STRATEGIC CHOICE, MARKET EVOLUTION AND BUSINESS OUTCOMES – EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES ON INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS ..... **V**
LIST OF FIGURES ..... **VIII**
LIST OF TABLES ..... **IX**
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..... **X**

PART A

I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES WITHIN AND BETWEEN FIRMS **1**

II. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE **8**

1. The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes 8
2. Quality Kills the Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals 12
3. Dynamics of Conflict in Supply Chain Relationships and the Importance of Governance Mechanisms 16

III. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK **19**

IV. REFERENCES **21**

PART B

I. THE ECONOMICS OF SENSATIONALISM: MEDIA STRATEGY AND BUSINESS OUTCOMES 34

1. Abstract 34
2. Introduction 35
3. Conceptual Background: The Economics of News 38
   - 3.1 Demand-Induced Sensationalism 38
   - 3.2 Supply-Induced Sensationalism 40
4. The Marginal Value of the Wulff Scandal 42
5. Data and Methods 45
   - 5.1 Data 45
   - 5.2 Event-Study Methodology 46
   - 5.3 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) Modeling 49
6. Results and Discussion 51
   - 6.1 Results: Event-Study Methodology 51
   - 6.2 Results: GARCH Modeling 56
   - 6.3 Discussion 58
7. Conclusions 60
8. References 62

II. QUALITY KILLS THE MEDIASTAR? CAREER PATHS OF PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS 69

1. Abstract 69
2. Introduction 71
3. The Market for Public Intellectuals 75
4. Quality of Intellectual Output: Some Ideas on the Problem of Measurement 79
5. Hypotheses 81
6. Sample, Variables, and Methods 84
   - 6.1 Sample 84
   - 6.2 Variables 84
   - 6.3 Methods 86
7. Results and Discussion 88
8. Limitations 97
9. Conclusions 98
10. References 101

III. DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 106

1. Abstract 106
2. Introduction 108
3. Theoretical Background 111
   - 3.1 Supply Chain Conflict 111
   - 3.2 Supply Chain Governance 113
4. Hypotheses 117
   - 4.1 Evolution of Cognitive Conflict 117
   - 4.2 Evolution of Affective Conflict 118
   - 4.3 Evolution of Manifest Conflict 119
   - 4.4 Evolution of Conflict Aftermath 120
   - 4.5 Evolution of Latent Conflict 120
5. Methodological Approach 122
   - 5.1 Sampling Procedure and Data Collection 122
   - 5.2 Measures 123
   - 5.3 Measurement Model 125
6. Analysis and Results 128
7. Conclusions 135
8. References 138

APPENDIX A 148
APPENDIX B 150
APPENDIX C 153
APPENDIX D 161
APPENDIX E 164

ERKLÄRUNG 173

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Integrative Framework 20
Figure 2: Standardized Residuals of GARCH Models 57
Figure 3: Conditional Variances of GARCH Models 57
Figure 4: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2007 Sample) 85
Figure 5: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2012 Sample) 85
Figure 6: Model 1 – Evolution of Cognitive Conflict 128
Figure 7: Model 2 – Evolution of Affective Conflict 129
Figure 8: Model 3 – Evolution of Manifest Conflict 129
Figure 9: Model 4 – Evolution of Conflict Aftermath 130
Figure 10: Model 5 – Evolution of Latent Conflict 130

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Stock Price Effects: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns 52
Table 2: Stock Price Effects: Average Abnormal Returns 53
Table 3: Stock Price Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 53
Table 4: Circulation Effects: Abnormal Increases and Cumulative Abnormal Increases in Circulation 54
Table 5: Circulation Effects: Average Abnormal Increases in Circulation 54
Table 6: Circulation Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal Increases in Circulation 55
Table 7: Online Effects: Abnormal Increases in Online Traffic Volume 56
Table 8: Summary of Results: GARCH Models 57
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the total Sample of Intellectuals 89
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets 91
Table 11: Pearson Correlations for the 2007 and 2012 Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets (N=140) 95
Table 12: Pearson Correlations for the total 2012 Sample of Intellectuals (N=436) 95
Table 13: Logistic Regression Results 96
Table 14: Sample Characteristics 123
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 127
Table 16: Summary Statistics of Competing Sub-Models 132
Table 17: Summary of Results: Structural Equation Models 134
Table 18: List of Events 149
Table 19: Intellectuals and Media Mentions (2007 Sample) 156
Table 20: Intellectuals and Media Mentions (2012 Sample) 160
Table 21: Measures and Factor Reliabilities 163

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAM	Alliance for Audited Media
AAR	Average Abnormal Return
ABC	Audit Bureau of Circulation
AC	Affective Conflict
AGFI	Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index
AR	Abnormal Returns
ARCH	Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
AVE	Average Variance Extracted
CA	Conflict Aftermath
CAAR	Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns
CAR	Cumulative Abnormal Returns
CC	Cognitive Conflict
CFI	Comparative Fit Index
CR	Composite Reliability
d.f.	degrees of freedom
DAX	Deutscher Aktienindex
DV	Dependent Variable
e.g.	exempli gratia
FG	Formal Governance
FoS	Fields of Science and Technology
GARCH	Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity
GFI	Goodness of Fit Index
H	Hypothesis
HDAX	Hundert Hauptwerte im Deutschen Aktienindex
i.e.	id est

IVW	Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V.
LC	Latent Conflict
Max	Maximum
MC	Manifest Conflict
Min	Minimum
mio.	million
NFI	Normed Fit Index
NR	Normal Returns
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
p	probability
R&D	Research and Development
RG	Relational Governance
RMSEA	Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
RQ	Research Question
SAR	Standardized Abnormal Returns
SCAR	Standardized Cumulative Abnormal Returns
S.E.	Standard Error
S.D.	Standard Deviation
SRMR	Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
TLI	Tucker Lewis Index
WoS	Web of Science

PART A

I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES, AND MONITORING CAPABILITIES WITHIN AND BETWEEN FIRMS

"Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed"
Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865)

There is a fundamental gap between the preferences of employees for maximizing private benefits and the firm's purpose of generating financial returns (Lazear and Shaw 2007). While an employee's effort typically leads to benefits for the firm, it imposes costs on the employee (Holmström 1999). It is an essential challenge for organizations to offer agreements that provide sufficient benefits for both the firm and its employees (Lazear and Oyer 2007; Murphy 1999; Raith 2008).

Accordingly, this dissertation focuses on organizational structures, incentives, and monitoring capabilities that govern exchange relationships between economic actors, both within and between firms. In particular, this thesis considers incentive structures of *internal* as well as *external staff* on markets for outputs whose quality is difficult to monitor. Thereby, the analyses take both employees' short-term income and especially their long-term interests into consideration and explain how firms select and compensate their employees. Moreover, a look at *interfirm relationships* shows how formal rules and provisions as well as informal concerns for long-term benefits affect supply chain transactions.

A growing stream of research that deals with the organization of monitoring and incentive structures, intended to make employees contribute to business objectives, can be attributed to the

notion of *corporate governance* (Lazear 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The approach of corporate governance involves mechanisms, processes, and structures that are supposed to match motivations of investors with those of managers, and to thus align collective actions (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009; Friebel and Guriev 2012; Jensen 2002). Corporate governance increasingly attracts attention from both academia and practice and thus yields a considerable bunch of sub-literatures (Bebchuk and Weisbach 2010). Research primarily draws on agency theory, *the economic theory of incentives* (Aghion and Tirole 1997; Castañer and Kavadis 2013; Harris and Raviv 1979; Holmström 1999; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1990). Empirical studies mainly focus on executive compensation to answer the question of what criteria evaluate performance, provide orientation for employees when they choose among a set of actions, and finally maximize firm value (Core, Guay, and Larcker 2008; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Holmström and Kaplan 2003; Kuhnen and Niessen 2012).[1] Results reveal that, because both the value as well as the utility function of an employee depends upon employers' characteristics, labor and human capital are highly heterogeneous, i.e., matching firms with committed employees is far from being trivial (Frank and Obloj 2014; Lazear and Shaw 2007). Moreover, difficulties in performance measurement and a firm's inability to base employment agreements on employee's contribution to total value lead to a variety of incentive contracts involving pay for (objective or subjective) performance, asset ownership, and job design (Holmström and Milgrom 1994).

Fama (1980, 1991) follows Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) in that he views firms as an interplay of contracts between self-interested actors. Thereby, he provides a framework for distinct manifestations of employment contracts in consideration of internal and external labor markets. In this vein, the chapters of this thesis also emphasize the essential significance of self-interest and private returns of market actors. In the following, the Chapters I-III (Part B) are related to reflections of Fama (1991) and subsequent literature.

[1] Nevertheless, recent articles also stress the impact of corporate governance on lower level employees (Friebel and Guriev 2012; Marquis and Lee 2013; Werner, Tosi, and Gomez-Mejia 2005).

Initially, Fama (1991) focuses on the fixed payoffs from labor contracts, in particular on the choice between time contracts versus salary contracts.[2] He highlights the prevalence of time contracts for tasks with readily assessable outputs or tasks with inputs observable at low noise, and the use of salary contracts for jobs in which inputs are frequently unobservable and outputs are commonly affected by factors beyond the employee's control (Baker and Jorgensen 2003; Holmström 1982).[3]

Low-noise inputs or outputs enable the firm to force the employee to provide effort by the prospect of rewards or sanctions in the course of the subsequent contract; i.e., effort will be rewarded by higher wages in the subsequent contract, and shirking will be punished by lower wages (Harris and Raviv 1979).[4] To enforce pure salary agreements in jobs in which objective performance can be measured only imperfectly, Fama (1991) draws on a dynamic perspective that incorporates an employee's non-contractual career concerns. These concerns in terms of *multi*-period reputation effects may "force" the employee to supply adequate inputs and outputs, since *in the long run,* superior performance is assumed to lead to job offers with higher wages and lower performance is assumed to lead to poor wages, both on internal and external labor markets. Hence, according to Fama (1980), labor markets fully discipline employees without any additional incentive contract. Yet, Fama (1991) incorporates the results of Holmström (1982) and highlights that the effect of career concerns may lessen with age, as more experienced employees, and thus typically those that fill key positions, are closer to retirement.[5] Subsequent research confirmed both that career concerns matter (Bar-Isaac and Horner 2014;

[2] Time contracts tie pay to working hours; salaries depict a weekly or monthly payoff that does not vary with working hours (Fama 1991).

[3] As illustrative examples, Fama (1991) brings in blue-collar and clerical workers who are typically employed on the basis of time contracts and accountants, researchers, engineers, i.e., jobs with mainly intellectual tasks, for the case of salary contracts. "Noise" describes imprecision of information about individual effort or performance.

[4] While Fama (1991) views the prospect of recontracting as sufficient to make employees provide effort, other studies consider direct pay for performance schemes. For example, Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2007) found piece rates to enhance productivity compared to fixed wages. Lazear (2000) provides evidence that pay for performance increases work effort and supports appropriate employee selection. However, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) reveal that increasing productivity does not necessarily enhance profits.

[5] Holmström (1982) found that younger employees even work too hard in order to demonstrate their ability to the market.

Gibbons and Waldman 1999; Prendergast 1999) and that the importance of incentive payoffs varies with age (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Ortega 2003).

The economists Gibbons and Murphy draw on the reflections of Fama and Holmström and examine *explicit* incentives from compensation agreements and *implicit* incentives from career concerns in combination (Gibbons 1998; Gibbons and Murphy 1992). Gibbons (1998, 2005b) discusses repeated game models based on subjective performance measurement to illustrate the effect of concerns for reputation that underlie *relational contracts* and career models.[6]

Based on this literature, Chapter I (Part B) builds upon career concerns of employees, highlights the importance of private returns, and studies effects of employees' actions on business outcomes. Specifically, the chapter focuses on incentive structures that govern activities in news publishing and assesses whether certain journalistic or editorial strategies enhance shareholder value. As inputs and outputs of journalistic work are only measureable with high noise, media outlets usually pay their internal and permanently employed journalists a fixed salary.[7] Yet, results show that journalists are also affected by incentives that do not necessarily concur with increasing firm value. Rather, concerns for long-term reputation – not only on the internal but also on the external labor market – and private returns from stardom and product spinoffs considerably shape journalistic action.[8]

Likewise, Gibbons (1998) utilizes the multi-task models of Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and suggests that an employee's choice of action is not only influenced by the contractual compen-

[6] A relational contract involves a fixed base salary as well as a relational-contract bonus. The bonus is paid if high performance is achieved. Although evaluation of performance may be subjective, the firm's concern for its reputation in multi-period relationships may force it to honor the relational contract (Gibbons 2005b).

[7] A quote from Matthias Döpfner, CEO of Axel Springer Corporation, gives a striking impression of the way media outlets (are able to) monitor their reporters: "*I don't care where people do their job. It's okay if they hang around in a beach bar in Berlin drinking Caipirinha all day, but at the end of the week, supply a story that the entire public talks about. You have to decide whether you want good or obedient journalists.*" The original, "Mich interessiert nicht, wo die Leute arbeiten. Ist doch gut, wenn die in einer Strandbar in Berlin sitzen und den ganzen Tag Caipirinha trinken, aber am Ende der Woche eine Geschichte abliefern, über die die Republik redet. Man muss sich entscheiden, ob man gute oder gehorsame Journalisten will", is in German (see di Lorenzo 2012); translated by the author.

[8] Based on Rosen's hedonic price models (Rosen 1974; Thaler and Rosen 1976), recent research does frequently not focus only on monetary rewards, but also includes non-monetary incentives (Lazear and Shaw 2007).

sation from the firm but also by private returns, for example in that certain actions attract attention from other employers and thus increase the employee's market value. In a similar vein, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1999) employ a model that involves an "*uninformed boss*" who informally assigns authority to an agent to ratify projects, but threatens him to withdraw authority in case of poor performance. Among others, the authors consider those situations possible in case of investment opportunities that require immediate decision before they disappear and thus keep the principal (i.e., the boss) from a detailed analysis, as it is the case with particular sensational news stories (see Chapter I (Part B)). Holding returns from reputation and authority constant, large private returns from certain projects tempt the agent to renege on the informal agreement, even if reneging impairs the principal's business outcomes.

Chapter II (Part B) focuses on career paths of intellectuals within public media. While formal agreements between intellectuals – who are frequently asked to voice an opinion on contemporary events – and media outlets typically include not more than expense allowances, intellectuals are driven to perform (well) by the anticipation of considerable benefits from public attention, stardom, and reputation that "rub off" on their other activities, such as publication of nonfiction titles or giving talks and lectures; i.e., their behavior is mainly governed by chances for additional revenues from public attention in the long run. The chapter analyzes market evolution on a market for credence goods and takes the media's decision-making in terms of "worker selection" into account. Moreover, it addresses differences in intellectuals' sets of incentives and opportunity costs that arise due to "customization", for example in terms of the adjustment and translation of scientific insights and intellectual expertise into knowledge that is packaged in bite-sized pieces as usually demanded by mass media.

Similarly, Gibbons (1998) considers incentives for skill acquisition within firms and Gibbons (2005b) transfers the line of argument to supplier-purchaser relationships in terms of customization and acquisition of purchaser-specific knowledge. He discusses a promotion model based on Prendergast (1993). As outlined in Chapter II (Part B), an agent's opportunity

costs and expected payoffs determine whether the agent customizes; and the difference between agents' values for the firm affect the firm's worker selection. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994) and Kwon (2006) empirically addressed the interplay of productivity differences and wage variations. That is, while Chapter I (Part B) examines how firms treat and compensate their *internal* staff, Chapter II (Part B) emphasizes incentives and worker selection concerning *external* sources.[9]

Finally, Chapter III (Part B) deals with the importance of formal as well as relational governance mechanisms for interfirm relationship dynamics. When firms draw on external sources and transact with other firms, the organizational design of such relationships can take various forms, ranging from one-time market transactions to dyadic alliances to networks to virtual companies (Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006). Research on interorganizational long-term relations is increasingly influenced by the network form of organization that involves joint ventures, R&D agreements, licensing, franchising, supply chain networks, or distribution networks (Campbell, Datar, and Sandino 2009; Dahlstrom, McNeilly, and Speh 1996; Gulati 1995; McGee, Dowling, and Megginson 1995; Parkhe, Wasserman, and Ralston 2006; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011). While networks may provide advantages such as economies of scale, accelerated dissemination and replication of successful business models, or accumulation of specific market know-how, research points to considerable challenges in regard to coordination and control as well as concerning the trade-off between secured cooperation while preserving the advantages of decentralized decisions (Campbell, Datar, and Sandino 2009; Contractor, Wasserman, and Faust 2006; Gilliland and Kim 2014; Mittal, Kamakura, and Govind 2004).

The seminal reflections of Granovetter (1985, 2005) and Uzzi (1996) suggest that relational long-term transactions are enforced on a basis that differs from market transactions. Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) state that firms interact by the use of private enforcement mechanisms based on informal agreements and unwritten expectations that operate by holding out or

[9] However, this thesis does not intend to focus on the "make or buy"-decision, but refers to the groundbreaking work of Grossmann and Hart (1986) and Holmström and Milgrom (1994) as well as to empirical findings of, for example, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Baker and Hubbard (2003), instead.

jeopardizing the prospects for future benefits from the transaction. That is, relational contracts are not restricted to intrafirm relations but also apply to networks and durable supply chain relationships. Gibbons (2005b) shows that relational contracts allow firms to circumvent problems in formal contracting in interfirm exchanges by facilitating subjective assessments, informal agreements, and flexible adjustments to new information ex post. Accordingly, an increasing body of literature highlights the importance not only of formal provisions but also of relational long-term concerns for the evolution, maintenance, and performance of networks and channel structures (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Sheng et al. 2006; Wallenburg and Schäffler 2014). Chapter III (Part B) examines the role of formal rules and relational motives for the evolution of conflict between firms. The focus is on supply chain relationships in the grocery context.

Summed up, while Chapters I and II (Part B) provide evidence for the effects of certain incentive structures on business outcomes and market evolution from a market perspective, Chapter III (Part B) takes an empirical perspective towards the underlying management and control activities in interfirm exchanges.

II. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS AND CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

1. The Economics of Sensationalism: Media Strategy and Business Outcomes

"Truth is too simple for us: we do not like those who unmask our illusions"
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882)

It goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased demand and therefore commercial forces induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism. This notion may appear reasonable, even self-evident; as newspaper margins are generally low, selling advertising space becomes a central source of newspaper profits, and such space sells better if circulation is high (Germano 2013; McChesney 1987; Sun and Zhu 2013).

Thus, publishers may try to increase circulation and – with the growing prevalence of the Internet – online traffic volume with sensational news catering to readers' need for entertainment in order to increase profits (Jensen 1979). Moreover, besides media outlets, advertisers or journalists may benefit from sensationalized news coverage. Since advertising fees in print media are fixed in the short run, advertisers would receive the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay for in case of temporary sales boosts. Finally, journalists may have their own ideological preferences, strive for attention and personal fame to improve their career perspectives, and, therefore, favor reports on scandals (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Dunham 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, 2010).

However, who actually benefits, and to what extent, by reporting on alleged "scandals" remains largely unclear to date. Consequently, this study evaluates the business outcomes of the most spectacular German scandal in recent decades. Thereby, it seeks to enhance the current understanding of linkages between editorial strategies, market reception, and business outcomes in news publishing. The chapter focuses on the exceptional scandal surrounding Germany's former Federal President Christian Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits and bribery while in public office and was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers have claimed that the German tabloid BILD made substantial profits after it became the driving force in re-

porting on, even *producing,* the Wulff scandal. This study focuses on the BILD tabloid. An event-study approach (Brown and Warner 1985; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010; McChesney 1987) and econometric GARCH models (Bollerslev 1986; Charles and Darne 2014) explore whether over the "scandal lifecycle" there is any "first mover advantage" for BILD or BILD's publisher that translates into profit in terms of an increase in circulation, additional traffic on BILD's website, or superior share price performance. Moreover, the chapter looks at what journalists can gain from scandal reporting and whether advertisers are able to derive any benefit from sensationalized news coverage.

The results provide an explanation for an intentional lack of thoroughly researched stories that are costly to produce because news corporations, as well as advertisers, come away empty-handed. In contrast to public opinion, there is no evidence that the Axel Springer Corporation profited from the Wulff scandal in any monetary terms. That is, moving first does not necessarily enhance profits as is commonly assumed, but rather incurs sizeable risks due to the high fixed costs of uncovering news and missing copyright regulations for the public good. Instead, sensationalism appears to be incited by self-seeking journalists that enhance their career perspectives and capture considerable private returns.

The contribution of the first chapter is the following:

- First, despite the prevalence of sensationalism in print media, the question of what can actually be gained from scandal reports remains surprisingly unanswered to date. Consequently, various arguments on sources of "inaccuracies" in news coverage are integrated by studying journalistic action in the context of economics (Besley and Prat 2006; Djankov et al. 2003). The focus is on demand-induced biases that may indeed result in improved business outcomes (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) as well as on supply-induced biases that rather provide (non-)monetary private returns for reporters and journalists (Baron 2006). Thereby, the approach offers insights into the incentive structures in news publishing and highlights challenges concerning the governance of self-seeking employees.

- Second, while the literature has discussed benefits of investigative journalism (Hamilton 2007; Logan and Sutter 2004), results provide reasons for an intentional lack of supplying such. They contradict public wisdom, which holds that publishers *produce* scandals to benefit monetarily. Thereby, the findings offer novel insights into a more effective resource allocation and market positioning to media experts, as well as into market prospects and business model opportunities concerning (investigative) journalism for news media in general.

- Third, while prior evidence examined the effect of sensationalism on business outcomes of highly regarded papers (McChesney 1987), this study extends that approach and is able to make a point for tabloids. Thereby, the analyses do not only consider circulation, but also daily information on share prices as well as data on online traffic volume. Hence, the study is able to account for the dissemination of news through various channels, which is particularly interesting in light of the increasing prevalence of online news services.

- Finally, implications for advertisers are provided as results suggest that "first movers" do not necessarily attract more readers and thus their advertising space is not necessarily more valuable.

Thereby, this chapter reveals drivers and incentive structures in news publishing and links editorial and journalistic strategies to business outcomes and private returns of various market actors:

1. What motivates editorial strategies and journalistic activity? What information becomes news?

2. Do investors consider the approach of covering events over the "scandal lifecycle" and overhyping related incidents as financially promising? Do they expect any additional revenues from the Wulff scandal?

3. Does coverage of alleged scandals indeed result in increased demand from the reading public, and does it, thereby, maximize a publisher's profit (*demand-induced biases*)? Or

is it rather the journalists who have a strong motive to engage in sensationalism to improve their (future) pecuniary or nonpecuniary income (which does not necessarily increase demand and, in turn, publisher's profits; *supply-induced biases*)? Or, ultimately, do only advertisers benefit from the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay for?

2. Quality Kills the Mediastar? Career Paths of Public Intellectuals

"How men long for celebrity! Some would willingly sacrifice their lives for fame, and not a few would rather be known by their crimes than not known at all."
John Sinclair (1754-1835)

Research as well as media practitioners increasingly criticize phenomena like the medialization and flattening of society, or the downturn in "quality journalism", especially within an area that used to be ruled by "the educated people": the domain of public intellectuals (Gattone 2012; Hamilton 2007; Jacoby 1987; Posner 2001).[10] This study adopts an economic perspective and considers demand and supply of intellectual output from a market perspective. On the demand side, media companies such as newspapers and TV stations act as gatekeepers for public intellectual content and have to fill newspaper op-ed pages, book sections, and airtime (Misztal 2012).[11] On the supply side, freelance intellectuals or academics that are affiliated to universities may appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences und thus decide to perform on the public stage.

Our data suggest that the market for public intellectuals yields few omnipresent "*media stars*" that are able to cover the market to a large extent. According to Adler (1985) and Rosen (1981), such a "*superstar status*" may lead to disproportional increases in monetary or psychological income. In case of high market concentration, stars may be able to attain larger market shares at costs that grow much less than proportionate (Rosen 1981), and acquire parts of customers' cost savings that result from a reduction in media's search effort (Adler 1985).

Assuming disproportionate returns for superstars, the basic question concerning the market for public intellectual output is: What separates the *media stars* from the *long tail* of *media midg-*

[10] In this regard, "medialization and flattening of society" depict the notion that public opinion forming increasingly follows the suggestions of mass media.

[11] Op-ed pages (short form of "opposite the editor pages") in newspapers or magazines are usually located opposite the editorial page and provide space for personal opinions and statements of named authors that describe their point of view on contemporary developments.

ets?[12] Therefore, the study looks at the careers of scholars and pundits in a market that shows characteristics similar to "*winner-takes-all-markets"* (Frank and Cook 1995). Basically, there are two options to initiate a career in the market for public intellectuals: Either, stardom can be based on profound knowledge (i.e., "specialization" in a particular topic); or, it can be based on "relentless" self-marketing (which does not necessarily require any knowledge at all). That is, the analysis pays attention to an economic issue of universal interest (Ferreira and Sah 2012): Does it pay off to further perfect your skills and to engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset and to grab any chance for publicity and media attention? Therefore, effects of demand and supply preferences on career opportunities and choices of intellectuals are analyzed. Moreover, the study addresses the challenge of "quality measurement" of intellectual output. Since intellectual output represents a credence good, similar to used cars, surgical treatments, or artistic performances, quality is, at least for the average individual, difficult to monitor. A discussion of instruments that may signal quality within intellectual discourse addresses this difficulty and derives implications for the development of quality through market evolution.

Results show that engaging in self-marketing disproportionately enhances the odds for public stardom, i.e., incentives and options for performing publicly increase with differentiation, even if intellectuals go beyond their area of expertise. However, mass media do not necessarily act irrationally when giving credence to few *media stars* that operate beyond their capabilities. The public and the media seem to value entertainment higher than information and primarily aim at reducing search costs; in contrast, being well and reliably informed about contemporary events hardly yields any benefits for the average media customer (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). On the supply side, data suggest that distinguished academics do not necessarily perform within the public sphere since they face considerable opportunity costs. Preparing and accomplishing public performances seem to come at the expense of scholarly work. As has become obvious in

[12] The long tail refers to the low-frequency population of a power law distribution that asymptotically approaches the horizontal axis. Chris Anderson applied the long tail phenomenon to business contexts and especially highlights the importance of "*long tail*" products for online business models (Anderson 2006): "*The era of one-size-fits-all is ending, and in its place is something new, a market of multitudes*."

recent years, increased specialization of knowledge and increased competition for publication in peer-reviewed journals for scientists leave no time for simultaneously taking part in public "intellectual" discourses.

The contribution of the second chapter is the following:

- First, in case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with instruments that improve customer's confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, consumer intermediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Posner 2001). While those tools are hardly applicable to the market for public intellectual output, this chapter discusses the problem of quality measurement.

- Second, although the chapter is based on Posner (2001), it extends his rather morally-based perspective on the decline in intellectuals' output in that it focuses on the economic reasoning for media presence of intellectuals. On the demand side, results highlight the importance of search costs on markets for credence goods. On the supply side, differences in opportunity costs restrain the majority of "true" intellectuals from careers in mass media.

- Third, Posner (2001) claims to conduct "*A Study of Decline*" but actually takes a non-dynamic empirical approach. This analysis identifies discriminants that create and destroy the chances for intellectual stardom, both static and over time.

- Finally, during the last decades, a large number of markets developed into "*winner-takes-all-markets*" (Frank and Cook 1995). In this regard, various studies empirically applied superstar theories to markets for entertainment goods (Ehrmann, Meiseberg, and Ritz 2009; Nelson and Glotfelty 2012; Walls 2010). This study applies superstar theory to a market that originally was supposed to focus on knowledge maximization instead of entertainment. However, results underline the notion that news and intellectual statements may increasingly be regarded from the perspective of "showbiz" (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005).

Thereby, this chapter provides insights into the evolution of a market for credence goods and gives a rational explanation for the matching of demand and supply by emphasizing certain cost and incentive structures of market actors:

1. What instruments on the market for public intellectual output may signal quality and thus increase customers' benefit or decrease their search costs, respectively?

2. What separates the media stars from the long tail of media midgets? Does it pay off to further engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset by engaging in self-marketing?

3. Have those factors that increase or decrease the chances for public stardom changed during the last years?

4. What do media markets focus on – information or entertainment?

3. Dynamics of Conflict in Supply Chain Relationships and the Importance of Governance Mechanisms

"Coming together is a beginning.
Keeping together is progress.
Working together is success."
Henry Ford (1863-1947)

Commercial exchanges between firms are increasingly looked upon in the context of relational structures rather than as arm's length one-time transactions (Lafontaine and Slade 2010). One of the inherent characteristics of such relationships is the occurrence of conflicts and disputes between exchange partners (Frazier 1999). Since it could impair the mutual benefits from the exchange relationship and lower the partners' commitment to each other, conflict is a widely recognized indicator for relationship performance (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Especially today's frequently changing business practices and the increasing prevalence of multichannel strategies that aim at bypassing distributors and retailers result in higher conflict among long-established partners. Hence, understanding and managing the evolution of conflict becomes crucial for practitioners in order to maintain their vertical supply chain relationships (Ganesan et al. 2009).

The construct of conflict received a lot of attention in past research on *intra*firm (Amason 1996; Barki and Hartwick 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Langfred 2007) as well as *inter*firm relationships (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier et al. 2006; Winsor et al. 2012). Studies on the management of interfirm conflict especially focus on buyer-supplier relationships (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011). Yet, although scholars have called emphatically for considering the *dynamics of conflict*, empirical investigations of interfirm conflict development and factors influencing transitions through various stages of conflict are scarce. Consequently, this study explores the evolutionary dynamics of conflict in supply chain relationships, for what is ostensibly the first time based on all the five states of conflict development as pro-

posed by the "dominant process model" (Pondy 1967). It is argued that the selection and implementation of formal as well as relational governance mechanisms are central drivers of conflict transitions (Ganesan et al. 2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Relational approaches recognize that agreements between firms are governed and enforced by not only formal hierarchy, rules and authority, but also by holding out the prospect of benefits from future transactions, assured by informal agreements and unwritten relational norms that affect exchange partners' actions (Gibbons 2005a).

Therefore, based on extensive longitudinal data from retailers of Germany's two largest grocery chains, several competing structural equation models are employed to examine conflict from a process perspective and to provide insights into the relative importance of governance mechanisms over the conflict "lifecycle". While formal governance mechanisms appear to limit the evolution of task-related disagreements effectively, relational governance mechanisms come in useful for mitigating the escalation of conflicts and for keeping discussions on a technical level. Yet, if affective sentiments prevail, the effectiveness of relational governance mechanisms turns out to be impaired or even reversed.

The contribution of the second chapter is the following:

- First, to capture the dynamics of conflict, this study incorporates ostensibly for the first time all five states of conflict in reference to the well-established model by Pondy (1967). Thereby, the chapter departs from Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006), who also consider formal and informal governance mechanisms in supply chain relationships simultaneously but neglect the procedural character of conflict. Hence, the chapter follows Palmatier et al. (2013) by drawing on relationship dynamics.

- Second, while it is pretty much accepted that conflict inexorably passes through distinct states, the focus of this study is on variables that may limit or speed up the transition from one state of conflict to the next, which improves the understanding and synthesis of prior insights.

- Third, following the claims of scholars of organizational economics as well as of marketing and supply chain management, the approach of this chapter empirically enriches the underexplored phenomenon of relational exchange and simultaneously considers formal bureaucratic structures and informal relational patterns to explain behaviors within interfirm exchanges (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Blome, Schoenherr, and Kaesser 2013; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002).

- Fourth, while most research on buyer-supplier relationships has drawn on data from the US market, this analysis contributes to a more holistic view since the analyses are based on a European context.

- Finally, a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implications not only for future research, but also for practitioners in terms of managing conflict by effectively governing and organizing supply chains.

Thereby, this chapter gives heed to a more sophisticated understanding of the evolution of interfirm conflict, considers contingent factors of relationship dynamics, and provides implications for how to arrange buyer-supplier relationships:

1. Does conflict inexorably evolve thorough distinct stages? Or are organizational characteristics able to affect the dynamics of conflict?

2. What about the relative importance of formal and relational governance mechanisms within interfirm exchanges?

3. How can managers effectively govern their long-term transactions with suppliers and customers in light of conflict evolution?

III. INTEGRATIVE FRAMEWORK

The core of this dissertation contains three main chapters. Based on the concept of corporate governance, these chapters are interconnected by the idea of analyzing organizational structures, incentives, and monitoring capabilities within economic exchange relationships. Figure 1 illustrates the framework and the organization of chapters. By studying exchange relationships from a market perspective, the research framework considers market evolution as well as business outcomes of transactions among self-interested market actors and pays attention to the ways firms select, monitor, and reward internal and external staff. Moreover, from an organizational perspective, the framework looks upon the underlying management and control activities that affect interfirm exchanges and thereby sheds light on the importance of governance mechanisms for relationship dynamics.



Figure 1: Integrative Framework

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PART B

I. THE ECONOMICS OF SENSATIONALISM: MEDIA STRATEGY AND BUSINESS OUTCOMES

"Truth is too simple for us: we do not like those who unmask our illusions"
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882)

1. Abstract

It goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased demand and therefore commercial forces induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism. However, who actually benefits, and to what extent, by reporting on alleged "scandals" remains largely unclear. Accordingly, this study evaluates the business outcomes of the most spectacular German scandal in recent decades. The results provide an explanation for an intentional lack of investigative journalism; while news corporations, as well as advertisers, come away empty-handed, sensationalism appears to be incited by self-seeking journalists.[13]

[13] A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Prof. Dr. T. Ehrmann) at the *EJO Conference, Daimler und Benz Foundation,* Berlin (09/2013).

2. Introduction

Media coverage of alleged "scandals" in public life has increased considerably in recent decades. In particular, tabloid papers have faced criticism for engaging in "sensationalism", where news stories are overhyped to increase consumer attention and newspaper circulation (Tjernstrom 2002). Reporters *slant* their stories, often in an exaggerated or trivial manner: That is, they tend to ignore facts that run counter to their stream of argument, or they over-report on matters that are insignificant to society at large (Baron 2006; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Hamilton 2004; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005).

Celebrities such as sport-VIPs, actors, or politicians find themselves in hyped and overinflated media reports; examples such as Tiger Woods, Charlie Sheen, or Bill Clinton abound. It has long been assumed that publishers focus on reporting such "scandals" to increase profits (Logan and Sutter 2004; McChesney 1987). This notion may appear reasonable, even self-evident; as newspaper margins are generally low, selling advertising space becomes a central source of newspaper profits, and such space sells better if circulation is high (Germano 2013; McChesney 1987; Sun and Zhu 2013).

Thus, publishers may try to increase circulation and – with the growing prevalence of the Internet – online traffic volume with sensational news catering to readers' need for entertainment (Jensen 1979). Yet, advertising fees in print media are usually fixed in the short run. Therefore, in the case of temporary sales boosts, only advertisers would receive the windfalls of greater audiences than they had paid for. Finally, editors and journalists may have their own ideological preferences, strive for attention and personal fame to improve their career perspectives and, therefore, favor reports on scandals (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Dunham 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006, 2010).

However, who actually benefits from newspaper reports on scandals remains largely unclear. Consequently, we study the *economics of sensationalism*, focusing on the following three questions: 1) Does coverage of alleged scandals indeed result in increased demand from the reading public, and does it, thereby, maximize a publisher's profit (*demand-induced slanting*)? Or, 2) Is

it rather the journalists who have a strong motive to engage in sensationalism to improve their (future) pecuniary or nonpecuniary income (which does not necessarily increase demand and, in turn, publisher's profits; *supply-induced slanting*)? Or, 3) Ultimately, do only advertisers benefit from the windfalls of greater audiences than they pay for?

We focus on the exceptional scandal surrounding Germany's former Federal President Christian Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits and bribery in public office and was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers have claimed that the German tabloid BILD made substantial profits after it became the driving force in reporting on, even *producing*, the Wulff scandal.

For our study, we focus on the BILD tabloid. First, we identified outstanding events in the course of the Wulff scandal. Next, we assembled daily data on the BILD publisher's stock market performance and figures for the tabloid's circulation; we also recorded traffic at BILD's web portal. We apply an event-study approach (Brown and Warner 1985; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010; McChesney 1987) to explore whether over the "scandal lifecycle" there is any "first mover advantage" for BILD or BILD's publisher that translates into profit. Additionally, we employ econometric Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) modeling (Bollerslev 1986) to verify the findings of the standard event-study approach. Moreover, we study what journalists can gain from scandal reporting (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999; Gibbons 1998; Holmström and Milgrom 1991).

Our study seeks to enhance the current understanding of linkages between editorial strategies, market reception, and business outcomes in news publishing. Despite the prevalence of sensationalism in print media, the question of what can actually be gained from scandal reports remains surprisingly unanswered to date. Our results reveal that sensational news and disclosure of political scandals hardly affect business outcomes of news outlets. Hence, the results contradict public wisdom, which holds that publishers *produce* scandals to benefit monetarily. While the literature has discussed the benefits of investigative journalism (Hamilton 2007; Logan and Sutter 2004), we provide reasons for an intentional lack of supplying such. Thereby, we con-

tribute to a more complete picture of the benefits of different editorial strategies. In addition, we integrate arguments regarding sources of "inaccuracies" in news coverage by studying both journalistic action in the context of economics and the impact of self-seeking journalists on newspaper content (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Djankov et al. 2003). Finally, we provide implications for advertisers, as results suggest that "first mover" advertising space is not necessarily more valuable.

Next, we describe the economics of news and elaborate on biases within news coverage. After defining our research questions, we describe our data and research methodology. Finally, we present and discuss our results and conclusions.

3. Conceptual Background: The Economics of News

The market for newspapers represents a two-sided platform (Armstrong 2006; Rochet and Tirole 2006). That is, newspapers offer two joint products, journalistic content and advertising space, to different sets of customers, readers and advertisers, on the basis of one physical good (Blankenburg and Friend 1994). Consumers' demand, i.e., circulation, constitutes the link between revenues from sales and from advertising (Corden 1952). However, because readers value not only information but also entertainment (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005), political issues may be sensationalized to satisfy readers' needs for amusement (Hamilton 2007).

For news corporations, the production of news involves a high fixed-to-marginal costs ratio. All else equal, news suppliers should prefer news that is cheaper to produce. This tendency strengthens due to the public good character of news (Hamilton 2004); once information is released, competitors can free ride on investigation efforts and publish the same information (perhaps in slightly changed livery).

For consumers, similarly to other entertainment services, news represents an experience good with multidimensional characteristics, the quality of which is difficult to assess (Fan 2013; Hamilton 2004). Accordingly, a newspaper's reputation and its brand positioning can help reduce consumers' purchase uncertainty (Akerlof 1970) as well as their search costs to find a news outlet that typically offers the particular type of information or entertainment value they most desire.

With those product characteristics in mind, according to Hamilton (2004), which information and events become "news" most likely depends upon their profit potential from the publisher's perspective – but also from the viewpoint of the journalists who ultimately provide the storyline. However, these two perspectives do not necessarily concur.

3.1 Demand-Induced Sensationalism

Following previous literature, publishers' primary focus is usually on profit maximization, rather than on knowledge maximization, by increasing newspaper demand (McManus 1994;

Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Schoenbach 2004).[14] First, increased circulation leads to increased turnover from sales (Corden 1952). Second, advertisers value access to large audiences (Ellman and Germano 2009). Thus, increased circulation allows charging higher prices for advertising space.[15] Consequently, publishers may have an incentive to slant and sensationalize stories to cater to readers' demand for entertainment, simultaneously downgrading information to a by-product (Jensen 1979; McManus 1994; Rothbauer and Sieg 2013; Schoenbach 2004; Suen 2004); in Jay Leno's words: "*politics is just show business for ugly people*". Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) applied Hotelling models to illustrate that newspapers tend to follow readers' prior beliefs rather than confronting them with new and contradictory information, reducing readers' "transportation costs". In doing so, outlets strategically position themselves in the market and develop into "brands", reducing readers' search costs to find a news provider that caters to their tastes (Hamilton 2004).

Considering news an experience good, Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006; 2010) empirically confirm that biases in news coverage often result from the motivation to develop a certain newspaper reputation and thereby increase circulation. Yet, establishing a brand name narrows the range of "product characteristics" a news outlet can efficiently offer; i.e., not every type of news is indeed profitable for a particular outlet to publish (e.g., highly detailed scientific content is unlikely to meet readers' interests for tabloids that usually cover stars' private life stories, soccer events, fashion and the like).

In particular, investigative stories centering on politics, politicians or government officials involve considerable editorial resources and, therefore, are quite costly for news outlets to pro-

[14] Current theory (Hamilton 2010) and empirical research (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010) argue that non-monetary incentives for news corporation owners today are almost negligible. While, of course, business practices do not *always* have to be motivated primarily by profit, we follow the literature and assume that economic logic largely determines newspaper content ("giving the audience what it wants"). Even if profit motives are not the primary focus, economic motives play an essential role to the extent that newspapers still at least must *recover their expenses*. This imperative requires them to follow an economic orientation (Alchian 1950; Becker 1962).

[15] We abstract from preferences of advertisers towards specific groups of readers (Hamilton 2010).

duce.[16] Moreover, once such news is public, competitors can easily steal parts of the rents by also covering the story – which, in turn, may keep outlets from making high investments in such stories, instead favoring "pack journalism".

Accordingly, dropping margins, lower entry barriers and overcapacity (for news content *and* advertising space) may increase the pressure to follow readers' preferences to ensure meeting circulation goals (Hamilton 2010). As suggested by the notion of "rational ignorance", this may especially be the case for news on public affairs because consumers are unwilling to pay for societal benefits (Downs 1957; Hamilton 2004). Hence, whether there is any "first-mover advantage" for media outlets from uncovering a political scandal remains unclear.

3.2 Supply-Induced Sensationalism

While in public opinion it goes nearly unchallenged that ambition for increased *demand* and thus commercial forces induce newspapers to engage in sensationalism, we also consider reasons that cause *supply*-induced biases that may result from (non)pecuniary incentives for journalists or editors (see also Balan, DeGraba, and Wickelgren 2009; Baron 2006; Djankov et al. 2003; Dunham 2013; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Hamilton 2004; Jung 2009; Larcinese, Puglisi, and Snyder 2011; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002; Tjernstrom 2002). Just as employees in other jobs with information asymmetries, journalists may act in a self-serving manner to capture additional (monetary and non-monetary) rents that do not necessarily maximize their outlets' profits (Baron 2006; Gibbons 1998): They may compete for page one stories with other journalists, aim at winning journalism awards, or strive for personal stardom to advance their career prospects. Similar to outlets' reputation, personal brand name capital may translate into increased salaries or product spinoffs such as book publications (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006; Hamilton 2004, 2007) – just think of the Woodward-Bernstein story (Jensen 1979). Therefore, journalists may have profound private incentives to uncover sensational news.

[16] Hamilton (2010) suggests that costs for producing an investigative story may reach $200,000 for a three-days-series comprising approximately ten articles.

Yet, not only for outlets but also for journalists, gathering information and composing attractive stories about public affairs require substantial effort. However, if they successfully expose a sensational story, they can increase their brand name capital considerably (Hamilton 2004); e.g., juries rewarding journalistic work are assumed to prefer honoring the reporters who initially took charge of a story rather than any "free-riders" copying them afterwards.

Here, we do not solely focus on pecuniary rewards for news corporations, their owners, and advertising clients, but rather also take into account supply-induced biases.

4. The Marginal Value of the Wulff Scandal

If sensational events boost newspaper demand and, thereby, newspaper profits, newspapers would have strong incentives to not only cover but engage in sensationalism, i.e., in overhyping stories and events, to "*produce*" scandals (Jensen 1979). The scandal that attracted the most attention in Germany in recent decades involves the incidents surrounding Germany's former Federal President Christian Wulff, who was accused of the unlawful acceptance of benefits while in public office and was finally forced to resign. Several newspapers and blogs have claimed that the German tabloid BILD, which belongs to the Axel Springer Corporation, made substantial profits after it became the driving force in uncovering (or even producing) this scandal.[17]

The development of the affair shows conspicuous characteristics of an ideal "scandal lifecycle", formerly observed during several political scandals. Initially, BILD revealed that Wulff received a loan from some businessperson under noticeably favorable conditions, supposedly in return for some political favor. Shortly before the story was published, Wulff left BILD's editor a voicemail and tried to threaten him into stopping the release. However, BILD published the voicemail along with the story, thereby playing the central role in "uncovering" the scandal. This makes this particular tabloid a prime case to study in the context of slanting and sensationalism; that is, if news outlets can actually gain by engaging in scandal reporting, BILD should certainly have been able to do so.

Other newspapers followed BILD and reported further accusations concerning questionable business deals and alleged bribery involving Wulff in multiple cases*;* the "scandal lifecycle" gathered momentum. Wulff resigned about two months after the initial article had been published. Afterwards, the media focused on the legal proceedings and continued to report on Wulff's private life (as well as his spouse's, and the later divorce of the couple). Yet, after

[17] BILD is Germany's only nationwide tabloid, with a circulation of approximately 2.4 million (Sundays: 1.3 million). BILD is the largest newspaper in terms of circulation in Germany and has long been the leader in terms of circulation of all daily newspapers across Europe. Subscriptions account for less than 2% of sales (Sunday paper). Style, readership, and outreach are most similar to the British "Sun", the Austrian "Kronen Zeitung", or the Swiss "BLICK". In the United States, the "New York Post" may be the most comparable to BILD.

months of work by 24 investigators, 75 dossiers, and 120 reports of witnesses, the only thing that remained that was relevant from a legal perspective were two "suspicious" overnight stays at a hotel (amounting to less than 1,000 €). Ultimately, Wulff was acquitted, underscoring the suggestion that news suppliers sensationalized the story.

Still, whether BILD indeed gained additional revenues from covering the alleged "scandal" remains unanswered to date. While historical evidence suggests that the "yellow journalists" were able to boost circulation but at the bottom line even lost profits during the Spanish-American War (Lee 1937), McChesney (1987) found no evidence for any additional earnings from Watergate for the newspaper in charge, the Washington Post. In contrast, Woodward and Bernstein, the journalists who uncovered the story, apparently received significant private benefits (Jensen 1979). In this study, we expand previous approaches and take a more nuanced view of the effects of scandal reporting on newspaper's revenues. Today, most news corporations offer their news via print media as well as online. Hence, they can increase their revenues either by boosting a paper's circulation (via increasing sales and advertising revenues) or by attracting more online users.[18] Additionally, we consider the possibility of supply-induced sensationalism, i.e., producing "scandals" because of (non)pecuniary incentives for journalists or editors.

Compared with news typically covered by BILD (e.g., entertainment stars, social life, sports – a quarter of BILD's 1,000 permanently employed journalists cover sports topics – motorcars, self-help, simplified, and low-detail/easy-content stories on current political/health/monetary topics), BILD's coverage of the Wulff scandal can be considered a type of product differentiation. In fact, it could be considered the maximum possible one as, by covering the Wulff story, BILD engaged in politics reporting much more deeply than previously, suddenly "competing" with highly regarded news magazines such as the German SPIEGEL. Accordingly, one would assume that the market should respond to this change in editorial strategy if it expects any effect on BILD's profitability (Carter, Dark, and Singh 1998; Horner 2002; Klein and Leffler 1981). As the Axel Springer Corporation (the BILD publishing house) is market listed, one would

[18] Printed versions are paid per each, with fixed short-run revenues from advertisement; online content is mostly free, with advertising fees that are usually paid per 1,000 clicks.

assume an adjustment of share prices (Fama 1965; Fama et al. 1969). Taking the opposite perspective, Anderson (2004) showed that the market punishes overly flawed, or false, news coverage with dropping stock market prices.

While effects are assumed to fade out over time – as people "forget" and news outlets reposition themselves in the market – making long-term effects unlikely, we focus on circulation, online traffic, and share prices to try detect evidence that indicates at least (short-term) profits from reporting on the scandal.

Accordingly, our research questions are:

Research Question 1. Did the coverage of the Wulff scandal indeed produce increased demand from readership or advertisers, reflected by an increase in a) BILD's circulation, b) BILD's online traffic volume, or c) Axel Springer Corporation's market value?

Considering supply-induced sensationalism, we also explore whether journalists profited from the scandal. That is, we assess whether there is any evidence suggesting that journalists enhanced their (non-)monetary income (Baron 2006; Besley and Prat 2006).

Research Question 2. Did journalists profit from the coverage of the Wulff scandal?

Prices for advertising space in print media remain constant in the short term; i.e., they are not adjustable in response to unexpected increases in circulation. Hence, we assess whether there is any chance for advertisers to capture the windfalls of a greater audience than they usually pay for (McChesney 1987).

Research Question 3. Did BILD's advertising clients receive the windfalls of greater audiences than they had paid for?

5. Data and Methods

5.1 Data

We initially compared existing chronologies of the Wulff scandal from different media outlets to identify outstanding events that may have any effect on the demand for BILD. Additionally, we conducted a thorough search in LexisNexis to avoid missing any events and to double-check that we assigned every event to the right date. We identified 71 specific events from December 2011 to April 2013 (see Appendix A, Table 18). Concerning potential effects on Springer's stock prices, we assigned every event to the first trading day that the information could be integrated in the share price.[19] Because some events belong to the same trading day, the GARCH models involve 58 event dates. Moreover, the GARCH approach controls for confounding events.[20] To avoid biased results from the standard event-study approach, we exclude those events that coincide with confounding events, which finally leaves a sample of 43 event dates for the financial market analysis.[21] We obtained historical data on the Axel Springer Corporation's stock prices as well as on different market indices (HDAX, DAXsector media) from *Datastream* (Thomson Reuters).[22]

For the analysis of abnormal increases in sales, we focus on BILD's Sunday paper and obtain weekly data on BILD's circulation from the German IVW.[23] Every event or information that became public between Sunday and Saturday was attributed to the following Sunday edition. Due to multiple events within one week and after controlling for the New Year effect in 2012 (confounding event), the final sample of events for the analysis of circulation consisted of 25 event weeks.

[19] Events after closing of the stock exchange, on weekends, or on holidays are assigned to the next trading day.

[20] We control for publications of financial reports by Springer and changes in the Corporation's supervisory board (time frame: +/- 5 days around the events).

[21] We exclude events that coincide with confounding events within a time frame of +/- 5 days around the events (see Appendix A, Table 18 for excluded events).

[22] The HDAX includes the 110 largest assets of the German Prime Standard and covers 95% of market capital. The DAXsector media includes 12 German assets that operate in the media sector.

[23] Axel Springer Corporation does not publish data on daily circulation. Hence, we used weekly data for the Sunday paper from the *IVW*, which corresponds to the *AAM* in the United States or the *ABC* in the United Kingdom.

Moreover, the IVW publishes monthly figures on visitors to a broad range of websites. We requested data on visits to BILD's website as well as to the websites of BILD's peers, which include the websites of *SPIEGEL, FOCUS, WELT,* and *STERN*. To provide a benchmark index for the event-study approach, we calculated the unweighted average of visits to peers' websites. All events were assigned to the month in which they occurred. We tested 14 event months for abnormal reactions in online traffic.

5.2 Event-Study Methodology

To examine whether the Axel Springer Corporation profited from the Wulff scandal (*RQ1c*), we employ an event-study approach. The objective of event-studies is to determine whether an event causes abnormal reactions within a time series of returns (Brown and Warner 1985; McWilliams and Siegel 1997). Developed for financial market analyses, the underlying assumption is based on the efficient-market hypothesis, which implies that share prices immediately incorporate all publicly available information. Thus, the price of a security reflects the value of all future cash flows the firm is assumed to generate (Fama et al. 1969; Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe 2002).

Using this methodology, we explore whether investors consider the approach of covering events over the "scandal lifecycle" and overhyping related incidents as financially promising and thus whether they expect any additional revenues from the Wulff scandal (Agrawal and Kamakura 1995). Moreover, we transfer the event-study concept to time series data other than the share prices, i.e., to the development of abnormal "returns" concerning BILD's circulation (*RQ1a*) and online traffic (*RQ1b*).

Returns on a specific share represent the relative change in share prices:[24]

$$R_{it} = \frac{P_{it} - P_{it-1}}{P_{it-1}}, \quad (1)$$

[24] We use the terminology of financial market analysis, describing the event-study methodology by means of stock prices. However, when applying the procedure to the analyses of circulation or online traffic, "returns" correspond to increases in circulation or online traffic, respectively.

where P_{it} represents the share price of asset i at day t, which is the offset relative to the event date. Hence, returns account for new information published between days t and $t-1$. *Normal returns* for asset i are estimated from the share price performance within an estimation period that precedes the event date. Then, *abnormal returns* (AR) are equivalent to the difference between *actual returns* (R) and *normal returns* (NR):

$$AR_{it} = R_{it} - NR_{it}. \quad (2)$$

We refer to the *constant mean return model* and to the *market model* to estimate *normal returns* (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). The *constant mean return model* assumes that the mean of returns for asset i is constant over time; i.e., *normal returns* represent the average of returns within the estimation period:

$$NR_{it} = \frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T} R_{it}, \quad (3)$$

where T depicts the number of days in the estimation period. However, if a benchmark index is available, the *market model* is preferred over the *constant mean return model*. Then, daily *returns* of asset i can be expressed as follows:

$$R_{it} = \alpha_i + \beta_i R_{mt} + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (4)$$

where R_{mt} is the return on a market index of assets on day t, α is the intercept, β is the systematic risk of asset i, and ε is the error term, with an expected value of zero. The estimates of daily *abnormal returns* are given as follows:

$$AR_{it} = R_{it} - (\hat{\alpha}_i + \hat{\beta}_i R_{mt}), \quad (5)$$

where $\hat{\alpha}$ and $\hat{\beta}$ are estimated from an OLS regression of R_{it} on R_{mt} over the estimation period, and AR_{it} represents the prediction error that is assumed to result from the event at time t (McWilliams and Siegel 1997).

To account for possible violations of the efficient-market assumption, we consider multi-day event windows (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010). *Cumulative abnormal returns* for an event window that ranges from t_1 to t_2 [t_1; t_2] are calculated as follows:

$$CAR_i(t_1, t_2) = \sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} AR_{it}. \quad (6)$$

Moreover, we determine *average abnormal returns* to examine whether the effects of the N events are systematically displaced relative to the event day:

$$AAR_t = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it}. \quad (7)$$

Finally, we construct *cumulative average abnormal returns* for various event windows to assess the holistic influence of events over the "scandal lifecycle":

$$CAAR = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it}. \quad (8)$$

We employ parametric as well as non-parametric test statistics to rule out non-normality in the distribution of excess returns. With regard to parametric tests, we refer to the statistic of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and its extensions (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010; Kolari and Pynnönen 2010). That is, we correct for event-induced changes in variance and for potential autocorrelation of returns (Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti 2010). In the case of multi-day event windows, we correct for serial dependence in accordance with Mikkelson and Partch (1988). To test for significance of average abnormal returns across several events, we apply an adjustment of the statistic of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991); i.e., we correct for cross-correlations among estimation periods' residuals following Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). We compute standardized statistics for cumulative average abnormal returns in accordance with Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). Because benchmark data were available on a quarterly basis only, we did not create any "market index" for BILD's circulation. Instead, we employ the constant mean return model and define the test statistic in reference to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). To tackle the potential problem of non-

normally distributed excess returns, we apply Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank tests. Appendix B provides the details on the test statistics.

5.3 Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) Modeling

Common knowledge has it that time series of stock market returns frequently face problems of heteroscedasticity. To address this phenomenon and to test the robustness of the results of the previous event-study results, we additionally employ econometric GARCH models and thus validate the findings for Axel Springer Corporation's stock price performance.[25] GARCH models represent an extension of the Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) methodology. While ARCH models consider the effect of previous periods' shocks on the current period's volatility (Engle 1982), GARCH models also involve the effect of previous periods' volatilities (Bollerslev 1986). In particular, we employ a GARCH(1,1) model to estimate the mean equation (9) and the variance equation (10):

$$R_{t,log} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 EVENT + \beta_2 CONF\_EVENT + \beta_3 R_{mt,log} + \varepsilon_t \quad (9)$$

$$\sigma_t^2 = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 EVENT + \gamma_1 CONF\_EVENT + \varrho \varepsilon_{t-1}^2 + \tau \sigma_{t-1}^2, \quad (10)$$

with $\varrho + \tau < 1$ (stationarity constraint) and positive coefficients in the variance equation (positivity constraint). $R_{t,log}$ and $R_{mt,log}$ are the log returns at day *t* on Axel Springer Corporation's shares and on the market index, respectively.[26]

EVENT is a dummy variable that takes the value of "1" on days within the event window, and "0" otherwise.[27] In accordance with the previously described event-study approach, we controlled for confounding events within a period of +/- 5 days by introducing the dummy

[25] We employed Ramsey RESET tests for each estimation period's OLS regression (Ramsey 1969). Tests yielded mixed results. For certain estimation periods, *p*-values dropped slightly below the 10% significance level (min(*p*) = 0.096).

[26] Returns are calculated by $R_t = 100 * [\log(P_t) - \log(P_{t-1})]$.

[27] We utilize different event windows, ranging from one day (event day, [0]) to 5 days (event day +/- 2 days, [-2; 2]; see Results and Discussion).

CONF_EVENT. The residuals are assumed to be normally distributed: $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma_t^2)$.[28] The variance equation (10) includes the dummies for events and confounding events as well as the lagged squared error terms ε_{t-1}^2 and its own squared history σ_{t-1}^2. The model is estimated using maximum likelihood. With normally distributed errors that are conditional upon information I_{t-1}, the density function is of the form:[29]

$$f(y_t|I_{t-1}) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_t^2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_t^2/\sigma_t^2}. \quad (11)$$

where σ_t^2 is specified in accordance with equation (10) and ε_t comes from equation (9).

The log-likelihood function to be maximized can be defined as:

$$ln\ L = ln \prod_{t=1}^{n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_t^2}} e^{-\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon_t^2/\sigma_t^2} = -\frac{1}{2}\sum_{t=1}^{n}(ln\ 2\pi + ln\ \sigma_t^2 + \varepsilon_t^2/\sigma_t^2), \quad (12)$$

where *n* is the number of observations.

[28] In addition, we also considered Generalized Error Distribution and Student's *t*-distribution; however, results remained the same.

[29] We also computed quasi-maximum likelihood covariances and standard errors as proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992). Those standard errors are robust if residuals are not conditionally normally distributed; however, results remained the same.

6. Results and Discussion

6.1 Results: Event-Study Methodology

Focusing on abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of single events, results remained rather inconclusive (see Table 1).[30] Only one event, the separation of the Wulff couple, showed significant abnormal returns that remain robust across both benchmark indices and test statistics (01/07/2013; $p < 0.1$). Furthermore, for the event window that involves five days around the event [-2; 2], there are no significant cumulative abnormal returns that hold for both the parametric and the non-parametric test statistic.

We found a significant negative effect in aggregation five days after the respective event days (see Table 2). However, this effect holds for one benchmark index only, and only for the parametric test statistic. Moreover, because longer event windows are more sensitive to confounding influences and because it is reasonable to assume that single news events unfold their effect more quickly than within five days, we considered it unlikely that this effect could be attributed to the Wulff scandal. Cumulative average abnormal returns for event windows that range from 1 day [0] to 11 days [-5; 5] remained insignificant (see Table 3).

We repeated all of our analyses based on an estimation period of 120 days to place greater emphasis on developments closer to the event dates. The results remained similar to the previous ones. In summary, we do not find support for any linkages as proposed by *RQ1c*.

[30] We controlled for thin trading bias. Yet, Springer Corporation's shares are traded frequently; thus, thin trading is not a problem (Campbell and Wasley 1993; Cowan and Sergeant 1996).

Event Date (Trade)	DAXsector media				HDAX			
	Day-0-Statistic [0]		5-Days Event Window [-2; 2]		Day-0-Statistic [0]		5-Days Event Window [-2; 2]	
	SAR[a]	t_{corr}(AR)[b]	SCAR[c]	t_{corr}(CAR)[b]	SAR[a]	t_{corr}(AR)[b]	SCAR[c]	t_{corr}(CAR)[b]
12/13/2011	-0.79	-1.10	0.42	0.19	0.45	0.83	0.30	0.61
12/15/2011	0.12	0.23	-0.03	0.11	-0.31	-0.48	0.20	0.50
12/16/2011	0.12	0.22	0.66	1.10	-0.04	-0.07	0.09	0.32
12/19/2011	0.24	0.43	0.50	0.87	0.12	0.27	0.05	0.24
12/21/2011	-0.10	-0.11	0.62	1.02	0.13	0.30	0.44	0.94
12/23/2011	-0.13	-0.16	0.68	0.93	0.25	0.52	0.65	0.91
01/02/2012	0.15	0.30	-0.11	-0.05	0.13	0.27	-0.12	-0.12
01/05/2012	1.19	1.49	0.33	0.44	0.69	1.10	0.33	0.56
01/06/2012	-0.34	-0.45	-0.13	-0.23	0.09	0.15	0.17	0.31
01/11/2012	0.33	0.61	-0.26	-0.26	1.91†	1.66†	0.27	-0.10
01/12/2012	0.17	0.34	-0.40	-0.40	-0.52	-0.79	0.24	-0.18
01/13/2012	-0.27	-0.34	-0.21	-0.10	-0.44	-0.65	0.02	-0.54
01/16/2012	-0.93	-1.26	0.10	0.23	-0.54	-0.90	-0.54	-0.81
01/18/2012	0.99	1.34	0.61	0.98	0.63	1.02	-0.14	-0.24
01/19/2012	0.38	0.61	1.36	2.04*	0.00	0.00	0.44	0.68
01/20/2012	0.74	1.13	0.88	1.32	-0.04	-0.11	0.31	0.50
01/23/2012	0.75	1.14	0.21	0.36	0.78	1.26	0.05	0.07
01/24/2012	-0.88	-1.22	-0.02	0.02	-0.65	-1.01	-0.29	-0.44
01/26/2012	-0.13	-0.10	-1.28	-1.70†	-0.78	-1.17	-1.14	-1.73†
01/31/2012	-0.30	-0.39	-0.46	-0.46	0.36	0.71	-0.26	-0.26
02/01/2012	0.60	0.96	-0.08	-0.02	-0.09	-0.15	0.09	0.27
02/02/2012	-0.01	0.00	0.48	0.67	0.31	0.61	0.50	0.91
02/06/2012	1.11	1.43	-0.43	-0.59	0.62	1.01	-0.29	-0.32
02/08/2012	-0.70	-0.98	-0.72	-0.99	-0.59	-0.99	-0.48	-0.67
02/10/2012	-0.82	-1.13	-0.82	-1.12	0.40	0.77	-0.49	-0.77
02/13/2012	0.06	0.11	-0.67	-0.90	-0.16	-0.24	-0.27	-0.40
02/16/2012	-1.53	-1.56	-1.21	-1.41	-1.11	-1.43	-0.80	-1.09
02/17/2012	-0.14	-0.12	-1.27	-1.53	-0.28	-0.37	-1.04	-1.48
05/22/2012	0.46	0.82	-0.79	-0.66	0.66	1.13	-0.36	-0.48
06/01/2012	0.36	0.75	-0.05	0.19	0.38	0.82	0.07	0.30
06/18/2012	0.29	0.68	0.26	0.64	-0.16	-0.22	0.44	0.67
06/22/2012	-0.14	-0.08	-0.60	-0.70	-0.20	-0.29	-0.55	-0.66
06/27/2012	0.63	1.06	0.13	0.51	1.12	1.52	0.04	0.09
07/23/2012	-0.58	-0.98	0.55	0.91	-1.10	-1.51	0.20	0.72
07/30/2012	0.18	0.48	-0.56	-0.61	-0.52	-0.84	-1.20	-1.64†
08/21/2012	0.33	0.73	-0.23	-0.15	-0.30	-0.42	-0.59	-0.77
08/24/2012	-0.09	0.05	-0.38	-0.35	0.07	0.27	-0.16	0.01
09/10/2012	0.18	0.48	0.22	0.49	-0.09	-0.03	-0.54	-0.71
12/03/2012	-0.52	-0.80	-0.64	-0.77	-0.34	-0.53	-0.42	-0.51
01/07/2013	1.76†	1.64†	-0.04	-0.26	2.09*	1.64†	0.85	0.77
03/22/2013	0.41	0.73	-0.09	-0.14	0.56	1.07	-0.11	-0.16
04/09/2013	1.09	1.39	0.64	0.93	0.63	1.09	0.85	1.41
04/12/2013	0.12	0.11	0.89	1.32	0.73	1.20	1.24	2.22*

Estimation Period: 250 days. Significance levels (two-tailed): * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$. [a] Based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test. [c] Based on Mikkelson and Partch (1988).

Table 1: Stock Price Effects: Abnormal Returns and Cumulative Abnormal Returns

Trading Day (relative to event day)	DAXsector media			HDAX		
	AAR [%]	t(AAR)[a]	t_{corr}(AAR)[b]	AAR [%]	t(AAR)[a]	t_{corr}(AAR)[b]
-5	-0.02	-0.01	-0.18	-0.07	-0.44	-0.40
-4	-0.08	-0.59	-0.41	-0.12	-0.92	-0.30
-3	0.05	0.47	0.78	0.00	0.08	0.14
-2	-0.02	-0.23	0.00	0.00	0.05	-0.03
-1	-0.12	-1.08	-0.45	-0.15	-1.11	-0.79
0	0.13	1.18	1.47	0.15	1.28	1.24
1	-0.06	-0.39	0.24	-0.12	-0.92	-0.23
2	-0.09	-0.82	-0.53	-0.13	-1.24	-0.56
3	-0.07	-0.71	-0.18	-0.07	-0.58	-0.24
4	-0.11	-0.81	-0.61	-0.02	-0.12	-0.12
5	-0.07	-0.54	0.01	-0.26	-2.58**	-1.30

Estimation Period: 250 days. Significance levels (two-tailed): ** $p < 0.01$. [a] Based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 2: Stock Price Effects: Average Abnormal Returns

Event Window	DAXsector media			HDAX		
	CAAR [%]	t(CAAR)[a]	t_{corr}(CAAR)[b]	CAAR [%]	t(CAAR)[a]	t_{corr}(CAAR)[b]
-5; +5	-0.47	-1.01	0.05	-0.79	-1.54	-0.78
-2; +2	-0.17	-0.55	0.33	-0.24	-0.65	-0.18
-1; 1	-0.05	-0.09	0.71	-0.12	-0.19	0.11
-1; +0	0.01	0.14	0.70	0.00	0.24	0.29
0; 0	0.13	1.18	1.47	0.15	1.28	1.24
0; 1	0.07	0.60	1.18	0.03	0.51	0.69

Estimation Period: 250 days. [a] Based on Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 3: Stock Price Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns

To assess the effects of the scandal on Springer Corporation's revenues, we analyzed circulation figures as well as online traffic on BILD's website.[31] However, statistics that referred to the circulation of BILD's Sunday paper showed no significant reactions of the readership, i.e., no effects on sales of single editions (see Table 4) or in the aggregate (see Table 5 and Table 6).[32] That is, nor can *RQ1a* be affirmed.

[31] To relate the results with the underlying statistical test, we head the columns of subsequent tables in accordance with the respective test statistic (see Appendix B). Again, as we now apply the event-study methodology by means of circulation and online traffic instead of share prices, "returns" correspond to increases in circulation or online traffic, respectively.

[32] We also considered event windows that include two [0; 1] and three editions [-1; 1].

Event Date (Paper)	Edition-0-Statistic [0]		3-Editions Event Window [-1;1]		2-Editions Event Window [0;1]	
	SAR[a]	t_{corr}(AR)[b]	SCAR[a]	t_{corr}(CAR)[b]	SCAR[a]	t_{corr}(CAR)[b]
01/22/2012	0.50	0.78	0.70	0.94	0.38	0.33
01/29/2012	-0.06	-0.33	-0.06	-0.26	-0.26	-0.90
02/05/2012	-0.31	-0.98	-0.23	-0.87	-0.24	-0.85
02/12/2012	-0.02	-0.26	-0.15	-0.49	0.04	0.05
02/19/2012	0.08	0.46	-0.01	-0.08	0.00	0.05
03/04/2012	0.33	0.98	0.11	0.23	0.20	0.52
03/11/2012	-0.04	-0.20	0.01	-0.04	-0.22	-0.71
04/29/2012	0.73	1.57	0.40	0.83	0.24	0.28
05/13/2012	0.32	0.98	0.06	0.23	0.34	1.08
05/20/2012	0.15	0.46	0.43	1.28	0.32	0.99
05/27/2012	0.31	0.92	-0.31	-0.04	-0.49	-0.47
06/03/2012	-1.03	-1.57	0.05	0.49	-0.15	0.00
06/17/2012	-0.34	-1.11	0.14	-0.11	-0.39	-1.22
06/24/2012	-0.19	-0.59	-0.05	-0.19	0.16	0.47
07/01/2012	0.38	1.24	-0.03	-0.08	0.11	0.38
07/29/2012	-0.01	0.07	0.09	0.26	0.16	0.52
08/05/2012	0.26	0.78	0.22	0.79	0.27	0.90
08/12/2012	0.13	0.46	0.60	1.51	0.56	1.37
08/26/2012	-0.50	-1.31	0.02	-0.19	-0.43	-1.22
09/09/2012	-0.45	-1.37	-0.37	-1.13	-0.35	-1.04
09/16/2012	-0.04	-0.07	-0.50	-1.40	-0.30	-0.85
10/07/2012	-0.03	-0.07	-0.46	-0.64	-0.63	-1.04
10/14/2012	-0.84	-1.44	-0.12	-0.04	-0.13	-0.05
12/09/2012	-0.47	-1.44	-0.26	-0.75	-0.15	-0.38
01/13/2013	0.52	0.72	-0.27	-0.30	0.36	0.47

Estimation Period: 50 editions. [a] Based on Brown and Warner (1985). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 4: Circulation Effects: Abnormal Increases and Cumulative Abnormal Increases in Circulation

Edition (relative to event edition)	AAR [%]	t(AAR)[a]	t_{corr}(AAR)[b]
-1	0.32	0.44	0.58
0	-0.27	-0.37	-0.46
1	-0.05	-0.08	-0.14

Estimation Period: 50 editions. [a] Based on Brown and Warner (1985). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 5: Circulation Effects: Average Abnormal Increases in Circulation

Event Window	CAAR [%]	t(CAAR)[a]	t_{corr}(CAAR)[b]
-1; 1	-0.05	0.00	-0.01
0; 0	-0.27	-0.37	-0.46
0; 1	-0.32	-0.32	-0.46

Estimation Period: 50 editions. [a] Based on Brown and Warner (1985). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 6: Circulation Effects: Cumulative Average Abnormal Increases in Circulation

With regard to visits to BILD's website, the statistics of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) suggest that online traffic for BILD became even worse compared to its peers in December 2011, the month that captures the first events of the scandal (see Table 7).

Readers who wished information about the details of the scandal apparently preferred BILD's competitors, which are more distinguished in regard to public affairs and issues having an impact on society-at-large.[33] However, the non-parametric tests could not reinforce this notion, leading to mixed results for *RQ1b*.[34]

We reran all event-study analyses on Springer Corporation's share prices, BILD's circulation, and BILD's online traffic volume considering only the events of December 2011 to February 2012, that is, when the "scandal lifecycle" reached its peak, culminating in Wulff's resignation. Yet, results remained insignificant.

[33] For example, with the exception of March 2011 (the Fukushima nuclear disaster), online traffic on Spiegel's website reached an all-time high in February 2012 (Wulff's resignation; $p < 0.05$). Similarly, a 2012 study on readers' trust in news outlets revealed that although 81% generally trust news coverage offered by regional newspapers by Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (71%), Spiegel (70%) and Sueddeutsche Zeitung (68%), only 30% trust the reliability of BILD's news (GPRA 2012).

[34] Because of longer time intervals for online traffic data, event-date clustering may be of special concern. Hence, we do not offer any statistics for multi-month windows, but instead employed regressions using event dummies (McChesney 1987). Results still remained insignificant.

Event Date (Online)	Month-0-Statistic [0]	
	SAR[a]	$t_{corr}(AR)$[b]
12/2011	-1.73†	-1.53
01/2012	0.18	0.23
02/2012	-0.65	-0.74
03/2012	0.46	0.51
04/2012	0.28	0.34
05/2012	-0.82	-1.02
06/2012	-1.04	-1.31
07/2012	0.02	-0.11
08/2012	-0.69	-0.91
09/2012	-1.06	-1.31
10/2012	0.26	0.34
12/2012	0.24	0.34
01/2013	0.25	0.40
03/2013	1.31	1.53

Estimation Period: 60 months. Significance level (two-tailed): † $p < 0.1$. [a] Based on Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991). [b] Based on Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test.

Table 7: Online Effects: Abnormal Increases in Online Traffic Volume

6.2 Results: GARCH Modeling

To establish the robustness of previous results, we also employed econometric GARCH models and included event dummies. We utilized different event windows, ranging from one day [0] to five days [-2; 2]; i.e., EVENT took the value of 1 just on the precise day of the event or on the days within the event window. For both the [0]- and the [-2; 2]-model, all Q-statistics of the standardized residuals came out insignificant, indicating no remaining serial correlation in the mean equations. Moreover, Q-statistics and Lagrange multiplier tests showed that there appears to be no ARCH left in the variance equations; i.e., we assume that the models are correctly specified.

Figure 2 and Figure 3 depict the standardized residuals and the conditional variances, respectively, of the [0]- and the [-2; 2]-model. They exhibit conspicuous volatility clusters that occur approximately quarterly and correspond to the publication of financial reports.



Standardized Residuals: [0]-Model

Standardized Residuals: [-2; 2]-Model

Figure 2: Standardized Residuals of GARCH Models



Conditional Variance: [0]-Model

Conditional Variance: [-2; 2]-Model

Figure 3: Conditional Variances of GARCH Models

	Event Day [0]		Event Window [-2; 2]	
	Mean Equation			
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
Constant	-0.007	0.027	-0.001	0.034
$R_{mt,log}$	0.693***	0.047	0.692***	0.050
EVENT	0.073	0.070	0.017	0.050
CONF_EVENT	-0.073	0.083	-0.085	0.084
	Variance Equation			
Constant	0.049*	0.022	0.046*	0.023
ε_{t-1}^2	0.132*	0.053	0.104*	0.048
σ_{t-1}^2	0.492***	0.143	0.537***	0.149
EVENT	0.058*	0.027	0.020	0.013
CONF_EVENT	0.159***	0.043	0.144***	0.043

Significance levels (two-tailed): *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 8: Summary of Results: GARCH Models

Table 8 provides the parameter estimates of the GARCH models for both the mean and variance equations. Columns two and three refer to the model that only considers the particular event day. The model of columns four and five also consider an event window of +/- 2 days around the event. For both models, the stationary as well as the positivity constraint are met as coefficients are positive and ϱ and τ sum up to less than unity.[35]

The results reveal that the events of the Wulff scandal did not directly affect returns on share investments. This finding holds for both models and thus reaffirms the outcome of the standard event-study approach ($p > 0.1$).[36] However, considering the precise event day only, results show that the scandal increased the share's conditional volatility ($p < 0.05$). That is, coverage of the Wulff scandal appears to have had no direct effect upon Axel Springer Corporation's share prices, but imposed additional risk on outlet's shares. However, the coefficient is relatively small and the effect does not hold for the event window of five days ($p > 0.1$). That is, the effect of the events on volatility seems to be smoothing out rather quick. We also employed models with event windows shorter than five days. However, results remained similar to those of the [-2; 2]-model as EVENT does not significantly affect returns on Axel Springer Corporation's shares or its volatility ($p > 0.1$). As a look at Figure 3 already suggested, publications of financial reports by Springer obviously increase the share's volatility; i.e., CONF_EVENT is highly significant for both models ($p < 0.001$).

6.3 Discussion

In summary, in marked contrast to public opinion, there is no evidence that indicates that Axel Springer Corporation profited monetarily from the Wulff scandal. The scandal neither increased the outlet's profit from sales or advertising nor affected its share prices. That is, moving first does not necessarily enhance profits as is commonly assumed, but rather incurs sizeable risks

[35] The models utilized the returns of the HDAX as benchmark index. We also employed GARCH models that utilized the DAXsector media. However, those models violate the positivity constraint that underlies GARCH models. Therefore, results are not reported here.

[36] CONF_EVENT may remain insignificant in the mean equation because positive and negative influences balance out over time. However, including confounding events in the standard event-study approach revealed that they affect share prices.

due to the high fixed costs of uncovering news and waiving copyright regulations for the public good (*RQ1*).

While we could not acquire adequate quantitative data on journalists' employment agreements and earning capacities, there are some qualitative but nonetheless strong indications that, primarily, the reporters benefited from the scandal (*RQ2*). The leading journalists received the highly prestigious "*Henri Nannen Prize*" in the category "*Best Investigative Performance*" for reporting on the Wulff scandal. Winning such prizes usually leads to extended stardom and higher salaries (Anderson 2004). After winning the prize, as previously suggested by Hamilton (2004) for self-serving journalists trying to establish a "brand name", the leading reporters could capture additional income by writing down the story and publishing a book about it, and finally, they sold the film rights to a German production company.

Accordingly, journalists seeking out sensational stories seem to work in a way that significantly enhances their own career prospects. Put differently, media outlets may be able to hire investigative journalists at lower wages in exchange for a certain degree of freedom of choice concerning which stories they want to cover within their job (Fama 1991; Lazear and Shaw 2007).

Concerning *RQ3*, as increases in circulation did not occur, advertisements did obviously not reach a significantly larger audience than they were assumed to. Hence, advertisers should keep in mind that media outlets' coverage of scandals does not necessarily increase circulation and thus reach of their advertisement. That is, in contrast to the frequent assumption, even the "first mover's" advertising space does not seem to become more valuable when focusing on sensational news.

7. Conclusions

It is commonly believed that sensational events boost newspaper demand and, in turn, outlets' profits. Accordingly, newspapers and media corporations are frequently accused of overhyping, or even producing, "scandals". Yet, our results show that business outcomes are rarely affected by sensational news reports, neither in terms of a boost in circulation or online traffic volume, nor in terms of increases in shareholder value. Even if profits are affected, the effects do not always *enhance* profits as commonly assumed, but can decrease them (see Anderson 2004). That is, contrary to public wisdom, sensationalism is not necessarily demand-induced.

In particular, coverage of the Wulff scandal did not result in increased sales for BILD. Rather, disproportionate costs of uncovering "true" stories incur sizeable risks on business outcomes und thus may give reasons for an intentional lack of supplying investigative journalism. Moreover, competitors may free ride on investigation efforts, recycle the news, and steal parts of the rents.

Yet, journalists can benefit from focusing on spectacular news. When choosing what stories to cover, journalists may be motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic values (i.e., the individually perceived attractiveness of an activity where their journalistic talent is employed versus the lure of money), or by some combination of both. As the economics of awards literature notes, people strive not only for higher incomes but also for to gain social distinction or peer group acceptance (Frey 2005; Frey and Neckermann 2008). Data on journalists' motivations are unavailable, so we cannot extend the analysis to cover psychological rewards. However, taken together, the coverage of the Wulff scandal appears to be based on journalists' private motivations in terms of profiting from extra monetary income (e.g., from "ancillary sales" in terms of books or film rights), psychological income (e.g., recognition among peers and the public, reputation, journalism prizes) and enhanced career prospects, rather than by profit-maximizing choices of news outlets.

Although our study is based on German news reports, we do not expect structural differences to the coverage of scandals elsewhere, so that our results should generalize to other settings. That

is, we "*think global, but drink local*" (Compaine and Cunningham 2011). However, as we consider the effects of a specific scandal on a single newspaper outlet, generalizability may be limited concerning the various types of media outlets: Our results suggest that *tabloids* are hardly able to benefit from political scandals in any monetary terms, even if news is sensationalized and the scandal lifecycle can be extended over time. Thereby, analogous conclusions for highly regarded papers cannot necessarily be drawn. Moreover, we only study short-term effects of the scandal, as data on e.g., long-term attitudinal effects on the readership induced by scandal reporting over time were unfortunately unavailable.[37]

Nevertheless, our results confirm those of McChesney (1987). Axel Springer Corporation was unable to squeeze any profit from the scandal despite the severity of the scandal, high public interest, and the appearance that BILD was highly involved in covering the scandal as a first mover with access to exclusive information. This inability emphasizes our findings and makes any impact of comparably minor scandals on business outcomes even more unlikely.

Moreover, we do not assume that self-serving behaviors and private motivations of journalists are restricted to BILD. Data on journalists' contractual agreements and the success of story spinoffs, e.g., book publications, could supply additional insights. While we examined whether news corporations benefit from covering a supposedly self-created scandal, future research could focus on benefits inherent in competitors' fast-follower strategies. More-detailed data also could deepen understanding of how to make scandal reporting more profitable from a publisher's perspective, especially in the case of online compared to print media.

[37] Yet, BILD has been publicly criticized for dramatizing stories and overhyping insignificant issues for decades, without ever feeling a need to change the reporting style (Mittelberg 1967; Reimann 2007) – which may indicate that attitudes of readers do not change much or do not matter much in terms of changing its economic prospects.

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II. QUALITY KILLS THE MEDIASTAR? CAREER PATHS OF PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS

"How men long for celebrity! Some would willingly sacrifice their lives for fame, and not a few would rather be known by their crimes than not known at all."
John Sinclair (1754-1835)

1. Abstract

Recent commercial crises entailed that appraisals of experts frequently missed the mark, making their predictions become obsolete, and fueling the discussion on the decline in intellectuals' reliability. While intellectuals originally were assumed to base their public presence on sound analyses of society, nowadays intellectuals are blamed for primarily striving for prominence, giving birth to the role of the "*public intellectual*". We adopt an economic perspective and take a market-oriented view on intellectual output. We see demand for public intellectual content coming from all kinds of media that act as consumer intermediaries and, therefore, not only value information but rather appreciate entertainment. Supply comes either from specialized experts that *inform* within the area of their expertise and thus get access to an increased audience for their day-to-day activity; or from non-specialists that play across the board and are merely tuned to attention and fame.

To determine the market, we refer to the listings of the German magazine *Cicero* that comprise the 500 most influential intellectuals in Germany for the years 2007 and 2012. Data suggest that the market for public intellectuals brings forth few omnipresent "*media stars*" that are able to cover the market to a large extent. On such markets with "*winner-takes-all"* characteristics, the best performers may be able to command substantially higher (non-)monetary incomes. Hence, we focus on particular career paths of scholars and pundits and ask: What separates the *media stars* from the *long tail* of *media midgets*? Thereby, we pay attention to an economic issue of universal interest: Does it pay off to further engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset and to engage in dissemination?

We assess news media and TV presence of Germany's most influential intellectuals and identify discriminants that create and destroy the chances for intellectual stardom, both static and over time. Thereby, based on our results, we cautiously draw some conclusions that address the development of quality of *public* intellectual output.[38]

[38] A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Prof. Dr. T. Ehrmann) at the *89th Annual Conference of the Western Economic Association International*, Denver, USA (06/2014).

2. Introduction

Mirages and improper predictions in the course of the economic crisis fired the discussion on the decline in intellectuals' reliability that initially got going by the seminal works of Russel Jacoby (1987) and Richard A. Posner (2001). While intellectuals originally were assumed to base their public presence on interventions that were drawn from sound and recognized scientific methods, Jacoby (1987) and Posner (2001) broached the issue of a decline in quality of intellectual output. Posner gave rise to the role of a public intellectual that "*uses general ideas drawn from history, philosophy, political science, economics, law, literature, ideas that are part of the cultural intellectual tradition of the world, to address contemporary events, usually of a political or ideological flavor, and does so in the popular media"* (Posner 2002). Posner (2001) especially highlighted the lack of quality assurance of intellectual content that is disseminated to the general public. Moreover, recent studies assessed negligible real-world effects of intellectual output as well as the shrinking success of intellectuals in shaping the societal and political discourse (Bates 2011; Collins 2011). The increasing prevalence of *"anti-intellectualism"* within society (Claussen 2011) enabled *intellectual rioters* to take part in the process of public opinion-making. Just think of Hans-Olaf Henkel, former president of the Federation of German Industry (BDI), who jumped on the bandwagon of euro skepticism and publicized his anti-euro stance in several TV talk shows (at this point, we do not want to link his radical media presence with his book publication that took place simultaneously). Or, to give an example from the US, think of the career path of Mehmet Oz, who was hired as a professor at the Department of Surgery at Columbia University in 2001, who was among the 100 Most Influential People in 2008 (*Time Magazine*), and who finally won his first "*Daytime Emmy Award for Outstanding Talk Show Host*" in 2010. Yet, we are not able to take a stand on the platitude that "everything was better in the old days". However, we set up some testable hypotheses, examine them empirically, and cautiously evaluate their effect on the particular supply of public intellectual output.

Our data suggest that the market for public intellectuals yields few omnipresent "*media stars*" that are able to cover the market to a large extent (the top 35 public intellectuals are responsible for one third of intellectual media presence). According to Adler (1985) and Rosen (1981), the

superstar status may lead to disproportional increases in monetary or psychological income. In case of high market concentration, stars may be able to attain larger market shares at costs that grow much less than proportionate (Rosen 1981), and acquire parts of customers' cost savings that result from reduced search effort (Adler 1985). In this regard, various studies empirically applied superstar theories on different markets. For example, Ehrmann, Meiseberg, and Ritz (2009) assessed superstar effects in deluxe gastronomy, or Nelson and Glotfelty (2012) analyzed the relationship between movie star power and earnings of box offices. Addressing the entertainment value of media content (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2002, 2005), we draw on Adler's (1985) statement "*the more you know, the more you enjoy*". That is, the entertainment value of a particular intellectual is a function of his popularity, e.g., because consumers may not just take the intellectual's message, but also discuss it with knowledgeable peers (Adler 1985).

Assuming disproportionate returns for superstars, the basic question concerning the market for public intellectual output is: What separates the *media stars* from the *long tail* of *media midgets*? Therefore, we examine the careers of scholars and pundits in a market that shows characteristics similar to "*winner-takes-all-markets*" with disproportionate pecuniary or psychological incomes for top performers (Frank and Cook 1995). Basically, there are two options to initiate a career in the market for public intellectuals: Either, stardom can be based on profound knowledge (i.e., "*specialization*" in a particular topic); or, it can be based on "relentless" self-marketing (which does not necessarily require any knowledge at all). That is, we pay attention to an economic issue of universal interest (Ferreira and Sah 2012): Does it pay off to further engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset by engaging in dissemination? Hence, we analyze the impact of certain opportunity costs and expected payoffs on career opportunities and choices of intellectuals (Gibbons 1998, 2005; Prendergast 1993).

On the demand side, we consider interests of media companies such as newspapers and TV stations (Misztal 2012). In this context, the media act as a gatekeeper for public intellectual content and fill newspaper op-ed pages, book sections, and airtime in accordance with consum-

ers' needs. Thereby, consumers do not only value information but also entertainment (Jensen 1979). On the supply side, freelance intellectuals or academics that are affiliated to universities may appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences. Specialized experts may benefit from an accelerated dissemination of their insights through the mass media, be it for monetary or non-monetary reasons. While this kind of publicity is assumed to be of (at least subliminal) *informational* character, non-specialists that talk beyond their area of expertise may prefer infotainment and are merely geared towards attention and publicity.

Yet, quality of public intellectuals' argumentation is, at least for the average individual, difficult to monitor. Intellectual output represents a credence good, similar to used cars, surgical treatments, or artistic performances. In case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with instruments that improve customer's confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, consumer intermediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Posner 2001). For example, while the voice of an actor and the melody of a song should be crucial for the evaluation of musicians' performance, recent research on music perception revealed that visual information may superimpose audible quality features and, therefore, affect performance evaluation (Tsay 2013). Accordingly, intellectuals may find appropriate tools that strikingly *suggest* quality and thus increase customers' benefit, or decrease their searching costs (Akerlof 1970; Deuchert, Adjamah, and Pauly 2005).

In order to clarify conditions on the market for public intellectuals, we focus on print media and TV presence of Germany's 500 most influential intellectuals in 2007 and 2012 (with reference to *Cicero* magazine) and identify discriminants that create and destroy the chances for intellectual stardom, both static and over time. Thereby, we enhance Posner's (2001) attempt, which claims to be "*A Study of Decline*" but actually represents a non-dynamic empirical approach. Moreover, we indeed give some ideas on quality measurement in public intellectual discourses, while Posner (2001) merely rants against declining quality. In addition to scholarly citations that are hardly recognized by media, we take a look upon intellectuals' specialized expertise concerning the issues they address in order to cautiously assess the quality of their output and pro-

vide a measure that indeed depicts the tradeoff between time for public discourses and time for academia. Finally, while Posner (2001) takes a polemic and moral perspective to criticize the decline in intellectuals' output, we focus on the economic reasoning for media presence of *intellectual rioters*.

We proceed as follows: First, we describe the market for public intellectuals with a focus on demand and supply. Afterwards, we will elaborate on quality assessment and monitoring of credence goods in general, and of intellectual content in particular. After deriving our hypotheses towards the chances and motives of intellectuals for media stardom, we describe our data and methodological approach. Then, we present and discuss our results conclude.

3. The Market for Public Intellectuals

Research as well as media practitioners increasingly observe phenomena like the medialization and flattening of society, or the downturn in "quality journalism", especially within an area that used to be ruled by the "educated people": the market for public intellectuals (Gattone 2012; Hamilton 2007; Jacoby 1987; Posner 2001).[39] Thereby, reasoning varies with point of view. Either a downturn in quality that results from sloppy scientific procedures or the lack of real-world consequences is criticized (Claussen 2011; Collins 2011; Hubbard 2004).

For the U.S., Richard A. Posner (2001) empirically tested developments and trends on the market for public intellectuals, tellingly entitled "*Public Intellectuals – a Study of Decline*". We follow Posner (2001) and examine the careers of public intellectuals in terms of markets that offer credence goods, that is, intellectual content whose quality is hard to assess.[40]

Demand for public intellectual content is induced by all kinds of media that have to fill an increasing amount of newspaper pages, radio pieces, or broadcasting time. Public intellectuals are consulted to voice an opinion on questions of political or ideological importance (Posner 2001). For journalists or reporters, it may be noticeably cheaper to ask an intellectual to fill a few seconds of air time than to get fully knowledgeable of specific occurrences and their societal consequences on their own. However, several studies elaborate on the syndrome of "*anti-intellectualism*" in media that depicts reluctance to intellectual content (Claussen 2011; Garnham 1995; Hamilton 2007, 2010; Holderman 2003; Ritzer 2006). Media are not primary demanders but intermediaries between intellectuals and the general public, with the latter valuing not only pure information but also entertainment (Jensen 1979; Posner 2001). Therefore, besides hard unbiased facts, media demand stories that cater to consumers' gusto for amusement, downgrading information to a by-product (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005; Rothbauer and Sieg 2013). Hence, producing marketable "news" not only requires relevant information but

[39] In this regard, "medialization and flattening of society" emphasize the notion that public opinion forming increasingly follows the suggestions of mass media.

[40] For the moment, we suppose that quality matters. Thus, intellectual content as credence good has to be accompanied by reliable signals for quality.

also an appealing form of representation, communication skills, and rhetoric ingenuity; for the sake of drama, extreme positions that encourage contentions may be sold like hotcakes (Posner 2001).

Demand is satisfied either by freelance intellectuals or by academics that are affiliated to universities. Especially for fulltime academics, there may be considerable incentives to profit from synergies by performing en passant on the public stage. First, publicity and prominence may "rub off" on other activities, such as publication of nonfiction titles or giving talks and lectures, and thus may enhance chances for additional revenues. Second, some intellectuals may just enjoy public attention, the "*little fame in between*", and only crave for publicity and stardom, hazarding temporary consequences of losses of pecuniary income (Posner 2001).[41] While the first motivation of increased sales in textbooks may be negligible in Germany due to language barriers and the dominance of US American literature, we particularly emphasize the second incentive. Low entry costs for intellectuals in regard to mass media facilitate access to the populace and allow for tremendous stardom beyond the scientific community (Drezner 2008; Gattone 2012). Due to the increasing prevalence of web-based communication and dissemination, such as blogs, size of successful public intellectuals' audiences may be multiplied at low costs, leaving disproportional (non)pecuniary rewards to them.[42]

Yet, not every intellectual decides to perform publicly. Intellectuals may either choose to specialize and to write and speak only about one's own subject, or to generalize and also address topics beyond their own disciplines (Hubbard 2004). Increasing specialization within research made it considerably costly to translate scientific insights into the sort of news that is demanded by media companies and that arouses public interest. Accordingly, several studies found a negative relationship between media presence and academic workload (Cronin and Shaw 2002; Danowski and Park 2009; Landes and Posner 2000; Misztal 2012; Park 2006). Especially young

[41] Losses of pecuniary income may result, for example, from eschewing highly remunerated executive trainings in favor of allowances from TV stations, which involves costs for preparing public performances and risks of losing scientific reputation (Gattone 2012; Park 2006).

[42] Based on Rosen's hedonic price models (Rosen 1974; Thaler and Rosen 1976), recent research does frequently not focus only on monetary rewards, but also includes non-monetary incentives (Lazear and Shaw 2007).

researchers are dependent upon ongoing scientific publication and scholarly productivity to brighten their career prospects; therefore, opportunity costs keep them from devoting themselves to the public discourse. They first have to "*walk the walk*" before they "*talk the talk*" (Posner 2001). In contrast, pecuniary and nonpecuniary returns from scientific publication lessen with age – new job opportunities become less likely and marginal psychological utility from applause for new scientific insights shrinks.[43] Similarly, scholars like Gibbons (1998) or Holmström (1982) show that career concerns hardly discipline employees that are close to retirement and thus stress the importance additional (non-) monetary incentives for more experienced workers.[44] At the same time, style of writing improves and life experience that is assumed necessary to comment on topics of ideological flavor increases with age, preferring elderly researchers to juniors. Besides opportunity costs, intellectuals face the risk of embarrassing oneself within the public discourse. Primarily academics that publicly speak beyond their expertise risk to be degraded to amateurs by their academic peers, and thus may lose parts of their reputation within the scientific community. Enhanced specialization of research and knowledge has made it even more difficult – for affiliated and especially for unaffiliated – to conscientiously comment on general matters (Posner 2001).

Yet, it remains arguable whether media are able and willing to separate experts from non-experts. The market for public intellectuals shows that media focus on few faces that cover large parts of the market and thereby achieve celebrity status (Goodell 1977; Posner 2001). While these *media stars* reduce search costs on the side of the media, they can pocket some of these cost savings in form of increased prices for lectures and talks (Adler 1985). However, most intellectuals are merged in the long tail and do not perform very well on the public stage – whether intentionally or inevitably. Although according to Chris Anderson, the guru of the long tail theory, "*the era of one-size-fits-all is ending*" (Anderson 2006), prior research suggests that the phenomenon of superstars on the market for public intellectuals is rather persistent (Landes

[43] For reasons of German pension law, offerings for new professorships become increasingly unlikely with age.

[44] Empirical research confirms this notion and shows that the importance of supplementary incentive payoffs varies with age (Chevalier and Ellison 1999; Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Ortega 2003).

and Posner 2000). Consequently, we examine what separates the *media stars* from the *long tail* and whether these separators vary over time.

4. Quality of Intellectual Output: Some Ideas on the Problem of Measurement

The quality of intellectual output is, at least for the average individual, difficult to monitor. Hence, intellectual work represents a credence good, similar to used cars, surgical treatments, or artistic performances. In case of quality uncertainties, markets usually respond with instruments that improve customers' confidence in the product, e.g., in terms of warranties, consumer intermediaries, increased verifiability, reputation, or competition (Horner 2002; Posner 2001). Accordingly, intellectuals have to find tools that signal quality and increase customers' benefit or decrease their searching costs, respectively (Akerlof 1970; Deuchert, Adjamah, and Pauly 2005).

At first glance, one could assume that the competition for publicity among the variety of intellectuals ensures quality on its own (Drezner 2008; Posner 2001). While this may be the case if quality is observable or can be assured in other ways, Posner (2001) argues that the market for public intellectuals, contrary to the market for scientific publishing, lacks quality screening, review processes, effective intermediaries, and the possibility of reputational sanctions.[45] Especially those academics that are beyond their scientific zenith can leave the market – in case their superficiality in the public discourse comes to light – at very low costs. Reputational sanctions would only affect them marginally because they are not dependent upon ongoing scientific publications to the extent younger researchers are (Posner 2001). Moreover, intermediaries, i.e., journalists and reporters, are unlikely to be able and willing to prove the substance of specialized intellectual content; and as it is the case with any kind of news, intellectual content cannot be accompanied by legally enforceable warranties (Hamilton 2007; Posner 2001). Hence, those tools that are usually assumed to increase consumers' trust in credence goods are hardly applicable to the market for public intellectual output. Furthermore, similar to the market for news, the market for public intellectuals' "news" may ascribe more value to entertainment than to information (Jensen 1979; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005). The fact that the top 35 public intellectuals in Germany account for one third of intellectuals' media presence and that those

[45] For a prominent example of failed quality screening of intellectual output, see the Sokal affair.

frequently address cross-sectional issues (see below) gives rise to the assumption that relevance of the issue might be preferred to rigor of analyses. Of course, one could argue that those intellectuals are of superior ability and even outperform specialists of other disciplines on foreign terrain. Yet, while we assume that there may be a handful of intellectuals that are able to speak knowingly about questions of cross-sectional importance, we suggest that, for the average intellectual, the quality of output deteriorates with diversification of issues (Freese 2009; Hubbard 2004). Especially today's requirements within academia, like publishing in peer-reviewed journals, involve scientific specialization and make it more difficult for generalists to play across the board (Posner 2001). While discussing and researching close to one's own discipline may dull the sense for relevance, double blind review processes usually avoid serious fallacies. Moreover, specialists on a certain issue have a sufficient overview of existing evidence; hence, redundancies are scarcer and argumentation is likely to be more rigorously (Stern 2009). Consequently, outstanding scientific reputation may signify quality of public intellectual content. Nelson (1997) denoted citations as "*academia's version of applause*". Reputation in terms of recognized scientific work, titles, or awards may signal credibility and reliability (Cronin and Shaw 2002; Davenport and Cronin 2000; Park 2006; Posner 2001).

Within the further course of this paper, we are not going to criticize the output of any particular intellectual, but rather cautiously analyze the rules of the market for public intellectuals. We pay attention to certain criteria that might signal informational quality and analyze their effect on demand and supply functions for (public) intellectual work.

5. Hypotheses

Demand as well as supply of public intellectual content is considerably high, especially due to major uncertainties concerning social and economic developments that foster need for intellectual output and because of very low barriers to entry on the supply side (Danowski and Park 2009; Freese 2009). Yet, determinants that affect demand and supply functions and, therefore, influence the chances for intellectual stardom remain unclear to date.

Specialization of knowledge makes it impracticable for the media to overlook the whole range of academic research and intellectual sub-areas, even if they were interested in doing so. Therefore, media are not inevitably irrational in giving the floor to distinguished intellectuals, even if they speak beyond the area of their expertise. To sacrifice informational specificity and quality of specialized knowledge and to focus on few intellectuals, instead, that are consulted with regard to a broad range of issues across various disciplines may yield higher overall utility (Posner 2001). Moreover, a focus on few superstars with broad visibility may please consumers that increasingly prefer entertainment to information and reduces their searching costs (Adler 1985; Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005).

Hypothesis 1. With an increasing spread of issues that an intellectual addresses, a high media presence of this intellectual becomes more likely.

Similarly, we consider academic titles and affiliation to universities as credentials that are observable at very low costs (Posner 2001). Especially in markets for credence goods, where quality of the output is difficult to assess, the customers may have a look at the quality of the input (Fama 1991). Consequently, affiliated intellectuals may face higher demand than freelancers. In contrast, the phenomenon of *anti-intellectualism* suggests that credentials valued in academia hardly impress the general public (Claussen 2011; Hamilton 2007).

Hypothesis 2. Intellectuals that are affiliated to a university are a) more likely or b) less likely to be considered in mass media.

From the perspective of the supply side, there is mixed evidence concerning the preference of distinguished scholars to perform publicly (Holderman 2003; Landes and Posner 2000; Misztal 2012; Posner 2001). Rules of the games in the market of public intellectualism appear to differ from those of scientific practices (Misztal 2012). The pressure that media and public apply on scientists to translate their knowledge into bite-sized pieces may lead to increased opportunity costs for intellectuals and thus may keep them from going public (Park 2006). Specialization of knowledge heats up the trade-off between rigor and relevance and limits the ability of specialized academics to get a public hearing (Posner 2001). Moreover, highly regarded scholars may have more reputation at risk in case they make a fool of themselves within public performances. However, when it comes to issues that require specialized knowledge, we assume that recognized scientists have a cost advantage that results from their experience in research. They are already able to employ the specific tools necessary to produce a specific output. Furthermore, especially academics at an advanced position within the academic lifecycle may profit from synergies by simultaneously performing on the public stage.[46] As both pecuniary and nonpecuniary marginal benefits from further scientific publishing diminish, distinguished scholars may appreciate the comparatively easy access towards greater audiences to increase fame and popularity.

Hypothesis 3. With an increasing number of scholarly citations an intellectual has received, a high media presence of this intellectual becomes a) more likely or b) less likely.

Especially young academics first have to become scientific specialists before they take part in public discourse. They usually do not have sufficient credentials at their command to enter intellectual dialogues and are, instead, dependent upon ongoing scholarly productivity to brighten their career prospects (Posner 2001). Resources that are spent for simplifying scientific knowledge and for preparing public performances are not available for academia. That is, publicity and stardom beyond the scientific community may come at the expense of research and

[46] Just think of a head of an institute that can command hundreds of research assistants like Hans-Werner Sinn.

scientific publications and vice versa (Park 2006). In other words, active scholars are assumed to simultaneously perform on the public stage less likely.

Hypothesis 4. Intellectuals that are active in scientific research are considered in mass media less likely.

Finally, we take a dynamic approach and identify changing impacts of factors that promote or inhibit public stardom over time. The prevalent consensus is that importance, credibility, and informational quality of public intellectual output are deteriorating (Park 2006; Posner 2001; Stern 2009). Moreover, recent economic and financial crises may have strengthened the effect of *anti-intellectualism* by reducing believe in academics' opinions. Hence, we abide by the broad consensus, take a dynamic perspective, and test the following presumptions.

Hypothesis 5. In explaining the media presence of intellectuals, a) the positive effect of spread of issues intensifies, b) the positive (negative) effect of affiliation to universities lessens (intensifies), c) the positive (negative) effect of scholarly citations lessens (intensifies), and d) the negative effect of active scholarship intensifies over time.

6. Sample, Variables, and Methods

6.1 Sample

Not every intellectual is an academic, not every academic is an intellectual, and not every intellectual is a public intellectual (Stern 2009). Hence, it is not an easy task to determine inviolably who indeed represents a public intellectual, not to mention the challenge of setting up a complete list of public intellectuals. Criteria, standards, and procedures may ever be criticized. Max A. Höfer developed the most recognized procedure in Germany to assess the influence of intellectuals. The procedure is based on people's (1) presence within the 160 most important German-language newspapers and magazines, (2) online citations, (3) hits on Google Scholar, and (4) number of cross-references within the biographic archive Munzinger. A list of the 500 most influential intellectuals in Germany was published in the magazine *Cicero* for 2007 and for 2012.[47] In order to avoid any self-induced subjectivity, we based our sample on *Cicero's* compilation. To avoid upward biases in our data on media mentions (see below), we deleted those intellectuals with common surnames. Hence, we obtained a final sample of 442 intellectuals for 2007 and 436 for 2012.[48] A complete list of both samples can be found in Appendix C, Table 19 and Table 20.

6.2 Variables

Similar to Landes and Posner (2000), we conducted a thorough search within LexisNexis to get data on *MEDIAMENTIONS*, i.e., the number of LexisNexis references, of the intellectuals within a five-year period ahead of the rankings, that is, from 2003 to 2007 for the 2007 ranking; and from 2008 to 2012 for the 2012 ranking.[49] We label the top 35 intellectuals by MEDIAMENTIONS of each ranking as *MEDIASTAR*s. For each ranking, they account for one

[47] *Cicero* is a German magazine that is published monthly and endeavors to provide upmarket journalism on politics and culture.

[48] We deleted those intellectuals whose surnames were among the 100 most common surnames in Germany.

[49] We focused on „*German Language News"* in LexisNexis. Searching in LexisNexis implies the advantage that only media mentions are being considered, without any reference to scholarly articles. Therefore, hits in LexisNexis are a better index for non-scholarly prominence than Google hits (Landes and Posner 2000). Furthermore, LexisNexis is able to separate the two survey periods more sharply than Google (Danowski and Park 2009).

third of overall media mentions of the total ranking (see Figure 4 and Figure 5). Moreover, the standard deviation halves itself when excluding the MEDIASTARs, displaying that these values disproportionately vary from the rest of the sample. We label those 35 intellectuals that are least prominent in terms of media mentions as *MEDIAMIDGET*s. As a second indicator for prominence and public stardom, we consider *TALKVIS*, which reflects whether the intellectual has ever been visiting one of Germany's major political talk shows.[50]



Figure 4: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2007 Sample)



Figure 5: LexisNexis References as a Function of Rank (2012 Sample)

[50] We considered the talk shows *„Günther Jauch", „Maybrit Illner", „Menschen bei Maischberger", „Hart aber Fair",* and *„Anne Will"*. Because first broadcast of some of these talk shows was after 2007, we focus on the 2012 ranking.

In order to indicate intellectuals that cover an exceptional broad spread of issues, we provide the variable *WIDESPREAD* that takes the value of "1" in case the number of issues covered exceeds the average by one standard deviation, and "0" otherwise. We count the number of issues by referring to the number of different categories that the intellectual is assigned to on *Amazon*. *REPUTATION* is the number of total scholarly citations the intellectual accounts for by 2007 or 2012, respectively, according to Thomson Reuters' *"Web of Science" (WoS)*. We consider citations recorded by the *Arts and Humanities Citation Index,* the *Science Citation Index Expanded*, and the *Social Science Citation Index*. The dummy *AFFILIATED* indicates whether the intellectual has or ever had a full professorship at a university. Moreover, *ACTIVESCHOL* signals whether the intellectual was publishing within a five-year period ahead of the rankings with reference to the *WoS* database. Additionally, we assign every intellectual to a scientific field according to OECD's *"Fields of Science and Technology" (FoS)*. We provide corresponding dummy variables as controls. *HUMAN* signals that the intellectual is assigned to the field of humanities, *SOCIAL* represents social science, *NATURAL* stands for natural science, and *MEDICAL* signifies medical and health science as field of research. Moreover, the category *OTHER* comprises journalists, writers, and bloggers. Furthermore, we include the dummy variable *SEX* as well as *AGE* into our statistics (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994).[51] Finally, *RANKING12* takes the value of "1" if the observation belongs to the 2012 ranking, and "0" otherwise.

6.3 Methods

We use stepwise logistic regressions to model the impact of the independent variable on the chances to be considered a MEDIASTAR (Hair 2010). In a first model, we only consider the 2012 ranking; in a second model, we include the 2007 ranking and afterwards assess changes in effects over time by adding an interaction term with RANKING12 (Model 3). Additionally, we assess whether the variables under examination affect the chance to become a guest in TV talk shows (Model 4). The approach can be formalized as follows:

[51] We count AGE from date of birth and stopped at the time the respective ranking was set up, i.e., 2007 or 2012.

$$P_i = \frac{1}{1+e^{-z_i}}, \quad (1)$$

where P defines the probability for MEDIASTAR or TALKVIS, respectively, and i indicates the model (with $i = 1,\ldots, 4$). Logits z can be defined as:

$$z_i = \beta_{i,0} + \beta_{i,1} * WIDESPREAD_i + \beta_{i,2} * REPUTATION_i + \beta_{i,3} * AFFILIATED_i \quad (2)$$
$$+\beta_{i,4} * ACTIVESCHOL_i + \beta_{i,5} * SEX_i + \sum_{j=6}^{9} \beta_{i,j} * X_{i,1}$$
$$+k_i * \sum_{l=10}^{9+n} \beta_{i,l} * RANKING12_i * X_{i,2},$$

where $X_{i,1}$ is a vector of dummy variables for the scientific fields (*FoS*), k is the gatekeeper for interaction terms (with $k = 1$ for Model 3, 0 otherwise), n is the number of included interaction terms, and $X_{i,2}$ is a vector of moderated variables.

7. Results and Discussion

Table 9 shows descriptive statistics for the full sample, both for 2007 and for 2012. Noticeable is the high average AGE of approximately 60 years for both samples. That is, in correspondence with prior research (Landes and Posner 2000), the veterans with considerable life experience shape the intellectual discourse.

Moreover, natural and medical scientists are significantly underrepresented compared with researchers for social science and humanities.[52] Social and humanities scholars may find it easier to deal with mass media because their suggestions are often geared to facts and figures to a lesser extent compared to, for example, natural scientists. Therefore, they face a lower risk of getting busted or of disgracing themselves (Hagstrom 1964). Furthermore, women are underrepresented as well, especially in the 2012 sample. While 16% of Germany's full-time university professors were female in 2007, their quota climbed up to 20% in 2012.[53] Yet, the amount of female among the most influential intellectuals declined from 14.7% in 2007 to 13.8% in 2012.[54]

Table 10 presents descriptive statistics of the sample composed of MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs for 2007, 2012 and in total. MEDIASTAR and MEDIAMIDGET do not differ significantly in AGE ($p > 0.1$). That is, AGE appears to be a requirement for access to intellectual discourses (see Table 9) but no differentiator.

Medical scientists are unrepresented; yet, one natural scientist made it into the MEDIAMIDGET category for 2007. WIDESPREAD is more frequent among MEDIASTARs ($p < 0.05$). As noted above, we think that it is overly costly for those intellectuals that play on an exceptional broad field to indeed acquire specialized knowledge on every topic they address.

[52] For comparison: in Germany there are 97,000 social scientists (including economists), 44,000 humanities scholars and 65,000 natural scientists (figures refer to employees that are subject to social insurance contributions according to data from the Federal Employment Agency).

[53] Information refer to Germany's Federal Office of Statistics.

[54] While humanities scholars frequently ruminate on gender diversity, only 14% of German philosophy professors are women (compared to, for example, 23% in economics and law). Moreover, percentage of women among scientific staff is significantly lower ($p < 0.05$) in philosophy (27%) than in economics (30%).

	2007 (N=442)		2012 (N=436)	
AGE**	59.8	(13.2)	62.4	(12.9)
TALKVIS (1|0)*				
TALKVIS (1)	-		108	(24.8)
No TALKVIS (0)	-		328	(75.2)
Number of Issues**	9.5	(4.2)	9.5	(4.2)
WIDESPREAD (1|0)*				
WIDESPREAD (1)	64	(14.5)	65	(14.9)
Not WIDESPREAD (0)	378	(85.5)	371	(85.1)
REPUTATION**	248.6	(2,241.1)	375.7	(2,958.9)
MEDIAMENTIONS**	479.7	(598.6)	836	(981.7)
AFIILIATED (1|0)*				
AFFILIATED (1)	135	(30.5)	159	(36.5)
Not AFFILIATED (0)	307	(69.5)	277	(63.5)
ACTIVESCHOL (1|0)*				
ACTIVESCHOL (1)	217	(49.1)	219	(50.2)
Not ACTIVESCHOL (0)	225	(50.9)	217	(49.8)
SEX (1|0)*				
Male (0)	377	(85.3)	376	(86.2)
Female (1)	65	(14.7)	60	(13.8)
Scientific Field*				
HUMAN	208	(47.1)	206	(47.2)
SOCIAL	73	(16.5)	89	(20.4)
MEDICAL	4	(0.9)	6	(1.4)
NATURAL	15	(3.4)	12	(2.8)
OTHER	142	(32.1)	123	(28.2)

* Count (percentage in brackets). ** Mean (standard deviation in brackets).

Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for the total Sample of Intellectuals

	2007 (N=70)		2012 (N=70)		Total (N=140)	
AGE**						
MEDIASTAR	63.2	(12.0)	63.9	(13.1)	63.5	(12.5)
MEDIAMIDGET	62.3	(14.1)	67.4	(11.9)	64.8	(13.3)
Total	62.8	(13.1)	65.6	(12.6)	64.1	(12.9)
Number of Issues**						
MEDIASTAR	10.4	(5.0)	10.7	(4.7)	10.5	(4.9)
MEDIAMIDGET	8.8	(3.7)	9.8	(3.3)	9.3	(3.5)
Total	9.6	(4.5)	10.2	(4.1)	9.9	(4.3)
WIDESPREAD (1|0)*						
WIDESPREAD (1)						
MEDIASTAR	11	(78.6)	10	(76.9)	21	(77.8)
MEDIAMIDGET	3	(21.4)	3	(23.1)	6	(22.2)
Total	14	(20.0)	13	(18.6)	27	(19.3)
Not WIDESPREAD (0)						
MEDIASTAR	24	(42.9)	25	(43.9)	49	(43.4)
MEDIAMIDGET	32	(57.1)	32	(56.1)	64	(56.6)
Total	56	(80.0)	57	(81.4)	113	(80.7)
REPUTATION**						
MEDIASTAR	23.5	(79.8)	31.9	(122.6)	27.7	(103.5)
MEDIAMIDGET	70.7	(308.5)	65.1	(200.4)	67.9	(260.2)
Total	47.1	(226.6)	48.5	(167.0)	47.8	(199.0)
MEDIAMENTIONS**						
MEDIASTAR	2,036.5	(950.9)	3,421.2	(1,456.6)	2,728.9	(1,411.5)
MEDIAMIDGET	36.2	(13.8)	61.6	(22.4)	48.9	(22.5)
Total	1,036.4	(1,205.2)	1,741.4	(1,970.5)	0	(0.0)
AFIILIATED (1|0)*						
AFFILIATED (1)						
MEDIASTAR	8	(34.8)	11	(34.4)	19	(34.5)
MEDIAMIDGET	15	(65.2)	21	(65.6)	36	(65.5)
Total	23	(32.9)	32	(45.7)	55	(39.3)
Not AFFILIATED (0)						
MEDIASTAR	27	(57.4)	24	(63.2)	51	(60.0)
MEDIAMIDGET	20	(42.6)	14	(36.8)	34	(40.0)
Total	47	(67.1)	38	(54.3)	85	(60.7)
ACTIVESCHOL (1|0)*						
ACTIVESCHOL (1)						
MEDIASTAR	18	(52.9)	13	(37.1)	31	(44.9)
MEDIAMIDGET	16	(47.1)	22	(62.9)	38	(55.1)
Total	34	(48.6)	35	(50.0)	69	(49.3)
Not ACTIVESCHOL (0)						
MEDIASTAR	17	(47.2)	22	(62.9)	39	(54.9)
MEDIAMIDGET	19	(52.8)	13	(37.1)	32	(45.1)
Total	36	(51.4)	35	(50.0)	71	(50.7)

[continued]

	2007 (N=70)		2012 (N=70)		Total (N=140)	
SEX (1|0)*						
Male (0)						
MEDIASTAR	30	(47.6)	27	(45.0)	57	(46.3)
MEDIAMIDGET	33	(52.4)	33	(55.0)	66	(53.7)
Total	63	(90.0)	60	(85.7)	123	(87.9)
Female (1)						
MEDIASTAR	5	(71.4)	8	(80.0)	13	(76.5)
MEDIAMIDGET	2	(28.6)	2	(20.0)	4	(23.5)
Total	7	(10.0)	10	(14.3)	17	(12.1)
Scientific Field*						
HUMAN						
MEDIASTAR	14	(46.7)	17	(53.1)	31	(50.0)
MEDIAMIDGET	16	(53.3)	15	(46.9)	31	(50.0)
Total	30	(42.9)	32	(45.7)	62	(44.3)
SOCIAL						
MEDIASTAR	7	(70.0)	7	(43.8)	14	(53.8)
MEDIAMIDGET	3	(30.0)	9	(56.3)	12	(46.2)
Total	10	(14.3)	16	(22.9)	26	(18.6)
NATURAL						
MEDIASTAR	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)	0	(0.0)
MEDIAMIDGET	1	(100.0)	0	(0.0)	1	(100.0)
Total	1	(1.4)	0	(0.0)	1	(0.7)
OTHER						
MEDIASTAR	14	(48.3)	11	(50.0)	25	(49.0)
MEDIAMIDGET	15	(51.7)	11	(50.0)	26	(51.0)
Total	29	(41.4)	22	(31.4)	51	(36.4)

* Count (percentage in brackets); ** Mean (standard deviation in brackets).
Example of interpretation: In 2007, there were 14 humanities scholars (HUMAN) assigned to the group of MEDIASTAR. This amount corresponds to 46.7% of all humanities scholars within the 2007 sample (30 in total). 30 intellectuals of the 2007 sample are assigned to humanities. This amount corresponds to 42.9% of the 2007 sample (N=70).

Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets

Accordingly, MEDIASTARs seem to focus on infotainment rather than substantial meaning. ACTIVESCHOL occurs less often among MEDIASTARs, at least for the 2012 sample ($p < 0.05$). MEDIAMIDGETs appear to be characterized by higher REPUTATION; however, differences are insignificant ($p > 0.1$). While AFFILIATED is more frequent in the 2012 sample than in the 2007 ranking ($p < 0.1$, see Table 9), unaffiliated intellectuals dominate the group of MEDIASTARs. Summed up, with spreading universities and reduced teaching loads, the ratio of academics among the total sample of intellectuals may increase (Posner 2001). Yet, top positions appear to be occupied by *intellectual rioters* that usually take up extreme positions on matters of cross-sectional importance like Alice Schwarzer, who even does not possess a higher education entrance qualification, Peter Handke, or Martin Walser.

Table 11 and Table 12 show Pearson correlations for the sample of MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs and for the total 2012 sample, respectively.

To test our hypotheses, we employed stepwise binary logistic regressions as a multivariate method to analyze the impact of the independent variables on the chances for MEDIASTAR (Models 1-3) and TALKVIS (Model 4). In Table 13, we report the estimated logit coefficients (*b*) and the odds ratios (Exp(*b*)) that indicate the effect of the independent variables on the odds of becoming a MEDIASTAR instead of a MEDIAMIDGET and of having visited a talk show (TALKVIS), respectively.

Model 1 includes the 2012 sample of MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs. While SEX comes out to be insignificant, HUMAN and SOCIAL foster MEDIASTAR in comparison to the reference category OTHER ($p < 0.1$). Moreover, as supposed (*H1*), WIDESPREAD appears to increase the odds for MEDIASTAR ($p < 0.1$), which fuels the discussion on deterioration of intellectual output. Intellectuals that engage in dissemination and address cross-sectional issues are more frequently demanded by mass media. Thereby, they achieve *superstar status* and may benefit disproportionately from further engaging in product differentiation beyond their own expertise (Adler 1985; Rosen 1981).[55] In line with *H2b*, results show that AFFILIATED makes ensuing public stardom less likely ($p < 0.01$). That is, AFFILIATED does not seem to signal credibility and to increase demand, but rather highlights the phenomenon of *anti-intellectualism*. REPUTATION is far from having any effect on media mentions for all models, rejecting *H3*.[56] However, ACTIVESCHOL makes success on the public stage less likely ($p < 0.05$). This confirms the idea that sacrificing resources for simplifying scientific knowledge and for preparing public performances comes at the expense of research and scientific publications and vice versa (*H4*). Model 2 adds MEDIASTARs and MEDIAMIDGETs of 2007 to the analysis. While Nagelkerke's R^2 and the percentage of correct classifications decrease slightly compared with

[55] To revisit and substantiate our comment in the introduction: MEDIASTARs published significantly more books than MEDIAMIDGETs during the period of observation (2003-2012; $p < 0.05$). We assume that outstanding media presence rubs off on book sales (Posner 2001).

[56] Results may be insignificant due to different citation habits of scientific disciplines. However, we made huge efforts in order to derive any effect from REPUTAION – to no avail.

Model 1, the impact of the independent variables seems to be fairly robust. The positive influence of WIDESPREAD on public stardom does not intensify over time but holds, although at lower significance for 2012 (rejecting *H5a*). In opposition to *H5b* and *H5c*, influences of AFFILIATED and REPUTATION remain constant. Yet, ACTIVESCHOL appears to become insignificant when considering both the 2007 and the 2012 sample. Consequently, we introduce an interaction term in order to assess the time varying influence of scholar's publication effort (Model 3). Being actively publishing had not influenced the odds for MEDIASTAR during the five-year period before the 2007 ranking. In contrast, results show that ACTIVESCHOL impaired the probability of performing publicly during the last years, supporting *H5d* ($p < 0.1$). A possible reasoning may be the increased specialization of knowledge and professionalization of scholarship. That is, opportunity costs of going public increased accordingly. Researchers have to make huge efforts to get published within refereed journals and, therefore, are kept from preparing and conducting public performances. Moreover, time variance may be induced by enhanced competition among public intellectuals, making it more difficult to survive as an intellectual MEDIASTAR. For instance, while it was sufficient to be labeled MEDIASTAR in 2007 by getting 1,241 MEDIAMENTIONS, for the 2012 sample an intellectual needed 2,356 mentions within five years (sample means increased accordingly; see Table 10).[57]

Results for TALKVIS (Model 4) are rather mixed. Being a female intellectual seems to increase the odds for TALKVIS ($p < 0.01$) and thereby fits former insights of research (Holderman 2003).[58] Yet, being a humanities scholar (HUMAN) comes out to work in the opposite direction ($p < 0.001$). We assume that the impact of HUMAN is caused by the fact that political talk shows deal with rather concrete up-to-date topics, while humanities scholars focus on more general long-term developments and ethics. Therefore, the reference group OTHER, which includes journalists and publicists, may be preferred by talk show producers. Again, being an active scholar reduces the chances of getting recognized in public, likely for similar reasons as

[57] Data to evaluate growth of the LexisNexis database during the entire period from 2003 to 2012 was unavailable. However, figures on a sample basis that were provided by LexisNexis upon request suggest that the database grew slower in the category "*German Language News*" than the threshold that has to be exceeded to be assigned to the group of MEDIASTARs.

[58] See Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) for a detailed consideration.

in the case of media mentions and in support of *H4* ($p < 0.001$). However, *H1-H3* could not be supported in the case of intellectual's TV presence. While WIDESPREAD and AFFILIATED show the expected signs, they remain insignificant.

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) MEDIASTAR	1							
(2) WIDESPREAD	0.272**	1						
(3) REPUTATION	-0.101	-0.094	1					
(4) AFFILIATED	-0.249**	-0.134	0.255**	1				
(5) ACTIVESCHOL	-0.100	-0.047	0.234**	0.289**	1			
(6) SEX	0.197*	0.151	-0.042	-0.075	0.075	1		
(7) HUMAN	0.000	0.002	-0.132	0.137	0.185*	0.065	1	
(8) SOCIAL	0.037	-0.140	0.214*	0.481**	0.154	-0.009	-0.426**	1
(9) NATURAL	-0.085	-0.041	0.761**	0.105	0.086	-0.032	-0.076	-0.041

Significance levels (two-tailed): ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 11: Pearson Correlations for the 2007 and 2012 Sample of Mediastars and Mediamidgets (N=140)

Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) TALKVIS	1								
(2) WIDESPREAD	0.013	1							
(3) REPUTATION	-0.060	-0.045	1						
(4) AFFILIATED	-0.093	-0.023	0.160**	1					
(5) ACTIVESCHOL	-0.268**	-0.060	0.123**	0.287**	1				
(6) SEX	0.110*	-0.036	-0.041	-0.109*	-0.028	1			
(7) HUMAN	-0.224**	0.094*	-0.114*	-0.058	0.088	0.062	1		
(8) SOCIAL	0.078	-0.068	-0.040	0.432**	0.083	-0.070	-0.479**	1	
(9) NATURAL	-0.032	-0.031	0.337**	0.135**	0.111*	-0.027	-0.159**	-0.085	1
(10) MEDICAL	0.023	0.006	0.460**	0.115*	0.078	-0.047	-0.112*	-0.060	-0.020

Significance levels (two-tailed): ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 12: Pearson Correlations for the total 2012 Sample of Intellectuals (N=436)

	DV: MEDIASTAR						DV: TALKVIS	
	1		2		3		4	
	b	Exp(*b*)	*b*	Exp(*b*)	*b*	Exp(*b*)	*b*	Exp(*b*)
Constant	-1.264 (1.107)	.283	-1.243† (.752)	.289	-1.305† (.770)	.271	-1.172** (.431)	.310
WIDESPREAD	1.430† (.792)	4.179	1.553** (.540)	4.726	1.568** (.542)	4.799	.141 (.334)	1.152
REPUTATION	.000 (.002)	1.000	.000 (.002)	1.000	.000 (.002)	1.000	.000 (.000)	1.000
AFFILIATED	-2.147** (.828)	.117	-1.939** (.565)	.144	-1.975** (.575)	.139	-.180 (.329)	.835
ACTIVESCHOL	-1.317* (.622)	.268	-.335 (.417)	.716	.131 (.504)	1.140	-1.228*** (.269)	.293
SEX	1.335 (.973)	3.801	.912 (.646)	2.488	.958 (.665)	2.607	.870** (.327)	2.388
HUMAN	1.389† (.795)	4.012	1.014* (.505)	2.758	1.023* (.510)	2.781	-1.071*** (.295)	.343
SOCIAL	2.200† (1.162)	9.023	2.300** (.773)	9.973	2.420** (.795)	11.244	.234 (.380)	1.264
NATURAL			-18.025 (----)[b]	.000	-18.892 (----)[b]	.000	.219 (.964)	1.245
MEDICAL							1.947 (1.389)	7.008
ACTIVESCHOL x RANKING12					-.962† (.575)	.382		
n	70		140		140		435[a]	
χ^2	21.488**		32.465***		35.342***		63.544***	
-2 Log likelihood	75.552		161.616		158.739		424.033	
Nagelkerke R^2	.352		.276		.297		.202	
Correct	71.4%		70.0%		70.0%		76.8%	

Significance levels (two-tailed): *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in brackets.
[a] One intellectual within the Cicero list already died before broadcasting of the political talk shows that we consider began.
[b] Only one case of a natural scientist.

Table 13: Logistic Regression Results

8. Limitations

The study has some limitations. It is quite difficult to set up an entire listing of public intellectuals because compilation depends on definition, criteria, and sampling procedure. However, by relying on Germany's most recognized and most extensive source when it comes to intellectuals, we aim at avoiding any self-induced subjectivity. Moreover, when collecting data on media mentions we refer to the procedure of Posner (2001). The insignificant effect of REPUTATION may be ascribed to different citation habits with respect to different scientific fields. Yet, we not only test the metric variable REPUTATION but also transformed the variable in order to mitigate this potential bias. However, results did not vary significantly. Finally, one could think of a battery of other signals for quality of intellectual work than ACTIVESCHOL, REPUTATION, WIDESPREAD, or AFFILIATED, e.g., governmental activities or affiliation to think tanks rather than universities.

9. Conclusions

In times of increasingly specialized knowledge, the media are not able to knowingly address all questions of public interest based on own investigations. Therefore, it is much cheaper for them to ask an intellectual to voice an opinion on a specific topic and to fill some seconds of broadcasting time or to provide some lines for newspapers. Thereby, the market brings fourth few omnipresent *media stars* that cover large parts of the market and thus are able to obtain higher (non-)monetary incomes due to superstar effects (Adler 1985; Rosen 1981).

Although our approach is based on Posner's (2001) remarks on the decline in public intellectual work, we clearly set us apart from his analyses. First, and probably most striking, we indeed give some ideas on quality measurement in public intellectual discourses and applied them empirically (both static and over time), while Posner (2001) merely rants against declining quality and, nevertheless, only chooses a static empirical approach.[59] In addition to scholarly citations that are hardly recognized by media, we provide WIDESPREAD that is more likely to explain demand and that also allows for conclusions on quality, especially in light of increased specialization of knowledge. Posner (2001) comprehensibly notes that performing publicly comes at the expense of research; since citations are directed to the past, we introduce ACTIVESCHOL to indeed depict the tradeoff between time for public discourses and time for academia.[60] Finally, while Posner (2001) takes a polemic and morally-based perspective to criticize the decline in intellectuals' output, we focus on the economic reasoning for media presence of *intellectual rioters*.

Hence, within this paper we take a look upon certain career paths of scholars and pundits and refer to the question: What separates the *media stars* from the *long tail* of *media midgets*? Thereby, we pay attention to an economic issue of universal interest: Does it pay off to further

[59] Besides, at the same time he confounds wrong judgments of intellectuals with wrongly deduced judgments.

[60] Posner (2001) also admits that public intellectuals are usually "*past the zenith of his scholarly productivity*".

engage in specialization or is it more favorable to capitalize on your current skillset and to engage in "relentless" self-marketing?

Covering a broad range of different issues and going beyond the area of one's expertise disproportionately increase the odds for public stardom, giving rise to a "*winner-takes-all-market"* where the best known performers are able to snatch large incomes (Frank and Cook 1995). That is, intellectuals that are highly demanded by mass media, i.e., that achieve *superstar status*, may benefit from further engaging in product differentiation beyond their own expertise because they can absorb parts of the media's cost savings (Rosen 1981). Within technical discussions with specialists that require profound knowledge and expertise, they would be likely to come out second best due to considerable cost disadvantages. That is, incentives and options for performing publicly increase with differentiation, i.e., the range of issues that an intellectual addresses. Consequently, intellectuals may appreciate the possibility of bypassing scientific peer review procedures, and thus capitalize on their current knowledge in order to reach prominence and fame by performing publicly instead of engaging in specialization. Yet, this way quality of intellectual output might deteriorate by preferring infotainment to rigor and generalization to specialization (Bates 2011). Nevertheless, the public and the mass media do not necessarily act irrationally when giving credence to few *media stars* that operate beyond their capabilities. In case that there is little benefit from being well and reliably informed about intellectual output, quality of *intellectual news* might be of minor importance. Instead, public and media seem to value entertainment higher than information (Mullainathan and Shleifer 2005) and primarily aim at reducing search costs. Therefore, they rather focus on few notorious faces than quarrying for a specific expert on a particular problem.

On the supply side, data suggest that distinguished academics do not necessarily perform within the public sphere. Intellectuals that are affiliated to universities or that are actively publishing scientific articles tend to represent *media midgets* rather than *media stars.* Preparing and accomplishing public performances seem to come at the expense of scholarly work. As has become obvious in recent years, increased specialization of knowledge and increased competition for

publication in peer-reviewed journals for scientists leave no time for simultaneously taking part in *intellectual* discourses. Moreover, the risk of making a fool of oneself in public disputes may keep researchers from engaging in dissemination. Instead, top positions appear to be occupied by *intellectual rioters*.

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III. DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT IN SUPPLY CHAIN RELATIONSHIPS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS

"Coming together is a beginning.
Keeping together is progress.
Working together is success."
Henry Ford (1863-1947)

1. Abstract

The level of conflict present among supply chain partners largely determines the partners' ability to realize relationship performance goals because conflict can substantially decrease the benefits of cooperation and can even create costs that largely exceed cooperation benefits. Accordingly, the phenomenon of interfirm conflict has received considerable research attention. Although scholars have called emphatically for studying the *dynamics of conflict*, empirical investigations of interorganizational conflict development and factors influencing transitions through various stages of conflict are scarce. Recent work on relationship dynamics further suggests that since cooperations evolve over time, the effects of relationship characteristics (e.g., governance mechanisms) on exchange outcomes vary. However, conflict dynamics are not yet well understood.

Consequently, we explore the evolutionary dynamics of conflict in supply chain relationships, for what is ostensibly the first time based on all five states of conflict development as proposed by the "dominant process model" (Pondy 1967). We argue that the selection and implementation of formal as well as relational governance mechanisms are central drivers of conflict dynamics and thus study their potential moderating effects on transitions between different states of conflict ("states of conflict" include latent, cognitive, affective, and manifest conflict that finally result in the aftermath of conflict). That is, we integrate the two distinct concepts of formal and relational mechanisms of interfirm governance, which enables us to study their effects jointly.

Therefore, based on extensive longitudinal data from retailers of Germany's two largest grocery chains, we employ several competing structural equation models to examine conflict from a process perspective and to provide insights into the relative importance of governance mechanisms over the conflict "lifecycle". While formal governance mechanisms appear to effectively limit the evolution of task-related disagreements and conflicts, relational governance mechanisms become useful for mitigating the escalation of conflicts and for keeping discussions on a technical level. However, if affective sentiments prevail, the effectiveness of relational governance mechanisms becomes impaired or even reversed.[61]

[61] A preliminary version of this chapter was presented (with Dr. B. Meiseberg and Prof. Dr. R. P. Dant) at the *6th International Conference on Economics and Management of Networks*, Agadir, Morocco (11/2013). Parts of the argumentation and preliminary exploratory analyses can also be found in Lengers, Dant, and Meiseberg (forthcoming).

2. Introduction

Commercial exchanges between market players are increasingly viewed in the context of relational structures rather than as arm's length one-time transactions (Lafontaine and Slade 2010). One of the inherent characteristics of such relationships is the occurrence of conflicts and disputes between exchange partners (Frazier 1999). Because it could impair the mutual benefits from the exchange relationship and lower the partners' commitment to each other, conflict is a widely recognized indicator for relationship performance (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Therefore, the construct of conflict received much attention in past research on *intra*organizational (Amason 1996; Barki and Hartwick 2001; De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001; Langfred 2007) as well as *inter*organizational relationships (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier et al. 2006; Winsor et al. 2012). Studies on the evolution and management of interfirm conflict particularly focus on buyer-supplier relationships (Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011). Today's frequently changing business practices and the increasing prevalence of multichannel strategies that target bypassing distributors and retailers result in higher conflict among old-established partners. Hence, understanding and managing the evolution of conflict becomes crucial for practitioners to maintain their vertical supply chain relationships (Ganesan et al. 2009).

Based on the recognized conceptual framework of Pondy (1967), there is a broad consensus that conflicts evolve along distinct states of (1) latent, (2) cognitive, (3) affective, and (4) manifest conflict that finally result in (5) the aftermath of conflict (Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin 1992; Thomas 1992). Despite emphatic calls for investigating conflict as a process (Frazier 1999; Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999), past research neglected the dynamics of conflict to a great extent. Although Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004), Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a, 1995b), and Winsor et al. (2012) represent few exceptions as they consider two different conflict states, they omit examining factors that may affect the transition from one

state of conflict to the next; i.e., they provide at most moderate hints for managing the dynamics of conflict effectively. However, considerations concerning the evolution of boundaries over time and investigations that factor in contingencies of relationship dynamics will be of major significance within interorganizational research (Fawcett et al. 2012; Palmatier et al. 2013). To consider contingent factors, we examine the way firms organize and manage their supply chains (Ganesan et al. 2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). We focus on governance structures that are implemented within supply chains to stop the exchange parties from behaving in an opportunistic manner and to thus decrease interorganizational tension and conflict (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Sheng et al. 2006).

Several scholars, e.g., Klein and Leffler (1981) with their concept of self-enforcing contracts, Heide (1994) in terms of "*market versus non-market governance*", or more recently Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002) and Gibbons (2005) with their integrative framework of "*relational contracts*", stress the inherent incompleteness of formal rules and the importance of informal patterns. Relational approaches recognize that agreements between firms are governed and enforced not only by formal hierarchy, rules and authority but also by holding out the prospect of benefits from future transactions, assured by informal agreements and unwritten relational norms between firms that affect exchange partners' actions (Gibbons 2005).

Based on extensive longitudinal data on wholesaler-retailer relationships of Germany's two major grocery chains, we employ structural equation modelling and test several hypotheses on the moderating effects of formal bureaucratic structures and relational governance on the dynamics of conflict. Our research contributes to existing literature in several ways. First, to capture the dynamics of conflict, this study empirically incorporates, ostensibly for the first time, all five states of conflict in reference to the well-established model by Pondy (1967). We depart from Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006) and draw on relationship dynamics in accordance with Palmatier et al. (2013). Second, while it is commonly accepted that conflict inexorably passes through those states, we focus on variables that may limit or speed up the transition from one state of conflict to the next, which improves our understanding of prior insights. Third, follow-

ing the claims of scholars of organizational economics as well as of marketing and supply chain management, we empirically enrich the underexplored phenomenon of relational exchange and simultaneously consider formal bureaucratic structures and informal relational patterns to explain behaviors within interfirm exchanges (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Blome, Schoenherr, and Kaesser 2013; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Heide 1994; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Fourth, while most research has drawn on data from buyer-supplier relationships in the US market, this study contributes to a more holistic view because the analyses are based on a European context. Finally, a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implications not only for future research but also for practitioners in terms of managing conflict by effectively governing and organizing supply chains.

This paper is organized as follows: We begin with an overview of the relevant literature. We then present hypotheses and describe the data, measures and methods. We offer results from structural equation modelling and finally conclude.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1 Supply Chain Conflict

The phenomenon of interfirm conflict in supply chains has been studied in the context of various buyer-supplier relationships such as the distribution of automobiles, beer, chemicals, clothing, engine parts, furniture, groceries, household durables, pharmaceuticals, and sports products (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Chung, Sternquist, and Chen 2006; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008; Lusch 1976a; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007; Rosenberg and Stern 1971; Runyan, Sternquist, and Chung 2010; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003; Wilkinson 1981). While early literature has focused on goal incongruences (Hunger and Stern 1976; Stern, Sternthal, and Craig 1973) and the exertion of coercive power (Brown, Lusch, and Muehling 1983; Gaski 1984; Lusch 1976b) as being crucial for the *emergence* of conflict, more recent studies have emphasized the impact of asymmetric dependence, commitment, and the presence of a relational mindset that surrounds the exchange partnership (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Jap and Ganesan 2000). In addition, a range of studies and meta-analyses of supply chain literature on the *consequences* of interfirm conflict emphasized the (long-lasting) detrimental effects of conflict on economic and relational outcomes (Anderson, Ross, and Weitz 1998; Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Ganesan et al. 2009; Koza and Dant 2007; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier et al. 2006; Runyan, Sternquist, and Chung 2010) and established interfirm conflict as an indicator for relationship performance (Brown, Lusch, and Smith 1993; Geyskens,

Steenkamp, and Kumar 1999; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007).[62]

Within this paper, we draw on the work of Pondy (1967) as well as on more recent research on conflict theory and conceptualize the consecutive states of *latent, cognitive, affective*, and *manifest conflict* that end up in the *aftermath of conflict*:[63] We conceptualize *latent conflict* as underlying structural conditions in terms of competition over scarce resources, goal incongruences and autonomy needs of supply chain agents that cause subsequent perceptions of conflict (Winsor et al. 2012). Research on *cognitive conflict* is quite widespread and looks upon disagreements between supply chain partners over how to achieve mutual goals and how to address business challenges (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004). We conceptualize *affective conflict* as non-task-related discrepancies reflected as anger and frustration toward an exchange partner (Jehn and Mannix 2001; Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a). In addition to cognitive conflict, affective conflict constitutes an intermediate state between latent conditions and *manifest conflict* that is characterized by overt harmful behavior that actively impedes the exchange partner's goals (Winsor et al. 2012). Finally, the *conflict aftermath* describes retained hostilities toward the other party subsequent to preceding conflict episodes (Kaufmann and Stern 1988).

Scholars of *intra*organizational conflicts have already applied multiple of these constructs in one and the same study to disclose their sequential properties, primarily in the context of decision making in teams and team performance (De Dreu and Weingart 2003; Ensley, Pearson, and

[62] We view conflict as a "*cost of participation*" (Pondy 1967) that may be reduced by adequate governance mechanisms (MacLeod 2000). We assume that, ceteris paribus, conflict impedes relationship performance and, therefore, constitutes an adequate outcome measure for relationship success. This notion is in line with previous empirical management studies (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). Because we focus on relationships that persist over the time of examination, we do not consider relationship termination or breach, which may constitute the climax of conflict-laden action; efficient breach is beyond the scope of this study (Macneil, 1982).

[63] There are numerous models that deal with conflict, negotiation, and litigation within an organizational context. Yet, the model of Pondy (1967) takes a very comprehensive view that allows for investigating conflict between departments or even entire firms (Lewicki, Weiss, and Lewin 1992) and facilitates the attempt to take a dynamic approach for analyzing interfirm boundaries (Winsor et al. 2012).

Amason 2002; Jehn 1995; Jehn and Mannix 2001).[64] However, while it goes nearly unchallenged that conflict inexorably passes through distinct states, studies in the context of *inter*organizational relations that examine the dynamic process of conflict are scarce (Frazier 1999). The prevailing approach is to explain the evolution of conflict using one overarching construct, disregarding the need for differentiation. Against this background, it may not appear surprising that scholars reach unexpected and contradicting results in regard to antecedents and consequences of conflict. For example, Brown, Cobb, and Lusch (2006) found that explicit contracting tends to increase conflict, although it was initially designed as an instrument to reduce conflict. In contrast, other scholars such as Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant (2011) stress the conflict suppressing abilities of explicit contract utilization. Although Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004) and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a, 1995b) represent the first approaches toward a more nuanced view on the construct of interfirm conflict by simultaneously focusing on cognitive and affective conflict, they provide no hints concerning the dynamics of conflict development in terms of the transition between distinct conflict states. By extending their approaches to cover multiple states of conflict and by considering contingent factors that influence the transition of conflict, this study may resolve contradictions on how to effectively manage conflict in supply chains.

3.2 Supply Chain Governance

In supply chain relations, as in most other interfirm affairs, contracts determine the way companies organize and govern their transactions (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron 2005).[65] Contracts and governance structures are implemented to ensure goal

[64] During our argumentation, particularly throughout the development of distinct hypotheses, we will occasionally draw on intraorganizational studies because empirical evidence for time-varying properties of conflict evolution is more extensive in this context. Pondy's (1967) model of conflict was initially developed for relationships within firms, but afterwards frequently adopted to an interorganizational context, giving cause that the underlying assumptions are transferable to a large extent. Moreover, the concept of relational contracting, which this study refers to, gives an integrative framework for relational contracts between and within firms (Gibbons 2005). That is, although there are specific disparities, e.g., due to ownership issues, assumptions concerning governance by means of formal and informal mechanisms are not limited to intraorganizational settings.

[65] Vice versa, we follow Williamson (2000) and define governance structures as the "*institutional frameworks within which the integrity of the contract is decided*."

alignment between the exchange parties, to restrain them from behaving in an opportunistic manner, and to facilitate coordination (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011). Research on interorganizational relations has adopted diverse theoretical perspectives including *agency theory, transaction cost economics,* and *relational exchange theory* (Lafontaine and Slade 2010). At a very general level, empirical marketing studies can be separated into two different areas. Much of the early supply chain research solely deals with either transaction cost economics or relational exchange theory. That is, it only considers one side of the story (Dwyer and Oh 1988; Kaufmann and Stern 1988). While market exchanges miss the possibility to economize on specific investments due to the risk of one-time transactions, transaction cost theory considers governance by *formal rules* for mitigating opportunistic behaviors (Williamson 1985). Within this line of research, empirical studies identified inter alia factors such as the *formal hierarchy of authority*, *bureaucratization* of channel structures*, authoritative enforcement and utilization of written contracts*, or the use of *formal incentive systems* as answers to the risk of losing relationship-specific investments (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Dwyer and Oh 1988; Dwyer and Welsh 1985; Gundlach and Achrol 1993; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003). Early transaction cost theory was charged with overestimating the power of hierarchy while neglecting the abilities resulting from the *social embeddedness* of relational exchanges to govern interfirm ties (Granovetter 1985). Originating from contract law and initiating another emergent stream of research, Macneil (1980), in the course of his *theory of relational exchange,* developed a set of contract norms that characterize transactions by capturing their relational embeddedness. In accordance with Macneil (1980), exchanges range from discrete one-time transactions to relational exchanges featured by well-marked relational contract norms. The prevalence of these *informal* relational norms is assumed to mitigate hazards arising from incomplete contracts among supply chain firms as they express adequate behavioral guidelines, signal stability, and provide reasons for repeated beneficial interactions (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Morris and Carter 2005; Noordewier, John, and Nevin 1990). Empirical research has made reference to relational

governance in terms of "*relationalism*" (Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007), "*social embeddedness*" (Uzzi 1999), or the general prevalence of *relational* or *social norms* within interfirm exchanges (Achrol 1997; Brown, Grzeskowiak, and Dev 2009; Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000).

In case of the occurrence of uncontracted-for events, expectations of benefits in the course of future transactions prevent supply chain partners from jeopardizing the relation through opportunistic behaviors and thus offer an incentive to perform in accordance with norms and standards characterizing the relation (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002, 2011; Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Gibbons 2005; Lafontaine and Slade 2010; Levin 2003). Therefore, relational norms that signal potential for future exchanges function as enforcement mechanisms on their own (Heide 1994; Klein 2000). That is, the concept of relational contracts recognizes that agreements between firms are governed and enforced not only by formal hierarchy of authority, but also by holding out the prospect of profits from future transactions, assured by informal agreements and unwritten relational norms between firms that affect current behaviors (Gibbons 2005; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Macneil 1980). Accordingly, more recent studies adapt the perspective of relational contracting theory and aim at explaining the occurrence of multiple, i.e., formal *and* relational, governance mechanisms simultaneously (Brown, Grzeskowiak, and Dev 2009; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Jap and Ganesan 2000; Koza and Dant 2007; Subramani and Venkatraman 2003), or try to clarify the interplay between these mechanisms (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Poppo and Zenger 2002).

While some articles suggest a substituting linkage between formal and relational governance (Boyle et al. 1992; Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron 2005; Gundlach and Achrol 1993), the emergent consensus in contracting theory is that formal and relational mechanisms facilitate each other (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002; Dahlstrom, McNeilly, and Speh 1996; Poppo and Zenger 2002). However, within this study, we do not side solely with one of these perspectives. Rather, we recognize that these mechanisms are intertwined and thus, in accordance with

the calls of other scholars, explore formal and relational mechanisms in combination (Gibbons 2005; Wallenburg and Schäffler 2014).

We conceptualize *formal governance* in terms of the construct of bureaucratization (Dwyer and Welsh 1985). In this context, formal governance is typically composed of three distinct dimensions: *formalization,* i.e., the degree to which procedures and decisions within the supply chain follow well-defined rules and guidelines; *centralization,* i.e., the degree to which decisions are made by formal authorities, in our case by the wholesaler; and *participation,* i.e., the degree to which the wholesaler and the retailer are involved in each other's decision processes (Boyle and Dwyer 1995; Dwyer and Oh 1987; Paswan, Dant, and Lumpkin 1998). Capturing the notion of informal mechanisms, we define *relational governance* as the degree to which actions and behaviors of exchange partners are controlled, coordinated, and regulated through various relational norms that characterize the exchange between firms (Dahlstrom and Nygaard 1999; Koza and Dant 2007). While opinions on which norms from Macneil's (1980) set should be included to build the construct of relational governance diverge, we focus on the three most common contracting norms: *mutuality* describes the characteristic that benefits and costs between exchange parties are evenly shared over time; *flexibility* represents the willingness of parties to an exchange to make adjustments for changing circumstances; and *solidarity* depicts the degree to which the exchange parties ascribe importance to preserving the relationship (Achrol 1997; Kaufmann and Dant 1992).

4. Hypotheses

Echoing Ganesan et al. (2009), firms have to answer the question of how they can support and sustain their supply chain relations in case of increased levels of conflict. Consequently, we develop and empirically test a set of hypotheses that predicts a contingent influence of formal and relational governance mechanisms on the transition of interfirm conflict.

4.1 Evolution of Cognitive Conflict

Similar to Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a) on the basis of bilateral deterrence theory or Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) by stressing the ability of *formal provisions* to coordinate reciprocal actions, many authors put emphasis on the conflict mitigating effects of hierarchical governance, particularly when the conflict depicts functional challenges and task-related responsibilities. In this regard, formal structures are assumed to remove ambiguity and to avoid disagreements.

Moreover, there is a broad consensus that *relational norms* characterizing an exchange play a crucial role in determining behaviors and actions of supply chain partners in the course of conflict episodes (Lusch and Brown 1996; Sheng et al. 2006). Within relational exchanges, performance is secured by expectations of future benefits that ensure that behaviors of supply chain partners do not need to be controlled in every detail but are assumed to comply with mutual requirements (Klein 2000). Hence, the prevalence of relational governance allows for autonomous actions and enables retailers to adapt flexibly to local market conditions (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006). Opinions on how to complete tasks and how to address upcoming challenges may be discussed less intensely in the confidence of mutual long-term orientation. However, Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern (2001) argue that affective sentiments towards an exchange partner are associated with the attribution of negative developments to the partner's actions rather than to one's actions or environmental circumstances. Moreover, affective conflict constrains bilateral communication and concerted behaviors (Koza and Dant 2007); therefore, this may impede or even invert the effectiveness relational norms when violated.

Hypothesis 1a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from latent into cognitive conflict.

Hypothesis 1b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from latent into cognitive conflict.

Hypothesis 2a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from affective into cognitive conflict.

Hypothesis 2b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition from affective into cognitive conflict.

4.2 Evolution of Affective Conflict

In their study on the effects of supplier fairness on retailers' sentiments, Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995b) underline the positive effect of suppliers' procedural fairness on relationship quality and affective attitudes, measured in terms of impartiality and explanation. Additionally, Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004) and Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant (2011) found that hierarchical authority and formal rules suppress the detrimental effects of cognitive conflict. However, while formal instructions may avoid disagreements on organizational processes, constraining the autonomy of independent retailers may cause frustration among supply chain partners. For example, Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan (2007) showed that the imposition of formal regulations is being perceived as intrusive, thereby raising the likelihood of tension and hostility to emerge. However, we assume the effect of perceived procedural fairness will prevail.

Relational governance may lead to increased tolerance toward goal incongruences in awareness of the fact that both parties are interested in sustaining the relationship (Kaufmann and Stern 1988). Disagreements are rarely ascribed to self-seeking interests and self-serving intentions (Ensley, Pearson, and Amason 2002; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). Intraorganizational research delivers corresponding empirical incidents. For example, Amason and Sapienza (1997) established an inverse relation between mutuality and affective conflict.

Hypothesis 3a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from latent into affective conflict.

Hypothesis 3b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from latent into affective conflict.

Hypothesis 4a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from cognitive into affective conflict.

Hypothesis 4b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from cognitive into affective conflict.

4.3 Evolution of Manifest Conflict

Formal governance mechanisms function as clear guidelines and procedures specifying the rights and obligations of exchange partners with clear consequences for violating these obligations (Jap and Ganesan 2000; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a; Winsor et al. 2012). Therefore, obvious interference in response to disagreements and actions that oppose the partner's intentions may become less likely when formal rules are present. In contrast, some scholars found formal governance to reinforce the evolution of conflict, primarily arguing that hierarchical instructions clash with an agent's own intentions (Brown, Cobb, and Lusch 2006; Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010). Particularly for affective tensions among supply chain partners, partners' actions may be increasingly perceived as inhibiting and jamming (Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001; Samaha, Palmatier, and Dant 2011).

In contrast, scholars agree to the greatest extent that exchange partners eschew relationship-damaging behaviors and opportunistic actions that may threaten relationship continuity as long as the boundary promises valuable future transactions, reflected by high levels of relational norms (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal 2007). Thus, cognitive conflict will be less likely to lead to conflict-laden behaviors in those exchanges that are characterized by a greater implementation of relational governance to avoid relationship termination (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011). However, in accordance with the transition from affective to

cognitive conflict, we assume that frustration and tension, i.e., affective conflict, among supply chain partners may lead to the ascription of negative business developments to the partner's actions (Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern 2001) and thus to an increase in manifest conflict.

Hypothesis 5a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from cognitive into manifest conflict.

Hypothesis 5b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from cognitive into manifest conflict.

Hypothesis 6a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition from affective into manifest conflict.

Hypothesis 6b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition from affective into manifest conflict.

4.4 Evolution of Conflict Aftermath

Malhotra and Lumineau (2011) stress the importance of reliable coordination in the time subsequent to manifest interfirm conflicts. However, in accordance with the prior chain of reasoning, we assume that formal governance in case of manifest conflict-laden actions may intensify perceptions of inhibition and interference even in the long run, while a pronounced relational mindset may alleviate long-lasting detrimental effects.

Hypothesis 7a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships strengthens the effect of manifest conflict on conflict aftermath.

Hypothesis 7b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the effect of manifest conflict on conflict aftermath.

4.5 Evolution of Latent Conflict

Prior research neglected the effects of the aftermath of preceding conflicts on future developments of supply chain relationships and on upcoming conflict episodes to the greatest extent

(Malhotra and Lumineau 2011). Formal regulations and central decisions made by wholesalers may differ from retailers' intentions, ignore their regional and specific market knowledge, and discourage them from acting autonomously and independently (Gilliland, Bello, and Gundlach 2010; Heide, Wathne, and Rokkan 2007). Because latent conflict depicts goal incompatibilities and drives for autonomy, we assume that formal regulations aggravate the emergence of new conflict episodes in terms of latent conflict conditions.

Because relational governance allows for flexible and self-paced actions of retailers, we finally highlight the autonomy enabling properties of relational governance and suggest that the aftermath of preceding disputes will be less likely to lead to latent conflict if supply chain partners preserve a relational mindset.

Hypothesis 8a. High formal governance in supply chain relationships accelerates the transition from the aftermath of preceding conflict episodes into latent conflict.

Hypothesis 8b. High relational governance in supply chain relationships limits the transition from the aftermath of preceding conflict episodes into latent conflict.

5. Methodological Approach

5.1 Sampling Procedure and Data Collection

Germany's two major grocery chains, accountable for approximately one-half of Germany's annual turnover in food retailing, distribute their products through company-owned as well as through approximately 6,000 independent stores per chain. To test our hypotheses, we used longitudinal data from a sample of independent retailers, who provided information concerning their relationship to their respective wholesaler. The data were gathered through a nationwide self-administered online questionnaire directed at store owners (see Appendix D for the relevant items in English and Appendix E for the original version of the complete questionnaire in German). In this way, we minimized potential key-informant biases because owners are assumed fully knowledgeable regarding their business with the wholesaler (Bagozzi and Phillips 1982).

We collected panel data in two waves with six months of temporal separation ($t=1$, $t=2$). Each wave included an initial invitation that held out the prospect of a summary of the survey results and a reminder that we sent out two weeks after the initial invitation to all non-respondents. All respondents were assured that their data would be treated confidentially and anonymously to ensure that our analysis does not suffer from social desirability bias. There were 3,776 store owners initially contacted by telephone to query for their willingness to participate; 1,490 were subsequently invited to the online survey via email; 730 of them answered the questionnaire (49.0%). Exclusion of questionnaires with missing data resulted in an adjusted sample size of 567 in the first wave (38.1%). Respondents were again contacted for the second wave, yielding a final sample of 254 retailers that answered both surveys completely.

Table 14 shows characteristics of the sample. The average retailer surveyed is approximately 47 years old and is working in retailing since 26 (thereof 20 years in a leading position). The average relationship duration between retailers and wholesalers in our sample is 15 years. Those figures underline the notion that retailers can be assumed to be informed and highly experienced concerning the dealings with their respective wholesaler.

	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.
Age [years]	46.86	24.00	67.00	9.09
Experience in retailing [years]	25.98	3.00	50.00	9.88
Experience in management [years]	20.19	2.00	44.00	8.82
Duration of the cooperation [years]	15.13	0.50	52.00	11.76
Supply frequency [1/week]	2.19	0.50	6.00	0.92
Sales area [m²]	1,551.30	55.00	5,800.00	967.18
Employees [full-time equivalent]	27.72	1.00	115.00	20.17
Product range [no. of articles]	16,478.57	20.00	65,000.00	8,761.97

Gender	Male	Female
	85.83%	14.17%

Sales	< 1 mio. €	1-2 mio. €	3-5 mio. €	6-10 mio. €	11-50 mio. €	> 50 mio. €
	4.66%	7.63%	41.10%	31.78%	13.56%	1.27%

Table 14: Sample Characteristics

To address potential non-response bias, we employed several tests and compared demographic information as well as answers to the items of early and late respondents for both waves. The results suggest that early and late respondents belong to the same population ($p > 0.1$). Moreover, we compared those respondents that only answered the first survey with those that answered both waves. Again, the results indicate that both groups originate from the same population ($p > 0.1$). Hence, non-response bias appears to be negligible in our case. Because we collected self-reported data from a single source, there are concerns of common method bias (Kreiser et al. 2010). The study controls for common method bias in the self-reported variables using Harman's single-factor test. The test yielded more than one factor, and no factor accounted for a majority of variance. Thus, according to Podsakoff et al. (2003), common method bias is not an issue. Moreover, the longitudinal study design minimizes common method bias as well as potential endogeneity issues (Podsakoff et al. 2003).

5.2 Measures

All of our reflective measures are based on existing literature and have already been applied in the context of buyer-supplier relationships.[66] Items were minimally adjusted to fit the retailer-wholesaler background; i.e., we postulate content validity of our measures. Retailers that were

[66] The only exception is the measure for manifest conflict that has been applied in an intrateam context (Barki and Hartwick 2001).

involved in the questionnaire development provided valuable insights into the relevance of items and wording of questions. A pretest assessed item comprehensibility. For both survey waves, we used identical measurement items and collected information for all exogenous and endogenous variables. All perceptual measures were anchored using 7-point Likert scales.

Conflict States. While most studies employ a general construct of conflict, there is no homogenous approach to the measurement of the different states of conflict (Brown and Day 1981; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Rosenberg and Stern 1971). Consequently, we conducted an extensive literature review and compared existing operationalizations on an item basis to carve out commonly used and recognized measures that fit our conceptualizations. For the composite second-order construct of *latent conflict*, we draw on the early operationalization of Etgar (1979) because, to our knowledge, his is the sole study that simultaneously considers the three components of latent conflict, i.e., competition over scarce resources, goal divergence, and autonomy needs. Task-related *cognitive conflict* is likely the most considered measure of conflict. To measure cognitive conflict, we abide by Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz (2004) and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a). To capture non-task-related discrepancies such as anger and frustration toward an exchange partner reflecting *affective conflict*, we refer to the measures of Jehn and Mannix (2001) and Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp (1995a). To stress the characteristic of *manifest conflict* in terms of knowingly interfering with the goal attainment of the exchange partner, we use the measure of interference established by Barki and Hartwick (2001). Finally, we adopt the measures of Kaufmann and Stern (1988) to scale the long-lasting impact of past conflicts in terms of *conflict aftermath*.

Formal Governance. In accordance with our conceptualization, we measure the implementation of formal governance as a composite second-order construct, composed by measures of *formalization*, *centralization*, and *participation*. In doing so, we make use of the widely recognized measures developed by Dwyer and Welsh (1985).

Relational Governance. As with formal governance, we view relational governance as a second-order construct, reflected by several sub-dimensions. As mentioned earlier, within this study, we

focus on the most common contracting norms of *mutuality, flexibility,* and *solidarity* (Achrol 1997). We refer to the operationalizations of Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000), Kaufmann and Dant (1992), and Lado, Dant, and Tekleab (2008) and measure the sub-dimensions using their items.

For second-order constructs, we initially establish reliable first-order factors. Therefore, we verified and secured the reliability of second-order scales, averaged their items, and thereby built the indicators for the factor analyses and structural models (see Appendix D, Table 21, for the full battery of constructs, measures, Cronbach's alphas, and composite reliabilities).

5.3 Measurement Model

We employed five autonomous measurement models. Each model includes a conflict state at *t=2*, the preceding conflict states according to Pondy (1967) at *t=1*, and both governance mechanisms at *t=1*. We employed exploratory factor analyses to ensure that all indicators solely load on their respective factor. During the confirmatory factor analyses, we estimated the loadings of each construct on its corresponding items and allowed for correlations between each construct. We assessed both convergent and discriminant validity for all our models. We evaluated whether our items are indeed related to their corresponding construct; across all models, all of the factor loadings (λs) were large, highly significant, and in the predicted direction; i.e., each item loads strongly on its respective construct, demonstrating convergent validity (Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Moreover, correlations among constructs ranging from -0.49 to 0.68 signify discriminant validity because they are clearly less than unity. We also computed composite reliabilities and average variance extracted (AVE) for each of the factors applied. Across the analyses, composite reliabilities are greater than 0.7 and AVEs are greater than 0.5, indicating internal reliability and reconfirming the assumption of discriminant validity. Hence, we infer that our measures are reliable and valid.

Table 15 shows descriptive statistics and correlations for all our measures.[67] While correlations among different conflict states show (expected) positive correlations, relational governance

[67] There are correlations outside the range of -0.49 to 0.68. However, those variables are not included within one and the same measurement model or structural model.

appears to be negatively correlated with all states of conflict. Moreover, formal governance seems to be positively related to most conflict states.

Factor	Mean	S.D.	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.
1. Formal Governance	3.48	.94	1											
2. Relational Governance	4.36	.96	.23**	1										
3. Latent Conflict (*t=1*)	2.31	.99	.63**	-.43**	1									
4. Latent Conflict (*t=2*)	2.75	1.22	.39**	-.34**	.73**	1								
5. Cognitive Conflict (*t=1*)	2.51	1.38	.19**	-.40**	.68**	.50**	1							
6. Cognitive Conflict (*t=2*)	2.59	1.27	-.02	-.44**	.50**	.55**	.57**	1						
7. Affective Conflict (*t=1*)	1.58	1.14	.05	-.49**	.61**	.44**	.57**	.50**	1					
8. Affective Conflict (*t=2*)	1.91	1.40	.14*	-.38**	.55**	.60**	.49**	.63**	.67**	1				
9. Manifest Conflict (*t=1*)	1.55	1.23	.35**	-.49**	.77**	.58**	.63**	.41**	.71**	.55**	1			
10. Manifest Conflict (*t=2*)	1.93	1.12	.32**	-.40**	.71**	.73**	.57**	.59**	.62**	.70**	.72**	1		
11. Conflict Aftermath (*t=1*)	1.12	.86	.14*	-.36**	.45**	.36**	.40**	.37**	.45**	.42**	.53**	.45**	1	
12. Conflict Aftermath (*t=2*)	.92	.70	.26**	-.38**	.52**	.44**	.33**	.39**	.48**	.52**	.54**	.57**	.43**	1

Significance levels (two-tailed): ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$.

Table 15: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations

6. Analysis and Results

In accordance with our measurement model, we developed five distinct structural equation models. For each model, we utilized data from *t=1* for exogenous factors (preceding conflict states, governance mechanisms, and moderators) and data from *t=2* for endogenous conflict states to achieve temporal separation and to indeed assess the dynamics of conflict. Model 1 considers the evolution of cognitive conflict (see Figure 6), Model 2 focuses on affective conflict (see Figure 7), Model 3 on manifest conflict (see Figure 8), Model 4 on the aftermath of conflict (see Figure 9), and finally, Model 5 examines the evolution of latent conflict conditions that originate from preceding conflict cycles (see Figure 10). We employed curve estimations for every direct effect within our structural equation models. Results suggest that all relationships are sufficiently linear to be included in covariance-based structural equation models. We also checked for potential multicollinearity for each of our structural models. Variance inflation scores indicate that multicollinearity is not a concern.



Figure 6: Model 1 – Evolution of Cognitive Conflict



Figure 7: Model 2 – Evolution of Affective Conflict



Figure 8: Model 3 – Evolution of Manifest Conflict



Figure 9: Model 4 – Evolution of Conflict Aftermath



Figure 10: Model 5 – Evolution of Latent Conflict

To avoid exclusively relying on model fit indices of a single model, we establish three competing sub-models for each model. In the "direct effects"-model, we solely consider direct effects of the exogenous factors on the endogenous factor and restrict moderating effects to zero. The "full moderation"-model restricts direct relationships between governance mechanisms and endogenous conflict states to zero and, instead, considers moderating effects of governance

mechanisms on conflict transitions. Finally, the "quasi moderation"-model considers both direct and moderating effects of formal and relational governance (see Figure 6 to Figure 10). Hence, we can compare the different sub-models to determine which of them fits our data best. Table 16 summarizes various model fit indices. We provide the chi-squares in addition to their respective degrees of freedom and *p*-values as well as the GFI, AGFI, TLI, NFI, SRMR, RMSEA, CFI, and χ^2/d.f. statistics.

The vast majority of sub-models show sufficient model fit with GFI > 0.9, TLI > 0.9, NFI > 0.9, SRMR < 0.08, RMSEA < 0.08, CFI > 0.9, and χ^2/d.f. <2.5. However, while a model may have a sufficient fit, this does not assure that the *best* model has been proposed (Hair et al. 1998). We could compare the sub-models based on χ^2-statistics to determine the *best* among them (Koza and Dant 2007). The difference in χ^2 between two models is also χ^2-distributed; degrees of freedom can be determined by calculating the difference in degrees of freedom, accordingly. That is, we assess whether a reduction of restrictions within a model, i.e., a loss in degrees of freedom, leads to a statistically significant improvement with reference to the χ^2-distribution (Koza and Dant 2007). For Models 1 to 4, the "quasi moderation"-model fits best ($p < 0.05$). However, for Model 5, there is no statistically significant improvement of model fit after introducing moderators ($p > 0.1$). Hence, we propose the "direct effects"-model in this case.

Model	Sub-Model	χ^2	*d.f.*	*p*-level	GFI	AGFI	TLI	NFI	SRMR	RMSEA	CFI	χ^2/d.f.
	Direct Effects Only	265.67	159	.000	.913	.873	.954	.918	.060	.051	.965	1.671
1	Full Moderation	270.75	157	.000	.911	.869	.950	.917	.066	.054	.963	1.725
	Quasi Moderation*	255.01	155	.000	.917	.876	.955	.921	.057	.051	.967	1.645
	Direct Effects Only	308.75	161	.000	.903	.860	.943	.913	.059	.060	.956	1.918
2	Full Moderation	304.56	159	.000	.903	.859	.943	.915	.062	.060	.957	1.915
	Quasi Moderation*	297.90	157	.000	.906	.861	.944	.916	.057	.060	.958	1.897
	Direct Effects Only	331.52	160	.000	.893	.846	.929	.903	.061	.065	.946	2.072
3	Full Moderation	339.40	158	.000	.890	.840	.924	.900	.064	.067	.943	2.148
	Quasi Moderation*	319.07	156	.000	.897	.848	.931	.906	.060	.064	.949	2.045
	Direct Effects Only	169.37	64	.000	.911	.854	.894	.888	.072	.080	.926	2.646
4	Full Moderation	173.40	64	.000	.910	.853	.890	.885	.073	.082	.923	2.709
	Quasi Moderation*	155.87	62	.000	.919	.862	.903	.897	.070	.077	.934	2.514
	Direct Effects Only*	109.05	65	.001	.944	.910	.945	.909	.059	.052	.960	1.678
5	Full Moderation	136.95	65	.000	.931	.889	.910	.886	.077	.066	.935	2.107
	Quasi Moderation	106.12	63	.001	.946	.910	.944	.912	.058	.052	.961	1.684

* Proposed Model

Table 16: Summary Statistics of Competing Sub-Models

Table 17 reports the path coefficients for the five proposed structural models. With reference to Model 1, the evolution of cognitive conflict appears to be dependent on the prevalence of formal governance mechanisms rather than on relational patterns. Relational governance does not influence the transition from latent and affective conflict into cognitive conflict, rejecting *H1b* and *H2b* ($p > 0.1$). That is, task-related disagreements cannot be avoided or mitigated by relational structures. In contrast, formal governance directly reduces cognitive conflict ($p < 0.01$) and moderates the transition from affective into cognitive conflict, supporting *H2a* ($p < 0.1$); i.e., supply chain partners seem to confine themselves to interact in accordance with formal regulations in times of affective conflict. However, the interaction term of formal governance and latent conflict remains insignificant ($p > 0.1$). Similar to the evolution of cognitive conflict, we do not see that formal or relational governance mechanisms moderate the transition from latent into affective conflict (in rejection of *H3a*, *b;* $p > 0.1$). That is, governance mechanisms do not appear to be able to tackle the aggravation of initial conflict conditions. However, while the interaction term of cognitive conflict and formal governance shows the predicted sign but remains insignificant ($p > 0.1$), relational governance limits the transition from cognitive into affective conflict, supporting *H4b* ($p < 0.01$). That is, a relational mindset prevents conflicts from drifting off the functional level.

Toward higher conflict states (Models 3 to 5), formal governance seems to increase the levels of conflict directly ($p < 0.001$; $p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$). That is, the more a conflict escalates, the more dysfunctional formal governance becomes. Accordingly, *H5a* must be rejected because formal governance does not mitigate the transition from cognitive into manifest conflict ($p > 0.1$). Results for *H6a* and *H7a*, which state a dramatizing influence of formal governance, remain insignificant as well ($p > 0.1$). Hence, formal governance appears to be unable to avoid detrimental transformations of advanced conflict states and directly exacerbates conflict development. In contrast, we found strong evidence for relational governance to effectively counter conflict escalation. Relational governance directly reduces the degree of endogenous conflict states within Models 3 to 5 ($p < 0.01$; $p < 0.001$; $p < 0.01$). Moreover, in support of *H5b*, a relational mindset among supply chain partners keeps them from taking harmful actions when cognitive

conflict occurs ($p < 0.001$). However, for existing hostilities among business partners, the effectiveness of relational governance appears to be reduced. In support of *H6b*, firms seem to attribute negative business developments to the actions of their exchange partners. Relational norms may be violated, causing disappointment and accelerating the transition from affective to manifest conflict ($p < 0.05$). However, confirming *H7b*, relational governance mechanisms appear to inhibit the formation of long-lasting hostilities subsequent to situations of manifest conflict ($p < 0.001$). With reference to *H8a* and b, the results of the assessment of competing sub-models reveal that the "direct effects"-model fit our data better than those models that also consider moderation. Therefore, we must over-rule *H8a* and *H8b*.

	Endogenous Factor				
Exogenous Factor	CC (Model 1)	AC (Model 2)	MC (Model 3)	CA (Model 4)	LC (Model 5)
Formal Governance (FG)	-.367** (.183)	-.086 (.197)	.272*** (.073)	.365*** (.075)	.409** (.111)
Relational Governance (RG)	-.007 (.132)	-.127 (.143)	-.194** (.081)	-.366*** (.075)	-.358** (.110)
Latent Conflict (LC)	.602*** (.212)	.375† (.294)			
Cognitive Conflict (CC)		.116 (.118)	.128† (.061)		
Affective Conflict (AC)	.235* (.124)		.503*** (.114)		
Manifest Conflict (MC)				-.130 (.075)	
Conflict Aftermath (CA)					.085 (.118)
LC X FG	.056 (.083)	.149 (.103)			
LC X RG	-.089 (.098)	.120 (.116)			
CC X FG		-.060 (.116)	.032 (.074)		
CC X RG		-.244** (.122)	-.266*** (.086)		
AC X FG	-.161† (.107)		-.027 (.087)		
AC X RG	.111 (.090)		.257* (.079)		
MC X FG				.004 (.045)	
MC X RG				-.348*** (.053)	

Significance levels (two-tailed): *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; † $p < 0.1$. Standard errors in brackets.

Table 17: Summary of Results: Structural Equation Models

7. Conclusions

In the course of emerging multichannel relationships, conflict between exchange partners is more likely to arise and thus threatens the continuity of potentially beneficial supply chain relationships. Hence, scholars assume that effective management and handling of interorganizational conflict will become key factors in shaping successful long-term relationships. Governance structures determine the way firms organize and manage their supply chains, define mechanisms for coordinating actions among exchange partners, and thus constitute adequate instruments to secure sustaining supply chain relationships (Ganesan et al. 2009). Therefore, in this study, we take a more nuanced view on interorganizational conflict and examine conflict as a process of five distinct states (Pondy 1967). Additionally, we draw on relational as well as formal governance and make a case for considering both mechanisms when investigating the dynamics of conflict. Specifically, we argue that formal and relational governance mechanisms affect the dynamics of interfirm conflict in that they limit or accelerate the transition between distinct states of conflict. Data suggest that formal governance effectively mitigates the evolution of cognitive conflict on functional topics and tasks as it clearly specifies reliabilities and obligations. However, formal governance appears to be unable to limit the transition between advanced conflict stages; in fact, it directly increases levels of conflict toward higher states. However, relational mechanisms and the presence of relational norms seem to limit the progression of cognitive and manifest conflict into subsequent states. In contrast, if frustration and hostilities, i.e., affective conflict, prevail within a supply chain relationship, the effectiveness of relational mechanisms is not only impaired but even inverted. Direct effects of relational governance reduce conflict, particularly for advanced states of conflict.

Contributions of this study are diverse. First, this study empirically incorporates all five states of conflict, ostensibly for the first time, in reference to the recognized model of Pondy (1967) and thus takes a step toward capturing the dynamics of relationships and procedural characteristics of conflicts. Second, while prior studies proceed from the assumption that conflict inexorably passes through distinct states, we argue for considering contingent effects that limit or accelerate the transition from one state of conflict to the next. Third, by simultaneously incorporating the

formal hierarchy of authority as well as informal relational patterns as mechanisms to govern interfirm exchanges, we take a more holistic view on supply chain governance and thereby comply with Lafontaine's and Slade's (2010) call for empirically enriching the underexplored phenomenon of relational exchange. Moreover, we supplement empirical research on supply chain relationships because we focus on a European context. Finally, a better understanding of the dynamics of conflict provides valuable implications not only for future research but also for practitioners in terms of managing conflict by adequately organizing their supply chains.

Despite our efforts to avoid biases that surround many empirical studies, our investigation is subject to limitations. First, we gathered data considering only one side of the dyad. Because wholesalers' perceptions of existing conflict and of employed supply chain governance may differ from retailers' perceptions, research that considers both perspectives would allow for additional insights. Second, while we examined the effects of formal and informal governance mechanisms on the dynamics of conflict, there may be other relationship characteristics that moderate the transition of conflict. The approach of considering supply chain governance is reasonable but non-exhaustive. As an example, several scholars argue that the dependence structure among supply chain partners affects the occurrence of conflict (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a). Hence, this study represents only a first step toward a nuanced view on conflict evolution. Third, our sample consists of supply chain relationships between independent grocery retailers and their respective wholesalers. These boundaries are assumed to be – at least to some degree – durably persistent and thus can cope with severe levels of conflict. That is, the generalizability of our study is restricted to more complex interfirm boundaries that show at least minimum levels of long-term orientation. Therefore, to a certain extent, the results may be applicable to other contexts, e.g., to franchise relationships or car dealer networks, but should be treated with caution in the context of short-term exchanges. Finally, while we measured our variables with six months of temporal separation, there is no consensus on response cycles of conflict states. That is, our approach of data gathering may not support an analysis of effects with longer response cycles. As already called for by Palmatier, Dant, and Grewal (2007), future

research should take a closer look at response cycles of key interorganizational factors to facilitate longitudinal examinations.

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APPENDIX A

LIST OF EVENTS

Event No.	Event Description	Event Date
1	Wulff is accused of having misled German Lower Saxony's parliament during his prime ministership concerning a personal credit from Egon Geerkens (businessman)	12/12/2011
2	Federal President's Office confirms credit from Geerkens	12/13/2011
3	Wulff gives a first statement: No business relationship to Geerkens, only to his wife	12/15/2011
4	Media substantiates business relationship	12/16/2011
5	Wulff gives a second statement: No reprehensible behavior	12/17/2011
6	Wulff is accused of taking vacations at Geerkens' charge and thus publishes list of holidays	12/18/2011
7	Documents regarding personal credit become public	12/19/2011
8	Geerkens: I attended the negotiation on the credit	12/21/2011
9	Wulff apologizes for his handling of the credit affair and dismisses his long-time spokesman Glaeseker	12/22/2011
10	Media speculates about an infringement of the constitution with regard to a lobby event ("Nord-Sued-Dialog")	12/23/2011
11	A statement of the BW Bank incriminates Wulff	12/30/2011
12	Media links a credit from the BW Bank for Wulff to the VW-Porsche deal	12/31/2011
13	Media: Wulff urged BILD's chief editor to stop coverage (voicemail)	01/01/2012
14	Wulff gives a TV interview	01/04/2012
15	BILD publishes wording of voicemail	01/06/2012
16	Lobby event is discussed in the judiciary committee of Anglo Saxony's parliament	01/10/2012
17	First noteworthy resistance movements within Wulff's own party	01/12/2012
18	Wulff's lawyer announces publication of answers towards media's catalog of questions	01/12/2012
19	Media: Wulff was invited to the Oktoberfest by film financier David Groenewold	01/14/2012
20	Prime Minister of Lower Saxony demands clarification	01/14/2012
21	Public prosecution department: No reasonable suspicion against Wulff	01/16/2012
22	Media: Anglo Saxony's government was actively looking for sponsors of the lobby event	01/18/2012
23	Publication of Wulff's answers towards media's catalog of questions	01/18/2012
24	House search at Wulff's acquaintances	01/19/2012
25	Media: Glaeseker supposed to be involved in organization of the lobby event	01/20/2012
26	Media: Federal state-paid cookbooks distributed at the "North-South-Dialogue"	01/21/2012
27	Opposition in Lower Saxony wants to bring a charge against Wulff	01/22/2012
28	Media: Looking for sponsors for the lobby event on behalf of Wulff	01/24/2012
29	Public prosecution department searches Glaeseker's office	01/26/2012
30	Media: Further business relationships to Geerkens	01/30/2012
31	Media: Federal President's Office already knew about shady travel behaviors of Glaeseker	02/01/2012
32	Public prosecution department proves acceptance of advantages: Wulff drove new Audi free of charge	02/02/2012
33	Media: Wulff received a Skoda at favorable conditions	02/04/2012

[continued]

Event No.	Event Description	Event Date
34	Media: Groenewold financed Wulff's vacations	02/08/2012
35	Media: Groenewold provided firm cellphone to Wulff	02/10/2012
36	Media: Jam producer paid for Wulff's hotel stay during German Film Ball	02/11/2012
37	Media: Anglo Saxony's government vouched for Groenewold's letterbox firm during Wulff's presidency	02/11/2012
38	Public prosecution department requests waiver of Wulff's immunity	02/16/2012
39	Wulff resigns	02/17/2012
40	Debate on Wulff's honorarium flares up*	02/29/2012
41	Public prosecution department examines Wulff's house*	03/02/2012
42	Wulff's retirement gets accompanied by a Great Tattoo*	03/08/2012
34	Public prosecution department expands investigations about Groenewold*	04/25/2012
44	Media: Groenewold paid for Wulff's bodyguards and hotel during Oktoberfest*	04/27/2012
45	Wulff obtains an interim order against BILD*	05/10/2012
46	Glaeseker makes a statement concerning the lobby event*	05/13/2012
47	Public prosecution department of Berlin ends investigations against Wulff	05/22/2012
48	Public prosecution department of Berlin ends criminal procedure against Wulff	06/01/2012
49	Wulff again takes part in political discourse	06/16/2012
50	Public prosecution department: Wulff will have to give evidence in the investigations against Glaeseker	06/22/2012
51	Audit office of Anglo Saxony: federal state supported lobby event	06/27/2012
52	Hanover's public prosecution department considers expanding investigations against Wulff	07/22/2012
53	Hanover's public prosecution may not have sufficient suspicion; accusation becomes uncertain	07/29/2012
54	Public prosecution department analyzes diaries of Glaeseker's wife*	08/06/2012
55	Wulff gives evidence in investigations against Glaeseker*	08/11/2012
56	Increase of Wulff's honorarium to 217,000 € per year causes indignation	08/21/2012
57	Baden Wuerttemberg's Prime Minister contradicts Wulff's statements on the lobby event	08/24/2012
58	Wulff's wife legally proceeds against rumors about a past life in the red light district	09/07/2012
59	Television presenter rejects accusations from Wulff's wife	09/08/2012
60	Book publication of Wulff's wife	09/10/2012
61	Public prosecution department investigates whether Wulff raised funds for Groenewold from Siemens AG*	09/30/2012
62	Media: Geerkens accommodated Wulff with money after his first divorce in 2007*	10/07/2012
63	Hanover's public prosecution department provides interim report*	10/09/2012
64	Public prosecution department will not impeach Wulff before the elections in Anglo Saxony	12/02/2012
65	Christian and Bettina Wulff break up with each other	01/07/2013
66	Hanover's public prosecution department brings charges against Glaeseker*	03/06/2013
67	Wulff couple sells their house*	03/07/2013
68	Public prosecution department now investigates in terms of bribery rather than acceptance of advantages*	03/09/2013
69	Public prosecution department offers a deal	03/22/2013
70	Wulff refuses the deal	04/09/2013
71	Public prosecution department brings charges against Wulff	04/12/2013

* Event was excluded from the event-study analysis that considers Axel Springer Corporation's stock market performance because it coincided with confounding events.

Table 18: List of Events

APPENDIX B

TEST STATISTICS

To test for significance of abnormal returns, we calculated standardized abnormal returns (SAR) for every single event by dividing abnormal returns of security *i* at day *t* by the estimated standard deviation $\hat{s}_i$ of abnormal returns during the estimation period. Moreover, we corrected for the prediction error (Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen 1991):

$$SAR_{it} = \frac{AR_{it}}{\hat{s}_i \sqrt{1+\frac{1}{T}+\frac{(R_{mt}-\overline{R_m})^2}{\sum_{t=\tau-T}^{\tau}(R_{mt}-\overline{R_m})^2}}}, \tag{B.1}$$

where τ is the offset of the estimation period relative to the event day, T represents the number of days within the estimation period, and $\overline{R_m}$ is the average market return during the estimation period.

In case of multi-day windows, we corrected for serial dependence in accordance with Mikkelson and Partch (1988):

$$SCAR_i = \frac{CAR_i}{\hat{s}\sqrt{(t_2-t_1+1)+\frac{(t_2-t_1+1)}{T}+\frac{(\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2} R_{mt}-(t_2-t_1+1)\overline{R_m})^2}{\sum_{t=\tau-T}^{\tau}(R_{mt}-\overline{R_m})^2}}}. \tag{B.2}$$

In order to test for average abnormal returns across several events, we utilized an adjustment of the statistic of Boehmer, Masumeci, and Poulsen (1991) that accounts for cross-correlation (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010):

$$t(AAR_t) = \frac{\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} SAR_{it}}{\sqrt{\frac{N}{(N-1)}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(SAR_{it}-\sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{SAR_{it}}{N})^2}} \sqrt{\frac{1-r}{1+(N-1)r}}, \tag{B.3}$$

where *r* depicts the average cross-correlation among the estimation periods' residuals (Kolari and Pynnönen 2010).

Following Campbell, Cowan, and Salotti (2010) and Kolari and Pynnönen (2010), we computed the standardized statistic for cumulative average abnormal returns by:

$$t(CAAR) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} SCAR_i}{\sqrt{\frac{N}{(N-1)}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(SCAR_i - \sum_{i=1}^{N}\frac{SCAR_i}{N})^2}} \sqrt{\frac{1-r}{1+(N-1)r}}. \quad \text{(B.4)}$$

In case of BILD's circulation, we employed the constant mean return model and set up the test statistics with reference to Brown and Warner (1980, 1985). Therefore, in a first step, we computed standardized abnormal returns for each event by dividing the abnormal return at date *t* by the standard deviation of excess returns within the estimation period:

$$SAR_{it} = \frac{AR_{it}}{s_i}. \quad \text{(B.5)}$$

To account for multi-date event windows, we computed the statistic for cumulative abnormal returns as follows:

$$SCAR_i = \frac{AR_{it}}{s_i\sqrt{(t_2 - t_1 + 1)}}. \quad \text{(B.6)}$$

Analogous to formula (B.3), we assessed average abnormal returns for circulation figures to account for the aggregated effect of multiple events:

$$t(AAR_t) = \frac{\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it}}{\sqrt{\frac{1}{T-2}(\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}(\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it} - \frac{1}{T-1}\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it})^2)}}. \quad \text{(B.7)}$$

Finally, cumulative average abnormal returns were tested using:

$$t(CAAR) = \frac{\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it}}{\sqrt{\frac{(t_2 - t_1 + 1)}{T-2}(\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}(\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it} - \frac{1}{T-1}\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} AR_{it})^2)}}. \quad \text{(B.8)}$$

To circumvent the problem of possibly non-normally distributed excess returns, we applied Corrado's (1989) non-parametric rank test that utilizes only ordinal information and also accounts for cross-correlation (Kolari and Pynnönen 2011). Therefore, abnormal returns of the estimation and event window are assigned to ranks K_{it}:

$$K_{it} = rank\ (AR_{it}), t = (\tau - T), \dots, \tau, t_1, \dots, t_2. \quad \text{(B.9)}$$

The rank statistic for abnormal returns is given by:

$$t_{corr}(AR_{it}) = \frac{K_{it} - (T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1) + 1)/2}{s(K)}. \quad \text{(B.10)}$$

For multi-date event windows the statistic is calculated by:

$$t_{corr}(CAR_i) = \frac{\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}(K_{it} - (T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1) + 1)/2)}{s(K)\sqrt{(t_2 - t_1 + 1)}}. \quad \text{(B.11)}$$

In order to assess average abnormal returns, we calculated:

$$t_{corr}(AAR_t) = \frac{\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(K_{it} - (T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1) + 1)/2)}{s(K)}. \quad \text{(B.12)}$$

Finally, we computed the statistic for cumulative average abnormal returns as follows:

$$t_{corr}(CAAR) = \frac{\sum_{t=t_1}^{t_2}\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(K_{it} - (T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1) + 1)/2)}{s(K)\sqrt{(t_2 - t_1 + 1)}}. \quad \text{(B.13)}$$

The underlying standard deviation *s(K)* is calculated by:

$$s(K) = \sqrt{1/(T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1))\sum_{t=\tau-T}^{t_2}(\frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N}(K_{it} - \frac{T + (t_2 - t_1 + 1) + 1}{2}))^2}, \quad \text{(B.14)}$$

where *N* is equal to one for equations (B.10) and (B.11).

APPENDIX C

LIST OF INTELLECTUALS

#	Name	Media Mentions `03 - `07
1	Achternbusch, Herbert	212
2	Adam, Konrad	850
3	Aichinger, Ilse	138
4	Albert, Hans	419
5	Allmendinger, Jutta	172
6	Alt, Franz	336
7	Althen, Michael	155
8	Altvater, Elmar	107
9	Aly, Götz	449
10	Amendt, Günter	96
11	Anderson, Sascha	37
12	Anz, Thomas	28
13	Arjouni, Jakob	129
14	Assheuer, Thomas	43
15	Assmann, Aleida	63
16	Assmann, Jan	168
17	Aust, Stefan	1,685
18	Baecker, Dirk	131
19	Bärfuss, Lukas	456
20	Baring, Arnulf	468
21	Bednarz, Klaus	274
22	Beikircher, Konrad	1,234
23	Belting, Hans	43
24	Benz, Wolfgang	316
25	Berg, Sibylle	367
26	Bertram, Christoph	48
27	Bertram, Hans	169
28	Besier, Gerhard	157
29	Beutelspacher, Albrecht	205
30	Bichsel, Peter	315
31	Bieri, Peter	1,044
32	Biermann, Wolf	2,126
33	Biller, Maxim	635
34	Bisky, Jens	237
35	Bissinger, Manfred	249
36	Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang	102
37	Bofinger, Peter	1,033
38	Böhme, Erich	221
39	Bohrer, Karl Heinz	148
40	Bolz, Norbert	274
41	Breinersdorfer, Fred	243
42	Breth, Andrea	596
43	Broder, Henryk Marcin	884
44	Bronfen, Elisabeth	86
45	Bruhns, Wibke	275
46	Brumlik, Micha	573
47	Brussig, Thomas	618
48	Brüstle, Oliver	235
49	Buch, Hans Christoph	344
50	Bude, Heinz	192
51	Bueb, Bernhard	282
52	Busche, Jürgen	191
53	Büscher, Wolfgang	414
54	Castorf, Frank	1,309
55	Czempiel, Ernst-Otto	42
56	Dahn, Daniela	101
57	Dahrendorf, Ralf	439
58	Dath, Dietmar	234
59	de Bruyn, Günter	244
60	de Weck, Roger	500
61	Delius, Friedrich Christian	180
62	Deschner, Karlheinz	25
63	Dettling, Warnfried	128
64	Di Fabio, Udo	485
65	di Lorenzo, Giovanni	665
66	Dieckmann, Christoph	857
67	Diederichsen, Diedrich	354
68	Diez, Georg	79
69	Diner, Dan	185
70	Dische, Irene	192
71	Dorn, Thea	358
72	Dörrie, Doris	828
73	Dorst, Tankred	695
74	Drewermann, Eugen	385
75	Driest, Burkhard	108
76	Droste, Wiglaf	1,030
77	Dückers, Tanja	379
78	Duden, Barbara	257
79	Dürr, Hans-Peter	130
80	Dürr, Tobias	77
81	Duve, Karen	188
82	Eekhoff, Johann	87
83	Endler, Adolf	99
84	Enzensberger, Hans Magnus	1,298
85	Fetscher, Iring	90
86	Flasch, Kurt	45
87	Flassbeck, Heiner	145
88	Flimm, Jürgen	1,665
89	Forte, Dieter	169
90	Franck, Julia	441
91	Franz, Wolfgang	1,182
92	Franzobel (Stefan Griebl)	344
93	Frei, Norbert	158
94	Freund, Wieland	1,112
95	Fricke, Thomas	139
96	Frühwald, Wolfgang	164
97	Fuhr, Eckhard	1,345
98	Fuld, Werner	48
99	Funke, Cornelia	1,575
100	Gall, Lothar	93
101	Ganten, Detlev	334
102	Gaschke, Susanne	65

[continued]

#	Name	Media Mentions `03 - `07
103	Gaus, Bettina	650
104	Gauß, Karl-Markus	106
105	Geiger, Arno	418
106	Genazino, Wilhelm	745
107	Gerke, Wolfgang	635
108	Gerster, Petra	317
109	Giordano, Ralph	1,192
110	Glaser, Hermann	24
111	Glaser, Peter	256
112	Goetz, Rainald	293
113	Goldt, Max	493
114	Goosen, Frank	351
115	Grass, Günter	6,350
116	Graßl, Hartmut	179
117	Greffrath, Mathias	134
118	Greiner, Ulrich	117
119	Grill, Bartholomäus	64
120	Grimm, Dieter	134
121	Grönemeyer, Dietrich	493
122	Grün, Anselm	227
123	Grünbein, Durs	602
124	Gruss, Peter	226
125	Gstrein, Norbert	96
126	Güllner, Manfred	689
127	Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich	93
128	Güngör, Dilek	241
129	Habermas, Jürgen	1,225
130	Hacke, Axel	297
131	Hacker, Katharina	415
132	Hage, Volker	241
133	Hahne, Peter	1,337
134	Hamann, Brigitte	119
135	Hamm, Peter	155
136	Handke, Peter	1,890
137	Hank, Rainer	29
138	Hanke, Thomas	143
139	Harig, Ludwig	86
140	Harpprecht, Klaus	232
141	Härtling, Peter	1,123
142	Hartung, Klaus	67
143	Hassemer, Winfried	681
144	Haußmann, Leander	751
145	Heidenreich, Elke	1,687
146	Hein, Christoph	961
147	Hein, Jakob	265
148	Hellinger, Bert	73
149	Henkel, Hans-Olaf	1,286
150	Henrich, Dieter	53
151	Henscheid, Eckhard	282
152	Hensel, Jana	255
153	Henzler, Herbert	184
154	Herbert, Ulrich	112
155	Herles, Wolfgang	164
156	Hermann, Judith	450
157	Herzinger, Richard	388
158	Hettche, Thomas	192
159	Hickel, Rudolf	508
160	Hilberg, Raul	109
161	Hilbig, Wolfgang	159
162	Hildebrandt, Dieter	1,320
163	Hochhuth, Rolf	910
164	Höhler, Gertrud	567
165	Honneth, Axel	104
166	Hoppe, Felicitas	240
167	Horx, Matthias	736
168	Hürlimann, Thomas	278
169	Hurrelmann, Klaus	395
170	Hüther, Gerald	154
171	Hüther, Michael	942
172	Iden, Peter	187
173	Illies, Florian	597
174	Issing, Otmar	822
175	Jelinek, Elfriede	2,137
176	Jenny, Zoë	3
177	Jens, Walter	1,061
178	Jesse, Eckhard	121
179	Jessen, Jens	125
180	Joffe, Josef	2,372
181	Jörges, Hans-Ulrich	621
182	Jürgs, Michael	415
183	Kaminer, Wladimir	1,152
184	Kant, Hermann	108
185	Karasek, Hellmuth	1,561
186	Keese, Christoph	945
187	Kehlmann, Daniel	1,241
188	Kelek, Necla	549
189	Kempowski, Walter	920
190	Kersting, Wolfgang	12
191	Kilb, Andreas	166
192	Kilz, Hans Werner	206
193	Kirchhof, Paul	3,170
194	Kirchhoff, Bodo	341
195	Kissler, Alexander	151
196	Kister, Kurt	105
197	Kleeberg, Michael	165
198	Klier, Freya	172
199	Kluge, Alexander	754
200	Kluge, Jürgen	388
201	Klüger, Ruth	219
202	Knabe, Hubertus	704
203	Knopp, Guido	1,095
204	Knüwer, Thomas	23
205	Köcher, Renate	439
206	Kocka, Jürgen	77
207	Koenen, Gerd	209
208	Köppel, Roger	941
209	Korn, Salomon	973
210	Korte, Karl-Rudolf	267
211	Kracht, Christian	314
212	Kraushaar, Wolfgang	215
213	Krekeler, Elmar	1,603
214	Kremp, Herbert	390
215	Kresnik, Johann	544
216	Kreye, Andrian	11
217	Kroetz, Franz Xaver	497
218	Kronauer, Brigitte	307

[continued]

#	Name	Media Mentions `03 - `07
219	Krumrey, Henning	289
220	Kumpfmüller, Michael	91
221	Kunert, Günter	295
222	Küng, Hans	921
223	Kurbjuweit, Dirk	221
224	Lange-Müller, Katja	391
225	Langguth, Gerd	269
226	Lau, Jörg	85
227	Lau, Mariam	1,065
228	Lauterbach, Karl	2,358
229	Lebert, Benjamin	197
230	Leggewie, Claus	226
231	Leicht, Robert	256
232	Leif, Thomas	287
233	Leinemann, Jürgen	270
234	Lenz, Siegfried	974
235	Lenzen, Dieter	867
236	Leonhard, Wolfgang	125
237	Lepenies, Wolf	496
238	Lesch, Harald	53
239	Leyendecker, Hans	385
240	Loest, Erich	369
241	Löffler, Sigrid	377
242	Lübbe, Hermann	114
243	Lustiger, Arno	272
244	Lütkehaus, Ludger	25
245	Malik, Fredmund	370
246	Mangold, Ijoma	139
247	Markl, Hubert	74
248	Markwort, Helmut	1,323
249	Maron, Monika	281
250	Marquard, Odo	118
251	Martenstein, Harald	268
252	Marthaler, Christoph	1,014
253	Matussek, Matthias	558
254	Mayröcker, Friederike	249
255	Meinecke, Thomas	226
256	Menasse, Eva	204
257	Menasse, Robert	415
258	Miegel, Meinhard	572
259	Miersch, Michael	279
260	Mika, Bascha	331
261	Mitscherlich, Margarete	136
262	Mittelstrass, Jürgen	71
263	Mlynek, Jürgen	393
264	Modick, Klaus	95
265	Moers, Walter	453
266	Mohr, Reinhard	270
267	Mommsen, Hans	235
268	Mosebach, Martin	642
269	Münkler, Herfried	344
270	Muschg, Adolf	965
271	Nadolny, Sten	175
272	Naumann, Michael	1,984
273	Negt, Oskar	241
274	Neuenfels, Hans	904
275	Nida-Rümelin, Julian	353
276	Niejahr, Elisabeth	48
277	Niethammer, Lutz	40
278	Niggemeier, Stefan	160
279	Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth	133
280	Nolte, Ernst	165
281	Nolte, Paul	485
282	Nüsslein-Volhard, Christiane	172
283	Opaschowski, Horst	467
284	Ortheil, Hanns-Josef	620
285	Osang, Alexander	298
286	Peffekoven, Rolf	239
287	Perthes, Volker	150
288	Peymann, Claus	2,070
289	Piper, Nikolaus	27
290	Pleitgen, Fritz	1,876
291	Plenzdorf, Ulrich	191
292	Politycki, Matthias	204
293	Pollesch, René	723
294	Pollmer, Udo	162
295	Polt, Gerhard	688
296	Pörtner, Rainer	164
297	Poschardt, Ulf	637
298	Posener, Alan	681
299	Prantl, Heribert	217
300	Raddatz, Fritz Joachim	318
301	Radisch, Iris	354
302	Raffelhüschen, Bernd	603
303	Ranke-Heinemann, Uta	148
304	Ransmayr, Christoph	226
305	Rathenow, Lutz	159
306	Ratzinger, Joseph	3,485
307	Raulff, Ulrich	250
308	Reemtsma, Jan Philipp	885
309	Regener, Sven	584
310	Reich, Jens	120
311	Reich-Ranicki, Marcel	2,222
312	Reinhard, Wolfgang	61
313	Reitz, Ulrich	897
314	Richling, Mathias	431
315	Rinke, Moritz	490
316	Ritter, Henning	99
317	Roggenkamp, Viola	169
318	Röhl, Bettina	161
319	Roll, Evelyn	74
320	Rosendorfer, Herbert	69
321	Rosh, Lea	695
322	Ross, Jan	39
323	Rothmann, Ralf	251
324	Rötzer, Florian	33
325	Rühl, Lothar	22
326	Rühmkorf, Peter	436
327	Rürup, Bert	3,544
328	Rutschky, Katharina	216
329	Sack, Manfred	37
330	Safranski, Rüdiger	653
331	Sartorius, Joachim	256
332	Schindhelm, Michael	801
333	Schirrmacher, Frank	1,428
334	Schlingensief, Christoph	2,050

#	Name	Media Mentions `03 - `07
335	Schlink, Bernhard	376
336	Schlögel, Karl	161
337	Schmidbauer, Wolfgang	93
338	Schmied, Wieland	55
339	Schmitter, Elke	151
340	Schnibben, Cordt	108
341	Schöllgen, Gregor	37
342	Scholl-Latour, Peter	878
343	Schorlemmer, Friedrich	254
344	Schroeder, Klaus	353
345	Schrott, Raoul	224
346	Schuh, Franz	119
347	Schwan, Gesine	1,588
348	Schwarzer, Alice	1,946
349	Schwelien, Michael	18
350	Seebacher-Brandt, Brigitte	101
351	Seewald, Peter	104
352	Seibt, Gustav	172
353	Seidl, Claudius	82
354	Seligmann, Rafael	223
355	Selten, Reinhard	153
356	Semler, Christian	607
357	Sichtermann, Barbara	103
358	Sick, Bastian	669
359	Siebert, Horst	168
360	Siedler, Wolf Jobst	239
361	Simitis, Spiros	173
362	Singer, Wolf	285
363	Sinn, Hans-Werner	2,661
364	Sloterdijk, Peter	764
365	Spaemann, Robert	122
366	Spengler, Tilman	135
367	Spinnen, Burkhard	345
368	Spitzer, Manfred	365
369	Spreckelsen, Tilman	58
370	Sprenger, Reinhard	170
371	Steinbach, Udo	273
372	Steinfeld, Thomas	175
373	Steingart, Gabor	595
374	Stölzl, Christoph	1,093
375	Strasser, Johano	224
376	Straubhaar, Thomas	1,346
377	Strauß, Botho	968
378	Streeck, Wolfgang	28
379	Streeruwitz, Marlene	278
380	Stürmer, Michael	1,103
381	Süskind, Patrick	632
382	Suter, Martin	1,175
383	Thalheimer, Michael	733
384	Theweleit, Klaus	285
385	Tichy, Roland	151
386	Timm, Uwe	542
387	Todenhöfer, Jürgen	315
388	Treichel, Hans-Ulrich	179
389	Tugendhat, Ernst	52
390	Ulfkotte, Udo	193
391	Ulrich, Bernd	213
392	Umbach, Klaus	65
393	Urban, Martin	43
394	Vanderbeke, Birgit	142
395	Veiel, Andreas	69
396	von Arnim, Hans Herbert	370
397	von Becker, Peter	72
398	von Düffel, John	536
399	von Hentig, Hartmut	142
400	von Lange, Alexa Hennig	258
401	von Lovenberg, Felicitas	126
402	von Matt, Peter	276
403	von Randow, Gero	74
404	von Schönburg, Alexander	324
405	von Stuckrad-Barre, Benjamin	483
406	von Uslar, Moritz	197
407	von Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich	460
408	von Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich	503
409	von Westphalen, Joseph	86
410	von, Klaus	91
411	Wackwitz, Stephan	97
412	Wallraff, Günter	742
413	Walser, Martin	2,597
414	Waltz, Sasha	844
415	Weder di Mauro, Beatrice	591
416	Wehler, Hans-Ulrich	318
417	Weibel, Peter	760
418	Weidenfeld, Werner	193
419	Weidermann, Volker	93
420	Weiler, Jan	367
421	Weimer, Wolfram	361
422	Weinrich, Harald	38
423	Wellershoff, Dieter	271
424	Welsch, Wolfgang	40
425	Welzer, Harald	177
426	Wesel, Uwe	66
427	Wickert, Ulrich	1,844
428	Widmann, Arno	553
429	Widmer, Urs	843
430	Wiegard, Wolfgang	566
431	Willemsen, Roger	1,117
432	Willms, Johannes	128
433	Winnacker, Ernst-Ludwig	432
434	Wittstock, Uwe	845
435	Wohmann, Gabriele	91
436	Wolffsohn, Michael	387
437	Wondratschek, Wolf	212
438	Zadek, Peter	1,060
439	Zaimoglu, Feridun	979
440	Zeh, Juli	569
441	Zimmer, Dieter	562
442	Zwerenz, Gerhard	87

Table 19: Intellectuals and Media Mentions (2007 Sample)

#	Name	Media Mentions `08 - `12
1	Achternbusch, Herbert	248
2	Adam, Konrad	51
3	Aichinger, Ilse	199
4	Albert, Hans	810
5	Allmendinger, Jutta	518
6	Alt, Franz	603
7	Altvater, Elmar	137
8	Aly, Götz	931
9	Assheuer, Thomas	530
10	Assmann, Jan	154
11	Assmann, Aleida	126
12	Ates, Seyran	618
13	Augstein, Jakob	687
14	Aust, Stefan	2,400
15	Bade, Klaus	860
16	Baecker, Dirk	84
17	Bahners, Patrick	296
18	Bärfuss, Lukas	716
19	Baring, Arnulf	521
20	Bednarz, Klaus	219
21	Belting, Hans	98
22	Benz, Wolfgang	491
23	Berg, Sibylle	1,085
24	Bertram, Hans	350
25	Beutelspacher, Albrecht	644
26	Bichsel, Peter	340
27	Bieri, Peter	367
28	Biermann, Wolf	2,751
29	Biller, Maxim	596
30	Bisky, Jens	238
31	Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang	146
32	Bofinger, Peter	2,576
33	Bohrer, Karl Heinz	241
34	Bolz, Norbert	500
35	Braunberger, Gerald	28
36	Bredekamp, Horst	183
37	Brenner, Michael	331
38	Breth, Andrea	870
39	Brock, Bazon	419
40	Broder, Henryk Marcin	2,493
41	Bronfen, Elisabeth	95
42	Brumlik, Micha	624
43	Brussig, Thomas	806
44	Buch, Hans Christoph	509
45	Bude, Heinz	301
46	Bueb, Bernhard	475
47	Bullinger, Hans-Jörg	381
48	Büscher, Wolfgang	975
49	Butterwegge, Christoph	408
50	Castorf, Frank	2,054
51	Dahn, Daniela	234
52	Dath, Dietmar	649
53	de Bruyn, Günter	199
54	Delius, Friedrich Christian	614
55	Di Fabio, Udo	893
56	di Lorenzo, Giovanni	2,531
57	Dieckmann, Christoph	949
58	Diederichsen, Diedrich	470
59	Diez, Georg	403
60	Diner, Dan	133
61	Ditfurth, Jutta	626
62	Döpfner, Mathias	4,028
63	Dorn, Thea	743
64	Dörrie, Doris	2,582
65	Dorst, Tankred	951
66	Dreier, Horst	394
67	Drewermann, Eugen	462
68	Droste, Wiglaf	618
69	Dückers, Tanja	381
70	Dürr, Hans-Peter	165
71	Duve, Karen	660
72	Enzensberger, Hans Magnus	1,954
73	Fetscher, Iring	89
74	Flasch, Kurt	250
75	Flassbeck, Heiner	485
76	Fleischhauer, Jan	555
77	Flimm, Jürgen	2,488
78	Franck, Julia	771
79	Franz, Wolfgang	2,817
80	Franzobel (Stefan Griebl)	51
81	Frei, Norbert	295
82	Fricke, Thomas	71
83	Fried, Amelie	898
84	Frühwald, Wolfgang	107
85	Fuest, Clemens	624
86	Funke, Cornelia	2,793
87	Gall, Lothar	124
88	Ganten, Detlev	252
89	Gauß, Karl-Markus	287
90	Geiger, Arno	1,131
91	Genazino, Wilhelm	835
92	Gerhardt, Volker	149
93	Gerke, Wolfgang	1,074
94	Gerster, Petra	347
95	Geyer, Christian	108
96	Gigerenzer, Gerd	163
97	Giordano, Ralph	1,036
98	Glavinic, Thomas	572
99	Goetz, Rainald	978
100	Goldt, Max	790
101	Goosen, Frank	670
102	Göttler, Fritz	169
103	Grass, Günter	8,632
104	Greiner, Ulrich	833
105	Grimm, Dieter	89
106	Grönemeyer, Dietrich	593
107	Grosser, Alfred	348
108	Grün, Anselm	663
109	Grünbein, Durs	876
110	Gruss, Peter	282
111	Güllner, Manfred	1,921
112	Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich	401
113	Habermas, Jürgen	1,931
114	Hachmeister, Lutz	243
115	Hacke, Axel	802
116	Hage, Volker	279

#	Name	Media Mentions `08 - `12
117	Hahne, Peter	2,114
118	Hamann, Brigitte	115
119	Hamm, Peter	185
120	Handke, Peter	2,978
121	Hankel, Wilhelm	333
122	Harig, Ludwig	73
123	Harpprecht, Klaus	519
124	Härtling, Peter	1,165
125	Haslinger, Josef	530
126	Hassemer, Winfried	614
127	Haußmann, Leander	1,739
128	Hegemann, Helene	1,217
129	Heidenreich, Elke	2,880
130	Hein, Christoph	823
131	Hein, Jakob	571
132	Heitmeyer, Wilhelm	277
133	Hellinger, Bert	163
134	Hellwig, Martin	137
135	Henkel, Hans-Olaf	1,550
136	Henrich, Dieter	51
137	Henscheid, Eckhard	176
138	Henschel, Gerhard	311
139	Herbert, Ulrich	109
140	Hermann, Judith	595
141	Hettche, Thomas	362
142	Hickel, Rudolf	761
143	Hildebrandt, Dieter	1,838
144	Hochhuth, Rolf	1,304
145	Höffe, Otfried	69
146	Höhler, Gertrud	587
147	Homburg, Stefan	300
148	Honneth, Axel	237
149	Hoppe, Felicitas	564
150	Hörisch, Jochen	145
151	Horx, Matthias	960
152	Hürlimann, Thomas	317
153	Hurrelmann, Klaus	701
154	Hüther, Michael	3,014
155	Hüther, Gerald	672
156	Illies, Florian	785
157	Ingendaay, Paul	196
158	Issing, Otmar	758
159	Jakobs, Hans-Jürgen	150
160	Jelinek, Elfriede	2,913
161	Jens, Walter	1,201
162	Jesse, Eckhard	271
163	Jessen, Jens	908
164	Joas, Hans	87
165	Joffe, Josef	1,474
166	Jörges, Hans-Ulrich	783
167	Jürgs, Michael	675
168	Kaminer, Wladimir	1,848
169	Kant, Hermann	260
170	Karasek, Hellmuth	2,447
171	Käßmann, Margot	6,860
172	Kast, Verena	52
173	Kaube, Jürgen	129
174	Kehlmann, Daniel	2,639

[continued]

#	Name	Media Mentions `08 - `12
175	Kelek, Necla	1, 070
176	Kemfert, Claudia	1,651
177	Kermani, Navid	1,099
178	Kilb, Andreas	128
179	Kilz, Hans Werner	413
180	Kirchhof, Paul	1,663
181	Kirchhoff, Bodo	507
182	Kirsch, Sarah	364
183	Kissler, Alexander	237
184	Kister, Kurt	245
185	Kleber, Claus	1,591
186	Kluge, Alexander	1,582
187	Kluge, Jürgen	1,239
188	Klüger, Ruth	408
189	Knabe, Hubertus	1,191
190	Knopp, Guido	1,317
191	Köcher, Renate	907
192	Kocka, Jürgen	92
193	Koenen, Gerd	169
194	Kohlhaase, Wolfgang	670
195	Köhlmeier, Michael	443
196	Köppel, Roger	628
197	Korn, Salomon	723
198	Korte, Karl-Rudolf	387
199	Körte, Peter	35
200	Kracht, Christian	949
201	Kraushaar, Wolfgang	297
202	Krechel, Ursula	805
203	Kroetz, Franz Xaver	806
204	Kronauer, Brigitte	498
205	Kruse, Peter	468
206	Kunert, Günter	311
207	Küng, Hans	1,316
208	Kurbjuweit, Dirk	616
209	Kurz, Constanze	444
210	Kuttner, Sarah	901
211	Lange-Müller, Katja	539
212	Langguth, Gerd	1,125
213	Lau, Jörg	509
214	Lebert, Benjamin	223
215	Leggewie, Claus	462
216	Leicht, Robert	796
217	Leif, Thomas	376
218	Leinemann, Jürgen	160
219	Lentz, Michael	506
220	Lenz, Siegfried	2,146
221	Lenzen, Dieter	1,594
222	Lepenies, Wolf	477
223	Lesch, Harald	298
224	Lewitscharoff, Sibylle	1,119
225	Leyendecker, Hans	558
226	Liessmann, Konrad Paul	360
227	Lobo, Sascha	1,051
228	Loest, Erich	556
229	Löffler, Sigrid	625
230	Lohmann, Hans-Martin	33
231	Lübbe, Hermann	81
232	Lübbe-Wolff, Gertrude	123

[continued]

#	Name	Media Mentions `08 - `12
233	Lütkehaus, Ludger	62
234	Lütz, Manfred	1,084
235	Maaz, Hans-Joachim	103
236	Macho, Thomas	150
237	Malik, Fredmund	247
238	Markschies, Christoph	654
239	Markwort, Helmut	1,984
240	Maron, Monika	749
241	Marquard, Odo	94
242	Martenstein, Harald	1,543
243	Marthaler, Christoph	1,206
244	Marx, Reinhard	3,006
245	Matussek, Matthias	799
246	Mayröcker, Friederike	674
247	Meckel, Miriam	722
248	Meinecke, Thomas	423
249	Menasse, Robert	596
250	Miegel, Meinhard	468
251	Miersch, Michael	1,639
252	Mika, Bascha	689
253	Misik, Robert	376
254	Moers, Walter	439
255	Mommsen, Hans	253
256	Mosebach, Martin	925
257	Müller von Blumencron, Mathias	699
258	Müller-Vogg, Hugo	171
259	Münchau, Wolfgang	159
260	Münkler, Herfried	546
261	Muschg, Adolf	644
262	Nadolny, Sten	434
263	Narr, Wolf-Dieter	36
264	Negt, Oskar	186
265	Neuenfels, Hans	1,479
266	Nida-Rümelin, Julian	384
267	Niggemeier, Stefan	683
268	Nolte, Paul	308
269	Nolte, Ernst	164
270	Nonnenmacher, Günther	53
271	Nöstlinger, Christine	479
272	Nuhr, Dieter	2,421
273	Nüsslein-Volhard, Christiane	191
274	Opaschowski, Horst	495
275	Ortheil, Hanns-Josef	848
276	Osang, Alexander	481
277	Osterhammel, Jürgen	130
278	Ostermeier, Thomas	1,040
279	Oswald, Georg	152
280	Otte, Max	588
281	Papier, Hans-Jürgen	1,975
282	Parzinger, Hermann	1,388
283	Passig, Kathrin	324
284	Perthes, Volker	285
285	Petras, Armin	1,654
286	Peymann, Claus	3,178
287	Platthaus, Andreas	212
288	Pleitgen, Fritz	1,604
289	Politycki, Matthias	282
290	Polleit, Thorsten	451
291	Pollesch, René	1,538
292	Pollmer, Udo	258
293	Polt, Gerhard	1,049
294	Poschardt, Ulf	1,652
295	Posener, Alan	1,363
296	Prantl, Heribert	573
297	Precht, Richard David	2,497
298	Prenzel, Manfred	216
299	Raddatz, Fritz Joachim	365
300	Radisch, Iris	766
301	Raffelhüschen, Bernd	973
302	Ransmayr, Christoph	304
303	Rathenow, Lutz	226
304	Ratzinger, Joseph	3,470
305	Raulff, Ulrich	509
306	Rauschenbach, Thomas	224
307	Reemtsma, Jan Philipp	992
308	Regener, Sven	1,301
309	Reich, Jens	303
310	Reichholf, Josef Helmut	349
311	Reich-Ranicki, Marcel	4,659
312	Richling, Mathias	964
313	Rinke, Moritz	1,120
314	Roche, Charlotte	3,321
315	Röggla, Kathrin	526
316	Röhl, Bettina	111
317	Rosa, Hartmut	165
318	Rosh, Lea	485
319	Ross, Jan	368
320	Rötzer, Florian	22
321	Rürup, Bert	2,459
322	Safranski, Rüdiger	708
323	Sartorius, Joachim	474
324	Scharpf, Fritz Wilhelm	25
325	Scheck, Denis	1,002
326	Schellnhuber, Hans Joachim	763
327	Schindel, Robert	187
328	Schirrmacher, Frank	1,855
329	Schlink, Bernhard	1,186
330	Schlögel, Karl	362
331	Schmidbauer, Wolfgang	448
332	Schmied, Wieland	67
333	Schoeps, Julius Hans	363
334	Schöllgen, Gregor	80
335	Scholl-Latour, Peter	944
336	Schönborn, Christoph	1,163
337	Schorlemmer, Friedrich	849
338	Schroeder, Klaus	1,516
339	Schrott, Raoul	662
340	Schuh, Franz	331
341	Schütte, Wolfram	42
342	Schwan, Gesine	6,552
343	Schwarzer, Alice	4,821
344	Scobel, Gert	39
345	Seel, Martin	136
346	Seibt, Gustav	214
347	Selten, Reinhard	183

[continued]

#	Name	Media Mentions `08 - `12
348	Setz, Clemens	654
349	Sick, Bastian	457
350	Siedler, Wolf Jobst	137
351	Singer, Wolf	252
352	Sinn, Hans-Werner	5,666
353	Sloterdijk, Peter	2,015
354	Sofsky, Wolfgang	133
355	Spaemann, Robert	244
356	Spengler, Tilman	313
357	Spies, Werner	616
358	Spinnen, Burkhard	467
359	Spitzer, Manfred	716
360	Spreng, Michael	606
361	Starbatty, Joachim	448
362	Steinbach, Udo	177
363	Steinfeld, Thomas	408
364	Steingart, Gabor	763
365	Steltzner, Holger	52
366	Stemann, Nicolas	950
367	Strasser, Johano	318
368	Straubhaar, Thomas	2,035
369	Strauß, Botho	1,068
370	Streeck, Wolfgang	49
371	Streeruwitz, Marlene	589
372	Stürmer, Michael	1,514
373	Süskind, Patrick	779
374	Suter, Martin	2,681
375	Tellkamp, Uwe	1,913
376	Thalheimer, Michael	951
377	Theweleit, Klaus	278
378	Thomä, Dieter	85
379	Tibi, Bassam	76
380	Tichy, Roland	339
381	Timm, Uwe	1,126
382	Treichel, Hans-Ulrich	231
383	Trojanow, Ilija	957
384	Ullrich, Wolfgang	1,167
385	Ulrich, Bernd	834
386	Veiel, Andreas	134
387	von Alemann, Ulrich	433
388	von Arnim, Hans Herbert	983
389	von Becker, Peter	479
390	von Beyme, Klaus	33
391	von Braun, Christina	135
392	von Brück, Michael	55
393	von Düffel, John	1,529
394	von Hentig, Hartmut	350
395	von Lovenberg, Felicitas	518
396	von Matt, Peter	516
397	von Randow, Gero	696
398	von Schirach, Ferdinand	991
399	von Stuckrad-Barre, Benjamin	1,048
400	von Thadden, Elisabeth	527
401	von Uslar, Moritz	503
402	von Weizsäcker, Carl Christian	926
403	von Weizsäcker, Ernst Ulrich	771
404	Voßkuhle, Andreas	2,764
405	Wallraff, Günter	2,811
406	Walser, Martin	4,704
407	Waltz, Sasha	1,418
408	Weder di Mauro, Beatrice	919
409	Wehler, Hans-Ulrich	320
410	Weibel, Peter	641
411	Weidenfeld, Werner	126
412	Weidermann, Volker	218
413	Weiler, Jan	966
414	Weimer, Wolfram	1,108
415	Wellershoff, Dieter	327
416	Welsch, Wolfgang	58
417	Welzer, Harald	585
418	Wickert, Ulrich	1,722
419	Widmann, Arno	2,356
420	Widmer, Urs	847
421	Wiegard, Wolfgang	486
422	Willemsen, Roger	2,553
423	Willms, Johannes	188
424	Winkels, Hubert	373
425	Winnacker, Ernst-Ludwig	149
426	Winterhoff, Michael	659
427	Wittstock, Uwe	1,121
428	Wohmann, Gabriele	144
429	Wolffsohn, Michael	465
430	Wondratschek, Wolf	306
431	Yogeshwar, Ranga	1,222
432	Zaimoglu, Feridun	1,454
433	Zeh, Juli	1,369
434	Zeilinger, Anton	304
435	Zimmer, Dieter	443
436	zur Hausen, Harald	720

Table 20: Intellectuals and Media Mentions (2012 Sample)

APPENDIX D

MEASURES AND RELIABILITIES

Measures*	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability
Relationalism (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Kaufmann and Dant 1992; Lado, Dant, and Tekleab 2008)		CR = 0.77
A. Mutuality		
1. Even if costs and benefits are not evenly shared between us in a given time period, they balance out over time.		
2. We each benefit and earn in proportion to the efforts we put in.	α = 0.76	
3. Our business usually gets a fair share of the rewards and cost-savings in doing business with the wholesaler.		
4. In our relationship, none of us benefits more than one deserves.		
B. Solidarity		
5. We are committed to preserving a good working relationship with the wholesaler.		
6. We consider the wholesaler to be our business partner.	α = 0.80	
7. We conscientiously try to maintain a cooperative relationship with the wholesaler.		
8. Our relationship with the wholesaler is more important to us than profits from individual transactions.		
C. Flexibility		
9. We would willingly make adjustments to help out the wholesaler when faced with special problems or circumstances.		
10. We would gladly set aside the contractual terms in order to work through difficult situations with the wholesaler.	α = 0.85	
11. The wholesaler willingly makes adjustments to help us out when we are faced with special problems or circumstances.		
12. The wholesaler gladly sets aside the contractual terms in order to work with us in difficult times.		
Bureaucratization (Dwyer and Welsh 1985)		CR = 0.78
A. Centralization		
1. My firm has to ask the wholesaler before we make significant strategic decisions.		
2. In our dealings with the wholesaler, even quite small matters have to be referred to someone higher up to answer.		
3. My company is usually discouraged from making changes in the wholesaler's sales programs without checking with their rep first.	α = 0.80	
4. For many facets of running my firm, we yield to recommendations of the wholesaler.		
5. Many aspects of my business are run according to the strong suggestions of the wholesaler.		

[continued]

Measures*	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability
B. Formalization		
6. My firm's dealings with the wholesaler are subject to a lot of rules and procedures stating how various aspects of my business are to be done. 7. There are standard procedures to be followed in my firm's dealings with the wholesaler. 8. In dealing with the wholesaler, my company's responsibilities are clearly specified. 9. My firm's relationship with the wholesaler is governed primarily by written contracts. 10. There are precise ways outlined for ordering, receiving, and merchandising the products from the wholesaler.	$\alpha = 0.80$	
C. Participation		
11. The wholesaler plays an active role in the decisions we make regarding the retailing of its products. 12. We consult the wholesaler concerning inventory decisions. 13. Our ideas for selling and servicing are welcomed by the wholesaler. 14. The wholesaler regularly asks our opinions and suggestions for improving its products and services.	$\alpha = 0.68$	
Latent Conflict (Etgar 1979)		$CR_{t=1} = 0.82$ $CR_{t=2} = 0.83$
A. Goal Divergence		
1. The wholesaler often wants to prod us to buy more products than are good for us. 2. The wholesaler often complains that we do not want to improve our modes of operation after its standards. 3. The wholesaler often demands that we concentrate fully on its brands, while it is to our advantage to add major sidelines to its business. 4. It is our major function to advise our customers as to which product they should choose while our wholesaler considers our major function to be developing relations between customers and our wholesaler's products.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.84$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.82$	
B. Lack of Autonomy		
5. My wholesaler influences strongly my choice of other suppliers. 6. Through couponing, discounting, and advertising, etc., our wholesaler practically dictates to us the type of promotion we are able to use in our stores. 7. We have little choice on pricing but to follow our wholesaler's suggested retail price.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.64$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.70$	
C. Competition over Scarce Resources		
8. The wholesaler restricts considerably our use of cooperative advertising monies. 9. The wholesaler often ties-in less desirable items with orders for choice items. 10. When opening new stores, our wholesaler often fails to consider and to protect our sales territory adequately. 11. The wholesaler often attempts to sell directly via internet or discounters and in this way to circumvent us.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.68$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.75$	

[continued]

Measures*	Cronbach's Alpha	Composite Reliability
Affective Conflict (Jehn and Mannix 2001; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a) When our firm reflects on the relationship with the wholesaler, our firm feels… 1. …anger 2. …frustration 3. …resentment 4. …tension	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.91$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.94$	$CR_{t=1} = 0.92$ $CR_{t=2} = 0.95$
Cognitive Conflict (Bradford, Stringfellow, and Weitz 2004; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995a)** 1. We disagree over ideas on how to achieve our goals. 2. We disagree over how to complete tasks. 3. We have differences of opinion over how to address problems. 4. The wholesaler and our firm have major disagreements on certain key issues.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.91$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.91$	$CR_{t=1} = 0.92$ $CR_{t=2} = 0.92$
Manifest Conflict (Barki and Hartwick 2001) 1. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from attaining my business goals and objectives. 2. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from taking action in the way that I desire. 3. The wholesaler often blocks or prevents me from managing my business in the way I desire.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.88$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.86$	$CR_{t=1} = 0.88$ $CR_{t=2} = 0.87$
Conflict Aftermath (Kaufmann and Stern 1988) 1. I am still very angry at the wholesaler because of the events surrounding past disputes 2. If the tables were turned, I would like to see my organization get even for how we were treated by the wholesaler during the course of past disputes 3. If we had to do it all over again, we would not do business with the wholesaler.	$\alpha_{t=1} = 0.73$ $\alpha_{t=2} = 0.70$	$CR_{t=1} = 0.75$ $CR_{t=2} = 0.72$

* 7-point scales (1 = "strongly disagree" and 7 = "strongly agree") unless otherwise indicated.
** 7-point scales (1 = "very infrequently" and 7 = "very frequently").

Table 21: Measures and Factor Reliabilities

APPENDIX E

QUESTIONNAIRE

Vielen Dank, dass Sie unser Projekt unterstützen und an der Untersuchung zu

„Erfolgsfaktoren von Zuliefer-Abnehmer-Beziehungen“

teilnehmen.

Im Zentrum dieser Untersuchung stehen folgende Fragestellungen:

1. Auf welche Weise erfolgt die Koordination und Abstimmung zwischen selbstständigen Einzelhändlern und ihren Großhändlern?
2. Wie können beide Parteien langfristig bestmöglich von der Austauschbeziehung profitieren?
3. Was sind kritische Faktoren, die die Erfolgspotenziale von Zuliefer-Abnehmer-Beziehungen beeinflussen?

Wir hoffen, durch dieses Projekt Ergebnisse zu erhalten, wie Zuliefer-Abnehmer-Beziehungen am besten organisiert werden können, um alle Beteiligten noch erfolgreicher zu machen.
Bei Interesse lassen wir Ihnen gerne eine Zusammenfassung der Untersuchungsergebnisse zukommen. Bitte geben Sie in diesem Fall einfach eine Mailadresse an.

Bearbeitungshinweise:

Bei der Beantwortung der Fragen gibt es keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Bitte antworten Sie möglichst spontan und vollständig. Sofern Ihnen eine genaue Angabe schwer fällt, schätzen Sie bitte. **Auch ungefähre Angaben sind für uns sehr wertvoll und helfen uns weiter.**

Der Fragebogen ist in fünf Abschnitte eingeteilt:

A. Grundlegende Angaben zur Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler
B. Angaben zur Koordination und Interaktion mit Ihrem Großhändler
C. Angaben zur Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler
D. Angaben zum Erfolg Ihrer Großhändlerbeziehung
E. Allgemeine Angaben zu Ihrem Unternehmen und zu Ihrem Großhändler

Die Beantwortung der Fragen wird nur ca. 15 Minuten in Anspruch nehmen. Aus statistischen Gründen sind einige Fragen im Wortlaut ähnlich.

Jede Information wird selbstverständlich vollständig anonym und vertraulich behandelt und dient ausschließlich wissenschaftlichen Zwecken.

Nochmals vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster
Institut für Strategisches Management

Befragung: Erfolgsfaktoren in Zuliefer-Abnehmer-Beziehungen

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

A. Grundlegende Angaben zur Beziehung zum Großhändler

1. Welcher Großhändler ist Ihr hauptsächlicher Geschäftspartner?

   _____

2. Wie lange arbeiten Sie schon mit Ihrem Großhändler zusammen?

   ____ Jahre

3. Auf welche Gesamtlaufzeit ist Ihr aktueller Vertrag mit Ihrem Großhändler ausgelegt?

   ____ Jahre ❑ unbefristet

   3.1. Wann läuft Ihr aktueller Vertrag mit Ihrem Großhändler aus? *(falls befristet)*

   in _____ Jahr(en)

4. Wie häufig war ein Vertriebsmitarbeiter Ihres Großhändlers im vergangen Jahr für Beratungen oder Unterstützungsleistungen vor Ort? *Eine Schätzung ist ausreichend.*

   _____ mal

5. Wie häufig pro Woche erhalten Sie von Ihrem Großhändler Trockensortiments-Lieferungen?

   _____ mal wöchentlich

6. Wie lange sind Sie bereits im Einzelhandel tätig?

   _____ Jahr(e)

   6.1. Wie lange davon arbeiten Sie in leitender Position?

   _____ Jahr(e)

7. Wie alt sind Sie?

   _____ Jahre

8. Welches Geschlecht haben Sie?
   ❑ männlich ❑ weiblich

9. Bitte geben Sie Ihren höchsten Berufsabschluss an.
   ❑ Ausbildung/ Lehre ❑ Fachschulabschluss/ Meister ❑ Fachhochschulabschluss
   ❑ Universitätsabschluss ❑ Kein Berufsabschluss

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

B. Angaben zur Koordination und Interaktion mit Ihrem Großhändler

1. Wie sind die Kommunikation und der Informationsaustausch mit Ihrem Großhändler zu beurteilen?

	Stimme gar nicht zu — Stimme voll zu
• In der Beziehung zu unserem Großhändler wird erwartet, dass jede Information, die dem Geschäftspartner helfen könnte, diesem auch gegeben wird.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Informationen werden informell ausgetauscht.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Der Informationsaustausch findet häufig statt.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Es wird erwartet, dass wir uns gegenseitig regelmäßig über Ereignisse oder Veränderungen informieren, die den Geschäftspartner betreffen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Es wird erwartet, dass wir uns gegenseitig betriebsinterne Informationen geben, wenn diese dem Gegenüber helfen können.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

2. Bitte bewerten Sie nachfolgende Aussagen zur Koordination mit Ihrem Großhändler.

	Stimme gar nicht zu — Stimme voll zu
• Bevor wir wesentliche strategische Entscheidungen treffen, müssen wir unseren Großhändler fragen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• In der Beziehung mit unserem Großhändler müssen auch relativ kleine Themen mit dem Großhändler abgestimmt werden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Uns wird üblicherweise davon abgeraten, das Produktprogramm zu ändern, ohne dies vorher mit dem Großhändler abzustimmen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Bei vielen Aspekten der Betriebsführung halten wir uns an die Empfehlungen unseres Großhändlers.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Zahlreiche unserer Betriebsabläufe werden gemäß den Vorgaben unseres Großhändlers ausgeführt.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Die Beziehung zu unserem Großhändler unterliegt vielen Regeln und Handlungsanweisungen, die beschreiben, wie Aufgaben unseres Unternehmens durchzuführen sind.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Es gibt Standardprozesse, nach denen im Umgang mit unserem Großhändler gehandelt werden muss.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Im Umgang mit unserem Großhändler sind meine Verantwortlichkeiten klar definiert.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Die Beziehung zu meinem Großhändler wird vorrangig durch schriftliche Verträge geregelt.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Es gibt präzise Bestimmungen zur Bestellung, Warenannahme und Verkaufsförderung der Produkte meines Großhändlers.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler spielt eine aktive Rolle bei Entscheidungen, die wir bezüglich des Verkaufs seiner Produkte treffen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Bei Entscheidungen zu unserem Warenbestand ziehen wir unseren Großhändler hinzu.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unsere Ideen zum Verkauf sind beim Großhändler willkommen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler fragt uns regelmäßig nach unserer Meinung und unseren Vorschläge zur Verbesserung seiner Produkte und Leistungen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

3. Bitte beurteilen Sie den Einfluss, den Ihr Großhändler auf Ihr Unternehmen ausübt, anhand folgender Aussagen.

	Stimme gar nicht zu … Stimme voll zu
• Unser Großhändler versucht häufig, uns mehr Produkte aufzudrängen, als gut für uns ist.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler beklagt häufig, dass wir unsere Arbeitsweisen nicht anhand seiner Vorgaben optimieren wollen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler fordert häufig, dass wir uns voll auf sein Sortiment konzentrieren sollen, während es für uns besser ist, auch mit anderen Lieferanten zusammenzuarbeiten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unsere Hauptaufgabe ist es, Kunden bei der Produktwahl zu beraten, während unser Großhändler unsere Hauptaufgabe darin sieht, Kunden an seine Produkte zu binden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Mein Großhändler beeinflusst mich stark in der Wahl anderer Lieferanten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Durch Coupon-Aktionen, Preisnachlässe und Werbeaktionen diktiert uns unser Großhändler die Verkaufsförderungsmaßnahmen, die wir in unserer Filiale durchführen können.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir müssen unseren Artikelbestand gemäß den Bestimmungen unseres Großhändlers anpassen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir haben wenig Einfluss auf die Preissetzung und müssen den Vorgaben unseres Großhändlers folgen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler schränkt uns hinsichtlich der Verwendung des Werbebudgets beträchtlich ein.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler versucht häufig, Bestellungen attraktiver Produkte an die gleichzeitige Abnahme weniger attraktiver Produkte zu binden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Bei Eröffnung neuer Filialen vermag unser Großhändler unser Einzugsgebiet häufig **nicht** angemessen zu schützen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Der Großhändler versucht häufig, uns durch eigene Filialen, Discounter oder den Online-Verkauf zu umgehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

4. Bitte beurteilen Sie anhand der nachfolgenden Aussagen, inwiefern es zu Meinungsverschiedenheiten in der Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler kommt.

	Sehr, selten … Sehr, häufig
• Wir sind unterschiedlicher Meinung, auf welche Weise unsere Ziele erreicht werden können.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir haben unterschiedliche Ansichten dazu, wie unsere Aufgaben zu erfüllen sind.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir haben unterschiedliche Auffassungen hinsichtlich der Bewältigung von Problemen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Zwischen uns gab es schon Meinungsverschiedenheiten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler und wir haben unterschiedliche Meinungen hinsichtlich zentraler Themen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

5. Wie sehen Sie Ihren gegenseitigen Umgang miteinander mit Blick auf die Zielerreichung?

	Stimme gar nicht zu — Stimme voll zu
• Unser Großhändler erschwert es mir häufig durch sein Verhalten, dass ich meine betriebswirtschaftlichen Ziele erreiche.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Ich erschwere es unserem Großhändler häufig durch mein Verhalten, dass er seine betriebswirtschaftlichen Ziele erreicht.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler hält mich häufig davon ab, Dinge so anzugehen, wie ich es für richtig halte.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Ich halte unseren Großhändler häufig davon ab, Dinge so anzugehen, wie er es für richtig hält.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Großhändler erschwert es mir häufig, dass ich meinen Betrieb in der Weise führe, wie ich es gerne möchte.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Ich erschwere es unserem Großhändler häufig, dass er sein geplantes Vorgehen wie von ihm gewünscht umsetzt.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

C. Angaben zur Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler

1. Inwiefern können Sie den folgenden Aussagen bezüglich der Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler zustimmen?

	Stimme gar nicht zu — Stimme voll zu
• Auch wenn Kosten und Nutzen der Beziehung zeitweise nicht gleichmäßig zwischen uns verteilt sind, gleicht sich das mit der Zeit wieder aus.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir profitieren beide im Verhältnis zu der Mühe, die wir uns geben.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unser Unternehmen erhält in der Regel einen fairen Anteil an Gewinnen und Kosteneinsparungen, die in der Geschäftsbeziehung mit dem Großhändler erzielt werden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Von unserer Beziehung profitiert keiner mehr als er verdient.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir bemühen uns um ein gutes Arbeitsverhältnis mit unserem Großhändler.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir betrachten den Großhändler als unseren Geschäftspartner.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir versuchen ein kooperatives Verhältnis mit dem Großhändler aufrechtzuerhalten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Ein gutes Verhältnis zum Großhändler ist uns wichtiger als die Gewinne einzelner Transaktionen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir würden unsere eigenen Abläufe anpassen, um unserem Großhändler bei speziellen Problemen zur Seite zu stehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir wären gerne bereit, Vertragsbedingungen auszusetzen, um dem Großhändler in schwierigen Zeiten beizustehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Der Großhändler würde seine Abläufe anpassen, um uns bei speziellen Problemen zur Seite zu stehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Der Großhändler wäre gerne bereit, Vertragsbedingungen auszusetzen, um uns in schwierigen Zeiten beizustehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Obwohl unsere Beziehung mit unserem Großhändler nicht besonders komplex ist, sind wir immer noch unsicher, wer für was zuständig ist.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Unsere beiden Unternehmen haben präzise Erwartungen aneinander, die über den reinen Kauf und Verkauf von Waren hinausgehen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Obwohl die Beziehung mit unserem Großhändler sehr kompliziert ist, haben beide Parteien klare Vorstellungen von den gegenseitigen Verantwortlichkeiten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Die Austauschbeziehung mit unserem Großhändler bildet ein komplexes Netz an gegenseitigen Erwartungen verschiedenster Art.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

2. Wie sehen Sie Ihre Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler?

Wenn ich an die Beziehung zu unserem Großhändler denke, bin ich...	Stimme gar nicht zu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stimme voll zu
• …verärgert.	
• …frustriert.	
• …verstimmt.	
• …feindselig.	
• …böswillig.	
• …angespannt.	

3. Wie stellt sich das Verhältnis zu Ihrem Großhändler dar?

	Stimme gar nicht zu 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stimme voll zu
• Ich weiß, dass unser Großhändler fair mit uns umgeht.	
• Ich glaube, dass unser Großhändler ehrlich zu uns ist.	
• Ich vertraue unserem Großhändler völlig.	
• Wenn unser Großhändler uns Zusagen gibt, hält er diese auch ein.	
• Ich kann mich auf das Wort meines Großhändlers verlassen.	
• Wir stehen unserem Großhändler loyal gegenüber.	
• Wir sind grundsätzlich bereit, langfristige Investitionen für den Verkauf von Produkten unseres Großhändlers zu tätigen.	
• Die Beziehung zu unserem Großhändler ist eine langfristige Verbindung.	
• Wir sehen es unserem Großhändler nach, wenn er uns durch einen Fehler in kleinere Schwierigkeiten bringt.	
• Wir tun alles dafür, den Absatz der Produkte unseres Großhändlers zu steigern.	
• Unser Großhändler steht uns loyal gegenüber.	
• Unser Großhändler betrachtet unsere Beziehung als eine langfristige Verbindung.	
• Unser Großhändler ist grundsätzlich bereit, langfristige Investitionen zu tätigen, um uns zu helfen.	
• Unser Großhändler sieht es uns nach, wenn wir ihn durch einen Fehler in kleinere Schwierigkeiten bringen.	
• Unser Großhändler tut alles dafür, unseren Absatz zu steigern.	
• Unser Großhändler hat sein Personal unter größerem Einsatz von Zeit und Geld für die Zusammenarbeit mit unserem Betrieb geschult.	
• Unser Großhändler hat seine Prozesse speziell auf unsere Anforderungen zugeschnitten.	
• Unser Großhändler hat sein Logistiksystem speziell auf unsere Anforderungen zugeschnitten.	

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

4. Bitte beurteilen Sie die Abhängigkeit zwischen Ihrem Betrieb und Ihrem Großhändler.

Sollte die Beziehung zu unserem Großhändler aus irgendeinem Grund enden,…	Stimme gar nicht zu — Stimme voll zu
• …würde auch unser Absatz von Produkten anderer Zulieferer sinken.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …wäre es relativ leicht für uns, auf neue Produktlinien auszuweichen.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …würden wir erhebliche Einkommensverluste erleiden, trotz größter Bemühungen, die wegfallenden Einnahmen zu ersetzen.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …würde unser Ansehen erheblich beschädigt werden.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …würde das dem Absatz unseres Großhändlers in unserer Region erheblich schaden.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …könnte unser Großhändler das durch die Zusammenarbeit mit einem anderen Einzelhändler in dieser Region leicht kompensieren.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …würde das Ansehen unseres Großhändlers in unserer Region erheblich beschädigt werden.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7
• …würde das dem Service schaden, den die Kunden unseres Großhändlers in dieser Region erwarten.	☐1 ☐2 ☐3 ☐4 ☐5 ☐6 ☐7

D. Angaben zum Erfolg Ihrer Großhändlerbeziehung

1. Bitte geben Sie nachfolgend einige Einschätzungen zur Beschaffung über Ihren Großhändler ab.

   1.1. Die Preise, die uns der Großhändler bietet, sind durchschnittlich _____% günstiger als die sonst üblichen Marktpreise.

   1.2. Welchen Anteil Ihrer Waren beziehen Sie über Ihren Großhändler? *(in % vom Gesamtbeschaffungsvolumen)*

   _____ %

   1.3. Ist eine Bezugsquote vertraglich fixiert?
   - ☐ Ja, es ist eine Bezugsquote fixiert und wir haben keine Probleme, diese zu erfüllen
   - ☐ Ja, wir haben allerdings Probleme, diese Quote zu erreichen
   - ☐ Nein, es ist keine Bezugsquote vertraglich fixiert

2. Wie hoch sind die variablen Gebühren, die Sie für Lieferungen von Ihrem Großhändler aufschlagen müssen?

   _____ % des Rechnungsbetrages

3. Wie hoch ist die Werbegebühr, die Sie an Ihren Großhändler abführen müssen?

   _____% des Umsatzes

4. Wie viele Tage befand sich Ihr Personal im vergangen Jahr insgesamt auf Schulungen oder Seminaren, die von Ihrem Großhändler bzw. Ihrer Einzelhandelskette angeboten wurden?
   (Summe der Personentage aller Mitarbeiter)

   _____ Tage

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

5. Wie zufrieden sind Sie mit der Beziehung zu Ihrem Großhändler? Bitte nehmen Sie zu folgenden Aussagen Stellung.

	Stimme gar nicht zu / Stimme voll zu
• Im Großen und Ganzen bin ich mit der Beziehung zu meinem Großhändler sehr zufrieden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Insgesamt ist unser Großhändler ein Unternehmen, mit dem man gut Geschäfte machen kann.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir würden aufhören, die Produkte unseres Großhändlers zu verkaufen, wenn wir könnten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wir sind zufrieden mit den Produkten und Leistungen, die wir von unserem Großhändler erhalten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Vergangene Konflikte haben keine Auswirkungen auf unser aktuelles Verhältnis zu unserem Großhändler.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Ich bin noch immer verärgert über unseren Großhändler aufgrund seines Verhaltens bei früheren Disputen.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wenn die Verhältnisse anders wären, würde es mich freuen, wenn wir uns dafür revanchieren könnten, wie der Großhändler uns in vorangegangenen Streitsituationen behandelt hat.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Wenn wir nochmal von vorne beginnen könnten, würden wir uns nicht für diesen Großhändler entscheiden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

6. Wie würden Sie den Erfolg Ihres Betriebs im vergangenen Jahr im Vergleich zu anderen Betrieben in Ihrer Branche anhand folgender Kriterien bewerten:

	Deutlich schlechter / Deutlich besser
• Umsatzwachstum	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Gewinnwachstum	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Allgemeine Profitabilität	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Liquidität	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Arbeitsproduktivität	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• Cash flow	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

7. Wie sind die Marktgegebenheiten in Ihrem Verkaufsgebiet?

In unserem Verkaufsgebiet…	Stimme gar nicht zu / Stimme voll zu
• …ist der Markt sehr komplex.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• …sind die Marktanteile stabil.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• …können Nachfragetrends leicht beobachtet werden.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• …sind Absatzprognosen ziemlich präzise.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7
• …gibt es viele neue Konkurrenten.	□1 □2 □3 □4 □5 □6 □7

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

E. Allgemeine Angaben zu Ihrem Unternehmen und zu Ihrem Großhändler

1. Wie viele Filialen betreiben Sie?

   _____ Filiale(n)

   1.1. Handelt es sich bei Ihren Filialen um Neugründungen, ehemalige Filialen Ihres Großhändlers oder um ehemalige Betriebe anderer Einzelhändler? *(Bitte geben Sie jeweils die Anzahl an)*

   ___ Neugründungen ___ Betriebe des Großhändlers ___ Betriebe anderer Einzelhändler

2. Wie groß ist die Verkaufsfläche Ihrer Betriebe insgesamt?
   (Summe aller Betriebe)

   _____ m²

3. Wie viele Angestellte beschäftigt Ihr Unternehmen? *(Bitte summieren Sie Teilzeitstellen auf; bspw. entsprechen zwei Halbtagsstellen einer Ganztagsstelle)*

   _____ Angestellte

4. Enthält Ihr Vertrag mit dem Großhändler eine Wettbewerbs- bzw. Konkurrenzklausel?
   ❑ Ja ❑ Nein

5. Wie stellt sich das Verhältnis von umsatzschwächstem zu umsatzstärkstem Monat bei Ihnen dar?
   (Umsatz des schwächsten Monats dividiert durch Umsatz des stärksten Monats)

   ___ : ___

6. Wo liegt Ihr durchschnittlicher Jahresumsatz?
   ❑ < 1 Mio. € ❑ 1 – 2 Mio. € ❑ 3 – 5 Mio. € ❑ 6 - 10 Mio. € ❑ 11 – 50 Mio. € ❑ > 50 Mio. €

7. Wie viele unterschiedliche Artikel haben Sie ca. in Ihrem Sortiment?

   _____ Artikel

Vielen Dank für Ihre Unterstützung!

ERKLÄRUNG

Ich versichere an Eides statt, dass ich die eingereichte Dissertation "*Strategic Choice, Market Evolution and Business Outcomes – Effects of Corporate Governance Structures on Individual and Collective Performance*" selbstständig verfasst habe. Anderer als der von mir angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel habe ich mich nicht bedient. Alle wörtlich oder sinngemäß den Schriften anderer Autoren entnommenen Stellen habe ich kenntlich gemacht. Ich versichere auch, dass diese Dissertation nicht bereits anderweitig als Prüfungsarbeit vorgelegen hat.

Münster, 13. November 2014

Jochen Lengers