is involved, what are the results of their engagement and what are the challenges as well as potentials of crowdsourcing method in election monitoring in promoting integrity of electoral process. Though, the analysis of crowdsourced outputs in terms of how many reports were generated on positive and negative incidences, and how reports detected election fraud, this data will not be used to generalize the ability of crowdsourcing technologies at large in detecting positive and negative experiences of elections to establish free, fair and credible elections or vice versa. Rather, the study will offer findings and insight into the familiarity of the crowdsourcing using ICT tools, that will help to suggest further studies and advanced methodological approaches of analysing crowdsourced process and outputs data on election monitoring.

In this context, different methods of data collection are deployed to collect relevant information for the research work. The rationale behind is that the chosen methods are used to corroborate the collected and analysed data. That is why this study uses different sources

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<sup>7</sup> <https://www.kartanarusheniy.org>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.usahidi.com/blog/2009/06/25/cuidemos-el-voto-monitoring-federal-elections-in-mexico/>

<sup>9</sup> <http://www.ifes.org/news/burundi-launches-first-ever-election-violence-monitoring-system>

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.usahidi.com/blog/2010/11/03/report-on-sudan-vote-monitor>

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.newmandala.org/crowd-sourcing-the-thai-election/>



of data. Both primary and secondary methods were used to collect the data. The methods of collecting data to analyse the research questions were done through a combination of methods of data collection such as semi-structured interviews, data sets analysis (stored data and online data) and document analysis. The decision to use a combination of methods of data collection was based on the fact that no single instrument is considered adequate enough to answer the research questions and give dependable results (Neuman 2007). The research relies on data sets analysis; in particular citizen-generated voices because the study is about citizen monitors and reporters in capturing and communicating election observation incidents of election fraud and promotion of electoral integrity. Uchaguzi datasets constitute a good store of data from the crowd about the conduct of electoral processes. Other source of data such as qualitative semi-structured interview was used to collect useful information about digital crowdsourcing method.

#### **6.4.1 Uchaguzi crowdsourced data sets**

This research is based on Uchaguzi crowdsourced platform deployed in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. This study aims to analyse Uchaguzi data sets, in this regard, “the degree of maturity and robustness of a generalization will strongly depend on the quality of the empirical data set constructed by the researcher, and it will generally be a long and hard job to produce it, with many trials and errors, new questionings, and assessments” (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009:12). It is time to undertake a more systematic analysis of the activities of crowdsourced systems in the three countries, especially the analysis of process and citizen-generated voices. The analysis of citizen-generated data regarding observation of electoral process is possible through Uchaguzi case studies. In this context, the analysis of Uchaguzi platform in comparative perspective is to gain insights into and, understanding of the current emerging deployment of crowdsourced citizen-based in observing, generating and reporting the conduct of electoral process using ICT tools. Especially, the analysis of Uchaguzi crowdsourced systems seeks to gain comprehensively the process used to engage ordinary citizens and outputs of citizen voices to see whether ordinary citizens were able to generate positive and negative observation data of the elections, and particularly detection of election fraud. In addition, it seeks to establish the challenges encountered in crowdsourcing process as well as potentials of citizen monitoring of the conduct of elections using modern means of communication technologies.

Uchaguzi datasets for citizen election observation data - are stored and are accessible from the crowd initiators or non-partisan election monitoring organisations that were responsible for crowdsourcing monitoring of electoral integrity. In Kenya 2013 general election the crowd sourcer of Uchaguzi platform was CRECO in partnership with Ushahidi as a technology developer. In Tanzania, the crowd sourcer was TACCEO using Uchaguzi platform powered by Ushahidi. The same case for Uganda, Uchaguzi platform was used in 2011 general election powered by Ushahidi and the crowd initiator was Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) in collaboration with other partners like Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMG) and Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU). These non-partisan election monitoring organisations formed Uchaguzi platform in order to motivate and invite ordinary citizens to participate in generating election observation data that will protect their vote and integrity of elections, and incoming data were used to inform the general public about the conduct of electoral process in a dedicated Uchaguzi crowd-mapping platform.

#### **6.4.1.1 Getting access to the Uchaguzi crowdsourced data sets**

Getting accessibility to the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was one of the main determinants for the next-step of this research. As aforementioned the aim of this research is to analyse the process and outputs of crowdsourced integrity of elections in comparative perspective. The researcher access to Uchaguzi data sets was a success story in this study to read and analyse voices of citizens on the conduct of elections. The researcher gained access to Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. First, access to Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 general election was given to the researcher by Ushahidi/Uchaguzi as a technology developer, and who stored Uchaguzi citizen observation data and CRECO as a crowd sourcer of 2013 Kenyan general election. The access to Uchaguzi dataset was granted after the submission of official research clearance letter and research identity card from the Kenya Commission for Science and Technology. Initially, the journey to research work and gaining access to Uchaguzi database began at the CRECO office as the in-charge of crowdsourcing citizen monitors and reporters of elections. From CRECO, the researcher was given a full introduction regarding crowdsourcing process of the 2013 Kenyan general election, and some background information to Uchaguzi monitoring 2010 Kenya constitutional referendum. Thereafter, the researcher was introduced to the Ushahidi/Uchaguzi technology team for technological part of the crowdsourcing process and access to the stored data of citizen monitors and reporters of electoral incidents in

Kenya 2013 election. The granted access to citizen generated observation data was only those generated data that were approved by the trained/trusted team (crowd-sourcer) for further action. Some of the numbers of accessed and approved data were verified and some were not verified and remained unverified on the dataset, but with status of approved reports. The approved, but unverified data means that the crowdsourcing team could not verify or establish the validity of the reported incidents.

Secondly, in Tanzania after getting research permit from the University of Dar es Salaam, issued by the Vice Chancellor on behalf of the Commission for Science and Technology, the permit made it much easier to contact the crowd sourcer for the October 2015 Tanzanian general election. In Tanzania the permission to access Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 data set was given by TACCEO as the main crowd sourcer. The access was somewhat different from that of Kenya and Uganda, as in Tanzania the researcher was given information on how to access the data and do online filtering of information on the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform. This process of online filtering of data was possible because data were collected during the process of election cycle from September to October 2015. Therefore, the researcher was able to generate all the required information from Uchaguzi Tanzania crowdsourcing platform in the dataset managed by TACCEO.

Thirdly, in Uganda access to the citizen generated observation data on the Uchaguzi dataset was granted by CEW-IT for the 2011 general election. The access gained by the researcher was possible using the introduction and research permit letter issued by the office of the High Commissioner of Uganda in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The researcher was given insightful information by the crowd sourcer regarding how the crowdsourcing method was used in Uganda 2011 general election, and access to the stored approved citizen observation data in csv format. Like Kenya, the dataset contained both verified and unverified observation data, but all reports were approved by the processing team.

In all three countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda before given access to the citizen generated election observation data, the researcher had to explain to the crowdsourcer why he needed access to the Uchaguzi data sets. After the researcher had informed them about the purpose of the research that is only for academic purpose, and guaranteed them the data would be secured and used with integrity, the respondents agreed to provide the required information. This is the reason Kersting (2013a:277) raised the question: Is there a need for a stronger control of government and private data protection to avoid the misuse of (big) data and internet communication? In fact, in Uchaguzi data sets some of the generated and

stored data contain information about citizen monitors and reporters such as their mobile numbers and names, which can easily be used to track back the observers. That is why in digital crowdsourcing method of undefined large group of people, usually crowdsourcers guarantee the anonymity of observers and reporters of electoral incidents.

#### **6.4.1.2 Researching Uchaguzi crowdsourced data sets**

The Uchaguzi crowdsourced data sets accessed by the researcher for analysis in Kenya and Uganda had both verified and unverified reports. The same for Tanzania, the researcher could have access to verified and unverified reports via online filtering option in the Uchaguzi platform. It is noteworthy that during the process of Uchaguzi deployment, one could use the filter function on the platform to go through generated observation data and check information such as verification status, type of media used to report the incident, location of the incident, type of crowd who reported the incident and even, to read generated information on a specific category and sub-categories of data. This process of filtering and collecting information through online function was possible in Tanzania because the researcher could follow the platform during electoral processes. In fact, this reduces detection of problems in terms of double reports, and categorized reports without incident. Conversely, the filtering function for collecting and viewing data though online option in Kenya and Uganda could not be used, this is because in Kenya the Uchaguzi platform is no longer available online, but the researcher was given access to the stored dataset of the citizen generated data. The same for Uganda the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform is no longer accessible online, but the crowd generated data can be accessed in different platform called “rwenzori peoples voice”, but the filter function is inactive. The same case, in Uganda the researcher was given access to the citizen generated observation data in the form of csv file format. But in Tanzania, the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform is still accessible online, even after the election - though with warning message or unknown error, but after several attempts of reloading the page, one could access the platform with most often encountered unknown error message (see Figure 6.3).

The screenshot shows the Uchaguzi Tanzania website interface. At the top, there is a navigation bar with the text 'TACCEO OBSERVATION OF UCHAGUZI 2015 TANZANIA' and a search bar. Below this is the main header with the 'UCHAGUZI' logo and 'TANZANIA' text. A navigation menu includes 'NYUMBANI', 'RIPOTI', 'TUNGA TUKIO', 'PATA TANABAHISHO', and 'WASILANA NA SISI'. The main content area displays a date range 'Sep 14, 2015 Oct 29, 2015' and a 'Warning Message' box. The warning message states: 'An error was detected which prevented the loading of this page. If this problem persists, please contact the website administrator.' Below the warning message is a code snippet: '>system/core/Kohana.php [139]: Cannot modify header information - headers already sent by (output started at /home/utanzania/public\_html/system/core/Kohana.php:588)'. To the right of the warning message is a 'Filter Reports By' section with a table of reports categorized by 'Jamii'.

Jamii	Count
Jamii zote	4596
Ripoti zilizothibitika	323
Kampeni	1561
Kampeni zinazoambatana na lugha ya matusi	204
Kampeni baada ya muda ulioruhusiwa	180
Usalama wakati wa kampeni	133
Kampeni za vitisho	132
Kampeni imezuwa au kusitishwa	154

Figure 6.3 Screenshot warning message Uchaguzi Tanzania crowd data

Source: <https://www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz/reports> [22 February 2016]

In order to collect data for analysis, and to ensure the quality of data sources available on the Uchaguzi sourced datasets, the following procedures were then used by the researcher for the analysis of the data sets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda:

- The researcher examined the structure of the datasets for the purpose of checking the likelihood of getting data to address defined research questions, and the chances of getting comparison data for the study. This procedure ensures that the structure of data presentation in all datasets are somewhat similar, and with most similar systems approach of data collection will likely produce most different results.
- From the Uchaguzi citizen generated election observation data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, the category and sub-categories of data presents the specific focus of the crowdsourcers in terms of monitoring the electoral process and most often considering steps of electoral cycle. This procedure guarantees the availability of data for each individual country for analysis in different steps of electoral process and for comparing the three countries in this study.

- The next step was to check whether citizen monitors and reporters generated election observation data in the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have undergone the process of verification for the credibility of the observation reports. In this respect, incoming reports from citizen monitors (bounded and unbounded monitors) would be marked verified or unverified in the datasets, as well as approved reports. This procedure ensures that the researcher obtained the actual number of trustworthy verified and unverified reports that crowdsourcers were not able to authenticate, as well as election observation reports from bounded and unbounded groups of observers.
- Thereafter, the content of each report was reviewed for the purpose of establishing the category and sub-categories of observation data. This process of reading each individual report guarantees that all verified observation data are correctly characterized in the category and sub-categories of data developed by the crowd initiators. This helps to audit and re-categorize generated multiple reports from the same observer and reporter that indicating the same incident in one location at the same time. This was tracked and identified by looking at the sub-category of data and geo-location of the incoming reports, time as well as latitude and longitude of the reports. From this observation, the researcher could generate data based on the category and sub-categories of the observation data, and detect multiple reports on the Uchaguzi system.
- What follows is to establish the distribution in terms of percentage of verified and unverified reports on each category and sub-categories of data, and data generated by bounded and unbounded monitors, and categorise data based on the stages of the electoral cycle. In this regard, the research could establish which stages of the electoral cycle received high number of observation data of verified and unverified reports. This procedure ensures assessment of the collective ability of the crowd monitors and reporters in capturing and communicating negative and positive incidents in the conduct of elections for the sake of promoting elections with integrity through Uchaguzi platform. Thereafter, the analysis of observation reports on the negative experiences of the elections, especially remarkable citizen reports on the illicit conduct of elections.

- In addition, the analysis of the datasets look at the type of media used to engage citizen monitors and reporters to capture and communicate election observation data. The type of media analysed were sms-based services, web-form, emails or social media networks accounts established by the crowd sourcers for receiving election observation information from the crowd on the ground. From this analysis the researcher was able to generate number of reports submitted by each medium of communication.

The analysis of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing datasets aimed to generate positive and negative data regarding the conduct of electoral process. In order to generate crowdsourced observation data on threats to election integrity, sub-categories of data on the Uchaguzi system were refined and re-categorized to form comprehensive sub-categories of fraud data.

#### **6.4.2 The logic of sampling**

“All research involves defining the population for which the study is to be conducted and selecting a sample from this population. Sampling methods vary greatly, depending upon the problems of the research and the nature of the population” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:31 [1970]). At this point, purposive sampling technique was employed for qualitative semi-structured face-to-face interviews in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, in order to draw the desired sample of the population. The premise of this technique could generate the most knowledgeable information about the deployment of crowdsourced technologies in the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Babbie (1990) contends that ‘we are almost never able to study all the members of the population that interest us. We are, therefore, obliged to select a few elements in the intended population for the study’. In this case, it was necessary to select a category of people from various organizations for qualitative interview - such as members from civil society organizations, technology developers, domestic election observers, academic/research institutions and electoral management bodies. This category of informants was perceived by the researcher to be representative of the population of individuals who are knowledgeable about and aware of emerging crowdsourced systems of monitoring elections using digital technology tools.

In order to make semi-structured qualitative interviews successful and interacting with few targeted people, the researcher identified few individuals for interview, and thereafter, the snowball sampling was used by requesting the first few contacted persons for interview to link the researcher with other members for interview. This is because snowball sampling

is ‘appropriate when the members of a special population are difficult to locate’ (Babbie and Mouton 2012). The purpose of using snowball sampling was to get in touch with the most knowledgeable and informed individuals, who are in one way or the other, were directly involved in the crowdsourcing process or following or aware of the process of crowdsourcing technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used in the selection of key informants from the civil society organisations such as CRECO in Kenya, TACCEO in Tanzania and CEW-IT in Uganda; technology developers from Uchaguzi team in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda; academic institutions such as University of Nairobi in Kenya, University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and University of Makerere in Uganda; electoral management bodies such as IEBC in Kenya, NEC in Tanzania and EC in Uganda, as well as domestic election observers such as ELOG in Kenya, TEMCO in Tanzania and DEMGroup in Uganda. The listed civil society organisations are big potential crowd initiators and depository of citizen generated election observation data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Therefore, at least two individuals from each of these groups were selected and through snowball process they were identified for semi-structured qualitative interviews. Accordingly, this research involved a total of 22 interviewees from Kenya (7), Tanzania (8) and Uganda (7). The premise of this approach was that the informants would be able to provide well-informed information about crowdsourced monitoring of the electoral integrity in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using digital communication technology tools, and to give more clarification during the face-to-face interview session on various matters.

### **6.4.3 Collecting primary and secondary data**

#### **6.4.3.1 Research context and timing**

The empirical work of this research was collected from various institutions available in one of the city from each of the selected cases. The cities that were selected for fieldwork include: Nairobi in Kenya, Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and Kampala in Uganda. These three cities were selected based on the fact that the civil society organisations or non-partisan election monitoring organisations and technology developers are found and stationed on these identified cities. Also, the selected cities have the highest concentration of electoral stakeholders offices compared to other cities, and most of those situated in other cities are branches of the main offices or partner organisations. Availability of key respondents for semi-structured interviews and citizen observation data in this case is higher in Nairobi, Dar



es Salaam and Kampala, than elsewhere. The headquarters of non-partisan election monitoring organisations that were the main crowd initiators of the citizen-based election monitoring are CEW-IT headquarters in Kampala, CCEDU headquarter in Kampala, CRECO headquarter in Nairobi and TACCEO headquarter in Dar es Salaam. Also, the office for technology developers responsible for the design of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform is found in Nairobi, Kenya. The academic institutions selected for interview are: University of Nairobi (Nairobi), University of Dar es Salaam (Dar es Salaam) and University of Makerere (Kampala). And domestic election observers visited for interview were such as ELOG (Nairobi), TEMCO (Dar es Salaam) and DEMGroup (Kampala). They are all found in the selected cities.

Data collection period lasted for over seven months, which is at least two months in each country. The data were collected for the first phase from March to May 2015, and second phase from September 2015 to January 2016. This period involved a range of activities: first, application for research permit/clearance in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Second, request for access to Uchaguzi crowdsourced citizen-based observation reports for the general elections in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011, and analysis of the Uchaguzi crowdsourced data sets in the three countries. Third, document reviews and semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted in the first and second phase in various institutions in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

#### **6.4.3.2 Qualitative semi-structured interviews**

The questions at hand require an in-depth elaboration of the cases. Since this research analyses emerging digital crowdsourcing method in monitoring electoral integrity, it also opt for comparative research using most similar systems designs. In this regard, semi-structured interview method proved to be useful with the context of this research, since there is virtually limited scholarly work that questioned the potentiality of crowdsourced method and its outputs of citizen-generated voices in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. All interviews were semi-structured face-to-face interviews, as a result not only provide road-map for the research during the interviews, but also allow the respondents to elaborate important issues that escaped the researcher's notice and issues not known to the researcher. To keep principle of anonymity, this research cannot reveal the interviewees personal details, but different individuals constitute the sample frame from different organisations.

Qualitative semi-structured interview is a common method in exploring and analysing new emerging and unknown issues with less standardized techniques of conducting and collecting information. This method of collecting primary data was more direct and deep, and actually helped the researcher to gather more information through semi-structured questions. As it was face-to-face encounter with interviewees, the researcher has an ample time to probe some of the information and get clarification from the respondents. The qualitative sources included semi-structured qualitative interviews in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. And to gain informed insight into crowdsourcing methodologies it was important to interview knowledgeable people on the implementation of crowdsourced citizen observers and reporters on election monitoring. As shown above, the interviews were conducted to various institutions and organisations. These include: CSOs such as Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) in Tanzania; Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT); Citizen Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) in Uganda and Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) in Kenya. Civil society organisations were the main crowd sources of election monitoring using citizen-oriented approach to observe and share incidences regarding the conduct of electoral process via established and publicized ICT channels.

In addition, other organisations selected for interviews include: Election Observation Group (ELOG), University of Nairobi and Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) in Kenya. In Tanzania the interview were conducted at the University of Dar es Salaam, National Electoral Commission (NEC), and Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO). While in Uganda, other interviews were conducted at the University of Makerere and Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMG), as well as Electoral Commission of Uganda.

In using semi-structured interview and getting viewpoints of different stakeholders, the researcher gains the necessary rich information and useful insights for addressing the research questions. This emerging area of digital crowdsourcing is still in infancy stage and relatively new phenomenon in monitoring the conduct of elections. In this context, there is limited published information about the use of crowdsourcing technologies in elections. Although, we have witnessed crowdsourced technologies in elections monitoring, to the knowledge of the researcher no empirical study is published yet in comparative perspective regarding citizen-oriented election monitoring in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Therefore, the choice of semi-structured qualitative interviews is appropriate for this research

especially in a situation where limited knowledge is known about the phenomenon under investigation (Neuman 2007).

The semi-structured interviews were conducted in English and Kiswahili language. In Kenya and Uganda, English language was used, while in Tanzania the interviews were conducted in Kiswahili, though in some points, the respondents use both English and Kiswahili. The researcher conducted all the interviews alone because he could speak and write both English and Kiswahili language. As observed above, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda share common language of English and Kiswahili, and this made it easier for the researcher to conduct all the interviews without any language barrier and the help of translator. It should be acknowledged that in all countries under study, there are other tribal languages apart from Kiswahili and English, and some of the tribes speak their own dialect, in such instance, the researcher required a local interpreter. But the focus of this research was on key informants and knowledgeable people who are in fact, familiar with English and Kiswahili language. The strength of the semi-structured interviews is that the researcher was able to conduct all the interviews alone and access important documents in the language that is understandable by the researcher, and not to depend on translators.

During the interview session, some of the respondents gave the researcher permission to make audio record of the discussion, while some of the respondents could not offer permission for audio record. In such situation the researcher used a pen and a notebook to take key points of the discussion. The respondents assured the researcher to contact them in case there is a point that needs further clarification, knowing that the researcher may miss some points because of offline model of interview. The recorded interviews were transcribed and the researcher could generate relevant information for answering the research questions under investigation.

#### **6.4.3.3 Document analysis**

Soft and hard copy or print and online sources of crowdsourcing, digital technologies and electoral integrity were reviewed to collect information relevant to address the focus of this study. This method focused on different documentary sources in addition to the collected data through semi-structured interviews and Uchaguzi data sets analysis. The researcher reviewed the following documents: traditional election observer reports, civil society organizations election observation reports, training manual of the citizen monitors and reporters developed by non-partisan election monitoring organisations, published journal

articles, previous research findings, Afrobarometer reports and academic literature as well as other online sources. In this case, some of the documents were obtained from online sources such as journal articles and crowdsourcing platform. Also, the researcher obtained some of the key documents from civil society organisations, universities library in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda between March to December 2015 and in Germany for other literature review and online websites. The documentary and online web analysis used to generate data essential for defining fundamental issues of crowdsourcing, digital technologies and electoral integrity and for identifying and capturing trends as well as initiatives of crowdsourcing method. Documentary information also used to explore the political history of democracy and the conduct of electoral democracy in the three countries. Since then, the study deployed most similar systems design for comparing Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda and the documentation process provide data for justifying the choice of the three countries in comparative perspective.

### **6.5 Data processing and analysis**

This research employed univariate analysis and comparisons of digital crowdsourcing citizen-generated voices in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This research generates data from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data generate and present textual data collected through semi-structured qualitative interviews, and other textual data generated from literature review. Data from interview were preserved by an audio recorder and by way of notes taking. For the audio recording interview, the information was transcribed into word format. The researcher read the transcribed data while listening the audio recorded data to check whether the data were correctly written. Then, together the research read the transcribed data and jotted notes, and highlighted all the information that answer the research questions, and other information relevant for this research. The researcher re-examined the data to select information that explains and clarifies the focus of the research for the understanding of the problem under investigation. The data from semi-structured interviews were integrated in elaborating and supporting the writing of the manuscript.

Secondary data generated and presented numeric and textual data collected and analysed from different sources such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Bank data, Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) data, Afrobarometer surveys, Pew Research Center surveys, Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.5), established observers reports, research reports, journal articles and book chapters, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) dataset and

Uchaguzi crowdsourcing datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Most of the data generated from the databases were presented in the form of tables and graphs in this research. The exception is the data generated from World Bank Group on Digital Adoption Index (DAI) and Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI-4.5) were subjected to descriptive analysis such as correlation matrix to see the relationship between digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity score. The DAI and PEI statistical data mainly focuses on Africa, Asia-Pacific and Middle East. For Uchaguzi datasets generated data on the voices of citizens regarding the conduct of the electoral process in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The generated data from Uchaguzi systems are presented based on the percentage of the data according to the categories and group of data, and data were presented in form of tables and graphs. Other secondary data from various documents are presented and acknowledged their sources throughout the research report.

## **6.6 Scope and limitation of the research**

This section draw the attention to some of the limitation in data collection and method used in this study. First, using comparative method of most similar systems design or method of difference, this study excludes countries such as Burundi and Rwanda in East Africa region. The study could be informed with the case of all five East African countries - Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, but the language factor of citizen generated data was an obstacle to include Rwanda and Burundi in this study. With sufficient budget and time one could deploy a translator of the citizen incoming reports on the Ushahidi platform in Rwanda and Burundi. But, insufficient budget and time was a barrier to engage language expert to translate stored observation data in order to collect data of the citizen voices on the evaluation of the conduct of electoral process. Another reason is that “projects, therefore, have to be scaled down to more limited but manageable proportions” (Berg-Schlusser 2012:220). In this case, Burundi 2010 general elections used Ushahidi software under a project called “Amatora mu Mahoro” (means “Peaceful Elections”) and created a platform to monitor and report the conduct of election between May and September 2010. Amatora mu Mahoro designed to ‘respond to threats throughout the electoral process in order to prevent, mitigate and resolve election-related conflict’ (IFES 2010). On the other hand, the inclusion of Burundi and Rwanda in this study could have led to change the research design from “most similar systems design” to “most different systems design”.

This research used interview, documentary review and data base as methods of data collection. Some of the targeted respondents in Tanzania, especially from civil society

organisations as the initiator of crowdsourcing technologies TACCEO "was raided by the police, on 29 October. The Police considered that the group was collecting and distributing results through social media, contrary to their mandate for election observation" (EU EOM 2015:39). This in one way or the other delayed the process of conducting interview in this organisation, but the researcher managed to get basic information on the crowdsourcing process in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

### **6.7 Chapter summary**

The chapter presents a description of research methodology of the entire study. It has presented methodological approach that seeks to unveil comparatively the puzzle of digital crowdsourcing method, as well as reporting of positive and negative electoral incidents. This chapter presents methodological routes used to collect information for this research report, and this include the choice of research designs and cases for comparison. In addition, the chapter presents methods used to collect primary and secondary sources of data, as well as data processing and analysis, and finally, scope and delimitation of the research.

This thesis opts for most similar systems design using cases of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Some factors controlled the reasons for selection of the three countries namely: similar political system, electoral management model, the three countries are signatories of global norms of democratic conduct of elections, Uchaguzi crowdsourced project, adoption of mobile phones technology, and somewhat similar political history, civil liberties and political rights status based on Freedom House classification. In addition, the choice of research methods namely semi-structured face-to-face interviews, Uchaguzi datasets analysis and document analysis used in this study - is to obtain understanding of the current crowdsourced systems involved in monitoring elections using technology in the three countries. Also, Uchaguzi crowdsourced case in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was chosen in order to provide comprehensive analysis and comparison of citizen engagement in election monitoring and outputs of citizen observers - because of the Uchaguzi project called "Election Watch in East Africa" that specifically involved the three countries – Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The choice of the research methods – Uchaguzi data sets analysis was to make sense of citizen observation reports whether or not were able to pinpoint both positive and negative electoral incidents. In addition, datasets analysis aimed to analyse specific citizen-generated observation reports that explained electoral fraud.

## **7 Crowdsourcing in Action: Evidence from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda**

### **7.1 Introduction**

It has been argued, that “we are living in the middle of the largest increase in expressive capability in the history of human race. More people can communicate more things to more people than has ever been possible in the past, and the size and speed of this increase, from under one million participants to over one billion in a generation, makes the change unprecedented” (Shirky 2008:105). Digital crowdsourcing has become a mega trend in recent years, fuelling participatory innovation and collaborative production of monitoring information and rapid dissemination of electoral incidents. Digital crowd-monitoring and reporting of electoral processes can expose observation information and, thus become a knowledge-based of both positive and negative feedback of the contests. The effect of digitally-empowered crowdmonitors and reporters of contests offers more opportunities to observe and communicate electoral incidents across the cycle. Election watch-civil society organizations or non-partisan election monitoring groups as champion of crowdsourcing method through digital communication technology tools have the role of inventing, inviting, training, deploying, receiving, verifying and processing incoming observation data, and sharing with larger communities of electoral stakeholders in the dedicated digital election watch platform such as *Uchaguzi* software in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

Specifically, this chapter shift the discussion in Chapter 5 from mapping digital information and communication technologies, and instead focusing on mapping election information generated by crowd-monitors of the electoral processes through digital tools in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This chapter presents crowdsourced method and evidences of digital crowdsourced citizen-generated voices in the Kenyan 2013, Tanzanian 2015 and Ugandan 2011 general elections. In this chapter, crowdsourced method will be explained, and then followed by evidence of crowdsourced detection of positive and negative feedback of elections on the *Uchaguzi* systems, and finally, comparing crowdsourced information in terms of reports generated by different groups of crowd-monitors, namely bounded and unbounded citizen observers and reporters, verification of citizen-generated voices and channels used in communicating observation information in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

## 7.2 Uchaguzi crowdsourced methodology

*Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing method involves the use of digital communication technology tools and different groups of crowdmonitors in monitoring electoral processes in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The idea of monitoring election through Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform is a strategy that aimed to promote free, fair, peaceful and credible electoral process in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. *Uchaguzi* platform as partnerships of electoral stakeholders, particularly civil society election monitoring organizations from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was designed to do the most basic four things - crowdsourced data, verification, data visualization and monitoring response in the electoral process in each respective country (Figure 7.1). *Uchaguzi* crowdsourced elections monitoring collect as much information from many sources as possible on any significant incidents worth sharing on the conduct of elections in the three countries. The crowd were digitally empowered to decide incidents to be significant, and to be sent to crowd-initiators, as well as shared publicly regarding the process of elections.

*Uchaguzi* project for crowdsourced monitoring of elections data - was the first platform as a product of *Ushahidi* software where ordinary citizens at the grassroots level were invited to participate in electoral process by observing and reporting anything they find noteworthy for sharing with the larger community. Whether it is positive or negative feedback the information were approved<sup>12</sup>, verified, and uploaded and shared in the *Uchaguzi* crowd-data platform. Crowdsourcing method is not only about collecting negative stories, rather crowdsourced capture both positive and negative feedback action of the state of elections on the day before election, election-day and after election, and generated data are sometimes shared on the open-source platform.

In all countries - *Uchaguzi* treated incoming reports from the unbounded observers as untrusted information, and in this regard, reports were subjected to verification process in order to establish credibility of the communicated information. Arguably since no technology innovators have figured out how to use the machine to verify volumes of crowdsourced incoming data automatically, *Uchaguzi* crowdsourced method used old schools of contacting people and trained observers in the field to verify reported data through telephone and mobile phone calling. In their situation room, the crowdsourcers had a pool of volunteers to play the role of verifying incoming observation information from the

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<sup>12</sup> In this study should be regarded as all citizen-generated observation reports accepted for verification process by the crowdsourcing approval team, and the outputs of *approved* reports can be classified as “verified” or “unverified” reports in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing datasets.



citizen monitors and reporters. They call back to find out more information from the constituency coordinators and trained monitors, as well as other trusted partners in the crowdsourcing process to provide information regarding electoral incidents.

Verified observation reports were visualized for the larger community inside and outside the countries via crowdmapping platform to know what is happening in different places. In this step, the most important issue is data visualization based on what type of data to be shared to different and specific group of stakeholders, among others, ordinary citizens on the ground, electoral authorities, law enforcement agencies and humanitarian organizations for real-time response and feedback. Some of the verified reports that require immediate feedback were processed as “hot spot issues” and timely were directed to the relevant authorities or offices for action. Initially, the crowdsourcers set the strategy of tracking the response from the relevant offices whether reported incidents were resolved or not. Additionally, in the *Uchaguzi* crowdmapping platform – in the citizen reports section - users of the platform could read the description of the approved and uploaded observation reports, date the incidents happened and location of the incidents.




Figure 7.1 Most basic elements of *Uchaguzi* crowdsourced process

Source: Data generated through fieldwork interviews, own drawing

In Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda - *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing method deployed the strategy of people’s first technology after. In this respect, Uchaguzi project build a network of partnerships because no one or single civil society organizations or technology developers can deal with the issues around the electoral fraud, malpractices and promoting good conduct of elections. The ability to crowdsource data is to generate and verify “localize, visualize, and publish complex, aggregate data on a multilayer map and increasing the speed of generating and sharing data up to real-time delivery” (Bott et al. 2014:9-10). Arguably digital crowdsourcing method require trust in building strong partnerships for observing and reporting election incidents from the crowd, and sharing publicly in crowd mapping platform. Therefore, *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform using digital

communication technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is a digital tool through which election monitoring information were coordinated by different electoral stakeholders in order to promote and protect integrity of elections in their respective country.

### 7.2.1 The network of partnerships

Strengthening electoral integrity, especially using crowdsourcing citizen-based technologies entails effective partnerships of stakeholders, *inter alia*, civil society election monitoring groups, government law enforcement institutions, media, citizen, technology developers and electoral authorities, in order to observe, analyse, disseminate reports and timely responses of the incidents that requires immediate action. The process of engaging citizen observers and reporters for actionable election information through *Uchaguzi* platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was a result of collaboration of civil society election monitoring organizations. And any successful crowdsourcing initiative involves partnerships and within those partners - can achieve the target and feedback of the elections monitoring. The partners look at the magnitude of data they want to collect through crowdsourced method. The aim is to make sure in the crowdsourcing process - networked organizations had enough internal capacity in terms of human resources to manage and process the volume of incoming observation information from the crowd and tech-savvy to visualize and disseminate approved and verified information.

In building up partnerships for crowdsourcing monitoring using ICT, various components are considered, namely technical and ICT component, as well as component of the people. The first component regarding technical and ICT offer opportunity to provide a digital platform for aggregating generated data from citizen monitors in order for the member of the public to access the reports and location in the crowdmapping tool. This component is for technology developers, and in this case, *Ushahidi* team in Kenya was responsible as a technical partner since *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform is a customized version of *Ushahidi* software. In crowdsourcing method - the component of people is the sole responsibilities of civil society election monitoring organizations as official election monitoring experts, and many other subsidiary partners to mobilize citizen observers on the ground to participate in observing and reporting election information. The crowdsourcing organizations are required to provide linkage to other entities that are useful in the crowdsourced process like government watchdogs. But also to create partnership with other organizations that interested in observing the process of elections through technology like

media that can play a role of sharing information and democracy assistance group for materials support in crowdsourcing monitoring method.

The two components - ICT and people demonstrates that crowd-monitoring cannot be effective only by relying on technology developers, rather civil society groups that operate at the community levels are the key players in crowdsourcing citizen-based systems. This is clearly pointed out by one of the technology developers that “technology in the deployment is only 10 percent and the other 90 percent is the outreach. So, we do not start with technology, we need people who will generate the data, recruitment and training, verification team and uploading verified reports in the platform”. This is the main reason for the partnership with civil society organizations that have members at the grassroots level that can be invited and engaged in the digital invented spaces for them to generate election observation information. The success of the *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing project for election watch depends on the viability of at least the two components of partnerships that range from technical and ICT to people’s component team. The crowd were sourced to observe, generate, adding and finding information of electoral conduct from their constituencies and different sources such as on the social networks like Facebook and Twitter platform. Also, crowd volunteers were used to analyse images, translating text, verifying information and mapping reports on the dedicated *Uchaguzi* crowd-data platform.

Understanding the sorts of stakeholders involved in the partnership is indispensable for pointing whether or not crowdsourced observation data are credible. Grömping (2014:2) observed “crowdsourced monitoring has smaller effects than traditional media and established election observers, because of a perceived lack in credibility”. One possible mistake of digital crowdsourcing method is exclusionary tendency of key stakeholders in the process such as electoral management officials, news media, state enforcement agencies like police and corruption bureau, just mention few. The sorts of stakeholders involved in the crowdsourced process guarantee and promote credibility and trust of the generated data. For example, failure to engage government watchdogs will result to high detection, but low deterrence. In order to promote interventions through transparency and accountability, different officials should be engaged to quickly act on the hotspot issues and other generated information. Therefore, in realizing the critique on the credibility of the crowdsourced data, civil society groups are taking a constructive initiative to engage different stakeholders capable of helping to generate and act on the credible citizen-generated information.

### **7.2.1.1 Kenya**

The Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) was the main partner for crowdsourcing monitoring in the 2013 Kenyan general elections, and other member organisations working across the country, as well as other partners including Ushahidi and Social Development Network (SODNET). CRECO membership and partners in election monitoring are drawn from both rural and urban-based non-governmental organizations. CRECO registered as a trust in 2005 under the Ministry of Lands has established a secretariat to implement the programs of the consortium, and coordinate the design of programs and implementation of activities of the consortium and promoting sharing of information among members, networking civil society organizations and partners as well as public in general (CRECO 2013). CRECO in respect of the role of citizenry through technology and crowdsourcing aims at making everybody an observer and reporter, and therefore, raising their stake in elections. Crowdsourcing elections using ICT tools were championed by CRECO partners with other members such as 4Cs, CLARION and COBADES and Ushahidi to implement observation of 2013 Kenya election through digital crowdsourced method of observation. Additionally, Kenya National Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR) and Catholic University of East Africa (CUEA) were partners in crowdsourcing methodology by providing training to citizen observers, and PeaceNet determine the reliability of sources of incoming information from field observers (CRECO 2013). Also, CRECO hosted other partners from Tanzania and Uganda who formed part of the election observation team.

### **7.2.1.2 Tanzania**

The crowdsourcing method in Tanzania 2015 general election was implemented under the auspices of Legal and Human Rights Centre, which is the lead organization in the consortium called Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO). The TACCEO consortium using Uchaguzi Tanzania platform deployed trained and untrained election monitors at different levels in the constituencies for generating election observation reports. Other TACCEO partners in the deployment process include: Southern Africa Human Rights NGOs Networks (SAHRiNGON), Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (FoRDIA), Leadership Forum, Tanzania Human Rights Foundation (TAHURIFO), Zanzibar Legal Service Centre (ZLSC), Women Legal Aid

Centre (WLAC), Youth Partnership Countrywide (YPC), Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC), Policy Forum, Mwanza Policy Initiative (MPI), HakiMadini, Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) and Tanzania Network for Legal Aid Providers (TANLAP) (LHRC and TACCEO 2016). TACCEO as the main crowdsourcer in Tanzania is a fusion of more than 17 civil society organizations established as a loose network, to observe election process (LHRC and TACCEO 2016).

### **7.2.1.3 Uganda**

In Uganda, Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) was the main crowd initiator in the 2011 general elections in collaborations with Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMG) and Citizens' Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU). CEW-IT members include: Public Affairs Centre (PAC), Rwenzori Consortium for Civic Competence (RWECO) and Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD). Other partners are Rwenzori Anti-corruption Coalition (RAC), Goodhope Foundation for Rural Development (GHFRD), Rwenzori Information Centres Network (RIC-NET), Kabarole Research and Resource Centre (KRC) and CEFORD to implement citizen-based election monitoring using modern communication technologies (CEW-IT 2011). CEW-IT managed Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform that offers opportunities to the general public to be observers and reporters of the conduct of the electoral processes.

### **7.2.2 Recruitment and training of crowd-monitors**

Recruitment of crowdmonitors, especially bounded monitors is for the integrity of generated election observation data. The potential of recruiting and training bounded citizen monitors is to overcome concerns of mistrust and credibility of citizen election observation data. This study found that recruitment of bounded observers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was conducted from a well-known network of partners, and also through a process of snowball sampling to get in-touch with potential and trusted monitors in their membership network. Recruited and trained observers apart from generating "trusted reports", also, they have the responsibility of verifying information from the field - generated by the network of "unknown" observers and reporters. In the crowdsourced method, accuracy and credibility of the observation data was guaranteed by the trained or bounded citizen group to receive and verify reports from different stakeholders in the areas the incident is communicated. In order to provide credible observation reports, civil society organizations must often recruit, train and deploy election observers (Schuler 2008). However, to generate credible

observation data - a set of citizen monitors were invited to participate in capturing and communicating electoral incidents. Both Uchaguzi crowdsourcing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda deployed trained and untrained citizen monitors.

In generating crowdsourced elections information, there are groups of people who are exposed with electoral process and others are trained, and they are in a position to share credible data regarding the conduct of the elections. And if voluntarily outsourced observation of the electoral processes, they are capable of exposing illicit acts of elections. Especially the trained group - are quite on target in terms of what or how they are contributing to the crowdsourcing platforms, how they are monitoring the conduct of elections and how they are feeding-in to the Uchaguzi systems. Trained team of observers and data verifiers are informed in terms of what and how to observe and generate credible data. But, there is also non-trained or non-informed that just punch-in observation information to the crowdsourcing platforms. In this case, this is where verification process of the incoming reports is indispensable. Uchaguzi as an open platform for election monitoring, any group of people invited to participate can punch-in elections information, and more often majority of them their orientations are quite unknown. With this regard, crowd-data processing teams are not in a position to real authenticate the background of who is sending reports, and may not brought forward what is prompting them to send observation reports. The crowdsourcers can only see the end product from undefined citizen monitors, and end products sometimes can be very problematic, if not carefully verified. But, the positive trend about crowdsourcing systems is the opportunities of getting data from people with different orientations and locations. This is the essence of crowd monitoring in a situation where people can work with the dedicated platform and engage with the issues of public nature without obstruction.

#### **7.2.2.1 Kenya**

In 2013 general elections, the crowdsourcer recruited and trained 259 supervisors in 259 constituencies out of 290, and were reached out through CRECO members and other partners (CRECO 2013). CRECO recruited observers from their membership organizations that work at county level. These are people they work in civic education, voter education, as well as civic engagement and oversight communities. One of the crowdsourcers remarked: “recruitment and deployment of citizen observers and reporters on the ground, it is a logistics nightmare, we had very ambitious objectives although we did not achieve 100

percent, we wanted to recruit 5 observers per constituency, we did not manage to do all, so we had 777 observers across the counties, and in some county we did not have enough representatives”. CRECO managed to recruit and train 3 observers for 259 constituencies with a total of 777 observers, a team that successfully conducted the process by monitoring and reporting the electoral malpractices (CRECO 2013). The recruitment and training included 1 supervisor in each constituency and 3 observers in each constituency. And about 31 constituencies - CRECO could not deploy due to the lack of contact of people in the constituencies to provide trust information and verification of the crowd data. The observation process mainly relied on the crowd data and therefore, the process was based on crowdsourced observation data from all over the country. And more than 200 trained online volunteers were engaged in translating, verifying and geo-locating incoming crowd data (Omenya and Crandall 2013). Table 7.1 shows that despite that CRECO recruitment and training of observers and reporters from their membership network – used criteria to recruit supervisors and trusted observers.

Table 7.1 CRECO supervisor and monitor recruitment criteria

Constituency supervisor	Constituency trusted observer
Must be post-secondary education and able to communicate in both English and Kiswahili (written and spoken)	Must be literate and able to communicate in both English and Kiswahili
Must be someone employed/trusted/contracted by the member organisation (current or past)	Must come from member organisation or its networks
Must be a resident of the constituency deployed to	Must have a working mobile phone
Must be a registered voter in the constituency deployed	Must be a resident of the specific deployed to
Must have a working mobile phone	Must be a registered voter in the constituency deployed
Must not be a political party official or agent	Must not be a political party official or agent
Must have a working email address	
Should have community mobilization and training skills	
Must have an active and accessible bank account	

Source: CRECO (2013:5).

Table 7.1 indicates that constituency coordinators/supervisors criteria of recruitment were a little bit higher in order to get people who will work and go around collecting trusted information in the constituencies. Afterwards, CRECO organized training for constituency coordinators that focuses on the three areas, namely general training and observation, Uchaguzi platform on how works and linkage and voter education (CRECO 2013). Also, constituency supervisors were required to carry out trainings of their constituency citizen observers and each constituency supervisor required to conduct training for three trusted

observers by using the training manual developed by the crowdsourcer (for this case CRECO). Training for constituency citizen observers focuses on how to send short messages to the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing systems, how to log onto the Uchaguzi platform, how to receive and respond to issues that were received in the form of sms from untrained monitors, and handling verification of the data through calls from the situation room to the team of election observers on the ground (CRECO 2013).

#### **7.2.2.2 Tanzania**

In Tanzania, TACCEO as a crowd-sourcer managed to recruit and conduct training to 200 long-term citizen monitors, and 2100 short-term observers who were deployed and placed in different constituencies, and 66 data clerks for processing incoming observation data from the field, as well as 11 technical data centre officers (LHRC and TACCEO 2016). The trained citizen monitors were responsible for verifying incoming observation information from undefined groups of citizen reporters, and trained citizen monitors were expected to generate trusted observation data. The data clerks at the situation observation room played a role of receiving field reports, processing, filtering reports, analysing and communicating information to the general public via *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform. Like CRECO in Kenya, TACCEO could not deploy trained observers in all 264 constituencies countrywide, thus the coverage level of TACCEO in form of deploying trained citizen observers was 75.6 percent of all constituencies in Tanzania (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:11).

#### **7.2.2.3 Uganda**

In Uganda, one of the respondents described that Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) as a crowd-initiator - trained a group of about 500 trusted long-term observers deployed for about two months before the actual election-day event, and had about 5000 trusted short-term observers deployed on the election-day. The observation reports were generated from both groups of trusted and untrusted observers and reporters. CEW-IT deployed 20 volunteers in their situation observation room at CEW-IT office in Kampala, and other 100 volunteers at the Makerere University to do the data processing, especially approving and verifying incoming observation data from untrusted network of monitors. In addition to the observation reports from the crowd, the study found that CEW-IT received observation reports from Uganda Radio Network which is an outfit network of journalists who report for radio stations. Especially, on election-day the network of



journalists was sharing observation data with CEW-IT, and even in the days before election-day, and their reports were treated as trusted information, and were shared in the platform.

### 7.2.3 Verification of crowd-monitors election information

On one hand, it is arguable that using crowdsourced monitoring information for evaluating the integrity of elections can be problematic because there might be incentives for the crowdmonitors to manipulate and share inaccurate or biased information. On the other hand, “information is simply something that can be known or communicated” (Bimber 2003:11). In this case, from Bimbers’ view of information, various assumptions can be drawn: first, the mushrooming of information communication channels can be used to expose illicit conduct of political activities regardless the incident is verified or not because “political discourse is the product of values and selectivity as much as verifiably “objective” observations, it comprises a mix of information and other factors” (Bimber 2003:10). Second, the recipients of the information (crowdsourced initiators such as non-partisan election monitoring organizations) are obliged to find the authenticity of the information because “when a political actor communicates a personal statement about the world containing a mix of facts and values, that actor is simply communicating a package of information, some of it dealing with “facts” and some of it with his or her values and predispositions. Some “facts” may even be wrong, but they can be communicated nonetheless and they constitute information” (Bimber 2003:10).

There is theory that digital crowdsourcing monitoring and reporting systems should not be moderated or verified because it is a form of information that remains solid on its own way. The crowdsourcing citizen-based process is to promote citizen voices and, in fact, need not to be verified or moderated. And if one should consider verifying incoming information from ordinary citizens information - should have procedures put in place to verify incoming information from a large group of people in the field. But the theory behind this concept of verification is that, in digital crowdsourcing process there are those who are keen on voices, and they are not concerned about auditing the voices, their aim is simply to get the voices. While there are those who are keen in what voices are saying and bring on-board, and not concerned what the voices are bringing are useful or not. In addition, there are those who are not keen whether the information is verified or not, but just the fact that there is a voice, and the fact that citizens on the ground have said, should go public using digital platforms. But, now the core business is about crowdsourcing elections monitoring by generating

citizen voices about positive and negative conduct of electoral process. It is argued that elections are contentious matters (Norris 2014), and this is the reason, one of the technology developers aptly remarked that “together with our partners we have measures to verify information we receive, measures to escalate information that needs a response, and measures to monitor that response”.

In generating information from the crowd - there are different groups of bounded, unbounded and passive citizen observers and reporters. In this case, the sources of information come from known and unknown observers and reporters. Some of the information may be a true reflection of what is happening on the ground or a false claim of what is happening during electoral processes. And for the bounded or known group of crowdmonitors there is an established criterion and even from the beginning of their recruitment and training to generate credible and unbiased observation data. But it can be argued that given the context of electoral politics - bounded or trusted network of monitors and data verifiers can generate biased reports that favour one sort of election stakeholder. Unbounded crowd is another group of generating election information, where in the first place there is no criterion to hold them accountable in monitoring and generating unbiased information. It is an open-call of undefined group and no criteria to trust their reports without verification procedures. In addition, there are different sources that the crowd sourcers look for other alternative observation information, especially from the social networks or “passive listening” on the online forums. In this context, there is a need to control and establish authenticity of the citizen-generated data from different sources - the social media and other unbounded citizen reports, and even bounded group of observers. Here the caveat is that:

Social medial is firstly an instrument for mobilisation and secondly a tool for communication, political deliberation and an arena to exchange ideas. Internet communication is open for misuse and manipulation. Acceptance of the new online instruments depends on their authenticity and trustworthiness. Because the manipulation of information is easy within online instruments...the wisdom of the crowd cannot always correct this manipulation in good time. Users create and use information. But is there an appropriate quality control? (Kersting 2013a:277).

The process of crowdsourcing election information is confronted with issues of data reliability and validity (Grömping 2014), and crowdsourcing election integrity and verification of the incoming citizen data becomes part of the discourse to establish accuracy and credibility of the observation reports. So, to generate trustworthy information, volunteered citizen election information, verification process and sound analysis of data

sourced from the crowd are indispensable. Therefore, trust is one of the prerequisites for crowdsourcing methodology using digital participatory technologies.

The verification process may determine the quality of the citizen-generated information (Schuler 2008), and seeks to establish the credibility of the generated reports, especially “to identify sensitive types of information that should not be disclosed and ways to detect and respond to inaccurate or fabricated information” (Chamales and Genius 2013:9). Some of the incoming information should not be released to the public - crowd data verifiers stand to detect and reject such reports to go online that promote, among other things, ethnicity, incite violence, and religious differences for political gain. Such reports threaten the cohesion and political stability of the country, and incite electoral malpractices which can lead to violence. Through verification process may ensure such incoming observation reports that incite and provoke violence have no place in the crowdsourcing systems for public view, because there will be no justification for sharing such information publicly.

Verification has a lot to do with the process, because it is the output (citizen-generated voices) that offers feedback to the integrity of electoral processes. Crowd-initiators deploy mechanisms of verifying crowd observation data from different groups of citizen observers and reporters. Because verification has to be defined by the one who is crowdsourcing citizen observation through technologies. The crowd-initiator to verify observation information should have established criteria for the data to remain unverified and others verified, others unverified but approved and still shared on the platform. Verification criteria include crowd data verifiers calling the person reporting the information or a trained community member and an election monitor who is part of a network of crowd-initiators.

The crowd data verification team review and ensure all the details needed are available to approve the incoming reports, by checking with other partners on the accuracy and even triangulating or searching for corroborating data including from mainstream media and trusted social networks. Also, crowd initiators verification involves cleaning the ‘noises’ from the incoming monitoring reports, because one of the crowdsourcer point out “some of the reports and in fact, many of the reports are generated with some of them are alarm missed, they are out of the ordinary, some of them are not clear enough, and some of them are not specific to the election observation events. So the verification process would help to attach some bit of more meaning, some bit of seeking clarification and interrogating certain situations so that the crowdsourcers are able to get more details about the incoming reports and incidents”. The research found that verification team in the three countries work in

shifts to ensure 24 hour verification process was achieved, and accurate data were produced and, shared publicly in the dedicated Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform.

It is noteworthy that as explained earlier, Uchaguzi crowdsourcing project was developed for election watch for East Africa, particularly in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, and in order to generate trustworthy reports for informing electoral process, the stakeholders developed “the crowd verification process” that generated information, which could be used by partners in monitoring electoral process in their respective countries. This crowd verification process in figure 7.2 was tested in the monitoring activities surrounding Kenya 2010 constitutional referendum using Uchaguzi platform (CRECO 2010). All partners in Uchaguzi crowdsourcing project from Tanzania and Uganda were hosted by Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) to observe how the voting was going on and observed incidents to the command centre (CRECO 2010). These partners from Uganda and Tanzania, also, observed the application of Uchaguzi platform, and how the verification process of the incoming reports from the field observers were processed by trained and volunteered team of data verifiers in the observation situation room stationed in Nairobi, Kenya. The trained and volunteered team were responsible to receive, verify, communicate and mapping approved crowd data to the Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform.

The initiators of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing system expected to receive volumes of reports through established and popularised short code number and other social media accounts and microblogging hashtag from open or undefined crowdmonitors. In order to enhance reliability of the crowdsourced data in Uchaguzi system, the verification process encompasses team of crowd administrator that receive, creates and approves reports on fraud and other irregularities for establishing authenticity of the information (Figure 7.2). The reports that were not approved remained with no further action. The study found that these are the generated reports that are irrelevant to the process of elections, and with unclear message or content, as well as reports that promote ethnicity or can incite violence in the country, among others. After a crowd administrator has established a pool of reports for verification, sends the reports to the crowd verification liaison for further action. Noteworthy that the trained crowd administrator and crowd verification liaison are volunteers in the Uchaguzi verification process. The crowd verification liaison required to submit through emails approved crowd observation information to the crowd sourcer verification liaison.




Figure 7.2 Uchaguzi project crowdsourced data verification process

Source: Adapted from CRECO (2010:11).

The *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections makes people have a voice and everybody to be an election observer and reporter. And for the purposes of the present inquiry, it is useful to analyse the verification process of generating, reporting and approving crowd election observation information in each country. As a citizen plays the responsibility of reporting to the platform anything good or bad that protect their vote, the validation of the incoming reports was the main responsibilities of the crowdsourced initiators that deploy the digital invented Uchaguzi platform. The verification process aimed at establishing authenticity of the incoming reports, and detecting the biasness of the reports and detecting reports that were

not pertinent to the issues of elections, and this justifies the decision of the crowdsourcers to establish verification team in order to eliminate such type of the reports. This research found that using digital communication technology tools meant to improve the quality of the incoming observation data, because the process involves and provides spaces for verifying received information before sharing with other electoral stakeholders in each specific country (CRECO 2013; LHRC and TACCEO 2016).

### **7.2.3.1 Kenya**

In Kenya CRECO acted as verifiers through their trained citizen observers in the field and situation room. Also CRECO and SODNET were the Uchaguzi official partners who verified reports for accuracy on the Uchaguzi platform with a network of trained volunteers. The situation room had been set up at the iHub centre in Nairobi to specifically deal with media and sms monitoring team responsible for searching, filtering, editing and initial categorization of data from the crowdmonitors (Figure 7.3). Also, translation team used to translate relevant incoming information from citizen observers and reporters shared using local languages and Kiswahili, and these reports were translated into English language. SMS team used to receive and deal with reports from trained/trusted partners and the crowd for reported incidences from the field through short message services, and here geo-location team play the role of locating the incoming reports from the undefined reporters.

The emergency team was responsible for processing urgent reports that were immediately geo-located and categorized, and in near real-time share information with relevant authorities for immediate action. Also, verification team deals with triangulation of information and verification of urgent information on the ground. Reports team handle categorization of data, editing of reports and approval of reports for crowd mapping platform, and then, analysis and research team for analysing information received in the Uchaguzi system and provide situation room data to the crowd initiator. Technical team and backup team offer technical support to the Uchaguzi platform. Observation reports generated by the group of trusted observers and reporters were not subjected to verification process. These trained or trusted monitors and reporters were registered in the Uchaguzi system by their mobile numbers and location, and once the report from any of the trained observer was received in the system, automatically information was treated as trusted report, and there is no need for verification process.



Figure 7.3 Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 crowd data workflow

Source: CRECO (2013:12).

### 7.2.3.2 Tanzania

In Tanzania, the process of crowdsourcing was implemented by TACCEO and set up Uchaguzi situation room at Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Dar es Salaam. The trained observers were deployed across the country and were responsible for sending trusted

observation reports to the Uchaguzi data center. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, in Tanzania the reports from trusted monitors and reporters were subjected to verification process. There were couple of 66 data centre people who were verifying incoming reports from the crowd, approving and geo-tagging the reports (LHRC and TACCEO 2016). The platform received observation reports from the general public, and their reports were subjected to verification process before sharing with larger networks of platform followers. Uchaguzi platform received observation data from trained TEMCO and TACCEO observers. Similar to Kenya and Uganda, bounded/trained crowd observers were registered in the Uchaguzi system using their mobile number. This helped the situation room to categorize the reports in form of trained observers (from their network) and untrained observers (from the general public). All approved observation data from trained and untrained observers and reporters were sent to the Ushahidi data server, and shared at the Uchaguzi one-stop sourcing center using various communication channels as well as Uchaguzi Tanzania crowdsourcing platform.




Figure 7.4 Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowd data workflow

Source: Adapted from TACCEO (2016:19).

The incoming observation reports from the general public before verification were treated as unverified reports. The data centre volunteers through communication with trained observers in the field could verify the incidents. In some instances, the data verifiers could call back the sender of the reports for further information regarding the incidences, and then, the long-term observers could make further follow-up for credibility of the reports.



All verified reports were channelled to Ushahidi data server, and then the reports were posted in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform for public view (Figure 7.4). The technology employed and the “efficiency demonstrated by the TACCEO’s election officer drew attention of hundreds of experts, who visited the data centre to learn how it works – managing numerous field data feedings within a second” (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:11).

### **7.2.3.3 Uganda**

In terms of verification process there were two data centres in Uganda 2011 election for processing all of the observation data at the national level. One of the centres was hosted at the CEW-IT head office, and the other centre was hosted at the Makerere University. At the Makerere University, the crowd sourcer worked with a group of 100 students who volunteered to do the verification process of the incoming reports. This group was getting reports and approving them, and send it to the CEW-IT situation room with a group of about 20 individuals receiving approved data from the Makerere centre. The group at the situation room was responsible for crowd mapping the reports in the Uchaguzi platform.

Like in Kenya, the reports from a group of trained observers were not subjected to authentication process. Trained observers were registered in the system and once they send their report it was automated plotted in the Uchaguzi dataset as approved and verified information from trusted observer. Observation reports from unbounded citizen monitors were treated as ‘junk reports’ until had been approved, and the approval process meant authenticating electoral incidents. Then, reports were geo-tagged to establish the location of the reports. Similar to Kenya and Tanzania, in the process of receiving incoming observation data from the unbounded crowdmonitors there was a principal of anonymity, but in the back end the crowdsourcers know the sender, who has reported the incidents by their mobile numbers. The crowd data were verified by either calling back a person who has sending the report for clarification of the events or calling another person in particular the trained observers in the area of incidents to verify the reported incidents.

Also, for some of the critical events, the verification and approving team used hotlines number to communicate the incident, and even to verify the events from law enforcement agencies and electoral commission officials or other official and other responsible person in the area to verify whether they have heard reported electoral incidents. Moreover, this study found that on the election-day, CEW-IT had two types of election observers who were static or roaming. So, events reported on election-day could also be verified by static team of

observers or roaming team of observers to rush to the particular place and verify the claim that has been reported by the crowd. The two teams served two purposes of authenticating the incoming observation data from unbounded monitors and reporters, but also, tracking feedback action of the communicated incidents to the relevant authorities.

#### **7.2.4 Uchaguzi crowdsourced categories of observation data**

The crowdsourced initiators (civil society organizations) design main categories and sub-categories of generating election observation information. The categories and sub-categories of observation data was used as a framework of observing and reporting the conduct of elections by citizen observers in order to generate information planned by the initiator. Uchaguzi platform is used and deployed for reports mapping of the positive and negative electoral incidents in near-real time. It is noteworthy that the structure of Uchaguzi platform is somewhat similar in terms of categories and sub-categories of election observation data in the three countries. Civil society developed categories and sub-categories of data based on developed standards of observing the conduct of electoral process. This is because “observers have stressed to election officials, politicians, and others in countries attempting democratic transitions that, for elections to gain international credibility, certain procedures must be followed: ballot must be counted at the polling stations and the result for each station posted at the site; measures must be taken to ensure that voters cast only one ballot; voter-registration lists must be posted in public areas before election day; poll workers must be trained; local political-party observers and domestic monitoring groups must be allowed to monitor the process; and so forth” (Carothers 1997:20). The category and sub-categories of observation are formulated in order to balance information that will be useful to different stakeholders such as category for the citizens, and the category that will make sense to the people who make responses like electoral authorities, as well as category for law enforcement agencies like police, among others. Uchaguzi election watch project - civil society together designed categories of data, but each member organizations can modify these categories during deployment process based on what sort of information they want to generate and share in electoral process, and in fact, the context of the electoral contest.

This research found that the rationale behind establishing categories and sub-categories of election observation data is to give more meaning to unstructured reports coming from observers and reporters in different form, with different content and from different group of observers such as trained and untrained, as well as reports generated from passive social

networkers on the Facebook and Twitter platforms. This is also to say that the categories and sub-categories of data define the scope of the crowdsourcers in terms of generating observation information. Categories and sub-categories of observation data enable quick categorization of incoming observation reports, and for the volunteered team in the situation room to process received data based on their specific category of data. This research further found that the volunteered team for categorizing observation information in one way or the other may not have knowledge in the field of election monitoring, so with designed categories and sub-categories easily can create understanding how to categorize data based on the key terms and content of the incoming reports. Categorization of data easily established specific information for different election players in case the incident requires immediate action - could make it easy for the monitoring team in the situation room to disseminate such information in near real-time to the relevant authorities or offices.

An overview of these categories and sub-categories of observation data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is to see to what extent diverge or converge in collecting information (Table 7.2). Also, to see the focus of civil society in monitoring positive and negative reports from crowdmonitors, and how categories used to capture information for sharing widely with other stakeholders on the Uchaguzi project. For example, in Kenya 2013 during Uchaguzi deployment process, CRECO used 7 main categories and 49 sub-categories of generating election observation data. It is found that most of the categories focus on election-day phase, post-election phase and less sub-categories on campaign event. These categories and number of sub-categories in brackets on election-day phase include voting issues (11), polling station administration (10), security issues (9), staffing issues (4) and post-election phase: counting and results (11). Positive events were (3) and other positive issues (1) collect data for election-day and post-election phase (list of sub-categories).

In Tanzania 2015 elections, TACCEO collected data using 9 categories and 45 sub-categories of observation data. The categories covered campaign, election-day and post-election phases. These categories and their sub-categories in brackets for campaign phase include campaign issues (8); election-day phase: polling stations logistics (6), ballot issues (4), security issues (5), issues with official actors (7), concerns of voters (7) and post-election phase include: issues after votes counting (2), while other irregularities (1) and positive events (5) comprises a mix of information for campaign, election-day and post-election phase. While in Uganda 2011 elections, categories of data were somewhat similar to Tanzania 2015 categories in campaign phase, election-day phase and post-election phase.

Table 7.2 Category and sub-categories of crowdsourced observation data

Kenya 2013 – Uchaguzi platform		Tanzania 2015 – Uchaguzi platform		Uganda 2011 – Uchaguzi platform		
Category	Sub-categories	Category	Sub-Categories	Category	Sub-Categories	
Voting issues	Ineligible voters vote	Campaign issues	Campaign in abusive language	Campaign issues	Campaign beyond official time	
	Eligible voter not allowed to vote		Campaigning out of recommended time		Media biased in reporting campaign	
	Purchasing of voter cards		Security during campaigns		Use of abusive language	
	Voters issued invalid ballot papers		Campaign intimidation		Violent campaign	
	Voter integrity irregularities		Campaign interrupted		Use of state resources in campaign	
	Irregularities with voter assistance		Media biased in reporting campaign		Security personnel campaigning	
	Voter names missing from register		Denial of use of public media		Citizen attendance	
	Voter intimidation		Any other issues			
	Bribing of voters		Polling station not in public space		Polling station logistics	Polling station not opened on time
	Voters voting more than once		No presence of security at polling station			Absence of EC official at opening time
Voter identification kit issues	Polling design compromising secrecy	Polling station not numbered properly				
	Polling station opened late	Design of polling station compromising secrecy of ballot				
	Polling postponed	Tempering with ballot boxes				
Polling station administration	Ballot box irregularities	Ballot issues	Any other issues	Ballot issues	Voting exercise	
	Polling station closed before voting concluded		Inadequate voting materials		Spoiled ballot papers	
	Polling station not opened on time		Tempering with voting materials		Transport issues	
	Polling station not numbered properly		Ballot boxes not sealed at the start of voting process		Ballot box	
	Design of polling station compromising secrecy of ballot		Any other issues		Ballots missing	
	Polling station not adequately lit	Security issues	Absence of security officers	Security issues	Counting irregularities	
	Missing inadequate voting materials		Occurrence of violence after voting		Internally displaced people	
	Campaign/propaganda in polling station		Security officers intimidating voters		Riots	
	BVR issues		Intimidation of counting officials and observers		Hostility	
	Other polling station logistic		Other security issues		Violence	
Security issues	Mobilisation towards violence	Issues with official actors	Agents refusal to sign final result form	Issues with official actors	Police brutality	
	Threat of violence/dangerous speech		Monitors not allowed at the polling station during vote counting		Arrests	
	Ambush		Party agents failed to agree on disputed ballot papers			
			Necessary staff not present throughout voting process		Issues with EC officials	

Kenya 2013 – Uchaguzi platform		Tanzania 2015 – Uchaguzi platform		Uganda 2011 – Uchaguzi platform		
Category	Sub-categories	Category	Sub-Categories	Category	Sub-Categories	
	Demonstrations	Concerns of voters	Issues with NEC officials	Voter issues	Issues with observers	
	Violent attacks		Issues with observers		Issues with security officials	
	Physical attacks on property		Voters names missing from voter register		Issues with party agents	
	Sexual violence		Voters voting more than once		Bribing voters	
	Rumours		Voters intimidation		Voter names missing from register	
	Bombings		Bribing of voters		Ghost names	
Counting and results	Failure to announce results by IEBC officials	Issues after votes counting	Vulnerable voters not assisted	Issues after votes counting	Polling results	
	Irregularities with transportation of ballot boxes		Questions from citizens		Other irregularities	Other irregularities
	Protest over declared results		Any other issues	Other issues	Other issues	
	Counting irregularities	Other irregularities	Results were not reported promptly by the returning officer	Positive events	Peace efforts	
	Observers or party agents irregularities		Other votes counting issues		Register display	
	Intimidation of counting officials and observers	Positive events	Security situation is good		Everything is fine at the polling station	
	Party agents irregularities		Peace and security after announcement of the results		Promoting stability	
	Provisional citizen results		Party agents accept results and sign		Peaceful campaigns	
	Party agents failed to agree on disputed ballot papers		Campaign went on well		Peaceful nominations	
	Party agents not allowed in the hall during counting		Other positive events		Voter education	
Observers not allowed in the hall during counting			Proper use of media			
Staffing issues	Absence of IEBC official at polling station opening					
	Absence of law enforcement officials at polling station					
	Observers/media blocked from entering polling station					
	IEBC officials not acting in accordance to set rules					
Positive events	Civilian peace efforts					
	Everything fine					
	Police peace efforts					
Other positive issues						

Source: Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections.

CEW-IT as the main crowdsourcer used 10 categories and 41 sub-categories to generate election data for the 2011 elections. These categories and number of sub-categories in brackets were campaign phase: campaign issues (7), election-day phase: polling station logistics (4), ballot issues (7), security issues (6), issues with official actors (4), voter issues (3), and post-election phase: issues after votes counting (1), but also other issues (1) and positive events (8) generate data for campaign, election-day and post-election phase.

The categories and sub-categories of election observation data are somewhat similar, but an exception can be observed on the campaign category, where in Kenya this category is missing, while in Tanzania and Uganda used to monitor and report campaign phase. That is to say, in Kenya the main focus of crowd-initiator was to capture information on election-day event and fewer issues after voting. This is justified with the initiative of the crowdsourcer in Kenya to deploy the Uchaguzi platform from 1<sup>st</sup> of March till 5<sup>th</sup> of March, while the election-day was 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013.

### **7.2.5 The structure of Uchaguzi crowdsourced datasets**

The structure of the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda encompasses similar features of receiving and storing observation data from the crowd. The structure of the data sets in the three countries had information on *reference number* of the report. In Kenya and Uganda Uchaguzi datasets, the reference number of the reports can be established because the researcher was given access to the csv file format of the reports, but in Tanzania since the filtering of the reports was conducted online, the reference number of the reports could not be established, the stored csv file of the citizen reports was not shared by the researcher. Also, the *incident title* presents the key heading of the generated reports. This is followed by *incident date and time*, and this indicates the date and time the reports from citizen monitors were posted in the crowd mapping platform and stored in the uchaguzi database. This answer the question of when the reports were posted online, but it does not answer the question when the reports were received in the observation situation room. Though, an exceptional case is in Kenya and Uganda for the reports coming from trained group of observers, where their observation data were automatically posted on the platform. With this regard, the reports indicate when the time data were received in the Uchaguzi system. These reports are generated by trained group of crowdmonitors registered in the Uchaguzi system. As shown above their reports were not subjected to verification process which in one way or the other could have delay the time of sharing the report on the Uchaguzi platform, but with

this regard, their reports were shared on real-time. The *location* shows the areas where incidents were reported, and the role of geo-location team was to locate specific area of the incoming observation from citizen monitors in the field to answer the question of ‘where’.

Also *description of the reports* contains a detailed explanation of the messages received. The description of the reports answer the question of what, who and sometimes why. But *category of data* for all incoming reports are categorized based on the established category and sub-categories by the crowdsourcers. In case the platform received messages that cannot be categorized in the designed categories and sub-categories, then the reports were categorized and labelled ‘others’. Then, the dataset comprises *latitude and longitude* of the incoming reports. *Approved section* of the reports used to presents all the reports processed and approved by the crowdsourcing team for further action such as verification process, and later the reports were presented as verified or unverified. *Verified* reports means the crowdsourcing team in the election situation room were able to establish the validity of the reported incidents by contacting the trained observers in the field, or any other trusted source to provide information on the incidents. But, unverified means the team could not authenticate the reports. Thus, verified section in the Uchaguzi data sets contained reports which are verified and unverified in form of “Yes” for verified reports and “No” for unverified reports in Kenya and Uganda datasets, while in Tanzania “green” colour for verified and “red” colour for unverified reports.

Table 7.3 presents a sample screenshot of Uchaguzi data set in Kenya for 2013 general elections. The structure of the dataset contains the section of data such as reference number, incident title, incident date, location of the incident, description of the reports generated, category of data, latitude and longitude of the reports, approved and verified section of the reports. For example, this is the case for the report reference number 1878, the incident title is: missing name from register, the incident date: 04/03/2013, time: 18:38, and the location of the incident: Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, and description of the reports is provided as: “voters miss in IEBC manual register”, the report was geo-located, and the category of the report was voter register. The latitude of the report was -1.31667 and longitude 36.783333 and the report was approved “YES” and verified “YES”.

Table 7.4 presents a sample screenshot of Uchaguzi Tanzania platform for 2015 general elections. The analysis of the reports section of the crowdsourced platform was found to have a similar structure in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda Uchaguzi datasets with an exception case of observation report reference number in Tanzania Uchaguzi platform.

Table 7.3 Snapshot of Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 crowdsourced dataset

#	INCIDENT TITLE	INCIDENT DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	APPROVED	VERIFIED
3999	Black out at poll	03/05/2013 11:38	Ayany Estate, Nairobi	There is a black	Civilian Peace Effor	-1.30856	36.777911	YES	YES
2156	Celebration	03/05/2013 10:38	Kitale, Kenya	people celebr	Geolocated, Threat	1.019089	35.002305	YES	YES
2125	Network jamme	03/05/2013 09:35	Karachuonyo, Homa	Results	Polling Station Logi	-0.40002	34.618647	YES	YES
1999	BVR Not Workin	03/04/2013 20:18	Shianda, Kenya	From Shianda	Geolocated, Missin	0.333333	34.483333	YES	YES
1914	Voter Bribery	03/04/2013 19:28	Mlango Kubwa, St. T	Voting prces	Geolocated, Transl	-1.2646	36.846501	YES	YES
1793	300 names missi	03/04/2013 19:14	Baringo Primary Sch	Kandenyé poll	Geolocated, Voter	-0.28886	35.641719	YES	YES
1878	Missing Names	03/04/2013 18:38	Kibera, Nairobi, Ken	voters miss in	Geolocated, Voter	-1.31667	36.783333	YES	YES
7504	Violent Attack K	05/03/2013 16:01	Korogocho, Nairobi,	A boy is killed	Geolocated, Threat	-1.2493	36.89101	YES	NO
7521	POLLING STATIC	05/03/2013 15:57	Kathiani	POLLING STATI	Trusted Reports,	-1.42929	37.313187	YES	YES
7507	Uchaguzi Sitroo	05/03/2013 15:39	Kindaruma Road, Ne	Scene at Uchag	Civilian Peace Effor	-1.29866	36.79091	YES	NO
7499	lost ballot boxe	05/03/2013 15:29	Kenya Industrial Res	It is alleged th	Geolocated, Irregul	-1.32375	36.831399	YES	NO

Source: Ushahidi/CRECO 2013 Uchaguzi Kenya dataset.

Table 7.4 Snapshot of Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowdsourced dataset

The screenshot displays the Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowdsourced dataset interface. The main content area shows a list of reports with titles, dates, and descriptions. The reports are color-coded: red for unverified and green for verified. The right sidebar contains filters for Category, Location, Type, Media, and Verification, each with a 'Clear' button. The Location filter shows a map with a red pin and coordinates -8.07585, 37.27286.

Source: <https://www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz/reports>

In Tanzania, as explained in the previous part the verified and unverified reports were presented in the platform in form of colours. The red colour is an alert that the report is unverified, while the green colour indicates the citizen observation reports are verified. It can be noted that, in the right side of each report title, displays the date and time the report was shared in the Uchaguzi platform. For verified and unverified reports, the Uchaguzi platform users could find the location of the reports and even, using the filter option to look for the type of media used to generate the reports. The use of online filtering option in



Tanzania enable the researcher to gather crowdsourced generated information more easily, compared to stored reports in csv file, and given the structure of the datasets which require the use of other software or manual work to generate required data, and cleaning of the datasets. Like Kenya and Tanzania, Table 7.5 below presents the structure of Uchaguzi Uganda for 2011 election reports, which is similar with incident title, incident date and time, location, description, category, latitude and longitude, approved and verified reports.

Table 7.5 Snapshot of Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 crowdsourced dataset

#	INCIDENT TITLE	INCIDENT DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	APPROVED	VERIFIED
41	polling station c	2/23/2011 8:35	Moyo Uganda	In Adjumani dis	EVERYTHING IS	3.653999	31.723821	YES	YES
42	polling station c	2/23/2011 8:40	Abuku Koboko Uganda	MILANGO MOS	EVERYTHING IS	3.416667	30.966667	YES	YES
43	polling station c	2/23/2011 8:30	Oluvu Maracha Uganda	Presidential dir	EVERYTHING IS	3.199496	30.858508	YES	YES
44	Late opening of	2/23/2011 9:37	Arivu Arua Uganda	In amazu pollin	POLLING STATI	2.87316	30.980462	YES	YES
45	polling station c	2/23/2011 8:49	Kabarole Uganda	Kabarole Distric	EVERYTHING IS	0.589668	30.254879	YES	YES
46	CAMPAIGNS BE	02/04/2011 12:08	Kagando Kasese Ugand	FROM TODAY 4	CAMPAIGNS BE	0.06345	29.897425	YES	YES
48	Polling station c	2/18/2011 8:45	Kisinga, Kasese	Kisinga trading	VOTING EXERCI	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
49	polling station c	2/23/2011 8:32	Bulembia Kasese Uganc	NAMHUGA PRIN	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
50	polling station c	2/23/2011 9:42	Vurra Arua Uganda	The polling stat	VOTING EXERCI	2.830014	30.941737	YES	YES
52	Opening in time	2/23/2011 19:45	Adumi Arua Uganda	AT 7:20AM ELEC	EVERYTHING IS	3.033333	30.833333	YES	YES

Source: CEW-IT 2011 Uchaguzi Uganda dataset.

### 7.2.6 Channels for generating crowdsourced observation data

The aim of any election monitor is to observe, generate and disseminate stories about election observation incidences to the public, especially regarding the overall conduct of elections. The same, crowdsourcers in generating and disseminating election observation reports from the crowd were to be effective and efficient with solid and accessible channels of communication. Civil society election monitoring groups by “providing a complete and comprehensive assessment therefore requires the organization to develop a rapid reporting system that can move a large volume of information quickly and reliably from around the country, including from the least accessible places” (Schuler 2008:146). This implies that digital communication channels determine the extent to which citizen observers and reporters could send their observation data, and how crowdsourcers could process the data, as well as ways in which members of the general public could get the feedback on the integrity of electoral processes. And if, there are no solid communication channels for feedback and tracking response, and strategies for sharing generated observation data to the online and offline communities, the public will remain uninformed with the crowd-generated voices on the positive and negative side of the electoral processes.

Ordinary citizens at the grassroots level have information to share about the conduct of elections, and sometimes may want to report incidents, but do not have channels or access to the established medium of reporting in order to make the story be known. Some of the election incidents may get not reported because citizens do not have relevant channels or access to the electronic devices to communicate the story to the dedicated platform. In this case, crowdsourcers have the role of promoting citizen engagement in election observation in order to play active role in monitoring and reporting elections as a way of protecting their votes. The complementarity of the citizens in digital crowdsourcing process is to report incidents before, during and beyond electoral process through different communication channels to make the process of elections work well.

Crowdsourcing method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda witnessed the use of different forms of collecting observation information from the crowd. Generally, the medium used to generate observation data can at least be grouped into four forms such as mobile sms-based services (using short code number), mobile phone application (for android and iPhone smartphones), social media networking sites (using Facebook and Twitter accounts) and web- based form or e-mail services. These options were available during crowdsourced process in Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 elections, but for Uganda 2011 elections mainly used mobile short code number, web-form and email services tools for generating observation data from the crowd. Also, in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform there was an option for people or platform followers to sign up for alerts in order to get to know what is happening in the area around their communities regarding the conduct of elections like security issues, violence and demonstration.

### **7.2.7 Monitoring response of citizen-generated data**

Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda served as an alternative forum for citizens who are in their own localities to actually be able to be part and parcel of the electoral process in their own communities. The Uchaguzi platform was created for citizens to report their feedback with regard to the conduct of the electoral process, and there was an automated response after the citizen monitor and reporter sent a message to the Uchaguzi systems. The reply of the message is only to notify and acknowledge to the sender - the receipt of the reports to the Uchaguzi systems, and not the response for the action that was taken on the communicated electoral incidents.

The research found lack of proper mechanism to coordinate and track responses for the disseminated electoral incidents to various relevant authorities, and in fact, limited effective collaboration among electoral stakeholders hampers the efforts towards tracking the responses that require immediate action, and feedback to the citizen observers and reporters. Limited collaboration among stakeholders – the study found was due to the lack of trust among the crowdsourced partners which was the major hindrance to the accessibility of each partner election monitoring data and responses from government watchdogs, and other offices. This implies election observation reports that were escalated to the government law enforcement agencies and electoral authorities, as well as other relevant offices could not be readily made available to others, especially to the general public because of the one-way form of communication – from crowd-initiators to the responsible offices.

Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform, users could easily see the information based on the categories, location, and description of the events and whether the election information is verified or not. In this regard, the general public with access to the internet, as well as aware with the Uchaguzi platform and other electoral stakeholders interested to look the trends of the conduct of electoral process from different part of the country could actually look from the visually Uchaguzi crowd-mapped platform. Arguably, through crowdmapping process created effect as far as the election monitoring is concerned in terms of technology and increasing transparency of the uploaded electoral incidents.

#### **7.2.8 Uchaguzi crowdsourced monitoring team**

Uchaguzi crowdsourcing working team shows how the flow of observation data was handled by different crowdsourcing team in the Uchaguzi crowdsourced platform in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. Figure 7.5 presents Uchaguzi crowdsourced team formed in the three countries to make the process successful in terms of monitoring, producing, processing and sharing election observation data in real-time. Media team and sms team are the initial sources of election information, where most of the election observation data were coming from, especially sms team. The analysis of Uchaguzi datasets could not provide data generated by media team, rather generated data through social media were communicated by citizen observers using the established social networks accounts, and not through passive listening of citizen social networkers. The media team encompasses group of tech-savvy volunteers engaged to track elections related information in the social media networking sites. The media team required to look shared election information on

Twitter and Facebook platforms that can be shared with other non-network users. But the study found out that most of the citizen observers sent their reports through mobile sms-based services. The sms team deal with incoming reports from the crowd was responsible to process and approve the reports. Once the sms team decided about the reports, the team pushed the reports to the next step of the translation team.




Figure 7.5 Uchaguzi crowdsourcing team

Source: Data generated through fieldwork interviews, own drawing

Then the translation team help to translate the information in one common language (such as English) in order for everybody to understand because some of the citizen observers send the reports using vernacular languages, and others used Kiswahili or English. For the written English language reports, were not subjected to translation process. So, the translation team make sure that the reports take the form of one kind of language or uniformity of the language of the generated monitoring data. For example, shared reports in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform were in English in Kenya and Uganda, while in Kiswahili in Tanzania. The crowdsourcers work with translators from different background so that they can take the reports and translate wherever the language comes in, and after translation of the reports – were sent to the geo-location team, in order to identify the correct location of the incidents and understand who, what, where and when incidents have taken place. The study found geo-location team comprises volunteers around the country and across the borders, and include students' volunteers from the Universities.

After geo-location of the reports - the observation data could move to the approval or check team to make sure all the reports have undergone all the processes required. Such information include whether the reports are properly categorized, geo-located, and translated to establish uniformity of the reports before it goes on the crowd-map. The team

was very crucial because it could determine what goes on the map for public view and what is not based on the validation process of the reports. The verification team is responsible for authenticating incoming reports to get credible information regarding the conduct of the elections. The trained observers in the field help to corroborate to find out the credibility of the data. The incidents that require immediate response or hot spot issues were handled with emergency team, the team that comprises all heads of each of the different team in the election situation room to deal with information that require urgent action. The hot spot messages are sent to the emergency team to be handled much faster, and sent to the organ that will immediately act on it, whether it is EMBs, police or Red Cross, among others.

Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform had visualization team that deal with the analysis of data in near-real time to draw the pattern and trends in order to provide insights to events and gave report based on geo-location. Other focus was on reports mapping and a lot of dots of the incoming reports in different location on the crowd mapping data platform. The fact that Uchaguzi platform was able to collect a lot of data from across the countries through a simple technology like sms services, the team had the role to crowdmap the reports based on geo-location of the generated reports. The established dotted map in the Uchaguzi platform shows the area where the electoral incidents happened. Technology team had the role of ensuring the platform is running properly and to handle any security threats of the Uchaguzi software, and to tackle any attempt of hacking the Uchaguzi system during deployment process. Therefore, Uchaguzi crowdsourcing team were able to pull out election observation data from ordinary citizens, and electoral incidents that needed a response, were escalated to the responsible offices, and all other approved reports and worth sharing in the crowd-mapping platform were visually mapped in near real-time after approval and verification.

### **7.3 Uchaguzi crowdsourced citizen-generated observation information**

Uchaguzi crowdsourced elections monitoring in the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda presents some evidence that digital crowdsourcing method can detect positive and negative experiences of the electoral process. That is why it has been observed that “the electoral use of social media, crowd sourcing and ‘big data’ analysis from Twitter feeds, Google searches and similar sites are also a potentially valuable new source” (Norris 2013a:572) of observation data on credible or incredible and fraudulent electoral process. This section presents analysis of the positive and negative citizen-generated data on the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing datasets. This section examined whether or not crowdmonitors in the digital invented spaces were able to detect illicit act and good conduct of electoral

processes. It is worth mentioning that this section presents all citizen-generated information on the Uchaguzi systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The next chapter is dedicated to the specific crowdsourced data on the fraudulent act of the electoral processes.

The analysis finds that Uchaguzi datasets in the three countries was not meant for research; rather it is a project for engaging citizens in monitoring and generating citizen voices on the conduct of electoral process. In this case, Uchaguzi datasets found to be unstructured and not open for public use after the election, though the platform was available to those with internet access during the election period to read uploaded observation information from the crowdmonitors. Given the fact that there was little publicity and outreach of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing project (Omenya and Crandall 2013), and this also limited accessibility of the generated data by citizen observers. Thus, at this point, it is important to put front citizen-generated observation data stored on the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Specifically the next chapter follows the analysis of specific issues of negative side of electoral process, especially verified election fraud data. Therefore, analysis in this section focuses to find out whether the crowdmonitors were strictly required to identify and report only negative incidents with regards to the conduct of electoral process, or were also required to report issues of electoral integrity in terms of positive incidents. This section will address the question did crowdsourced initiators aim at observing and generating positive and negative electoral incidents?

The analysis found some of the observation reports, especially in Kenya and Uganda - one report contain different electoral incidents that can also be grouped in other categories or sub-categories of data. In this case, such reports were re-categorized and information was placed in each respective category and sub-categories of observation data. This trend, likely increases the number of original verified reports in each country. The examples of the re-categorized observation reports are presented in each individual country analysis. In addition, in Kenya and Uganda there were cases of double reports recorded in Uchaguzi systems of the same incident, location, date and time. This study establishes that the reason for double reports can be the ownership of multiple sim cards by one user, and user/observer may opt to send one report using different sim cards at the same time. This can be, the reason for crowdsourcing approval team to consider these reports are coming from different sources with different mobile numbers, reporting the same incidents. If that is the case, then the motives for reporters to use different mobile numbers to send the same reports, is yet unpacked and left gap for further research. Specifically analysis in this research with this

kind of double reports, were removed and left with one report in the Uchaguzi datasets. In this section, crowdsourced citizen-generated data are analysed and presented using categories and sub-categories of data deployed by the crowdsourced initiators in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda for generating election monitoring reports from the crowdmonitors.

### 7.3.1 Crowdsourced information in Kenya 2013 general elections

As regards to Uchaguzi crowdsourced reports in the 2013 Kenyan general elections, the researcher was given access to a total of 2993 approved reports in the Uchaguzi dataset in the form of csv file format. In the process of analysing approved reports, the researcher found that the actual number of approved reports that can be used for further analysis was 2856 reports. This is due to the number of reasons: first, some of the incoming observation reports from trained/trusted groups of observers were recorded more than once, and the analysis found a total of 217 reports in the dataset, while the actual number of the reports was 103. The total number of 114 reports were removed and deducted from the approved number of reports 2993. At this point, makes the approved number of reports to be 2879 in the dataset. In Table 7.6 each colour represent sample reports that contain similar information in terms of incident title, incident date and time, location, description, category, latitude and longitude, and all reports were approved and verified (see approved and verified column). Table 7.6 these are examples of observation reports on the Uchaguzi dataset that were recorded more than once, and yet were approved and verified.

Table 7.6 Example of reports recorded more than once in Uchaguzi Kenya dataset

#	INCIDENT TITLE	INCIDENT DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	APPROVED	VERIFIED
7422	Kitale Girls_po ar	03/05/2013	Kitale, Kenya	Kitale Girls_po	Trusted Reports,	1.019089	35.00231	YES	YES
7423	Kitale Girls_po ar	03/05/2013	Kitale, Kenya	Kitale Girls_po	Trusted Reports,	1.019089	35.00231	YES	YES
4321	LESSOS POLLING	03/05/2013	Kitale, Kenya	LESSOS POLLIN	Trusted Reports,	1.019089	35.00231	YES	YES
5739	LESSOS POLLING	03/05/2013	Kitale, Kenya	LESSOS POLLIN	Trusted Reports,	1.019089	35.00231	YES	YES
2865	most agents/obs	03/04/2013	Kuria West	most agents/o	Trusted Reports,	-1.1729	34.54745	YES	YES
3767	most agents/obs	03/04/2013	Kuria West	most agents/o	Trusted Reports,	-1.1729	34.54745	YES	YES
2859	amend name ma	03/04/2013	Kuria West	amend name r	Trusted Reports,	-1.1729	34.54745	YES	YES
3766	amend name ma	03/04/2013	Kuria West	amend name r	Trusted Reports,	-1.1729	34.54745	YES	YES
2856	Martha, creco We	03/04/2013	Westlands	Martha, creco	Trusted Reports,	-1.24353	36.77078	YES	YES
2989	Martha, creco We	03/04/2013	Westlands	Martha, creco	Trusted Reports,	-1.24353	36.77078	YES	YES
1830	Party agents faile	03/04/2013	Bomachoge B	Party agents fa	Trusted Reports,	-0.90303	34.74522	YES	YES
2693	Party agents faile	03/04/2013	Bomachoge B	Party agents fa	Trusted Reports,	-0.90303	34.74522	YES	YES

Source: Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 election dataset

Second, some of the generated reports in the Uchaguzi dataset that could not be analysed or located in their specific categories or sub-categories of data stand at a total number of 40 reports. Again, in the Uchaguzi Kenya dataset these reports were approved and verified, yet the analysis of this research could not establish the content of the reports to classify their categories or sub-categories. In this context, these generated and approved reports in the dataset were removed from the dataset and make the reports stand at 2839.

Table 7.7 shows examples of generated reports that could not be located in any of the categories or sub-categories of election monitoring data. As shown in table 7.7 some of the reports mentioned only the name of the place or area and still, these reports were marked approved and verified in the Uchaguzi dataset. Some of the examples of the reports are: report number 5737 incident title mentioned Kisumu, and location of the report Kisumu Central, and description of the report remained Kisumu, and the report was approved as well as verified. The source of the report is from trusted observer. Also, the same for report number 4454 incident title Mombasa, location Mvita and description of the incident Mombasa, and category of the report Trusted report, and report number 1711 mentioned incident title Machakos and location Machakos Town and description Machakos. The analysis shows the “category” of the reports in these examples - all the reports were from trusted sources of election monitors. It is reasonable to argue that this problem was a result of the decision of the crowdsourcer to register any information from the trusted/trained observers should be treated as candid reports, and automatically Uchaguzi system approved and verify their reports, even without verification team scrutinizing the content of the incoming reports from trusted observers. As a result, even report with exclamation mark (!) such as report number 3899 in Table 7.7 was recorded, approved and verified in the Uchaguzi system, and was added in the total number of approved and verified reports.

Third, the analysis of Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 dataset found some reports from trusted observers contain more than one electoral incident. In this case, a total of 13 reports from trusted observers could be re-categorised in different categories and sub-categories of observation data and, as a result, in the re-categorisation process a total of 17 new additional reports in the Uchaguzi dataset were created. Because of this process of re-categorization of reports the total number of approved reports stands at 2856 reports for further analysis. Sample reports from citizen monitors that contain more than one incident and could be re-categorized in more than one category and sub-categories of data are: a) #5682, 04/03/2013, 12:12, Nyakach, “design of polling station compromising secrecy of ballot, bribing of



voters, unusually many assisted voters”, b) #2292, 04/03/2013, 07:52, Githungu Constituency 048 “polling station not opened on time, polling station not numbered properly, missing voting materials and polling station not adequately lit” and c) #1681, 04/03/2013, 15:32, “names missing, illiterate voters not assisted” Msambweni Constituency, Ramisi Ward, Vingujini Primary School polling station

Table 7.7 Example of reports approved without election incidents


#	INCIDENT TITLE	INCIDENT DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	APPROVED	VERIFIED
5737	Kisumu	05/03/2013 11:46	Kisumu Central	Kisumu	Trusted Rep	-0.0945	34.7574654	YES	YES
4008	Black out	05/03/2013 00:44	Kibra	Black out	Trusted Rep	-1.30754	36.796024	YES	YES
5589	Ekerenyo	04/03/2013 20:49	North Mugirango	Ekerenyo	Trusted Rep	-0.50378	34.9970245	YES	YES
2044	Kisii town	04/03/2013 20:14	Bonchari	Kisii town	Trusted Rep	-0.66975	34.691162	YES	YES
1769	githurai town	04/03/2013 16:42	Ruiru	githurai town	Trusted Rep	-1.14889	36.95694	YES	YES
4458	Mombasa	04/03/2013 16:00	Nyali	Mombasa	Trusted Rep	-4.02062	39.6976967	YES	YES
1711	MACHAKOS	04/03/2013 15:57	Machakos Town	MACHAKOS	Trusted Rep	-1.56605	37.258217	YES	YES
4454	Mombasa	04/03/2013 15:24	Mvita	Mombasa	Trusted Rep	-4.04908	39.6645508	YES	YES
3514	Mumias town	04/03/2013 14:01	Mumias West	Mumias town	Trusted Rep	0.263252	34.4381905	YES	YES
2674	Nyatike	04/03/2013 13:53	Nyatike	Nyatike	Trusted Rep	-0.90532	34.2332077	YES	YES
2485	Lokichogio	04/03/2013 13:18	Turkana West	Lokichogio	Trusted Rep	3.962224	34.854065	YES	YES
3648	Angurai	04/03/2013 13:18	Teso North	Angurai	Trusted Rep	0.675764	34.3391953	YES	YES
3644	Busia	04/03/2013 12:27	Matayos	Busia	Trusted Rep	0.398098	34.1723404	YES	YES
2306	NYERI	04/03/2013 11:03	Kieni	NYERI	Trusted Rep	-0.25428	36.9054604	YES	YES
3899	!	04/03/2013 06:44	Lugari	!	Trusted Rep	0.611447	34.855957	YES	YES
2714	Sms	01/03/2013 14:59	Kitutu Masaba	Sms	Trusted Rep	-0.6873	34.888569	YES	YES

Source: Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 election dataset

Therefore, out of 2856 number of approved reports, a total of 2051 reports in the dataset were verified, while 805 reports were unverified. And a number of 1676 reports were from bounded observers and 1180 from unbounded observers and reporters. It is important to note that crowdsourcing process in Kenya was carried out in five days from 1<sup>st</sup> March 2013 to 5<sup>th</sup> March 2015. This means that election observation data from citizen monitors were generated in five days. The number of the crowd data via sms-based services stands at 2752, Twitter 41 and Web form 63 reports. Graph 7.1 shows that on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013 the number of incoming observation reports to Uchaguzi system were high because it was on election-day. And on election-day a total of approved reports were 2104, and about 1434 reports were verified, and 670 remained unverified. On 5<sup>th</sup> March 2013, there was a rapid decrease in the number of reports where the system received about 331 reports and 253 were verified and 78 unverified reports. The timeline graph of the observation reports shows the focus of civil society crowdsourced initiators was on election-day event, and less on campaign and after voting events. This is because the trend of the number of observation reports from 1<sup>st</sup> of

March to 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 2013 before election-day and after voting events were low compared to the election-day reports on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013.

Graph 7.1 Timeline graph of Uchaguzi Kenya 2013 crowdsourced election reports



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own graph

In Kenya 2013 election - crowdsourced citizen monitors and reporters used short code number 3002 to communicate their observation incidents. Trained observers were assigned identification number and specific location for observing and reporting electoral incidents in the Uchaguzi system. Once their reports were received in the uchaguzi system, automatically the location of the reports is known - trusted sources. So, there was no need of verifying the incoming reports from this group of monitors. Table 7.8 shows that many of the reports were generated by bounded citizen observers (58.7%) and unbounded citizen observers (41.3%) of the generated data. Of all the reports, reports labelled verified in the Uchaguzi system were (71.8%) and unverified reports (28.2%). Given the widespread of mobile phone ownership and usage in Kenya, many of the observation reports were generated through mobile phone device (96.4%) of all the reports in the Uchaguzi system, and Twitter (1.4%), while web form based services in the Uchaguzi platform (2.2%).

Across the categories of election observation, some of the observation categories - the unbounded observers generated more information than bounded observers. For example, reports regarding security issues unbounded observers (92.9%) and bounded observers

(7.1%) of the total reports. Also positive events unbounded observers (77.3%) and bounded observers (22.7%) and other positive events unbounded (61.9%) and bounded (38.1%). For the positive observation reports, some of the reports were not subjected to verification process because the nature of the reports explained the positive conduct of electoral process, and some of the information could not cause any negative effect if the reports were shared publicly without verification. A sample of the positive reports from unbounded observer in the Uchaguzi system that show peace at the polling station is: #1660, 04/03/2013, 13:28, So far so good South C, Nairobi Kenya “everyone is so far so good around south c waiting in queues to cast their vote. Everything has been good and well organized. Though there have been some long queues but everyone is calm”.

Table 7.8 Categories of crowdsourced observation data in Kenya

Categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	Sms	Twitter	Web form
Voting issues	731(80.7%)	175(19.3%)	771(85.1%)	135(14.9%)	893(98.6%)	3(0.3%)	10(1.1%)
Polling administration	496(65.7%)	259(34.3%)	514(68.1%)	241(31.9%)	720(95.4%)	14(1.9%)	21(2.7%)
Security issues	12(7.1%)	156(92.9%)	30(17.9%)	138(82.1%)	160(95.2%)	3(1.8%)	5(3.0%)
Counting and results	141(72.7%)	53(27.3%)	157(80.9%)	37(19.1%)	194(100.0%)		
Staffing issues	124(59.9%)	83(40.1%)	167(80.7%)	40(19.3%)	203(98.1%)		4(1.9%)
Positive events	98(22.7%)	334(77.3%)	287(66.4%)	145(33.6%)	408(94.4%)	10(2.3%)	14(3.3%)
Other positive issues	74(38.1%)	120(61.9%)	125(64.4%)	69(35.6%)	174(89.6%)	10(5.2%)	10(5.2%)
All categories of data	1676(58.7%)	1180(41.3%)	2051(71.8%)	805(28.2)	2752(96.4%)	41(1.4%)	63(2.2%)


Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

Graph 7.2 shows that bounded observers generated more reports on voting issues (81%) and unbounded (19%), polling station administration bounded (66%) and unbounded (34%), counting and results bounded (73%) and unbounded (27%) and staffing issues bounded reports (60%) and unbounded (40%) of the generated reports in Uchaguzi system. Unverified (28%) of all the reports sent to the Uchaguzi system were from unbounded observers, who their reports were subjected to verification to establish the authenticity of the reported incidents before shared in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform.

Furthermore, graph 7.3 presents the percentage of verified and unverified reports in each categories of generating election observation data. Many of the unverified reports found on security issues (82%) and (18%) were verified. The analysis shows these are the reports from unbounded citizen observers (93%) of the reports in the Uchaguzi system regarding security issues. Most of the reports on positive events were treated as verified in the Uchaguzi system, with exception of some of the reports that require more verification


regarding the incidents in an occasion of the reports contain different negative information and yet, show the situation is peaceful.

Graph 7.2 Percent of bounded and unbounded crowdsourced data in Kenya



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own graph


Graph 7.3 Percent of verified and unverified crowdsourced data in Kenya



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own graph

For example, report #2077 in the Uchaguzi system, specify three problems such as problem with BVR machine, slow process of voting and some potential voters could not find their names, and conclude it was peaceful. For example, #2077, Some BVRs not working in Kitale 04/03/2013, 20:16, Kitale Kenya, Hi, I was observing voting in central div t/n west it was peaceful, but some centers has problem with BVRs and used manual voters register; it was slow, and some could not find their names, but it was peaceful. Geolocated, Unverified. Many of the reports from trusted/bounded observers were regarded automatically as verified reports in the Uchaguzi system that is why the percentage of the reports in voting issues (85%), polling station administration (68%), counting and results (81%) and staffing issues (81%) is high in the Uchaguzi system. Many of the unverified reports stand for unbounded monitors such as voting issues (15%), polling station administration (32%), counting and results (19%) and staffing issues (19%).

Graph 7.4 Percent of medium generated crowdsourced data in Kenya



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own graph

Regarding the medium of observing, generating and reporting election incidents, analysis revealed that short message services were dominant in reporting process. Graph 7.4 in all categories of election observation - sms-based system was mainly used by the citizen observers to communicate observed incidents from the field such as voting issues (99%), polling administration (95%), security issues (95%), counting and results (100%), staffing issues (98%), positive events (94%) and other positive events issues (90%) of the reports in

the Uchaguzi system. It is obvious that all citizen groups of observers such as bounded and unbounded monitors in the field used their mobile phone for texting election observation reports to the Uchaguzi system. Other established medium of communicating incidents such as Twitter and web form in the Uchaguzi platform was used in minimal way.

### 7.3.1.1 Crowdsourced generated negative feedback data in Kenya

The crowdsourced citizen-based in observing, generating and communicating election incidents, the expectation was to capture negative side of the elections on one hand, and to generate positive observation reports on the conduct of the electoral process on the other hand. Specifically, this part highlights negative reports generated by both bounded and unbounded citizen observers and reporters. This part presents various tables with percentages of the generated observation data in terms of verified and unverified data, reports from bounded and unbounded monitors as well as reports generated through sms, Twitter and web form in each category and sub-categories of election observation data.

Table 7.9 Crowdsourced data on voting issues in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Twitter	Web form
Ineligible voters vote	9.2%	90.8%	28.9%	71.1%	97.4%		2.6%
Eligible voter not allowed to vote	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%		
Purchasing of voter cards	61.5%	38.5%	84.6%	15.4%	100.0%		
Voters issued invalid ballot papers	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%		
Voter irregularities/importation	48.8%	51.2%	70.7%	29.3%	92.7%	4.9%	2.4%
Irregularities with voter assistance	90.8%	9.2%	90.8%	9.2%	98.3%		1.7%
Voter names missing from register	88.5%	11.5%	89.3%	10.7%	98.8%		1.2%
Voter intimidation	88.9%	11.1%	88.9%	11.1%	100.0%		
Bribing of voters	85.9%	14.1%	88.5%	11.5%	98.7%		1.3%
Voters voting more than once	90.0%	10.0%	90.0%	10.0%	100.0%		
Voter identification kit issues	91.5%	8.5%	94.7%	5.3%	99.3%		0.7%
No. of reports	731	175	771	135	893	3	10

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

The percentage rate of the reports indicated problems in voting issues was (85.1%) of the verified and (14.9%) remain unverified. The crowdsourcer in generating election observation data in voting problems, 11 sub-categories of data were designed as a guide for the citizen monitors to observe the voting process. Table 7.9 shows the most often reported incident was technical issues with voter identification kit (94.7%) of the verified reports. Other irregularities noted from citizen generated data include voter names missing from register (89.4%) and irregularities with voter assistance (90.8%).

The personnel assisting the voters did not take an oath of secrecy and instance of bribing of voters (88.5%), and also unusually ineligible voters were allowed to vote (28.9%), while eligible voters were not allowed to vote (86.3%). This study found the reason was that their voters' identification cards had been laminated afresh. Also, there were instances of voter's issues with invalid ballot papers (66.7%) of the verified reports and voters intimidation (88.9%). And about (89.4%) of the verified reports show voters voting more than once and (84.6%) reported purchasing of voter cards and voter integrity irregularities/importation (70.7%).

Table 7.10 polling station administration the findings revealed that (68.1%) of the reports were verified and (31.9%) of the unverified reports. In mapping polling station administration observation reports in 2013 Kenya general elections about 10 sub-categories of data were developed to capture various incidents. Of the (77.2%) talking about ballot box irregularities and missing/inadequate voting materials (73.1%), and technical issues observed include information on the malfunctioning of BVR machine (37.9%) at various places of the country, but the study found out lack of electrical power led to the BVR machines shutting down, and further contributing to delays in voting process. Data on polling station shows not adequately lit (96.3%) and design of polling station compromising secrecy of ballot (96.8%) of the generated and verified reports as well as campaign and propaganda in polling station (87.5%). And incidents of polling station not numbered properly (72.8%), polling station not opened on time (61.9%) as well as polling station closed before voting concluded (36.4%) and other polling station logistic (60.2%) featured in the crowd verified observation data.

Table 7.10 Crowdsourced data on polling station administration in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Twitter	Web form
Ballot box irregularities	77.2%	22.8%	77.2%	22.8%	100.0%		
Polling station closed before voting concluded	27.3%	72.7%	36.4%	63.6%	100.0%		
Polling station not opened on time	59.1%	40.9%	62.0%	38.0%	92.1%	2.5%	5.4%
Polling station not numbered properly	67.9%	32.1%	72.8%	27.2%	93.8%	2.5%	3.7%
Polling compromising secrecy of ballot	96.8%	3.2%	96.8%	3.2%	100.0%		
Polling station not adequately lit	96.3%	3.7%	96.3%	3.7%	100.0%		
Missing/inadequate voting materials	73.1%	26.9%	73.1%	26.9%	98.5%	1.5%	
Campaign and propaganda in polling stations	87.5%	12.5%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%		
BVR issues	28.8%	71.2%	37.9%	62.1%	89.4%	6.1%	4.5%
Other polling station logistic	60.2%	39.8%	60.2%	39.8%	96.9%	1.1%	2.0%
No. of reports	496	259	514	241	720	14	21

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

Regarding the problem of technology use in the 2013 Kenyan general election, three set of technologies such as Biometric Voter Registration (BVR), Electronic Voter Identification (EVID) and Results Transmission System (RTS) were used. These electronic technologies were largely a challenge for the IEBC to implement during electoral processes. There were “irrefutable shortfalls in the system, including insufficient voter education, which led to an unprecedentedly large number of rejected votes. The inadequate training of IEBC officials and the lack of cellular network coverage at some polling stations are also believed to have led to breakdowns in the electronic vote transmission (EVT) of results, which challenged the credibility of the provisional results” (International Crisis Group 2013:5).

The analysis of citizen reports revealed that electronic devices led to problems such as laptops ran out of batter power because some polling stations had no electric power and EVID not working in some areas. Also, servers intended for results transmissions were unable to handle the volume of data being uploaded, leading to the breakdown of the RTS (Chugh and Krueger 2013). While the problem of EVID and BVR may be perceived as technical problems, the problem was more managerial because of the delays in the processes that impacted the management of election technology. This is because “short timeframe between the development of the RTS and the election limited the amount of testing for the system before the election. Delays in several key processes, which include-the competitive procurement process for a BVR system, a three month delay in the commencement of voter registration, and the procurement process for EVID – directly impacted the ability of the IEBC to test all three of these technologies” (Chugh and Krueger 2013).

Table 7.11 Crowdsourced data on security issues in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Twitter	Web form
Mobilization towards violence		100.0%	14.3%	85.7%	100.0%		
Threat of violence/dangerous speech	6.8%	93.2%	11.4%	88.6%	96.6%	1.1%	2.3%
Ambush		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%		
Demonstrations		100.0%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%		
Violent attacks	7.3%	92.7%	26.8%	73.2%	90.3%	2.4%	7.3%
Physical attacks on property	14.3%	85.7%	28.6%	71.4%	100.0%		
Sexual violence		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%		
Rumors	28.6%	71.4%	28.6%	71.4%	85.7%	14.3%	
Bombings		100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%		
No. of reports	12	156	30	138	160	3	5

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

As far as security issues are concerned (Table 7.11), polling station administration irregularities consequently increased tension in different polling stations, and as a result led



to the threat of violence (11.4%), mobilization towards violence (14.3%) and violent attacks (26.8%) and physical attacks on property (28.6%) of the verified reports. Also generated data shows that other reported security issues include: demonstrations (33.3%), bombings (50.0%) and some were rumours (28.6%) of the verified incoming reports.

Counting and results of the elections, 11 sub-categories of observation data were used to generate reports from citizen monitors and reporters. In this regard, counting and results category (80.9%) of the reports were verified in the Uchaguzi system, and only (19.1%) remained unverified. Table 7.12 indicate that some of the sub-categories of data of all received reports, were verified in hundred percent. This was because the reports were generated by trusted or bounded group observers. These include report on: protest over declared results, intimidation of counting officials and observers, party agents failed to agree on disputed ballot papers, observer or party agents irregularities, party agents and observers not allowed in the hall during vote counting. Other incoming reports were verified and others were not verified such as failure to announce results by IEBC official (91.7%), irregularities with transportation of ballot boxes (66.7%), counting irregularities (75.9%) and party agents irregularities (68.8%) of the verified reports. For example: reports number 7408, 05/03/2013, 13:12; shows Mombasa Presiding Officer arrested for ballot tampering. County Returning Officer appeals for calm as Presiding Officer arrested trying to sneak rejected votes in ballot box.

Table 7.12 Crowdsourced data on counting and results in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium sms
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	
Failure to announce results by IEBC official	83.3%	16.7%	91.7%	8.3%	100.0%
Irregularities with transportation of ballot boxes	50.0%	50.0%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%
Protest over declared results	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
Counting irregularities	69.0%	31.0%	75.9%	24.1%	100.0%
Observers or party agents irregularities	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
Intimidation of counting officials and observers	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
Party agent irregularities	62.5%	37.5%	68.8%	31.2%	100.0%
Provisional citizen results	66.0%	34.0%	77.3%	22.7%	100.0%
Party agents failed to agree on disputed ballot papers	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
Party agents not allowed in the hall during counting	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
Observers not allowed in the hall during vote counting	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%
No. of reports	141	53	157	37	194

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

Table 7.13 staffing issues category included four sub-categories of data that were used to capture negative side of the stakeholders in the management of the electoral process. The reports capture and communicate information on different actors such as absence of IEBC

official at the polling station opening (78.6%), absence of law enforcement officials at polling station (95.7%), observers/media blocked from entering polling station (64.3%) and IEBC officials not acting in accordance to set rules (78.9%). Staffing issues category (80.7%) were verified observation data.

Table 7.13 Crowdsourced data on staffing issues in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Twitter	Web form
Absence of IEBC official at polling station opening	41.1%	58.9%	78.6%	21.4%	94.6%	1.8%	3.6%
Absence of law enforcement officials at polling station	85.1%	14.9%	95.7%	4.3%	100.0%		
Observers/media blocked from entering polling station	64.3%	35.7%	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%		
IEBC officials not acting in accordance to set rules	56.6%	43.4%	78.9%	21.1%	98.7%		1.3
No. of reports	124	83	167	40	203	1	3

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

### 7.3.1.2 Crowdsourced generated positive feedback data in Kenya

In the Kenyan 2013 general election - labelled as the most peaceful conduct of election since the inception of multi-party politics in the country in 1992 (Internal Crisis Group 2013). In this election “some presidential candidates held multiple prayer rallies, youth groups participated in widespread peace campaigns, and the media collaborated with security agencies and peace committees to resolve simmering tensions. Consistent international pressure, a robust civil society preaching non-violence and a determined citizenry intent on avoiding a repeat of 2007-2008 all promoted a peace-at-all-cost message” (International Crisis Group 2013:3). A real plus also to the crowdsourced generated data is the portrayal of positive incidents during the conduct of electoral processes.

Table 7.14 Crowdsourced data on positive electoral incidents in Kenya

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium		
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Twitter	Web form
Civilian peace efforts	2.3%	97.7%	32.6%	67.4%	86.0%	4.7%	9.3%
Everything fine	25.3%	74.7%	70.3%	29.7%	95.3%	2.1%	2.6%
Police peace efforts		100.0%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%		
Other positive issues	38.1%	61.9%	64.4%	35.6%	89.7%	5.1%	5.2%
No. of reports	172	454	412	214	582	20	24

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya dataset, own table

Table 7.14 presents positive electoral incidents, and citizen-generated observation reports show peaceful initiatives by civilian efforts (32.6%), and police peace efforts (60.0%). And some of the incoming reports indicated everything was fine (70.3%) and

reports on other positive issues (64.4%) of the verified reports. An example of the peace efforts reports in the Uchaguzi datasets is: #2850, 04/03/2013, 23:17, P.C.E.A Langas, Eldoret Kenya, voting ended peacefully in Langas, I'm concerned about the groupings in the streets. The police should disband the groups and ask the young people to go to sleep.

### **7.3.2 Crowdsourced information in Tanzania 2015 general elections**


The analysis of crowdsourced election monitoring reports in Tanzania 2015 general election was collected in the Uchaguzi Tanzania platform using online filtering option in the Uchaguzi platform. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, the researcher could not have access to the stored data in the csv format, rather access and analysis was online during crowdsourcing period from September to October 2015. Through online filtering of categories of election observation, the analysis revealed a number of approved reports in the Uchaguzi crowdmapping platform to be 4596, whereby reports from trained/trusted observers' show 323 out of which 204 reports were verified and 119 reports remained unverified in the Uchaguzi system. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, the reports from bounded/trusted group of crowdmonitors were subjected to verification process. In Tanzania, all reports from bounded and unbounded crowd observers undergo the process of verification. This implies that even the bounded or trusted network of observers sometimes may generate reports that cannot be verified. This is justified by the number of 119 observation reports from trained/trusted observers remained unverified on the Uchaguzi system in Tanzania for the 2015 elections.

The number of observation reports from bounded crowd observers was 323 and unbounded crowd observers were 4273 reports. Total number of verified reports was 3220 and unverified reports 1376. The crowdsourcing process in Tanzania - the platform was active in collecting observation data for forty six (46) days of receiving and processing observation reports from citizen observers and reporters. Like Kenya and Uganda, crowdsourced monitoring incoming reports were mainly through sms-based services with a total of 4415 and web form 181 reports.

The timeline graph 7.5 is the trends of citizen-generated observation reports in Uchaguzi Tanzania platform from both bounded and unbounded crowdmonitors and reporters in the field. The graph presents verified, unverified and total reports generated during observation processes. The graph shows that on the election-day the number of citizen observation reports was high compared to the other days of observation such as campaign and post-election day phase. A total number of 1482 report was generated on the

Uchaguzi system on 25<sup>th</sup> October 2015 on election-day, and about 968 reports were verified and 514 remained unverified. Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowdsourcing platform, operate four days on the post-election phase till 29<sup>th</sup> October 2015. The analysis shows that the focus of civil society election monitoring organization in Tanzania (in this case TACCEO) to generate more observation data on election-day is evident on graphical presentation - because the trend show low response from citizen observers for the pre-election events and high on election-day event, and then the graph went down on the post-election phase.

Graph 7.5 Timeline graph of Uchaguzi Tanzania 2015 crowdsourced election reports



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own graph

Table 7.15 is the summary of the citizen-generated observation reports from bounded and unbounded monitors as well as medium used to generate the observation data from ordinary citizens. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, the exception with this Table 7.15 is the number of reports from unbounded crowdmonitors that counts (93.0%) of all the reports on the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform, while bounded crowdmonitors generates about (7.0%) of the reports. Verification team was able to verify (70.1%) of all the approved reports and (29.9%) remained unverified.

Like Kenya and Uganda, the dominant medium for generating election observation reports was short messages services (96.1%) and web form (3.9%). On one hand, in Tanzania unbounded citizen monitors were active in generating reports than bounded/trained group of monitors, while on the other hand, bounded citizen monitors were

active in verifying reports in the field generated by unbounded citizen group of monitors. As bounded/trained citizen observers could not generate high volume of election observation reports, but the group managed to seek the authenticity of the generated observation reports from unbounded citizen observers.

Table 7.15 Categories of crowdsourced observation data in Tanzania

Categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	Sms	Web form
Campaign issues	77(5.5%)	1322(94.5%)	1007(72.0%)	392(28.0%)	1379(98.6%)	20(1.4%)
Polling station logistics	17(7.0%)	225(93.0%)	208(86.0%)	34(14.0%)	226(93.4%)	16(6.6%)
Ballot issues	18(13.8%)	112(86.2%)	96(73.8%)	34(26.2%)	107(82.3%)	23(17.7%)
Security issues	26(22.4%)	90(77.6%)	73(62.9%)	43(37.1%)	100(86.2%)	16(13.8%)
Issues with official actors	15(28.8%)	37(71.2%)	43(82.7%)	9(17.3%)	47(90.4%)	5(9.6%)
Concerns of voters	10(6.1%)	153(93.9%)	127(77.9%)	36(22.1%)	142(87.1%)	21(12.9%)
Issues after votes counting	20(12.7%)	138(87.3%)	133(84.2%)	25(15.8%)	114(72.2%)	44(27.8%)
Other irregularities	21(1.8%)	1135(98.2%)	763(66.0%)	393(34.0%)	1143(98.9%)	13(1.1%)
Positive events	119(10.1%)	1061(89.9%)	770(65.3%)	410(34.7%)	1157(98.1%)	23(1.9%)
All categories of data	323(7.0%)	4273(93.0%)	3220(70.1%)	1376(29.9%)	4415(96.1%)	181(3.9%)


Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

For the bounded and unbounded citizen monitors data in each category, as shown in graph 7.6 - unbounded crowdmonitors were able to generate more reports than the bounded group. In this case, in all categories of election observation used to generate election observation information, unbounded crowdmonitors were superior to bounded crowdmonitors in terms of observing and reporting electoral incidents, in fact, both positive and negative feedback of the electoral processes. This is because in campaign issues (94%) of the reports were from unbounded and (6%) bounded citizen observers, polling station logistics unbounded (93%) and bounded observers (7%) of the reports.

Also, ballot issues were reported by unbounded (86%) and bounded crowdmonitors (14%), security issues (77%) unbounded and (23%) bounded, issues with official actors (72%) unbounded and (28%) bounded, concerns of voters (94%) unbounded and (6%) bounded crowdmonitors. Additionally, issues after votes counting a high number of reports were generated by unbounded (87%) and bounded (13%). This was also the case for other irregularities (98%) unbounded and (2%) bounded and positive events (90%) unbounded and (10%) bounded citizen monitors and reports.


The percentage of verified observation reports was higher in all categories of data than unverified reports in Uchaguzi Tanzania crowdsourcing platform. For example, graph 7.7 shows that campaign issues (72%) were verified and about (28%) were unverified reports and polling station logistics (86%) were verified and (14%) remained unverified reports

Graph 7.6 Percent of bounded and unbounded crowdsourced data in Tanzania



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own graph

Graph 7.7 Percent of verified and unverified crowdsourced data in Tanzania




Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own graph

Like Kenya and Uganda, in Tanzania the major channel of communication used to generate election observation data from citizen observers and reporters was sms-based

system. Graph 7.8 shows across all categories of election observation - the short message services was the main channel used by both bounded/trained and unbounded/untrained citizen observers to report their observation reports. Categories like campaign issues (98%) and other irregularities (99%) of the reports were generated through sms. Also web form on the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform was used to generate reports on issues after votes counting (28%), ballot issues (18%) and security issues (14%) of the received reports on the Uchaguzi system in the 2015 Tanzanian elections.

Graph 7.8 Percent of medium generated crowdsourced data in Tanzania



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own graph

### 7.3.2.1 Crowdsourced generated negative feedback data in Tanzania

The categories of election observation developed by civil society election monitoring organization in Tanzania were used to capture negative incidents of electoral process as presented in this part. There were about seven (7) main categories with 38 sub-categories of election observation information. Most categories on negative incidences of electoral process capture observation reports on campaign event, election-day and after voting day events. However, most observation reports were generated on election-day.

Category on campaign issues entailed inviting ordinary citizens to observe and report seven sub-categories of election observation data. In general, a total of 1399 reports were generated and about (72%) of the reports were successfully verified by a verification team.

Sub-categories such as campaign in abusive language (66.0%) of the reports were verified. Table 7.16 show other sub-categories and their percentage of verified reports were campaigning out of recommended time (63.6%), poor security during campaigns (78.9%), campaign intimidation (56.8%), media biased in reporting campaign (50.0%) as the governing party – CCM, appeared to enjoy advantages of incumbency (Commonwealth Observer Group (2015), incidents were campaign interrupted (54.2%) and other reports not related to these sub-categories were treated as other campaign issues (82.5%) of verified citizen-generated reports.

Table 7.17 presents crowdsourced polling station logistics data generated during observation period. The analysis shows that the Uchaguzi dataset received a total of 242 reports and about (86%) were verified reports. Polling station logistics involves sub-categories of capturing negative reports such as polling station not in public place ((91.4%), no presence of security at polling station (50.0%), polling design compromising secrecy (50.0%), polling station opened late (92.1%), and there were a few locations at which materials were delivered late causing the station opening to be delayed (Commonwealth Observer Group 2015), and any other polling issues presents (82.6%) of the verified reports.

Table 7.16 Crowdsourced data on campaign issues in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Campaign in abusive language	6.0%	94.0%	66.0%	34.0%	98.0%	2.0%
Campaigning out of recommended time	1.7%	98.3%	63.6%	36.4%	99.4%	0.6%
Security during campaigns	0.8%	99.2%	78.9%	21.1%	98.5%	1.5%
Campaign intimidation	1.5%	98.5%	56.8%	43.2%	97.0%	3.0%
Media biased in reporting campaigns	25.0%	75.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	
Campaign interrupted	11.8%	88.2%	54.2%	45.8%	98.6%	1.4%
Any other campaign issues	6.7%	93.3%	82.5%	17.5%	98.9%	1.1%
No. of reports	77	1322	1007	392	1379	20

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

Table 7.17 Crowdsourced data on polling station logistics in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Polling station not in public place		100.0%	91.4%	8.6%	100.0%	
No presence of security at polling station	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	
Polling design compromising secrecy	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	
Polling station opened late	2.6%	97.4%	92.1%	7.9%	94.7%	5.3%
Polling postponed	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%		50.0%	50.0%
Any other polling issues	8.7%	91.3%	82.6%	17.4%	91.3%	8.7%
No. of reports	17	225	208	34	226	16

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table



Table 7.18 Crowdsourced data on ballot box issues in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Inadequate voting materials	10.9%	89.1%	71.7%	28.3%	67.4%	32.6%
Tempering with voting materials		100.0%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%	
Ballot boxes not sealed at start of voting process		100.0%	100.0%		100.0%	
Any other ballot issues	17.1%	82.9%	75.0%	25.0%	89.5%	10.5%
No. of reports	18	112	96	34	107	23

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

Also, Table 7.18 ballot-box issues in the voting day collect information on inadequate voting materials (71.7%), tempering with voting materials (71.4%), and ballot boxes not sealed at the start of voting process (100%), and any other ballot issues (75.0%) of the data verified. Concerns of voters during the conduct of electoral process, citizen observers generated data as presented in Table 7.19 such as voter names missing from voter register (75%), and Commonwealth Observer Group (2015) recorded cases where voters did not find their names on the register. Additionally, the observer mission observed that on election-day a significant number of party agents did not have copies of the final Register against which to check the names of voters when polling officials called out their names as required by law. Also, crowdmonitors reported vases of voters voting more than once (66.7%), voters' intimidation (55.6%), bribing of voters (82.6%), and vulnerable voters not assisted (57.1%), and other voter issues (80.9%) were collected and verified on the Uchaguzi system in Tanzania for the 2015 elections. In addition, Table 7.20 is the security aspect of the electoral process as one of the categories of election observation used to collect information on absence of security officers at the polling stations (47.9%) observed by the citizen observers and reporters, occurrence of violent after voting (94.4%), security officers intimidating voters (60%), intimidation of counting officials and observers (71.4%) and any other security issues (93.3%).

Table 7.19 Crowdsourced data concerns of voters in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Voters names missing from voter register	12.5%	87.5%	75.0%	25.0%	91.7%	8.3%
Voters voting more than once		100.0%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%	
Voters intimidation	11.1%	88.9%	55.6%	44.4%	100.0%	
Bribing of voters	17.4%	82.6%	82.6%	17.4%	95.7%	4.3%
Vulnerable voters not assisted		100.0%	57.1%	42.9%	100.0%	
Questions from citizens		100.0%	87.5%	12.5%	87.5%	12.5%
Other voters issues	2.2%	97.8%	80.9%	19.1%	80.9%	19.1%
No. of reports	10	153	127	36	142	21

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

Table 7.20 Crowdsourced data on security issues in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Absence of security officers	9.9%	90.1%	47.9%	52.1%	97.2%	2.8%
Occurrence of violent after voting	55.6%	44.4%	94.4%	5.6%	33.3%	66.7%
Security officers intimidating voters	20.0%	80.0%	60.0%	40.0%	80.0%	20.0%
Intimidation of counting officials and observers	14.3%	85.7%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%	
Other security issues	46.7%	53.3%	93.3%	6.7%	93.3%	6.7%
No. of reports	26	90	73	43	100	16

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

With regard to issues with official actors, this sub-category was used to collect information on the irregularities and disagreement of election stakeholders such as party agents' refusal to sign final result form (100%) verified data, and monitors not allowed at the polling station during vote counting (100%). These observation reports on party agents and monitors were not allowed at the polling station during vote counting were generated and reported by trained network of election observers.

Table 7.21 Crowdsourced data on official actors and after votes counting in Tanzania

Issues with official actors	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Agents refusal to sign final result form	100.0%		100.0%		66.7%	33.3%
Monitors not allowed at the polling station during vote counting	100.0%		100.0%		100.0%	
Party agents failed to agree on disputed ballot papers	33.3%	66.7%		100.0%	33.3%	66.7%
Necessary staff not present throughout voting process		100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	
Issues with NEC officials	19.4%	80.6%	90.3%	9.7%	96.8%	3.2%
Issues with observers	33.3%	66.7%	88.9%	11.1%	88.9%	11.1%
No. of reports	15	37	43	9	47	5

Issues after votes counting	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	Sms	Web form
Results were not reported promptly by the returning officer	9.4%	90.6%	90.6%	9.4%	84.4%	15.6%
Other votes counting issues	13.5%	86.5%	82.5%	17.5%	69.0%	31.0%
Other irregularities	1.8%	98.2%	66.0%	34.0%	98.9%	1.1%
No. of reports	41	1273	896	418	1257	57

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

Other observation data from both trained and untrained observers are presented in table 7.21 such as necessary staff not present throughout voting process (50.0%), issues with National Electoral Commission (NEC) officials not acting according to the law (90.3%), as well as issues with election observers (88.9%). Post-election phase, especially issues after votes counting citizen observers were able to collect information on the results in some vote counting centers that were not reported promptly by the returning officer (90.6%) of the

verified reports, other votes counting issues (82.5%), and other irregularities after counting of votes (66%) of the received and verified reports.

Also, Commonwealth Observer Group (2015) observed that ‘the conditions for the count at some polling stations were not always conducive. For instance, in some areas it was quite dark by the time the count was completed; although officials were provided with battery operated lamps, it still made the task of the counting officials more difficult’. Additionally, the observer mission observed that counting and closing procedures were not always consistently followed at some of the polling stations observed.

### 7.3.2.2 Crowdsourced generated positive feedback data in Tanzania

Ordinary citizen observers managed to generate positive events on the conduct of electoral process, and reported to the Uchaguzi system. Table 7.22 shows this category of positive reports verified and unverified observation reports, data generated by bounded and unbounded groups of observers, as well as medium. Some of the positive observation data were not processed for verification, but there were some incoming positive observation reports that could not be shared without verification process because the reports presents alert of malpractices as we have seen earlier on one hand, while on the other hand the same report indicates everything is fine in the constituency or polling station.

Some generated reports in the previous section needed validation by cross-checking the reported fraud or malpractices in the conduct of the electoral processes. In this section, sub-category of data used to generate information on the positive feedback of the election showed security situation was good (59.7%), peace and security after announcement of results (73.5%), campaign went on well (65.6%) and other positive events (66.0%). It is worth noting that these positive feedback reports were subjected to verification process, and the results are presented in terms of verified and unverified reports (Table 7.22).

Table 7.22 Crowdsourced data on positive feedback in Tanzania

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Security situation is good	5.8%	94.2%	59.7%	40.3%	95.5%	4.5%
Peace and security after announcement of the results	8.8%	91.2%	73.5%	26.5%	85.3%	14.7%
Party agents accept results and sign	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%		50.0%	50.0%
Campaign went on well	4.5%	95.5%	65.6%	34.4%	98.8%	1.2%
Other positive events	19.4%	80.6%	66.0%	34.0%	99.3%	0.7%
No. of reports	119	1061	770	410	1157	23

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Tanzania dataset, own table

### 7.3.3 Crowdsourced information in Uganda 2011 general elections

Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 election dataset have a total of 6531 approved citizen monitors reports on the observation of electoral contests. The researcher has to take the dataset into the process of cleaning up generated citizen observation data. As a result, the analysis establishes a total of 6506 approved reports in the dataset for further analysis. Because analysis of the dataset found a total of 39 reports were recorded more than once in different sub-categories of data, while the actual number of reports was 14, and this make additional number of 25 reports of the same incident. Therefore, a total of 25 observation reports from crowd monitors were deducted from the total number of approved reports, and remained with 6506 number of approved reports in the Uchaguzi Uganda dataset for 2011 general elections.

This analysis of Uchaguzi dataset found a total number of 3154 were verified reports, while 3352 were unverified reports. Number of reports from bounded group of observers 2697 and unbounded citizen observers 3809. Like Kenya and Tanzania, crowdsourced election monitoring reports from the crowd were mainly generated via sms-based system with total reports 6399, and web form reports 107. Other channels of generating observation reports such as e-mails and social networks were not used in the 2011 Ugandan elections.

Table 7.23 Sample reports recorded more than once in Uchaguzi Uganda dataset

#	INCIDENT TITLE	INCIDENT DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	CATEGORY	LATITUDE	LONGITUDE	APPROVED	VERIFIED
166	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
167	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
168	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
169	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
170	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
171	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
172	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
173	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
174	peaceful voting	03/07/2011 09:46	munkunyu kasese	Kyabiseri.polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.183333	30.083333	YES	YES
4769	polling station cor	2/18/2011 13:00	Arua, Uganda	Polls started at	POLLING STATI	3.03	30.91	YES	YES
4770	polling station cor	2/18/2011 13:00	Arua, Uganda	Polls started at	POLLING STATI	3.03	30.91	YES	YES
4986	voting material ari	2/18/2011 8:36	okoro ,uganda	In luma polling	EVERYTHING IS	2.554429	30.941737	YES	YES
4987	voting material ari	2/18/2011 8:36	okoro ,uganda	In luma polling	EVERYTHING IS	2.554429	30.941737	YES	YES
5051	voting material ari	2/18/2011 20:36	gulu, uganda	At Green Valley	EVERYTHING IS	2.77932	32.284828	YES	YES
5052	voting material ari	2/18/2011 20:36	gulu, uganda	At Green Valley	EVERYTHING IS	2.77932	32.284828	YES	YES
5081	peaceful elections	2/18/2011 12:15	kasese uganda	Friday, February	EVERYTHING IS	1.054628	33.266602	YES	YES
5082	peaceful elections	2/18/2011 12:15	kasese uganda	Friday, February	EVERYTHING IS	1.054628	33.266602	YES	YES
5889	voting material ari	2/18/2011 9:01	oponj, uganda	At amuru polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.295074	32.603517	YES	YES
5890	voting material ari	2/18/2011 9:01	oponj, uganda	At amuru polling	EVERYTHING IS	0.295074	32.603517	YES	YES


Source: Uchaguzi crowdsourced Uganda 2011 election dataset

It is worth to note that non-partisan election monitoring organisation in Uganda - in this case CEW-IT deployed the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform in fifty eight (58) days of engaging ordinary citizen to generate election observation data. Table 7.23 presents

examples of citizen observation reports that were recorded more than once in the Uchaguzi dataset, and the observer reports were approved and verified. Each colour represents reports of the same generated observation data that were recorded as different reports in Uchaguzi Uganda system, while in fact; observation data is from one source of the crowd observers, reporting the same incident such as report number 166 to 174 on peaceful voting was recorded nine times on the dataset.

Visualization of election observation data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda somewhat show similar graphical presentation of election-day event. On the election-day, just like Kenya and Tanzania, in Uganda Graph 7.9 shows there were high volume of election observation reports from citizen monitors and reporters. A total number of 2913 reports were received in Uchaguzi system on the voting day, and 1691 reports were verified and 1223 reports remained unverified. The voting day in Uganda for the 2011 general elections was on 18<sup>th</sup> February 2011. An exception with Uganda crowdsourcing observation data compared to Kenya and Tanzania is that, just five days after voting event, especially on the post-election phase, Uchaguzi system on 24<sup>th</sup> February received a total of 1747 reports, and verification team was able to verify 486 of the reports, and other reports about 1261 were approved but remain unverified.

Graph 7.9 Timeline graph of Uchaguzi Uganda 2011 crowdsourced election reports



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own graph

Uchaguzi Uganda system encompasses data from bounded and unbounded monitors, verified and unverified, as well as medium used to generate and communicate the observed incident. Table 7.24 presents overall data on verification, types of crowd monitors and medium used for crowdsourced election observation data. Like Kenya and Tanzania, many of the observation reports were generated through mobile sms (98.4%), and web form used to generate (1.6%) of all the incoming reports on the Uchaguzi data set. And unbounded citizen observers reported (58.5%) and bounded (41.5%) of all the reports. In this case, unbounded crowdmonitors in Uganda generated more observation reports than bounded monitors.

Therefore, it was only in Kenya 2013 general elections, bounded citizen monitors were active in reporting electoral observation incidents than unbounded crowdmonitors, and in Tanzania and Uganda the volume of observation data from unbounded/untrained citizen observers were high compared to bounded monitors. But comparatively, the volumes of observation reports from unbounded crowdmonitors in Tanzania were high compared to Uganda during 2011 general elections. In Uganda, nearly half of the crowdsourced observation reports were verified (48.5%) and other generated observation reports (51.5%) were not verified in the Uchaguzi dataset.

Table 7.24 Categories of crowdsourced observation data in Uganda


Categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	Sms	Web form
Campaign issues	76(45.0%)	93(55.0%)	86(50.9%)	83(49.1%)	166(98.2%)	3(1.8%)
Ballot issues	603(40.3%)	893(59.7%)	691(46.2%)	805(53.8%)	1479(98.9%)	17(1.1%)
security issues	28(33.3%)	56(66.7%)	45(53.6%)	39(46.4%)	84(100.0%)	
Issues with official actors	113(52.6%)	102(47.4%)	123(57.2%)	92(42.8%)	212(98.6%)	3(1.4%)
Issues after vote counting	135(31.8%)	289(68.2%)	135(31.8%)	289(68.2%)	419(98.8%)	5(1.2%)
Voter issues	104(55.9%)	82(44.1%)	129(69.4%)	57(30.6%)	186(100.0%)	
Polling station logistics	249(44.5%)	311(55.5%)	291(52.0%)	269(48.0%)	558(99.6%)	2(0.4%)
Other issues	115(28.1%)	290(71.9%)	189(46.5%)	216(53.5%)	399(98.5%)	6(1.5%)
Positive events	1274(42.9%)	1693(57.1%)	1465(49.4%)	1502(50.6%)	2896(97.6%)	71(2.4%)
All categories of data	2697(41.5%)	3809(58.5%)	3154(48.5%)	3352(51.5%)	6399(98.4%)	107(1.6%)

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

Furthermore, the percentage of bounded and unbounded reports in each category is presented in graph 7.10. Like Kenya, bounded/trained observers generated reports, were automatically approved and categorized in the Uchaguzi system and plotted in the crowd-map platform without verification process. Bounded observers generate more observation data on other irregularities (67%), issues with official actors (53%), and voter issues (56%). Other categories of observation data unbounded citizen monitors were dominant such as


campaign issues (55%), ballot issues (59%) and security issues (67%), issues after votes counting (68%), polling station logistics (56%), as well as other issues (72%) and positive events (57%).

Graph 7.10 Percent of bounded and unbounded crowdsourced data in Uganda



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own graph

Graph 7.11 Percent of verified and unverified crowdsourced data in Uganda




Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own graph

For the case of verified and unverified observation reports on the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing dataset, a number of reports such as voter issues (69%) and other irregularities (67%) were the most verified incoming reports regarding the electoral process. This followed by issues with official actors (57%), security issues (54%) and campaign issues (51%). The percentage of unverified reports were on issues after votes counting (68%), ballot issues (54%) other issues (53%) and polling station logistics (48%). Graph 7.11 shows number of verified and unverified observation data in each category, and indicates somewhat equal share of percentage rate of verified and unverified observation reports in the Uchaguzi system for the 2011 Ugandan general election. Arguably, the crowd initiator was unable to handle the verification process of the large volume of the crowd observation data in the Uchaguzi system.

Categories of election observation data in Uganda, number of observation reports from the crowd were received through texting were high in each category of data compared to web form. For example, in all categories sms reports range from 98% to 100% in the Uchaguzi system, and web form range from 0 to 2 percent in each category of data. This was the case for campaign issues (98%) sms reports and (2%) for web form reports. Graph 7.12 presents generated data in each category and the type of medium used.

Graph 7.12 Percent of medium generated crowdsourced data in Uganda



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own graph



### 7.3.3.1 Crowdsourced generated negative feedback data in Uganda

Uganda 2011 crowdsourced technologies focus on observing negative and positive experiences of electoral contests. The number of observation data on negative side was 3539 of which 3154 observation reports were verified. Each category of election observation received diverse number of reports such as ballot issues 1496, campaign issues 169, security issues 84, issues with official actors 215, issues after votes counting 424, voter issues 186, polling station logistics 560 and other issues 402 of the reports in the Uchaguzi system. Table 7.25 campaign issues generated information such as campaign beyond official time (48.4%), use of abusive language (68.8%), low citizen attendance on campaign (75%), violent campaign (40.6%), use of state resources in campaigning (62.5%) and incidences where security personnel campaigning for politicians (20.5%) of the verified information. Also traditional observers reported some incidents of hate speech by presidential candidates in their campaigns, in defiance of the electoral laws (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011). Also, it has been reported that during the campaign the NRM party was dominant in all aspects of campaigning, taking maximum advantage of government resources and patronage, vehicles and personnel. Therefore, the money factor and widespread allegations of bribery and other more subtle forms of buying allegiance were key features of the political campaign, and NRM campaigning also received massive positive coverage on state television and radio (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011:19).

Table 7.25 Crowdsourced data on campaign issues in Uganda

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	Sms	Web form
Campaign beyond official time	45.1%	54.9%	48.4%	51.6%	98.9%	1.1%
Media biased in reporting campaigns		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%	
Use of abusive language	43.8%	56.2%	68.3%	31.7%	93.6%	6.4%
Citizen attendance	62.5%	37.5%	75.0%	25.0%	100.0%	
Violent campaign	40.6%	59.4%	40.6%	59.4%	96.9%	3.1%
Use of state resources in campaigning	50.0%	50.0%	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%	
Security personnel campaigning	25.0%	75.0%	25.0%	75.0%	100.0%	
No. of reports	75	94	86	83	157	12

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

According to Commonwealth Observer Group (2011) each polling station was ‘staffed by up to four polling officials under the authority of a Presiding Officer. Copies of the Voters’ Register in respect of the polling station were supposed to have been made available by the Electoral Commission to Presiding Officers, and by political parties to their polling agents. Each polling station was required to have an Election Constable for law and order duties and each cluster of polling stations an Orderly Officer to direct voters to the proper

polling station within that cluster'. Table 7.26 presents polling station logistics on election-day - citizen observers were deployed to observe and report information regarding polling station logistics such as polling station not opened on time (52.6%) and polling stations not numbered properly (56.7%). Other information presented includes absence of Electoral Commission (EC) official at opening time of polling station (46.4%) and design of polling stations compromising secrecy of ballot (58.1%). Also, Table 7.27 different sub-categories of election observation used to gather data on ballot issues, especially the incidences of tempering with ballot box (62.5%), problem in voting exercise (44.3%), and information on spoiled ballot papers (83.3%). Other reports on transport issues of ballot box (72.2%), ballots missing (59.5%) as well as counting irregularities (33.3%) of the verified incoming citizen reports. Polling kits were often incomplete and amongst the problems observed by the Commonwealth Observer Group (2011) were delayed arrival of ballot boxes, short supply of ballot boxes in some cases, material in the inventory list not being found in the polling kit and ignorance of polling staff about what they supposed to do with some of the supplied material. Interestingly, "ballot boxes were not sealed with tamper-proof tags in many polling stations, and at places voters were even observed lifting the lid off the ballot box to place the ballot paper inside" (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011:28).

Table 7.26 Crowdsourced data on polling station logistics in Uganda

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Polling station not opened on time	44.9%	55.1%	52.6%	47.4%	99.8%	0.2%
Absence of EC official at opening time	39.1%	60.9%	46.4%	53.6%	98.6%	1.4%
Polling station not numbered properly	33.3%	66.7%	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%	
Design of polling station compromising secrecy of ballot	42.6%	57.4%	58.1%	41.9%	100.0%	
No. of reports	249	311	291	269	558	2

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

Table 7.27 Crowdsourced data on ballot issues in Uganda

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Tempering with ballot box	58.3%	41.7%	62.5%	37.5%	100.0%	
Voting exercise	37.7%	62.3%	44.3%	55.7%	99.3%	0.7%
Spoiled ballot papers	83.3%	16.7%	83.3%	16.7%	100.0%	
Transport issues	72.2%	27.8%	72.2%	27.8%	100.0%	
Ballot box	42.4%	57.6%	47.5%	52.5%	96.7%	3.3%
Ballots missing	61.9%	38.1%	59.5%	40.5%	100.0%	
Counting irregularities	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	100.0%	
No. of reports	603	893	691	805	1479	17

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

Table 7.28 show voter issues generated data on bribing voters (69.8%), voter names missing from register (69.5%) and ghost names in the voter register (60.0%) of the verified. This illicit act of bribing voters, missing names from register and ghost names signalling fraudulent acts in the electoral process. In addition, issues with official actors include data on issues with electoral commission officials (55.7%), issues with observers (61.1%), issues with security officials (72%) and issues with party agents (50.7%). Numerous allegations were also reported by the established observers groups during campaigns that, many candidates distributed cash and other direct benefits to voters such as refreshments and food, cooking oil, salt, sugar, soap and blankets.

Similarly, it has been observed that the use of money in relation in Uganda has become a culture such that voters have become accustomed to receiving bribes for their votes (Commonwealth Observer Group 2011). Also citizen observers and reporters were deployed and invited to report on the security situation in the process of election such as reporting on riots (56.7%), hostility (71.4%), violence (40.5%), police brutality (38.6%) and arrests (64.3%). These incidences presented and verified in Table 7.29 may create fear among the potential voters and ‘why bother’ among voters to participate in various electoral events, especially campaign meetings of the candidates, and later on may lead to low voters turn-up on election-day event. For example, it was observed and reported by Commonwealth Observer Group (2011:29) that Commonwealth Observers were “dismayed at the large scale presence of armed police and military on the streets throughout the day in some areas. While security for the process is important it was felt that the level and nature of the security presence, notably on behalf of the military, was not warranted and may have intimidated some voters”.

Table 7.28 Crowdsourced data on voter issues and official actors in Uganda

Voter issues	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Bribing voters	60.5%	39.5%	69.8%	30.2%	100.0%	
Voter names missing from register	51.6%	48.4%	69.5%	30.5%	100.0%	
Ghost names	60.0%	40.0%	60.0%	40.0%	100.0%	
No. of reports	104	82	129	57	186	
Issues with official actors	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Issues with EC officials	52.5%	47.5%	55.7%	44.3%	100.0%	
Issues with observers	61.1%	38.9%	61.1%	38.9%	100.0%	
Issues with security officials	52.0%	48.0%	72.0%	28.0%	100.0%	
Issues with party agents	46.7%	53.3%	50.7%	49.3%	96.0%	4.0%
No. of reports	113	102	123	92	212	3

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

Table 7.29 Crowdsourced data on security issues in Uganda

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms
Internally displaced people		100.0%		100.0%	100.0%
Riots	33.3%	66.6%	56.7%	43.3%	100.0%
Hostility	42.9%	57.1%	71.4%	28.6%	100.0%
Violence	18.9%	81.1%	40.5%	59.5%	100.0%
Police brutality	45.0%	55.0%	38.6%	61.4%	100.0%
Arrests	42.9%	57.1%	64.3%	35.7%	100.0%
No. of reports	28	56	45	39	84

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

### 7.3.3.2 Crowdsourced generated positive feedback data in Uganda

Positive events with a range of sub-categories were used to generate data on the good conduct of the electoral process. Data presented on table 7.30 include peace efforts (57.1%), register display (65.2%), everything was fine at the polling station (47.9%) and reports promoting stability (80%). Other sub-categories were reports on peaceful campaigns (55.8%), peaceful nominations of candidates (56.3%), voter education activities (73.3%) and proper use of media (66.7%). It is worth noting that engagement of the crowd monitors and reporters was not only observing and communicating negative side of the elections, but also, to capture and share positive side of the conduct of electoral process.

Table 7.30 Crowdsourced data on positive electoral incidents in Uganda

Sub-categories of data	Crowdmonitors		Verification		Medium	
	Bounded	Unbounded	Verified	Unverified	sms	Web form
Peace efforts	31.5%	68.5%	57.1%	42.9%	99.0%	1.0%
Register display	39.1%	60.9%	65.2%	34.8%	100.0%	
Everything is fine at the polling station	42.9%	57.1%	47.9%	52.1%	97.8%	2.2%
Promoting stability	80.0%	20.0%	80.0%	20.0%	100.0%	
Peaceful campaigns	52.7%	47.3%	55.8%	44.2%	95.3%	4.7%
Peaceful nominations	56.5%	43.5%	56.1%	43.9%	84.4%	15.6%
Voter education	73.2%	26.8%	73.3%	26.7%	86.5%	13.5%
Proper use of media	66.6%	33.4%	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%	
No. of reports	1274	1693	1465	1502	2896	71

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Uganda dataset, own table

## 7.4 Comparing crowdsourced citizen-generated observation information

It has been argued, that “the currently predominant view among social scientists seems to opt for the strategy that...of “concomitant variation”. Such studies are based on the belief that systems as similar as possible with respect to as many features as possible constitute the optimal samples for comparative inquiry...It is anticipated that if some important differences are found among these otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of

those differences alone” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:32 [1970]). This section compares crowdsourced generated data in terms of observation reports generated by different groups of crowdmonitors, verification of citizen-generated reports and medium used to generate observation information. The crowdmonitors in observing and communicating both positive and negative incidents of elections pave the way for generating comparison data in the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. As observed by Fung (2011:194) collecting only problems makes it quite difficult to compare, and “once reports are collected, data gathered by popular election monitoring can be made available for anyone to analyse in any way they like, to the extent there is hand waving in any interpretive exercise of assessment, others can easily check and verify”.

The analysis of citizen-generated data shows some of the non-partisan elections monitoring organisations observe election as a one day event and other fewer categories on campaign event and post-election phase. In this case, this research argues that election monitoring is a continuous process, and it is a cycle, rather than one day event (Global Commission 2012; Norris 2014). Arguably crowdsourcing integrity of elections across the electoral cycle may establish and promote free, fair and credible conduct of elections, and inform policy framework for the couple of years before the next election cycle. Election observation across the cycle had a long-term deployment that allows long term monitoring towards election-day and post-election phase, as well as short-term observation on election-day event. Also, monitoring electoral cycle through crowdsourcing technologies - citizen get quite lured that elections are not determined by voting day, but there are other stages to observe prior to the election-day and after election day events. The tendency of election monitoring groups to focus on election-day event is pointed in various literatures (Carothers 1997; Msekwa 2002; Kelley 2008, 2009; Norris 2014, 2015), among others, but also, one of the interviewee reiterates that:

We advertise in the newspapers inviting interested election monitoring organisations to submit their application to observe our elections, and most of the traditional observers from my experience, they come towards the polling day. A few will come earlier to observe other activities prior to the polling day, but we have few that monitoring the organisation of the elections like display of our voter register. But, most of the observers and big number of them normally submit applications towards nominations of candidates and mostly on polling day.

Electoral stakeholders to observe pre-election events such as components around voter registration as the heart-beat of electoral process is indispensable, and other pre-election stages of the electoral process such as nomination of candidates, campaigns issues, what law


says that would actually lead to electoral fraud and malpractices and other steps that are critical to be observed prior to election-day and post-election phases. A snapshot of categories of election monitoring shows that monitoring in Kenya - the focus was mainly on election-day and few issues after voting. While in Tanzania and Uganda the crowdsource observation generates and share data on campaign phase, election-day and post-election events. Categories and sub-categories of election monitoring in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform shows citizen engagement to observe and communicate electoral incidents lasted for 5 days in 2013 Kenya election, 46 days in 2015 Tanzania and 58 days in 2011 Uganda towards election-day event. The data shows variation in number of days in deployment of Uchaguzi platform, and Kenya as the main Uchaguzi developer could not make effective use of the platform to deploy Uchaguzi early enough in collaboration with civil society organisations by inviting ordinary citizen to observe electoral cycle for the 2013 election compared to Uganda 2011 and Tanzania 2015 general elections. Comparison of crowdsourced data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda the focus is on the bounded and unbounded crowd data, verified and unverified generated data, as well as electronic tools used for generating observation reports.

#### **7.4.1 Bounded and unbounded crowdsourced election observation data**

Comparative checking of bounded and unbounded groups of citizen observers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda shows a difference in terms of the number of reports generated by the two groups of observers. In Kenya, bounded and unbounded monitors generate observation data on seven categories of data widely based on election-day event such as voting, polling station administration, security, staffing, positive events and counting as well as results. For the case of Tanzania and Uganda categories were somehow similar whereby in Tanzania developed nine categories such as campaign, polling station logistics, ballot issues, security, official actors, concerns of voters, votes counting, other irregularities and positive events. In Uganda developed and used ten categories of data include: campaign, ballot issues, security, official actors, votes counting, voter issues, polling station logistics, other issues, other irregularities and positive events. Given the number of categories and sub-categories of election observation used to generate reports - the number of reports generated in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda differ in each country, especially reports from bounded and unbounded observers. Graph 7.13 for the reports from bounded observers show generated reports in Kenya was higher and this was followed by Uganda, and then Tanzania. In the presented graph, Kenya crowdsourced initiators could not develop a category on campaign


issues, concerns of voters and other irregularities, rather the categories were used in Tanzania and Uganda.

Graph 7.13 Percent of bounded crowdsourced election data



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

Graph 7.14 Percent of unbounded crowdsourced election data



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

It is found on voting issues that bounded group in Kenya generated (66%), Tanzania (14%) and Uganda (40%) of the observation reports. For security aspect bounded group in Kenya generated few observation reports (7%), while Tanzania (22%) and Uganda (33%). Graph 7.14 presents unbounded group observation reports in each category developed by the crowd initiators in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In Tanzania, compared to Kenya and Uganda, unbounded group of observers were active in generating election observation reports. This was a different case in Kenya and Uganda, where bounded group was dominant in most of the categories in generating observation data.


#### **7.4.2 Verified and unverified crowdsourced election observation data**

In the Uchaguzi datasets, there is rich election observation information generated by ordinary citizen observers. As pointed out in the previous section, some of the observation reports were verified and other reports remained unverified because the crowdmonitoring verification team could not establish the genuineness of the incidents. It is noteworthy that some of the positive reports showing good conduct of the electoral processes were shared on the Uchaguzi platform without verification procedures.

The exception case in Tanzania was that nearly (93%) of the observation reports were from unbounded citizen monitors, and yet verification team were able to verify about (70%) of the generated and approved reports. Graph 7.15 shows that verified reports in the Uchaguzi system, in Tanzania verification team managed to process and verify more reports, followed by Kenya and then Uganda. In Kenya about (18%) of the reports regarding security issues were verified. This is the lowest percent compared with other categories of data, and even in other countries where in Uganda the lowest percent of verified reports was counting and results (32%), and Tanzania the lowest percent of the reports was security issues (63%). Graph 7.16 shows the percentage of election observation reports that remained unverified in the Uchaguzi systems. In this regards, Uganda had a high percent of unverified reports, then Kenya and lastly Tanzania. In Kenya, security issues (82%) and in Uganda, counting and results (68%), voting issues (54%) and other positive issues (53%) as well as campaign issues (49) were unverified. While Tanzania security issues reports (37%) and other irregularities (28%) were unverified reports. Crowdsourcing monitoring of the electoral integrity to the large group of people, the crowd sourcers should have mechanisms to establish the credibility of the incoming reports. That is why some of the reports in the Uchaguzi systems in the three countries were approved but remained unverified.




Graph 7.15 Percent of verified crowdsourced election data



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

Graph 7.16 Percent of unverified crowdsourced election data




Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

### 7.4.3 Technology for generating crowdsourced election observation data

The growing use of digital tools by civil society organisations is enabled by the current trend of ICT penetration, especially mobile phone in developing and emerging democracies. This initiative of non-partisan civic groups is facilitated by electoral democracy assistance institutions such as National Democratic Institute (NDI). It is evident that a growing number of election-monitoring organizations around the world employ sms technology to improve the effectiveness of their monitoring efforts. For two decades, the NDI, a non-profit organization that works around the world to support democratic development, has provided “technical support to nonpartisan domestic election monitors in over 70 countries. In recent years, this assistance has increasingly included helping nonpartisan domestic monitoring organizations use technology such as text messaging to enhance their effectiveness. SMS messaging tools represent one promising area where new techniques are making a significant contribution to election observation” (Schuler 2008:144).

Given the increasing ubiquity of mobile phone technology in East African countries suggest that the more the people who own mobile phones, the higher the chances people may observe and share electoral incidents, thereby may increase dissemination of negative and positive information on the conduct of the electoral process. Also, the penetration rate of mobile phones may facilitate the call back to verify information from the citizen observers on the field, and to communicate hot spots issues that require immediate response to the relevant electoral stakeholders such as electoral management bodies, Red Cross and police force, among others. Graph 7.17 found the use of sms-based services in crowdsourcing election monitoring to be higher in the three countries, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Short message services in the three countries were used by the crowd sourcers to facilitate the events of observing, generating and reporting election incidents. This is because ‘sms messaging has demonstrated an impressive ability to help election-monitoring organisations overcome many logistical challenges to effective election oversight and protection of citizens’ rights. The speed of communication and processing, the flexibility, and the coverage sms can gives monitoring organizations as powerful tool for organizing volunteers and responding instantly to an evolving election environment. These tools allow groups to quickly collect a rich dataset of election information. When combined with a reporting methodology...sms reporting contributes to a deep understanding of how elections are conducted across a country and whether the results reflect the will of the people’ (Schuler 2008:154).

Graph 7.17 Percent of crowdsourced election data generated through sms



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

Most of the election observation reports were submitted through short message services for about (98%) in Uganda, (97%) in Tanzania and (96%) in Kenya of all categories of election data. Social media like Twitter (1%) in Kenya and web form services (3%) in Kenya, (3%) in Tanzania, and (2%) in Uganda submitted in the Uchaguzi system. Twitter and web-form services were not such much used compared to sms-based system. In fact, the penetration rate and use of social networks, for example, in Uganda 2011 general election, minimal number of users could generate reports through such channels. The same for Kenya 2013 election, but crowdsourcing method could expect huge number of observation reports in the future election cycle given the current use and access of social networks and free access of Facebook with some mobile network operators in Kenya and Tanzania. Therefore, still the sms-based system is the dominant medium in terms of generating and reporting election incidents. This is due to the fact that the growing number of mobile phones as presented in the previous chapter, allows non-partisan election monitoring groups to “quickly collect a rich dataset of election information...sms reporting contributes to a deep understanding of how elections are conducted across a country and whether the results reflect the will of the people” (Schuler 2008:154).

### **7.5 Limitations of Uchaguzi crowdsourced datasets**

Analysis of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing datasets to generate observation data regarding the conduct of Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections indicates that - various limitations can be considered in the course of collecting information for analysis. This study found that the number of trained and deployed bounded citizen observers can be obtained from the crowd sourcers, and the number of the reports generated by this group also can be analysed in the Uchaguzi datasets. But the actual number of unbounded volunteered crowd observers and reporters cannot be established in the Uchaguzi systems, and even the crowd sourcers could not provide such records of unbounded crowd reporters.

It is worthy to note observation reports generated by unbounded citizen observers and reporters can be identified and analysed in the Uchaguzi systems. This study could only establish number of bounded citizen observers, but could not establish the number of unbounded citizen monitors who volunteered to submit their reports on the Uchaguzi platform. The generated observation reports from Uchaguzi system shows number of bounded and unbounded crowd observers in terms of the number of the observation reports. In this case, limited records of unbounded citizen observers, still remains a gap and area of improvement in the future deployment for the Uchaguzi designers and crowd sourcers to develop mechanisms of tracking data for the actual number of crowd reporters in the Uchaguzi system.

Since the reporting system and storing data for public use is based on the principle of anonymity, using medium of generating electoral incidents such as mobile numbers, email or social networks accounts, as well as web form can be used to establish statistics for unbounded observers. In this respect, the system can detect and identify if reporter medium of reporting has been previously used to report the incident, and further track the location and time the medium used to generate observation report in the Uchaguzi system. This step will offer more data on crowdsourced systems and provide more opportunities for the researchers to establish number of bounded and unbounded group of citizen, and even, to deploy various data analytical methods for qualitative and quantitative approaches.

In addition, there is a limitation on the Uchaguzi datasets whereby for the bounded group of election observers their demographic characteristics such as age, gender, urban and rural, education and employment status, among others, could not be found from the crowdsourcers or analysed on the Uchaguzi data set. The assumption was that for the

recruited and trained observers - the crowdsourcers could have at least data on their educational levels, professional skills, gender, socio-economic activities (employed or unemployed) and even geographical location. This data could be made available and accessible in the dataset for researchers to analyse in relation to the observation data generated on the Uchaguzi system. This could also facilitate the discourse analysis of the trained and untrained election observation reports in terms of quality and credibility of the data based on age or education level.

The crowdsourcers role of passive listening in the social networks for generating election monitoring information that could be used for triangulation of elections incidents is, not visible in the Uchaguzi datasets. Uchaguzi datasets comprised observation reports from bounded and unbounded group of monitors and reporters. This research expects the role of passive citizen observers and reporters to appear in the datasets. The observation reports generated through social media such as Twitter and Facebook were reported by unbounded citizen observers who used established channels to communicate the election incidents. In this case, this study found the crowd sourcer mainly they capitalised on sms reporting system than other channels of communication like shared observation data on the social media networks, and this is evident on the percentages of observation reports generated through short messages services.

This research could not establish observation reports based on the type of elections such as presidential, parliamentary or council elections on the Uchaguzi data sets. The observation reports generally speak on the process and incidences of electoral conduct, but no indication whether information is related to the presidential, parliamentary or council elections, and this could have provided more opportunities to analyse incidences related to each type of elections. Furthermore, it is difficult to establish number of reports based on geographical location, in terms of rural and urban areas and polling stations, because some of the stored observation reports lack official name of the area and polling stations. In addition, some of the verified and unverified reports were missing the name of the location the incidents were reported. Therefore, for one to specify the location of some of the observation reports in the Uchaguzi datasets in the form of polling stations, constituencies as well as rural and urban-based generated reports, he/she needs to have a list of official names of polling stations from electoral management bodies and polling station codes, and expertise to re-geotag the untagged generated reports in the Uchaguzi systems.

## **7.6 Chapter summary**

This chapter dwelt on the discussion of crowdsourced method and citizen-generated reports in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. The postulated research questions on crowdsourced method and evidence of crowdmonitors detection of positive and negative electoral incidents guided the analysis and presentation of research results in this chapter. The analysis reveals that in the three countries bounded and unbounded citizen observers were engaged in the process of monitoring and generating elections data. Analysis shows that crowdsourced citizen-based monitoring can be deployed as inputs to support large production of positive and negative election integrity reports. There is evidence of verifying unbounded and bounded crowd data in Tanzania, while in Kenya and Uganda evidence shows that only unbounded crowdsourced data were verified. This chapter showed unbounded crowdsourced observers proved to be more active in Tanzania in terms of generating reports on electoral incidents, compared to Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, large volumes of unbounded crowd observers were verified by crowd data verifiers, followed by Kenya and Uganda. However, in Kenya bounded crowdsourced observers generated more data compared to unbounded crowdsourced data, contrary to Tanzania and Uganda, where unbounded monitors were superior to bounded crowdmonitors in terms of observing and reporting electoral incidents.

This chapter shows that crowdsourced initiators in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were responsible for initiating crowdmonitoring platform, in this case, Uchaguzi software, where volunteered observation reports were uploaded, tagged and visualized. More important crowd-sourcers were responsible for creating spaces for citizen participation in democratic process, especially monitoring the electoral contests in their respective countries. In this regard, analysis shows that two types of crowd citizen observers were engaged in the digital crowdsourced systems. The crowdmonitors who were invited to contribute observation reports in the digital invented space in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were bounded and unbounded citizen observers. Evidence presented in this chapter showed these two types of crowdmonitors were able to participate in monitoring, generating and reporting electoral incidents using different digital communication channels. Mobile sms for texting service was a dominant medium in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The use of social networks accounts, email and web form services was low in Kenya and Tanzania, while in Uganda during 2011 election social networks were not prioritized as a channel for generating observation reports. However, it is obvious that the dominant medium and the popularity of

mobile ICT in the three countries for reporting electoral incidents is influenced by the fact that there is leapfrogged in area of mobile phone, and there is evidence of citizens access to and use of mobile devices in political activities.

Analysis of the category and sub-categories of generating electoral incidents in the three countries showed categories of observation data focused more on receiving negative reports than positive information. The goal of the civil society as a crowd-initiator influenced the nature of the categorization of data, and in this regard, the crowd sourcers designed and expected to detect and generate more reports on negative side of the elections. The main focus of the next chapter is to find whether or not citizen-generated data pinpoint fraudulent incidents in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

## **8 Detecting Threats to Electoral Integrity through Digital Crowdsourcing**

### **8.1 Introduction**

Electoral democracy stakeholders have seen decades of established traditional election observation groups observing and releasing reports on the conduct of election on whether electoral contests adhered to the international standards or global norms on democratic elections. This chapter sets out to analyse more recently crowdsourced monitoring information and the ability of crowdsourced citizen-oriented elections monitoring in detecting election fraud. The previous chapter presents both positive and negative feedback of elections, but this chapter, specifically analyses fraud generated reports by crowd observers in the *Uchaguzi* systems. Crowdsourcing information on the illicit conduct of the electoral contests was generated through digitally empowered crowd observers and reporters. The use of electronic devices for observing, generating and reporting election data - ascertain the power of the ordinary citizen to see fraudulent practices of various forms. This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of negative feedback of the crowdsourced observation data focusing on the components of the electoral cycle. The crowd generated data was grouped into four phases, namely pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election phase. The analysis shows the crowds were able to detect and communicate fraudulent data on the four phases in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

### **8.2 Uchaguzi monitoring threats to elections with integrity**

Electoral democracy has been recognized globally in all democratic countries as the preferred form of liberal democracy. Now more than ever, eligible registered citizens participate in the election process to vote for political leaders in order to establish legitimate government (Kersting and Cronqvist 2005). Monitoring conduct of election is becoming a global norm to ensure free, fair and credible democratic process, though in most electoral democracies “their elections are not free and fair because the necessary civil liberties are lacking” (Lijphart 2005:38). But, when citizens on the ground are enabled to actively participate in observing and reporting the conduct of the contests it may contribute to an environment in which a free, fair, peaceful and credible election can take place. This is because “fair elections provide an important means of improving responsiveness by making elected officials accountable to voters, however, election fraud undermines this critical function in many young democracies, often at the hands of tightly networked groups of



political elites” (Callen and Long 2015:354). Citizen engagement in a large network of observers and reporters - actors such as politicians and other stakeholders in favour of candidates or political parties may become less attractive to illicit act to interfere the conduct of elections and stimulate the emergence of credible election process (Vickery and Shein 2012). The emerging crowd-monitoring process may also stimulate the promotion of elections with integrity as one of the respondents described that:

Detecting and deterring election fraud is like a driver who is in a high way driving, and there are traffic officers within one or two kilometres. The driver will be very careful in speeding limit, and the driver cannot over speeding because s/he knows if reaches the traffic police officers, and is over speeding, obviously will be penalized. So, the traffic police officers are very ready timing drivers for over speeding. So, for us as non-partisan civic groups we came in collaboration with citizen groups and other stakeholders for timing the acts of election fraud. But when actors know there are some people, who are watching and reporting what they are doing, they will be cautious. As a result, engaging citizen to observe and report fraudulent acts in collaboration with civil society using technology, it brought kind of fear factor in those planned to do election fraud, and the issue of reporting is able to make electoral process to become a little more transparent in a digital platform through uploading observation reports from field observers.

This can be further argued that crowdsourced monitoring makes elections manipulators aware of the power of citizen observers and reporters because “people knew that if they try to rig the election there could be someone behind them that may send a text message reporting the incident” (Livingston 2011:13). Despite the fact that those who were likely to interfere the election could be aware of crowdsourced monitoring, the study seeks to check if they withdraw their decision to interfere the conduct of elections. Through the analysis of the crowd generated reports the study will be able to tell and presents data on the detection of election fraud in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. In this case, digital crowdsourcing may contribute to the early detection of election fraud and deterring illicit acts of the election process - as one respondent pointed out “when you get early detection then, you are able to intervene early, and with early intervention, then you are able to curb the situation that would have escalated to the problem”.

This research found that citizen-oriented election watch in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections through *Uchaguzi* platform assisted in the creation of a more rapid observing and sharing of electoral incidents and even, early alert warning system by citizen monitors and reporters. The *Uchaguzi* technologies bring in the voices of citizens to the electoral process through different forms of crowdsourcing such as bounded and unbounded citizen observers and reporters. These two different groups were engaged in

different ways by the crowd initiators, and ICT instruments were used as the main enabler of the collaboration between non-partisan election monitoring organisations and citizen observers in generating positive and negative experiences of the electoral process.

Digital technologies played a key role in promoting the integrity of elections as “individuals can now report election fraud faster, to a bigger audience, and at cheaper cost than before, for example, on their weblogs” (Bader 2013:3), as well as social media networks and texting. The assumption here is that the more the people who use mobile phones and other communication technologies, the higher the number of people who participate in generating observation reports. The crowdsourcers through *Uchaguzi* platform empower the crowd to observe and report negative electoral incidents using different digital tools. For example, as shown above, the crowd may use mobile phones for short code number, social networks such as Facebook and Twitter account, filling web-form in the crowdsourcing platform, and e-mailing incidents, as well as using smartphone applications.

Non-partisan election monitoring organisations and other stakeholders came out into monitoring the elections; first of all, as remarked by the crowd initiator they wanted to “raise confidence to the population, that there is an independent voice of election observers, which is looking at what is taking place across the country on the different phases of before, during and after the elections, and non-partisan civic groups aimed to promote free, fair and credible elections by empowering citizens to participate in the observation and reporting of electoral incidences via ICTs, especially mobile short code number service”. In this context, non-partisan civic groups and invited citizen observers in the *Uchaguzi* platform came out to build the confidence of the people with regard to electoral processes. And if that is the case, they came out to detect any illicit in the electoral process. The overarching goal is to provide an avenue to more ordinary citizens from passively accepting election fraud reported by established observers in the form of comprehensive reports to actively engaging in action to detect and prevent it, and the process is open to all regardless of social class. In this way, *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform offers an innovative space for citizen participation, and safety through principle of anonymity to express their voice on election-related issues.

The strength of engaging and using domestic election monitoring is to generate observation data across the electoral cycle. Norris (2014) developed eleven main stages in the electoral cycle that may be used by election monitoring organisations to observe the electoral process and report different forms of electoral fraud or electoral malpractices, as well as positive side of the electoral contests. Table 8.1 using Norris 2014 electoral cycle

evaluated whether non-partisan election monitoring organisations through crowdsourcing technologies in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 elections were able to capitalise on this cycle because “elections are not an event, but rather a long-term process involving numerous interdependent phases and periods” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

For the pre-election phase and especially with regard to electoral procedures information was collected on voting procedures and election official actors. It is only in Uganda 2011 election that the crowdsourcing process collected data on political party nominations. Data on voter registration was captured on election-day in the instances registered voters at the polling found their names not listed in the register. The other exception was in Tanzania regarding campaign media, where collected data was on media biased in reporting campaigning process. Table 8.1 crowdsourced data on the Uchaguzi datasets across the electoral cycle shows to a greater extent the focus of crowd-sourcers was to generate observation data around campaign, voting day and post-election events and less on pre-election incidents. The analysis found that some of the pre-election events were observed and information was collected during campaign and voting-day phases. In this case, this study puts forward the idea that with digital crowdsourcing, citizen observers could report different incidences across the electoral cycle, rather than narrowly focusing on campaigns and voting day events.

Table 8.1 Uchaguzi crowdsourced integrity of election cycle

Electoral phase	Electoral stages	Elections by country		
		Kenya 2013	Tanzania 2015	Uganda 2011
Pre-Election	1. Electoral laws			
	2. Electoral procedures	x	x	x
	3. Boundaries			
	4. Voter registration	x	x	x
	5. Party registration			x
Campaign	6. Campaign media		x	
	7. Campaign finance	x	x	x
Election-Day	8. Voting process	x	x	x
Post-Election	9. Vote count	x	x	x
	10. Post-election	x	x	x
	11. Electoral authorities	x	x	x
Number of issues		7	8	8

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets

### 8.2.1 Categorizing crowdsourced election fraud data

Digital crowdsourcing brought forth a new age of collaboration between ordinary citizens, non-partisan civic groups, the government authorities/watchdogs, electoral authorities, media and other electoral stakeholders in monitoring and reporting the quality of electoral

process in real-time. The inclusion of crowd in elections monitoring and possibilities of crowd-mapping citizen voices and other concerns of citizen observers offers a means for transparencies of elections and active participation (CRECO 2010), as well as creative way of engaging ordinary citizens in the protection of their votes and promoting the credibility of electoral contests. According to Norris (2014:35) fraud in electoral process refers to “interference with the electoral process that violates domestic laws, usually perpetrated intentionally by governments, incumbent office holders, electoral officials, party workers, or citizen...attempts at wrongdoing, exemplified by voter intimidation, bribery, and ballot stuffing”. In this respect, electoral fraud involves a wide range of stakeholders, which suggest the possibilities of fraudulent electoral processes as “there are ways to manipulate elections, including voter intimidation, ballot box stuffing, and changing vote totals after ballot are cast” (Callen and Long 2015:355). The analysis of Uchaguzi crowd data aim to generate incidences related to the electoral fraud, and there is a reason to “study the effects of election monitoring both for the design of policy and for understanding the mechanics of election fraud” (Callen and Long 2015:355).

Crowdsourced election observation data can be analysed using four major phases of the electoral cycle: pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election. This is due to the fact that ordinary citizen though ICT tools have a broader power of observing and communicating election incidents across a range of activities in the electoral process. And through crowdsourcing technologies a pool of undefined citizen volunteers act as long-term observers and reporters of electoral incidents. Citizen observers have the ability to identify and generate reports and identify incidences that may require further investigation by government watchdogs and other relevant authorities, and may attempt to uncover fraudulent practices on their communities during different phases of elections cycle. Therefore, analysis of electoral fraud focuses on the verified observation data in the *Uchaguzi* system for the Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. In this case, this analysis focuses on four electoral phases, namely pre-election fraud, election campaign fraud, election-day fraud and post-election fraud.

#### **8.2.1.1 Refining crowdsourced sub-categories for election fraud data**

“The overarching concept of electoral integrity remains highly abstract, so that in practice, to measure and monitor standards, it can be usefully broken down into its component parts” (Norris 2015:11), or what Schedler (2002) called “menu of manipulation”. In this context,

*Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda designed categories and sub-categories of observing the integrity of the electoral process. The previous chapter presented all categories and sub-categories of election observation data with their respective generated information in terms of percentages. In this chapter, the focus is on crowdsourced ability to generate election data on the illicit conduct of the electoral process. It is worth noting that the sub-categories of election observation data in this chapter are refined, and some of the sub-categories are combined to generate comprehensive sub-category of election fraud data. The selection of sub-categories of data encompasses those with reports on the illicit conduct of election by a range of actors. The nature of these sub-categories of observation data shows interference in the conduct of electoral process. The sub-categories were, therefore, refined as well as grouped in four phases of electoral process such as pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election day phases. The refined categories are used to generate data on *Uchaguzi* system on the ability of the crowdsourcing to detect incidences related to election fraud.

It is argued that “if reports about fraud are brought from many disparate sources, the resulting database makes a rich source of information through which it is possible to gain comprehensive insight into how an election has been manipulated” (Bader 2013:523). In this section, crowdsourced monitoring of elections - isolate a number of sub-categories that do not relate to the illicit conduct of elections. The purpose of refining sub-categories of observation data designed by crowd sourcers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is to generate election fraud data that shows interference with the conduct of electoral process. Refined categories will tell the story of how ordinary citizens were able to observe, capture and communicate any attempts worth sharing, as a threat to the integrity of electoral process.

For the pre-election phase, the main category is *manipulation of vote registry* and this includes observation data reported in other sub-categories namely: voter names missing from register or voter not listed in the register and ghost names in the register. Campaign phase as the main categories of election observation data in the *Uchaguzi* datasets encompasses: *vote buying* (bribing of voters, purchasing of voter cards and voters importation); *voters threatened with violence* (mobilisation towards violence, threat of violence/dangerous speech, use of abusive language, violent campaigns and campaign interrupted); *voter intimidation* (campaign intimidation, security officers intimidating voters, security personnel campaigning, police brutality and arrests).

Furthermore, election-day phase includes: *ballot box stuffing* (tempering with voting materials or ballot box, ballot boxes not sealed at the start of voting process and ballot missing); *secrecy of the vote* (irregularities with voter assistance and design of polling compromising secrecy of ballot); *multiple voting* (voters voting more than once) and *voting fraud* (ineligible voters vote, eligible voter not allowed to vote, voters issued invalid ballot papers, polling station closed before voting concluded, polling station not numbered properly and missing or inadequate voting materials. And post-election phase comprises: *miscounting of votes* (failure to announce results by electoral officials and counting irregularities); *intimidation of counting officials and observers* (party agents and observers not allowed in the hall or polling station during vote counting) and *election triggered violence after voting* (violent attacks, violence, physical attacks on property, demonstrations, protest over declared results, occurrence of violent after voting and riots).

#### **8.2.1.2 Digital crowdsourced election fraud data**

The conduct of electoral democracies and monitoring quality of elections are complex processes, because fraudulent act can occur at all the different stages of the electoral cycle, namely post-election, campaigning, election-day and post-elections phases (Elklit and Reynolds 2005; Norris 2014, 2015). And it has been observed that illicit acts can take many different forms during electoral processes, ranging from manipulation of vote registry, vote-buying and voter intimidation, to voters threatened with violence, to ballot box stuffing, miscounting of votes and intimidation of counting officials and observers, to election triggered violence after voting (Schedler 2002; Lehoucq 2003). Thus, crowdsourced generated election fraud data can be classified in form of pre-election fraud, campaign fraud, election-day fraud and post-election fraud.

This research finds that *Uchaguzi* systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda placed at the center the voices of ordinary citizens on the positive and negative incidences for establishing credible and/or incredible electoral process or quality of the electoral processes. According to Norris (2013a:564) any positive assessment of electoral process reflecting “genuine will of the people” or “free and fair”, but any negative assessment or where election problems arise, described as ‘fraudulent’, ‘malpractices’, ‘manipulated’ elections or “violations of democratic principles”. If this is the case, then analysis of *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing observation data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda in this part focuses on generating negative incidences on the conduct of electoral process because “understanding

the whole electoral process as a cycle allows analysts to identify problems with greater precision” (Norris 2015:51). That is why this part will present refined observation data on election fraud. The negative side of elections shows misconduct of the electoral process, but not all misconduct reports can be cited as fraud, though “numerous types of flaws and failures undermine elections” (Norris 2015:3). This chapter is interested in the specific observation data on election fraud generated on the pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election day phases. Generated data that do not indicate illicit acts of electoral stakeholders are not included in this chapter. Thus, gathered crowd observation information will provide a comprehensive analysis on election fraud in each phase of the electoral cycle.

It is noteworthy that the analysed crowd data in this chapter are verified crowdsourced generated observation data on the *Uchaguzi* data sets. As a result out of 2051 verified reports in Kenya, 797 reports reported fraud incidents, in Tanzania out of 3220 verified reports, a number of 529 were reports on fraud and in Uganda out of 3154 verified reports, a total of 430 show incidences of electoral fraud. Collected observation data on electoral fraud from *Uchaguzi* datasets are highlighted in Table 8.2 and with graphical presentation in Graph 8.1. Generated data on fraud incidences across the electoral cycle are presented in form of percentages. As explained in the previous section fraudulent reports entail illicit act of electoral actors which interfered the conduct of electoral process; and in one way or the other aimed to favour aspirants to win the electoral contests. In attempt to expose illicit acts of electoral stakeholders, deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform and invited ordinary citizen election monitors and reporters were able to detect fraudulent incidences of the electoral process, and in this case election fraud data are generated in each phase of the election.


Table 8.2 Verified crowdsourced election fraud generated reports

Phase	Fraud variables	Kenya 2013	Tanzania 2015	Uganda 2011
Pre-election	Manipulation of vote registry	218 (89.3)	18 (75.6)	69 (69.1)
	Vote buying	109 (82.5)	19 (82.6)	60 (69.8)
Campaign	Voters threatened with violence	12 (11.7)	210 (61.4)	24 (50.2)
	Voter intimidation	16 (88.9)	83 (56.8)	12 (46.4)
	Ballot box stuffing	50 (79.3)	6 (75.5)	53 (63.9)
Election-day	Secrecy of the vote	138 (92.5)	1 (50.9)	2 (66.7)
	Multiple voting	9 (90.3)	2 (66.7)	
	Voting fraud	154 (59.7)	33 (71.7)	2 (66.7)
Post-election	Miscounting of votes	33 (80.5)	133 (84.2)	189 (46.7)
	Intimidation of counting officials and observers	40 (80.4)	7 (77.8)	
	Election triggered violence after voting	18 (31.6)	17 (94.4)	19 (44.2)
No. of reports		797	529	430

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own table

The presented data show some variation in detecting fraudulent acts in the electoral process. Graph 8.1 presents visualization of crowdsourced fraud data generated in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It is noteworthy in Uganda there was no data on intimidation of counting officials and observers and multiple voting. In all three countries there were a range of fraudulent acts of elections stakeholders from pre-election such as manipulation of vote registry, secrecy of the vote to post-election like intimidation in counting process and occurrence of violence after voting. There is obvious variation in the detection of types of fraud in the three countries. Of note, observation of voter threatened with violence was low in Kenya and this may be due to the fear and memory of 2007/2008 election violence, but in Tanzania observed incidents were high (210) number of the verified observation reports on this category.

Graph 8.1 Uchaguzi crowdsourced detection of election fraud (N.)



Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own graph

In general, it has been observed that “the difference between free and controlled elections is indicated by the opportunity a voter has (1) to have his franchise recognised through registration; (2) to use his right to vote without being segregated into categories dividing the electorate and revoking the idea of popular sovereignty; (3) to cast his ballot free from external hindrance; (4) to decide how to vote, even to spoil his ballot, without external pressure; and (5) to expect his ballot to be counted and reported accurately, even if it goes against the wishes of those in power” (Hermet 1978:3). The following sections



present fraud data detected and communicated by ordinary citizens during electoral cycles in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The presentation focuses on four phases, namely pre-election fraud, campaign fraud, election-day fraud and post-election fraud

#### **8.2.1.2.1 The pre-election fraud data**

The analysis of the pre-election phase of fraud observation reports in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda found and established one category of manipulation of vote registry which encompasses other types of fraud such as voter registration fraud and voter disenfranchisement fraud of deleting eligible voters from voter register, as well as adding ghost names in the vote register.

*Manipulation of vote registry:* The integrity of the elections should involve “elements relating to voter’s opportunity to participate in the election without coercion or restrictions of any kind” (Elklit and Svensson 1997:35). Manipulation of vote registry in the early preparation or any stage of electoral process may distort the credibility of the elections because eligible voters will be prevented from venting their choices in the ballot box. Also, ghost names that appear in the voter register and missing names of registered voters are potential indicator of fraud in an election. This was not an exception in Kenya (89.3%), Tanzania (75.6%) and Uganda (69.1%) where potential voters reported missing their names in the voter register. In view of this, this findings show manipulations of vote registry in the three countries disenfranchise voters for the legitimacy in terms of trust and satisfaction with the political system.

The three countries Constitution advocates registration of eligible voters to participate in democratic elections. For example, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010 Article 83 (3) states that “administrative arrangements for the registration of voters and the conduct of elections shall be designed to facilitate, and shall not deny, an eligible citizen the right to vote or stand for election”. And the Constitution of Tanzania of 1977 Article 5 (1) states “every citizen of the United Republic who has attained the age of eighteen years is entitled to vote in any election held in Tanzania. This right shall be exercised in accordance with the sub Article (2) and of the other provisions of this Constitution and the law for the time being in force in Tanzania in relation to public elections”. In a similar vein, the Constitution of Uganda of 2005 Article 59 (1) and (2) states that “(1) every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above, has a right to vote. (2) It is the duty of every citizen of Uganda of eighteen years of age or above, to register as a voter for public elections and referenda”.

### **8.2.1.2.2 The election campaign fraud data**

It is argued that “without extensive protection for and facilitation of civil and political rights, many citizens will not have the ability to participate in the political process, both in the electoral arena and outside it...this requires not only the prevention of electoral fraud, and of violence and intimidation against voters, candidates, and parties, also...the prevention of more subtle denigrations of electoral rights, including rights to (some measure of) equality in access to political finance and to the mass media” (Diamond and Morlino 2004:29). Electoral campaign process entails mobilization of potential voters by candidates, political parties and candidates or party supporters. During this period different actors may commit fraud in supporting their candidates or political party through vote-buying or purchasing of voter cards, and intimidating voters with violence by creating fear as a result he/she may or may not turn-up on voting day. In this analysis campaign fraud data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda encompasses three main sub-categories of observation data namely: vote buying, voters threatened with violence and voter intimidation.

*Vote buying:* There has been a concern about money in politics and financing of elections, especially campaigns cycle. An unregulated electoral process often creates an uneven playing field in electoral contest, which results to vote buying. It is observed that “vote buying and political intimidations are characteristic dimensions of African election campaigns” (Bratton 2008:621). Also, another way to “undermine the integrity of an election is to engage in vote buying, ‘persuading’ voters with gifts and financial rewards” (Van Ham and Lindberg 2015:7). But, in order for crowdsourcing citizen-oriented monitoring to detect and deter vote-buying in democratic process “it is necessary that there be someone on the other end of the line committed to the fight against corruption. If there are no concerned citizens, ‘dialling in’ or [texting] in the fight against corruption, phones alone will likely make little difference” (Bailard 2009:339).

On one hand, it can be plausibly reasoned that the more electronic opportunities that are available such as mobile money transfer system, more likely election actors will engage in corrupt act of influencing potential voters though vote-buying. On the other hand, the growth of mobile phone technology and ownership by ordinary citizens may decrease the prevalence of vote-buying by offering opportunities of decentralizing sharing of information regarding corrupt acts in the conduct of electoral process, especially during campaign event. That is to say “the net effect of the rapid and massive diffusion of mobile phones in Africa will be the reduction of corruption by decentralizing information and communication,

thereby shrinking the veil of secrecy that shields corrupt behavior as well as altering the cost-benefit calculus of corrupt behavior by strengthening oversight and punishment mechanisms” (Bailard 2009:337).

It is not unreasonable to argue that detecting electoral campaigning fraud, with regard to vote buying or bribing is a trick to capture data and verified by the crowd initiators and other volunteers. This study found that when involving the non-partisan election monitoring organisations and ordinary citizen - it is easy to capture information on bribery such as candidates or their supporters distributing money on campaign rallies. But it is, easy to capture such type of data, but it is harder to verify it. This is because by the time information will be received on the *Uchaguzi* systems and, by the time data verifiers want to be sure with the reported incident by calling field observer for verification - that person will have gone, and as a result such data will remain unverified on the *Uchaguzi* systems.

Some of the cases of vote-buying were observed, reported and verified in Kenya (82.5%), Tanzania (82.6%) and Uganda (69.8%). But absence of election laws for regulation, controlling expenditure and accountability of sources of campaign funds during campaign cycle engineered illicit conduct of vote buying or bribing of voters through monetary payments in exchange for pledging their vote to a given candidate or political party (Bailard 2009). It is found that in Tanzania despite structural advantages of Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau (PCCB) having structures in every district, PPCB has “failed to trace and combat corruption during elections. The 2015 general elections seemed to have been the most expensive and corrupt elections because of its competitive nature (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:36).

In Tanzania, domestic local observer report cited some incidences of vote-buying during the 2015 Tanzania general election. This was the case reported “on 8<sup>th</sup> of October, 2015 one of the contestants of parliamentary seat for Kasulu rural constituency was seen offering some money to groups of women in different wards within the constituency. For instance, in Tilye ward, Kasulu, Kigoma region, the contestant gave Tshs 540,000 to a group of seven women. He also did the same in Kalela ward whereby, he gave Tshs 360,000 to four different groups of women. Other groups which received his ‘hospitality’ included Buhoro, Muzye and Rungwe Mpya ward” (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:137).

*Voters threatened with violence:* Violence is a form of election fraud because it prevents eligible voters from voting for the fear of security issues. Reports generated on the Uchaguzi

datasets showed people were stabbed and others were beaten. Example, a man was killed in Thayu, at Ngecha road Nairobi on 4<sup>th</sup> March 2013 on the election-day in Kenya (CRECO 2013). There has been an increasing tension along the coast area with attacks at Chumani, Kilifi where a gang of people has been attacking people from specific ethnic groups.

The domestic observer observed that “on the morning of March 4<sup>th</sup>, a gang of people were questioning residents from Chumani about their ethnicity and attacked those of a certain ethnicity. Earlier in the day, IEBC officials in the same area were abducted and injured by members claiming to belong to the MRC” (CRECO 2013:24-25). Additionally, on the evening prior to election-day citizens reported violence in Kilifi and Kaloleni areas. Uchaguzi alerted the relevant authorities in time to deploy security officials to these areas, but approximately 13 people were killed including 4 police, and “at least 13 killed in co-ordinated attacks by armed secessionists in Mombasa and Kilifi as rest of country vote peacefully” (The Guardian 2013). Another incidence reported a car set ablaze hours before polling began in Kakamega, Kenya. The reports show that the Range Rover estimated to be worth about shilling 15 million was set ablaze as one of the ex-Member of Parliament was delivering accreditation to his agents. This is what the reporter said: “we were attacked by people who stopped us at a narrow road and pelted us with stones. They forced us out of the car and stole our belongings then burnt our car, luckily we are alive” (Capital News 2013).

*Voter intimidation:* In Kenya, “this heightened anxieties significantly, especially over the intent to rig the elections and the impartiality of IEBC officials. There were instances of electoral irregularities involving IEBC staff; other reported electoral malpractices included voter bribery and intimidation” (International Crisis Group 2013:5). For the case of Tanzania, “in Geita rural constituency, the house of CHADEMA’s candidate was burnt by unknown people. On 5<sup>th</sup> October 2015, one of the CCM candidates while he was in a campaign rally at Isimani Tarafani, Iringa, advised his supporters to ‘deal’ with UKAWA<sup>13</sup> youths if they attack them. Such kinds of ‘orders’ were issued by candidates in Mlimba, Morogoro and other places” (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:135).

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<sup>13</sup> “*Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi*” a Kiswahili language short form for the ‘Coalition of the People’s Constitution’ - is the opposition coalition made up of four political parties in Tanzania – namely Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), National League for Democracy (NLD), National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi) and the Civic United Front (CUF).

### **8.2.1.2.3 The election-day fraud data**

“While international election observation is valuable in its own right, domestic observation has two clear advantages. First, domestic observers often stay in one polling station during the entire course of voting and counting procedures. When they do so, their presence may have a deterrent effect on fraud and other irregularities. If fraud is still committed, stationary domestic observers have a better chance of detecting the fraud than international observers who typically spend between half an hour and one hour in individual polling stations. A second reason why domestic observers may be in a better position to detect fraud is that they are more familiar with local practices and consequently may have better insights into how fraud is committed in their communities” (Bader 2013:524). In this case, crowd observers generated observation data on *ballot box stuffing*, and some were also covered in the news media like “The Star” in Kenya whereby the polling clerk was taken to court over election misconduct. The report revealed the polling clerk was accused of “issuing two extra ballot papers for county representative and senator. The second count stated that ... issued a ballot paper for county assembly ward in order to give undue advantage to ... and an undisclosed political party agent, was arrested while trying to bribe voters at the Kauwi Primary School polling centre in Kitui west constituency” (Nzengu 2013, The Star - Newspaper).

*Secrecy of the vote:* It is argued that “secrecy of the ballot is considered essential in most modern states” (Kersting 2007b) and “when secrecy and privacy are guaranteed through physical measures in the polling station and in registration and counting procedures, ballots can be cast without fear of manipulation or pressure from others” (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004:11). It is, however, further pointed out that “free and equal elections that maintain the secrecy of the vote are protected by constitutional stipulations and safeguards” (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004:11). It is the role of electoral management bodies and other public authorities to take the responsibility and make sure the secrecy and security of the voters are guaranteed at the polling station during voting (Kersting and Baldersheim 2004).

The country that adheres to the conduct of democratic elections is expected to guarantee the secrecy of the vote during implementation of voting process. One of the instruments that can be used to promote voting secrecy is the country Constitution, electoral law and regulations. For example, the Constitution of Kenya of 2010, Article 81 (e) (i) guarantees “free and fair elections, which are – by secret ballot”. And Uganda Constitution of 2005 Article 68 (1) states that “at a public election or referendum, voting shall subject to the

provisions of this Constitution, be by secret ballot using one ballot box at each polling station for all candidates in an election and for all sides in a referendum”. The Constitution of Tanzania of 1997 does not provide specific article for the election of President, Members of Parliaments or Councillors through a secret ballot, rather the secret ballot is stated for the election of a Speaker as well as that of Deputy Speaker in Article 86(3) of the Constitution. Given the fact that some provision guarantees secrecy of the vote in the ballot box in Kenya and Uganda, crowd election observation data shows that design of the polling station compromising secrecy of ballot. Since voting process in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda used traditional method at the polling station, reports show lack of secrecy (92.5%) in Kenya, (50.1%) in Tanzania and (66.7%) in Uganda of the verified data in the Uchaguzi dataset.

*Multiple voting:* The incidences of voters to be allowed to vote more than once was reported in Kenya by (90.3%) and Tanzania (66.7%) of the verified data in some of the polling stations. But in Uganda, no multiple voting incidents were reported on the Uchaguzi platform. Also, *voting fraud* were observed and reported by the crowd monitors, and it is reasonable to argue that “without a requirement of equal voting at the decisive stage, inequalities in votes could work cumulatively to violate the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests” (Dahl 1989:110). In a similar vein, “no regime can be a democracy unless it grants all of its citizen’s formal rights of political participation, including the franchise. But a good democracy must ensure that all citizens are in fact able to make use of these formal rights to influence the decision-making process: to vote, to organize, and to assemble” (Diamond and Morlino 2004:23). It is on this reason that elections are essential due to the fact that it is the avenues which facilitate eligible voters with an opportunity to participate in electing their political leaders and by ensuring that the will of the people is the basis of authority of government as per Article 21 (3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and Article 8 (1) (a) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977.

#### **8.2.1.2.4 The post-election period fraud data**

This is the period after the actual event of voting process during the electoral cycle. In this phase, election fraud can be in form of vote counting, addition of fake ballots, falsification of results and delays in announcement of results. Therefore, post-election event of ballots counting should be carefully controlled to prevent fraudulent acts of election stakeholders (Elklit and Svensson 1997). The case of *miscounting of votes* - “at the decisive stage of collective decisions, each citizen must be ensured an equal opportunity to express a choice

that will be counted as equal in weight to the choice expressed by any other citizen. In determining outcomes at the decisive stage, these choices, and only these choices, must be taken into account (Dahl 1989:109)". In addition, *intimidation of counting officials and observers* featured in the crowd observation reports, especially from trained citizen observers and reporters in Kenya (81.4%) and Tanzania (77.8%) of the verified observation data in this sub-category.

Despite detection of election fraud after voting process - post-election phase regarding candidates challenged the election results, some examples can be presented using the case of Kenya 2013 election due to the number of electoral irregularities in the conduct of election, presidential aspirant Raila Odinga and together with Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) filed Court petitions challenging Kenyatta and Ruto's victory. They requested the Supreme Court to call for a "fresh election", citing evidence that "the polls were neither credible nor free and fair" on one hand. On the other hand, Jubilee Coalition supporters filed a third petition seeking a "re-computation of presidential percentages without rejected votes". On 30 March 2013 the "Supreme Court dismissed Odinga and AfriCOG's petition, and unanimously ruled the elections were held in compliance with the law and that Kenyatta and Ruto were "validly elected" (International Crisis Group 2013:6). In addition, after 2013 Kenyan elections, a total of 188 election petitions were filed (Judiciary Working Committee on Election Preparations 2013).

For the 2016 Ugandan elections one of the candidates in the Presidential election Amama Mbabazi petitioned the Supreme Court challenged the result of election because of the irregularities. And on 31<sup>st</sup> March 2016 the decision of the Court was that the elected President Museveni was "validly elected as President in accordance with Article 104 of the Constitution and section 59 of the Presidential Elections Act" (Republic of Uganda 2016:52). Conversely, in Tanzania, according to the Constitution the Presidential election results cannot be inquired by any court of law. Article 41 (7) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 states that "when a candidate is declared by the Electoral Commission to have been duly elected in accordance with this Article, then no court of law shall have any jurisdiction to inquire into the election of that candidate". But, for the parliamentary election results, three months after elections, domestic observer such as LHRC/TACCEO findings show that there was unpromising number of elections petitions filed in courts of law in Tanzania compared to available disputed election results reported by media and election observers (LHRC and TACCEO 2016:40).

### **8.3 Chapter summary**

*Uchaguzi* crowdsourced citizen-generated reports in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections provide insights on the ability of crowdmonitors to detect incidents related to illicit act in electoral process. The analysis shows fraud data on the pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election phase. The comparison of crowdsourced data on election fraud showed that crowdmonitors in the three countries changed the role of citizens from ‘information consumer’ of established election observers’ reports to ‘information producer’ on the conduct of electoral processes. These cases of crowdsourced citizen-based monitoring of negative feedback of elections, in fact, did not replace or reduce the role of traditional election monitoring groups in the pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election periods, but rather complement traditional method of observing and reporting the same contest by generating volumes of electoral incidents across the cycle, and in near real-time. Crowdsourced method expanded modern ways of citizen participation in electoral politics using digital tools in detecting electoral fraud of the electoral processes.

Crowdsourced data shows that reports of election fraud are high in Kenya (797) compared to Tanzania (529) and Uganda (430). There were high incidents of voter intimidation (88.9%) in Kenya, compared to (56.8%) in Tanzania and (46.4%) in Uganda. But there were similar reports on vote-buying about (82%) in Kenya and Tanzania, while in Uganda (69%). However, election triggered violence after voting the incidents were high in Tanzania (94.4%), and Uganda (44.4%) and Kenya (31.6%). In Kenya, low incidents of violence was due to the fact that there were campaigns by civil society preventing hate speech - recalling the post-election violence of 2007/2008 elections. All countries citizen observers were able to generate fraud data on the conduct of elections, and thus, shows still there are some challenges in promoting integrity of elections in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Therefore, the next chapter seeks to present challenges encountered and potential role of crowdsourcing systems, as well as creation of synergy among key electoral stakeholders; especially established election monitors and crowd-initiators in promoting the integrity of elections.



## **9 The Challenges and Potential of Digital Crowdsourced Method**

### **9.1 Introduction**

We are now living in the information age, and democratizing elections monitoring and crowdsourced information through digital technologies in developing or fledgling democracies are indispensable. This is because rapid growth of modern means of communication technologies creates more opportunities of using available, accessible and affordable ICT tools to observe and share electoral incidents in a real-time, and that may promote integrity of elections. In addition to “detect and deter fraud, election observation, if properly structured, can help hold together shaky electoral processes in transitional countries; the sustained engagement of international groups can encourage a wary citizenry to take the electoral process seriously and participate in it” (Carothers 1997:20). Crowdsourced process using digital tools does not exist without challenges; thus, this chapter explains synergy between crowdsourced and traditional monitoring, challenges faced and potential of crowdsourced technologies, using examples from Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015, and Uganda 2011 and examples from Uganda 2016 general elections.

### **9.2 Creating synergy for election monitoring**

“Most analyses have neglected the dynamic interaction between the different sets of actors involved in election-monitoring. Yet the patterns of interaction, task-sharing and specialisation may turn out to be decisive in explaining the difference between the success and failure of a mission” (Chand 1997:547). Every electoral stakeholder needs to engage in the process of monitoring because their target is to evaluate the quality of elections in order to promote free and fair contests. Partnership may bring front electoral incidents and, in particular through crowdsourced whistle blowing incidents. Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation endorsed in 2005 at the United Nations admitted that: “citizens have an internationally recognized right to associate and a right to participate in government and public affairs in their country. These rights may be exercised through non-governmental organizations monitoring all processes related to elections and observing procedures”, and this calls for international observer missions “advocate for the right of citizens to conduct domestic non-partisan election observation without any undue restrictions or interference”.

### **9.2.1 Observation and validation of data**

It is argued that “crowdsourcing applications can never fully replace a structured analysis of the electoral process produced by qualified experts, based on comprehensive reports that take into account all its components, but it can enhance them and make them available much faster” (Tuccinardi and Balme 2013:98). But digital crowdsourcing can detect incidents outside the area of operation of long established observers, and incidents can be easily picked and reported by crowd-monitors - and that way they may complement the established observer reports and assessment of the electoral contests. Arguably “the work of citizen observers goes well beyond the detection of fraud and irregularities” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014) by offering more comprehensive reports over the entire electoral process, and positive feedback of electoral process. The crowd is everywhere and crowdsourced could be a good method for detecting and deterring electoral fraud and other malpractices, if civil society can create spaces that digitally empower citizens to share observed incidents from their localities. As discussed earlier, the crowds are capable of getting whatever is happening and share it in real-time, while the traditional observers would be systematic, and in fact, they are few in numbers, and may only get issues that are within their circle. Observation data from crowdmonitors can be shared with traditional observers’ sources of information and the two may synergize each other. That is why the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observers of 2005 states “international election observation missions should identify, establish regular communications with and cooperate appropriately with credible domestic non-partisan election monitoring organizations”.

All group of respondents in Kenya and Tanzania, with exception of university researchers in Uganda stated aspect of observation and validation of election information. Crowdsourcing and traditional observers can validate each other observation data, which makes it much easier to improve the process of observing the elections. This is because international observers may use data provided by civil society monitoring organizations and their “findings can provide an important complement to the findings of international election observation missions” (see para 17 of the Declaration of Principles for International Observation of 2005). The contribution of crowdsourced method and what it adds to traditional observation is the early detection, response and prevention, as well as escalating the electoral incidents and early alarm warning compared to traditional observers. Crowdsourced component has a response mechanism that can see something and start acting on what is happening, before it is too late - because with crowdsourcing there is an

amplified opportunity of citizens to detect and share in real-time. The fact that traditional observation may validate incidents generated by citizen observers, it is an important mechanism, - but also, crowdsourced monitoring to validate reports before escalating, it is also, an important achievement. Therefore, the difference between crowdsourcing and traditional observation is that, crowdsourcing is a key to observing, generating and reporting in a timely fashion, and able to detect and prevent before things escalate with early warning mechanisms, but traditional election observers release comprehensive reports several months after the election is over (Carothers 1997, Grömping 2012).

Crowdsourcing and traditional observers can be as broader as they may want, but may not get all the information on the electoral process. Different observers may observe electoral contests with their particular interests, and the observer may be as much narrow or broad, but with partnerships of observation and data sharing - it can enrich the process of observation by bringing in all different data together in one-stop sourcing platform. Though, it is arguable that international observers and non-partisan civic groups “joint deployments, coordinated deployment plans or shared election day questionnaires or statements are not realistic options” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014), but cooperation may seek to share observation data and sources of information and even, cross-checking of data. In totality, partnerships in assessing the quality of electoral process may present information on the conduct of the elections on various stages of the electoral cycle. Therefore, what civil society election monitoring organizations through digital technologies may inspire is better electoral democracy using better crowdsourcing process. But in order for the crowdsourcers and traditional observers to know what happened, to see the negative and positive incidents at large and see where to improve and response, there is a need of a holistic view of the whole process. In this regard, the best way is to work with various electoral stakeholders through generating and sharing observation data on the success and failure of the electoral process, as well as identifying the gap that needs further improvement for the next deployment of the methodology. It is unfortunate that, this collaboration was ineffective in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda election cycle.

### **9.2.2 Production and dissemination of election data**

Collaborative production and rapid dissemination of election data is one of the area mentioned by all group of respondents in Kenya and Uganda, and in Tanzania three groups of respondents. It is arguable that crowdmonitors know the situation, the area, the people at

a large extent, the environment and the tricks of rigging elections, and the power to share election information (Grömping 2012). Traditional international observers are important because they also build confidence in the nationals, and they give some moral support to the local observers. One respondent observed that crowd-initiators and traditional observers may share observation information and dissemination of data to the larger communities because when “international observers come to the country, first they usually meet with local observers to learn the situation, and to know what is there, but because their ‘arms’ are longer than the local observers, shared information goes out, they have access to international media, so the information you give them - will be given outside, through this process one can establish whether the elections to some extent were free and fair or there was fraud”. This is also contributed by “the prestige of its members, institutional credibility, media visibility and access to high-placed decision makers” (Chand 1997:548). Using crowdsourced method “reported fraud and irregularities become immediately visible on the map, it is possible to get a sense of what the main violations in the elections are at any stage of the election process and how these violations are spatially distributed” (Bader 2013:524). In this case, ubiquity crowdsourced technology is one of the methods for gathering and disseminating election observation information in near real-time.

There is an advantage to the use of traditional observers: probably they are well trained, well deployed and they can report in a more concrete way. But their reports are time bound, and it is difficult to get easily near-real time reports from traditional election observers. As Carothers (1997:18) observed “weeks or even months later, the major observer groups release their final reports, although the election is by then old news”. Traditional observation groups with few observers on the field needed collaboration with citizen monitoring groups for timely dissemination of information to the wider population, and for response of the urgent incidents. One of the respondents observed the synergy is “how traditional observers work with ordinary citizens, so that they do not have to wait to release their final observation reports until the country has burnt, to get their recommendation on the burning of the country”. In this case, “early warning activities can also enable CSOs to establish or maintain good working relationships with other stakeholders” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014). Traditional election observers working with ordinary citizens through crowdsourcing process may find the ways on how to get their observation data and able to escalate immediately hot spot issues to the relevant authorities. This could also offer ample

opportunities to monitor response and bring feedback down to the ordinary citizens, while they are still observing and reporting the process of elections.

### **9.2.3 Evaluating quality of elections**

Established election observers to understand what crowdsourcing method really sought to do, is important, especially those who are used to the traditional monitoring. But also, crowd initiators “understanding the behavior of international organizations and transnational actors requires attention to their politics and preferences beyond their formal mandates” (Kelley 2009:767). Lack of understanding of crowdsourcing, resulted a limited commitment to the initiative, in the face of competing interests and limited resources to the local observers. This was the case in Kenya and Tanzania as partnership in crowdsourcing method of election did not work well. Collaboration with traditional observers such as ELOG on ICT observation failed in Kenya under Uchaguzi Kenya 2013, as well as TEMCO on ICT observation through engaging *open* crowdsourcing - failed in Tanzania under *Uchaguzi Wetu* 2015 platform, but in Uganda collaboration between CEW-IT and DEMGroup limited the visibility of ICT election watch platform for the 2011 election (Hellström 2015). This is because of the “apparent lack of understanding and trust between these two observation structures” of traditional and crowdsourced method (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014), and “lack of trust in the system may result in an inactive crowd” (Hellström 2015:3).

Evaluating quality of elections was mentioned by three groups of respondents in Kenya and Uganda, and four groups of respondents in Tanzania. Responses from most of the crowd-sourcers shows crowdsourced process in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is a work in-progress in promoting electoral integrity, and thus in the future civil society organizations in collaboration with technology developers will have to improve version of *Uchaguzi* platform. This is to ensure that crowdsourced method is not a process that works in isolation, because traditional observation is a key partner in evaluating election quality as many “international organizations have built strong capacities for monitoring” (Kelley 2008:222). In election integrity – digital crowdsourcing looks at issues of early detection and prevention, and responding to issues, but traditional observation is about recording and documenting comprehensive reports on the electoral process. All these different methodologies and any other that may come after - seek to promote integrity of elections. Crowdsourcing to make information available in near-real time can also be validated by traditional observers, in order to build confidence to the general public that the conduct of

the election is watched by ordinary citizens and other stakeholders using digital technologies for generating and communicating electoral incidents.

Despite different preferences and interests of established and civil society election monitoring organizations, all monitoring groups aimed at evaluating electoral contests in order to promote free, fair, peaceful and credible elections. All of their observation initiative and activities contribute to the promotion of the electoral integrity. This is the main reason for the crowdsourcing and traditional monitoring to create a synergy of monitoring and reporting electoral incidents. The synergy will create more opportunities for collaboration in promoting adherence to the global standards on democratic conduct of elections.

### **9.3 The challenges of digital crowdsourced method**

Crowd-monitoring of elections using digital participatory technologies and invented spaces is not a smooth process, because non-partisan organisations may encounter several challenges in their endeavour to engage ordinary citizens in observing and generating election observation information. The focus of this part is to elaborate challenges in crowdsourcing systems based on the assumption that election is a contentious issue, and any initiative, to expose conduct of electoral contests, likely to face challenges depends on the nature of election actors, and regime type. Especially engaging crowd from different geographical location and background, to observe and generate reports that could provide explicit evidence to the credibility or incredibility of the elections is a major threat to those intentionally planned to interfere with the conduct of electoral process. Thus, this part is dedicated in mapping the challenges faced by crowd-initiators in engaging ordinary citizens using communication technologies in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 and other examples of encountered challenges in 2016 Uganda general elections.

#### **9.3.1 Late deployment**

Limited time to develop working relationships resulted from poor strategic planning, and delayed implementation of *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing method. This challenge was mentioned by all groups of respondents in Kenya and two groups of respondents in Tanzania and Uganda. This research finds out early deployment of crowdsourcing was a challenge in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda despite the fact that there was study conducted by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Knight Foundation (2010) on the deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform in the 2010 Kenyan Referendum and experiences of *Uchaguzi* platform in Tanzania 2010 general elections. The study by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Knight

Foundation offer some recommendations as next steps to the deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform in the future election cycle:

- Plan early: One resounding challenge was aiming to achieve many objectives in such a short time period. Planning early, from 6 to 12 months prior to an election/ referendum was strongly and widely recommended.
- Further build effective partnerships: Defining and agreeing on role, responsibilities and expectations will help partners to implement a successful project.
- Develop strategies (for example, campaign, feedback to action, security and privacy), and strategies should aim to: 1) improve the filtering and verifying large volumes of information, 2) strengthen feedback loops and action by building an urgent response team, and 3) provide any necessary security and privacy plans for the project and its users.
- Use simulation: Simulation exercises can help to identify obstacles, test new technology, and improve workflows and communication approaches. These activities can better prepare people for an upcoming election/referendum day and provide a wealthy of community building and learning opportunities.

In view of the above recommendations lesson can be learnt from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda regarding the deployment of *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform for monitoring the three countries general elections. Late deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform can be evidenced from the number of days for the crowdsourced activities such as 5 days in Kenya, 46 days in Tanzania, and 58 days in Uganda. Also, it is evident that crowdsourcing process in the three countries “popular election-monitoring projects have developed in such short time frames” (Fung 2011:206). On one hand, given the late deployment of crowdsourcing process, especially with regard to *Uchaguzi* platform, still crowd-sourcers are optimistic that in the future they will deploy much earlier, as one of them remarked “we started the process late, but in future, we can start much earlier and recruit volunteers early to understand the terrain of the things, how to respond and make judgement of the calls and reports”. Further added that “the lesson we learnt is that the partnership has to be established very early”.

On the other hand, early deployment depends on the accreditation of monitors by EMBs to observe the electoral process. Principles for Election Management, Monitoring and Observation in the SADC Region as adopted on 2003 recommended that “the EMB must ensure that the accreditation process for observers and monitors is speedy, efficient and non-discriminatory”. In Uganda there was a delay in the accreditation for the non-partisan civic groups as an initiator of citizen-oriented monitoring. This was reported by a respondent who said that “the Electoral Commission was not very willing to give us accreditation, at least

early enough, so they were ready to give foreign observers because they know for them always the “text is free and fair”, but for our local observers, who know local issues very well, they were a bit slow and that was a challenge we faced”.

International observation mission reported “accreditation criteria and procedures are mentioned only perfunctorily in the election acts. A concern was raised when, following accreditation of organisations, the Electoral Commission required individual domestic election observers to present themselves to ROs in their district, to confirm their identity, followed by security screening carried out by the police. This requirement constituted an unexpected cost and administrative hurdle for domestic observation missions and in some cases had still not been resolved by Election Day” (EU EOM 2011:33). It can be argued that “if the procedure is too time-consuming and cannot be completed before election-day, or if accreditation is selective, the electoral process may lose credibility and the election management body will be viewed as having something to hide” (ACE Encyclopaedia 2013:65).

Furthermore, in crowdsourcing process there is a “cost of educating the public to use a cell phone short code system or other targeted program requires public outreach” (Bardall 2010). But in developing strategies for publicity and outreach of *Uchaguzi* platform, on how citizens observers could send their reports - various challenges were encountered, especially with regard to the cost of using traditional media for broadcasting the method, such as how citizens could know about the *Uchaguzi* platform. This research found that crowdsourcers had a plan of using media campaigns and budgets for billboards to inform the public, but the plan was somewhat unsuccessful. This is because one of the respondents reported that:

During the elections, prices for media campaigns were unbelievable, officially the price was the same, but the price of billboards went up to three or four times unofficially. Radio and newspaper adverts we had to pay in cash. We tried very hard, but we could not use mainstream media. So we opted to get and disseminate information through university students, especially to people who cannot see us on the online platform, through partner members around the country and we also succeeded to work with 16 network of community-based radio station. They translated our materials and posters into the vernacular language, and we use them as a way to get election data.

### **9.3.2 Digital crowdsourcing partnerships**

In order for crowdmonitoring of elections to be successful, it requires partnerships and strategies that are well organized and agreed among the stakeholders. This concern raised by all groups of respondents in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The partnerships in this context



should involve all key electoral stakeholders from state watchdogs and civil societies to ordinary citizens, as well as technology innovators and media to communication service providers, among others. The telecoms could provide affordable rates for running medium of generating data from citizen observers. This could serve and motivate invited crowdmonitors to send reports at low cost through SMS or sending reports to be free of charge to the established mobile short code number and other digital channels.

Bott and Young (2012:55) stipulated “the core risks and challenges arise around the concept of trust” in building partnership for crowdsourcing systems. This may affect partnership between civil society organisations as initiator of crowdmonitoring and other networks of observers in general. Some civil societies opted for more decentralised modes of election observation and develop channels of communication between citizens and crowdsourcers in terms of generating data and feedback action. The research found that some civil societies were not willing to collaborate in *Uchaguzi* platform because of different interests and lack of trust to each partner. Take, for example, in Kenya, as reported by the respondents, a series of meetings and discussions were conducted towards election-day in March 2013 regarding deployment of *Uchaguzi* system to all interested election monitoring organizations. *Uchaguzi* developer guides the network of civil society on how to publish their observation results in *Uchaguzi* platform. Apart from the idea of one-sourcing centre for generating electoral incidents, the aim was to gain collaboration that will accommodate all interests and build trust among each other. But the partnership could not work well as intended. This is elaborated by a respondent in Kenya that:

Ideally we wanted all civil society election monitoring organisations to be partners on *Uchaguzi* platform, and we wanted to congregate on one platform. All civil society organisations need to have only one platform to monitor the process of elections by accommodating different focus areas of observation and reporting the incidents. One year before the election for the 2013 by the way, we were very much united on this agenda; we all agreed to have one platform, and one short code. Six months before the election, people were not talking to each other. We did account for over 32 different civil society organisations - for election monitoring and peace building platform. Most of them funded by five donors, we even asked the donors why you deliberately create competition instead of collaboration in this sphere? I can understand may be we were naïve, but apart from their people, the human resource is the most valuable resource at the NGOs or civil society for data generation. Human resources justify their existence. And we ask them to voluntarily release them to generate data and the civil society could finance them to do their activities for the money they get for the election activities.

Likewise, other stakeholders such as political parties were invited to participate in generating election information for sharing with wider communities in the *Uchaguzi*

platform. Unfortunately, the study found that in Kenya, political parties were not interested in being partners on the *Uchaguzi*, but political parties could deploy their party agents to share polling stations information with *Uchaguzi*. This is because political parties have their agents nearly in all polling stations, and likely could produce rich observation information, especially regarding the whole process of voting, counting and declaration of results. These are agents trusted by political parties to observe the process in the polling stations; their reports could also be verified by other observers trusted by crowdsourcers before sharing in the platform. Despite the fact that political parties could not collaborate in generating observation data, it is interesting to note that, as reported by the respondent in Kenya:

We real tried to work with political parties, and before election political parties were not interested in our platform, the day after election results political parties came looking for information - just to claim the election results were manipulated and they needed data to verify the results by looking incidences of fraud and malpractices. But, if they could collaborate from the beginning before election-day to generate observation data, we would have been able to build a mechanism to detect big data on electoral fraud and malpractices.

Most of the interviewed respondents reiterated election watch using digital technologies should be geared towards partnerships for crowdsourcing process, and human resource is a key component to a successful e-observation. Since ICT may promote citizen monitoring, the viable partnerships among advocates of democracy with the use of technology will guarantee promotion of electoral integrity. In this case, digital tools are an enabler to observe and synthesise citizen voices with regard to electoral processes. This means that the crowd engagement in electoral process and building viable partnerships is one step forward to engage citizens and technology for observing elections. Analysis of *Uchaguzi* clearly depict some setbacks of crowdsourced method in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections - lack of viable partnerships, that in one way or the other, partners have the key role to play such as to generate reports, verify, and response, as well as feedback action of the reported incidents to the relevant authorities or offices.

To make crowdsourcing and partnerships more successful some of the respondents argued the initiators should incorporate binding agreement in order to commit each partner and clarify terms and conditions of their engagement. The memorandum of understanding will eliminates confusion on who is responsible for which task. Therefore, memorandum of understanding will assign each partner responsibilities in the crowdsourcing process and will act as a tool of accountability in monitoring. Assigning responsibility to each partner will depend on the capacity of the partners that can offer in the crowdsourcing process.

### **9.3.3 Funding and human capital resources**

Crowdsourcing systems requires adequate resources in terms of human resources such as crowd observers and reporters nation-wide that form a network of volunteers and develop a large-scale election observation data collection system, quality control groups like data verifiers, and categorization of incoming and approved reports, but also financial resource is indispensable for successful and sustainable crowdsourcing method. Crowdsourcing success factors depend on human capital, both “at the level of the individuals or groups spearheading the initiative as well as at the level of the crowd joining it. This includes language skills, managerial skills, national orientation, traditions, level of education, and, as an entry requirement for the crowd, the skills to use a mobile phone” (Bott et al. 2014:5).

It can be argued that “funding is typically the biggest concern and one of the most frequent sources of tension within observer organisations and networks, the availability of funds and the timely disbursement of funds are all potential sources of friction amongst and within observation groups” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014). Challenge of late deployment, training program and observation of electoral cycle was a result of financial resources to carry early huge deployment and to recruit observers for verifying incoming data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It is pointed out that the “inherent nature of crowdsourcing initiatives makes them low cost, especially if based on existing telecommunications infrastructure such as mobile phones” (Bott et al. 2014:6). It is further suggested that additional “investments directed toward the betterment of enabling infrastructure can substantially enhance the participation of the crowd. In low-income countries, performance based donor funding of local community development could be used to create a positive incentive for governments to allow greater citizen scrutiny and participation, for example, through crowdsourced monitoring and reporting platform” (Bott et al. 2014:6).

In Kenya, one of the crowdsourcer reported that some of the trained observers by CRECO networks left for other jobs in IEBC, and thus left a gap as some constituencies had fewer observers than had been anticipated. Also because of lack of adequate financial resources, one respondent indicated that “the training session began a little bit late, we should start earlier, to have much earlier simulation and people understand how the platform and the process of observing and reporting could run”. Coverage of the whole electoral process was hampered due to limited resources to roll out nationally and to initiate the visibility of *Uchaguzi* platform earlier, and even to maintain the platform after the election events. Also funding issues play a role for the crowd-initiators to concentrate on some stage

of the electoral cycle such as election-day event as “funds are more readily available in this phase of the cycle than in other equally important phases” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

#### **9.3.4 Quality of election observation information**

The quality of election observation data was mentioned by all groups in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. But, it is worth noting that “every crowd-sourced or collaborative production effort faces problems of noise from low-quality reports and spoiling from those who intentionally submit erroneous or irrelevant reports” (Fung 2011:204). The quality of incoming reports may lack necessary information like a detailed and explanation of the incidents in order to answer the question of what, who, when, where and if possible why. One of the crowdsourcer observed that “the quality of reports from trained observers weighing better than the quality of the reports from untrained observers”. In this case, there are two issues that can be learned: first, training is required for a network of election observers, and trained group can be trusted to generate quality and readable observation reports. Second, crowdsourced method may not need a big number of undefined monitors to detect electoral incidents, but few and well trained observers can generate quality and readable reports that can better explain incidents regarding the conduct of electoral process.

In addition, ‘weakness of crowdsourced information management derives from its participatory openness, making sense of received text messages and categorizing information appropriately has been a consistent challenge’ (Bott and Young 2012:56). This study found that unbounded crowdmonitors, who participated through open-call, generated observation reports with missing information, and crowd verification team, take a lot of time making sense out of it, and to verify. Because there is no online tool for approving and verifying the reports generated from the crowd, it was a question of every crowdsourcer to conduct training program to the group of volunteered data verifiers. But, it is arguable that through publicity and outreach, the crowdsourcers can disseminate information on how ordinary citizens can compose readable and comprehensive observation reports.

#### **9.3.5 Verification for data integrity**

Civil society through crowdsourced citizen-based monitoring and reporting of electoral incidents required to generate credible observation reports. It is stated that “non-partisan election observation and monitoring by citizen organizations is the mobilization of citizens in a politically neutral, impartial and non-discriminatory manner to exercise their right of

participation in public affairs by witnessing and reporting on electoral developments through: independent, systematic and comprehensive evaluation of legal frameworks, institutions, processes and the political environment related to elections; impartial, accurate and timely analysis of findings based on the highest ethical standards for impartiality and accuracy” (GNDEM 2012:6). The verification of incoming data from the crowd observers is indispensable because crowdsourced citizen-based required to be impartial and neutral to all candidates, political parties and all other stakeholders in their reporting process.

The question of data accuracy is critical to the non-partisan election monitoring organisations using digital communication technologies to generate election observation data from the crowd (Bardall 2010). And, it is argued “when critics doubt the validity and representativeness of crowdsourced data, they fail to appreciate that all other monitoring and evaluation tools and methods, whether surveys or focus groups, participatory rural assessments, training participants, or involvement of local partner organizations, necessarily face similar challenges” (Bott and Young 2012:63). Given the question of validation of data and the dilemma of impartiality for the crowdmonitors to generate unbiased information, it is the role of crowd-initiators to receive crowdsourced data and establish authenticity of the information. In practice, crowd-sourcers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using *Uchaguzi* platform faced the challenge of verifying incoming reports in terms of accessibility to some areas that are hard to reach and verify reports from the crowd. One of the respondents argues people were not cooperative to provide information that could verify the incidents. This is because “they know something is going to be reported and shared publicly, and they might be implicated for further investigation”. This was recounted as a stumbling block for some of the generated reports to remain unverified on the *Uchaguzi* datasets. As shown above, information come in any form and shape, it takes a lot of time to verify the incidents, and crowd data verifiers could not verify some of the reports because the sample of the texts from the public was challenging.

The challenge in initiating crowdsourced method is what tool or technique to quickly analyse the number of citizen reports generated through different channels. It has been pointed out “crowdsourced election observation initiatives are on the rise. Leading election monitoring organizations are also looking to leverage citizen-based reporting to complement their own professional election monitoring efforts. Meanwhile, the information revolution continues apace... The volume of election-related reports generated by “the crowd” is thus expected to grow significantly in the coming years. But international, national and local

election monitoring organizations are completely unprepared to deal with the rise of Big (Election) Data” (Meier 2013). Uchaguzi system received huge volumes of reports from citizen observers, and the challenge was how to approve, analyse and inform the general public the trend of elections in the country. To approve and verify the reports need a huge team to do approval and verification process. The process of managing information coming from the crowd observers were a manual exercise in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The technology did not support the process of verification of data automatically. In this case, the ability to approve, verify and visualize information was through manual packaging.

### **9.3.6 Response and feedback**

The problem of response and feedback was mentioned by all respondents from civil society organizations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This challenge was not mentioned by electoral authorities’ respondents in the three countries, and even established domestic observers in Kenya and Tanzania. There was a challenge in terms of establishing communication channels of giving back response or feedback action to the general public and citizen reporters. The study found that the question remains: to what extent people who have been crowd sourced are able to engage back and forth, and whether there was a good back and forth in terms of further engagements with the reported incidents. The reporting system remain to be a one way, the effectiveness of crowdsourcing in generating observation data is based on more feeding-in and getting information for crowd-mapping process. The different channels of communication attracted and getting citizen monitors convinced to submit their reports. Still, *Uchaguzi* system in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda remain to be a single stream in receiving data, and feedback action mechanism to the general public and incident reporters remain a gap. This is an area that requires more attention and improvement in the future digital crowdsourced systems.

The success stories in this matter was that Uchaguzi system had coordinators and data verifiers on the ground, and were getting out a lot of information, and put the incidents on the platform and, even indicating where there is a problem. But, beyond how fast they were able to get issues to the specific authority and track the response to the incident also, remain a gap. How long does the authority take to address communicated problem, still not clear because crowd-initiator could not track back the reported incidents. With this regard, this research found that different electoral stakeholders were eager in accessing and getting generated reports from *Uchaguzi* systems. As pointed out by one of the crowd-sourcer in

Kenya “one thing we learnt is that everybody was very happy to collect our data, law enforcement, IEBC and others were eager to get information from us. Initially, we explained the methodology, explained the process, but they were not so eager to share their information with us. One of the challenges we face is that information was very one way”. The information was shared with different organs for response, but the crowdsourcer could not get the information back on what was the response on the incidents reported to them. The partnership between *Uchaguzi* and government watchdogs and electoral authorities was one sided as the platform passed as much information as it could, but the response from the government watchdogs was below expectation.

For example, in Kenya the police were interested to get direct access to all of the information in the *Uchaguzi* platform, but could not be given access because of lack of consensus among the civil society organisations who were partners in crowdsourcing process. One of the respondent pointed that “the law enforcement agencies were eager to be part of the platform, but civil society organisations did not want the police to have direct access to the data. They may start prosecuting our people on the ground, who are sending election information from the field”. This suggest that in the future there should be separate platform for government watchdogs and for crowdsourcers, and find the best way to share the information with law enforcement agencies once removed any identified information on the sender of the reports. Such mechanism may create anonymity of the reporters and the platform will push data to the government watchdogs in a near-real time in order to respond to the incidents that require immediate action.

### **9.3.7 Interference with crowdsourced digital technologies**

Declaration of Global Principles for Non-partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organisations clearly indicates that election monitors “seek to cooperate with election management bodies and other governmental authorities related to election processes and make observations, assessments and findings based on the national legal framework and obligations concerning democratic elections that are set forth in international human rights instruments, as well as standards, principles and commitments...the quality of an election process typically reflects the democratic character of governance leading to an election and can be an important indicator of the nature of government that results from an election” (GNDEM 2012:4). Electoral authorities and other government watchdogs should not perceive crowdsourcing monitoring of elections as a threat to the elections, rather the

goal of crowdsourcing method of observation data is to promote the credibility and genuineness of the conduct of democratic elections (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

The challenge of tempering with technology is a serious concern in digital crowdsourcing. It is only in Kenya that civil society did not mention aspect of interference of crowdsourced technology. This was the case in Uganda 2011 election where sms channel for generating reports from citizen observers was disabled. It was revealed by the respondent that the system was disabled for “like two hours and could not get any information from the citizen. That was the big challenge, and we made noise through media, why the system is disabled, we cannot get the sms, we cannot email, we cannot do anything, and eventually it was rectified”. The short code for sms was shut down for the DEMGroup and CEW-IT used to receive reports from trained observers. The case of DEMGroup using UgandaWatch2011 crowd platform, Hellström and Karefelt (2012:421) observed that ‘during the election-day the regulator (under pressure from the government), ordered the operators to filter and block SMS traffic and specific words in messages. Filtered SMSs later on reached the platform but created a terrible backlog and the whole idea of publishing observations in near real-time was lost. Therefore, when operating in politically sensitive environments it is important to have various backup systems and communication channels in place’. In fact, this was the case with CEW-IT in Uganda for the 2011 election, the organization had another short code that was not publicised, but was only shared with their trained observers – as one of the crowdsourcer reported that “when they shut down the national short code we still receive the sms from trusted observers”. In this case, it has been observed that “information technologies...are such an important part of civic organizing...political elites seeking to manipulate election results and must also attempt to disable cell phone networks and internet connections” (Howard 2011:148).

Tempering with technology is a challenge to any crowd-initiators who want to deploy the method has to prepare for, because one respondent argued authorities are not always “amused to see “long noised reports” pointing on the fraud and irregularities of electoral processes”<sup>14</sup>. The 2016 Ugandan elections there was shuts down of social networks. The

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<sup>14</sup> The right to receive, search and impart information is enshrined in the UDHR, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Constitutions of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. But government tempering with technology restrict citizen voices critical of electoral processes, and social media, sms and mobile money transfer shutdown becoming the preferred control tool during election cycle. It has been reported, that “in July 2016, the United Nations Human Rights Council condemned internet shut downs and declared that the same rights people have offline must also be protected online” (see CIPESA (2016:6): State of Internet Freedom in Africa 2016: Case Studies from Selected Countries on Strategies African Governments Use to Stifle Citizens’ Digital Rights).



government ban on social networks explained by President Yoweri Museveni as “security measures to overt lies...intended to incite violence and illegal declaration of election results” and a similar shutdown occurred during the 2011 general election (Duggan 2016).

In reaction to the shuts down of digital instruments, human rights groups condemned that “the Ugandan government’s decision to block access to social media on mobile phones on election-day is a blatant violation of Ugandans’ fundamental rights to freedom of expression and seek and receive information and without clearly defined security concerns, this closure is nothing but an exercise in censorship as Ugandans elect their leaders” (Duggan 2016). On one hand, Uganda Communications Commission succeeded with the shutdown of Facebook, Whatsapp and Twitter on election-day, but on the other hand, several internet users using mobile broadband on devices such as mobile phones and iPad managed to bypass the blockade by using the virtual private network to continue accessing social media networking sites (Musisi 2016).

In addition, ICT instruments are used as a tool for promoting freedom of expression and access to information. The decision of the government of Tanzania to enact Statistics Act and Cybercrimes Act of 2015 was perceived as a way to limit media functioning and generating self-censorship on the internet (EU EOM 2015). This was the case “cybercrime law was ‘quickly’ passed and assented to by the President for implementation at the middle of campaigns. LHRC/TACCEO and a number of individuals were the first victims of this draconian law; LHRC/TACCEO had its data centre’s equipment seized by the police (under this law) before the release of the presidential election results” (LHRC and TACCEO 2016). Similarly, the European Union Election Observation Mission report shows that in Tanzania:

Immediately after election day, the raiding of the national observers group TACCEO/ Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) by the police, where analysis of electoral data including results was being conducted, and the consequent arrests and confiscation of equipment and documents under section 16 of the Cybercrimes Act, raised concern over the use and implementation of the Act. The Cybercrimes Act of 2015 received considerable criticism from political parties and civil societies for non-compliance with international principles on freedom of expression, with serious concerns raised over its implementation, especially with regards to the disproportionate sanctions and excessive powers given to the police to conduct search and seized operations...concerns over the use of the Cybercrimes Act in a way that infringes fundamental freedoms, and limits the scope of action for civil society organisations and domestic observers (EU EOM 2015:8).

#### **9.4 The potential of digital crowdsourced method**

Crowdsourcing is increasingly seen as a core mechanism of new systematic approaches to election monitoring using digital participatory methods and tools. In electoral democracies, crowd-monitoring method can be used to address complex problems of electoral integrity, and even to capture incidents where the radar of established election observers has often failed. As a result of using digital participatory methods, non-partisan election monitoring organizations in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda together with other electoral players managed to take a key role in monitoring and reporting of negative and positive experiences of the electoral contests in their respective countries. The use of digital participatory technologies and invented spaces empowered ordinary citizens overwhelmingly to participate in observation and reporting the conduct of electoral incidents.

Digital technologies has potential role to play in enhancing participation and communication during electoral processes, and ensuring timely provision of information of electoral incidents and even, reporting hot spot issues, as well as feedback action. In other words, “advances in information and communication technologies have provided new opportunities for monitoring and observing election processes in recent years. Individuals can now report election fraud faster, to a bigger audience, and at cheaper cost than before, for example on their weblogs. Fraud has also become more visible as observers make videos, using their cell phones or video cameras, of the proceedings inside polling stations” (Bader 2013:3). The aim of this section is to bring front the potential of crowdsourced systems, as a new method of promoting electoral integrity across the cycle. Emerging crowdsourced method can give ordinary citizens spaces to share their feedback regarding to the conduct of elections, and even-to the ways forward to promote credible electoral processes.

##### **9.4.1 Rapid dissemination of election information**

There was a challenge of crowdsourced method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda as information was one-way for the generated election observation data. But the fact that citizen on the ground can place the reports on the crowdsourced platform on the good or bad conduct of election - is a good thing despite the drawbacks of two-way communication. Digital crowdsourced is a promising method, especially by looking where we are coming from in East African countries, where communication and information systems were always a preserve of elites and states. But now given contemporary technological revolution, when

citizen has an issue of electoral incidents cannot wait for traditional observers to witness and put in their final reports, they can just submit to the crowdsourced platform or share the incidents on the social networks platforms. It is arguably, at this point, crowdsourcing is becoming more powerful and effective in communicating electoral incidents in real-time, and access to the crowd uploaded data - users can see the work of the crowd reporters, and others can engage with it as an individual or as a group that the information in the platform is edited and verified by the crowdsourced team to ensure credibility of the information.

*Uchaguzi* platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda has a potential in making every citizen an election observer, especially if they know the platform, the mobile short code, and other medium of submitting the observation reports or through passive crowdsourcing 'listening' to and data mining from social networks by the crowd digital monitoring team. When crowdsourced monitoring of the electoral processes is being deployed, the expectation is that generated information will reach everyone regardless of the location and age group, as long as could have access to the digital channels, and response and feedback action of the reported information. Previously unreported electoral incidents are now collectively published and shared by citizen monitors, and globally viewable by the general public in near real-time via open-source platform. The logic of ordinary citizen monitors and reporters through digital technologies, especially mobile phones is to create fear to the fraudulent acts and malpractices of the elections among the electoral stakeholders, because their practices will be detected, reported and published (Livingston 2011).

Crowdsourced method has revolutionized the speed of monitoring elections and sharing generated information, visually mapped in real-time in an open source such as *Uchaguzi* platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This means that effectiveness of digital crowdsourcing relies on richness of generated observation data from citizen observers, time of capturing the incidences, reporting systems as well as verification and transmission of the generated reports to wider communities. It is pointed out that "the introduction of new information communication technology (ICT) is radically transforming political landscapes around the world by creating unprecedented opportunities for civic engagement and connecting citizen, politicians, security responders, international and domestic observers and political financiers with lightening speed" (Bardall 2010). Also, "the possibility for citizens to consult dynamic or static political information is an important capability of new information and communication technologies" (Kersting 2012a:23).

With digital crowdsourcing and information sharing in near-real time, the undecided voters will get quite lured with this kind of options or platforms, because in any case, some people who are potential voters do not have time to go for political rallies. In this case, “the emancipated citizen selects information and is not manipulated by a monopolised media in the hands of powerful politicians and traditional organisations” (Kersting 2012a:24). Also, if potential voters have channels like citizen observers and observation reports from different location within the country informing them about manifestos of political parties, and on-going overall conduct of the electoral process into the system of undecided voters, then that becomes a knowledge-base on which, they decide to go for voting. Additionally, crowd monitoring apart from detecting electoral fraud as the priority goal of civil society organizations, they also play a key role of mobilizing citizens by triggering them to come out to vote on election-day. This is carried out through observing and publishing information in a digital invented platform, about the conduct of the electoral process.

Therefore, the potential which had not been exploited by the crowdsourcers and other electoral stakeholders is to make an online interface between duty bearers and voters. Respondents have argued that *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform has that potential, and it is possible to create a dashboard on *Uchaguzi* system that can be shared or attributing to the electoral management bodies or can be linked to law enforcement agencies for the purpose of sharing information. These are information that requires immediate response and feedback action to the voters, and even information for future reform that will be communicated to the electoral authorities regarding management of the electoral process. Through crowdsourced systems - electoral authorities and other relevant offices can easily react to the generated observation reports on the *Uchaguzi* platform in near-real time, but this potential has not being fully exploited on the *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform.

#### **9.4.2 Using simple mobile technology**

It has been observed that mobile phones are the most widely spread ICT in sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘most important activist technology’ of recent (Hellström and Karefelt 2012:412). Additionally, “crowdsourcing’s potential cannot be overestimated, especially in Africa, where mobile networks have grown exponentially, bypassing all other infrastructure development on the continent in terms of speed and widespread use” (Bott et al. 2014:4). In recent years, there is an increasing use of crowdsourced method that raises the question: how we can use the method and simple mobile technology to inform the next launch of

election observation. Crowdsourced system includes the use of different digital channels for reporting information, *inter alia*, mobile phones for sms, mobile short code, social networks, web form, e-mails and mobile application. Admittedly, in all these channels of communication “crowdsourcing has the potential advantage of being open to anyone with access to a mobile phone” (Bott and Young 2012:63). Now, there is a paradigm shift of using mobile phones, especially mobile social media applications. People are now using more data to chat and share pictures on Twitter, Facebook Messenger, Instagram and WhatsApp messaging application. Now a lot of digital tools to communicate or information sharing are emerging compared to two or three decades back whereby the common option available for communication was phone calling. One respondent offered an example that:

Now SMS are sometimes more expensive than buying internet data bundle as long as users have smartphones, laptops or tablets. It is easier to maintain a smartphone in lower cost than normal mobile phones with no access to internet. The costs of buying mobile internet data which can be used for communicating and chatting information with a lot of messages and exchange of information, as well as pictures is relatively cheaper than buying a bundle of normal sms where the sender and recipients may not share the common channel and cost of communication. With smartphones, people can make even internet calls with groups of people using applications such as Facebook messenger, skype or google hangouts and even sharing information and pictures through chatting on Whatsapp. But mobile sms is only limited to texts.

Using simple mobile technology like messaging applications is one of the potential of crowdsourced method to pull much information from the crowd to address the existing problems of electoral integrity. This is the potential area for crowd-sourcers to use emerging mobile applications services for receiving text reports and videos of electoral incidences from citizen monitors. In this regard, with increasing diffusion of internet connectivity and technological breakthroughs, the potency of the crowdsourcing platform is more than promising. The challenge is to the technology innovators, civil society, citizens and governments to embrace technology for its positivity in forging better societies, and credible conduct of electoral democracy. As shown in the previous section, civil society faced several challenges related to communication infrastructure in engaging citizen volunteers to generate observation reports. The aim of deploying citizen observers and reporters is to detect and prevent any form of election fraud, and sharing positive feedback of elections. Given communication challenges and limited resources, as well as low ownership of smartphones by ordinary citizens - to crowdsource election monitoring, one of the way to address is by “overcoming these challenges to guarantee effective citizen oversight of election is at the heart of SMS reporting by mobile phone” (Schuler 2008:146), but the

crowdsourced initiators must consider the cost of sending sms – as a motivating factor for citizen to participate in sharing incidents. On one hand, sending reports should be free of charge for the senders, for example the cost of the SMS should be on the receiver (crowdsourced initiators), but on the other hand, the challenge with this option will generate a lot of unsolicited messages and abuse of the platform (Hellström and Karefelt 2012).

### **9.4.3 Keep election stakeholders on check**

The potential role of digital crowdsourcing in promoting electoral integrity is high, and one thing is that it may keep the legal entities or bonafide entities on check. Crowdsourced method allow citizens to engage more actively in civil society initiatives by monitoring and reporting electoral incidents and helping keep election stakeholders accountable (Hellström and Karefelt 2012). All groups of respondents in Kenya and Tanzania, and three groups in Uganda pointed out the potential of digital crowdsourced method is to keep key electoral stakeholders on check. Crowdsourced method through different types of crowd-monitors from bounded to unbounded crowdsourcing - is a line that will also be feeding-in information about electoral processes and the acts of different election stakeholders. There has been a long tradition of established observers and electoral authorities as the sole owners with observation information, but now there is also feeding-in of observation data through crowdsourced systems and digital platforms for information sharing in real-time, compared to traditional approach. Emerging crowd-monitoring is a check of the electoral processes, and it is method for monitoring and timely dissemination of generated data, as well as complement to the problems of back and forth.

One of the respondents argued that civil society through crowdsourced method and the use of ICT tools may contribute to make the electoral authorities do their work impartially, and other election actors not to interfere electoral processes. This is because the appointment of members of the electoral bodies is a major challenge in ensuring checks and balances. It is observed by respondent in Uganda that “the challenges with electoral commission members are appointed according to the constitution and the president have constitutional powers to approve the electoral commissioners. And people who are appointed or approved by the president and are the ones who are managing the elections, how free are they? How independent are they? Because it is the president who appoints or approves, and actually if he/she has the power to appoint also he/she has the prerogative to fire”. This is also the case in Tanzania, whereby members of the electoral authorities are

appointed by the President (see Article 74 (1), (2) and (5) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and in Uganda members of the electoral authorities approved by the President (see Article 60 (1) and (8) of the Constitution of Uganda 2005). In this respect, crowdsourced monitoring of elections have the potential role to watch and kept members of the electoral authorities on their toes regarding, among other things, what they are doing, what they have done in the register, in polling stations, and how many are they in the polling stations, as well as detecting and deterring any illicit acts of other stakeholders that may interfere the will of the people. The detection of any fraudulent acts will be communicated in near real-time by ordinary citizen observers using digital communication channels.

#### **9.4.4 Monitoring election cycle**

Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform has the potential of observing incidences across the electoral cycle because ‘ordinary citizens are everywhere’ (Norris 2014), and they are key players on the democratic process, and through their electronic devices, especially mobile phones, they may share information regarding the electoral processes. As aforementioned, the challenge of crowdsourcing is financial resources for maintaining Uchaguzi platform and human resources and storage of the election data. Otherwise, Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform may go beyond elections day events, and deploy citizen reporters to monitor incidents across the electoral cycle. This was articulated by one respondent that:

In most cases, the crowdsourcers deploy Uchaguzi platform for elections and tend to limit it to only reporting voting process. But its potential is that Uchaguzi crowdsourcing mechanism can be easily exploited by reporting other suspicious characters at political rallies, gathering even in detecting issues of hate speech after elections campaign, by studying crowdsourcing information coming from the public to determine what kind of information is coming from different sorts of crowd and be able to link it to the security concerns. That potential is not yet exploited and even issues of corruption in the elections, this is another area that Uchaguzi can easily do especially crowdsourcing that is focusing on issues like “follow our money” or campaign finance. Following campaign finance crowd can detect which candidate is splashing money and where. But the most important issue here is to engage ordinary citizens, voluntarily to use their mobile phones for sms to communicate incidents in the management of the electoral processes.

This potential of crowdsourced was not well exploited in the Kenyan 2013, Tanzanian 2015 and Ugandan 2011 general elections, rather the focus of Uchaguzi watch was mainly on the ‘classic’ voting process and fewer issues after voting, campaign issues as well as pre-election events. As observed by the respondent “democracy is not only judged during elections, democracy is continuous, so you have to keep on monitoring this democracy, as we build democratic country”. In a similar vein, “a wise man once said that democracy is

more about what happens between elections than the elections themselves” (Kiai 2010:212). This practice of monitoring election-day event still leaves room for election monitoring organizations or ‘political entrepreneurs’ to leverage by inviting ordinary citizens to share their experiences of democratic process using accessible, available and affordable digital communication channels to monitor elections across the electoral cycle. Therefore, using digital tools there is enormous potential for citizen electoral observers to observe other phases of the electoral cycle comprehensively, and the continuous presence of citizen observers in the country can also ‘facilitate their engagement in the observation of local elections, which international observers tend not to observe’ (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

Civil societies have a very big stake on promoting integrity of the elections, because these are organizations attached at the community and they are at the grassroots levels. These civil societies have very big advantage because they can talk one-to-one with the locals and they know the issues and can explain the levels of the reported incidents. So, if civil societies are real committed they have a big stake in promoting election integrity, by providing early warning of election fraud by engaging e-citizens in monitoring the electoral processes. Also, one of the respondents pointed out the reason for them to participate in civic education is because “we came out to reduce apathy. You know people sometimes may say why I should go out to vote, maybe they already know who is going to be a leader before voting, but we came out to say no, you have the responsibility to play as eligible voter, as a citizen come out and be counted. And you can say, Yes, I participated in bringing this leader into power or into refusing this leader not to be a leader here”.

Citizen engagement for crowdsourcing at elections time is good, but to start making them participate in various issues like budgeting, the integrity of leaders and discuss issues when election is out of the context, may help to promote citizens voices and make them feel it is their responsibility to observe and report electoral politics. This is because “citizens’ rights to transparency and accountability do not end with elections” (Schuler 2008:155). Civil society should move towards more active citizen participation in governance issues such as monitoring public service delivery and corruption in order to create a culture of observing and sharing critical incidents among citizens. In this case, citizen do not have to be paid to report, but awareness creation and “invented spaces” (Kersting 2012a, 2013a, 2017) for participation and reporting can be used to make the process of engagement better. Especially using ubiquitous tool of mobile cellular phones, ordinary citizen participation could promote the practice of governance and democratic elections across the cycle.



## **9.5 Chapter summary**

This chapter presents challenges and potential of digital crowdsourcing. It is obvious that advances in digital information and communication technologies in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are improving real-time communication of election observation information. This is facilitated by the growth rate in the access to simple technology tools that foster participation, and empowered ordinary citizens to observe and share election information. This chapter show that in the three countries despite the challenges in crowdsourcing process, powerful communication technologies can open-up new opportunities and promise of improved election integrity across the electoral cycle. Also this chapter highlights that still there are untapped potentials in improving integrity of elections through crowdmonitoring using digital participatory communication technologies and open-source software like *Uchaguzi* platform.

It seems clear so far that digital crowdsourced systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda during deployment process faced various challenges. Also, it is clear that there are potentials for crowdsourced collective action in monitoring and communicating electoral incidents. Findings showed civil society in the three countries as political entrepreneurs of using ICTs in elections - to the greater extent share similar challenges, with an exception of civil society in Kenya regarding the challenge of interference with crowdsourced technologies. In Tanzania and Uganda, crowdsourcers cited government interference with crowdsourced communication channels, and this also was supported by respondents from domestic election observers and University researchers. Despite the fact that in Kenya respondents from civil society did not mention the challenge of technology interference, responses from University researchers and domestic election observers revealed that this is a growing challenge to the crowdsourced initiators and any crowdsourcing initiative – should be prepared unexpected government interference in shutting down channels for generating election information. Interestingly, respondents from electoral authorities in the three countries did not see or even mentioned challenges of response and feedback action or interference with crowdsourced technology. But communication of crowd-generated data was more of one-way, from crowdsourcers to electoral authorities. In this case, civil societies observed that electoral authorities were not ready to provide feedback to the observation reports escalated to them for action. Additionally, respondents from electoral commission in Kenya pointed five challenges, while in Tanzania four and Uganda mentioned three challenges of digital crowdsourcing. But in the three countries electoral

authorities acknowledged the potentials of crowdsourcing technologies in terms of rapid information dissemination using simple mobile technology. In Kenya and Uganda established election observers did not mention the potential of using simple mobile technology, while in Kenya and Tanzania was not mentioned by University researchers. Also the potential of crowdsourcing in holding electoral stakeholders accountable was mentioned by all groups of respondents in Kenya and Tanzania, but only respondents from electoral commission in Uganda did not cite this potential of crowdsourcing.

Generally, almost all groups of respondents from civil society, electoral authorities, domestic election observers and University researchers mentioned three key areas for creating synergy in monitoring and communicating electoral incidents. The three key areas for creating collaboration mentioned were observation and validation of information, dissemination of election data and evaluating the quality of electoral contests. All respondents were optimistic in terms of the role that can be played by the growing interest of crowdsourcing citizen-based in monitoring elections using ubiquitous communication technologies, specifically by leveraging the potentiality and influenceability of mobile phones technology in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

## **10 Towards Electoral Integrity in a Crowdsourcing Age**

### **10.1 Introduction**

Electoral integrity is one of the cornerstones of modern liberal democracies. The diffusion of technology, and collective action of civil society and citizens' mapping of electoral process played a critical role in the promotion of electoral integrity. Especially by leveraging on the potential of mobile phone technology as a digital channel, used to amplify voices of citizens and the role of civil society organizations to advocate integrity of electoral process. This *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform brought forth a new era of collaborative production of election information between ordinary citizens, non-partisan elections monitoring organizations, government authorities and other election watchdogs. Digital participatory methods such as crowdsourcing platform and its possibilities of generating and visualizing citizen-generated voices offers a means for citizen participation in electoral process and likelihood of transparency and accountability in the management of elections.

It can be argued that crowdsourced monitoring of elections using digital tools is a creative means of engaging citizens in the protection of their votes. The focus of this research is on the newness of digital crowdsourced systems as a form of ordinary citizens' participation in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents. This chapter presents similarities and differences of digital crowdsourcing in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Summary of results, conclusions, and an agenda for digital crowdsourcing, as well as electoral integrity are also presented in this chapter.

### **10.2 Tying it all together**

#### **10.2.1 Similarities and differences of results**

It has been shown that “intersystemic similarities and intersystemic differences are the focus of the “most similar systems” designs. Systems constitute the original level of analysis, and within-system variations are explained in terms of systematic factors. Although these designs rarely have been formulated rigorously, their logic is fairly clear. Common systematic characteristics are conceived of as “controlled for”, whereas intersystemic differences are viewed as explanatory variables. The number of common characteristics sought is maximal and the number of not shared characteristics sought, minimal” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:33 [1970]). This study used case-oriented analysis of Kenya,

Tanzania and Uganda with most similar systems design. This section is dedicated in establishing commonalities and differences of digital crowdsourcing systems in the three countries. This analysis used indicators such as the political context, digital participatory tools, crowdsourced initiators, and actors in the invented spaces, categories of observation data, verification process and citizen-generated voices, as well as feedback and responses.

*The political context:* The political context of the cases shows periodical conduct of “competitive” elections and initiative of the governments and electoral authorities to invite observers to assess the quality of the conduct of electoral process. According to Freedom House (2016) proxy indices data on political rights and civil rights for East African countries show that in Uganda freedom status declined from “partly free” in 2014 to “not free” in 2015 and 2016 due to increased violations of individual rights and the freedoms of expression, harassment and abuses for opposition supporters and civil society groups. While Kenya and Tanzania freedom status for the period of 2011-2016 scored “partly free”, and somewhat varying score of political rights and civil liberties.

Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda gained their independence from British colonial administration, under Westminster model of constitution with plurality/majority first-past-the-post electoral system. After independence just like many other African states, the three countries declared one party state. This was the case in Tanzania 1965, Kenya from 1969 opposition parties were not allowed until 1982 constitution declared one party politics, and for Uganda 1986 after military coup declared a non-party democracy. Later on, the transition from one-party to multiparty politics in Kenya and Uganda were characterized by ethnicity sectarianism, but in Tanzania penetration of ethnicity in politics was carefully handled in the transition to pluralist politics. In this context, the transition in Kenya was through established committee of the party to collect views from the citizens on how KANU should be reformed, but in Tanzania was through the appointment of the Presidential commission to coordinate and collect citizen views on whether to retain the one-party or introduce a new system of multiparty. While in Uganda the transition was through referendums for the citizens to vote for the movement system or multiparty system of government. As a result, the re-introduction of multiparty politics in Kenya was 1991, Tanzania 1992 and Uganda was until 2005.

The three countries have signed Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976 which provide universal accepted principles to the citizen to participate in democratic process and standards of the

conduct of elections. The three countries have consolidated an electoral culture of periodic conduct of elections after every five years, for example, Kenya and Tanzania amount for more than two decades, and one decade in Uganda. The 2013 Kenyan elections were the fifth “competitive elections” and Tanzania 2015 too, while Uganda 2016 was the third. In addition, the principles and standards for democratic elections are enshrined in each country constitution. The voter turnout in the conduct of election is varying in terms of low and high in turnout rate.

The electoral management model of the three countries is agency model or independent model of electoral authority. For examples, in Kenya members of the commission are appointed through rigorous transparent consultations of selection panel and end up with an approval of legislature and President. But in Tanzania members of the electoral authority are appointed by the President, while in Uganda electoral commissioners are appointed by the President with the approval of legislature. In general, electoral management authorities in the three countries are mandated to organise, supervise and manage the conduct of electoral process by ensuring integrity of the processes. In ensuring integrity of the electoral process, the conduct of electoral democracies in the three countries are observed by domestic, regional and international invited election monitors, and more recently digitally enabled crowdsourced systems engaged through initiative of non-partisan elections monitoring organizations in the invented spaces.

*Crowdsourced elections monitoring information:* Digital crowdsourcing method for elections monitoring was deployed in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. This initiative by civil society organizations or in Bruce Bimber’s words “political entrepreneurs” enabled citizens to be observers and reporters of electoral incidents using inexpensive digital tools, especially mobile SMS. Earlier chapter showed crowdsourced systems can be grouped into three main categories from bounded and unbounded citizen monitors to passive citizen monitors. Table 10.1 is the summary of crowdsourced generated elections information in Kenya 2013, Tanzania 2015 and Uganda 2011 general elections. This summary shows aspect of similarities and differences in crowdsourced initiators, duration crowdsourced platform was active for receiving and verifying citizen observation information, list of digital communication tools designed for receiving electoral incidents from crowd-monitors in the field and crowdsourced outputs in the three countries. Drawing from Table 10.1 similarities and differences can be established.

Table 10.1 Digital Uchaguzi crowdsourced elections monitoring

Country/ election year	Duration	Crowdsourced initiators	List of digital tools	Crowdsourced reports
Kenya 2013	Deployed Uchaguzi platform for 5 days	CRECO, SODNET, and Uchaguzi software developer	Uchaguzi software, Mobile SMS, Mobile short code, E-mail, Web form, Social networks accounts (Twitter & Facebook), and Smartphone application (for android & iPhone)	Total approved reports 2856 Bounded monitors reports 1676 (58.7%) Unbounded monitors reports 1180 (41.3%)  Verified reports 2051 (71.8%) Unverified reports 805 (28.2%)  Mobile SMS reports 2752 (96.4%) Twitter reports 41 (1.4%) Web form reports 63 (2.2%)
Tanzania 2015	Deployed Uchaguzi platform for 46 days	TACCEO, LHRC, and Uchaguzi software developer	Uchaguzi software, Mobile SMS, E-mail, Web form, Social networks accounts (Twitter & Facebook), and Smartphone application (for android & iPhone)	Total approved reports 4596 Bounded monitors reports 323 (7.0%) Unbounded monitors reports 4273 (93.0%)  Verified reports 3220 (70.1%) Unverified reports 1376 (29.1%)  Mobile SMS reports 4415 (96.1%) Web form reports 181 (3.9%)
Uganda 2011	Deployed Uchaguzi platform for 58 days	CEW-IT, DEM Group, CCEDU, and Uchaguzi software developer	Uchaguzi software, Mobile SMS, and Web form	Total approved reports 6506 Bounded monitors reports 2697 (41.5%) Unbounded monitors reports 3809 (58.5%)  Verified reports 3154 (48.5%) Unverified reports 3352 (51.5%)  Mobile SMS reports 6399 (98.4%) Web form reports 107 (1.6%)

Source: Data generated from Uchaguzi Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda datasets, own table

*Digital participatory tools:* Digital crowdsourcing is an emerging method for citizen engagement in electoral processes. Uchaguzi software is an example of digitally empowered citizens to participate in the democratic process. This software promotes crowdsourced collective action in monitoring and reporting the conduct of elections in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Uchaguzi software enables citizens to expose information on electoral processes and deepen participation that can help to prevent problems of fraud or malpractices in elections. It is evident that the three countries deployed Uchaguzi to monitor and upload reports, and visually mapped approved observation reports. Crowdsourcing election watch using digital tools in East Africa was initiated by civil society organizations from the three countries under the brand name of Uchaguzi to promote citizen participation using digital technologies. As a result, Uchaguzi crowdsourcing as a tool was deployed in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections.

It is noteworthy that after election-day event Uchaguzi platform was no longer available online in Kenya and Uganda. This was justified by one of the respondents who commented on the accessibility and sustainability of Uchaguzi platform. Respondent remarked “the cost of running the Uchaguzi platform contributed not to be available all the time, because elections happen in a span of time. Once the election is over and the purpose was fulfilled, there is a challenge to maintain the platform”. In Tanzania after election-day event, the platform was available online, but with several challenges like “access denied” or warning error message to get access to the platform such as “an error was detected which prevented the loading of this page. If this problem persists, please contact the website administrator”. Depending on donor funding of elections, digital participatory tool such as Uchaguzi in the three countries faces the challenge of sustainability after election-day event.

East African nations have ‘leapfrogged’ in area of technology, especially mobile phones. The subscriptions rate of technology users is somewhat higher in the three countries, but Kenya is leading compared to Tanzania and Uganda. This is the case for the number of populations that can only be reached by fibre optic network project, the subscriptions rate of mobile phones and internet users per 100 inhabitants. As other studies such as Pew Research Center (2015) have shown, the use of cell phones is higher in Kenya, followed by Tanzania and Uganda. Social networks have increasingly spread in East African countries and have been accessed through smartphones than conventional computers connected to the internet. The Afrobarometer surveys have shown the use of social media in political activities for the three countries. Given the project of free data on the Facebook page in Kenya and Tanzania through “Internet.org” program may attract more users of the platform. Digital participatory tools are essential to democracy, and arguably democratic election is impossible without digital tools. A “free” and “fair” electoral process is not about the freedom to vote but also participatory process to access and share election information. Freedom House (2016) shows Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are “partly free” in the freedom of the press. Surveys conducted by Afrobarometer indicate somewhat commonalities and differences on the freedom of newspaper to publish and also the use of news media, access to radio news, Television and newspapers, as well as internet and social media news.

Especially the crowd-initiators in the three countries tend to capitalise in using mobile phone for texting monitoring reports during deployment of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform. The three countries deployed Uchaguzi web platform. In Kenya the website was

([www.uchaguzi.co.ke](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ke)), in Tanzania ([www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz](http://www.uchaguzitanzania.or.tz)) and Uganda was ([www.uchaguzi.co.ug](http://www.uchaguzi.co.ug)). Given the growing digital communication channels, different tools were used to generate observation data from the crowd observers. For example, the use of mobile short code number, email and web form in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Also the use of Twitter and Facebook accounts, as well as smartphone applications for Android and iOS in Kenya and Tanzania. In addition, in Kenya and Tanzania crowdsourcers used different channels to disseminate generated observation data to the general public through Twitter and Facebook pages, and uploaded citizen-generated reports on the Uchaguzi web platform. In Kenya also used Instagram and Google+ for sharing election information. In Uganda no evidence of social networks uses for sharing crowd information rather than uploaded and visualized approved data on the Uchaguzi web platform.

*Crowdsourced initiators:* The idea of monitoring election through Uchaguzi systems was a strategy that aimed to promote Uganda 2011, Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 general elections to have free, fair, peaceful and credible electoral processes. Uchaguzi project is a partnership of civil society organizations from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The engagement of citizens as election watchdogs through Uchaguzi platform were championed by the Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) in Kenya, Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) and Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) in Uganda. The role of Ushahidi team in Kenya as technology developer is acknowledged for re-designing Uchaguzi software dedicated for monitoring and promoting citizen participation in elections in the three countries.

CRECO was the main partner in the Uchaguzi crowdsourcing technology in the 2013 Kenyan general elections, and other member organizations working across the country, as well as other partners including Ushahidi and SODNET. CRECO membership and partners in election monitoring are drawn from both rural and urban-based non-governmental organizations. The crowdsourced method in Tanzania 2015 general election was implemented under the auspices of Legal and Human Rights Centre, which is the lead organization in the consortium called TACCEO. The TACCEO consortium using Uchaguzi Tanzania platform deployed trained and untrained election monitors at different levels in the constituencies for generating election observation reports. TACCEO as the main crowd sourcer in Tanzania is a fusion of more than 17 civil society organisations established as a loose network, to observe election process. In Uganda CEW-IT was the main crowd initiator in the 2011 Uganda general elections in collaborations with DEMGroup and CCEDU. The



partnership of civil society developed a model of crowdsourcing monitoring team such as media and monitoring team, translation team, geo-location team, verification team, approval and check team, emergency team, and visualization and technology team to ensure smooth monitoring, reporting, processing and sharing of election information. Therefore, through crowdsourcing team, information from the citizens both negative and positive was sourced, processed, verified, uploaded and mapped on the Uchaguzi platform for access by all.

*Actors in the invented space:* Promoting electoral integrity using crowdsourced citizen-based technologies entails partnerships from different stakeholders, *inter alia*, non-partisan election monitoring groups, election authorities, government enforcement institutions, media, citizen and technology developers, in order to observe, generate, analyse, disseminate reports and timely responses of the incidents. The main player in the digital crowdsourcing invented space was civil society organizations and Ushahidi technology developer for re-inventing Uchaguzi platform. Each actor in the crowdsourcing process has the role to play, namely civil society organizations were mainly responsible for human resource aspect (ordinary citizens) that can contribute positive and negative side of elections on the Uchaguzi system, while Ushahidi team was responsible with technological part of the platform by ensuring it working by generating and visualizing approved reports.

Digital crowdsourcing systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda deployed hybrid approach of bounded and unbounded citizen monitors. In Kenya, recruitment and training of bounded used criteria to recruit supervisors and trusted network of observers and data verifiers. In the three countries, recruitment of bounded observers was selected from their membership network. The number of recruited, trained and engaged bounded citizen observers vary in each country, and even the number of days that were engaged to observe, generate and verify information from the field vary in the three countries. Bounded group of observers played a role of observing, reporting and validating incoming observation data in the Uchaguzi invented space. Also, unbounded citizen monitors formed another group of actors in the Uchaguzi invented space. This group was engaged through ‘open-call’ to participate in sharing their experiences with regard to the conduct of electoral processes in the three countries. Various digital communication tools were used to attract their attention and participate in the invented dedicated digital crowdsourcing platform. The principle of anonymity was used to the unbounded monitors and reports, because their generated reports were shared without information that can be used to identify them, rather the location of the reporter was geo-tagged in the crowdmapping platform. What is common in the three

countries regarding unbounded group of observers is that the crowd initiators could not track back the number of volunteered citizen observers, who in fact, participated in sharing election observation data in the Uchaguzi platform. Therefore, bounded monitors were registered on the Uchaguzi systems and even their reports could be detected by the software, but unbounded were not, and their reports were subjected to verification process for authenticity of the incidents. In addition, crowdsourcing team involved digital volunteers, who mainly were trained to generate data from social media networking sites, especially Facebook and Twitter. Data mining from social networks is a potential source of election data shared by online network users. But this potential source of data was not shared on the Uchaguzi systems in the three countries.

*Categories of election observation data:* The categories of election monitoring through digital crowdsourcing method were developed during the launch of Uchaguzi project for election watch in East Africa. The categories serve as a framework and each partner organizations in the Uchaguzi project could refine the categories of observation depending on the context of elections. The analysis found somewhat similar categories used to generate data from crowd observers and reporters in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Analyses take into account all categories used by the crowdsourcers to generate crowd observation information in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. These categories are presented in chapter seven by highlighting citizen-generated data. But in chapter eight these categories were more refined to the specific variables of election fraud data.

In Kenya 2013 during Uchaguzi deployment process, CRECO used 7 main categories and 49 sub-categories of observation data focusing on election-day phase, post-election phase and fewer sub-categories on campaign event. In Tanzania 2015 general elections, the crowdsourcing method initiated by TACCEO collected data using 9 categories and 45 sub-categories of observation data covering categories on pre-election, campaign phase, election-day phase and post-election phase. Uganda 2011 general elections the categories of data were somehow similar to Tanzania in campaign phase, election-day phase and post-election phase by using 10 categories and 41 sub-categories to generate election data. The structure of the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda encompasses similar features of receiving and storing observation data from the crowd. reference number, incident title, incident data and time, location, description of the reports, category of data, latitude and longitude, approved reports section, as well as verified and unverified section of the generated reports.

*Verification process of incoming information:* A central situation rooms were created in the three countries for receiving reports, validating them and acting on them. In Kenya CRECO acted as main verifier through their trained citizen observers in the field and SODNET were the CRECO official partners who verified reports for accuracy on the Uchaguzi platform with a network of trained volunteers. The situation room had been set up at the iHub centre in Nairobi. In Tanzania, TACCEO set up Uchaguzi situation room at Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Dar es Salaam. The trained observers were deployed across the country and were responsible for sending trusted observation reports to the Uchaguzi data center. Unlike Kenya and Uganda, in Tanzania the reports from bounded monitors and reporters were subjected to verification process. Crowd data verification team were responsible for verifying incoming reports from the crowd, approving and geo-tagging the reports. In terms of verification process there were two data centres in Uganda for processing all of the observation data at the national level. One of the centres was hosted at the CEW-IT head office, and the other centre was hosted at the Makerere University. At the Makerere University, the crowd sourcer worked with a group of students who volunteered to do the verification process of the incoming reports. This group was getting reports and approving them, and send it to the CEW-IT situation room comprise group of individuals receiving approved data from the Makerere centre. The group at the situation room was responsible also for crowd mapping the reports in the Uchaguzi platform. Like in Kenya, bounded generated data in Uganda were not subjected to verification process. In the three countries, bounded group of observers were registered in the Uchaguzi system, but in Kenya and Uganda once they send their report, it was automated plotted in the Uchaguzi dataset as approved and verified information from trained or bounded observer.

*Citizen-generated voices:* The analyses demonstrate voices of citizens generated by different group of crowdmonitors, and information that detect prevalence of illicit acts of fraud or manipulation in the conduct of electoral process. Digital crowdsourcing generated both positive and negative reports on the conduct of electoral processes in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. The volumes of generated positive and negative observation reports were high on the election-day in the three countries. After the election-day the Uchaguzi systems in Kenya and Tanzania could not generate and verify observation reports, but the exception was Uganda just five days after voting event, the system continue to receive information and crowdsourcing verification team were able to verify some of the reports and other remained unverified in the Uchaguzi system. In this context, Kenya Uchaguzi crowdsourcing process

was deployed to generate and verify election observation information on five days, in Tanzania the platform was active for 46 days, while Uganda operated for 58 days of generating positive and negative monitoring reports.

The analysis of bounded and unbounded groups of citizen observers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda establish differences in terms of the number of reports generated by the two groups of observers. In Kenya, bounded and unbounded monitors generate observation data on seven categories of data widely based on election-day event such as voting, polling station administration, security, staffing, positive events and counting as well as results. In Kenya, many of the observation reports were generated by bounded citizen observers. For the case of Tanzania and Uganda categories were somehow similar whereby in Tanzania developed nine categories such as campaign, polling station logistics, ballot issues, security, official actors, concerns of voters, votes counting, other irregularities and positive events. In Uganda developed and used ten categories of data include, namely campaign, ballot issues, security, official actors, votes counting, voter issues, polling station logistics, other issues, other irregularities and positive events. Also, in Tanzania and Uganda most of the citizen reports were generated by unbounded monitors but in varying levels such as Tanzania about (93%) of the reports were from unbounded observers and (58%) in Uganda. In all three countries, the dominant communication channel used to generate citizen observers' reports was mobile short message services, whereby more than (90%) of the reports were generated through this medium.

The verification processes of incoming observation reports in the Uchaguzi systems, the team in Tanzania managed to process and verify more reports, followed by Kenya and then Uganda. The analysis of crowdsourced elections data in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda could not establish data from passive crowdsourcing generated through data mining from social media networking sites or online public forums. Despite the fact that there were success stories of Uchaguzi systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to generate observation reports from bounded and unbounded crowd observers, in Kenya and Uganda there was a problem of observation reports recorded more than once, and these were information from bounded group of observers. In addition, in Kenya the analysis establish problem of the observation reports approved and verified with any indication of election events, and also these were reports from bounded or trusted group of observers. In the three countries observation reports shows some alarm were missing in the incoming and stored reports in the Uchaguzi data sets. This suggests civil society as crowd initiators needs to pay attention in the issues

of proper geo-location of data with clear names, observation information grouped based on the type of elections (such as presidential, parliamentary and council), to process and categorize all reports from all groups of observers like trained, untrained and passive because passive group reports were missing in the Uchaguzi data sets.

With regard to crowd-monitors of the electoral cycle the analysis establishes in Kenya and Tanzania during pre-election generated data on electoral procedures and voter registration, while in Uganda on party registration. For the case of campaign phase data shows in Tanzania and Uganda generated information on the use of campaign media, while in all countries information related to campaign finance was generated. For the election-day event data were generated on the voting process in the three countries. For the case of post-election phase information on vote count, post-election and electoral authorities were captured and communicated in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.

From the general categories of election observation data, the sub-categories were refined specifically for election fraud data. As a result, eleven variables of fraud data were designed to plot observation data related to the illicit acts of the electoral process of the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections. In these variables citizen observers were able to detect fraudulent acts in the conduct of elections. The variables used for generating data were manipulation of vote registry, voters threatened with violence, voter education, ballot box stuffing, secrecy of the vote, multiple voting and voting fraud, and miscounting of votes, as well as intimidation of counting officials and observers and election triggered violence after voting. the commonalities was on the variables used to generate fraud data, but the exception case was in Uganda information such as intimidation of counting officials and observers and multiple could not capture data from the citizens observers. The difference on these variables is the number of reports generated by citizen observers in each variable, whereby in Kenya the number of illicit acts was high, compared to Tanzania and Uganda. Also, the percentage levels of reported fraud data differ from one country to another, with an exception of vote-buying somewhat similar in Kenya and Tanzania.

*Feedback and response:* There was a success stories on the initiatives to engage citizen on the invented spaces and digital communication tools used to enable invited crowd observers to communicate their reports, but the response and feedback of the communicated information was missing. The lack of proper mechanism to coordinate and track responses for the communicated events to various relevant authorities, and in fact, limited

collaboration among electoral stakeholders hampers the efforts towards tracking the responses that require immediate action, and feedback to the citizen observers and reporters. Limited collaboration among stakeholders in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda was due to the lack of trust among the partners which was the major hindrance to the accessibility of each partner election monitoring data and responses from government watchdogs, and other offices. This implies election observation reports that were escalated to the government law enforcement agencies and electoral authorities, as well as other relevant offices could not be readily made available to others, especially to the general public because of the one-way form of communication.

### **10.2.2 Summary of results**

The analysis of digital crowdsourced method in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda demonstrates the use of digital tools in monitoring can be seen as an important ingredient in the increasingly technology-based elections for reinforcement of democratic principles. Using digital tools and crowdsourced method is to establish environments for inclusion, observation, sharing of best practices and mobilization in the functioning of liberal democracies. But the extent to which digital tools are widely used and their effect in the electoral processes depends on place and context matters or nature of electoral process. This is because promoting and protecting elections with integrity there is ‘no one size fits all’ or fixed solution to all problems, so what matters is the manner in which crowdsourced method and digital tools can be used for citizen participation in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents. This suggests that various digital instruments can be used differently depending on the digital devices available and accessible for participation. But there are success stories of Uchaguzi crowdsourcing platform and use of mobile phone technology and internet as a global public network facilitated smooth monitoring and reporting of elections in the three countries.

Recently, demand for elections with integrity, citizens are digitally empowered to actively participate and contribute to an environment in which “free”, “fair” and “credible” elections can take place, and become less attractive for politicians, candidates, electoral management bodies, citizens and other stakeholders illicitly to interfere the process. That is why “elections which fail to reflect the values of transparency, inclusiveness and participation can be seen as lacking integrity” (Norris 2013a:569). This paves the way for

more digital crowdsourced method and participatory tools to promote integrity and adherence to the democratic principles on the conduct of elections.

Digital crowdsourced systems for citizen-monitors of electoral integrity can be cost effective and viable mechanisms in facilitating participation in the invented spaces created and controlled by both citizens and civil society organizations. The case of *Uchaguzi* platform in the three countries suggests that crowdsourced method have the potential to empower citizens to share their experiences and generate big election data in the invented spaces. This means that digital crowdsourcing is a radical departure, the way the few established observers used to evaluate electoral process and offer written comprehensive reports several months after the election. With crowdsourced systems in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda using digital technologies, both few trained and untrained were engaged in observation process, and more with crowdmapping platform is to share generated observation reports in near-real time. This was possible with the widespread use and access to digital tools, especially mobile phones for texting election reports - thereby civil society source to the digitally empowered crowd the task of observing elections; who are in fact diverse, and voluntarily ready to capture and communicate incidents to the crowdsourced *Uchaguzi* dedicated platform.

The initiatives of crowd-sourcers in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to make an open-call for participation to the crowd in the observation process is a real plus in strengthening electoral integrity and inclusiveness in checking the acts of electoral stakeholders in developing and fledgling democracies. In this case, ordinary citizens in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were digitally enabled to become auditors and reporters of the positive and negative side of the electoral process. The observation of electoral process in three countries witnessed initiatives of civil society to focus on digital crowdsourcing by initiating invented space like *Uchaguzi* platform. As a result, *Uchaguzi* systems were used to receive observation data from bounded and unbounded crowdmonitors through various digital channels such as SMS and special mobile number, web form, mobile applications for Android and iPhones users, email and social networks pages. Generated election data from the crowd were then verified for accuracy and approved for further action and sometimes, some of the hot spot issues were escalated to the relevant authorities for action.

This analysis found links between bounded and unbounded crowd-monitors in terms of verifying observation information from the field. The hybrid approach of monitoring and verifying incoming data facilitated production of election reports. This is the case whereby,

trained citizen observers from being data verifiers also, played the key role of actively generating election observation reports. Since unbounded crowd-monitors have even “many eyes” on the ground, the chances of detecting and deterring tricks of manipulating elections are higher compared to the few bounded crowd-monitors. In the three countries bounded observers were required to verify incoming data from unbounded observers. On one hand, bounded observers in the field were paid for successfully participating in the monitoring and reporting process, but on the other hand, other trained groups, especially crowd data verifiers in the election situation room, who were responsible for processing incoming reports like verifying data by calling back trained observers in the field, geo-tagging, translating the reports, and categorizing data, as well crowdmapping the reports were volunteers without financial reward.

The quality control measures of incoming observation data from the crowd was due to the fact that sometimes perception plays a big role on what citizens on the ground can report about electoral processes. Because of perception in generating election data – verification process of the incoming data is important to validate all election information. That is why on the Uchaguzi datasets in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, there are verified and unverified observation data. The nature of most of unverified reports shows positive situation of the electoral process, that does not require verification process and response as well. For example, observation report like “*I went to my polling station, I voted, I am so happy and I pray peace for my country*”. This is a positive message to the *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing system and important message to the positive feedback of the elections. With limited resources, crowd data verifiers could not call back to the sender or citizen observer to ask whether the observer was “extremely happy, very happy, just happy or contempt”. In this case, the verification process deal with observation data that in one way or the other requires response or further action, and reported incident is a threat to the integrity of election.

In addition, it is interesting in this analysis to find out crowd-initiators in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were well informed with Howe (2008) observation that “sometimes crowds can be wise, but sometimes they can also be stupid”. This helps digital crowdsourcing team to take initiatives to “clean noises” through verification of the incoming observation data. This is evident with the decision to establish verification team for processing reports from the field in order to verify and share credible data. It is a fact that contribution of citizen election monitoring using emerging digital tools is significant, especially in detecting and reporting positive and negative experiences of the electoral



process, but also authenticating their reports is indispensable. Because lack of trust in digital crowdsourcing is a critical threat to the sustainability and credibility of the crowd observation method, especially the unbounded group of citizen observers. Indeed, crowd initiators in Kenya and Uganda more often opted not to verify reports from bounded or trusted observers, who are also data verifiers in the field of observation. Conversely, observation data from trained observers were subjected to verification process in Tanzania. In view of this, one could assume that verified data from both groups of observers could be used to establish credibility and/or incredibility of the electoral process. The argument for not verifying reports from trained observers, could lead to the underutilization and lack of trust, as well as often questioning the credibility of the crowd observation data.

On one hand, the assumption is that bounded crowdsourcing is very much informed by bad elements of elections through training, and what to report or not to report, and even how to generate quality reports. On the other hand, there are electoral players who have their own scam, interests and may want to have this group of bounded to generate biased reports. This means that verification of observation reports is indispensable regardless of trained or untrained observers. The crowd-sourcers may not claim bounded observers, they are well trained and equipped with necessary skills, so there is no need of verifying their reports. Because the question remains, namely who is training them? How independent and objectives are those training them? With digital ICTs, verification process of all reports is crucial, for accountability purposes in terms of who is reporting what, and checking others. The real plus with digital crowdsourced systems is that crowd are everywhere, and capable of feeding-in to the crowdsourcing platform. But many of crowd reporters, especially unbounded crowdsourcing, their background and motivation to voluntarily participating in sharing reports, cannot be easily determined. Thus, verification is a way of controlling other crowd observers' "emotions" because politics is about spending "big money", and politics have been so monetized. On this basis, a big spender, at whatever cost may influence the crowd in generating biased data. Through validating crowd-generated information, crowd initiators can filter biased or 'cooked' data before call it a verified data for public consumption. Therefore, "crowdsourcing systems do not exist without problems and challenges. Among them there is a need to evaluate the correctness and validity of user contribution, how to reach enough users to result in a significant contribution to the system, and how to make people accountable for their participation. Each crowdsourcing system

faces these challenges in its own way, depending on its specific goals and domain” (Arias et al. 2015:188).

The future of digital crowdsourcing relies on the non-partisan election monitoring organizations because general public are now accessing their information to build confidence and judge the credibility of the elections. There are digital tools for generating and sharing election information, but government watchdogs may try to shut down the medium scaring of information going out. This is because we are in the digital cosmopolitan and age of connection, thus, how to make sense in crowdsourcing data and method is the next decision. What is the position of the government towards this component of digital crowd-monitoring? Why governments are scared of technology? Arguably technology tools bring about open participation, inclusion, transparency and can enforce accountability. Increasingly governments need to learn how to adapt technology, and interesting enough, they have been forced through open data and open government partnership initiatives, whereby Kenya and Tanzania are members of open government partnerships from 2011, but Uganda is yet to be a member.

The analysis of the work of citizen observers with the case of *Uchaguzi* datasets is one of the influences on intervention and practice. Indeed, crowdsourcing technologies detection of election fraud is a result of collaborative production of data between ordinary citizens and crowd-initiators, as well as other election watchdogs. Given the number of citizen, who have access, use and own some of the tools, remarkably diffusion of mobile phones for sms reporting, we should expect a greater level of engagement and partnership among partners for collaborative production of more election information in the future. The analysis of *Uchaguzi* crowdsourced data shows the ability of crowd to generate data on the pre-election, campaign, election-day and post-election phases. Though, data shows more focus of crowd-initiators was to generate data on election-day. Especially, election fraud data shows citizens’ observers were capable in observing and sharing electoral incidents.

In sum, the extent to which government watchdogs are engaged on the crowdsourcing process will also determine the extent to which citizen-generated observation reports are taken into action. This is influenced by the fact that despite the availability and production of big election data from ordinary citizen, the gap remained of sharing information with key stakeholders like electoral authorities and other election watchdogs. The non-partisan election monitoring organisations shows “fear” of government watchdogs like police for security of observers, who are generating data. Therefore, during crowdsourced method, and

even after crowd-monitoring process is over, citizen-generated voices have to be analysed, and results of the crowdsourcing process have to be gathered to a report and that will be available in different forms (online and printed) for general public to get information about crowd experiences with the conduct of the electoral process (Bott et al. 2014).

### **10.2.3 Concluding observations**

In the contemporary information revolution, we have witnessed adoption of new methods for election monitoring (crowdsourcing) and reporting information (digital tools) about electoral processes. This thesis is an inquiry into digital crowdsourcing and promotion of electoral integrity in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It analyses aspects of crowdsourced method and citizen-generated voices in the comparative perspective about crowdsourced initiators, who is engaged, channels for generating reports, outputs and challenges. Analysis is motivated in part by the growing deployment of digital tools in elections and the use of open-source platform for uploading and visualizing generated observation reports.

This study has attempted to provide an analysis of digital crowdsourcing and citizen-generated voices, as well as challenges encountered and potential role of crowdsourcing for monitoring integrity of electoral process in Uganda 2011, Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 general elections. The key driving factor for this analysis is the fact that, recently diffusion of digital communication tools and crowdsourcing method for citizen participation in electoral politics, offers a means in promoting electoral integrity. Also given the fact that election with integrity is one of the cornerstones of modern liberal democracies, and digital crowdsourcing is a growing phenomenon for monitoring electoral integrity, this study analyses the method and ability of ordinary citizens in mapping positive and negative conduct of elections in comparative perspective.

Digital crowdsourcing method has been deployed in monitoring and reporting electoral incidents in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In this regard, the thesis put forward the assertions that crowdsourced method matter in the study of election monitoring-led promotion of elections with integrity. In the light of the analytical framework adopted - namely invited and invented space, hybrid form of crowd-monitors and electoral cycle, the thesis analyses crowdsourced process and citizen-generated voices in the three countries and relies on multiple sources of data such as qualitative semi-structured interviews, documents analysis and other secondary sources in making its core argument. The analytical framework supports growing body of scholarly work on election monitoring and electoral integrity by

demonstrating the ability of digital crowdsourced citizen-based monitoring in mapping positive and negative feedback elections. In this respect, this thesis argues that digital crowdsourced method using invented space and hybrid crowd-monitors can potentially improve election integrity by mapping the contest across the electoral cycle, and complement traditional method and approaches of monitoring quality of elections. Additionally, this thesis offers potential contributions in monitoring and reporting electoral processes in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, among other things, demonstrates diffusion of technological tools in the three countries significantly enabled citizen engagement in the invented space by civil society to contribute in promoting electoral integrity.

The analysis shows the promise of digital crowdsourcing as a method for monitoring and detecting electoral incidents. Citizen-generated observation data, especially election fraud serve as evidence that emerging crowd-monitoring is a complement to the work of established observers in promoting elections with integrity. This initiative of civil society use of new invented spaces enabled citizens as producers of election data. The number of election reports generated through hybrid approach of monitoring and validation of incoming information is an early alarm that crowd observers to the crowdsourced systems are capable of generating and even controlling the quality of the reports. This is supported by the fact that growing rate of access and use of mobile phones to call and text in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is an enabler for citizen participation monitoring process. The thesis can reasonably argue that the penetration rate of mobile phone technologies in East African countries - are a digital inclusion of ordinary citizens to participate in the electoral politics.

Digitally enabled citizens and crowdsourcing method is redesigning the way elections have traditionally been monitored with comprehensive reports after the election is over and even the election is by then 'old news'. But now through digital crowdsourced observation - data are shared in near-real time. Major concerns about digital crowdsourcing was how this method was used to engage the crowd in the invented spaces through open-call to observe and communicate electoral incidents, and whether shared data detected problems and good conduct of the elections, as well as credibility of the observation data. This study using the three cases of Uganda 2011, Kenya 2013 and Tanzania 2015 shows how ordinary citizens were able to collect data on positive and negative side of the elections. The validation of incoming information from the crowd shows crowdsourced systems have already installed monitoring methodologies to crosscheck information, in order to minimize the possibility of error or abuse of the crowd generated data. This research document that Uchaguzi used

hybrid approach of bounded and unbounded citizen monitors to generate credible observation data, and collaborate with crowd data verifiers in the election data center to verify incoming reports. This means that validation of incoming reports was to establish the credibility of the crowdsourced data. This further show that hybrid monitoring enabled bounded monitors to play two roles: first, as a crowd-feeders in the dedicated digital platform by generating “trusted” observation data, and second, as a crowd data verifiers.

Given the rapid growing of digital participatory tools, methods and demand for elections with integrity, as well as the power of ordinary citizens in mapping electoral incidents, digital crowdsourcing has been observed as a threat to the government watchdogs. The challenge of interfering with crowdsourced technology in Uganda 2011 and shut down of social networks sites and mobile services in 2016 general elections justify the fear of government of the rich data generated by citizens exposing the good and bad conduct of elections. This marks the point that the fundamental problem with digital crowdsourced method is to establish a trusted partnership with government watchdogs and other electoral stakeholders. The partnership is a means to conduct accountable, transparent and inclusive process of observing, generating and sharing hot spot issues with relevant offices, as well as feedback and responses of the incidents. The aim of digital crowdsourcing is for the communities at large to participate, and also, see what is happening in different parts of the country, but remarkably is for the electoral authorities and other watchdogs timely to intervene in case of fraud or malpractices and violence.

On one hand, the aim of election monitoring groups is to disseminate generated observation information to the relevant election stakeholders for response and feedback action. And dissemination of election monitoring reports is effective when there is a solid established channel of communication between citizens as reporters or producers and crowdsourced initiators and electoral authorities as well as other stakeholders. This implies that means of communication and partnerships that exist between crowdsourced initiators and relevant offices for response and feedback determine the extent to which citizen-generated reports will be addressed. If crowdsourced initiators cannot efficiently and effectively deliver produced election observation information to the relevant stakeholders, their contribution to promote electoral integrity stands unaccomplished. In fact, collected and undisseminated citizen observers’ reports not only become useless but also lead to multiple losses (in terms of data bundles, costs of SMS and time) and wisdom of the crowd regarding their role in promoting and preventing election integrity. Therefore, limited

feedback and response must largely be regarded as one of the failure in the digital crowdsourcing systems. Citizen-generated voices were more of a one-way from field observers and reporters to the election situation room, sometimes from situation room to the relevant authorities for response. In this context, ordinary citizens' observers and reporters only remain as producers of rich election information. But also funding is a stumbling block to plan early crowdsourcing process that will include network of partnerships, trusted networked of observers, training program for processing and verifying data, outreach and publicity of the crowdsourcing method, and to sustain the crowdsourcing platform for monitoring events across the cycle.

On the other hand, the strengths of digital crowdsourcing method for election watch in East African countries, namely Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda is that the digital tool used for monitoring, generating and mapping incoming observation reports is designed within East Africa, especially remarkable in Kenya. *Uchaguzi* platform is a customized version of *Ushahidi* software developed in Kenya during 2007/2008 post-election violence. Now *Uchaguzi* is a platform for election watch in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This is a product of civil society organizations from the three countries that aiming at supporting citizen participation in electoral process, but most important in promotion of "free", "fair", "credible" and peaceful conduct of electoral processes. The engagement of citizens as election watchdogs through *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform were initiated in Kenya by Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO), Tanzania Civil Society Consortium for Election Observation (TACCEO) and Citizen Election Watch with Information Technology (CEW-IT) in Uganda. Together with *Ushahidi* team as technology developer, the three countries successfully deployed *Uchaguzi* platform and rich election data were generated and stored on the *Uchaguzi* systems. The analysis of citizen voices was possible in the three countries because of the access granted to the researcher by crowd-sourcers to analyse *Uchaguzi* data sets.

The success stories of *Uchaguzi* platform is the generated and visually mapped approved and verified election observation data from the crowd. Despite the challenges faced, there are potential of digital crowdsourcing method in detecting and disseminating in near-real time generated data in a dedicated digital platform. In this context, digital crowdsourcing is a promising method in promoting electoral integrity and there are opportunities in terms of digital tools and methods for election stakeholders, especially civil society organizations to plan early in engaging the crowd in the invented spaces as sensors

and reporters of the electoral incidents. The evidence of citizen-generated voices in detecting positivity and negativity of elections suggests that the use of new digital participatory methods and tools in monitoring and reporting the conduct of electoral democracies, can create an agenda for reform, partnerships among election watchdogs, centralization of election observation data in a digital platform, as well as rapid dissemination of best practices in near-real time in order to complement other methods in promoting and preventing integrity of democratic conduct of elections.

In sum, given the explorative work of using small-N comparative approach of the three countries, it is reasonable to argue that the widespread of digital tools has been presented as a means to ensure greater citizen participation in electoral politics, and created new forms of political communication. Digitalization of elections underlined the need for citizen participation in the invented spaces championed by civil society, and ICT is seen as a powerful tool of open communication channels between key democratic institutions and citizens in modern electoral democracies (Kersting, 2009). The move towards digital crowdsourcing allows wider use of digital tools that enabled citizens with a mobile phones, smartphone or internet access to expose any kind of wrongdoing anywhere, and anytime during the course of electoral processes.

At this point, Przeworski and Teune cautiously argued that “no research based on a design other than a random multistep sample of all social systems will allow universal generalizations”, but “the validity of generalizations and the guidelines for further research provided...will depend upon the nature of the findings that they respectively bring” (Przeworski and Teune 1982:37 [1970]). In the context of this research, it has been shown in Chapter 4 and other studies such as World Bank Group (2016) that there is a positive correlation of digital adoption index and perceptions of electoral integrity in promoting free and fair elections. In this case, it is possible to conclude that diffusion of digital tools, especially an increased adoption rate of mobile phones, digital crowdsourcing method is one of the complementing factor in detecting problems of electoral integrity, non-free and unfair conduct of elections, exclusion of citizens in politics and other electoral malpractices that liberal democracy is facing in East African region, and possibly Africa in general. Since the crowd are everywhere, diffusion of communication channels implies crowdsourcing systems potentially have the role to play in the promotion of electoral integrity, and *Uchaguzi* open-source software is a digital tool that can be customized by any election

stakeholders to set up their own way to monitor, collect and visualize approved and verified data in near-real time, and escalate hot spot incidents to the relevant authorities.

#### **10.2.4 An agenda for digital crowdsourced monitoring of elections**

*Crowd-initiators of the invented space:* Political crowdsourcing monitoring is a method in which civic organizations deploy digital technological tools to bring problems and good conduct of elections to the attention of election stakeholders. Accordingly, political crowdsourcing seems to be “an effective method of monitoring made possible by ICTs that complements more traditional strategies. So, we can expect to see more crowd-sourced monitoring in the future” (Fung et al. 2013:42-43). In the present age, citizens are no longer satisfied with only voting and leaving the voting stations, rather citizens want to have a more active role, especially in the *invented space* to monitor and expose information on the conduct of electoral politics (Kersting 2017). But still “up to now a lot of attention has been given to election day - perhaps also the campaigning period – but not the full electoral cycle”, and detection of election fraud “we may need to change forms, procedures, or regulations in order to close that loophole”, while malpractice “may be addressed with better training” (Staffan Darnolf (IFES) in Norris et al. 2014:270). This suggests that crowdsourcing initiators must and/or should be able to observe and report events in all stages of the electoral processes such as pre-election period, campaign, election-day and post-election day events. This thesis acknowledges the process towards crowdsourcing method is in its infancy stage, therefore, non-partisan monitoring organizations should identify early the strategies and goals of crowdsourcing monitoring the electoral cycle. But also, to specify the type of the crowd-monitors to be engaged in the process, in order to establish human and technological capacities of handling incoming information.

After deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform for monitoring the 2010 Kenyan referendum and the 2010 Tanzanian general elections, the study conducted by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Knight Foundation (2010) offers some useful recommendations for the next deployment of *Uchaguzi* platform, especially crowd-monitoring and reporting process. But the analysis in this study found the recommendations such as plan early, effective partnerships, strategies for publicity and outreach, as well as simulation exercises still remain unusable in the *Uchaguzi* systems for the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections. This study puts forward the view that Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Knight Foundation recommendations written in 2010 are still



relevant for the crowd-initiators to take into account for any collaborative production of election data using invented spaces and digital communication technologies. In addition, hybrid methodology of bounded and bounded observers is useful in ensuring wide coverage of observation and validation of incoming reports.

It is obvious that e-observation in developing and fledgling democracies is widely advocated by non-partisan election monitoring organizations using opportunities of growing digital technologies. It is evident that e-observation and e-reporting of democratic process needs early preparations and deployment for successful monitoring of elections. While there is a growth of digitally enabled citizen to observe and generate election reports using ICT on one hand, on the other hand those who in one way or the other planned to manipulate the elections may change the techniques which might not be easily detectable by ordinary citizen. This is because the emerging e-observation paves way, also for e-rigging of election results by using software applications that cannot easily be familiar by election monitors during tabulation and transmission of results from polls centre to the electoral management body national tabulation hall. This suggests that non-partisan civic groups need also to capitalise on acquiring and equipping their trained or bounded observers ICT knowledge. Also, capacity of civil society to cross check election data from their field observers and data received at the national polls centre. In this case, crowdsourced citizen-based observation requires respect for “ICCPR-enshrined rights and obligations, such as freedom of movement (for observers to move around the country freely), respect for the right to security of the person (ensuring the security of observers) and the right to access information (for the observers to access electoral laws and regulations, polling sites, electoral offices and officers)” (Nagore and Tuccinardi 2014).

Civil society organizations as crowdsourcing initiators should share the experiences of citizen observers’ data by packing the incidents and lesson learnt during deployment process to the wider community, especially during and after the process is over. Most of the citizen-generated election observation data remained unexploited and unconsumed by stakeholders. Given an emerging area of open election data and e-documentation of information, needs a lot to be done and dissemination for usability. Feedback and response in monitoring and reporting the conduct of elections is important especially in the process that engaged ordinary citizens to share their information for response. Crowdsourced initiators in receiving observation reports and giving feedback to the reporters and general public can make the process more significant in terms of building public trust, participation and

accountability in the management of the electoral process. Also, feedback and response can promote active participation in the invented space because participants are guaranteed their voices will be used responsibly, and will be an incentive to potential citizens' contributors in the invented space for promoting integrity of elections. Additionally, marketing of digital crowdsourcing platform is an issue, specifically marketing *Uchaguzi* platform for election monitoring should not be underestimated, preferable is to make the "marketing campaign education (how to use the service) and explains its cause (why use the service and what to expect)" (Hellström and Karefelt 2012:421-422).

It is obvious that in the three countries digital crowdsourcing monitoring by civil society and *Uchaguzi* platform has been running on exclusive funding from donors. Going forward, the implementing partners, especially non-partisan civic groups need to rethink of models that are adaptable to limited resources but still effective in their operation. Volunteers, open-source resources and tapping on past experiences are areas of focus that can minimize spending, while improving effectiveness. It would be interesting if electoral management bodies could assist in terms of financial resources to the activities of civil society in promoting the integrity of elections, especially monitoring pre-election activities. It is notable that the major stumbling blocks to civil society activities to tackle issues across the electoral cycle is dependency on donors' support, and the only aspect electoral management bodies gave them is letter of accreditation and invitation to observe the electoral contests.

*Technology innovators for the digital crowdsourcing platform: Uchaguzi* software created a new invented space for crowdsourced collective action that was based on demands from citizens and civil society organizations. The software centered on the need for the provision of monitoring and reporting electoral process and safeguarding of the environment conducive for promoting elections with integrity in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda election cycle. In this respect, the invented space by *Uchaguzi* platform is perhaps the beginning of transforming monitoring of electoral contests - and this initiative of *Ushahidi* technology developer will help in providing guidance on how to proceed for improvement and bring citizen participation to elections in East African countries.

Nowadays, 'democratic innovation seems to be generated mostly in the global south, in the young democracies' (Kersting 2012a). *Uchaguzi* platform is a product of *Ushahidi* open-source software developed in Kenya, and now *Uchaguzi* digitally empowered citizens to participate in monitoring - in order to keep an eye on the conduct of electoral process.

Ordinary citizens were able to capture and communicate electoral incidences worth sharing with wider communities, but citizen initiatives are stifled by lack of action in response to the part of other stakeholders because citizen reporters expected return in terms of responses of the communicated information. This is because observation information was rather a one-way as one of the respondents put forward “we escalate to electoral body and law enforcement agencies for response, but it was very unlucky to send us back the feedback”. Therefore, accountability in terms of monitoring received and escalated data is a gap that still remains in the *Uchaguzi* software. Section of escalated reports to various authorities can be established on the *Uchaguzi* software indicating the status of the response from the relevant authorities. This will enable the general public, analysts and researchers to promote aspect of accountability in the electoral processes by analysing low, medium and high response of the escalated incidents.

The nexus of tech-community and non-partisan election monitoring organizations calls for strong partnership model, especially in developing key areas of observation information on the *Uchaguzi* software and online analysis tool of the reports. There is a key lesson from *Uchaguzi* platform in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda that online tool for analysing citizen-generated reports is gap on the software. But also, planning and training of crowdsourcing team on *Uchaguzi* software should be at the heart of the resurgent strategy of the digital crowdsourcing in the future. Deployment of the *Uchaguzi* platform in the three countries was happening days to the election-days. This denied adequate chance for simulations and debugging sessions as would be ideal. As a result, last minute pressure is both expensive and lays seeds for deployment challenges of the *Uchaguzi* platform.

The analysis of digital crowdsourcing systems using *Uchaguzi* software, the citizen-generated voices could not provide evidence of data mining from social media networking sites shared by passive group of observers and reporters. The missing data from passive crowdsourcing from the social networks largely contributed by the lack of appropriate software to generate and validate events, and even to detect biases from the voices, because sometimes “it remains difficult to establish how far online postings reflect the general views of ordinary citizens (Norris 2015:34). But innovation of Artificial Intelligence for Monitoring Elections (AIME) developed by Patrick Meier and colleagues is free and open-source software that automatically can filter relevant election reports from the crowd, especially Twitter platform (Meier 2015). The design of AIME is a one step forward to address problem of generating and validating passive crowdsourcing reports. The software

was deployed and tested during Nigerian 2015 general elections in collaboration with local partners (Meier 2015). The gap in the *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform needs to be filled in the future election cycle - AIME open source software can be deployed to monitor instances of election fraud, malpractices and even good conduct of electoral process in the social networks in order to establish the role of passive crowdsourcing in promoting integrity of elections. Thus, 'AIME combines crowdsourcing with artificial intelligence to automatically identify tweets of interest to the crowd initiators during electoral process, but using AIME social networkers can be asked to tag tweets related to the specific key words such as election violence, rigging, fraud, malpractices and voters issues' (Meier 2015).

*Government watchdogs in the invited space:* According to the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2002 (which came into force 2012), Article 22 calls upon States party to "create a conducive environment for independent and impartial national monitoring or observation mechanisms", and additionally, Articles 12.3, 27.2, and Article 28 calls upon states to create conducive environment for civil society organizations to exist and operate within the law. The growing diffusion of communication tools marks the need for the electoral authorities and other government watchdogs to institutionalize digital crowdsourcing method (championed by CSOs) in their invited spaces. Technological revolution and yet, more to come, is facilitating the application of "e-" in various social, economic and political activities. East African countries have leapfrogged in areas such as mobile phone communications and innovations (such as *Ushahidi* open-source platform), and government watchdogs may take advantage of the opportunities afforded by these new digital technologies. Political activities embraced the use of electronic devices in managing the smooth conduct of electoral process. Examples of technologies use in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda include Biometric Voter Registration technology, verification of voter register through mobile phones technology, monitoring of electoral process and reporting, as well as vote count and transmission through digital tools. The electoral management bodies in the three countries should enhance the use of digital information and communication technologies in the conduct of electoral processes.

Especially electoral authorities as the 'owners' of the electoral process, is it possible to have their own digital crowdsourcing platform? On one hand, the answer is likely yes, because the electoral authorities' crowdsourcing platform may play a big role across the electoral cycle, and able to even capture and share civic education or voters' education and awareness program, to the voting process, counting and declaration of results. The electoral

management bodies' platform can be used to build trust of the electoral process, and influence voters to "believe" everything was right. Also could use the platform to share with voters any complex stumbling blocks to the electoral process, and seek solution from the crowd as the potential beneficiaries of the outcome of electoral processes. On the other hand, how such crowdsourcing platform can be operated by electoral management bodies is probably the difficult question, especially in promoting transparency and accountability of elections. Electoral management bodies' crowdsourcing platform could detail and slot all the activities across the electoral cycle for the public view and to contribute and share any illicit conduct at the grassroots levels. Arguably, nothing blocks electoral authorities from either having their own crowdsourcing platform that can cater the electoral cycle or for them to hook positive and negative data from civil society driven crowdsourcing platform just for the purpose of ensuring a successful conduct of elections. Given an increasing ubiquity of communication channels and future of big election data, there is a potential for electoral authorities engaging in crowdsourcing digital participatory systems.

Some civil societies have initiated a Parallel Voter Tabulation (PVT) project with the help of National Democratic Institute (NDI). This was the case for Election Observation Group (ELOG) in Kenya 2013 general elections. The PVT data from ELOG was even used as evidence in the Supreme Court during 2013 Presidential election petition. Also Uganda 2011 elections, DEMGroup deployed PVT, but in some point their sms reporting system was jammed for hours before could continue receiving polling stations results. In Tanzania 2015 there was initiative to run PVT, but the project was not successful, however, observation reports shows that the reason for the invasion of TACCEO office by police force was the transmission of election results without the mandate/authorisation of electoral commission (EU EOM 2015). In this case, using digital tools for PVT can facilitate confidence of the electoral results, but the possible conduct of PVT is that "observers must have free access to the voting and counting processes. Free access throughout the day from opening until close of the poll is indispensable if the observer group is to evaluate qualitative aspects of the process" (Estok et al. 2002:9). This depends on the collaboration of electoral authorities and government watchdogs not to temper with technology deployed for generating election results from the polling stations. In general, electoral watchdogs in their invited spaces should open space for running PVT because its potential includes detecting and deterring fraud, offering a timely forecast of the electoral results, instilling confidence in the electoral process with the official results and reporting on the quality of

the process. Therefore, it is vital to discuss and agree early with the electoral authorities for open lines and action agenda during the observation period.

*Crowdsourced initiators and established monitoring groups:* It is arguable that partnership between crowdsourced initiators and traditional election monitoring missions are, by and large, missing because of methodological approaches of observing and reporting, resources and interests. On one hand, traditional election observers have the capacity to validate crowd reports, carry out further investigation, and finally, share the outputs to the relevant authorities in the form of comprehensive reports. On the other hand, digital crowdsourcing systems have a capacity to detect and share incidents in a timely fashion in a large “menu” of observation, rather than waiting for the problems to occur and come out with a report and recommendation at the end of the event, while they could have prevented the incidents. This suggests that partnership among election stakeholders whose goal is to promote “free”, “fair” and “credible”, as well as peaceful electoral contests, should find ways to share information to address and prevent incidents before escalating to distort the integrity of the electoral process. This also implied the need to enhance a mutually relationship between crowdsourcers and long established election observers to make use of the emerging mechanisms of citizen-based election monitoring and digital communication technologies to share their observation information in a digital platform. The information should be accessed timely, processed and communicated to the relevant offices for hot spot issues, and finally, to offer recommendations that will be adopted and applied by the responsible electoral authorities in the next elections cycle.

*Digital crowdsourcing researchers:* Digital crowdsourcing approach, especially in monitoring electoral politics is a ‘newly used concept, unfamiliar method, untested in the field and it makes fairly large claims that are not well backed by substantial evidence’ (Meier 2009). This study attempts to fill the gap in terms of crowdsourcing process and analysis of citizen-generated voices in the Ugandan 2011, Kenyan 2013 and Tanzanian 2015 general elections. But given the current trends of non-partisan election monitoring organizations to crowdsource in the form of an ‘open-call’ using digital tools, still crowdsourcing concept in the context of election monitoring needs further investigation. It is worth mentioning that during crowdsourcing process and even after, citizen-generated voices have to be analysed and shared (Bott et al. 2014). Also when digital crowdsourcing collective action process is over, generated data need to be gathered in comprehensive reports for public consumption, to see what the crowd said with regard to the conduct of

electoral process (Bott et al. 2014). This implies digital crowdsourcing is a continuous process, especially in monitoring and reporting incidents in the electoral cycle, and analysis of electoral events.

In addition, research needs to address the question on the crowdsourced rich election data and traditional election monitoring outputs because “the way that many citizens judge the quality of elections has been found to differ sharply from the assessments provided by international observers” (Norris 2013b:578). It is, of course, beyond the scope of this research to explore the convergence or divergence of the traditional and crowdsourced reports. Moving forward, this explorative work set an agenda for research, especially how crowdsourced big election data interrelate with established monitoring data? Thorough analysis of crowdsourced and traditional election monitors outputs will unpack the extent to which “many eyes” are superior to “few” in promoting integrity of electoral procedures.

Moreover, a well-functioning and vibrant democracy requires ordinary citizens on the ground, who are able and free to observe and report, either using their own resources or digitally empowered to participate in democratic processes. Yet citizens voluntarily to participate in the digital invented spaces without any financial rewards or air time bonus leaves many questions unanswered, because those participating in the process of monitoring and reporting need to be able to justify their participation, particularly if it is voluntary. What motivates the crowd, voluntarily to participate in sharing observation data in a dedicated digital platform? Especially unbounded crowd-monitors used their own costs of sending SMS or internet data bundle for online applications, and voluntarily decided to share observed incidents in digital platform for others to view and be informed with regard to the conduct of electoral process. In addition, one of the Dahl’s (1971) institutional characteristics of polyarchy is that ‘citizens should have access, and an effective enforced right to gain access, to sources of information that are not monopolized by the government, or by any other single group’. So research needs to investigate whether ordinary citizens in the rural, urban and metropolitan areas are aware with *Uchaguzi* crowdsourcing platform, and if any, what are the sources of their information? Is it online or offline source of information?

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