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ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION:
PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIA 1998-2006

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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Die vorliegende Studie untersucht das politische Verhalten einer indonesischen islamischen Partei, der Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). Diese Partei erzielte öffentliches und wissenschaftliches Aufsehen, als sie ihre Wählerzahl im Jahr 2004 von 1,7 % auf 7,3 % versechsfachen konnte. Kritiker werfen der Partei vor, dass ihre Ideologie undemokratische Elemente enthalte, so etwa die Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Religion und Politik oder Fragen wie die Gleichberechtigung der Geschlechter und der religiöse Pluralismus. Die Beteiligung der PKS an demokratischen politischen Prozessen sei daher weder ernsthaft noch nachhaltig. Vielmehr werde die Partei entsprechend ihrer Zielsetzung letztendlich islamistische Politik machen, die mit Demokratie nicht kompatibel sei oder gar versuchen, die Demokratie durch ein islamisches System zu ersetzen.

Die vorliegende Studie folgt einem neo-institutionalistischen Theorieansatz nach Douglas C. North, um den Einfluss der Ideologie auf das politische Verhalten der PKS gegenüber den demokratischen politischen Institutionen in Indonesien zu untersuchen. Die Hypothese der Arbeit lautet, dass Ideologie immer dann die dominante Richtlinie für das politische Verhalten der Partei bildet, wenn die formellen Institutionen wirkungslos sind. Dies ist weniger stark der Fall, wenn die formellen Spielregeln funktionieren.

Ein historischer Überblick zeigt, dass sich die Verhaltensmuster der PKS von „heimlich" zu „offen, aber ideologisch" zu „programmatisch/pragmatisch" gewandelt haben. Diese sich wandelnden Muster verlaufen parallel zu den Veränderungen der politischen Institutionen Indonesiens, die freier und demokratischer wurden. Die Demokratisierung ermöglichte es muslimischen politischen Akteuren, sich rational und pragmatisch zu verhalten – die PKS stellt hierfür ein dramatisches und wichtiges Fallbeispiel dar. Während der Wahlen 1999 versuchte die Partei, die politischen Präferenzen des konservativsten Teils der muslimischen Gemeinschaft zu artikulieren. Daher wurde sie am rechten Rand des ideologischen Spektrums in Indonesien eingeordnet. Im Zuge der zunehmenden Stabilität der demokratischen politischen Institutionen wandelte sich die PKS jedoch von einer konservativen zu einer pragmatischen Partei – ohne jedoch ihre konservative Ideologie aufzugeben.

Die sich ändernde organisatorische Balance der PKS beeinflusste ihr Verhalten in Wahlen. Während der Wahlen 1999 sah die Partei, die zudem nur schlecht organisiert und vernetzt war, ihre Wahlaktivitäten lediglich als Bestandteil von religiösen Aktivitäten an. So ermahnte PKS ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten während der Vorbereitung auf die Wahl immer

wieder, ihre religiösen Pflichten zu intensivieren und warnte sogar davor, sich zu sehr mit der Mobilisierung von Wählern zu beschäftigen. Dies änderte sich dramatisch anlässlich der Wahlen 2004, die die Partei nicht länger als ein mögliches Mittel zum Zweck ansah, sondern vielmehr als *das* Mittel, um ihre ideologischen Ziele zu erreichen. Im Ergebnis motivierten ihre Mitglieder und Aktivisten so viele Wähler wie möglich ohne sich darum zu sorgen, ob die Wähler die Ziele der Partei verstanden hatten.

Die zunehmende Stabilität und Effektivität der demokratischen Institutionen als Arenen des politischen Wettbewerbs haben auch das Verhalten der Partei als Regierungspartei beeinflusst. Während des Zeitraums von 1999 bis 2004 verhielt sich die Partei ideologisch, in dem sie ausschließlich mit anderen islamischen Parteien zusammenarbeitete und sich gegenüber der säkularen Politik sehr zurückhaltend verhielt. Als die Partei nach den Wahlen 2004 in die Regierung eintrat, änderte sich ihr Verhalten maßgeblich. Mit Ausnahme ihrer starken Unterstützung für den Gesetzesentwurf gegen Pornographie und pornographische Handlungen (RUU-APP) lässt sich das politische Verhalten der PKS in der Regierung als weitgehend pragmatisch und machtorientiert beschreiben.

Das sich wandelnde Verhalten der PKS ist ein Anzeichen für den Erfolg des Demokratisierungsprozesses in Indonesien. Die politischen Institutionen waren in der Lage, den politischen Akteuren, und hier besonders muslimischen Akteuren, ein gewisses Maß an Sicherheit zu bieten, damit diese ihre Interaktionen, Transaktionen und Zusammenarbeit nach formal kodifizierten Regeln durchführen konnten. Diese Sicherheit motivierte die politischen Akteure dazu, rational zu handeln und ihre politischen Ziele kooperativ zu verfolgen. Noch wichtiger ist die Tatsache, dass, soweit das Verhalten der PKS betroffen ist, das demokratische System substanziell funktioniert: es ermöglicht politischen Wettbewerb, der die Partei dazu bewegt, eine Plattform zu bilden und politische Programme nach den Präferenzen ihrer Anhänger zu formulieren, aber auch Wahlversprechen einzuhalten. Der Demokratisierungsprozess war in der Lage, die PKS davon zu überzeugen, dass demokratisches Handeln und die Einhaltung von Regeln der einzige Weg ist, die eigenen politischen Ziele zu verfolgen – selbst wenn dieser Weg manchmal mit den ideologischen Grundlagen der Partei in Widerspruch steht.

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CHAPTER I

ISLAMIST PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA:

ON RESEARCHING THE INDONESIAN PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS)

1. INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the democratic participation of an Islamist political party in Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, or *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera*). The focus of this research is to assess the influence of ideology on the party's behavior in democratic politics. The PKS has been a great success, but has at the same time triggered controversies in Indonesian politics, after it successfully increased its vote from 1.7% in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004. The controversy stems from perceptions—among observers as well as the public—that the Islamist ideology of the PKS contains elements that are incompatible with democracy, and that its participation in democracy is merely a pretext for its true objective of establishing an Islamist political system. Utilizing theories of party studies, this research analyzes the impact of ideology upon the behavior of the PKS in democratic politics, i.e. in its organization, its participation in elections, and its role in government.

1.1. Islamist Parties: A Democratic Dilemma

In fact, suspicions about the participation of Islamist parties in democratic politics are by no means a unique Indonesian problem. A scholar of Islamist parties calls it a "democratic dilemma" in that, on the one hand, the parties adopt a strictly religious political ideology with elements that are incompatible with democratic values—such as, for example, their approaches to questions of gender equality and religious pluralism. Yet on the other hand, Islamist parties are gaining popularity in many Muslim countries when they participate in democratic politics and have a presence in elections (Jonasson, 2004). From the point of view of political democratization, a process that is only in its initial phase in the Muslim world, this is gives rise to a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, banning Islamist parties from participation in democratic politics would obviously be an undemocratic option, as it would disenfranchise significant Muslim groups. Yet on the other hand, letting parties with undemocratic objectives compete and win elections, some would argue, is democratic suicide, as it will risk giving such parties opportunities to turn the democratic system upside down and establish their preferred undemocratic political systems.

At an empirical level, it is true that the emergence and growing popularity of Islamist parties is a widespread phenomenon in many Muslim countries, ranging from North Africa, to the Middle East, to Central Asia, to South Asia and Southeast Asia. Even the manner of their emergence is quite uniform: they started from small but militant Islamic groups that emerged amidst widespread public resentment toward the existing political systems. Their moralist and religious images were in contrast to the rampant corruptions among existing regimes, and their care for the needy was in antithesis to the prevalent selfish politicians. When the groups entered into the political arena, they became popular almost immediately. However, this rapid popularity triggered counter-reactions from the political and military establishment that led to political crises and even violence.

The first and perhaps the most notorious case was the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). Growing from the Islamic movements in the 1960s and 1970s, the FIS emerged as the most well-organized political organization in 1980s Algerian politics. This period was also marked by the rise of oil prices that severely affected the country's economy, with unemployment reportedly reaching forty percent of the total force work. The economic crises triggered mass riots in major cities in early October 1988, which demanded that the government resign. The authorities suppressed the mobs with counter-violence, causing the deaths of hundreds of people. Yet, the demonstrations were able to force the government to carry out political reforms. At the end of the year the government passed bills that allowed citizens to organize opposition parties and provided a legal framework for economic liberalization, and by early 1989 no les than eighteen political parties were founded, including the FIS, which was established in February 1989. Led by two figures – Abasi Madani, an elderly professor from the University of Algiers who displayed a moderate political stance, and a fiery young preacher Ali Belhaj, who staunchly promoted strict and radical Islamist political views – the FIS attracted a wide spectrum of support from Muslim communities, ,especially in urban areas, amid high levels of disappointment with the existing regime.

The government organized the first multi-party elections for district and provincial legislatures in June 1990, and the FIS won 54 percent of votes and collected 46 percent of district and 55 percent of provincial legislatures. The Incumbent party reaped only 32 percent. The first Gulf War reportedly galvanized the FIS's popularity. Shocked by its defeat, the government started to engineer the incoming national legislative election, by redrawing the electoral districts. Rejecting the government Gerrymandering strategy, the FIS called for a nation-wide strike, driving hundred of thousands of people to the streets. In June it agreed to put an end to the protests after the government agreed to guarantee a fair election. Yet, the

compromise sparked a split among the FIS's leaders, and the prolonged show of people's power alarmed the military, which then arrested Madani and Belhaj. The party's leadership was handed down to Abdul Kader Hachani, in preparation for the election. In the first round of elections held in December 1990, the FIS garnered 48 percent of the total votes, and won 188 out of 231 seats in parliament. Unfortunately, the army could not accept the prospect of Islamist rule and in January 1992 it cancelled the electoral process, forced the government to resign and declared a state of emergency and martial law. In March the military government dissolved and banned the FIS, and in June it sentenced Madani and Belhaj to 12 years in prison (Shahin, 1997: 112-161).

A similar story took place in Turkey, when Islamist parties repeatedly gained successes but were repeatedly suppressed by secularist politicians and the military. The history of Islamist parties in Turkish politics had been centred on its prominent figure, Necmettin Erbakan (b. 1926). In 1970 the industrialist Erbakan and his associates founded The National Order Party (*Mili Nizam Partisi* or MNP) which differentiated itself from other existing parties by its religious orientation. However, this party disbanded following military intervention in Turkish politics in 1971. In the next year Erbakan founded another Islamist party, the National Salvation Party (*Mili Selamat Partisi* or MSP) with a similar moral-religious tone. This party enjoyed considerable success as a minor party and won 11.80 percent of the national vote in the 1973 elections, thereby achieving the 10 percent Electoral Threshold which allowed the party to have seats in parliament, which saw it breifly join the coalition Government during the Cyprus crisis in 1974. Binnaz Toprak, a respected Turkish political analyst, wrote that the MSP's success in the election told the people and politicians that religion played a significant role in structuring voters' behavior. Although officially an Islamic party was prohibited by the constitution, most of its constituents voted for it because they perceived it to be Islamic party. In fact, the party's platform was not specifically religious or Islamist, but rather framed the country's political problems from a moral point of view. Its platform envisaged that the party struggled for:

> A political system that would eliminate squander, bribery, and corruption through the screening of both the politicians and the public administrators on the basis of their moral character in addition to objective testing and qualification; and a nation which has a historical consciousness, unity, and faith in common national goals (Toprak, 1990: 99).

This deceptively non-religious statement used a rhetoric that enabled the party to touch upon voters' religious sentiments. *Firstly*, by evaluating the political and administrative shortcomings of the government in moral terms, it implied that the solution—i.e. the party's platform—was a religious one. *Secondly*, by making historical consciousness one of its objectives, the party also implicitly pointed to Islam as the major uniting factor in the history of the Turkish nation.

Civil unrest in 1980 lured the military to intervene in national politics, dissolving political parties and banning their leaders. Another Islamist party was founded by Erbakan's followers in 1983 – the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) – and when, in 1987, the new constitution restored the political rights of the banned parties' leaders, Erbakan took over the Welfare Party's leadership as it prepared to compete in the elections. Initial results were lukewarm result, with the Welfare Party winning only 6.7 percent of votes in the 1987 election. Yet it steadily increased its appeal in subsequent elections. In 1991, in a temporary coalition with the right-wing nationalist party, WP eventually won 17 percent of votes and entered into the parliament. Finally, in the 1994 parliamentary election it managed to collect 21 percent of votes, which eventually enabled Erbakan to lead a government in 1996, becoming the first ever Islamist prime minister. Although it enjoyed strong support at the municipal level, the Erbakan administration suffered from various controversies and bouts of ineffectiveness, which were partly due to a corrupt coalition partner and the narrow space for political maneuvers that it was allowed by the military. Erkaban's foreign policy showed an Islamic inclination, with serial visits to Libya and Iran and participation in the formation of an economic block of Muslim countries (D-8), triggering criticism from other parties and the military. At the end of 1997, with his coalition partner allegedly involved in corruption scandal, Erbakan was forced to publically defend the fragile coalition, which negatively affected his popularity. Furthermore, WP's policy of expanding Islamic elements in educational and bureaucratic institutions, and of promoting religious symbols in public, led the military to warn that the Refah government was trying to establish Islamic law, while also giving rise to resistance from the business community, which saw the populist budget as favoring Islamic cultural entrepreneurship. In February the military issued demands to the government: these included the elimination of Islamist influence and symphatizers from the state system, restrictions on religious civil organizations, the closure of hundreds of religious schools, and tight controls over religious mystical orders and religious dress. These demands eventually led to the collapse of the government, and in June 1997, Erbakan resigned. In January 1998 the authorities declared Refah to be a banned party 'because of evidence

confirming its actions against the principles of the secular republic'. Erbakan, together with five of his deputies, were banned for five years from political leadership (Mecham, 2004: 339-358).

A similarly gloomy story concerning an Islamist party can be found in Egypt, where the centrist *Hisbul Wasath* (or Central Party) was denied its right to participate in elections. This began in 1995 when the authoritarian government escalated its repression of Islamist politicians, especially those which belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood. In early 1980's the regime conducted democratic experiment of multiparty system. In the 1984 election, in coalition with the nationalist Wafd Party, politicians from Brotherhood managed to garner 15 percent of votes and 13 of percent seats, and in 1987 in another coalition with the Liberal Party and the Labor Party, the Brotherhood won 17 percent of votes and 13 percent of seats. Anticipating unhappy prospects, the regime stopped its multiparty experiment. As could easily be predicted, the votes for non-government parties declined drastically; their vote dropped to only 14 percent, from 28 percent in 1984 and 30 percent in 1987. in response, opposition parties tried to strengthen their base by signing a 'civic compact' in 1995, a join commitment to promote inclusive democratic participation, freedom of belief and women's rights. Initially the Brotherhood was enthusiastic to join the coalition in the hope of improving its electoral prospects, but finally it withdrew from signing the compact when the document did not declare the *Sharia* to be the sole basis of law. In that year many of its credible young leaders of the Brotherhood were also arrested and charged with conducting illegal political activities.

This political situation—i.e. the Brotherhood's reluctance to join a reforming coalition on the one hand, and the escalating oppression from the regime on the other—had frustrated many of its activists and members, especially among professionals. Together with other reform-minded professionals and politicians these activists established the *Hisbul Wasath* in late 1995. The name *Wasath* or center implies its two fundamental objectives: *firstly*, it marked a moderate political movement that sought a middle way, an alternative to the deadlock of antagonism between the regime and the opposition; and *secondly*, the name alludes to a key and popular Qur'anic term—'Thus have We made you a justly balance (*wasath*) community. That ye might be witness over the nations' (Qur'an, 2: 143)— thereby giving it Islamic credentials. The project thus represented a new moderate politics waged by new generation of Islamist democrats. It is interesting to note that 64 out of 72 of the party's founders were Brotherhood activists. Surprisingly, the Brotherhood's leadership reacted swiftly and furiously toward the indication of independence among its young activists, and

publicly opposed the new organization's application for legal recognition as a political organization. The Brotherhood's harsh reaction drew public concern, and even a highly respected *ulama* associated with it, Yusuf Wardhawy, opined that *Hizbul Wasath* was a way to break the isolation that the government had imposed on Islamic movements. Wardhawy said that the Brotherhood's actions were regrettable:

> I fear that the Islamic movement constraints the liberal thinkers among its children and closes windows of religious renewal and progressive interpretations, and stand on one side of ideas and thoughts while not accepting the other point of view or those who hold different opinions about objectives or the means to accomplish them (Norton, 2005: 142).

The strong reaction and even intimidation from the Brotherhood caused many of the Wasath founders to withdraw from the new organization and return back to the Brotherhood's fold, thereby making Wasath unable to apply to the court to have status as a political party because it was unable to meet the requirement of 50 founders. In the following month, after it met the 50 founding members requirement, the Court rejected its application based upon the existing law 40/1977, which stipulated that a new party must fulfill a legitimate purpose not met by an existing party. And since the ruling National Democratic Party claimed to provide everything Egyptians needed, the standard was virtually impossible to fulfill. In fact, the Wasath was only one among more that thirty parties rejected by the court. In 1988 the party was renewed, under the name of the Egyptian Center Party (*Hizbul Wasath al-Mashri*), founded by 92 activists, including three Christians and nineteen women, with only 21 of the founders coming from a Brotherhood background. The platform of the new organization layed out its objective of in principle rejecting secularism, while also advocating toleration, diversity and pluralism. It said:

> "National unity and religion as one unit are of extreme importance whereby each Muslim and Christian, through their own religion, would compromise the national unity… Islamic scholarship affirms that too much religion on its own does not insure justice, and not enough religion does not prevent acquiring what is just. Invoking what is just in the political arena or exercising authority on behalf of a particular religious faction in a religious pluralistic country is a claim that has no judicial base (Norton: 2005: 143)"

However, based upon the evaluation that the organization contributed nothing new that the existing parties could not provide, the court rejected again Wasath's appeal for legal status in September 1998 (Norton, 2005: 133-160)

In spite of repeated failures, Islamist parties continued to attract attention and support from voters in Muslim countries. Writing on the electoral support for Islamist parties in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Garcia-Rivero and Kotze observed that the parties indicated a developing trend in Muslim politics in the region, where such parties were able to mobilize popular support in elections in the last decades. In addition to the aforementioned FIS in Algeria in 1990, Islamist parties were also on the rise elsewhere. These included: the Turkey Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 1995 and 2002 elections; the Jordanian Islamic Action front (JAI), which initially boycotted the first election in 1997 in protest at the government's manipulation, but then won 23 percent of seats in 2003, thereby becoming the only political party in parliament (the others being independent candidates); in Morocco, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) received 14 seats in parliament in 1997 and increased this to 42 seats in the subsequent election of 2002. The most surprising of all, perhaps, was the landslide win of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the 2006 parliamentary elections, with 44 percent of votes and 56 percent of the seats in the national parliament. This result eventually brought this radical Islamist party, founded in 1986, to form a coalition government with its archrival: the Fatah party (Garcia-Rivero and Kotze, 2007).

It is this persistence and growing popularity of the Islamist parties that has triggered suspicions and anxieties. Many scholars perceive that the political values in Islamic traditions are hardly compatible with democratic norms. *First*, Islam is seen as an all-inclusive religion which regulates all aspects of the lives of its followers. It apparently draws no line between religion and other aspects of human life and, as a result, it seems impossible for Muslim communities to develop any system, institution or mechanism for their life outside of their religious boundaries. There also perceived to be no secularization in Islam in terms of the separation of politics from religion. It means that in Islam political life is governed by religious dogmas, which give only limited space for rationality and other human creativities. Islamic political culture, therefore, is seen as being very unlikely to nurture democracy. (Lewis, 2002: 100)

Second, the absence of a secularization process in Islamic communities is seen as preventing the emergence of two basics institutions essential for democracy, i.e. the nation-state and civil society. The universal concept of *Ummah* is the foundation of Muslim political identity, which divides the world into two irreconcilable realms: *Darul Islam* or the abode of Islam and *Darul Harb* or the abode of war. The ultimate ideal for Muslim politics is to establish a universal polity, in the past in the form of Caliphate, that encompass the whole Muslim world (Kedourie, 1992: 1). The notion of a universal Muslim community is seen as

being incompatible with concept of the nation-state, which is fundamental for modern democratic practice (Linz & Stephan, 1996). Moreover, the inclusion of religion over other communal spheres has made it impossible for any civil society to emerge among Muslim communities, because civil society required equal civic interactions, whereas the religious character of Islamic culture has made it cliental and hierarchical. (Gellner, 1996: 23-29).

Third, the long history of confrontation between the Islamic world and the western world, from the crusades up until the history of colonialisms has created anti-western sentiments among Muslim societies as well as anti-western tendencies in Islamic culture. These sentiments have become even stronger after the abolishment of the last Islamic Caliphate and its impotence in the face of western modern development (Lewis, 2002). Anti-Western sentiments, furthermore, have made Muslims tend to reject any products of western culture including democracy (Huntington, 1997: 112).

Of course, not all agree with those assessments. Many scholars suggest different analyses of democratic underdevelopment in Muslim nations. Some of them argue that Muslim countries are not unique in their democratic underdevelopment, which means that anti-democratic sentiments are not the exclusive property of Muslim countries, and should therefore not be attributed to Islam alone, but also to other factors such as social and political and economic conditions, geo-politics and international factors (Abdel Fatah, 2003: 5; Mujani 2003). Many theories of democracy and democratization also suggest that democratic political institutions require certain economic and social conditions to thrive (Lipset, 1959). Although scholars are more critical of Lipset's original thesis that economic development almost certainly produces democracy, they do not reject the significant contribution of the economy to the development of democratic politics (Przeworsky, 2004). It is in this context that Abootalebi wrote that the inauguration of democratic elections in Muslim countries will not succeed without addressing the fundamental problem of the uneven distribution of socioeconomic and political resources. The religious debate on Islam and democracy must then deal with not only the normative questions of justice and freedom, but also with developing the mechanisms necessary to remedy the structural problems (Abootalebi, 1999: 9). Rose, who studied the values and attitudes of Muslims in Central Asia, also found that 'there is little difference between Muslims, the Orthodox, and non-believers. Even more strikingly, the most observant Muslims are almost as pro-democratic as those who are non-observant'. He concluded that 'neither nominal religion nor the degree of religious observance has much influence on democratic values'. At a glance, 'being Muslim does not make a person more likely either to reject democracy or to endorse dictatorship' (Rose, 2002: 110)

Others even argue that there are democratic values in Islamic religion, such as the principle of *shura* or consultation and *ijma* or consensus. In fact, these deliberative methods are common traditions among Muslim societies in solving problems at various levels of communal life from politics, to society, to family. (Mousalli 2001). A recent study by Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart on ninety-two countries, out of which forty five are Muslim countries, shows that contrary to widely held opinion in terms of their attitudes towards democracy Muslim countries have an equal score compared to those of Western Christian countries. Even more surprisingly, on the approval of the democratic ideas, Muslims have a higher score. The study suggests that what differentiates Muslim countries from Western Christian countries—and the more likely source of conflict, if there is any—are issues of gender equality, and not of democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2002). Scholars of Muslim politics are reporting similar findings. Esposito and Voll, for example, have argued that those who maintain that democracy and Islam are not compatible make two faulty assumptions. They assume that democracy can only be implemented in one form and that there is only one expression of Islam. While Stephan and Robertson add that one should be cautious in ascribing the lack of democracy in Muslim countries to the nature of Islam. Islam, they argue, cannot explain the exceptionally low performance of democracy in Muslim-Arab countries (2003: 39).

However, the emergence of series of Islamist parties and their growing popularity in Muslim countries have cast equally growing doubts on the prospects of democratization in those countries. Huntington says in his book about the latest global wave of democratization, "Whatever the compatibility of Islam and democracy in theory, in practice they have not gone together". He is also doubtful about the prospects of democracy in those nations where Islamists are among the participants in politics. Democracy, he argues, requires not only consent to establish institutions but also a commitment to enact its values. As was shown in the history of many Asian and Muslim countries, political leaders tended to be enthusiastic about democracy only when they were outside government, while undermining it when they were in power. Hence, according to Huntington, the participation of Islamist parties in democratic politics endangers the prospects of democracy.

> Liberalization in Islamic countries thus enhanced the power of important social and political movements whose commitment to democracy was questionable… Would the existing governments continue to open up their politics and hold elections in which Islamic groups could compete freely and equally? Would the Islamic groups gain majority support in those elections? If they did win the elections, would the

military, which in many Islamic societies are strongly secular, allow them to form government? If they did form government, would it pursue radical Islamic policies? (Huntington, 1991: 208-209).

1.2. The PKS and Democratization in Indonesia

It is surprising that until quite recently only a few studies on Islam in Indonesia— a nation with a Muslim population of 88.2% among its 240 million citizens—have been undertaken either by international Islamic scholars or Southeast Asian scholars. Robert Hefner describes this as a double marginalization. Scholars of international Islamic studies, according to Hefner, tend to see Indonesia as historically the last nation to join the caravan of Islamic civilization and therefore less original compared to the cultures and traditions of Muslims in the Middle East region. While scholars of Southeast Asian studies had sensed that Islamic culture was just an outer veneer of the more real characteristics of Indonesian societies (Hefner, 1997).

Recent developments have, however, brought Indonesian Muslims into the spotlight of the international media and international scholarships. On the one hand, some indications of democratic consolidation, especially two successful parliamentary and presidential elections during which Muslims played a pivotal role, have led observers and analysts to refer to Indonesia as an empirical example of a democratic Muslim country (Carter, 2004). In a closer observation, it is worth noting that Indonesian Muslims have a considerably long history in seeding democratic cultures (Hefner, 2000). These cultures have shown themselves to be capable of exercising democracy not only at a procedural level, but also down to the basic elements of democracy such as pluralistic ideology (Ramage, 1996), a strong civil society (Bush, 2000) and social capital (Mujani 2003).

At the same time, several violent acts carried out by Muslim extremists have invited others to warn that Indonesia, and Southeast Asia in general, are potential hotbeds for global terrorism (Abuza, 2004). Some reports indicate the increasing trend of using Islamic languages and symbols to legitimize violent acts. For several years Muslim hardliners had waged *Jihad* against Christians in Indonesian cities of Ambon and Poso, which claimed thousands of casualties. Several bomb attacks were launched, especially toward Christians and western targets, including two bomb attacks on the tourist island of Bali in 2002 and 2005, and similar attacks on the J. W. Marriot Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.

Examined against this backdrop, the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) represents a fault line between two conflicting trends in Southeast Asian Muslim society; namely, democratization and radicalization. Some observers have used double

characterisations to refer to this party. Van Bruinessen, for instance, described the PKS as 'imperfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia's strongest force for democratization' (van Bruinessen, 2003) based on the fact that many of the party's spokesmen believe in anti-Islamic conspiracies, are anti-Zionistic, anti-Western, and have been known to be hostile to liberals and secularist Muslims. At the same time it 'is one of the very few forces in the political arena that may seriously contribute to a gradual democratization of the country, as it believes in participation in the existing political system and in changing society through persuasion of individuals rather than through grabbing power' (also Collins, 2004).

Founded in 2002, the PKS grew from the PK (*Partai Keadilan* or Justice Party) following the latter's failure to pass the electoral threshold in the 1999 general election. PK was founded in 1998, after the collapse of New Order authoritarian regime, by ex-Muslim student activists of 1970s-1980s known as the *Tarbiyah* student network. The network was actually a group of extra-curricular Muslim student-groups developed mostly in secular universities. The Arabic term *Tarbiyah* simply means 'education,' which implies that these groups were focusing their studies on traditional-religious Islamic subjects—such as theology (*Tauhid*), rituals (*Ibadah*), ethics (*Ahlaq*), history (*Tarikh*), and politics (*Siyasah*)—in contrast to the secular subjects they studied in universities. *Tarbiyah* groups were almost absent among traditional Islamic educational institutions, i.e. in the *Pesantren* and other Institutes of Islamic Studies, where Islamic religious sciences were studied as the main subjects (Abdulaziz *et al.,* 1996).

One of the specific characters of *Tarbiyah* groups, which differentiated them from other Muslim civil organizations, was their overt political orientation. In contrast with most Muslim organizations during the Indonesian New Order era, which tended to avoid political discourses, under the state's repression and due to the state trauma of radical Muslim politics, the *Tarbiyah* groups took politics as their main discourse. It was a prevalent conviction among *Tarbiyah* activists that the ultimate goal of their *Dakwah* or Islamization was to Islamize the state. Three reasons may explain this situation. *Firstly*, the fact that Muslim political activists from the former Masyumi party initiated this movement meant that this movement held a political orientation since the beginning of its invention. *Secondly*, it adopted a non-conventional approach to studying Islamic sciences by including political subjects (*Siyasah*), which were normally not studied in formal Islamic educational institutions. *Thirdly*, their extensive networks with Middle Eastern groups and organizations informed them with political practices from the Middle East (Machmudi 2005). The fact that these groups

developed among students had also helped to give the impression of enthusiasm and militancy within the *Tarbiyah* movement.

Immediately after the regime change took place in Indonesia in May 1998, the national leaders of the *Tarbiyah* movement conducted a survey of their networks about an initiative to form a political party. The result was strongly supportive, and *Partai Keadilan* (PK) or the Justice Party was declared in Jakarta July 1998. The decision to form a political party was a natural course for *Tarbiyah* movement (Damanik, 2000). PK joined the 1999 election with highly Islamist appeals. The issues of the Islamization of society and the purification of Islam dominated their campaign. However, PK was able to get only 1.7% of the national vote in the 1999 election, and failed to pass the 2.5% electoral threshold, thus preventing it from competing in the next election. Even when it gained only a small vote, PK's appearance in the Indonesian political arena generated noticeable reactions in Indonesia. Fore some, PK marked a new generation and new hope for Muslim political interests which had been marginalized and repressed by the secular state, but for others it offered a worrying signs of the return of exclusivist and chauvinistic Islamism which in turn would encourage the regime and the military to take a repressive stance against the Muslim community (Basyaib, 1999).

In order to be able to contest in the next election, PK was transformed into the PKS in 2002, and received all of PK's properties and organizational structures as well as functionaries. While retaining almost all PK's organizational structures, the new PKS shifted its appeals from Islamism to general issues such as anti-corruption, law enforcement and concerns toward needy people. PKS not only spoke about their policies but also proved what they said in their actions. Local media routinely reported how PKS representatives in national as well as local parliaments returned illegal moneys, and how they were always in the frontline in times of disaster, sending volunteers and paramedics. These strategies had an enormous impact. In the 2004 elections, PKS raised its votes to 7.3% and even won the majority vote in the Special Province of Jakarta, the state capital, which is politically the most important province on theIndonesian political map.

The PKS's success once again generated controversy. On the one hand, from an insider point of view, this success proved the PKS's seriousness in participating in democracy and countered the allegation that the majority of Indonesian Muslims would eventually reject the PKS. For its opponents, however, the success raised yet another suspicion concerning the real motives of the PKS. They argued that in spite of its newly political slogans, structurally the PKS was almost the same as the PK in terms of its personnel and organization. Therefore,

the argument goes on, the PKS's democratic orientation was just a political trick to cover their real Islamist agendas. With the PKS targeted to win 20% of the vote in the 2009 election, and with some polls confirming the PKS's growing popularity, concerns about the PKS's real motives are also mounting. A commentator even expressed his fear by saying that a ballots for the PKS is more or less what a bullet is for *Jama'ah Islamiyah* (Dumme, 2005).

1.3. Research Questions

The present research on the PKS is concerned with the following question:

To what extent do the PKS's ideological orientations explain its organizational behaviors in democratic politics: i.e. in organization, in election and in government?

1.4. Explanation of the Terms

1.4.1. ***Islamism*** refers to an interpretation of Islam that emphasizes the ideological and political aspect of the religion. The word '*Islamisme*' was first coined by the French philosopher, Voltaire, as a substitute for the problematic term '*mahometisme*' to refer to the religion of the Arabs. This word was adopted into English in the 1900 edition of the *Oxford English Dictionary*. After the adoption of the Arabic word '*Islam*', the term Islamism was no longer used. However recently, when political Islam has been a major topic in international politics after the collapse of the former Soviet Union, 'Islamism' once again became ubiquitous among scholars and journalists (Kramer, 2002). Now it refers more specifically to certain types of religious interpretations, organizations and movements among Muslims that emphasize the ideological and political aspects of the religion, combined with a strong belief in the uniqueness and superiority of Islam vis-à-vis other political ideologies. Other synonyms are also used, oftentimes interchangeably, such as fundamentalism (Voll, 1995), and Salafism (Kepel, 1985).

1.4.2. ***Political Party*** is defined as an organization with the following fundamental set of properties. *Firstly*, following Joseph Schumpeter, who defines a party as a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power (Schumpeter, 1962: 283). *Secondly*, following Sartori's tracing of its etymology, which sees party being derived from "part", implying that a political party is part of a whole. This means that, although it is a partisan organization and its members may oftentimes be greedy politicians, party behavior is intended to serve the wider interests of the public. In

this point, "party" differs from "faction" which is a partisan group pursuing its own interests (Sartori, 1976:).

1.4.3. *Democratic Participation.* I define democratic participation as the consent granted to a political party to participate in electoral politics. There are two different conceptions of democracy, the so-called procedural and participatory concepts of democracy. The first, accentuating the normative elements of a party, suggests that in order to truly participate in democratic politics, a political party should focus on the democratic processes through which it becomes an open organization, providing its members with opportunities to participate in decision making. This is because a political party is not only a vehicle to achieve political power, but also an incubator to nurture citizens' political competences. Open participations in party activities are fundamental for the sustainability of democracy (Scarrow, 2003; Torell, 1999). Meanwhile, the second conception of democratic participation stresses the effectiveness of party activities as a vehicle of political competition. In order to be effective, a party needs to have the capacity to act decisively and to react quickly, and therefore it must be centralistic and party leaders must assume solid control of the party. According to this point of view, democracy lies outside the party, in its ability to serve as an effective political tool (Schumpeter, 1962: 269; Huntington, 1991: 6-7). This research will provide analysis of the PKS's democratic participation from both the participative and competitive perspectives of democracy.

1.5. Relevant Academic Literature

1.5.1. Studies on Islamist Parties

Although party studies are among the most fertile field in political science (Janda 1993: 163ff.; Mair, 1995: 120), studies on Islamic political parties are sparse. The pessimistic situation in Muslim countries with regard to the democratization process seems discouraging to any extensive studies on the topic. Most studies on Islamist parties are cursory overviews, such as Liou (2004) on PAS in Malaysia; Shanahan on Iraqi *Hizbu ad-Da'wah Al-Islamiyya* (2004); Mecham on Turkey's Islamist parties (2004); or Nortons' study on Egyptian *Hizbul Wasat* (2005).

Shahin wrote an extended comparative study on North African Islamist political movements (Shahin, 1998). Comparing some Muslim countries in Northern Africa, he concludes that radicalization among Muslims was caused by historical and political factors. Historically, in those countries, Muslims played a significant role in fighting against

colonialism, but after independence the governments tended to repress Muslim political aspirations, which had caused resentments among Muslim leaders, who felt that they had been betrayed by the their own countries. Meanwhile, politically the resentment and hatred had mounted when the secular governments turned into corrupt regimes where greedy politicians competed with one another to pursue their personal interests at the expense of the desperate people. Typically, slowly but surely Muslims adopted another strategy by forming militant groups which exploiting people's miseries, which had been caused by massive economic inequalities and popular hatred toward corrupt regimes and selfish politicians, and which led to intense, and oftentimes violent, clashes with the secular establishments (Shahin 1997: 235). Shahin adds, though, that Islamist politics is not always violent in character and some violence done by Islamists such as in Algeria was more a product of the military, licensed by secular politicians, mishandling the situation. Shahin's study, however, focuses on Muslim politics in terms of social movements, even when he discusses political parties; therefore he gives no specific answer to the question as the nature of Islamist parties.

An in-depth study of an Islamist party is conducted by Farish Ahmad Noor on Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS). In his two volumes edition, Noor goes into almost all the details of the party, from its historical development since the colonial era; the internal dynamics under successive leaders and their respective strengths and weakness; its struggle as an opposition party in Malaysian politics against the governing party UMNO and the coalition of Barisan National; and its policies in promoting Islamist politics. Regarding the last point, Noor notes an interesting fact that PAS's Islamist project is indeed flexible and in line with the development of global political trends. In the 1980s, PAS Islamist projects were designed to change the constitutional set-up of the Federation of the State of Malaysia by giving the central power into the council of *ulama* and reducing parliament to a rubber stamp for the council. Meanwhile from the late 1990s PAS developed a new discourse, when younger generations of its leadership try to reinvent the party's image not just as the defender of Islamic teachings but also as a promoter of human rights, democracy and constitutionalism in Malaysia (Noor, 2002: 730-31).

In his concluding remarks, Noor explains that while there are some undemocratic elements in the PAS's project of Islamism, especially with regard to religious pluralism and gender justice, it is not true that Islamist politics is always dedicated to the creation of authoritarian regimes and despotic modes of rule. The plain truth, for him, is that the problem of government and the centralization of power has been at the heart of modern political projects. In western political thought, he argues, the need to find a justification for social

ordering, policing and governing; the need to root projects in some teleological or eschatological formula; the need to locate the political moments of the present within some greater reality that transcends the confines of the mundane and profane, were major themes of great thinkers: Hobbes found the answer in Reason, Rousseau found his solution in the state of Nature, while Hegel sought refuge in Absolute Spirit. Islamism, therefore, is neither new nor unusual in the history of modern politics (Noor, 2002: 734).

Nevertheless, a pioneering study of Islamist parties using specific party theories is found in Jonasson's work on the linkage of Islamist parties, i.e. how Islamist parties play an intermediary role between civil society and the state as well as why they organize the way they do. Comparing three Islamist parties operating in three different countries with different regime types and with different political milieus—*Fizilet Partisi* in secular Turkey, *Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami* in monarchic Jordan, and *Jamaat e-Islami* in militaristic regime Pakistan—Jonasson found a striking uniformity of linkage organization among the Islamist parties that she studied. This seems to defy the standard theoretical explanations of party linkage behavior. In the standard theories of party linkage, derived from the history of western societies, the societal origin of parties, as well as the institutional structures in which the parties operate, define the way the parties organize their linkage.

Firstly, in rural societies that are characterized by interpersonal relationships among their members, the typical political party that emerged was the *cliental party*: a political party, which is organizationally dominated by local elites and which mobilizes support from a non-elite mass. The political mission of cliental parties is to maintain the existing—usually hierarchical—structures of society. Secondly, modernizing societies, characterized by modernization and urbanization processes that are typically followed by economic, social and cultural alienation and anomy, usually produce *mass-integration* (socialist) or *total-integration* (communist) parties, which are organizationally dominated by political activists with strong ideological commitments, develop thick organizational structures with activities that are labour-intensive and not limited in the electoral periods. They mobilize support from the lower class of the society, and their political mission is to transform the existing structures of the society into the one that favors the masses. Thirdly, modernized societies would produce *catch-all* parties, characterized by thin organizational structures, run by professionals with capital-intensive organizational activities—especially the utilization of the mass media—which are confined to campaigns at elections times. Their political mission is pragmatic, focuses on issues-based programs, and mobilizes support from all segments in the society.

Quite surprisingly, Jonasson found that these rules do not apply to Islamist parties. Three Islamist parties in three different countries, with different societal backgrounds—urbanized Jordan, modernizing Turkey, and rural Pakistan—as well as different regime types and different electoral systems, come out with very similar linkage behavior. Organizationally, these parties resemble the characteristics of *mass-integration parties*, with strong ideological commitments among their leaders and members, thick organizational structures and political activities beyond elections times; yet electorally they resemble the *catch-all party*, which mobilizes support from all segments of society. Since Islamist ideology is the only thing these parties have in common, Jonasson concludes that ideology is the main driver of Islamist parties in organizing their linkage (2004: 465-472).

1.5.2. Studies on the PKS

With regard to the Indonesian PKS, although it is as relatively a new party there are already plenty books and articles written about it, as the PKS have attracted much attention among the observers of Indonesian politics. So far, studies on the PKS can be categorized into three types of literature. *Firstly*, sympathizers' works, usually written by the party members or supporters that promote certain features or characteristics in an uncritical way. Zulkiflimansyah, a PKS member of parliament, wrote several articles of this type. He eloquently argues how the party, which evolved from the *dakwah* movement, seeks to achieve progressive objectives in democratizing Indonesia, without losing its commitment to moral ideals. In one of the articles he wrote (Zulkiflimansyah, 2006):

> As a political party, the PKS has had to adapt its ideological framework to the realities of democratic politics in Indonesia. The PKS is not confronted with an authoritarian regime that it must fight against. Instead, it is faced with access to government via a democratic process, and this has translated into the practical realities of bargaining as part of a governing coalition. In other words, the party has to deal with the necessary compromises with other actors within the political system, including other political parties and the government.
> There are ample examples which point to the complexities inherent in the PKS functioning as a political party and not just a religious movement. As the seventh largest political party in the country, PKS leaders were faced with the option of joining the governing coalition in 2004 or serving as an opposition in the legislature.
> Had the party leaders stuck to the static framework of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely the PKS would have agreed to partake in government.
> Yet, the PKS decided to engage with and support the governing coalition led by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla. Party leaders were convinced that such cooperation would add to their political education, including the art of governing. The party leaders also saw participation as a means to

prevent Islamic radicalism from entrenching itself in Indonesia as a result of Muslim communities feeling alienated from participation in the government structure.

Other works of this category were written by Yon Machmudi, one of the PKS's founders, in his doctoral dissertation and in another more popular version. An interesting topic Machmudi highlights in his works is that the PKS represents one of three strands in the new generation of Indonesian Islamic movements. The first strand is *convergent Muslim*, which synthesizes the inheritances of Indonesian Muslim movements in previous eras, especially the antagonism between the traditionalist and modernist camps. The focus and objectives of this group are to adapt Islamic values and practices in line with the modern context of Indonesian society. The second strand is *radical Muslim*, which intends to transform the existing societal and political structure radically, and replaced them with an Islamic system. Different from the convergent group, radical Muslim believes that the existing mainstream Islamic movements are unreliable and diluted by compromising with the secular and oppressive regime. Therefore, it prefers radical methods to implement Islamic teachings in Indonesia. This motive led the group to become involved in various violent actions. The third strand is *global Muslim*, which takes its inspirations from trans-national Islamist movement such as Egyptian Muslim Brothers and Palestinian Hizbut Tahrir. PKS, which evolved from Tarbiyah Movement, belongs to this group. According to Machmudi, the adoption of internationalist issues was initially a tactic to divert the attention of the repressive regime by avoiding discussions of local topics or criticizing the status quo. But indeed, the PKS pays a lot of attentions to international issues, and in fact adopted the organizational structures and mechanisms of trans-national Muslim organizations, e.g., the Egyptian Muslim Brothers.

Secondly, there are strategic works that provide analyses of the PKS based upon certain programmatic objectives and recommendations—positive or negative—as to how public policy makers should deal with the party. It is natural that writers and analysts come up with such studies, since as a political party the PKS is part of a governing coalition, and the PKS is involved in policy decisions which are of interest to both the national and international communities. Analyses that provide recommendations will be useful, especially for the general public and policy makers, since the PKS is a new party with no previous record in government. One of the widely circulated articles on the PKS is from Sadanand Dhume, which describes the PKS as a radical party actively promoting the Islamisation of Indonesian politics. Although Dhume sees the PKS as a peaceful political organization which is willing to participate in the democratic political process, he also argues that the PKS adopts

a radical Islamist ideology similar to that espoused by other radical organizations. He provocatively wrote (Dhume, 2005):

> Despite the Justice Party's social work, little separates its thinking from Jemaah Islamiyah's. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, in its founding manifesto, the Justice Party called for the creation of an Islamic caliphate. Like Jemaah Islamiyah, it has placed secrecy—facilitated by the cell structure both groups borrowed from the Brotherhood—at the heart of its organization. Both offer a selective vision of modernity—one in which global science and technology are welcome, but un-Islamic values are shunned. The two groups differ chiefly in their methods: Jemaah Islamiyah is revolutionary; the Justice Party is evolutionary.

There are many works which put forward a negative evaluation of the PKS, usually written by non-specialists and in popular rather than in scholarly writings (Aguswandi, 2006). Nevertheless, other analysts provide positive judgments of the party. Greg Fealy, for example, suggests that it is true that, due to its ideology being adopted from the Muslim Brothers, the PKS has some ambivalence towards the West, actively participated in various protests against the American support of Israel and the invasion to Iraq, and tended to be suspicious of the EU and US political agendas, especially the 'war on terrorism'. Yet, many of its senior figures have a Western tertiary education and visit the West frequently, and their awareness of international developments is probably higher than that of any other Indonesian Islamic party. He also prefers to see the PKS ideology as moderate, instead of radical, based upon the fact that although it seeks to implement Islamic law, its leaders believe that this objective should be pursued indirectly, not by imposing it forcefully, but rather by raising the society's religious awareness. According to this view, the people themselves will demand the *sharia*. Fealy, then, recommends that:

> Of all Indonesia's Islamist parties, the PKS offers the best prospects for meaningful engagement. Despite the party's concerns about Western motives and manipulation, its leaders are nonetheless worldly and open to reasoned argument, and the PKS is also keen to be seen as a responsible party and to allay impressions that it is fanatical or introspective. All these factors favour a fruitful interaction between the PKS and European interlocutors (Fealy, 2007: 38).

Thirdly, there exist descriptive-interpretive writings that try to capture a more complete picture of the PKS in open-ended ways, see the PKS as still in a process of development. The first such writing is a 20 page sub-chapter in Z. A. Amir's *Peta Islam Politik Pasca Soeharto* (Map of Political Islam in Post-Suharto Era), which briefly yet

informatively describes the profile of the Justice Party after the 1999 election. Amir discussed the party's formation, its ideological principles, its social base. its organizational structures, and its decision-making mechanisms (Amir, 2003: 83-106). A. S. Damanik (2002) provides a fuller exploration of the party's profile. Based on his bachelor thesis, this work supplies rich detail concerning the party's history, starting from its embryonic phase in the form of the Tarbiyah movement, the development of network organizations through which it recruited its most active leaders, and description of the party's mission and objectives in promoting politics according to Islamic ideals. Damanik raises a very interesting point in his work, when he compares PK/PKS with the Democratic People's Party (PRD), a tiny leftist Indonesian party, which collected 0.07 percent in the 1999 elections. He suggest that these two ideologically opposed parties shared three characteristics: *Firstly*, they started from social movements that responded to an authoritative and repressive government, in the form of the Tarbiyah movement in early 1980s for thePKS and in the shape of the Indonesian Student Solidarity for Democracy (SMID) in early 1990s for the PRD. *Secondly*, more than merely providing political responses, the groups were in fact ideological movements, one based on Islam and the other on Socialism, in which activists were militant and enthusiastic, and in which organizational activities were dominated by the recruitment and indoctrination of new members and activists. *Thirdly*, when eventually they transformed their organizations into political parties, their main initial agendas were not pursuing votes or public office, but rather promoting their political visions and ideologies (Damanik, 2002: 223-227). A. M. Furkon wrote another descriptive work on the PKS, which focuses especially on the history of the party during its formative period.

1.6. Theoretical Notes: Religious Ideology and the Rationality of Party Behavior
1.6.1. The End of Ideology, the Beginning of Religious Politics

The term ideology was coined by the French thinker, Destutt de Tracy, in his four volumes *Elements d'ideologie* (1801-1815), to refer to what he intended to be a 'science of ideas'. In the spirit of the anti-clerical French revolution, de Tracy and his colleagues in the French National Institute intended the discipline to provide a ground for reducing ideas to the activities of sensations. By using this method, they wanted to critique transcendent notions of philosophy and religion with the aim of hindering the perpetuation of false abstract principles which, they believed, distorted the true understanding of men, society and politics. This iconoclastic view brought the group in loggerhead with Napoleon Bonaparte who saw the group and their views undermined the political authority. The French emperor then

reorganized the Institute and abolished the Moral and Political Sciences, the sanctuary of de Tracy' group, and denounced them as '*ideologues*': pejorative dreamers who do not understand real political affairs. Since then the term ideology has carried negative connotations (Cox, 1969).

In the hands of Karl Marx, the term ideology achieved its modern standard meaning, as a distorted way of understanding political affairs. For Marx, ideology includes all ideas that reflect the interests of a particular class at a particular time in history, but which are presented as universal and eternal. It represents human misunderstandings of the true nature of their relationship with the economic environment and the significance of that relationship within the whole development of history. In the stage of industrial capitalism and bourgeois society, the entire cultural-superstructure—which includes law, philosophy, religion, and politics—are all forms of ideology. And for Marx, only Marxist social theories that understand the true nature of human history, i.e. the history of class conflicts and struggles, are free from ideological distortions. Later on, Karl Manheim proposes a more systematic conception of ideology, which he defined as 'the whole outlook of a social group, conditioned by the group's political orientation, and temporally by its location in ongoing historical processes. Using his definition, Manheim concludes that Marxism is itself an ideology (Manheim, 125).

Sinister uses of the terms ideology and ideological were also prevalent among political scientists during the first half of the twentieth century, referring to grand political philosophies such as Marxism, communism, Nazism and Fascism. This discourse culminated in Daniel Bell's *The End of Ideology* (1960). According to Bell, the old nineteenth-century ideologies had failed and become exhausted, leaving behind only memories of events that marked the darkest calamities of modern history: the horrors of Soviet communism, Hitler's Nazism and Mussolini's Fascism. By 1950, he said, the old politico-economic radicalism had lost its meaning, the ideological age had ended, and was replaced by a new era of capitalism and the welfare state. Younger intellectuals had put an end to radical and apocalyptic ideologies (Bell, 1960: 13). S. M. Lipset also agrees that the fundamental political problems of modern industrial societies no longer give rise to ideological disputes, but tend to revolve around the question of how to fulfill peoples' economic interests. The very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the West brought to an end domestic politics for those intellectuals who needed ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action (Lipset, 1963: 17).

There was an interesting development in political studies, however, after the declaration of the end of ideology in the 1960s, i.e. the continuation of the usage of the term

albeit in revised and hence more neutral way, and the resurgence of religion in politics, which generated non-rationalistic political behaviors. The first point emanated from initial findings of a survey on the US presidential election in 1950s by Michigan political scientists, published in *The American Voter* (1960). The study found that most of the American voters cast their ballots not based on their understanding of the competing political issues and policy programs offered by candidates and their parties, but rather based on personal and psychological identifications with parties or candidates (Angus *et al.* 1960).

One member of the team, Philip Converse, who wrote a lengthy article on 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics' (Converse, 1964), further developed this idea. Preferring the term 'belief system' as a substitute for ideology, Converse defines a belief system as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence." Yet, interestingly, he calls the usage of such value-attitudinal configurations 'ideological'. Studying American voters and examining their capacity to understand political preferences, he classified them into five levels: (1) *Ideologues*, who were able to use in some active way a relatively abstract and far-reaching conceptual dimension to evaluate political preferences and policy positions. (2) *Near-Ideologues*, who mentioned such concepts in a peripheral way, did not rely on their evaluation of the concepts in explaining the political affairs, or who used such concepts in a fashion that raised doubts about the accuracy of their understanding of the concepts. (3) *Group Interest*, who failed to rely upon any such far-reaching concepts, yet they were able to evaluate the political parties and their candidates in terms of their expected favorable or unfavorable treatment of different social groups—e.g. they disliked the Democratic Party was because it helped Negroes too much. (4) *Nature of the Times*, who invoked some policy considerations in their evaluation, yet were unable to base their evaluation on substantial societal or historical categories and only related parties or candidates to momentary occurrences or personal interests. (5) *No Issue Content*, which included people whose evaluation of parties and candidates did not provide any reference to policy preferences whatsoever. Sometimes, members of this group said that they were loyal to parties or candidates but had no idea what policy the parties or the candidates stood for.

The significance of Converse's work lies in its treatment of the ideological judgments as evaluations of political preferences and policy positions. In doing so, he set up a new way of using the word ideology: it no longer referred to abstract, grand political visions, but rather to a set of policy preferences commonly found in a continuum of left vs. right or liberal vs. conservative politics. Observing the usage of the word 'ideology' in a century history of the

American Political Science Review, and especially with regard to the impact of Converse's work, Kathleen Knight summarizes:

> Although the core definition of ideology as a *coherent and relatively stable set of beliefs or values* has remained constant in political science over time, the connotations associated with the concept have undergone transformation. In the nineteenth century, ideology connoted attachment to values of liberal democracy, and to be an "ideologue" was to support "the rights of man" against an absolutist state. The implication of being unrealistically dedicated to those ideas was added by Napoleon and later by Marx. In the first half of the twentieth century, as the fights against fascism and communism took center stage, ideology came to connote *any* belief system. Democratic ideology was contrasted with totalitarianism, as good against evil. The image of Hitler and his followers as *ideologues extraordinaire* was imprinted in the public mind, perhaps to be resurrected at the opportune moment. But, at least as apparent in the pages of the *Review*, the connotation of *irrational* commitment to a set of ideas faded with the internal anticommunist crusade and the (academic) furor over the "end of ideology." The behavioral revolution reinforced the concept of ideology as a "belief system" and relieved the concept of remaining negative connotations (Knight, 2006: 625).

While relieving the concept of ideology from non-rational connotations, scholars observed the reemergence of irrational, uncompromised, and emotionally charged political behaviors, which were now driven by religions. This phenomenon was rather unexpected since on the one hand the grand-thesis of twentieth century social sciences was the prophecy of the rationality of modern civilization and the wane of myths and religions. On the other hand, policy makers were highly optimistic about the democratic developments and cultural secularizations that they hoped would bring a prospective new world order, while on the other hand denouncing religions as among the obsolete remnants of bygone civilizations. However, as an astute sociologist of religious studies—who happened to be the supporter of the secularization thesis—clearly shows, the accurate description of the situation is rather the de-secularization of the world:

> The world today, with few exceptions, is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that the whole body of literature by historians and social sciences loosely labeled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken (Berger, 1999: 2)

Thought-provokingly, a French sociologist Gilles Kepel calls the phenomena 'the revenge of God': after being denounced as negative elements in modern human history and in many places prohibited from public spheres, religions came in from the cold in the 1970s and conquered centers of world political power from America, to Israel, to the Vatican, to Iran. In

1976 in America, a Baptist priest Jimmy Carter was elected president, apparently to wash away the sins of the Watergate scandal of the previous administration, and the press did notice that in this year there was a rise of religion in US politics. In 1977, the conservative Likud Party won the Israeli election and chose Menachem Begin as prime minister, who fostered the prominence of Jewish religious orthodoxy in the country's politics. In 1978, the Polish Cardinal Karl Wojtyla was elected Pope John Paul II, and the Catholic religion witnessed the growing dominant of the *integriste* wing that managed to overcome the internal uncertainty caused by the 1968 protest movement. In 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini, the supreme spiritual leader returned to Tehran and initiated the first ever religious revolution in modern history (Kepel, 1994).

So prevalent and intense was the resurgence of religions in political affairs, that Samuel Huntington was led to launch his famous thesis of the 'clash of civilization.' There are five factors, Huntington wrote, that should make us believe that religions are the next source of conflict on international politics. *Firstly*, the differences between cultures, traditions and religions are real, sometimes beyond compromise, and not negotiable. *Secondly*, thanks to the rapid development of communication and transformation technology, the world has become a smaller place, and people with different cultures, traditions and religions will be increasingly involved in interactions, tensions and eventually conflicts. Since the interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people, this, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities that are thought to stretch back deep into history. *Thirdly*, the steady progress of economic development has weakened local and national identities, and pushed younger well-educated generations of believers to unite in civilizational levels. *Fourthly*, the emergence of the non-western (Confucian, Hindu, Muslim, and Japanese) civilizations has started to challenge the dominance of the West in world affairs. *Fifthly*, religions have proven to be uncompromising identities: one can certainly have mixed race or ethnicity, and hold double citizenships, but surely they could only have one religion. *Finally*, the religions increasingly also influence economic organizations, activities and networking that produces economic regionalism, which facilitates people to think in dichotomies—us vs. them—in economic and business activities (Huntington, 1993).

However, many political scientists as well as scholars from other disciplines reject Huntington's claim that conflicts between religions—especially Christianity and Islam—will dominate global political affairs, though they possibly agree with his six propositions. A methodologically more rigorous study on the role of religion in politics, and with more realistic findings, was provided by Norris and Inglehart. Analyzing statistical data from eighty

countries around the globe during a twenty year period, the authors examined six hypotheses on the topic and draw six conclusions. *Firstly*, the religious values hypothesis, in which religiosity is the result of one's formative years of experience. Moreover, the data showed that people who live in low levels of economic development and other human development indexes are more religious than those who live in more affluent and secure environments. *Secondly*, the religious cultures hypothesis, in which societies tend to follow the long lasting religious traditions rooted in their histories, with developments in the economy and education having the capacity to affect these trends. This point in particular counters Huntington's thesis—which claims that democracy is the crux that differentiates the Western and Muslim civilizations—by providing data that shows the disjunction is not one of democracy but rather of gender equality, and that the main source of difference is not clashing religious values but rather disparities in economy and education. *Thirdly*, the religious participation hypothesis, in which the research found that the scale of religious beliefs are not necessarily parallel with religious participation. This is the case, for example, in some societies, such as Western Europe, in which church attendance is low but beliefs in religious ideas—God, the afterlife, Heaven and Hell—is still quite high. Some Muslim societies like Iran and Turkey also show high appreciations of religious values accompanied by low participation in religious worship. Whereas in various other societies, from Ireland in Europe, Nigeria in Africa to India in Asia, high participation in religious activities is also the result of social norms and networks instead of religious values alone. *Fourthly*, the civic engagement hypothesis, in which it found that participation in religious activities has a positive correlation with social activisms, whether in the form of joining religious organizations, participating in civil society groups or support for political parties. Especially in post-industrial societies, belonging to religious organizations accurately predicts the support for conservative politics. *Fifthly*, the religious market hypothesis, which says that religiosity is like market, it will increase in plural societies and where the state regulations are minimal. Norris and Inglehart disprove this hypothesis by showing that religiosity is high in religiously homogeneous societies where religions are in line with the degree of state regulation. *Finally*, the demographic hypothesis, in which the study concludes that the level of religious population in the globe is steadily increasing, not as a results of proselytizing but because the secular societies of post-industrial countries have lower and more constant birth rates while religious societies of rural countries are growing faster (Norris and Inglehart, 2004).

1.6.2. The Ideology of Islamist Political Party

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that while political studies in general perceive ideological behaviors in politics as being in conflict with rational ones, early party studies treated ideology as being among the sources of party rational behavior. The seminal work of Anthony Downs, *The Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), laid the ground in analyzing how party leaders use ideology rationally to articulate public political aspirations and attract their support. Assuming that party's ultimate objective is being elected to public office, and that the voters hardly have the capability to thoroughly compare policy alternatives offered by competing parties, Downs suggests that adopting ideological rhetoric is the most rational way for party leaders to attract public support. On the one hand, it helps the public to understand easily what the party stands for by summarizing its detailed programs into general propositions; and on the other hand, it will also help the potential voters to differentiate one party from the others (Downs, 1957: Chapter 7).

Combined with of the theories of Converse (1964), Downs' study initiated what is known as a 'spatial theory' of party ideology, which placed party ideologies as positions along linear continuum, commonly referred to as left vs. right. The former indicate preferences for loose social norms combined with high state participation in politics, while the latter prefers strict social norms and minimum state involvement in the economy. With regard to the rationality of party ideological behavior, scholars hold different assumptions. Some follow Downs' line, assuming that a party's ultimate objective is to win elections and assume positions in public office, therefore the party will easily change their ideological in accordance with the changing moods of voters. In other words, these scholars believe that party ideological positions are merely instrumental to other, more substantial ends, i.e. that of being elected to public office. Yet other scholars make a different assumption, which sees party ideological positions as direct results of their leaders' ideological preferences, since party leaders and activists are commonly more ideological than their followers, and it is this ideological commitment that led them into party activism in the first place. Therefore, according to this group, pursuing certain policies is the ultimate goal of political parties, while wining elections and taking public office are merely instrumental. Trying to overcome this antagonism, Strom-Mueller proposes a 'unified theory' of party behavior, which takes elections to be the immediate objective and it is instrumental to either office orientation or policy orientation.

And what about religious parties? Do they also change policy positions arbitrarily, or pursue them consistently? Before proceeding to answer this question it is worth noting that

religious elements play an important role in party behaviors and competitions. In their pioneering research on party alignments, which found that parties in Western politics are rooted in old social competitions during the Industrial Revolution, Lipset and Rokan also note that religion was among the factors that created political cleavages. Religions provided values and identities that influence and structure people's political preferences (Lipset and Rokan, 1966: 26-33). Consistent with this notion, a world wide survey by Lijphart on elections in four countries—Canada, Belgium, South Africa, and Switzerland—found that religion is the strongest factor in influencing political cleavages in those countries—the second one being language, the third being social class (Lijphart, 1979).

In relation to the ideological and policy position of religious parties, the first data available is a world-wide survey conducted by Keneth Janda, which included around 150 parties. Although it was difficult to measure and only less than 50 percent of the parties were coded on religious items, Janda found that,, when politically relevant, religion is a powerful indicator of party support. Moreover, parties with strong support from religious cleavages, although they operate in different societal and political settings, show similar patterns of behavior: they exhibit stronger opposition to secularization than other political parties with non-religious bases of support (Janda, 1989). Other more specific studies on Catholic parties in Europe also support the suggestion that religious ideology can structure political behaviors. A cross-national survey provided evidence that party governments in Catholic countries in western and southern Europe exhibit similar patterns in pursuing welfare policies. This meant that Catholicism structured their political preferences (Castles, 1994). Similarly, Kersbergen's and Becker's study on Christian democracy in the Netherlands showed that religious ideology—and not socialism—is the strongest force behind welfare policies in the country (Kersbergen and Becker, 1988).

Exploring the wider picture of Christian Democratic parties, Jonasson suggests that the influence of religious ideology is more encompassing than the conventional discussions of party ideology describe. Religious ideologies are not only influential for Christian Democratic parties in formulating policy preferences, but also in structuring how the parties develop their organizations. One the one hand, the parties intend to reform the society following the Catholic religious doctrines, and therefore they set up organizational structures and mechanisms in which the commitment to religious values is of paramount importance. On the other hand, in order to gain broader support from the masses in elections—that would enable them to take public office and implement policies—the parties develop pragmatic external

networking, by developing extra-political organizations in order to socialize their missions to the society and to build coalitions with other political parties (Jonasson, 2004: 420-444).

It is this double characteristic of party behavior—internally resembling a mass-integration party while externally resembling a catch-all party—that Jonasson also found among Islamist parties. In a similar way to their Christian counterparts, on the one hand, Islamist parties organize their internal networks following strict religious lines. They require certain religious values of their activists and members, and collecting as many votes as possible and wining elections are not the ultimate objectives, but rather the promotion of religious values. On the other hand, since the religious calling is universal, addressed to all people regardless of their race, cultural background or economic strata, the parties also appeal for support from all segments in the society. She concludes that this peculiar feature is a direct result of the influence of religious ideology (Jonasson, 2004: 468).

Jonasson's conclusions are very informative in understanding the unique pattern of behaviors of the religious political parties which she studied. However, her theory is problematic if we consider a wider application or the wider context of party behavior. *Firstly*, her conclusions suggest that the influence of religious ideology is exogenous, i.e. that the ideology is fixed and affects the parties' behavior from the outside, or that the ideology produces the organizational structures and behaviors. Literatures on party behaviors provide mixed evidences on the relations between political preferences—i.e. ideology—and actual political behaviors. There are researches that show that preferences influence behavior, yet there are equally many works which suggest that what happens is not exogenous influences of fixedly formulated preferences on political actors who passively adopted them, but rather a strategic action of creative actors to adopt and adapt the preferences to given opportunities. In this way, the actual behaviors oftentimes reflect more the structure of the opportunities rather than the political preferences. A telling example is found in party behavior in elections, in which—at the first glance—it seems that electoral strategies are derivative of electoral objectives which are defined by the party's political preferences. Closer observation, however, reveals that electoral strategies and techniques are structured not only by party objectives, but by strategies and techniques of other rival parties. Therefore, what one sees as ideological party behavior may well in fac bet strategic behavior under the influence of opportunities created by inter-party competition (Aranson, Hinich, Ordershook, 1974).

Secondly, she observed that institutional contexts played no significant role in affecting the behavior of the Islamist parties which she studied. On this point, Jonasson assumes that the political institutions in which Islamist parties operate are given and static.

From the point of view of the democratization process, institutions are very dynamic in that they have a wide range of possible conditions both in terms of the variety of their structures and the degree of their stability and effectiveness. If one confines her observation only to political institutions in Jordan, Turkey and Pakistan, and takes these institutions to be given and static, then Jonasson's conclusion that the influences of institutions is far weaker than ideology in affecting Islamist parties' behaviors is sound. However, if one widens the perspective to the comparative context of democratization it will become clear that political institutions in those three countries are weak, ineffective, unstable and un-institutionalized. Students of democratization characterize the degree of institutionalization of the political system as a fundamental element in measuring the degree of democracy. Some indicators of the level of institutionalization may be the parties' roots in society, the level of moderate inter-party competition, the legitimacy of elections as the only way to power, and the stability and effectiveness of parties' organizations (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). Those three countries—as Jonasson explores extensively—exhibit strong characteristics of authoritarianism, paternalism and clientelism, which indicate the low degree of institutionalization of the political systems. From this insight, Jonasson's findings may well be read from the opposite direction: the fact that the behaviors of Islamist parties appear ideological, is not because their ideology is all-encompassing, but rather because the existing institutions are weak and ineffective. In the context of political institutions in Indonesia, which have undergone progressive reform and institutionalization in the last decade, we can expect a different impact upon Islamist party behavior.

1.6.3. The Institutional Factors: Douglas North's Cognitive Institutionalism

In order to analyze the influence of ideology on party behavior in the context of democratizing political institutions, this research applies the new-institutionalism approach from the American economist and Noble Prize laureate Douglas C. North. In the literature on new Institutionalism, North is known as a proponent of an historical approach to institutionalism, which underlines the importance of historical sequences of human actions, i.e., actions and decisions taken in previous times which influence and bind subsequent actors in taking actions and making decisions (Hall and Rose, 1996; Steinmo 2003; Peters, 2005). More specifically, North's theory explores institutions from the cognitive science perspective, which elaborates the impacts of institutions on human understandings and behaviors.

North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Throughout history human beings have needed institutions to stabilise their life

as well as to structure the incentives for interactions, in society, in politics and in the economy. In everyday activities, it is institutions that provide guidelines for regularity, from greeting friends in the streets, driving a car, shopping in the supermarket, attending religious ceremonies or burying the dead. In the economy, the regularity of all sorts of economic activities from bartering, retail, banking, the stock exchange and monetary trading are enabled by institutions. And in politics, the various political activities from state administrative bureaucracy, to political persuasion and mobilisation in election campaigns, to lobbying behind closed doors, are all conducted under institutional arrangements. In sort, institutions define and limit the choices of individuals (North, 1990, 3).

At the core of North's theory, institutions play two fundamental roles: i.e. as *rules of the game* and as a *system of incentive distribution*. The former means that institutions regulate actors' behaviors, specifying what they can and cannot do. In this way, institutions reduce uncertainty for interactions, transactions and collaborations, by providing information on the range of what actors are allowed to do. Such information is substantial in helping actors to calculate what sort transactions they may undertake and with whom. Without institutions, it would be very costly to conduct interactions, transactions and collaborations because one would need to spend time and effort to get to know about potential partners. And without such information, transactions and collaborations are unlikely to take place because it would be unlikely that rational actors would proceed on the basis of pure speculation. The latter (system of incentives distributions), meanwhile, points to the ability of institutions to provide stable and sustainable rules under which actors may conduct exchanges. The stability of the exchanges is guaranteed by institutions' capacity to provide regular and consistent rules and enact sanctions for transgressions; while sustainability is provided by the fact that under regular and consistent rules actors can formulate long-term strategies and maximize their gains (North, 1990: Chapter 4).

Furthermore, North classifies institutions into formal an informal categories. The former have well-defined rules with a variety of scope and specification, from constitutions, to statutes and common laws, to specific bylaws, and finally to individual contracts. Formal institutions can, in turn, be divided into three categories: *politic*, which broadly defines the hierarchical structure of polity, its basic decisional structure, and the explicit characteristics of its agenda control; *economy*, which defines property rights, i.e. the rights over the use of and the income to be derived from property, as well as the ability to alienate an asset or a resource; and *contract*, which contains specific provisions of agreement in exchanges (North, 1990: 47).

Informal institutions are conventions, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and so on, which have arisen to coordinate "repeated human interaction" (1990: 40). While formal institutions can be created overnight, informal institutions develop and change incrementally. In general, informal rules of the game evolved from human culture, i.e. from the accumulation of knowledge, values and other factors that influence human behavior transmitted from one generation to the next through teachings and imitations. Referring to the abundance of literature on this topic in anthropology, North points out that in pre-modern societies, where there were no states and other formal institutional arrangements, informal rules provided an explanation for the regularity and stability of the societies (1990: 37-38).

According to North, the difference between formal and informal institutions is one of degree rather than substance, in which the former are more rigid and codified while the latter are more fluid and casual. These two dimensions of institutions are also complementary in their functions. On the one hand, formal institutions may develop from informal practices in order to make them more effective and reliable by reducing the cost of information, monitoring and enforcement. There are countless real world examples in which laws, regulations and institutions are derived from informal practices prevalent in society (1990: 46ff). In the same vein, on the other hand, informal institutions also have the capacity to substitute the formal rules of the game whenever the latter become too rigid and are unable to guarantee regularity and sustainability of interactions and transactions. There are equally abundant instances among economic and political actors in which informal negotiations and deals are used to overcome deadlocks that are unresolved by existing formal regulations (North & Denzeu, 1994).

In this research, North's conception of the roles of institutions and the inter-relations between the formal and informal elements of institutions are applied to scrutinize PKS behavior under the simultaneous influence of ideology and institutions. In this case, I take ideology as a sort of informal institution that structures repeated human behaviors. Furthermore, I follow Hinich & Munger who define political ideology as: "a worldview that explains three major topics of human collective life: *ethics* or what is good and what is bad; *economy* or how should the society's resources be distributed; and *politics* or where power appropriately resides":

IDEOLOGY	WHAT IS GOOD?	WHO GETS WHAT?	WHO RULES?
CAPITALISM	Individual achievement through work; Observance of property rights.	Distribution according to output	Wealthy have more control over goods, services and policy
COMMUNISM	Self-realization from role In society; Brotherhood of working class	Distribution according to need	Party represents general will; All are equal, so no politics.
FASCISM	Nationalism, Racial purity, Service of fatherland	Distribution according to contribution military/ economic might of nation	Corporatist view of military-labor industry.
NEW-DEAL DEMOCRATIC	Individual achievement Through work; Self respect; Self improvement	Distribution according to output; progressive tax structure to finance safety Net whose output is insufficient	Wealthy get disproportionate power; Experts and technocrats correct the excesses of market processes.

Meanwhile the rules of the game, or the institutions, in which the PKS conducts political behaviors are democratic institutions especially party laws, electoral laws, and the party system. *Party Laws* are regulations issued by the government to regulate political parties, addressing issues such as the formation of political parties, how parties should be organized, what sort of funding sources they may pursue, what actions are forbidden and what sanctions may apply to transgressions (Janda, 2002). *Electoral Laws*, refers to the regulation of elections which specifies, among other things, the schedule of elections, who is in charge of the election, who is eligible to participate, who oversees the events, etc. *Electoral Laws* also specifies the 'electoral system' or the method by which votes are collected by parties in elections, and how they are translated into seats in parliament. There are many types of electoral system adopted in different countries across the world, but in general those systems can be classified into three basic categories: *majoritarian* systems, also known as winner takes all systems, in which the party which collects the most votes in an electoral district wins the contest and all the allocated seats; *proportional representation* (PR) system in which a party will receive seats according to the percentage of its votes; and a *mixed system*, in which the two systems are adopted simultaneously at different levels or in different rounds of elections (see Balis & Masicotte, 1996). *Party system* refers to the pattern of interactions of political parties operated in a given country. Classical theories derived from the experiences of advanced democracies point to the number of parties and the distance of their ideologies as the determinants: the greater the number of parties and the wider the distance of their ideologies the weaker the system will be, and vice versa (Sartori, 1976). Whereas

contemporary theories based on observations of new democracies propose that the stability of the party system depends on its degree of institutionalization, indicated by: (i) parties' roots in society (so that parties would change in every election); (ii) parties' acknowledgement of elections as the sole procedure to power; (iii) moderate inter-party competition; (iv) degree of parties' organizational stability (Mainwaring, 1995).

The findings of this research confirm North's theoretical explanations that formal and informal institutions structure actors' behavior by providing information—and thus reducing uncertainty—and provide stable systems of distribution of incentives. The PKS as a political actor utilizes both ideology and formal rules in its endeavor to pursue its political goals. North's descriptions on the inter-substitution between formal and informal institutions are also supported by the findings of this study. During the early period of its participation in democratic politics, when regime change had just taken place and democratization had barely begun—and thus the political institutions were rudimentary and ineffective—the party relied more on its ideological vision in understanding politics, identifying its competitors, and in directing its political behaviors. Whereas in subsequent years, during which the democratization process steadily gained ground and political institutions started to function effectively to reduce uncertainty as well as to provide a fair and stable system of incentives distribution, the PKS increasingly adopted formal rules in perceiving the political environments and formulating their programs accordingly.

1.7. The Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter I (the introduction) explains the background, research questions, methodology and the structure of the study. In this chapter, I review previous works on the PKS as well as on Islamist parties in general and their place in the context of the wider discipline of party studies. I also introduce the theory of Cognitive Institutionalism from Douglas C. North and show how it can help to understand the structure of the PKS's behavior under the simultaneous influences of ideology and institutions.

In Chapter II, I review the history of Islamist parties in Indonesian history, i.e. Sarekat Islam (1912-1929) and Masyumi (1946-1660). This chapter has a double function. On the one hand, it provides an introductory background to the Muslim political tradition in Indonesia, as well as comparative data on the political behavior of Islamist parties under the simultaneous influences of ideology and political institutions. On the other hand, this chapter also functions as a sort of "theoretical warming-up" to test the capacity of Douglas North's theory to explain Islamist parties' behaviors under the simultaneous influences of ideology and political

institutions. The results are convincingly consistent. Both parties tended to be cooperative, trusted in and relied on the formal rules of the game whenever the latter were advantageous for their political objectives (SI 1912-1923, Masyumi 1946-1955). Yet they also tended to distrust the same formal institutions, retreated into ideology in understanding the political environment, and became uncooperative and reactionary whenever the existing system was disadvantageous to their aims (SI 1923-1929; Masyumi 1955-1960).

Chapter III deals with the genesis and the development of the PKS, starting from the underground Tarbiyah movement in the 1970s and 1980s, its adoption of the methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers', its success in taking over student campuses and organizations in early 1990s, and finally its metamorphosis into a political party after regime change in 1998. This chapter also reviews three competing theories on the genesis of Tarbiyah movement. In retrospect, North's theory on the substitution of formal and informal institutions can explain the PKS history quite neatly. When the political environment was hostile toward Muslim politics in 1970s and 1980s, it operated in a clandestine and exclusive fashion. Yet when Suharto leaned toward the Muslim community—as a compensation for his souring relations with the military—Muslim groups started to open their activities to the public; after the regime changed and politics became democratized, the PKS joined the political system; finally, when democracy started to be institutionalized, it adopted democratic discourses.

Chapter IV discusses the relation between the dynamics of the PKS's political ideology—its conceptions of ethics, economy and politics—and the development of Indonesian political institutions. It is interesting to find that the development of political institutions in Indonesia, from the authoritarian regime dominated by the military apparatus and restrictive toward civil liberties, into the democratic political system, was paralleled by the PKS's increasingly more open and cooperative approach to politics.

Chapter V focuses on the PKS's behavior and its organization. A political party is never a unitary actor. There are three different elements within each party, with their own logic and mechanisms: (i) the party on the ground, which represents the idealist face of party; (ii) the party in public office, which represents the realist, power hungry, element of party, and; (iii) the party's central office, the task of which is to balance the two conflicting elements. This internal tension has caused ambiguity in the organizational behaviors of the PKS. Driven by the party on the ground, and under the influence of ideological inspirations, it applies religious-moralist ideas in the party organization, in which party leaders are seen as moral and religious leaders who command religious and moral authority over the party members. Yet under the pressure of the party in public office, in order to achieve success in

political competition, it develops rational and pragmatic organizational structures and mechanisms, such open membership, democratic leaders and candidate elections, and the mobilization and empowerment of female activists in the party workforce.

Chapter VI analyzes the PKS's behavior in elections, focusing on the antagonism between party electoral objectives, following its ideological inspirations, and the logic of party competition as a result of the democratization of political institutions. Under the influence of its ideology, the party perceived elections as just another event to communicate their Islamist political visions to the Indonesian public. This was the dominant tone during the 1999 election. In 2004 election, however, the party shifted its rhetoric, from a party that promotes religious and moral reforms into 'clean and caring' party that advocates clean government and anti-corruption, and is willing to support people in difficult times. The new strategy was adopted when the PKS started to understand the mechanisms of democratic politics and became confident of benefiting from them.

Chapter VII explores the PKS's behavior in government, both in the legislature and in the executive. The party's behavior in the legislature clearly indicates its internal dynamics In the former period of the legislature (1999-2004) its members were known for their almost excessively strict commitment to moral ideals in their political activities, such as refusing bribes, kickbacks or other unofficial funds. In the current period (2004-2009) when many of its younger politicians entered the parliament, the PKS MPs started to do politics as usual, making coalitions and undertaking other political deals and maneuvers. A similar situation has arisen with regard to the PKS's involvement in the executive branch of government. During Abdurrahman Wahid's presidency (2000-2002), a PKS Minister was staunchly pursued in order to eradicate corruption in his department, and this allegedly caused him to be sacked from the cabinet. Meanwhile, under the Yudhoyono presidency, the party has received three ministerial positions and has eagerly supported unpopular government policies such as raising the price of oil and oil exploration in spite of strong protests from its supporters.

Chapter VIII summarizes the study's findings and conclusions on the rationality of the political behavior of an Islamist party that participates in a democratic political system.

CHAPTER II

POLITICAL ISLAM IN INDONESIAN HISTORY:

IDEOLOGY, INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND THE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF

SAREKAT ISLAM (1912-1929) AND *MASYUMI (1945-1960)*

1. INTRODUCTION

After introducing what I call 'cognitive institutionalism' theory from Douglas North to analyze the influence of ideology to political behaviors of Islamist parties, this chapter applies the theory to analyze the history of political behaviors of two major Islamist political parties in Indonesian history, i.e. the Sarekat Islam (1912-1929) and Masyumi (1946-1960). The focus is on the relations between ideology and institutional contexts in influencing the political behavior of the parties. Applying North theoretical insights—that on the one hand institutions are rules of the game through which actors regulate their interactions, transactions and collaborations in order to make them fair and sustainable to all participants; and on the other hand ideology is an informal element of institutions with capacity to supplant basic institutional functions, especially to reduce uncertainties, whenever the formal ones failed to do so—this chapter shows how the influence of ideology is parallel with the dynamics of institutional contexts.

The pattern is consistent for both Sarekat Islam (SI) and Masyumi. Operating in the height of colonial era in early decades of the 20th century, in its early years the political behavior of SI was cooperative when the colonial ruler—under looming threat of the World War I in Europe—promised greater political roles for native Indonesians. In this period, SI leaders interpreted Islam as socialist and democratic doctrines: that all humans are equal hence against capitalistic exploitations, and that the people embody the rights to chose their ruler hence greater political participations for native Indonesians. However, when the colonial policies were increasingly restrictive and repressive—after the WW I was over—SI switched its behaviors to be non-cooperative, adopted Pan Islamism which ultimate objectives were establishing universal Islamic caliphate, together with other Muslim countries launched all-out struggle to expel colonialism and imperialism from Muslim lands.

Similarly, the political behaviors of Masyumi evolved in the same pattern. Soon after Indonesian independence, Masyumi was the most significant political party, and it adopted Islamist ideology and wanted to implement Islamic system in the republic. During the liberal parliament era of 1950s, Masyumi assumed three periods of Premiership and involved in

almost all coalition governments. Adopting Islamist ideology notwithstanding, Masyumi developed proactive and liberal policies—welcome foreign capitals, recognizing de facto economic domination of Western and Chinese entrepreneurs, even signed a Mutual Security Act (MSA) with the USA—when the institutional context favored its positions. This occurred in the period when political parties were dominant players in Indonesian politics, during which the president was at odds with the military. Yet, in the second half of the 1950s, when the army reached an agreement with the president and dominated political affairs and push aside political parties, the behavior of Masyumi became reactionary, criticized government policies using religious and moral judgments. Eventually, some of its top leaders were involved in a politico-military insurgency, and the government disbanded the party.

In summary, this chapter's findings challenge both Jonasson's conclusion on exogenous influence of ideology in Islamist parties and Huntington's argument that Muslim political leaders tended to support democratic systems only when they were not in power. Different from Jonason's inference, this chapter proves that although ideology did motivate and drive Sarekat Islam and Masyumi political orientations, the actual behaviors significantly reflected the dynamics of institutional contexts as well as inter-party competitions. Different institutional settings made the Islamist parties to interpret the same ideology differently. And unlike Huntington apprehension, this chapter provides evidences that Islamist political leaders tended to support democracy whenever it was advantageous to them, either when they were inside or outside the government, and showed deviant behaviors when the democratic institutions were detrimental to their politics.

2. SAREKAT ISLAM (1912-1929)

2.1. Ideology and Programs

Sarekat Islam was the first truly national political organization, in the sense that its memberships and activities were cross-ethnic, cross-cultures and cross-regions. In the Indonesian history, the political movement officially recognized as the first national organization is Budi Utomo, an organization established by students of medical school in 1908. Yet in fact, Budi Utomo's membership was limited among Javanese aristocrats, and had no real mass supporters. While Sarekat Islam, facilitated by its popular ideology, was able to recruit supports from both the elites urban groups as well as the mass rural communities.

According to a German historian Bernard Dahm, three critical factors contributed to the SI rapid development (Dahm, 1971: 40-42). *Firstly*, its initial mission as cooperative organization among the Javanese traders, and its successful boycotts of the Chinese traders in

Solo Central Java had attracted support from Indonesian emerging native middle class, i.e. merchants, professionals like medical doctors, teachers, and civil servants. Although it was a trading organization, the first SI political move in boycotting the Chinese traders had attracted supports from other vocational groups since they perceived it as a heroic and nationalist political action. This was because the Chinese community drastically changed their public behavior after the China Revolution in 1911. They started to see themselves as a great nation, equal to the Europeans, and behaved like the Europeans and undermined indigenous Indonesians. This was not only annoyed the native communities, but also insulted the elites and aristocrats. Therefore, albeit the fact that those elites and professionals were indifference—even hostile—toward Islam, they appreciated SI political maneuver as heroic, and lent their supports to the organization.

Secondly, its Islamic rhetoric had strong appeals to Muslim leaders and communities. In the second decade of the twentieth century the *Hajis* or Muslims who performed the *hajj* pilgrim to Mecca had already became dominant local leaders in many part of the country. In the previous time the Dutch treated Muslim community with hostility and oppression. Islam had for long time become the symbol of local patriotism against the foreigners, and the Christian Dutch, and it had caused a trauma among generations of colonial administrators, because since their early arrival in the 17th century, they encountered series of Islam-inspired local resistances, virtually across the archipelago from Sumatra, to Java, to Sulawesi. The most dramatic was the Java War 1825-1830 led by a millenarian King Diponegoro from Yogyakarta, which claimed more than 8000 casualties among European, and some 200,000 among Indonesians (Ricklefs, 2004: 153). However, since Christian Snouck Hurgronje became advisor for the colony, the Dutch started to change its perception and attitude toward Islam and Muslims. He was able to convince the colony's administrators that Islam has no hierarchical structures, and that there is no Pope in Islam. Therefore, Hurgronje advised, that the government should allow and even protect Islam as ritual systems and activities, and it must be suppressed only when it turned into political activities (Buskirk, 1975: 84-87). As a result, the Government allowed Muslims to observe their religious rituals including the *hajj*. In Dham's record, since 1900, thousands of Indonesians went to Mecca, for example in 1914 the total number of pilgrims from Indonesian was 28,427 with 19.784 were from Java when the total number of the pilgrims from around the world was only 58,855 (Dahm, 1971 : 41). And it was these *Hajis* who commanded religious, social and political influence among its community who were among the core supporters of SI.

Thirdly, its millenarian rhetoric—of the advent of the just prince that will save the nation with divine power—had also attracted people of rural areas. During the last century, amid terrible economic and social conditions, the Javanese rural communities had developed a millenarian doctrine of the arrival of the Just King (*Ratu Adil*), who would save the nation with divine power. The source of such a myth was a prophecy written by a medieval king of Kediri in East Java, named Jayabaya, which foresight the coming of distressful period in Java, when people lived in unbearable sufferings, then the just king named *Heru Cokro* would come and save the history. Coincidentally, the SI leader and top figure was Tjokroaminoto (read: Cokro-aminoto), whose name was strongly reminded the mass to the promised just king. And SI activists did exploit the fact enthusiastically to socialize the organization among rural community. This myth had fostered SI's popularity among the mass, and the absence of this mythical factor had prevented previous organizations to become real mass organizations. The harshness of the Dutch colonial policies during the 19th century had triggered massive disappointments at all levels of Indonesian society. These mounting resentments were inarticulate until the turn of the 20th century. And SI became the first organization and movement that met this long awaited needs for political articulation and expression (Kahin, 1952: 44)

As is expressed by its name, Sarekat Islam adopted Islam as its political ideology. To recall the definition from Hinich and Munger, ideology contains philosophical principles and guidelines for party pertaining ethics or what is good, economy or who get what, and politics or who rules. In its two decades of history, Islam had been the worldview of SI and the source of guidelines for political behaviors.

In relation to the ethical value or what is good and what is bad of the society, SI leaders perceived that Islam provided answers for Indonesians' important questions with regards to the meaning, the condition, and the future of their collective life. The SI leaders grew in the height of the colonial era when massive economic exploitations, political oppressions and social and cultural discriminations occurred. In such historical contexts, the highest moral values for SI were the reversal of those unequal conditions, and into complete equal statuses and rights, especially between native Indonesians and Europeans. And SI found that Islam provides ethical sources for human equality, in which all human beings, regardless of their ethnicity, nationality, culture and ideology, are equal in front of God and are counted upon his deeds and behavior rather than their origins (Amelz, 1954: 77).

On economy, SI perceived that Indonesian people should control and received benefits from the county's economic resources, and put an end to exploitations by foreigners. In his

speech at the first national congress, Tjokroaminoto fierily decried: "it is not decent to regard Indonesia as a milk cow which is given food only because of its milk" In the Declaration of Principles 1917, SI stated that it fought 'sinful capitalism which is the origin of the present deteriorating economic condition of the largest part of Indonesian population.' The principle of economy for SI was to distribute the economic resources equally, in which the powerful assists the weak and the needy (Noer, 1973: 113). SI economic view was Islamic socialism. In his book *Islam and Socialism* (1923) Tjokroaminoto wrote that since the earliest history of Islam, socialism has been known and practiced by Muslims.

> Since the time when our prophet Muhammad established a state, he governed the state according to socialist principles, in which the land was owned by the state. The principle was also adopted in the subsequent Muslim governments such as Mongol Indian dynasty… In this regard Muslim has reached the highest level of socialism based not upon man-made rules but God's rules. Since the time of the Prophet, Islam has regulated the principles of economy, in which it prohibits usury and hence it against capitalism (Amelz, 1954: 143-144).

Meanwhile on politics, with regard to the question of where the power properly resides, Sarekat Islam perceived that the highest authority is in the hands of God the omniscience. However, Islam also gives equal rights for all people to interpret God's laws, and therefore Muslim rulers should consult the people in adopting and implementing God's laws. Tjokroaminoto made this very clear that: "if we really are Muslims, who understand and consistently follow the teachings of Islam, we must be democrats" (Amelz, 1954: 155).

Islam as a political ideology, as understood by the SI leaders was articulated in the organizations' programs. The 1913 statute stated that the aims of the organization were: (a) To promote commercial enterprise, (b) To aid members who had got into difficulties through no fault of their own, (c) To foster the spiritual and material interests of Indonesians, and (d) To further the cause of Islam by combating misconceptions, spreading knowledge of its true precept. (Amelz, 1954: 96). And in 1917 Declaration of Principles, those objectives were elaborated into eight basic programs (Noer, 1973: 113-115):

a. *Politics*: SI demanded the establishment of the regional levels of the People's Council (*Volksraad*) and transform it into a real representative body with legislative powers; implementations of electoral suffrage for all men over eighteen years; and the abolition of mandatory labor and travel permits.

b. *Education*: SI demanded the abolition of discrimination in schools' admission; mandatory education for children under fifteen years of age; the increase of the

number of schools and improvement of the educational institutions at all levels; the development of law and medical studies at university; and scholarships for Indonesians to study abroad.

c. *Religion*: SI demanded the abolition of any regulation that hampered the propagation of Islam, government salary for Muslim clerics, subsidies for Islamic educational institutions, and recognition of Islamic holidays.

d. *Judiciary*: SI demanded the separation of judiciary from executive power; establishment of a single unitary judicial body for all populations in the country; and special assistance and protections for the poor and the needy.

e. *Agriculture*: SI demanded the abolition of landed estate; and the improvement of agricultural irrigations.

f. *Industry*: SI demanded the nationalization of industries which monopolize and supply essential services and commodities, such as textile and paper factories, industries which produce iron materials and means of communications, and enterprises which control the distribution of water, electricity and gas.

g. *Taxation*: SI demanded the introduction of proportional tax, and the implementation of taxes on estate profits.

h. *Social services*: SI demanded for governmental assistance for cooperative societies; eradication for social vices such as opium consumption, gambling, prostitution, child labor, and support for workers' rights and the increase of free medical clinics.

2.2. Institutional Context

The first fundamental institutional context as a backdrop of the emergence of SI was the implementation of the Ethical Policy by the Dutch colonial power. This was a historical turning point, in which the Dutch launched proactive initiatives of welfare programs to improve the living standard of native Indonesians. However, there were two basic dilemmas in the policy, in both political and economic level. Politically, there were two different motives in launching the policy, i.e. humanitarian and capitalist visions. On the one hand, humanitarian drives to take proactive measures in improving Indonesians' social and economic conditions were pushed strongly by the Dutch liberals and humanists. A Dutch writer named Dauwesdeker a.k. Multatuli wrote a novel *Max Havelaar* (1860) narrated the sufferings of the Javanese people under the Agricultural System policy in the 19th century. In 1899 a Dutch lawyer who spent some years in Indonesia, C. Th. Van de Venter, wrote an article entitled "Debt of Honour" (*de Gids*, 1899), in which he argues that the Dutch people

owed for their wealth and prosperity to the people in Indonesia, and they had to pay for the debts. On the other hand, the policy also seemed to serve the interests of the Dutch businesses, in which the colony was increasingly perceived as a source of both labors and potential markets. And in order to be able to work and consume better, the Dutch had to provide economic stimulations to improve their economic conditions (Ricklefs, 2002: 193-94).

Economically, new developments in economic balance between Java and the outer islands caused the policy to become problematic. The initial designs of the policy were for the Javanese people, who suffered the most from the previous century policies, and most of the Ethical policy programs were implemented in Java. However, the opening of new plantations and explorations of natural resources had shifted the economic focus from Java to the outer islands. And since the financial scheme of the program was not intended as a grant but investment, focusing on Java would make the program unsustainable, and eventually it was implemented only half-heartedly. Nevertheless, it did make a difference for Indonesians, especially the opening of mass-education for native Indonesians and the opening of administrative decentralization (Cribb, 1993: 226-230).

For the first point, there were two different educational schemes the government developed, the elite and mass educations. The reformation on the educational system for the elite Indonesians started in 1900 when The Training Schools for Native Officials (*Opleidingschole voor Indlandische Abtenaren*, OSVIA) were opened in three cities in Java. These schools were intended to train Indonesians to become civil servants. At the same year, schools for native doctors (*School tot Opleiding van Inlandische Artsen*, STOVIA) were established. In 1908, the modern educational system was enlarged to include the development of elementary Dutch Native Schools (*Holandisc-Inlanderische Scholen*, HIS) intended for elementary education for the Javanese elites. A sort of junior high schools were also established in 1914, the Extended Lower Education (*Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderweijs*, MULO). The senior high schools level, the so called General Middle Schools (*Algemeene Middelbare Scholen*, AMS), was established in 1919. Finally tertiary level of educational institutions were established in 1920s, i.e. Technical College in Bandung and Law College in Jakarta (Ricklefs, 1981: 149-50).

Those educational institutions were accessible and affordable only to Indonesian elites. For the non-elite Indonesians, the colonial government provided special First Class and Second Class schools. From 1907, the government opened village-schools in which the student must pay themselves and the government subsidized only if necessary. At the beginning the villages seemed reluctant to establish the idea of village-schools, and then the

government put "gentle pressures" from above to continue the program. By 1912, there were about 2500 village-schools. Although the educational reformation achieved much lower than it was initially programmed, it had enormous impacts for Indonesians. Statistically, in the first third decade of the 20th century, Indonesians who visited schools at any level had increased from 265,940 in 1900, into 1.7 millions by 1930. More significantly, it produced a new class of educated lower middle-class. It is this new educated generation that provided the seeds for nationalist movements in the country (Ricklefs, 150-51).

The proponents of Ethical policy also advocated that in order to achieve a sustainable welfare improvements, a greater autonomy should be granted to the Dutch Indies, through gradual process of decentralization of power: from The Hague to Batavia (Jakarta), from Batavia to regions, and finally decentralization from Dutchmen to Indonesians. The first decentralization scheme was passed in 1903, and implementation was started in 1905 with the formation of local council for the main cities. Although these councils enjoyed only advisory capacity with no real representative power, and was also criticized because it consist mainly of the Dutch members and only small elite of native Indonesians, such bodies nurtured more confident for greater autonomy of the colony among native Indonesian elites. The decentralization program was further revised in 1922, restructuring the bureaucratic administrations into further details. Yet, these new laws gave no greater rights for natives in political affairs. Meanwhile, in 1912 the Dutch central government in the Netherlands passed a bill on monetary autonomy that granted the colony administrators to manage their own income and expenditure. This policy made colony administration became more responsive—if not more effective—to the developing problems, as the decisions were in the hand of field officers and no longer in the parliament in The Hague (Gonggong, 2001: 253-257).

Another new and more significant institutional development was the formation of *Volksraad*, or people council, as a representative body for the Europeans and indigenous Indonesians in political affairs. The idea started from a proposal from business community to form a committee on *Indie Weerbaar* (Indies Defense) a sort of part time militia composed of native Indonesians to help the Dutch military. The government initially rejected the idea, but when the shadow of WW I loomed in the European sky, it perceived the proposal as a cheap mass mobilization against possible external enemy. In December 1916 the Dutch parliament passed a bill to create a representative body for the citizens of the colony, the *Volksraad*, which main tasks were giving advices to the administrator of the colony especially on budgetary matters. *Volksraad* also had the right to forward petitions, but had no capacity of legislation. The absence of legislative function of the body was—according to Minister for

Colonial Affairs—because legislate laws and regulations are complex tasks which needed full time works, while Volksraad representatives worked in the council in part time schemes (Van Helsdingen, 1976: 46).

The Volksraad started its functions in May 1918, with thirty eight elected and appointed members. Nineteen members were elected, ten of whom were Indonesians; the other nineteen were appointed, five of whom were Indonesians. Although the council only had advisory functions, it did play as a medium of negotiation between Indonesian leaders and the colonial regime. Governor-general van Limburg Stirum deliberately appointed more radical leaders such as Tjokroaminoto and Tjipto Mangunkusumo into the council in a hope to bring the radical elements of Indonesian nationalist movements to the system and into cooperation. On the other side, the European members of the council were also dominated by the supporters or sympathizers of Ethical policy that joined in Netherlands-Indies Liberal Alliance and Dutch Socialist Workers Party (Ricklefs, 1981: 153-54). Dahm notes that the council served two important functions in nurturing nationalism and national unity among native Indonesians. Firstly, it gave a truly united and nation-wide symbol of hope for greater political roles and autonomy that previously existed only occasionally in individual parties. Secondly, the broke of WW I and its aftermath had caused many difficult communications between colonial administrations and The Hague, which eventually compelled the Governor General to seek advices to the council on more important matters, which gave to Indonesians self confidence and experience on national affairs (Dahm, 1971: 49-50).

In a statement passed in November 1918, the Governor General van Limburg-Stirrum said that the latest world events would have equal consequences for the Netherlands and its Indonesian colony, and therefore the *Volskraad* should play more roles in working with the colonial administrators. This statement, known as the "November Premise," almost immediately triggered responses from members of the council. The nationalists, chafed at the restricted competence of the council, demanded fundamental reforms of the council as well as the government. Tjipto Mangunkusumo demanded legislative capacity for the council, while Tjokroaminoto sued a motion to reform it into parliament elected from and by the people. Even the *Bupatis*, aristocrat district leaders, who hitherto were regarded as loyalists similarly demanded for greater roles.

These developments sent an alarming signal to the government, which changed its perception toward the council from hope into doubt, and then into worry of a unitary nationalist resistance. As a response, the new Governor General Idenburg who was appointed for the third term started to thwart *Volksraad* from further development by proposing a

creation of local councils at regency levels. This law was intended to put legislative and representative functions in regency levels, which was easily co-opted by the government, and at the same time denied the chance of *Volskraad* from assuming legislative functions. This policy was pushed further by the next Governor General Dirk Fock (1921-1926), who denounced *Volksraad* as no more than "an oligarchy of intellectuals representing only themselves" (Dahm, 1971: 50).

Meanwhile simultaneously, as a result of Bolshevik Revolution, the communist group—led by several Dutch political activists—became more active and launched more open political actions that caused riots in a number of areas. In late 1917, the communist reportedly gathered no less than 300 sailors to be sent to Russia. And in 1918 the government started to crush communist activists, exiled its leader Sneevliet and arrested many other Dutch communist activists. In early 1919 in Surakarta Central Java, railway workers launched a strike demanding for a better salary, but then they started to storm into the town causing mass riots, attacking traditional palaces which they deemed as the embodiment of feudalism. The government arrested the leader, Haji Misbah, who earned a reputation as a '*red haji*' because of his promotion of Islamic communism. Another incident occurred in May, in North Sumatra, when a Dutch official was murdered after an SI leader, Abdul Muis, gave a speech in the region. Muis was soon arrested. In the following month, another more systematic movement was unfolded in Garut West Java after the police clashed with a group of SI local branch—known as Section B—that claimed a number of casualties. In this period, some communist groups were members of SI, and therefore the Bolshevik euphoria was also apparent in SI (Ricklefs, 2002: 217-220).

Facing this situation, the newly appointed Governor General Dirk Fock (1921-1926) set up tighter policies by enacting strict regulations of order and tranquility. He had used his legal ability to create networks of regulations, by which he succeeded in prevented mass strikes, as well as suppressed offences in public speaking and in the press. His administrators never hesitate to arrest and banish just about anyone who made slight actions against tranquility and order in the colony. It is under the Focks term that the bonds between ethical policy in the Netherlands and nationalist movements in Indonesia came to an end. However, since the bonds had rooted so deeply among Indonesian nationalists, the latest government policy had caused bitter anger and frustrations (Dahm, 1971, 50-51). He even ratified very specific orders to guarantee that no one would disturb the colony, for instance he in 1924 passed an order to restrict Muis movement to Java and in 1925 prohibited Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim from attending SI meetings in Kalimantan. The next administrator de Graeff

(1926-1931) was reportedly sympathetic to the ethical policy, however the Dutch government in the Netherlands as well as the Dutch community in Indonesia at the period had been influenced by conservative political interpretation and already developed antagonistic attitude toward Indonesians. Even they opened an Indology Faculty in Utrecht in 1925 purposively to disseminate conservative-imperialistic academic views (Noor, 1973: 203-4).

The increasingly conservative policy by the colonial government triggered two major developments among indigenous Indonesians. *Firstly*, increasing frustrations among nationalist and communist groups had led the latter to launch open rebellions. In November 1926, an uprising broke in Banten West Java, killed one European, that took the government a month to put an end. In January 1927, other uprisings took place in Padang and Batam in Sumatra, which killed another European, but were quickly crushed by the authority. *Secondly*, increasing repressions from the government and equally radical reactions from communist groups had led into the emergence of a new generation of nationalist political activists, who were better educated and inspired more by the ideals of nationalism which transcended all particularities and conceived Indonesia as a united whole, rather than communism which emphasized class struggles or Islam which gave priorities to Muslims over other believers. Two nationalist groups emerged almost simultaneously, one in Indonesia led by Sukarno—the disciple and son in law of Tjokroaminoto—and Mohammad Yamin, two in the Netherlands led by Mohammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir. This new generation of nationalist leaders would soon dominated Indonesian political arena and discourses of national independence until the Japanese arrived in 1942 and replaced the Dutch as the colonial power in the country (Ricklefs, 2002: 227-233).

2.3. Political Behavior

Sarekat Islam (SI, or *Islamic Union*) founded in 1912 by Samanhudi and H. O. S. Cokroaminoto was the first national political organization carrying Islamic ideology that appeared in the Indonesian history. The organization was originated from the Islamic Commerce Union (Sarekat Dagang Islam, SDI), a cooperative for Javanese *batik* traders intended to prevent the increasing activities of Chinese interlopers. In colonial time the Dutch employed Chinese—along with Arabs and Indians—as middlemen in its trade with indigenous people. In Solo, the conflict mounted into physical clashes between the Chinese and the Javanese, and led into the formation of SDI (Ricklefs, 1981: 158ff).

Initially, the colonial government granted recognition for SI only as a local organization, and could replicate itself in various places but had no right to form a national

organization. However, as local SI branches developed rapidly, it became necessary to form a central coordinating body. In its founding year 1912, about 4,500 members were registered, and by 1914 there were no less than 56 local SI organizations, with total members in excess of 366,000 people. A Central Sarekat Islam (CSI) hence was formed in 1914, with Tjokroaminoto in the helmet of the organization, and Abdul Muis as the vice chairman. The function of CSI is to coordinate SI local branches. In other words, CSI members were not individuals, but local SI organizations (Noer, 1973: 105).

Under the leadership of Tjokroaminoto and Muis, CSI soon transformed itself into a political movement and forgot its origin as a commercial organization. In 1915, the younger generations from different political orientation joined SI and were to exercise dominant roles in directing the organization. The first were Fachrudin and Agus Salim who had Islamic background in their activism, and the other were Semaun and Darsono who started their organizational carrier in a Marxist organization under the mentorship of the Dutch Sneevliet (Noer, 1973: 107-112).

In 1916, SI held its first National Congress in Bandung. In the previous annual congresses, the word "national" was never used. And it was for the first time Indonesian nationalist organization had literally a nation-wide gathering. The congress was attended by no less than 80 branches from various major areas in the archipelago, not only from Java and Sumatra, but also from Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, Bali and Lombok (Amelz, 1954: 101). In this event, Tjokroaminoto explained the long term objectives of SI, i.e. the creation of Indonesia as a nation. At this stage, there was no sign or indication of anti-colonial character in SI policies. It still saw the colonial government as the accepted status quo, and the struggle for political freedom for Indonesian people would be pursued through cooperation with the colonial power. The term "cooperation" is an important term in the history of Indonesian nationalist movement, referring to an approach adopted by the early generation of Indonesian nationalists. This is contrasted with another approach, "non-cooperation", which was became the trend in the final years of the Dutch colonialism (Buskirk, 1975: 93). When the colonial government formed a parliament for the colony, *Volksraad*, in 1918, Tjokroaminoto and Muis were among its members in the first period (1918-1921). Already in the first year, Tjokroaminoto proposed a motion to transform the council into a parliament elected from and by the people, which motivated similar demands from loyalist district officials, the *Bupatis* (Dahm, 1971: 49-50).

Yet in the next national congress held in Jakarta 1917, SI rhetoric became more radical when the leftist group of Semaun and Darsono gained more popularity, and succeeded to

endorse SI to declare capitalism as "sinful", although the term referred mainly to Chinese and Dutch and not to indigenous Muslim traders (McVey, 1962). It was true that the leftist wing successfully asserted its greater influence over SI in 1917 and was a memorable event for historians and commentators, yet at the same year the influence of Islamic ideology was also increasing. Endorsed by Salim and Fachrudin, Tjokroaminoto took the leftist rhetoric on anti-capitalism and the struggle for the proletariats, but wrapped it in Islamic vocabularies. In a speech at the conference, Tjokroaminoto said that Islam had become the main inspiration as well as opened up opportunities for Indonesians to struggle for a national independence. Later on, after his release from detention without trial following the abortive tiny armed rebellion of SI Section-B in West Java 1921, Tjokroaminoto was more enthusiastic in promoting the idea, and published a book entitled *Islam and Socialism* (1922). In the book, Tjokroaminoto discusses extensively about socialism and the history of Islam, and he concludes that the history of Islam—especially the history of the prophet Muhammad—was perfectly socialist: in favor of the poor, widows and orphans, and strictly prohibited usury and other excessive accumulation of wealth (Tjokroaminoto, 1922).

Meanwhile, after its Dutch leaders were exiled or arrested, the leadership of the communist group ISDV was handed into Indonesians, especially Semaun and Darsono, and in May 1920 ISDV congress, they changed the organization into Communist Association of Indies (PKH, *Perhimpunan Komunis Hindia*) and later into Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). It was a member of SI and controlled a number of local SI branches. Internal tensions between Islamic and Marxist camps were soon escalating, each camp criticizing the other, and soon became personal enmities among SI leaders. Islamic faction accused Marxist to be misleading the organization from its true spirit in achieving objectives through Islamic way, while the latter slammed the accuser to be unrealistic in pursuing soft-approach of cooperation in confronting colonial oppressions. This strives were usually neutralized by Tjokroaminoto who put the priority on the unity of the organization over factionalism. However, in October 1921, while Tjokroaminoto was in detention, Islamic camp that dominated the SI central leadership held an Extraordinary Congress in Surabaya discussing the so called party discipline. The forum decided to ban double membership, and thus expelled the Marxists from the organization (Suradi, 1997: 50-52).

In the following years, SI took fundamental changes on its policy. In the national Conference February 1923, SI changed itself into a political party *Partai Sarekat Islam* (PSI, or Islamic Union Party). This internal reform was intended to consolidate the organization. Formerly, SI local branches were autonomous and SI central leadership had only capacity as

coordinating body, and the real policy power were in the hands of local SI leaders. The change was intended to vest organizational power in the hands of national leaderships, in order to enable them to make decisions that bound the whole organization (Amelz, 1954: 134-137).

Two developments marked the new phase in the history of SI (now PSI) and dominated its course until it was changed again, followed by a prolonged organizational crisis in 1929. The first was the shift into non-cooperation policy in relation with the colonial government. This means that PSI refused any cooperation with the government in the form of participation in the *Volksraad*, and it set its objective to achieve the independence of Indonesia, instead of being merely a greater autonomy. This decision was triggered by the government's decision to exclude Tjokroaminoto from the membership of *Volksraad* second period (1921-1924), followed by the aforementioned SI Section-B incident. PSI leaders perceived the government's decision as undermining their organization, and should be responded in equal way. In the national congress in 1924 in Surabaya, PSI ratified the non-cooperation as the new course of the organization. It refused to participate in the *Volksraad*, and even expelled its member, R. P. Soeroso, who received government's appointment as a *Volksraad* member (Suradi, 1997: 43). Even when eventually the government issued a letter to appoint Tjokroaminoto in the next *Volksraad* period (1927-1930), Tjokroaminoto consistently refused the offering by saying that, in addition to the fact that his party decided non-cooperation policy, he would love to join the *Volksraad* only if it is reformed and more receptive to the political aspirations of Indonesian people (Suradi 1997: 44; Amelz 1954: 110-111). It is important to add here, that at the second part of the decade, the nationalist spirit was at its peak, when the younger generation of the nationalist leaders were born and held the historic "Youth Oath" in 1928 declaring "One country, one nation, one language: Indonesia." Among this new generation leaders was the future Indonesian president, Sukarno, who was Tjokroaminoto's disciple and son-in-law.

Secondly, PSI new policy was the adoption of Pan-Islam political rhetoric and programs. The outset was in 1922 when Agus Salim, then SI general secretary, organized All-Indies Islamic Congress in Cirebon, West Java, in which he invited major Muslim organizations in the country to discuss political Islam and Pan-Islamism. The idea of the congress was to link the political struggle for Indonesian Muslims with their fellow Muslim brothers across the Islamic world against European colonialism, with the ultimate objective to establish international Islamic Caliphate. The Islamic Congress was held annually in the following years, until the end of the Dutch colonial era in 1945. According to Salim, a truly

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international Islamic political authority deemed necessary, since western colonialism were international networks that systematically occupy almost the entire Muslim world (Van Bruinessen, 1995).

Coincidentally, in March 1924 the last Islamic caliphate of Ottoman Turkey was abolished by a nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, known as Ataturk. This event shook the Muslim world, not only in the Middle East, but also in remote Southeast Asian area, since the Caliphate and the caliph was perceived as the highest spiritual-political authority in the Islamic tradition. Interestingly, although PSI leaders such as Tjokroaminoto, Salim and Fachrudin were keen to the idea of Islamic politics and Islamic caliphate, they seemed to be more sympathetic to the nationalist Ataturk rather than the ousted Caliph Abdul Madjid who was regarded as corrupt and western collaborator. In December that year, an extraordinary Congress was held with a special purpose to discuss the aftermath of the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate. Two international congresses were to be held to discuss this matter, one in Mecca and another in Cairo, and Indonesian Muslims needed to send their delegates. The extraordinary congress agreed to send Indonesian envoy to both upcoming international congresses with a message that the Caliphate that was going to be established should be in a form of a council which members were representatives of Muslim countries, and the chairman of this caliphate council was elected by the council members for a given term (van Bruinessen, 1995).

After returning from the international congress—which was successfully held but without any concrete decision—the PSI leaders established an Indonesian branch for Mecca-based International Islamic Conference. PSI organizational activities focused on socializing Pan Islamism as the alternative way in political struggle for Indonesian Muslims. In 1929, PSI changed its name once again following several internal strives among its leaders, and with Tjokroaminoto became less active because of his health, the organization lost its popularity and was overshadowed by new political organizations. The organization suffered internal frictions between Salim and his followers who advocated a more flexible relation, even cooperation, with the government and Abikusno Tjokrosuyoso who drove the party further into confrontations with the status quo (Noer, 1973: 139-140, Suradi 1997).

3. MASYUMI (1945-1960)

3.1. Ideology and Programs

MASYUMI (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslims Consultation Council) was not only the most important Muslim political party of post independent Indonesia, but

also the most important party in Indonesian politics of the period. During the short era of parliamentary democracy (1949-1957) of post-independence Indonesia, Masyumi was the biggest party in the parliament and assumed three periods of Premierships, and played a substantive role as well as received a large share of portfolio in almost every cabinet (Luciu, 2003: 15).

The history of Masyumi started in 1937 when the leaders of major Muslim organizations, who were concerned about the heightening antagonism between Muslims and secular-nationalists and the communists, agreed to form a join federation of Indonesian Islamic Higher Council (*Majelis Islam A'la Indonesia*, MIAI) to provide a national forum for Muslims political struggles. The council played as unified front for Muslim politics when the Japanese army took over Dutch East Indies. However, when it was reluctant to cooperate, the Japanese dissolved it and replaced it with Masyumi (*Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, Consultative Assembly of Indonesian Muslim), in 1943 and made sure that only cooperative Muslim organizations were allowed to join (Ricklefs, 2002: 240-243).

In March 1945, in the final months of its surrender, the Japanese helped Indonesians to create an Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (*Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, BPUPKI) which then changed into Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence (*Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*, PPKI) by August that year. During this occasion, representatives for Muslims community came from Masyumi. It was these Masyumi delegates who pushed Islamist issues in the draft of the constitution, such as requirement that the president and the vice president should be Muslims, the ratification of Islamic laws for Muslims, and the demand for a special ministry of Islamic affairs. Under strong rejections from Christian politicians as well as the most respected nationalist figures such as Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, Islamist supporters were willing to compromise. The first two demands were rejected, and the third request, the creation of an Office of Religious Affairs was accepted. The Muslim politicians assumed that the Office would deal exclusively with Islamic affairs, yet in turn it concerned the affairs of all religious groups in Indonesia (van Dijk, 1981: 48-55).

Three months after the declaration of independence on August 17, 1945, the new government announced an endorsement for Indonesians to create political parties as means for people representations. On 7-8 November that year, Masyumi held an Islamic Conference in Yogyakarta to discuss the government proposal, and the forum unanimously agreed to change Masyumi into a political party representing political interests of all Indonesian Muslims and participate in the parliament. It was even reported that the conference agreed to denounce that

any Muslim organization participating in politics outside Masyumi was illegitimate. Yet not all major organization complied, such as Sumatran Islamic organization named PERTI (*Perhimpunan Tarbiyah Islamiyah*, or Islamic Educational Congregation). Nevertheless, eight major Muslim organizations joined the new party (Ricklefs, 2002):

Organization Members of Masyumi (1946)

- PSII (*Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
- PII (*Partai Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Party),
- Muhammadiyah
- NU (*Nahdhatul Ulama*, Revival of the Ulama)
- PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam*, Islamic Union),
- PUI (*Partai Umat Islam*, Muslim Party)
- PUII (*Partai Umat Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Muslims Party)
- Jamiatul Wasliyah

Organizationally, Masyumi was a party of indirect rule, in which its memberships was composed of organizations (Douverger, 1954: 6). This means that the sources of authority were not inside but outside the party, in the hands of the leaders of its various organizations. This structure had an enormous impact to the political behavior of Masyumi, in which it always needed consents and supports from the organizations for its policies.

Like SI in the early decades of the century, Masyumi represented the political aspirations of Indonesian Muslims, and adopted Islam as its ideology, as was clearly defined in its statutes (Basic Statute, 1955: verse II). On ethical values, or what was good in society, Masyumi perceived that Islam was the solution for Indonesian politics, as the best alternative for world conflicting ideologies. Masyumi leaders portrayed the time in which they lived as characterized by deadly antagonism between the Western block led by the USA under capitalism versus the Eastern block headed by the Soviet Union under the ideology of communism. In fact, the two ideologies had caused human sufferings: capitalism with its principle of unrestrained accumulation of wealth had led nations into wars, drove oppressions, exploitations and discriminations under colonialism; while communism with its doctrines of materialism and atheism that contradict the basic nature of men as spiritual beings had produced proletariat dictatorship that destroyed the traditional structures of the society and caused sufferings among the people living under communist states. According to Masyumi,

Islam was the best political system for Muslim and non-Muslim alike, with a balance perspective on human nature: submission to religious rules and peaceful interactions with other human being. Islam teaches compliance to Gods' laws for its adherents, unity among its followers in society, cooperation among members of society to achieve common goods, and tolerance toward people from other religions (Masyumi, 1955: 31-48).

Secondly, on economy, Masyumi held a perspective that Islam basically recognized the rights of individuals to own means of productions, as long as they acquired those through good ways (*halal*), as was prescribed by the Qur'an that (IV: 31): "men have rights for what they achieved, and women have rights for what they achieved. And ask to God for His wealth" (Masyumi 1955: 89-90). However, according to Islam, society has a collective duty to look after the poor and the needy. Masyumi perceived welfare services as *fardhu kifayah* or religiously collective duty of the society that at least part of the community should accomplish, and when no one did it the whole society would be guilty (Masyumi, 1955: 54).

Thirdly, on politics Masyumi believed in the principle that the true authority was in the hands of God, and therefore Muslim should have been the leader of the countries where Muslims constitute the majority in the population, such as in Indonesia. In the words of Mohammad Natsir, the most prominent leader of Masyumi and the former Indonesian prime minister, Islamic political formula was neither completely identical nor totally different from democracy. "Islam is not one hundred percent democracy, neither it is one hundred percent autocracy. Islam is… Islam" (Noer, 1973: 291). According to Natsir, Islam is democratic in terms that it is against despotism, absolutism and arbitrary measures by the ruler to the ruled. However, in Islam not every issue is subject to consultation and deliberation (*shura*), such as the eradication of social vices—gambling prostitution, superstitions, polytheism etc. Consultation applies only to the methods, no to the actions (Burns, 1981: 29).

Under such ideological formulations, Masyumi set its political objective to "*implement Islamic teachings and laws in the lives of individuals, the society and the state of Republic of Indonesia to achieve Allah's will*" (Basic Statute, Verse III). To achieve the objectives Masyumi endeavored to (Basic Statute, Verse IV):

a. Inform, teach and train Indonesian Muslim in political matters.

b. Build and empower the unity and potentials of Muslim community in every walk of life.

c. Advocate humanity, solidarity, brotherhood and religious piety according to Islamic teachings.

> d. Cooperate with other organizations for common objectives and with mutual consents.

In order to achieve the political visions, Masyumi formulated its party programs as follows: (Masyumi, 1955: 60-69):

1. *Politics*: (a) The state is a constitutional Republic based on Islamic teachings, to guarantee the safety of lives and wealth of all people in Indonesia, native and foreigners. Republic is the most suitable form of Islam and democracy. (b) The state must guarantee freedom of religion. (c) The government is presidential who responsible to the House of Representative. (d) The House is bicameral with democratically elected members of Parliament and Senate. (e) The Constitution must guarantee human rights. (f) Acknowledge the equal rights for men and women based upon their respective natures.

2. *Economy*: (a) proposing guided economy in which resources distributed for the maximum of the people welfare; prohibiting private monopoly; promoting cooperative economy. (b) Nationalization of vital business such as banks, transportation services, mines and undustries that supply public needs. (c) Industrialization to reduce import, especially in densely populated areas. (d) Encouraging foreign capital with mutual profits. (e) Protecting and empowering agricultural enterprises, advocate price regulation to protect peasants' economy and regulating wages for peasant workers. (f) Protecting fishery enterprises by providing training and education for fishermen, assisting fishermen cooperatives, modernizing technologies and facilities for fishery. (g) Agrarian policy that give priority to protect productive lands. (h) Promoting the development of the middle class.

3. *Monetary*: (a) Private Banks are regulated by law and the government oversees the banks' credit policies. (b) Tax policies to simplify tax regulations, cut ordinary good taxes and increase luxury goods taxes.

4. *Social*: (a) government provides social services and health, pension, and unemployment insurances. Protect workers rights, protect minimum wage, and dispute settling. (b) Advocating social loans, in addition for work loans, for workers. (f) Regulate workers' unions. (g) Developing social regulation for helping needy children and eradicating social vices such as prostitution and gambling. (h) The state should look after the veterans of revolution and their families. (i) Transmigration from dense to less dense populated regions.

5. *Education and Culture*: (a) Developing additional religious private schools, providing scholarships for selected students especially from poor families. (b) Developing cultural constructive activities, such as boy scouts for the youth.

6. Foreign Policy: (a) Against any form of colonialism. (b) Promoting peaceful international politics and cooperate with all nations, especially those religious and democratic. (c) Participate actively in international organization such as the UN. (d) Support world order based on humanity and morality. (e) Accepting foreign aids that bring no constraining military and political consequences.

7. West Irian: (a) Demanding the inclusion of West Irian (Papua) into Indonesian territory.

3.2. Institutional Context

The years during which Masyumi was active in Indonesian politics were among the most unstable decades in Indonesia' history, when it witnessed the end of colonialism that lasted for centuries, followed by the invention of the new republic of Indonesia. During this period, from 1945 to 1960 there were intense institutional engineerings to create, reshape and revise the structure of the new republic. These engineering contests were the inevitable result of the clashes of interests between various powers to install state institutions

Following Herbert Feith explanation, there were three streams of constellations or rivalries—which were distinguishable but inseparable—simultaneously influenced the dynamics of political institutions during the period of Masyumi history, 1945-1960. *Firstly*, was institutional rivalries between civilian versus military in controlling the direction of the new republic, especially in dealing with the Dutch who wanted to reclaim the country after the Japanese surrender. The civilian politicians preferred to pursue a diplomatic way, in the hope of international supports especially from the newly formed United Nations, with the consequence of compromises and concessions with the Dutch; while the military commanders perceived diplomacy as adverse and betraying the spirit of independence, and therefore favored strict and all-out resistances in protecting the republic from the Dutch efforts to reclaim it.

Secondly, ideological rivalries—among civilians as well as military—with regards to the directions of the national development of the new republic, between three dominant camps, i.e. the *nationalists* who wanted the republic to be developed on the basis of common historical and cultural identities of Indonesian people, the so called spirit of "unity in diversity" (*Bhineka Tungga Ika*); the *Islamists* who wanted the state to be developed on the basis of Islamic law, in order to be fair to the fact that the majority of Indonesians were

Muslim; and the Marxist who wanted the new state to be established in the spirit of anti-imperialism, anti-fascism, anti-capitalism, and in favor of the mass.

Thirdly, administrative rivalries—among both civilians and militaries—between the so called "administrators" who gave priorities on regulation, institutionalization and rationalization of the new state, versus "solidarity makers" who emphasized the mass mobilizations and consistent calling upon national identity (Faith, 1962: 113-120).

When the republic of Indonesia was declared in 17 August 1945 following the Japanese surrender in the pacific war, it was intended to include the whole area of the former Dutch colony from Sabang in the northern tip of Sumatra to Merauke in the southeast corner of West Papua. The institutional processes to be accomplished were to install central governmental institutions, to create national bureaucracy, and to form national armed forces. The first point was accomplished quickly by developing a government and a temporary parliament (KNIP, *Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat* or Central Indonesian National Committee) to which the cabinet was responsible. The second point was also implemented quite smoothly by turning the existing bureaucratic system installed by the Japanese under the latter undeclared approval and assistances, while the third, the nationalization of military, met various difficulties especially because of disagreements among its top leaders between the Japanese-trained officers who preferred to maintained large forces which include irregular military units and the Dutch-trained officers who preferred rationalization of the military.

The Dutch forces returned to Indonesia by September 1945, behind the British forces of Southeast Asian Command under Lord Luis Mountbatten which arrived at Indonesia to take over the Japanese power. The Dutch intention was to reclaim the colony after the Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces. However, they met fierce resistances from the republican forces in various fronts across Sumatra and Java that pushed them to come to negotiations. Indonesian leaders also agreed a negotiation in the face of a possible asymmetrical war between the well-equipped and well-coordinated Dutch armed-forces and the poorly armed and coordinated republican army. The first diplomatic agreement was reached by March 1946 between Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir with the Dutch Van Mook, in which the republic assumed sovereignty over Java, Madura and Sumatra while the Dutch controlled other regions, and followed by Linggarjati Agreement in November that year, in which the two sides agreed to form a Federal State of Indonesia in which the republic would be one of its part.

The agreement triggered rounded criticism, especially from the military and Marxist camps, because they regarded it as selling the republic to the Dutch and betraying the

independence, and eventually forced the cabinet to resign. In the strong anti-colonial political atmosphere the next cabinet that was formed in July 1947, was conspicuously leftist with Amir Sjarifuddin as the Prime Minister. Facing indications of change of policy directions in Indonesian leadership, the Dutch launched the first military aggression in 20th July 1947 and in a few days captured major cities in Sumatra, Jakarta, West Java and East Java, leaving for the Indonesian only central Java. By August 1947, the republic moved its capital to Yogyakarta. Under strong pressures from the UN, the Dutch and Indonesia come to another agreement aboard USS *Renville* in Jakarta harbor January 1948, for cease fire and that the republican army in West and East Java must retreat into Central Java.

The Dutch military aggression and the Renville agreement humiliated the cabinet and forced it to resign, and created other crises, even brought the republic into the brink of civil war. The first crisis emerged immediately after the Siliwangi Division of the army left West Java and moved to Central Java following the agreement. Amid the power vacuum, an irregular military unit, from Hizbullah Batallion, refused to comply and declared an Islamic State/Islamic Army of Indonesia (DI/TII *Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia*) in West Java led by S. M. Kartosuwiryo in May 1948. This would be the longest military rebellion in Indonesian history that lasted until 1962 (van Dijk, 1981).

Meanwhile, the arrival of the Siliwangi Division to Central Java had intensified the existing tensions inside the military as well as between the military and civilian politicians. In order to adjust to the situation, the central government planned to rationalized the military and cut the number of soldiers into half, especially by demobilizing the irregular units. The Siliwangi Division, being the most trained, skilled and well equipped unit, under the leadership of Dutch-trained Col. A. H. Nasution, was likely to be secured from this plan, while irregular units in Central Java, many of them affiliated with leftist groups, were the likely victims. The tensions soon broke into open conflicts between the opponents and the proponents of the planned policy. Outnumbered in skills and equipments, the irregular units, joined soon by leftist groups, were driven out into mountainous country sides between Central and East Java. Coincidentally, a senior leader of the communist party named Muso who just returned from Soviet joined and led the movement, followed by the former leftist Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin. In 18 September 1948, the Communists declared a National Front Government (FDR) in the district of Madiun East Java, and appealed to the Indonesians to expel Sukarno-Hatta government who they perceived as collaborators of Japanese fascism and Dutch imperialism. The rebellion was contained in around a month, and the top leaders Muso

and Amir Sjarifuddin were killed. This incident marked the communist with treason against the republic (Ricklefs, 2002).

The armed rebellions by DI/TII and FDR had caused a deep trauma for the army toward political ideology, both Islam and communism, which would influence its attitude and behaviors in years to come. The incidents helped it to construct its image as ideologically neutral group, and that its main objectives were for the good of Indonesian nation; and it also portrayed political parties and civilian politicians as groups who were preoccupied with ideologies, and they struggled for their own respective groups.

Amidst the chaotic situation in the republic, the Dutch launched a second military aggression in December 1948, conquered Yogyakarta and arrested all national leaders, and cornered the republic to rely on the military under Gen. Sudirman who waged guerilla war between Central and East Java and an Emergency Government in the hand of the Minister of Economy from Masjumi, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, who were on hiding in Sumatra. The aggression caused a strong reaction from the UN, and especially the US which drastically more sympathetic to the republic after the repression of the communist groups in Madiun. By August 1949, the conflicting sides agreed to come to another negotiation, known as the Round Table Conference held in The Hague that was to last about three months, and in November that year some agreements were reached, in which the Dutch recognized and handed over full sovereignty into a Federal State of Indonesia, in which the Republic of Indonesia was only one of its seven federal state members.

Although the Dutch seemed to be the winner in the conference in which it succeeded in reducing the republic into territorially tiny portion of Indonesia, in reality given the already strong feeling of nationalism even among the states, the federation soon fell down and the state dissolved itself one after another and joined the republic. According to Herbert Faith, the decisive factor that contributed to the reformation of a unitary state was the common feeling that the situation was not a choice between federal or unitary forms of state, but rather a choice between supporting the spirit and ideals of 1945 declaration of independence or siding the Dutch in their efforts to reclaim the country. On the fifth anniversary of independence, 17 August 1950, the federation state was abolished and the unitary republic of Indonesia reborn with Jakarta as the capital that consisted of the whole territory of the former Dutch colony minus Irian Jaya (Faith, 1962: 74-77).

The return of the unitary republic, however, was accompanied by significant institutional changes that were to influence the structures of political dynamics of the decade, especially the new role of the president and the strengthening position of the parliament. The

original institution was the so called 1945 Constitution, and during the transfer of sovereignty in 1949 it was adopted by the Republic of Indonesia as a part of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) and for the federation state adopted its own constitution. The reformation of the unitary Republic of Indonesia had urged the politicians to reformulate the constitution into what is known as 1950 Provisional Constitution (UUDS—*Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara—*1950). In 1945 constitution, Indonesian government is presidential in which the president is the head of the sate as well as the government, and appoint ministers who help him and responsible to him. In 1950 Constitution, the government was parliamentary, led by a Prime Minister who responsible to the parliament, while president was confined to figurehead of the state. Moreover, the parliament had a capacity to force to resign not only cabinets, but also individual ministers. Although the constitution did provide a power for the president to dissolve the parliament, the statement was ambiguous. It reads "the President decree announcing such dissolution shall also order the election of the House of Representative within 30 days," in which the dominant interpretation was that the presidential right was only applicable if it would be possible to call upon elections within 30 days—which was an extremely difficult requirement.

The dominant position of the parliament implied the dominant position of political parties in Indonesian politics. There were five major political parties which dominated the parliamentary politics, plus a number of nationalists and Christian parties (Feith, 1962: 122-145).

a. The biggest party was **Masyumi**, which held Islamist ideology and represented the political aspirations of Muslim communities, and promoted the implementations of Islamic laws and systems in the republic. It had 49 seats in the parliament or 21.1 percent. Its memberships composed of two major categories, the modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups. The latter split from the party in 1952 after several internal conflicts. In terms of governmental politics, Masyumi was in a tight rivalry with the PNI, but in term of ideology its archrival was the communist PKI.

b. The second was the **nationalist PNI** with 36 seats or 15.5 percent in the parliament. It was founded by Sukarno in 1927 and based upon the ideals of nationalism, which objectives was to preserve Indonesia as united nation and country. After the independence, however, Sukarno did not involve in PNI activities since as the president he was above all parties. PNI became the party of Javanese traditional elites and aristocrats, and to some extent embodied Javanese political cultures.

c. The next major party was the **socialist PSI**, founded and led by Sutan Sjahrir in 1948, with 17 or 7 percent parliamentary seats. In fact, PSI political clout was much greater that its parliamentary portion indicated. There were two main resources of PSI strong influence in national politics. *Firstly* were human resources, in which many of its leaders were western-educated intellectuals who played important roles in various major political events. *Secondly* was an ideological element, in which PSI political ideology which was very close to the western democratic-socialist tradition was able to provide vivid analyses of the political situations as well as consistent and easily understandable prescriptions—which had widespread currency outside the party itself.

d. The fourth dominant party was **Marxist Murba Party**, founded by a former Communist leader Tan Malaka and his followers, which received only four seat or 1.7 percent. In contrast to PSI, which represented the party of administrators that run by intellectuals and pursued rational and programmatic politics, Murba represented the party of solidarity makers which activists were mostly without higher educations who came to prominence as leaders of mass organizations or militia groups during Japanese occupations and independence revolution, and its main supporters were ex-guerilla fighters, low ranking professionals, and other groups who preferred expressive politics. Just like PSI, or perhaps even more, Murba political influence was much larger than its actual number in parliament. This was, firstly, because Murba earned a historical credit for the event of Indonesian proclamation of independence in August 1945, when its top leaders were the initiators of the youth group that forced Sukarno and Hatta to make the proclamation immediately after the Japanese surrendered. Secondly, its radical political views combining Marxism, nationalism and millenarianism—which demanded consistently abrogation of all diplomatic agreements with the Dutch, confiscation and nationalization of all vital enterprises from transportation facilities, industries, mines, and plantations—were gained currency among wider political groups.

e. The **Communist PKI**, was another major political force in the parliament with 13 seats or 5.6 percent. This party showed a formidable resilience both in ideological visions and organizational works. Founded in 1920, it was banished by the colonial government after the abortive putsch in 1926, and its leaders were either arrested or fled the country. But it returned into a major political group during independence years with strong ideology and vast mass support. Yet again, the failed revolt of FDR in November 1948 had dragged the party into political pariah in the country,

stigmatized with treason of national independence. And by 1950s it was able to recover, return into the political system, and receive seats in the parliament. PKI once again showed its organizational superiority when in 1955 election it garnered 16.4 percent of national votes and tripled its parliamentary seats into 16.8 percent.

f. The sixth political power composed of **minor nationalist parties**—such as PIR, PRN, SKI, Democratic Faction, and the Labor Party. In terms of number of parliamentary memberships these group was large, with 38 seats or 16.3 percent, but because of the absence of neither clear and consistent ideological visions nor loyalty to policy positions, the group was fluid and opportunistic, sought any possible opportunity to take advantages from any political transactions, and was keen to participate in any cabinet.

g. Lastly, the recognizable faction in the parliament was of **Christian and Catholic parties**. In contrast with minor nationalist parties, which in fact personality-parties with no real mass support, the Christians parties did commanded popular support among Christians especially in the eastern provinces. The parties also had relatively strong influence in national politics because of the disproportionately large numbers of Christians in the bureaucracy, the military, and business and educational institutions. The parties had highly qualified leaders with high political and administrative skills, and were regularly included in the cabinets. Their policy positions were mainly to maintain their groups' political interests and advocated religious freedom.

Theoretically, Indonesian party system during the period liberal democracy was an unstable system, where the parties were numerous and their ideological distance was both wide and intense. Following the classification from Sartori (1976: 125-128), the number of parties and their ideological distance are the main indicator of party system stability. For Sartory, any party system which consisted of more than five parties is a plural system, and when the ideological gaps between those parties are wide, the system became polarized. Indonesian party system was indeed a polarized system, in which there were seven parliamentary factions which composed of around 20 parties. Moreover, the ideological distances between parties were not only wide but also intense, involving different spectrums of ideological, religious and cultural orientations. *Firstly*, there was an ideological continuum between leftist PKI and Murba on the one hand and rightist Masyumi and Christian parties on the other. *Secondly*, thee was a cultural-regional continuum, with Masyumi in one end representing Muslim culture and outer-islands communities and PNI on the other representing

political aspiration of Javanese culture and community. *Thirdly*, the system was divided by a religious continuum that extended from Communism on the one hand and Islam and Christianity on the other. In reality, the system instability was exacerbated by the presence of 'bilateral opposition' of two irreconcilable ideological and policy positions, that make two parties or factions impossible to come together in a coalition (Sartori, 1976: 134-35). This was the case of antagonism between Masyumi and PKI, in which both sides portrayed the other as anti-system.

Caught in polarized systems notwithstanding, Indonesian political parties were able to maintain a relative stability and eventually enacted constitutional democracy. There were several factors scholars believe contributed to the situation. *Firstly*, the fact that the political scene was dominated by 'administrators' politicians, whose focus was solving pragmatic problems rather than refining political discourses such as independence, revolution, or nationalism. In fact this group of politicians was cross-parties, and included figures of the politicians were the Vice President Mohammad Hatta, former Prime Minister and PSI leader Sutan Syahrir, Masyumi chairman Mohammad Natsir, PNI chairman Wilopo, leaders of Christian parties and a handful of independent members of parliament. During the first four parliamentary cabinets—those of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo—the group advanced consistent political programs focusing on pragmatic issues.

There were three major priorities: (a) Rationalization of public services and the military; (b) Establishing a legitimate authority, in which the cabinets were able to convince the public and interest groups that they had the rights and capability to govern the country. They set up Ministry of Information which main tasks were providing information to the public especially in rural areas beyond the reach of mass-media; building schools to prove to the public of the effectiveness of their governments; and building a mutual cooperation with religious leaders and groups to promote pro-government views in exchange of financial supports. These consistent set of policies had enabled political parties to enact a constitutional democracy, and compelled other political elements to follow rules of the game they set up. *Secondly*, economic booming caused by the Korean War in the turn of the decade which drastically raised the price of Indonesian export commodities especially rubber. The increasing revenues enabled the government to fully fund its programs, and more importantly to fund the military. The increasing military budget gave the civilian government political leverage to draw sympathy and support from the army leaders. And during the period the major faction in the military did support the government programs, especially the rationalization of the military personnel.

The upper hand position enjoyed by the parliament and the political parties was even greater when in 1953 the military suffered internal crisis, as the result of "17 October affair" when a number of army central command officers and territorial commanders organized mass rallies accompanied by tanks and armored vehicles in front of the presidential palace, demanding the dissolution of the parliament. Some factors simultaneously contributed to the military maneuver. *Firstly*, the long established anti-civilian-politicians feelings among the military who perceived them as opportunistic and concerned for their own interests; *secondly*, growing internal divisions in the military between a number of cliques; and *finally*, the government plan to cut military budgets following the sharp decrease of state revenues, especially declining prices of export commodities after the Korean War. This *coup* attempt provoked fierce reactions from the cabinet, the parliament and the president that cornered the military and ended in the suspension of a number of senior officers including the chief of staffs, Col. A. H. Nasution. The suspension of Nasution opened up opportunity for anti-Nasution clique in the military, who soon replaced pro-Nasution officers in key posts. With the military fell in internal conflicts, the civilian politicians in the cabinet, in the parliament as well as in the political parties expanded their roles in Indonesian politics, since the only counter balance was the President whose constitutional status was a figurehead (Feith, 1962: 303-330).

In the first two cabinets, during which Masyumi assumed Premierships, this dominant position was exercised by playing the political balance between the military on the one hand and the President on the other. Natsir cabinet (September 1950-March 1951) which excluded PNI in its coalition continued the policy priorities from its predecessor Hatta cabinet, focusing on economic development, and rationalization of the bureaucracy and the military. This rationalistic and non-sensational politics pursued by Natsir was fully backed-up by the military commanders led by administrator-officers like Simatupang and Nasution who preferred to have small but well trained and disciplined military forces. Yet it was disliked and opposed by President Sukarno, who perceived it as neglecting the spirit of nationalism and Revolution. While the next Masyumi cabinet led by PM Sukiman in coalition with PNI (April 1951-February 1952) was disliked and criticized by the military on the matter of Defense Minister, yet was able seek counter support from Sukarno by expanding presidential budgetary and endorsing his enthusiasm for public speeches (Glassburner, 1962: 123-124; Feith, 1962: 146-224).

The supremacy of civilian politicians reached its peak in the election in September 1955. The election itself seemed to become an anticlimax. Indonesian society put a very high

expectation to the election as panacea for the hardships and disorientations they suffered. The civilian politicians, especially those from political parties, emphasized the hope even more when they answered all criticisms against them with a promise that everything would be fixed after the elections. However, the election produced only paradoxes, anguish and uncertainties. Instead of bringing a unity, political parties' anxiousness to maximize votes had led them to use vulgar ideological mobilizations which caused tensions and conflicts along ideological and other primordial lines in the society that lasted months after the polls (Feith, 1954). The electoral results were also surprising and perplexing, especially the poor achievement of Masyumi and PSI and huge gain of NU and PKI. This somewhat unpredictable electoral result recast the whole picture of national politics. Masyumi and PSI which hitherto dominated the political scene, inside and outside the parliament, must realized that their electoral gains were not as expected; while NU and PKI which achieved big successes naturally demanded greater roles. This tension brought yet another uncertainty for the future of Indonesian politics, and so many fingers pointed to civilian politicians and their political parties as the suspects (van der Kroef, 1957a, 1957b).

The mounting resentments to the civilian politicians gained momentum in November 1955, when Nasution was reappointed as the army Chief of Staff. Nasution' appointment (now Major General) created new rivalries inside and outside the military. In the military, the reappointment of Nasution inevitably brought his old associates, many of whom were suspended after 17 October affair 1953, and the replacement of many of the current officers in army headquarter and territorial commanders. Seemed to learn from history and was driven by common disappointment toward the parliament and political parties, Nasution then was willing to cooperate with President Sukarno and was able to attract considerable support from PNI. Meanwhile anti-Nasution clique, now under the figures of army Vice Chief of Staff Col. Zulkifli Lubis and the commander of North Sumatra Division Col. M. Simbolon tried to resist Nasution's reforms. Outside the military, Nasution-Sukarno-PNI collaboration had pushed Masyumi and PSI—the archrivals of Sukarno and PNI—to side Lubis and Simbolon, although not too publicly. During October and November 1956 Lubis who then no longer Vice Chief of Staff mobilized two attempts of *coup d'etat* to arrest Nasution and dissolve the cabinet, but no avail. Nasution proved himself as the better in the maneuver and networks (Feith, 1962: 440-444).

The rising collaboration between President Sukarno and the Army was soon accompanied by another important political developments, i.e. the rapid grew of PKI and Sukarno's deliberate attempt to use it as counterbalance against the Army. Because of its

involvement in FDR rebellion 1948, PKI was decimated and discredited, and many of its activists split into Murba party. However, it was able to rebuild its organization, when in 1951 younger generation of leaders—such as Aidit, Lukman, Njoto, and Sudisman—took over the Politburo and implemented new course of party programs. Marxism was now a guide for political programs and no longer an inflexible dogma. Ricklefs summarizes the situation:

> The party's strategy was cloaked in Marxist-Leninist terminology which concealed a departure from conventional Marxist-Leninist theory. Rather than social class determining political orientation, in Aidit's arguments political orientation became a determinant of social class… Aidit's strategy in seeking allies among other political streams meant that in practice PKI adapted itself to a social structure in which cultural, religious, and political allegiances were horizontal or communal rather than horizontal, as in a class-conscious society.
> Aidit strategy was defensive, for PKI was widely distrusted by many in the political elites and the military. His main aim was protecting the party from those who hoped for its destruction, whatever theoretical adjustments or political alliances this might required… In the end, what was at stake was less the future of working class or of Communism as a political ideology than the future of PKI as an organization (Ricklefs, 2001: 294).

PKI political flexibility combined with organizational skills of its activists had brought the party back into the center of political stage, when it tripled its parliamentary seats in 1955 elections. As the fourth largest party, PKI had more confidence to push its demands especially on the abrogation of the Round-Table debt agreements with the Netherlands and the inclusion of West Papua to Indonesia. Coincidentally these were the favorite issues of President Sukarno, and then increasingly PKI's issues and enemies were also Sukarno's issues and enemies. By 1957 PKI had extended its influence beyond formal politics, by developing filial mass-organizations, establishing intellectual networks, even infiltrating the army. Meanwhile, Sukarno perceived in PKI's increasing power a potential balance for the army increasing influence in politics and in economy, and he was keen to use it for his advantage. For example, in 1957 he praised the one party-system of Soviet Union, and said that he preferred such a structure (Pauker, 1962; Ricklefs, 2002: 314-315).

Lubis coup d'etat and its aftermath of political crisis urged Nasution to endorse Sukarno to dissolve the parliament and impose martial law, which the latter did in March 1957. Subsequently business cabinets—or cabinet based on expertise of the elected ministries—were formed and responsible to the president. Following the end of constitutional democracy, which then denounced as western-style democracy, Sukarno forwarded his own conception of Guided Democracy, which combined democracy, the spirit of revolution, and

Indonesian identity. Later on he elaborated his conception to include 1945 constitution, Indonesian socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and Indonesian identity (USDEK: *UUD 1945, Sosialisme a la Indonesia, Demokrasi Terpimpin, Ekonomi Terpimpin, Kepribadian Indonesia*). In December 1957 Vice President Mohammad Hatta resign, as a protest against Sukarno uncontrolled political maneuver, which immediately amplified anti Sukarno feeling especially among non-Javanese politicians and military officers. In February 1958, military officers from Lubis and Simbolon groups, joined by Masyumi and PSI politicians, declared rebellion and gave the central government ultimatum to install a new cabinet under Hatta, and return Sukarno into his constitutional figurehead position. Yet the movement was abortive, and Nasution was able without much difficulty to contain the rebellion and captured the leaders (Lev, 1963; Feith and Lev 1963).

The national political scene was then practically under the control of Sukarno and Nasution. Civilian politicians and political parties were exhausted in their debates in Constituent Assembly elected by the elections. And for more than two years of the constituent sessions and deliberations, the parties were trapped in protracted deadlocks and were unable to write any significant legal product. In early 1959 Nasution brought a proposal to the president to solve the prolonged deadlocks in the Constituent Assembly, i.e. to return to the original version of 1945 Constitution and dissolve the assembly. With no indication of progress in its sessions, Sukarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly in 5 July 1959, and reinstalled the old constitution. After dissolving the parliament, Sukarno appointed a 'Business Cabinet' (*Kabinet Karya*) under non-party politician Djuanda Kartawidjaja as the prime minister, although most of the ministers were from parties especially PNI and NU. When eventually the cabinet resigned in 1959, Sukarno enacted a presidential government, under the Guided democracy (Palmer, 1957).

In fact, the triumph of Sukarno's regime and the failure of constitutional democracy were products of various factors. *Firstly*, public dissatisfactions were mounting after the elections, when it turned to add new conflicts instead of solving problems. *Secondly*, the relatively successful economic programs of the previous cabinet governments had induced social modernization, in which more people were moved from rural into urban lives, and had greater abilities to articulate their demands especially for more economic growth and job opportunities. *Thirdly*, the fact that the main actors of Indonesian politics were people from middle class whose only financial incomes were from governmental rents or political contracts, had made political competition a zero-sum game. The politicians were ready to exploit any means in their disposal—especially ideologies—to gain and defend governmental

positions, since it meant not only power and prestige but more importantly, incomes. These factors had triggered two growing demands, i.e. disapproval of political parties and constitutional democracy they advocated, and demands of an alternative system that eventually paved a way for Sukarno's Guided Democracy, the raise of military in politics and economy, and the retreat of parties into the background of Indonesian politics (Feith, 1962: 500-538).

3.3. Political Behavior

The history of Masyumi reveals the deeper nature of modern history of Muslim politics as well as Indonesian politics in general. *First*, the formation of Masyumi represented Muslim's antagonism with secular ideologies. The Islamist-secular antagonism that started in earlier decades of the twentieth century persisted if not more articulated, especially with regards to the status of Islam in Indonesian constitutions. Islamist politicians demanded the formal status of their religion in the constitution given the fact that Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, while the secularists maintained that the existing constitution which is religiously neutral represented a conclusive national consensus, since Indonesia is religiously plural country. *Furthermore*, the history of Masyumi also recorded the first political schism between the modernists and the traditionalists, the two major religious schools among Indonesian Muslims. In a closer observation, the split was a logical consequence of the political dilemma lingered in Muslim politics, in which the traditionalists had larger mass-supports especially from rural communities that constitute the major part of Indonesian society but they lacked modern educational qualifications and organizational skills to participate and compete in modern politics, while the modernists on the contrary had more advance political and organizational knowledge and administrative skills but obtained only limited supports among the mass . The modernists, then, tended to dominate the party courses that generated disappointments among the traditionalists who felt they received unfair share. *Finally*, Masyumi policies in the government had been liberal and rational, they welcome foreign capital investments, accepted the status quo of economic dominance of the Westerners and the Chinese, tight fiscal programs, and rationalized—quite successfully—the military and the bureaucracy. This policy style was in contrast to another dominant approach that emphasized the national spirit and identity over economic performance, exemplify by President Sukarno (Bone Jr., 1954).

During transition period of 1945-1949 Masyumi participated and even played major roles in most of transitional cabinets. Only during Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet (1946-1949)

Masyumi refused to join in. This refusal to join the cabinet had caused the first split when PSII as organization-member protested the decision and left the party. The short acquaintance with PSII left dilemmatic political problem for Masyumi in the coming years. One of PSII leaders was S. M. Kartosuwiryo who in 1948 declared an Islamic State /Indonesian Islamic Armed Forces (*Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia*, DI/TII) in West Java. DI/TII rebellion became Achilles' heel for Masyumi, especially when it was in the government, when opposition parties accused it as having secret collaborations with the rebels. In fact, Masyumi leaders publicly denounced and consistently differentiated themselves from the rebellion, yet at the grass root level many Muslims had great difficulties to separate the two, especially in the time when it was still common that political organizations had military wings (van Dijk, 1981).

The new period of Masyumi history began on the 4th National Congress in Yogyakarta 1949, in which it took two important decisions. *Firstly*, it elected Mohammad Natsir (1908-1983) as the executive chairman of the party. Natsir election symbolized the ascension of younger generation of Masyumi leadership, who had western educational backgrounds and with high political and administrative skills. Other figures from this generation that were going to dominate the party included people with high caliber such as Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mohammad Roem, Jusuf Wibisono, and Burhanuddin Harahap. They replaced the older generation whose leadership was set up by the Japanese, designed to garner supports from the mass and not for modern political competitions. *Secondly*, the congress also changed the role of consultative body in the party (*Majelis Syura*) from legislative into advisory body. This decision drew the older leaders further into the background, and gave the younger leaders a full control over the party (Ricklefs, 2002).

After the Dutch eventually recognized Indonesia's full independence on 17 August 1949, a new government was set up with Sukarno as the President of the republic and Mohammad Hatta the Vice President. Continuing the parliamentary tradition of the previous period, Hatta was elected prime minister of the transitional cabinet, and Masyumi received four out of fourteen ministerial posts. When the new parliament was set up in 1950, Masyumi represented the largest faction (Faith, 1962: 128):

The Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia (1950)

PARTY	SEAT
Masyumi	49
PNI (Nationalist Party)	36
PIR	17
PSI (Socialist Party)	17
PKI (Communist Party)	13
Democratic Fraction	13
PRN	10
Catholic Party	9
PARINDRA	8
Labor Party	7
PSII	5
Christian Party (Protestant)	5
Murba (Proletariat Party)	4
Labor Front	4
FKR	4
SKI	3
Peasant Group	2
Independent Members	26
TOTAL	232

One month after Hatta's cabinet resign in August 1950, a new cabinet was formed with Mohammad Natsir of Masyumi as the Prime Minister. Under strong pressures from Masyumi organization members to keep majority portfolios of the cabinet, Natsir failed to negotiate a coalition with PNI and took up an unpopular decision by forming a cabinet that include smaller parties: PSII, PIR, the Catholic, the Christian and Democratic Fraction. However, the cabinet was short-lived because of their unability to build a necessary base for political supports in the parliament and resigned in March 1951, especially under strong critics of PKI, PNI and President Sukarno over the issue of Irian Jaya (west Papua). According to the Round Table Conference agreement (1949), the Netherlands recognized Indonesian territory without Irian Jaya, while Indonesia demanded Irian to be included as it was part of the Dutch colony. Natsir managed to solve the problem through diplomatic way with some options for compromise, while PKI, PNI and Sukarno demanded outright inclusion by the way of mass mobilization and threats of military invasion (Glassburner 1962; Feith, 1962: 146-175).

Yet Masyumi still have another opportunity to form the next cabinet, with Sukiman as the Prime Minister in April 1952. Sukiman was Natsir's rival in Masyumi, represented the older generation of leadership with close relations with Javanese politicians such as Sukarno and PNI leaders. Learned from its previous mistake in excluding PNI, Sukiman formed a coalition cabinet with the second largest party. Yet, Sukiman's strategy in building a strong support in the parliament had to be compensated with other frictions inside the parties, especially with his conspicuously pro-America politics. The first criticism broke when Sukiman ordered mass arrest of communist politicians, activists and symphatizers without informing the military and even many of his cabinet members. According to Faith, the Sukiman action was a result of false intelligence reports combined with his excessive anti-communist sentiment. It was the same sentiment that led him to sign Mutual Security Act (MSA) with the US, in which Indonesia would receive US aids in compensation of Indonesia's participation in promoting the free world. Strong reactions came from inside Masyumi and PNI, which perceived the policy as against the spirit of Indonesia's n neutrality in international politics. Sukiman cabinet resigned in February 1952, after only ten months in power (Glassburner 1962; Feith, 1962: 177-215).

In July 1952 NU disaffiliated from Masyumi as a protest against the party's decision not to re-nominate NU's chairman Wachid Hasyim as the Minster of Religious Affairs and gave NU no ministerial post in the following PNI-led coalition cabinet. Indeed, it was merely a trigger, since there were several factors contributed to the split. *Firstly*, theological divergence between the traditionalist NU and the modernists that dominated Masyumi executive leadership had created latent distrust among the two groups. *Secondly*, the Masyumi decision to confine the role of Consultative Assembly as advisory body was perceived by NU as systematic marginalization of the role of NU senior leaders in the party. *Thirdly*, a strong demand from one of the main Masyumi organization members, Muhammadiyah, which wanted its turn to have Minister of Religious Affairs after three consecutive terms were held by NU. *Fourthly*, there were asymmetrical and dilemmatic divisions of labor and shares of resources between traditionalists and modernist Masyumi leaders. The traditionalists NU commanded large mass-supports from Muslim communities, at least in Java, but with scarce resources of political and administrative skills outside religious affairs. *Fifthly*, personal enmity between NU chairman Wachid Hasyim and Masyumi chairman Natsir after the latter accused the former for mismanaging the shipment of Indonesian pilgrims to Mecca during Sukiman tenure. Since NU exit reduced only seven seats and did not change Masyumi's status

as the largest faction in the parliament, Natsir and other Masyumi leaders seemed quite confidence that the split was harmless for their party (Bone Jr. 1954; Feith, 1962: 233-236).

Meanwhile it is important to note at this point, that observers at that time gave high credits to Masyumi's economic and political performances. On economy, many confirmed that Masyumi provided a major contribution to the economic progress in early period of constitutional democracy.

> Dr. John Sutter; in his extensive descriptive study of Indonesian economic policy, sees the period as being divided into two parts, which are, roughly, the times of political ascendancy of two major factions in the struggle. The period of the first four cabinets, from December 1949, when Dr. Mohammed Hatta took office as Prime Minister, until June 1953, when the cabinet of Mr. Wilopo fell, is referred to by Sutter as "the Masjumi period." He regards it as such in spite of the fact that Dr. Hatta and Mr. Wilopo were not members of the Masjumi political party, because, in his view, during this period the dominating outlook among members of the cabinet was the "Sjafruddin-Masjumi" outlook. (Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was first minister of finance, and later the governor of the Bank of Indonesia. He was also quite consistently the Masjumi party's outstanding spokesman on matters of economic policy. The period following the fall of the Wilopo cabinet is referred to by Sutter as "the PNI period" and as having been dominated in outlook by "the less tolerant ultra-nationalist and socialist politicians (Glassburner, 1962: 114).

An optimistic observer even likened it with US Democratic Party:

> Within the vast, sprawling confederacy of the Masjumi there is more surface unity at present than there has been for months past. 'In some ways the Masjumi resembles the Democratic Party of the United States. It commands the almost automatic allegiance of a certain section of the population, albeit on a religious, not regional, basis. The Masjumi has its conservative wing (Sukiman and Wibisono) and its "New Dealers" (Natsir and Roem). To complete the analogy, Masjumi has even had its "Dixiecrat" revolt in the shape of the Nahdatul Ulama secession of late 1952. Again, as with the Democratic Party at various stages of its history, the Masjumi's opponents gleefully and wishfully continue to predict further schism and even its disintegration (Bone Jr., 1954: 20).

On politics, in the meantime, Herbert Feith also praises Masyumi at this period as the major champion of constitutional democracy. He cites Natsir, when the latter warned his fellow parliamentarians not to loose faith to, and act in consistent with, democratic principles:

> If we want to teach our people to practice parliamentary democracy, let us not make a caricature of democracy… whoever weakens democracy, whoever for group or personal interests undermines its power to serve as the basis for a strong

government, he consciously or unconsciously is quietly arousing a proneness to dictatorship in the hearts of our people (Feith, 1978: 326).

Masyumi obtained a third opportunity to form a government in August 1955 with Burhanuddin Harahap in the premiership post in coalition with other Islamic parties but excluded PNI which fell under strong pressures from the parliament as well as from the military for alleged corruption scandals in the previous cabinet. The main task set to the cabinet was to hold elections for the intended Constituent Assembly which would rewrite the constitution. Indeed, it was the long awaited election since the original schedule was in early decade. Had the election was conducted on schedule, Masyumi would certainly be the winner. However, by the mid 1950s many things had changed, as was Masyumi's fortune. The vote was scheduled at 29 September 1955, preceded by weeks of heightening political tensions among political parties and their supporters, which impacts would last for months after the voting day. The result was surprising in many aspects, especially the surprising success of NU and PKI and the poor performance of Masyumi and PSI. Furthermore, the long awaited elections, which so many Indonesians believed to be able to solve many of national problems, proved to create another episode of political crisis, when parties in the parliament had to adjust to the new political constellations (Bone J. 1955; Pauker 1958; Feith, 1962: 414-459).

The Result of 1955 General Elections

PARTY	PERCENTAGE	SEATS
PNI	22.3	57
Masyumi	20.9	57
NU	18.4	45
PKI	14.4	39
PSII	2.9	8
Christian Party	2.6	8
Catholic Party	2.0	6
PSI	2.0	5
IPKI	1.4	4
PERTI	1.3	4
PRN	0.6	2
Labor Party	0.6	2
GPPS	0.6	2
PRI	0.5	2
PPPRI	0.5	2
Murba Party	0.5	2
BAPERKI	0.5	1
PIR Wongsonegoro	0.5	1
GERINDA	0.4	1
PERMAI	0.4	1
Dayak Party	0.4	1
PIR Hazairin	0.3	1
PPTI	0.2	1
AKUI	0.2	1
PRD	0.2	1
PRIM	0.2	1
ACOMA	0.2	1
Prawirodirdjo & Associates	0.1	1
Others	2.7	0
TOTAL	**100**	**257**

Analysts did notice that Masyumi was getting frustrated by the new course of political development—the dissolve of the parliament, and the increasingly strong triangle of the President, the Army and PKI—that pushed aside parties from the political stage, and electoral result and the existing institutional settings which it perceived blocked its future electoral success. *Firstly*, the 1955 electoral performance was shocking for Masyumi, as it had high expectations of success. The exit of NU in 1952 posed no significant problem for Masyumi leaders, and they doubted the traditionalists' capability to organize party and mobilize voters.

Coincidentally, Masyumi held the government position in election time, and Burhanuddin Harahap made sure that the polls were held in due time. Even the prime minister who visited Pakistan before the election predicted that his party was expected to win 40 to 50 percent. Thus the final result that it only got runner up position with only 20 percent—with PNI in the first place, NU in close third position and even PKI loomed not far in the fourth, while its ideological ally PSI was far behind won only 2 percent of vote—was shocking. Initially, it could maintain the disappointment when PSI was excluded from the Ali Cabinet by demanding that PKI must not be involved. In the following months it became apparent that Ali intended to dominate the cabinet, undermining the fact that Masyumi had equal seats. In the parliament, PNI took the speaker position when its candidate defeated Masyumi, and Ali seemed determined to get rid of Masyumi's supporters whenever he could. He blocked any minister of former Harahab cabinet from entering his cabinet, and expelled Masyumi and PSI men from strategic positions (Teik, 1972: 233-234).

In the Constituent Assembly, Masyumi also failed to win the first position and lost from PNI, which also took the leadership of the Assembly after defeating the NU's candidate. Masyumi could not threaten to leave the cabinet because of the possibility of PNI-NU-PKI coalition that would form a majority in the parliament. Masyumi leaders soon realized that the existing institutional settings—PR electoral system and Unicameral legislature—would cause a permanent defeat for their party. The most dominant leaders of the party who happened to be non-Javanese—Natsir, S. Prawiranegara, and B. Harahap are Sumatrans—seemed convinced that Javanese voters tended to vote for the Javanese parties—PNI, NU, PKI. The political situation was so pessimistic for Masyumi which until the election believed to be the largest party (Teik, 1972: 234-235). Concluding Masyumi situation, an observer wrote:

> Masjumi's dilemma was self-evident. Its continuation in the Sastroamidjojo cabinet was futile given PNI's refusal to share power equitably. Threatening to quit was equally futile since Sastroamidjojo could resort to another alignment without losing his government's parliamentary majority. Planning for larger margins at future elections would be a waste of resources in view of the Javanese voter's stubborn ethnic loyalty. Masjumi's leaders did not know what precise course of action to pursue but in the months after March 1956, they were very evidently restless (Teik, 1972: 236-37).

Teik even suggests that this political catastrophe had caused Masyumi's leaders to lose their confidence and trust in the constitutional principles. In the party conference in December 1956, it passed a bill that Sastroamijoyo's cabinet could not be maintained. And Natsir proposed for a new cabinet under Hatta—presumably in an effort to find opportunity to get a

fair political share. However, the maneuver in fact undermined democratic values Masyumi championed in the previous period.

> Perhaps he was not conscious of it but by advocating a Hatta-led cabinet, Natsir was undermining confidence in the legitimacy and utility of democracy. Hatta was not a member of any political party and he did not contest the parliamentary election. By demanding that Hatta be made Prime Minister, Natsir was insisting by implication that fame was a more valid source of political authority than the mandate of the people (Teik, 1962: 241).

In March 1957, when PNI-led post-election cabinet resign, Sukarno declared martial law and dissolved the parliament, and proposed his infamous Guided Democracy, and installed non-party cabinets. Masyumi, under the leadership of Natsir refused to join the cabinets, and vehemently denounced the Guided Democracy as unconstitutional. The martial law was in fact suggested by the newly (re)elected Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. A. H. Nasution who wanted to put order in his chain of commands, especially against rebellious regional military units. Infuriated and threatened by Nasution maneuvers, a number of senior army officers led by Col. Zulkifli Lubis and Col. M. Simbolon declared a Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI, *Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*) in Bukit Tinggi - West Sumatra in February 1958.   This was supported by Col. Ventje Samual who declared PERMESTA (*Piagama Perjuangan Semesta Alam*, Universal Declaration of Struggle) in the eastern province of Moluccas a few days later. It was soon known that national civil politicians were involved in PRRI, including Masyumi top leaders Mohammad Natsir, Burhanuddin Harahap and Sjafrudin Prawiranegara. The rebels gave the central government five days ultimatum with three demands: the cabinet must be dissolved, the vice president Mohammad Hatta and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Yogyakarta must be appointed to form a business cabinet until elections were held, and Sukarno must return to his constitutional position as figurehead President. In response, Nasution acted decisively and by May 1958 the rebel head quarter was taken over, and the rebel leaders surrendered and were taken to Jakarta and imprisoned. Nasution also banned Masyumi, PSI and Christian Party in all regions where they supported the rebellion (For detail account of PRRI/PERMESTA, see H. Feith and D. Lev, 1963; Doeppers, 1972).

Meanwhile, in the Constituent Assembly that was inaugurated on 10 September 1956, Masyumi with other Muslim party—NU, PSII, Perti, PPTI, AKUI—engaged in heated debates with nationalists and communists in efforts to rewrite the constitution. Initially, the debates were three partite involving Islamic, nationalists and Marxist ideological aspirations.

However, given the solidity of the Islamic block in pushing their agenda to invest Islam in the constitution, the Nationalists and Marxists came into a single block and the debates evolved into antagonism between Islamic and secular ideology. The political disagreements had been protracted, and the political deadlocks in the Assembly sessions were lasted for two years without any indication for possible compromise. In May 1959 the Assembly voted for the inclusion of seven words of The Jakarta Charter which would make Indonesian Muslims subject to Sharia law, which ended in another deadlock as it failed to achieve two third quorum. Annoyed by the prolonged squabbles Sukarno dissolved the Assembly and issued a decree to return to the original 1945 constitution, again with the full support from the military. The Jakarta Charter was included in the preamble of the constitution but with the seven words obliging Muslims to comply with Sharia Law omitted (Feith, 1962: 597-608).

The involvement of Masyumi top leaders in PRRI rebellion shattered Masyumi irrecoverably. It was reported that Sukiman, then the chairman of the party's advisory body, proposed to expel Natsir, Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahab from the party for their involvement in PRRI, but to no avail. Natsir still had a popular image among Masyumi rank and files and grass root members. He even retained his position of the chairman up to one year after the rebellion. However, the party would soon meet its final destiny. Its leaders' long enmity with President Sukarno, its persistent rejection of Guided Democracy, as well as its leaders' involvement in PRRI rebellion, contributed to the final sealing of its history. In August 1960, the government banned the party (Ricklefs, 1981: 256).

4. CONCLUSSION

The previous paragraphs in this chapter discuss the roles of ideology and institutional setting in the history of two major islamist political organizations in Indonesian history, i.e. Sarekat Islam which operated in Indonesian politics during the emergence of nationalist movement in colonial era and the and Masyumi which was present and participated in political system after national independence. Using North theory of new institutionalism to analyze the structure of the behavior of the political parties, by taking the influence of ideology and institution into account, this chapter find a number of parallel features in SI and Masyumi.

Firstly, both SI and Masyumi were Islamist, that is, they adopted Islam as political worldview, advocated Islamic values and teachings as the solution for the existing political problems, and used Islam to mobilize support from the mass. In the case of SI, the significance of Islam as the base for the organization was clear in its name, that the organization was advanced to pursue Islamic values, and that Islam was a solution for

Muslims problems. Even when it changed its organizational course from trade into political organization, its ideological orientation did not change. Similarly, in the case of Masyumi, Islam was the fundamental identity, symbol and rhetoric—perhaps more than SI. Masyumi was formally a federation of major Muslim organizations in the country, and represented political aspirations for Indonesian Muslims. Masyumi's programs were also marked by its Islamist tone, and quite ambitious, to promote Islam as the base of Indonesian constitution.

Secondly, although both parties adopted Islam as identity, program, rhetoric, and symbols, SI and Masyumi accentuated different discourses of Islam, in line with structural contexts in which they emerged and operated. SI was founded at the height of the colonial era, when the Duct eventually took control conclusively to the archipelago, and applied colonial policy characterized by economic exploitation, political repression and social and cultural discrimination. In such contexts, SI leaders perceived that Islam provides solution to get rid from those maladies. Islam teaches equality, that ones should be judged according to their religious piety and not according to their ethnicity or nationality. On politics, Islam promotes the rights of people to participate in collective decision making, hence Islam promotes democracy and against imperialism. Islam also emphasizes social solidarity, and since natural resources belong to God they should be shared equally among members of the society. Hence Islam is anti colonialism. Meanwhile, having emerged and operated in different structural milieu, Masyumi emphasized a different Islamist discourse. Masyumi emerged in post colonial time of post WW II, in which the structural political context was the combination of a need to find national identity and the abundance international influences in the form of ideological rivalries between Western Democracy plus Capitalism and Eastern Communism. In such contexts, Masyumi's founders believed that Islam was the best alternative, since on the one hand it had rooted in Indonesian history and traditions, and on the other hand it contained all the positive elements found in both Democracy and Communism and devoid of their weakness. Islam provides a system of consultation and deliberation in collective decision making, hence Islam is democratic. Islam also guarantees individual rights to own properties and pursue economic enterprises; hence Islam is in accords with capitalism. Yet Islam strictly sanctions social equality and collective duty of the society to take care of the needy and the powerless, hence Islam matches Communism.

Thirdly, the political behavior of SI and Masyumi did not only reflect their Islamist orientations but were also parallel with the existing institutional settings. In a striking parallel manner, SI and Masyumi tended to behave moderately and proactively in the system in which the existing institutional settings were advantageous and accommodative to their aspirations,

and their positions ascended in political constellations and their influence on the public expanded. During 1914-1918 when its memberships expanded rapidly, SI vowed its loyalty to the colonial government and actively participated in the *Volksraad* in line with the facts that the government promised greater political roles for indigenous Indonesians. However, after the government changed its course upside down and started implementing strict controls on nationalist movements, combined with internal frictions and the exit of the Marxist faction that severely weaken SI organization and reduced its public supports, SI started to launch reactive and radical policy by withdrawing its participation in the *Volksraad* and even adopted Pan-Islamic political programs, to join with nationalist movements in other Muslim lands to expel colonial powers and to gain full independence. In a similar manner, during 1950-1955, Masyumi acted proactively and rationally in advocating constitutional democracy and in formulating pragmatic political and economic policies. This was the period when political parties enjoyed an upper hand position in Indonesian politics when the president was confined by the constitution merely as a symbolic figurehead with little political capacity and the military suffered from internal frictions. However, when the political constellation changed— when its electoral achievement was shockingly poor and thus its portion in parliamentary politics was significantly reduced, the president collaborated with the military by imposing martial law and pushing political parties to the background of national politics and economy—Masyumi's leaders started to loose their confidence in the existing system, so they proposed maneuvers that contradict constitutional wisdoms, and even participated in open rebellions against the government.

CHAPTER III
FROM CAMPUESES TO THE PARLIAMENT:
THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF PKS

1. INTRODUCTION

As is discussed in the previous chapters, ideology did not drive political behaviors independently, but rather in combinations with formal institutions. Ideology and institution are two sides of the same coin in affecting political behaviors of Sarekat Islam and Masyumi, two major Muslim political organizations in the Indonesian history. In the history of the two parties, ideology worked in combination with institutional settings, it informs the parties' leaders about the conditions of their political environments. Moreover, ideology does not necessarily inspire political actors to act irrationally, although it might as well. In tracking the history of political behaviors of Islamist political organizations, the previous chapters found that ideology works in combination with institutional setting, in informing actors about the situation in the environment and supply alternative options to survive and to get benefits in doing transaction and cooperation. Actors' trust to the rules of the game tended to be strong when—through ideology—they perceived that the system was beneficial; and the trust tended to weaken when the actors saw no opportunities for their sustainable benefit in participating in the system.

In this chapter, I discuss the historical development that led into the formation of PKS from the perspective of Northian institutionalism. As in the previous chapter, the focus is on explaining the role played by ideological drives and inspirations, in relation with the existing institutional settings and competition opportunities in structuring historical developments of PKS. The first part of the article will discuss the origin of PKS, i.e. the history and development of Tarbiyah Movement, followed by a section on the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as the ideological progenitor of the movement. The later part will deal with the chronological account of the formation of the Justice Party (PK), its participation in the election and early experience in real political battlefield of the parliament. Finally, this chapter will discuss the transformation of PK into PKS, after the former was unable to pass the electoral threshold to be present in the next elections. This continued with discussion on PKS electoral success and its taking part into coalition government.

1.1. Theories of Political Party's Life Cycle

Before discussing PKS history, it is useful at this point to introduce theories formulatee by scholars of party studies in understanding the historical development of political party. As will become clearer in the next chapters, a political party is a distinct organization with unique structure that combine organizational properties of business firm, voluntary organization and governmental bureau (see Chapter V). The unique characteristic of a party organization has made a political party evolve in a distinct pattern, and gone through a distinct life cycle. As long as the organizational aspect is concerned, there is one fundamental factor that significantly affects party functions. This is what Panebianco calls "degree of institutionalization" and "degree of systemness", which refers to the party's ability to cope with changing environments and at the same time maintaining its identity and objectives. It must be kept in mind, following Panebianco's line of argument, that those two tasks are not easy to tackle since they are in fact are of opposite directions. And he calls this an organizational dilemma. If it sticks consistently to its identity and objectives, the risk of the party is that its survival will not last in the face of changing environments; yet if it is willing to adapt to the dynamic surroundings it takes the risk of losing its identity and departure from its original objectives. A strongly institutionalized party is one that is able to maintain its organizational identity—as a mean to achieve certain objectives—while coming to terms with the changing environment; and the weakly institutionalized party needs to make a trade off between identity and survival (Panebianco: 1988: 11-14)

In a chronological manner, there are four stages of developments in a party history that are substantial in affecting its degrees of institutionalization and systemness. *Firstly*, societal origin that provides basic orientation for party. Party scholars have documented that different societal setting affects the way political parties work in quite different manners. A traditional society, in which the dominant social and cultural characters are hierarchical, tend to produce '*cliental party*' in which the party is run by a handful of elites in the community, its objectives is to maintain the existing societal structures, and it woos support from the community through material incentives. A modernizing society that experiences rapid industrialization and urbanization, in which the society is divided by interest-based groupings, tend to produce 'mass-integration party', which objectives are to reform the society according to the value of certain societal group, and therefore its orientation is ideological and mobilizing support from certain segments in society by exploiting ideological appeal. Lastly, an urbanized or modernized society, in which sufficient degree of welfare services are available and mass communications are common, the party which emerges tend to be a 'catch-all' party, a

pragmatic type of a party which objectives are to promote social and economic amelioration and mobilize political support from all segments of society (Gunter and Diamond, 2003: 169-170).

Secondly, *the genetic factor* or the process by which a political party was created. According to Panebianco in his classic book on party organizations, *Political Parties: Organization and Power* (1988) there are three different processes of genesis of political party, each will influence the way the party work in significantly different way: one is *territorial penetration*, a process in which a political party was created "from above", when the first branch being formed was the national party center that subsequently creates or stimulates the development of periphery or the lower level branches. This genetic model will produce a centralistic and highly institutionalized party, in which the party central leadership holds strong power and control over its lower branches. This is because the central leadership is relatively solid and was established before the development of party branches. Two is the *territorial diffusion*, which is the opposite of the previous model in which party organization was created "bottom up", when a group of regional political organizations agree to form a central party leadership. Party that was created in this way tend to have decentralized and less institutionalized organization, since the real authority is in the hand of regional organizations which existed before the creation of the central office and tend to be independent of it. Three is the *combination* between territorial penetration and diffusion. For example, a number of regional organizations agreed to form a national party organization, which subsequently created or stimulated the formation of lower level party branches. In this case, organizational centrality and its degree of institutionalization are in between of those model above, because there are three different organizations: the original initiators, the central office, and party branches created or stimulated by central office, that make it less centralized and institutionalized than territorial diffusion model but more so than territorial diffusion (Panebianco, 1988: 50-51).

Thirdly, organizational factor important for the development of political party pertains with the source of legitimacy. Two factors are at stake, namely whether or not there is external sponsor of party organization and whether or not there is a charismatic leader in the party. If such an external sponsor exists, Panebianco argues, the party will be conceived as "political arm" of the sponsoring body, and will lead into the question of party's loyalty in which the party's loyalty and legitimacy. In this case, party's loyalty will be primarily to the external organization and only secondarily to the party, and the external sponsor will become the primary source of legitimacy for the party's leaderships, in term that every major decision

taken by party leaders need to be approve by the external sponsor. Interestingly, Penebianco notes the different between national or domestic-external sponsor and international-external sponsor. National or domestic external sponsor will undermine party organizational functions, and therefore weaken party organizational institutionalization since the sponsor will exercise control over it; but international-sponsor—typical for Communist party—tend to strengthen party institutionalization since the sponsor has an interest of the party high degree institutionalization to minimize other external influences. The next factor which influences party organizational performance is the presence or absence of a charismatic leader. If such a leader exists, the party will depend very much on him or her in which every major decision taken by party leaders need to have his/her approval. Instead of competing to propose the best programs and policies, party leaders will compete against each other to be close to, and favored by, the charismatic leader and hence undermines organizational procedures (Panebianco, 1988: 52-53)

Fourthly, party organization will be going through a process of "organizational maturity" in the form of the institutionalization and establishment of organizational structures and mechanism. Typically, yet quite controversially, the organizational maturity is characterized by the formation of 'party oligarchy', in which a small number of leaders dominate the control over the party organization. This theory was originated by Robert Michels, who deems oligarchic tendency in party organization as inevitable, and dubs it as an iron law for party organizations. The oligarchic tendency of party organization is unavoidable because of the logic of the fundamental factors in the organization. One is technical factor, in which to become effective in making decision and reacting to new situations, it is necessary that the decision making be in the hand of small group of leaders who will be able to react and coordinate in better way. Two is sociological factor, in which the mass or party members and symphatizers tend to need strong leaders and they tend to venerate their leaders, because the mass need a sense of security. They are also inclined to convince themselves that their leaders are strong and capable. Three is psychological factor, in which party leaders themselves will be motivated to develop an oligarchic organization, in order to get a more stable position and to secure greater material and prestige rewards from their positions (Michels, 2001)

2. ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUNDS

2.1 The Origin: Tarbiyah Movement

Like SI and Masyumi in the past, PKS developed from a semi-political organization, named Tarbiyah Movement (*Gerakan Tarbiyah*), a loosely organized Islamic movement popular among younger Muslims in Indonesia in 1970s-1980s, especially among university students. It was conspicuously very popular among students of secular universities and schools in which religious subjects were not studied, and less popular in religious educational institutions in which religious subjects were formally taught. Initially, it was a network of extracurricular study groups among Muslim students to study religious subjects, such as Qur'an and *Hadits* (prophetic traditions), Islamic Law (*Sharia* and *Fiqih*), and history of Islam etc. By late 1980s such study groups became a trend among university students. Major universities, usually state-owned, also became centers for Tarbiyah movement. Some of them even developed well-known centers of religious activism—such as the Community of Salman Mosque in of Bandung Institute of Technology in West Java, and Shalahuddin Communion in Gadjahmada University of Yogyakarta—which influenced the spread well beyond their university campuses (Azis *et al*., 1996).

There are several theories on the origin of the movement. *The first theory* conceives that Tarbiyah movement was a further development of the movement initiated by student activists in Salman Mosque of Bandung Institute of Technology. The Salman Mosque was founded in May 1972, after years of efforts to establish a mosque in the institute back in 1960 had been hampered by the campus authority. The initial idea to build a mosque and to develop an Islamic community among students was to facilitate Muslim students in observing religious duties such as daily prayers, and also to organize a Muslim community in the campus. Muslim students—many of whom came rural and traditional communities across the country to study in Bandung (the capital of West Java which in colonial era was known as *Paris van Java*)—felt that something was missing from their life when they lived in a secular campus located in secular urban environment and were doing mainly secular activities. They were longing for the warmth of religious atmosphere and community.

However, the early 1960s was an era when the Indonesian Communist Party was on the rise and the military was still traumatic with Muslim politics (Masyumi, PRRI, DI/TII), therefore developing an Islamic community in a strategic university campus was not easy. After more than a decade of efforts, Bandung Institute of Technology founded a campus mosque named Salman Al-Farisi, or known simply as Salman Mosque. One of its founders was Dr. Imaduddin Abdul Rahim—a.k.a. *Bang Imad* or Brother Imad—who was the secretary

of International Islamic Federation of Student Organization and involved in various international activities at that period (Naipul, 200: 7-25). Bang Imad introduced to Salman community the thoughts and organizational traditions of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwan al-Muslimun*) that was to influence heavily the way Salman Mosque community organized its activities. More than merely a place of religious rituals, the Mosque evolved into a center of Islamic society. It provided various services for its members and Muslim community outside the campus, such as education, marriage consultancies, and even banking system. And it was soon became a model and replicated in various universities in the country (Djamas, 1989: 207-86).

Interestingly, the history of the origin and development of Muslim student community in Salaman Mosque was quite in tone with the theory of the paradox of modernity and the Islamic revival, put forward by Eickelman and Piscatory in their classic study on the modern Muslim politics (see, Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 5-20). The classical formulation of modernization theories perceive that diversifications of economy and institutionalization of politics were *sine qua non* of modernization process. This process is best pursued through the advancement of specialized educations and trainings, by developing western-model educational institutions. Moreover, the argument also states that modernity was inevitably going to remove traditional structures in society. Religion, as part of traditional cultural and societal system, would be inevitably pushed aside by the modernization process. This view— and some other variations—were adopted by many policy makers in the Muslim world in directing their national development.

However, the difference between traditions and modernity was proved not so clear cut. When Muslims in various countries from Egypt to Iran, from Turkey to Pakistan to Malaysia and Indonesia developed modern educational systems, educated Muslims had abandoned neither their religion nor their tradition. On the contrary, modernization instigated a rejuvenation of religious sentiments. Eickelman and Piscatory call this process: 'Objectification of Muslim Consciousness', which consist of three simultaneous elements. *Firstly*, modernization of education system introduced modern sciences to Muslim students that provide systematic understanding of reality. This enabled them to systematize their understandings of Islam, endorsed them to perceive Islam not merely as traditions they inherited from their parents but as a way of life (*manhaj*) to be pursued systematically, as well as to be differentiated—and in some occasion to be defended—from non-Islamic systems of life. Instead of weakening, modern educations strengthen Muslims religious understanding and sentiments. *Secondly*, education and economic modernization brought also the

development of mass publications that disseminated effectively religious teachings far beyond the capabilities of traditional religious propagation institutions. Mass publications of religious materials facilitated instant Islamisation of the society. *Thirdly*, institutionalization of politics attracted Muslims to participate and take control of the symbolic productions of Muslim politics. When the impact of objectification of religious consciousness had become visible among Muslim community, they naturally need institutionalized channels for their inspirations and interests in political sphere, and gradually new generations of politicians and political organizations entered the arena and compete for power on behalf of the new Muslim generation (Eickelman and Piscatory, 1996: 5-20).

The second theory of the genesis of the Tarbiyah movement argues that it was not a new story of Islamic activism in Indonesia, but rather a direct continuation of the previous ones. They were the fruits from a tree planted through systematic religious propagation programs organized by Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (*Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia*, DDII), founded by former Masyumi leaders such as M. Natsir, M. Roem, and S. Prawiranegara. By the late 1960s, Masyumi politicians pursued different public activities: some of them founded DDII as a new vehicle to promote Islamic interests when the new regime thwarted their reentering politics. Another group, mostly from second level leaderships, were allowed by the military establishment to form a new political party namely Indonesian Muslims Party (Parmusi) and to compete in the election. Finally, the younger generation of Masyumi activists took pragmatist way by joining the regime through Golkar or its filial organizations (Fealy and Platzdasch, 2005). Natsir was also active in religious activities at the international level, when he assumed several key positions in international Islamic organizations and enjoyed vast recognition in the Islamic world. DDII played significant roles in facilitating the establishment of Tarbiyah movement. Firstly, DDII actively contributed in building and developing mosques and Islamic communities in secular campuses, which then constitute Tarbiyah network. Secondly, DDII was assigned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to organize scholarships to Middle Eastern universities, especially to Egypt and and Saudi Arabia. Among the students sent by DDII was Abdi Sumaiti a.k.a. Abu Ridho who was to became the ideologue and key figures in Tarbiyah movement and PKS. Lastly, DDII translated and published works of major modern Middle Eastern authors, including Hassan Al-Banna, Sayyid Qutub and Said Hawwa, whose books became the canon for Tarbiyah members (Furkon, 2005).

This theory resembles Imaduddin Shahin's thesis on the ascent of Muslim political movements in North African post-colonial Muslim countries. According to Shahin's study on

contemporary Islamist political organizations in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, Islam was the main pillar of the society and politics in those countries before and during colonial era. In Tunisia it was represented by traditional *ulama* who took control over *Sharia* court and educational institutions; in Algeria represented by Sufi leaders and their mystical orders (*tariqat*); while in Morocco was a combination between the Sultanate, the *ulama* and the Sufis. During the period of struggles for independence from French colonial occupations in those countries, the Muslim leaders contributed significant tasks in mobilizing mass support for the struggles. However, in the post colonial governments they were denied political rights, even were systematically discriminated and marginalized by the status quo in their respective countries.

In Tunisia, the government under the president Habib Burguiba launched secularization program, focusing on economic productivity and development. Although his secularization program was not as explicit as that in Turkey that ban religion in any public activity, he took over traditional religious and education institutions and imposed government ultra-rational interpretations on religion that rendered it as merely an instrument for economic development. In Algeria, a similar scenario was also set up, in which the government took over traditional religious institutions, marginalized the traditional ulama, and imposed socialist-interpretation of religion. The President, Houari Boumedina, expressed his idea on socialist national policy that religion would be useless for Algerians when they were still in overwhelmed poverty and backwardness (Shahin, 1998: 47). Lastly, in Morocco, the manipulation and coercion of religious institutions followed by marginalization toward the ulama who contributed to national liberation was also conducted by King Hassan. He put all religious activities under the state's controls and auspices and published official religious journals as the standard religious reading materials for the mass, and appointed religious leaders and preachers and made sure they would follow the government's guidelines. The king even reportedly said, that he as the *Amirul Mu'minin* (the chief of the faithful, the title of Islamic Caliph) has the duty to defend Islam against everything, including the ulamas.

Against these backdrops of political marginalization by the political status quo, Muslim political activists in the North African countries turned their activism from politics to *da'wa*, especially targeting younger and more educated generations. They founded small but solid organizations, focused their activities in social services helping people, and gained popularity. In Tunisia, they founded *Harakat Nahda* (Awakening Movement) that emerged in the 1970s and dominated Tunisian politics in the 1980s; in Algeria various small organizations eventually merged in *Front Islamique du Salut* (Islamic Salfation Front) which

surprising electoral win in 1990 and the government violent rejection has become an archetype of Islamist political organization and its participation in democratic politics. And in monarchic Morocco, various Islamist groups also emerged and articulated the political interests of new Muslim generation, especially *Harakatul Islah wat Tajdid al-Maghribiyah* (The Movement of Reform and Renewal) led by Abdul Karim Muthi', and *Al-Adl wal Ikhsan* (Justice and Benevolence) led by Abdel Salam Yassin.

The third theory of the origin of Tarbiyah community, suggests that Tarbiyah movement was initiated by Indonesian students who had just returned from the Middle East in the 1980s. It was at the height of the government effort to contain Islamic radicalism and political activism among university students. Since the mass riots in Jakarta January 1974, following student demonstration rallies against government corruptions and unreserved invitations to foreign investments to build capital-intensive industries that devastated traditional labor-intensive economies, the government launched policies to thwart university students' involvements in politics. Historians have recorded that the riots was in fact a pretext of intra-military conflict between anti-Suharto professional army generals vs. pro-Suharto business-generals which was won by the latter. In line with the policy of depoliticizing the mass, the government curbed university students, who had shown expressive discontents .Government decrees banned political activities in university campuses ratified in April and May 1978, the so called Normalisation of Campuses' Life/Student Coordination Body (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus/Badan Koordinasi Kemahasiswaan*, NKK/BKK). The government agued it wanted to protect the students from irresponsible influences that could distract them from their main activities of studying (Scwarz, 1999: 33-35; Kingsbury, 2002: 84-86).

Simultaneously the government and the military also launched operations to strengthen their power domination by secretly reviving the banned DI/TII remnants, and then violently crushed them to discredit Islamic politics. The 1970s was a crucial era for Suharto government in its effort to establish total control over the countries politics. Several senior former members of DI/TII were approached by Indonesian intelligence service (BAKIN) and were suggested to reconsolidate their organization to anticipate the reemergence of Communist groups. ICG report writes:

> Through the intelligence agency, BAKIN, former Darul Islam fighters, primarily but not exclusively from Java, who had been incorporated into the Indonesian army and government, were persuaded to contact their old comrades. The argument provided by BAKIN was that, with the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in

danger of Communist infiltration across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and that only the reactivation of Darul Islam could protect Indonesia. Whether through coercion or money or a combination of both, a number of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government had arrested 185 people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organisation called *Komando Jihad*, committed to following the ideals of Kartosuwirjo and establishing the Islamic state of Indonesia (NII). In realty, the Komando Jihad was Ali Moertopo's creation (ICG: 2002: 5).

In such a situation, Muslim students were under double threats from the regime, i.e. as the generation of Muslim activists and as university students. It seemed this situation that led into the creation of an organization for Muslim students that would avoid government repressions but were still capable to focus its concerns about Muslim political aspirations at the same time. This theory reports that the movement was initiated by graduates of the Middle East universities who returned to Indonesia in the early 1980s, which included Hilmy Aminuddin, Salim Segaf Aljufri, Abdullah Said Baharmus, and Acep Abdul Syukur. Initially, they seemed to have difficult times with the authority, and Hilmy Aminuddin was detained but no further information is provided of the reason. When the situation was getting better, those activists reorganize their movement and organize their activities more systematically. Among the early figures who joined the movement were Abdi Sumaithi, Yusuf Supendi and Rahmat Abdullah. The main targets of recruitment were highs school and university students. Utilizing campuses' mosques as the save haven to express student religious and political activism, they organized a network of Islamic study clubs in major universities that evolved into Tarbiyah movement, following the ideological and organizational pattern of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Salman, 2006: 189-1990).

The last scenario does not sound unique, as the Middle East has constantly influenced the dynamics of Indonesian Islam. Already in 1880, a Dutch prominent scholar Christian Snouck Hurgronje wrote that the city of Mecca for Indonesian Muslims was like the heart for a human limb; it pumped blood of fresh ideas to the whole populace of Muslim in Indonesia. In previous centuries, it functioned as arteries through which fresh ideas from the Middle East traveled into Indonesian archipelago, as the Mecca was where the pilgrims annually gathered in the holy city of Mecca in the 12th month of Muslim calendar, and returned back to Indonesia with updated news about developments and trends in various parts of the Islamic world (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005: 47). A historian of Indonesian politics wrote:

The holy city had a more than usual attraction for Indonesians. Snouck Hurgronje, who visited Mecca in 1885, remarked that the "Jawas" there were distinguished by their scorn for their own half-pagan country, and their naive respect for the idealized land where all institutions were presumed to be in accordance with the law of the Prophet. The pilgrimage was the principal source of foreign ideas for nineteenth century Indonesians, particularly those outside Java. Though the majority of "Jawas" spent only a few weeks in the Hejaz, they made contact there with the remarkably large number of their countrymen residing semi permanently in Mecca, who had come to share the international and distinctly anti-colonial outlook of the holy city.' (Reid, 1967: 269)

Moreover, many of these pilgrims were students who stayed in the Middle East for given periods of time, before they returned to their homeland with the newest religious discourses they learned. In the first decade of the 19th century, a number of returned pilgrims brought back puritanical interpretation developed by Ibnu Abdul Wahab—the founder of Wahabi—to Western Sumatra and initiated a religious reform (Reid, 1967: 272-273). In the early 20th century, other returnees brought Islamic modernism advanced by Egyptian Muhammad Abduh and founded Muhammadiyah. In the 1970s Saudi government intensified their contributions in propagating Islam in Indonesia, partly because of the abundance petrodollars and partly as an effort to hamper the spreading influence of Iranian Islamic Revolutions. Through various agencies, government and privates, they provided scholarships and other financial grants. It established the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) that has made efforts to spread the message of Islam in the Islamic world, and also supported the installation of Indonesian branches of Saudi-based international organization, such as OIC and WAMY. In 1980 the Saudi Government set up the Indonesian Institute for Islamic and Arabic Sciences, *Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab*, or LIPIA (Bubalo and Fealy, 2005: 55). The institution effectively became a channel for transmitting religious ideas and ideologies from the Middle East, not only that a-political Salafi tradition from Saudi, but also Palestinian Hizbut Tahrir, and Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.

2.2. The Inspiration: Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

It seems quite save at this point to opine the three theories as complementary, instead of competing, namely that religious objectification among educated-urban-Muslim generation, strategic shift of Muslim activists from politics to religious propagation, as well as influences from the dynamics of religious discourses in the Middle East were simultaneously contributed to the emergence of the *Tarbiyah* movement.

What is clear was that the Tarbiyah movement developed into more synchronized networks, if with loose organizational structures, and more expressively avowing the ideology of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*), a religious-political organization founded by Hassan Al-Banna (1906-1949) in Egypt in 1928. Considering its important influence to Tarbiyah movement, it is worth a lengthy exposition. Initially, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted the ideology of *salafi* movement advocated by an Egyptian intellectual Rashid Ridha—who revised the original and more liberal version advanced by his mentor Muhammad Abduh, into more conservative and apologist tones—to reform the society's social, economic and political conditions by returning into the authentic teachings of Islam based on Qur'an and the Hadits, which were rational and practical, as were exemplified by earlier generations of Muslims (the *Salaf*). They believed that Islam provided all necessary requirements of social developments provided that the Muslims followed the correct understanding of their religion. At the same time, they refused and denounced traditional religious interpretations represented by Al-Azhar religious establishment which were too much preoccupied with impractical and obsolete scholastic teachings irrelevant to current events, as well as liberal-westernized thinkers who were keen to accept anything western that undermined Islamic identity (Lia, 1998: 76-79).

However, different from other *salafi* movements which were commonly apolitical, Muslim Brotherhood was explicitly advocating political issues in their objectives and programs. Moreover, it adopted organizational structure that was also uncommon among *salafi* organizations, i.e. by combining military-like hierarchical structures and chain of commands and Sufi-Orders style of secretive networks and absolute obedience to the leader. Some analysts mistakenly argue that Al-Banna imitated the organizational structure of European fascism that combined militarism and absolute compliance to the leader:

> From Italy's Fascists, al-Banna borrowed the idea of unquestioning loyalty to a charismatic leader, modeling the slogan of his paramilitary organization--"action, obedience, silence"--on Mussolini's injunction to "believe, obey, fight." Taking a cue from the Nazis, he placed great emphasis on the Muslim Brotherhood's youth wing and on the marriage of the physical and the spiritual, of Islam with activism. Unsurprisingly, al-Banna also taught his followers to expect not encouragement but repression from traditional Islamic authorities (Fukuyama and Samin, 2002).

However, a closer look to al-Banna personal backgrounds will give more accurate information. Al-Bana first organizational experience was in Sufi order, al-Hasafiyah group, in which he became a fully initiated member when he was only sixteen (Mitchell, 1969: 3-4).

There were two basic characters of Sufi organization: firstly it was secretive, because it taught esoteric knowledge that should have been kept secret and limited to selected individuals; and secondly it was hierarchical, in which it required an absolute obedience of the members or disciples to the spiritual master. It was more plausible to consider Sufi order tradition as the inspiration for al-Banna in constructing Brotherhood organization. Besides, Brotherhood activities exhibited clearly imprints of Sufi tradition, such as reciting formulations of prayers and meditation, although Al-Banna never considered himself a spiritual master in a Sufi tradition sense of the term.

To realize his political vision, al-Banna created cell-like groups called *Usrah*, through which the organization carried out its recruitments and indoctrination programs. These organizational structures were created following organizational crisis in 1931-1932, when a number of prominent members challenged al-Banna leadership, but failed. This forced the groups to resign. The structure assured al-Banna's domination in the organization: on the one hand the military-like hierarchy and compliance created a solid and effective organizational mechanism and decision makings, on the other hand cell-like organs provided a decentralized autonomy of its branches and localized any possible problem, for example when a leader was arrested it would not caused any problem to other cells. Finally, the Brotherhood also developed a sustainable financial source for its organization by creating joint-stock companies in which only members were allowed to buy shares, to ensure its financial independence and prevent external intervention (Lia, 97-98).

During the World War II, when the British military occupied Egypt, seized the Suez Canal and forced the Ottoman-backed monarch to install pro-British government, created social unrest and severed economic hardships, the Brotherhood created a military wing in spite of al-Banna' insistences for non-violence policy. When the first Arab-Israeli war broke in 1948, following the creation of the state of Israel and annexation of Palestine land, the Brotherhood participated actively in fund rising and its military units were involved in various combat operations. During post-war turmoil period, the Brotherhood grew rapidly and was able to put its pressure on the government. In December 1948 the government charged the Brotherhood of accumulating weapons and bombs for a revolution, and issued a decree dissolving it. Al-Banna and other leaders vehemently rejected the accusation, and sporadic conflicts sparked between the Brotherhood and government security units.

When in February 1949, al-Banna was assassinated—apparently under the government order—the conflict intensified. In retaliation, in May that year, a group of Brotherhood military unit launched a putative attempt to assassinate the Prime Minister Abdul

Hadi, and the government reacted with massive arrest and imprisoned thousands of the Brotherhood activists. In July 1952 a military group called Free Officer toppled down the monarch and installed a revolutionary government, led by Muhammad Najib, Gamal Abdul Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Initially the relation between the Brotherhood and the military junta was cordial, but soon it became sour when in October 1954 the Brotherhood was blamed for a failed assassination attempt to Gamal Abdul Naser. Massive arrest was launched to the Brotherhood activists, many served life sentence and six of its top leaders were hanged—including Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966) who was executed in August 1966. Qutub was a prolific author and his works enjoyed international readerships especially *Al-Adalah al-Ijtima'iyah fil Islam* (The Social Justice in Islam), his commentary of the Qur'an, *Fi Dhilalil Qur'an* (in the Shade of the Qur'an), and *Ma'alim fit Thariq* (Milestones), in which he advocated an uncompromising struggle against infidels that referred to the western cultures and civilization. And for this reason many contemporary analysts depict Qutub as the forerunner of *Jihadi* movements, including Al-Qaeda.

In a closer inspection, however, Tarbiyah movement adopted Muslim Brotherhood ideology and organizational structures of earlier period when it was under the leadership of Hassan Al-Banna. A senior member of the movement explained, that the Tarbiyah community perceived Brotherhood organizational model as a better alternative for Indonesian Muslims. For centuries—from colonial era down to independent Indonesia—Muslim political movements suffered from typical weaknesses, namely too much dependence on outstanding figures and lack of regenerations. They soon disappeared when the founder passed away or no longer in the organization for other reasons. The Brotherhood's method provides a better alternative, which emphasized organizational mechanism instead of personal figures and paid serious attention to sustainable regenerations (Interview with Khalid Mahmud in Yogyakarta, 03.04.2007). And these have been the characteristics of Tarbiyah movement: their leaders were student activists known only among themselves, and only later on when PKS gained popularity Indonesian public know those people.

Meanwhile another Tarbiyah activist Yon Machmudi, in his doctoral dissertation on the movement suggests that there were two main appeals of Brotherhood movement for Indonesian Muslim activists. *First* is its practicality, that is, it provides systematic guidelines to improve and develop Muslim society in various aspects, from social to economic to politics. Islam is not complicated scholastic teachings that only learned people can understand. Rather, it is a clever book for Muslims in pursuing a healthy and happy life, in this world and in hereafter (Machmudi, 2005: 207). This echoes Piscatori's point when he

explains the development of mass-Islam that spread among non specialists as the product of modern education and mass media. And it is also consistent with the fact that most of Tarbiyah activists and members were students and graduates of non-religious studies.

Secondly, another selling point of Brotherhood among younger and educated Muslims was its moderately conservative religious views and gradual political agendas. At the religious level, although Brotherhood religious view is conservative, it is still possible to qualify it as moderate in term that if does not advocate violent rejection toward the others. Machmudi adds that among indications of its moderation is its adoption of Sufi traditions, since in Islam Sufi groups are the most well known of its inclusive religious outlook. At the political level, the moderation is indicated by it gradual political agenda, i.e. that the development of Islamic society and polity should be pursued in gradual, and not through grabbing power or revolution. The common understanding among Tarbiyah activists on the political project of the movement is that it should be started from individuals, to recruit members and to educate them according to Islamic teachings. The next step is to Islamize the family, because it is the fundamental unit of the society and strategic unit for regeneration. When Islamic family system is established, it will be highly likely that that the society is easier to be persuaded to follow Islamic principles. And finally, when the society has been Islamized, the political system would follow, because Muslim public will naturally ask for Islamic political systems (Interview with Khalid Machmud, 19.04.2007). According to Machmudi, the empirical evidence of Tarbiyah political moderation was the fact that whereas being arrested by the police or other government apparatus was customary in 1980s, no Tarbiyah activities were banned and none of its activists were arrested (Machmudi, 2005: 207).

Tarbiyah movement adopted the organizational traditions of the Brotherhood, initially developed by al-Banna, with cell-like structures and stressing obedience to the leaders. This group was called *Usrah*, which consisted of 5 to 12 students who intensively studied Islam under the guidance of a mentor. In many cases, members of a cell did not reveal who was their mentor to members of other cells. The mentors on their part form further cells, etc. The movement was also marked by their typical activities. The first and the most fundamental was *Liqo* (Arabic term for meeting), a weekly gatherings in which members of cells meet with their mentor to learn and discuss religious subjects. The typical subjects were on theology and the history of the Prophet Muhammad, based on selective readings of the Quranic verses and prophetic traditions. The second was *Mabit* (Arabic: to reside), in which members spent a night in a Mosque do intensive learning and discussions on religious subjects, and practicing some special prayers. The session usually started at 10.pm, when the mentor delivered

lectures, followed by asking and answering questions. At around 3am, members woke up for special night prayers. This non obligatory prayer is valued very highly in Islamic traditions, as it provides Muslims with a very tranquil situation to pray, in addition to physical-psychological efforts to get up early in the morning. The third was *Daurah* (Arabic: training), communion of larger numbers of participants in which the movement attracted new members. This session was typically organized on behalf of formal student organizations in faculties and departments, and was normally held during early academic years when new students just started their new lives in campus. Fourth, *Rihlah* (Arabic: trip), in which a large members of Tarbiyah travel into tourism sites. Usually they went with their family members and the session was in large part informal gathering in which members socialized with others. Fifth, *Mukhayam* (arabic: camping) was a special session during which members of Tarbiyah groups spent time outside towns to have special physical activities. In this session participants learned various physical skills and techniques necessary for survival (Damanik, 2002: 190-193; Salman, 2006: 122-139).

2.3. The Startup: Take over Students Organizations

Those activities were carried out by and large in clandestine during the 1980s, in order to avoid unwanted curbs from the authority. Yet the situation was changed considerably during the 1990s, when the governments opened greater opportunities to Muslim public activisms. In August 1990, Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI, *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*) led by then the Minister of Science and Technology B. J. Habibie was founded in Malang East Java. Legion of prominent Muslim figures and intellectuals such as Nurcholish Madjid, Amien Rais, Dawam Raharjo, Adi Sasono—to name but few—were on the board of the organization, and it represented the massive surge of Muslim politics in Indonesian history at the closing of the century. A leading member of the association even boasted that it was the third moment in the century when Indonesian Muslims joined to form an organization representing Indonesian Islam, after the formation of CSI in 1914 and Masyumi 1945 (Ramage, 1995: 77). ICMI became a political vehicle for Muslims to take positions in economy, bureaucracy, and in the military. However, not all Muslim leaders approved and joined ICMI. Abdurrahman Wachid, then the Chairman of NU criticized ICMI as a Trojan horse of the government to exploit Muslims (Ramage, 1995: 68).

The friendly political atmosphere in the 1990s enabled activists of Tarbiyah community brought their activities into public. *Firstly*, they founded educational institutions to socialize their programs as well as to attract new recruits. They founded 'Nurul Fikri' in

Jakarta, study assistance (*bimbingan belajar*) to help high school students in their preparation to enroll into University, run by graduates of the University of Indonesia, including Suharna in collaboration with Hilmy Aminuddin. It soon became popular among students in the city because of its effective methods combined with low tuition fee, and students who were succeeded in enrolling into their favorite universities then became voluntary campaigners to promote the institution among their junior colleges in high schools. In addition to studying academic subjects, Nurul Fikri provided classes to study religion that the students were happily attended. It therefore effectively became a recruitment posts, and most of the students who were studied in Nurul Fikri joined Tarbiyah groups in their campuses. Tarbiyah activists also founded an Islamic boarding school, Al-Hikmah, in South Jakarta, led by Abdul Hasib Hasan, which provided facilities for their members to study religious subjects such as Arabic, Islamic theology and law more intensively, as well as a center of excellence for trainings and indoctrinations of Tarbiyah members. They also set up 'Khairu Ummah' an organization that provided preachers for religious speeches and propagations (*lembaga dakwah*) organized by Yusuf Supendi. Initially they sent their preachers in around Jakarta, but when many Tarbiyah activists finished their university studies and worked in various jobs across the country—from Aceh in Sumatra to Lombok in eastern Indonesia—it also sent preachers to give sermons to those workplaces (Damanik, 2002: 152-157).

Secondly, they promoted publication of magazines to disseminate their ideas and communicate with their communities. The most well known was *Sabili* magazine, founded by Zainal Muttaqien and Rahmat Abdullah. In a quite short time, the magazine became very popular not only among Tarbiyah community but also among non-Tarbiyah Muslim students. The news and articles printed in *Sabili* were specially design for young readers, by avoiding complex analyses and technical terms of religious studies—that characterized many Islamic magazine at that time—and additional features contained information on Islam in various countries. Because of its popularity with rightist messages, the government banned *Sabili* in 1993. Tarbiyah activists also founded a number of small semi-commercial publishing houses which were widely recognized of their publication of special editions of pocket books on Islam translated from chapters of books written by the Middle Eastern writers (Damanik, 2002: 158-160).

Thirdly, they also set up Studies and Information of Contemporary Islamic World (SIDIK, *Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer*) as a think-tank to provide information analyses on international Islam, with special focus on various conflicts suffered by Muslim communities in various countries, from Palestine, Afghanistan, Bosnia etc. They

frequently organized seminars and workshops on the subjects, where participants watched video-film narrating the conflicts. Different from common opinions constructed by western media that depicted Muslim groups as the culprits of the conflicts, SIDIK sent messages that they were in fact the victims. *Fourthly*, Tarbiyah communities occasionally held cultural events, which the the most popular is *Nashid* or Islamic acappella performed by male singers (Damanik, 2002: 169-175).

In mid-1990s Tarbiyah network was flourished in various university campuses in Indonesia, especially in major cities. In line with their political tendency—adopted from the Muslim Brotherhood—they started to expand their influence to formal structures, by systematically taking over student-parliaments, at university as well as at faculty and department levels. And they had done this quite smoothly, because their network was solid and comparatively better than other communities. In the University of Indonesia in Jakarta, a major center of Tarbiyah community, the first figure to emerge as the chairman of University Student-Senate was Zulkiflimansyah in 1994, and in the next periods the leaderships was handed down among Tarbiyah activist including Rama Pratama who was the Senate chairman in 1998 and often appeared on TV during student demonstrations before and after the regime change. The taking over of formal student bodies in university campuses were also took place in other major universities across the country. In the second half of 1990s, student activists in major universities were often associated with mosque-based activists, on the fact that Tarbiyah activists whose bases were mosques now dominated the structures.

In mid 1997 monetary crisis severely hit Indonesia and other Asian countries, followed by price hikes on almost every commodity that triggered social and economic unrests. Calls for succession of national leadership were voiced by several political oppositions. Student groups organized rallies in major cities, demanded political reform. In tone with the political atmosphere, activists from Tarbiyah network founded Action Union for Indonesian Muslim Student (KAMMI, *Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*) in March 1998, in an annual meeting of Muslim student networks held in Muhammadiyah University of Malang in East Java. Elected as the first chairman was Fahri Hamzah. KAMMI adopted Islamist ideology, typical for Tabiyah network, by putting Islam as the solution to solve what they perceived as 'moral crisis' of national politics. It programs were to organize and to mobilize Muslim students to support the reformation of Indonesian politics. In the following months, during the regime change in 21 May 1998 when Suharto resigned and replaced by the vice president B. J. Habibie, KAMMI was among the major student groups in mobilizing rallies and demonstrations. In their rallies KAMMI's mass was unique and easily

distinguishable from other groups, especially with a large portion of female students wearing headscarf. KAMMI was in close collaboration with some prominent Muslim political activists such as Amien Rais, and during transitional government under President Habibie KAMMI often organized rallies to support the government policies, since he was the former chairman of ICMI and the fact that many ICMI members gained position in the cabinet. Another KAMMI leader was Andi Rahmat who was elected Member of Parliament representing PKS (Siddiq, 2003).

The success of Tarbiyah movement went through hostile political environment under Suharto regime was not without reactions. Other Islamist groups accused the Tarbiyah network of being either infiltrated or co-opted by the regime. The first accusation was based upon the fact that a former member of Indonesian intelligence service, Suripto, has become a leader and later on an MP of PKS. Suripto was a member of the intelligence bureau in 1960s-970s during period when the regime launched harsh policy against Muslim activists, the accusers go on, and the conventional wisdom says that an intelligence agent never retired. Moreover, one of the founders and senior leaders in Tarbiyah movement Hilmy Aminuddin was arrested and held by the military for his involvement in radical activities, and then released. Conventional wisdom also says that when one was in military detention during that time, he had two options: either he compromised with the military in which case he would be released, or if he resisted to compromise he would stay there or even be banished without trace. The second accusation was that Tarbiyah activists made deals behind closed door with the regime, since in many occasions their activists carried meetings and religious sermons in a house belong to Suharto's son in Jakarta (see, *Dewan Rakyat*, 1 October 2003).

However, according to Machmudi, the accusations were baseless. *Firstly*, Suripto had been in close contact and interaction with Tarbiyah community since early 1980s, and after joined a humanitarian mission to Bosnia, representing Indonesian Muslim community, he had been in closer collaborations with Muslim activists (Machmudi, 2005: 115; also F. Hamzah, 2002). Suspicion toward Aminuddin was also unsupported, since Hilmy denied that accusation, and that the formal report from the Military and the media coverage on the issue did not mention Aminudin's name (Machmudi, 2005: 108). *Secondly*, with regards to the Tarbiyah activities that took place in Suharto son's house, it was not because of the activists made any deal with the regime's family, but rather because some of Tarbiyah activists had worked in business organizations which belong to Suharto family. Thus, the activities had nothing to do with Suharto's family. Moreover, Machmudi suggested that the impressions that Tarbiyah community never experienced any inconvenient treatments from the regime were

misperceptions. It did receive close surveillances that severely restricted the activists from carrying out organizational programs. Even oftentimes they could not communicate with fellow activists. The success of Tarbiyah networks to keep away from the regime was its deliberately vigilant moderation (Machmudi, 2005: 115)

3. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3.1 PK: The Formation

After explaining the organizational origin of PKS, i.e. the Tarbyah movement, its genesis, its inspiration from Egyptian Muslim Brothers, and its organizational structures and main activities, in this section I discuss the formation of Justice Party (PK) as a political vehicle of Tarbiyah activists. The previous section provides necessary information about the societal backgrounds of PKS. It will elaborate more fully in the concluding section of this chapter, and at this point it would be enough to mention that the party stemmed from urbanizing societies especially among university students in Indonesia from 1970s to 1990s. This section traces the historical momentum of the formation of PK following the theoretical framework outlined in the opening of this chapter, to picture the organizational character of the party, from the formation period during PK and then in consolidation period when the party changed into PKS.

The story began when on 21 May 1998 Suharto resigned from his thirty two years in power under mounting pressures of monetary and financial crises combined with concerted demands for political reform from the oppositions and students' movements. He handed over the presidency to the vice president B. J. Habibie who headed a transitional government which main task was preparing an election. The regime change opened up a new era of political reform (*reformasi*) after more than three decades sealed by an authoritarian regime. Indonesian society wellcome the new political opportunity by forming political parties in the hope of participation in the upcoming election. So enthusiastic were Indonesians that almost 200 political parties were declared during May 1998 to February 1999.

In tune with the political mood, the idea of forming a political party as a vehicle to furthering their political missions also emerged among Tarbiyah communities. However, two decades of experience under the repressive regime caused some of them resisted the proposal and perceived politics as a dirty business. Hidayat Nurwahid and Anis Matta were among the opponent of the idea of creating a party (Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid, 06.07.2007). When the controversy of whether or not the community should form a party could not be resolved in deliberations—something that was very unusual by their measure—they

conducted a voting survey to ask the opinion of the members of their networks. No less than 6000 questionnaires were distributed to Tarbiyah activists across the country and even abroad, and more than ninety percents of the questionnaires were answered, out of which 68% agreed to create a party. The result of the polling clearly showed that the idea was very controversial, in which a large portion in the community refused it.

In a closer observation, however, the refusal of the idea to form a political party and of participating in power politics was in fact classified into two different opinions. The first one, was refusing the idea of participation in practical power in politics because of historical trauma which had happened under the authoritarian regime, that gave strong impressions to many activists that politics was a dirty business, and a religious movement should have avoided muddy tracks, instead it had to find clean and save paths to achieve its objectives. Hidayat Nurwahid, for example, said that he preferred that Tarbiyah community created a mass-organization, one like Muhammadiyah or NU, which would keep distance from politics. Meanwhile, the second refusal was not to the idea but rather on the timing of the formation. As was mentioned earlier, Tarbiyah movement adopted Al-Banna bottom-up gradual political agenda, starting from Islamizing individuals, the family, the society, and only after then the politics. Many Tarbiyah activists believed that the development was still a beginning, and forming a political party and taking part in political struggle meant skipping necessary stages of development, and could make their movement to be unsustainable. The debates reportedly lasted even after the party was declared, but the majority of the activists agreed to enter the political arena (Damanik, 2002: 233).

A political party was created in Jakarta 20 July 1998 under the name of *Partai Keadilan* (Justice Party), and the declaration was signed by 52 activists, with different professional occupations and represented various segments in the organization. Most of them are university graduates, in Indonesia and abroad, three of them hold PhD degree, five of them were women, and one person from ethnic Chinese (Damanik, 2002: 231-232). Conspicuous, in retrospect, of the list of party founders was that there were no names with great stature that could be recognized by wider public outside their community. Perhaps Daud Rasyid Sitorus was the only name circulated in the national media in the 1990s after he was involved in a public debate with a prominent Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid.

The Founders of PK 1998

1. Hidayat Nurwahid
2. Luthfi Hasan Ishaq
3. Salim Segaf Al-Jufri
4. Mulyanto
5. Nurmahmudi Ismail
6. Abdi Sumaithi
7. Mutammimul Ula
8. Abdul Hasib Hasan
9. Fahri Hmzah
10. Daud Rasyid Sitorus
11. Mukhlis Abdi
12. Agus Nurhadi
13. Igo Ilham
14. Chin Kun Minh
15. Arifinto
16. Nursanita Nasution
17. Rahmat Abdullah

18. Ahmad Satori Ismail
19. Untung Wahono
20. Mashadi
21. Maddu Mallu
22. Nasir Zain
23. Acep Abdul Syukur
24. Ahzami Samiun Jazuli
25. Yusuf Supendi
26. Yoyoh Yusroh
27. M. Anis Matta
28. Zirloriza Jamil
29. Suharna Surapranata
30. Ihsan Alransyah Tanjung
31. Syamsul Balda

32. Habib Abu Bakar Alhabsyi
33. Sukmanjaya Rukandis
34. Ahmad Heriawan
35. Erlangga Masdiana
36. Didik Ahmadi
37. Suswono
38. Ahmad Zainuddin
39. Abdul Roqib
40. Abdullah Said Baharmus
41. Ahmad Hatta
42. Makmur Hasanuddin
43. Siti Zainab
44. Sri Utami
45. Nurmansyah Lubis
46. Naharus Surur
47. Muhroni
48. Aus Hidayat

49. Tifatul Sembiring
50. Almuzamil Yusuf
51. Tizar Zein
52. Fahmi Alaydrus

The public declaration was held in Jakarta on 9 August 1998 attended by thousands of supporters. It was well covered in the media, and got positive responses from the Muslim public as well Muslim leaders.

Elected as the party president was Nur Machmudi Ismail (then 37 years old) who holds doctoral degree on food production technology. There was also a behind the scene story about the election of Nur Machmudi Ismail as the first party's president. He was not among the most senior figures in the organization, yet the community chose him because he was graduated from a western university. They argued that electing graduate from Middle Eastern university could expose them to possible sentiment from political groups that still had trauma with Islamic politics (Amir, 2003: 102-103). It is reported a number of Tarbiyah leaders, after they agreed to form a political party, approached Amien Rais, a former Chairman of Muhammadiyah and professor of international politics in Gadjahmada University, who was himself a student activist in the 1970s and wrote a doctoral dissertation on Muslim Brotherhood and had a close relation with Tarbiyah communities, to lead the party they wanted to establish. Yet Rais refused to do so as he had his own plan to create his own party based not on Islamic ideology. This caused strong reactions among some of Tarbiyah leaders, who regarded that Rais 'has neglected the *Ummah*.' (Confidential interview, Jakarta).

Another interesting fact was that the party did not use "Islam" in its name to indicate its ideological orientation. There were many new parties which explicitly adopted the word Islam or Muslim as part of their names to indicate their ideological orientations. According to PKS leaders, and is also mentioned in its manifesto, 'justice' embodies the highest value of Islamic politics as well as the most universal aspect of the universe. Indonesian word for justice (*adil*) was adopted from Arabic, which is an important Qur'anic key term, understood terminologically as 'to put thing in its proper place'. On the one hand, this term refers to moral values, which implies that the party should and will follow the Islamic rules and values; while on the other hand it also refers to natural realms, in which God has created the universe in a perfect balance, and that the nature also constantly follow God's laws (Damanik, 2002: 233-236). It is also interesting to note that PK also did not claim as the inheritor of the previous Islamic organization and Islamic movement, as was commonly had done by new Muslim parties. In post-Suharto democratic euphoria, the emerged political parties among Muslim community exhibit strong tendency to revive the political legacy previous generations. Among modernist Muslim, there were several examples, such as "Indonesian Syarikat Islam Party" and "Syarikat Islam Party of 1905" which brought the legacy of Sarekat Islam. There were also "Masyumi Party" led by Abdullah Hehamahua, "New Masyumi Party"

founded by Ridwan Saidi, and "Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi" which explicitly brought the legacy of Masyumi in their names. Other less explicitly, but still symbolically tried to give impression that they were the heirs of the greatness of the legacy of the past. The "Crescent Star Party" led by Yusril Ihza Mahendra, and "Islamic Ummah Party" led by Deliar Noer did it symbolically, by taking crescent-star as the parties' logos. It was no coincident that after Masyumi was dissolved in 1960, its members and symphatizers called themselves 'Crescent Star Family' to remind to the great idea of the bygone party (Fealy and Platzdasch, 2005). This show quite convincingly that PK grew from new generations with new political agendas that made it took no interest to claim any historical relations with older generations' Muslim politics, despite the fact that some of PK founders such as Abdi Sumaithi, Mashadi and Mutammimul Ula were activists of Crescent Star Family.

In January 1999 the government passed election bill that set the requirements for parties to participate in elections. To create a political party was relatively easy: requiring only signatures of at least fifty citizens aged twenty one or over plus registration with a court and the Ministry of Justice, which was recorded in the government gazette (*lembaran negara*). However, to be able to present in elections parties needed to meet more difficult task, namely it had to have an organization established in one-third or nine of the provinces and half of the district or municipalities in each of those provinces. In addition, the law also stipulated a threshold, with delayed effect, of 2% minimum of national votes to be able to participate in the next 2004 election (King, 2003: 51). Although creating a party was relatively easy for Tarbiyah community, meeting requirements to establish branches in half of the districts in nine provinces was a Herculean task that forced them to do their outmost. At provincial level the task is still easy, and they could rely on their own network, since they had set up network in universities in major cities and provincial capitals. Yet in setting up organizational branches at district levels they could not rely on their on network, and need to recruit personnels from outside the network. Imam Nur Azis, who then the secretary and founder of PK in Central Java recalled that during that period he traveled intensively to every district in the province to mobilize supports found party branches. It was very difficult in small town, because Tarbiyah network was popular in major cities, and less known in small towns. In a similar vein, the founder of PK in Yogyakarta, Khalid Mahmud confirmed that the first expansion of PK organization to meet election requirements was the most difficult period for the organization. In small districts, it would be very lucky for them if they found persons who had knowledge on the movement that was very helpful, but on many other cases they had to appoint people who barely heard about their movement (Interview with Cholid Machmud,

19.04.2007; Iman Nur Aziz 22.05.2007). The desperate organizational situations were recorded in PK statutes, in which it set a requirement for a person to be elected as party leaders at district level was twenty five years of age (PK , ART Article. 45). It is easily read that this was intended to recruit party functionaries from among university students. But they made it, and qualified to present in the elections.

The Election Day was 7 June 1999, when 48 parties competed for 105 millions votes. PKS ended at seventh position with 1,436,670 votes or 1.36 percent of national votes and qualified to have seven seats in the parliament. Out of forty eight parties participated in the elections only twenty one were able to get seats in the parliament, yet only eleven parties had more than one seats:

The Result of 1999 Elections

PARTY	PERCENTAGE	SEATS
PDIP	33.73	153
Golkar	22.43	120
PKB	12.60	51
PPP	10.70	58
PAN	7.11	34
PBB	1.94	13
PK	1.36	7
PKP	1.01	4
PNU	0.64	5
PDI	0.62	2
PDKB	0.52	5

This was a mix result for PK. On the one hand, it was surprisingly successful result, given the fact that this was a party of amateur politicians with no prominent figure whatsoever and bring no symbolic legacy of past Muslim politics. Yet on the other hand, it was not good enough since the result was under the minimum electoral threshold, which implied that it could not participate in the next elections.

It is important to note here that although PKS was created by the activists of Tarbiyah movement, it does not imply that the latter was the external sponsor of PK. This was because PK leaders were in fact the most senior leaders of Tarbiyah movement. The two organizations

were in fact overlapped in their organizational structures, and PK had no external sponsor, which meant that it had internal source of authority. In addition, there was no charismatic leader in the party whose influence was greater than party organization, and thus PK organizational functions run on its won mechanisms. This was to influence the way PK organize its political behaviors and maneuvers.

The first important political move was when they joined Consultation Forum for Islamic Parties (Forum Silaturrahmi Partai-Partai Islam, FSPI) that included:

- United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan* PPP)
- Crescent Star Party (*Partai Bulan Bintang*, PBB)
- Islamic Ummah Party (*Partai Umat Islam*, PUI)
- Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (*Partai Islam Indonesia Masyumi*, PIIM)
- Ummah Awakening Party (*Partai Kebangkitan Umat*, PKU)
- Ummah Awakening Party (*Partai Nahdhatul Ummah* PNU)
- Indonesian United Islamic Party (*Partai Islam Persatuan Indonesia* PIPI)
- Indonesian Islamic Mystical Orders Party (*Partai Thariqat Islam Indonesia*, PITI)
- Indonesian Islamic Union Party (*Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, PSII).

These small parties—known as *partai gurem*, or bug parties—launched its first action in demanding the government to call off Law No. 3/1985 and 8/1985 on the obligation for organization to adopt Pancasila as their ideology. The law was eventually called-off and in the new Party Law No. 2/1999, no ideological standardization was applied. With those small parties PK was also involved in a plan to combine their votes to get additional seats or known as *stambus accord*. However the accord was eventually canceled by the election committee when they could not reach agreement on how it should be done.

The next major political action taken by PK was joining with National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) led by Amin Rais to form a joint fraction, named Reform Fraction. This coalition was significant in democratization process, because by having 41 seats in combination (PK 7, PAN 34) it was the fourth biggest fraction in the parliament and was eligible to have it representative as the fourth vice chairman of the parliament, and ruled out the unelected Military-Police Fraction from getting seat in chairmanship. This was a significant political moment in parliament, because one of the main objectives of political reform was reforming the parliament as a real political representative of the Indonesian people, which means to gradually reduce the unelected representatives such as from special

appointed Military-Police Fraction. PKS perceived this collaboration as ideological as well as strategic, for the former it saw that PAN had a common platform and objectives with PK both as reformist parties and parties of Muslim activists, and that this collaboration would overcome the politics status quo represented the military faction. In fact, a group of small parties—PNU, PKU, PSII, PDR—invited PK to form their own parliamentary fraction but PK refused it and even PK replied by inviting them to join Reform Fraction with PAN. The small parties went on to form their own fraction (PK, 2001: 83-84).

Perhaps the most significant experience in this period was when it joined a strategic coalition in 'Central Axis' (*Poros Tengah*) group during the first democratic presidential election. According to the old 1945 Constitution, the president was elected by the highest political body, the People Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, MPR), which members were 500 parliamentarians as representative of political parties plus the so representatives of interest groups (*Utusan Golongan*) and Regional Representation (*Utusan Daerah*). In its first post-Suharto sessions in October 1999, the parliament was polarized between the two biggest parties, PDI-P and Golkar, which represented secular political groupings, while Muslim parties and political aspirations seemed powerless since the biggest of them (PKB) earned only 12% of the total seats, and were overwhelmed by the antagonism between the two biggest parties. However, there were six Muslim parties in the top ten parties in the parliament, and the total sum of their seats was more than that of PDI-P. Yet, the Muslim parties represented different ideological stances with a long history of rivalries and enmities among each other, especially between traditionilist camp (PKB, PPP, PNU) and modernist camp (PAN, PBB, PK), and any effort to bring them into one single faction seemed impossible. But this is what happened. Under the highly skillful maneuvers of Amien Rais, combined with apparent external threats from the old authoritarian regime represented by Golkar—which formed a 'National Axis' (*Poros Kebangsaan*)—and the Christian and secular block represented by PDI-P—which then created 'People Axis' (*Poros Kerakyatan*), Muslim parties were willing to join their forces to form the Central Axis.

The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) session had three major schedules, i.e. electing the chairman of the House of Representative (DPR, the parliament), the chairman of the Peoples Consultative Assembly, and electing the President and the Vice President. PDI-P as the plurality-winner in the election was very confident that it will dominate and control the sessions and put their representatives in top national leaderships. On the other hand Golkar, as the main vehicle of the old regime and had been in power for the last three decades was also still command of large control over representatives of interest groups and regional

representatives in MPR. Golkar also pushed their candidates into the top national leaderships. Yet, the self confident of the two biggest parties proved counterproductive as it made them— especially PDI-P—less willing to compromise and made concessions to other parties. Whereas political lobbies offered bargains and concessions to small and big parties were done very well by the Central Axis, and would bring them into victory. The first session was electing MPR's chairman, in which Amin Rais was elected, with the help of Golkar. In the second session to elect DPR's chairman Central Axis gave its vote to Golkar and this made the party's chairman Akbar Tanjung win the post. Finally, and the most important was presidential election. Golkar's candidate, the former transitional president B. J. Habibie called-off his candidacy after the MPR rejected his report in running the transitional government. PDI-P played a significant role in lobbying parties to reject the president's report and subsequently pressed Habibie to call-off his candidacy, in order to secure its own candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri. Knowing this fact, Golkar gave its vote to Central Axis candidate Abdurrahman Wahid to win the presidency. PDI-P was forced to accept its stubbornness and attained only vice presidency.

It is interesting to not at this point, that PK initially nominated its own candidate for president since before the election. It was among recommendations of the first national workshop in December 1998. Alongside with its plan to join election competition, it decided to nominate presidential candidate who will carry its political missions. Among the names included in the selection were Amin Rais, Nurcholish Madjid, and Hidayat Nurwahid and A.M. Syaefuddin. Under the agreed criteria of (a) intellectual and religious integrity, (b) leadership capabilities to bring the nation out of crisis, (c) personal capacity as public example, (d) international vision and diplomatic capacity, (e) clean political records and did not involved in previous regimes, (e) able to stand above diversity of Indonesian society. The fact that it decided to nominate Didin Hafiduddin—less known religious-intellectual figure from Bogor West Java, compared to national stature such as Amin Rais and Nurcholish Madjid—show that political mood in the party was very idealistic, and that upholding its ideal vision is more important than formulating realistic programs (PK, 2001: 73-75).

Wahid presidency, however, was short lived because of his inability to maintain the cohesiveness of his multiparty cabinet combined with his acrobatic political maneuvers. His grand coalition cabinet, installed in October 1999, was definitely oversize with 35 ministerial posts to accommodate representatives of coalition members. In August 2000 he reshuffled his cabinet, and installed a new one with only 26 ministries. This policy disappointed his coalition partners in Central Axis, especially Amien Rais, who perceived him as betraying

their supports. Wahid also created his enemies in the military as well as in the police by unilaterally replacing commanders in strategic posts without approval from the military, the police as well as the parliament. In April 2001 he sacked PDI-P and Golkar ministries from his cabinet, on alleged corruption and nepotism, but was unable to give sound evidence. This escalated criticism in the parliament when PDI-P and Golkar as the two biggest parties in parliament joined Central Axis in opposing Wahid. Using two corruption scandals, one of Logistic Body and the other on the grant from the Brunei Sultan, the MPR held special session in 23 July 2001 to hold the president accountable. When he failed to do so, the MPR impeached Wahid, and handed over the presidency to the vice president Megawati. In fact, anticipating the impeachment in one o'clock early morning early hour of Wahid issued a presidential decree to dissolve the parliament and called for an early election, but failed to get support both from the military and the police.

The early years of political reform became the most productive years of learning real politics for PK. Through joining various coalitions it learned from scratch the vocabulary and mechanism of Indonesian politics, knowing firsthand the major actors and their characteristics, as well as witnessing the geniuses of Indonesian politics at works doing on of the most creative and successful political maneuvers in uniting Muslim political groups into a single political faction. It learned how to approach ones' opponents, how to compromise and make concessions, etc. for example, PKS was initially reluctant to give support to Abdurrahman Wahid's candidacy, because, in addition to the fact that he has an image as the leader of traditionilist Muslim, it perceived his political track records—his close relations with the military and Catholic communities (i.e. Gen. Benny Murdany), his alliance with Megawati Sukarnoputri in months before and after regime change, as well as his liberal thinking—as insulting the *ummah* (PKS, 2001: 81-82). However, when it involved in the political game, in learned what mattered and what were at stake, it changed its decision, aborted the candidacy of Hafiduddhin and supported the candidacy of Wahid (PKS, 2001: 189-192).

In October 1999 president Wahid appointed PK's president N. M. Ismail as the minister of forestry. Ismail then resigned from his party's position in April 200, and the party leadership was held by Untung Wahono as the caretaker. In May 200 it held a Special National Congress, in its first National Congress Leadership, Hidayat Nurwahid was elected as the second party's president. Hidayat Nurwahid was to play a significant role in building the party's image in the subsequent years. He was born in Klaten Central Java—a district between Yogyakarta and Solo/Surakarta— in 1960. His parents were both activists of a local branch of Muhammadiyah, and he was brought up in strong religious tradition. After

graduated from an elementary school near his home, Nurwahid spent his junior and senior high schools at Gontor Islamic Boarding School in Ponorogo East Java. He enrolled in State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN, *Institute Agama Islam Negeri*) in Yogyakarta in 1979 to study Islamic Law. After finishing his bachelor degree in 1983, he received a scholarship grant to continue further studies in Islamic University of Medina Saudi Arabia, enlisted in the department of theology, and finished his doctorate degree in 1992. On his return to Indonesia he taught at the graduate school of Islamic studies in Muhammadiyah University of Jakarta.

Another prominent figure in the party was the General Secretary, Muhammadh Anis Matta, born in Bone South Sulawesi 1968. He studied at junior and senior high schools at Darul Arqam Muhammadiyah Boarding School of Gombara, in South Sulawesi. In 1986, after finishing his studies, he moved to Jakarta to study Islamic Law in Saudi-owned school LIPIA, which he finished in 1992. Anis Matta was very popular among Tarbiyah community, in which among other things was indicated by the fact that many publishers confirmed that books with an introductory chapter from him raised the selling.[1] Leadership succession in PK was also unusual, in which it always carried out smoothly and quickly, without much debates, let alone antagonism. This smoothness of leadership successions, which occurred in all of its organizational levels from national to sub-districts, had become a positive characteristic of the party, and at the same time was starkly in contrast with other parties that experienced common troublesome process of leadership changes, often ending up in party splits.

3.3. PKS: The Consolidation

Meanwhile, following the PK's failure to pass electoral threshold and was hence unable to be present in the next election, the Tarbiyah community founded a new party named Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) in Jakarta 20 April 2002, with Al-Muzammil Yusuf as the chairman and Hario Setyoko as the general secretary, and among the 50 founders were Umar Salim, Zulkifliemansyah and Suswono (PKS, 2004). The smoothness of the merging process indicated that PKS was carefully prepared to function as a new political vehicle for Tarbiyah community after the first one they developed was unable to continue the journey. PKS document records that there were 51 persons who signed formal registration of the party in notary. And different from PK founders who were senior members and become list of Tarbiyah's whose who, PK founders were ordinary activists.

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[1] My personal observation during 1998-2002.

The Founders of PKS 2003

1. Bali Pranowo
2. Buchori Yusuf
3. Eddy Zanur
4. Eman Sukirman
5. Ferry Noor
6. Abdul Jabbar Madjid
7. M. Ridwan SR
8. NAsir Zein
9. Harjani Hefni
10. Herawati Noor
11. Arlin Salim
12. Ali Akhmadi
13. Akhzami Samiun Jazuli
14. Ahmadi Sukarno
15. Ahmad Yani
16. Achyar Eldine
17. Abdullah
18. Budi Setiadi
19. Herlini Amran
20. Imran Zabidi
21. Kaliman Iman Sasmitha
22. Iskan Qolba Lubis
23. M. Martri Agung
24. Muttaqin
25. Mahfudz Abdurrahman
26. Martarizal
27. M. Idris Abdus Somad
28. M. Aniq Syahuri
29. M. Budi Setiawan
30. Muslim Abdullah
31. Musoli
32. Musyafa Ahmad Rahim
33. Nizamuddin Hasan
34. Edy Kuncoro
35. Ruly Tisnayuliansyah
36. Rusdi Muchtar
37. Sarah Handayani
38. Usman Effendi
39. Wahidah R. Bulan
40. Wirianingsih
41. Yon Mahmudi
42. Yusuf Dardiri
43. Zaenal Arifin
44. Zufar Bawazir
45. Haryo Setyoko
46. Umar Salim Basalamah
47. Zulkiflimenasyah
48. Suswono
49. Syamsu Hilal
50. Sarah Handayani
51. Almuzamil Yusuf

Earlier that year, Anis Matta informed that if the threshold ratified, his party would change its name into 'Islamic Justice Party' (PIK, *Partai Islam Keadilan*) (Kompas 28 February 2001). Even it presented in a join-statement with other 14 parties, in Sahid Jaya Hotel Jakarta on 8 June 2002, which failed to pass the electoral threshold to reject the ratification of the political law, and demanded the government to allow them to participate in 2004 elections. In the 8th national meeting of Majelis Syuro April 2003, PK decided to merge with PKS (Kompas, 16 April 2003). In the party, the chairman was Hidayat Nurwachid and Anist Matta retained his position as the general secretary, and al-Muzammil Yusuf moved into the vice chairman.

Since Nur Mahmudi Ismail was replaced by president Wahid in March 2001, PKS was effectively outside the government. During Megawati's administration PKS decided to stay outside the government, and became opposition party. The official version of this decision was that it wanted to exercise oversight-functions, to monitor and criticize the government. However, an interpretation suggests that the true reason of its oppositional stance was ideological, in which it believed that a woman should not become a national leader. To participate in the cabinet under a female president meant that it would contradict its own principle, and it decided to stay outside (Asa, *Tempo* 5-11 July 2004.).

And during 2002 and 2003 it put full concentration in developing its organization and building a mass base. There were at least two different levels of consolidations which took place, i.e. organization and programs. At the organizational aspect, PKS reformulated its leadership structure by giving more power and control over the organization to *Majelis Syuro* (Deliberation Assembly). During PK period, the highest decision making institution was party national congress, and the Majelis Syuro assumed responsibility to implement decisions and policies taken by the congress. In PKS period, although its constitutional status was still under the national congress, the *Majelis* holds the capacity as the highest decision making institutions, in which all major party policies and programs are taken in it or need to be approved by it. Moreover, although its members were composed of large numbers of people representing various elements, organizational as well as regional representatives, its functionaries who are responsible for routine activities were from small group of people who have been working together prior to 1998. This had enabled the party to work efficiently, decisions could be taken in simpler way, and programs could be executed more effectively.

Other organizational improvement was the creation of auxiliary institutions, which the most important are the Electoral Wining Body (*Badan Pemenangan Pemilu*, Bapilu) which tasks are to manage party campaigns and mobilize support for elections. Under the leadership of Muhammad Razikun, this body developed systematic programs and training for party

activists and symphatizers, and promoting party images through networking with other organizations and in the media. Other important auxiliary body is Board of Experts (Dewan Pakar) which members are professional from various expertise, and which one of the tasks is giving advice to the party according to their special vocation (*Republika*, 09.03.2004).

PKS also revised its political programs. During the PK period it pursued idealistic programs, such as clear in the case of its decision to nominate Didin Hafidudin as its presidential candidate. In the new period, the party started to touch pragmatic political programs. The first step is formulating the image as a "clean and care" party. The first, clean, refers to PKS programs to fight against corruption. And it was quite successful not only to talk the talks, but also to walk the walk, of the jargon. In fact, attitude of anti-corruptions was also the main characteristic of its political career during PK. The difference between the two periods was that during the PK period, the politicians and activists perceived it as mainly moral obligation to be pursued personally; while in the PKS period, a new meaning was added to the same activities: in addition to religious and moral duties, anti-corruptions are now a political project that needs to be publicized as the main image. As was explained by PKS Member of Parliament, Rama Pratama, in a teleconference with PKS Japan, it is inappropriate at personal level for a Muslim to tell other people about his good deeds. Because the Prophet said that if a Muslim doing a good deed with his right hand, his left hand should not know it. This is to guarantee that the person is sincere in doing his deed, and to prevent personal pride. But when it comes to party matters, this rule does not apply. PKS cadres and activists must publicize their good deeds, in order to socialize and advertise the party's reputation. This is not about personal show offs, but rather about party PR strategies (Pratama, 25.02.2007).

The second jargon, that PKS is a care party, was carried out through social services programs, mostly during natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes which occurred frequently in the country. PKS activists were almost always the first team arrived at the spot of such natural disasters, before the government agencies, to give emergency assistants. And they always arrived with their political identities, such as party uniforms, or party flags. They also distributed T-Shirts with a party logo on it, and/or party stickers. PKS workers also developed their skills in cooperating with the media, and asked for coverage in their public activities. The media were commonly quite cooperative, since these activities were emergency services in characters, although intended as party campaigns and advertisements. The media also keen to report sensational actions of PKS politicians and parliamentarians in refusing illegal money or rejected briberies. However, these political enthusiasm sometimes went too

far, for example, during emergency relieves following the Tsunami in Aceh in early 2004, PKS activists reportedly put stickers and other party logo to aids belonging to another Muslim organization, which sparked small incidents.

At the same time PKS still exhibited its original Islamist character, such as concerns about international Muslim politics. It repeatedly organized rallies and demonstrations condemning Israel's occupations in Palestine. It promoted supports for the Palestinians, and initiated demonstration rallies against US invasion to Afghanistan and Iraq. It released a number of official statements on these matters, sent a letter to UN General Secretary protesting Israel's massacre of civilian Palestinians in Janine refugee camps, and in collaboration with other Muslim organizations and NGOs released a statement protesting US invasion to Iraq (PKS, 2006: 157-159).

The program bore fruits in 2004 elections. In the parliamentary elections held on 24 April, PKS surprisingly won 7.35 percents of national votes. 24 parties were present in the elections, 17 got seats, and only 13 more than 1 seats.

THE RESULT OF 2004 ELECTION

PARTY	VOTES %	SEATS
Golkar	21.58	128
PDI-P	18.53	109
PKB	10.57	52
PPP	8.15	58
PD	7.45	57
PKS	7.35	45
PAN	6.44	52
PBR	2.44	13
PBB	2.62	11
PDS	2.13	12
PPDK	1.16	5
PKPB	2.11	2
PP	0.77	2

The surprising surge of PKS has changed the political map in the parliament. Formerly, with only seven seats PKS needed to join other party to form a fraction in the parliament, now PKS can form its own fraction: PKS-Fraction (FPKS). Furthermore, with more seats in the parliament PKS gained more power in political bargains. On 5 July 2004 Indonesia held the first direct presidential election, in which five pairs of hopefuls raced: Wiranto – Salahuddin Wahid, who were nominated by Golkar; Megawati and Hasyim Muzadi endorsed by PDI-P; Amin Rais – Siswono Yudhohusodo from PAN; S.B. Yudhoyono – Jusuf Kalla from Democrat Party; and Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar nominated by PPP. PKS did not nominate their own candidate, and initially preferred to stay outside the government, to further develop party's organization and mass-base. However, more than eight million votes it garnered was so attractive that pushed candidates to approach PKS. In Majelis Syuro session held in late April 2004, the party decided not to nominate presidential/vice presidential candidate, and in late June it issued a press release stating that it did not endorse any presidential candidates, and even advised its members not to participate in campaigning any candidate (PKS, 2006: 196-97).

PKS reluctance to endorse any candidate generated controversies inside the party and confusing the wider public. And in fact the hesitance was caused by heated controversies among its leaders on which candidate it should support. The debate was prolonged among members of Majelis Syuro, the party highest decision-making body. They were split into two equal camps: one side preferred Amien Rais, because had strong Islamist credential, both personally as well as his political views, and he had been long ally for many PKS leaders, and in fact many PKS members and activists at grass-root levels became his campaigners. The other camp, based on pragmatic calculation preferred Wiranto, who was former chief of the military and was nominated by the largest party Golkar, and was supported by the largest Muslim organization NU. In the last minutes, PKS released a statement that it endorsed Amin Rais. However, both Amin and Wiranto failed in the first round of the election. In the second round, PKS decisively endorsed S. B. Yudhoyono who competed against Megawati. This quick decision can be read both as result of PKS political calculation, that Yudhoyono had a bigger chance to win, and as an ideological strategy, to stop the incumbent Megawati.

When eventually Yudhoyono won and became the first directly elected president, PKS joined coalition government. In fact, there were many, inside and outside the party, who hoped PKS would play an opposition role given its anti-corruption reputation, to oversee and criticize the government which is plagued by rampant corruptions. Even many of its leaders preferred that their party will stay outside the government (*Kompas*, 11.08.2004). However,

eventually it decided to join the cabinet. Initially, it nominated four candidates to serve in the cabinets: Anton Apriantono for Ministry of Agriculture, Yusuf Asy'arie for Ministry of Housing, Adhyaksa Dault for Ministry of Youth and Sport, and Suripto for Attorney General, but received three ministerial portfolios, and failed to take attorney general position. According to PKS MP and member of Board of expert Zulkieflimansyah, the decision to take part in the cabinet was taken as an exercise for the party, so that the party would have a real experience in running government which was very important for its future (Zulkifleiemansyah, interview 25.06.2007). The term exercised seems fit to the situation, given the fact that those ministers are not from Tarbiyah leaders or activists, but rather professionals who were agree with the party's political visions and missions and agree to work with and bring political profits for the party.

Another significant event for PKS in post 2004 general elections was the election of its president, Hidayat Nurwahid, as the chairman of People Consultative Assembly (MPR). During New Order era, MPR was the highest state institution which selected the president, but in post-Suharto politics it no longer enjoys its former status and becomes a join session of the two Chambers of the Parliament. Notwithstanding, the MPR chairman still holds a prestigious status. The ability to put its representative in such position was a great achievement for PKS. Commenting on this event, Azyumardi Azra, a prominent Muslim intellectual, wrote that the raise of Nurwahid in the position has a number of significances. At the personal level, Nurwahid who has educational backgrounds on Islamic studies and holds Master and Doctoral degrees from Madinah University Saudi Arabia, marked a moment in where a Muslim politician with Islamist backgrounds was accepted in contemporary Indonesian politics. While at institutional level, it meant that PKS is now a mainstream party, and no longer the party of student activists (Azra, *Media Indonesia*, 10.11.2004)

A few days after being elected as the MPR chairman, Hidayat resigned from his party's post, which was handed over to Tifatul Sembiring as a caretaker until the next congress was held to elect a new leader. Again, there was no sign of debate or rivalries in this succession. Sembiring was eventually elected as the party's president in the National Congress held July 2005 in Jakarta. Tifatul Sembiring was a former coordinator of PKS region I, which includes North Sumatra and Aceh. He was born in Bukit Tinggi West Sumatra 1961. Graduated from Institute for Informatics and Computer Management (STI&K) Jakarta in 1982, he worked as a civil servant in State Electric Company for several years. In 1990 he joined Nurul Fikri foundation, and served as a preacher in Khairu Ummah. He spent six months in Pakistan, studying international politics in the Center for Asian and Strategic

Studies, Islamabad - Pakistan. His last post in the party was as a Coordinator for region I of Sumatra, which was responsible to coordinate 10 provincial branches. In 2004 election Sembiring successfully flocked 380 PKS representatives to provincial and district parliaments throughout Sumatra, and brought 17 representatives to national parliament. This success catapulted him into first rank figures in the party.

Another figure that came to the front was Hilmy Aminuddin who holds the position as the chairman of the powerful Deliberation Assembly (*Majelis Syuro*). His father, Danu Muhammad Hasan was a prominent figure of DI/TII and a close aide of Kartosuwiryo. But Machmudi reports that Aminuddin considers his father as his "biological, not ideological, father". He spent in military detention for some time in early 1980s, for possessing and distributing what the military classified as confidential information (Machmudi, 2005: 108).

4. CONCLUSION

This chapter discusses the history of PKS, from its organizational origins in Tarbiyah movement, to the success story in 2004 elections, and a joined coalition government. The intention of this chapter is to portray the party's history using theory of party's life cycle to understand its basic structures and pattern of functions. As is reviewed in the opening section, scholars of party studies suggest that a political party organization is like a living being, in which the societal backgrounds function as its parents, the environment contexts and processes in which it was born, the experiences it went through in formative years, all are important in building the party's character and "personality". This type of personality—in the word of Panebianco, degrees of institutionalization and systemness—provide information about how it will behave in given situations, how it will react to certain internal and external changes.

The societal background of Tarbiyah movement was fast moving modernizing segment of Indonesian society, i.e. the younger and more educated—and subsequently better economic condition—of university students and young professionals. The movement itself emerged because of several simultaneous factors: (i) The paradox of modernization and the advancement of higher education among Muslims that produced 'objectification of Muslim consciousness', instead of detaching them from religion and tradition, it fostered them to embrace their religion more tightly and pursued it more systematically. (ii) Postcolonial Muslim politics, in which Muslim politicians who contributed significantly to the country's struggle and independence from colonialism, were thwarted from political participation in

post-colonial Muslim country by secular regime and military. The Muslim politicians then switched their activities from power-politics into politics of religious propagation (*dakwah*), recruited and trained younger and better education Muslim generations. (iii) The renewal influence of Islamic movements in the Middle East, a major source of religious dynamics for Indonesian Muslim for centuries, which witness new surges of Islamist movements during political crises in 1970s. This urbanizing and modernizing societal background invested the organization pragmatic and objectives oriented characteristics. It adopted successfully non-violent Islamist ideology of Muslim Brotherhoods with its gradual political agenda, in which success in politics requires preparation from individuals, family, and society. Its activists were also skillfully adapted to hostile political environments during the New Order era, and it suffered no significant conflict with the authority, which was common for Islamic movement at that time.

When political environment changed in favor of Muslims, when Suharto swung his political alliance from the military to Muslim community, the movement came out of the cold and into public activities. And when eventually the regime changed and people were electrified with democratic euphoria, Tarbiyah ativists decided to form a political party. The formation process of the party resembled what Panebianco describes as "territorial penetration" in which a group of people agree to form a central party organization, which subsequently created or stimulated the creation of the lower level branches. This genesis process, in Panebianco's theory, will produce a strongly centralistic party organization. And PKS was, in fact, showed a strongly centralistic party, in which the central leadership holds huge power and control over the organization. One may argue, at this point, that PKS centralistic was a product of its ideological inspirations which strongly emphasizes loyalty and obedience to their leaders, socialized in Tarbiyah activities. Yet it is equally true that its genetic factor facilitated the central leadership to have greater control to the organization, since the central leadership has common ground and solid coordination, while regional branches were created by it and hence dependent upon it.

During and after its formation PKS had neither external sponsor organization nor charismatic leaders that stood above the organizational mechanism. Therefore, from its formative period the party has internal source of authority, and that it run on the basis of its own organizational structures and mechanism. It is true that the party was in fact created by, and a vehicle of, Tarbiyah movement; however since party leaders were also the most senior Tarbiyah activists, the movement did not function as an external sponsor for the party. Among the most notable example of PKS organizational centrality was the smoothness process of

leadership successions because, in addition to its ideological characteristics that prefer deliberation over competition, leaders in central office have known each-other for years and have established patterns of communications and interactions.

Finally, PKS organizational development in recent years has confirmed the presence of oligarchic tendency. At organizational level the tendency has been indicated by revisions of organizational functions, in which during PK period the highest decision-making body was party national congress which decisions were implemented by the Majelis Syuro; whereas during PKS period, the Majelis assumed the status of the highest decision making body, and although major policies were taken through consultations and deliberations, the practical interpretation and strategies of implementations of the policies were in the hand of a small number of key leaders. Meanwhile on programmatic level, the oligarchic tendency was indicated by the shift of the party course from strongly emphasizing ideological drives— focusing their attention to party objectives—during PK period, into focusing on organizational survival, growth and expansions. Political values were added to doctrinal values and behaviors. For instance, in the previous period to be moralist in politics such as emphasizing that anti-corruption was a religious duty for every individual that should be pursued personally; while in the later period the same programs has been enacted in different ways - as political actions that should be publicized for party advertisements.

CHAPTER IV

BETWEEN INTERNAL ASPIRATIONS AND EXTERNAL REGULATIONS:
THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF PKS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter I have shown the chronological account of the PKS, starting from its origins in the Tarbiyah movement by adopting its ideological orientation from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, and further focusing on its organizational genesis, formation and consolidation. Also, I have explained how those organizational elements influence the very party behavior. Recalling the findings of Jonasson's research on Islamist parties, one may argue that the behavior of PKS is a mere product of its ideological orientation. And in fact, PKS linkage behavior seems to be not too different from those Islamist parties Jonasson studied. Internally, it exhibits strong ideological tendencies, in terms of how it recruits members and activists and also requiring its members to commit to its ideological values; while externally it tends to be pragmatic, mobilizing support not only from within the Muslim community, but also from other segments of society, while at the same time willing to cooperate with other parties from different ideologies. Thus, it could also be interpreted, referring to Jonasson's conclusion, that PKS behavior was under the encompassing drive of its religious ideology, in which religion should be enacted in personal and political behaviors, even though its messages aim at addressing all people, not only the Muslims. Therefore it theoretically had the ability to mobilize support not only from within the Muslim community.

It is true that ideology plays a significant role in influencing political behavior of the PKS. However, it is just as well true that ideology is not the only factor affecting the outcome-behavior, or perhaps not even the most significant factor. In this chapter, I will explore the ideological orientation of the PKS, in a more detailed way, in order to reveal its true caliber in affecting party behavior. In doing so, I will apply the theory of cognitive institutionalism from Douglas North, which perceives ideology as an integral part of institutions, and its influence on actors' behavior besides other institutional factors. As was introduced in Chapter I, North defines institutions as "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Throughout history human beings were in need of institutions to stabilise their life as well as to structure the incentives for interactions - in society, politics and economy. (North, 1990, 3). Furthermore, North classifies institutions into formal institutions, characterized by well-defined rules with a wide scope and various specifications, including

constitutions, statute and common laws, specific bylaws, and, finally, individual contracts (North, 1990: 47); and informal institutions, which can be any kind of convention, codes of conduct, norms of behavior, and so on, which have arisen to coordinate "repeated human interaction" (1990: 40). In this case, ideology, together with culture and religion, are examples of informal institutions. For North, ideology and institutions constitute two sides of the same coin, both playing similar roles in constraining behaviors, and at the same time setting opportunities for interactions, transactions and collaborations by reducing uncertainties and facilitating distribution of resources (Fiori, 2002).

This theoretical insight transcends the current theoretical antagonism between the 'partisan' and 'strategic' point of view on ideology. The first camp understands a political party to be a "policy seeker", thus its ideology constitutes guidelines for party behaviors. Moreover, a political party commonly does not choose its ideology arbitrarily, but rather it represents orientations and interests of societal background, from which the party originally emerged. In their famous seminal study on party identification, Lipset and Rokkan wrote that political parties are traces of antagonism between various cleavages in society (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), which imply that each party's orientation is structurally set by its history and its behaviors are guided by ideological orientations. On the other hand, there is a growing number of publications suggesting that political parties, in fact, 'use' ideology, strategically, in order to pursue its real objective of gaining power. These pieces of literature, generally labeled as rational-choice approaches, suggest that politicians are rational beings whose actions are well-calculated in order to achieve gains and to avoid losses. One of its progenitors, Anthony Downs, wrote that any political party is an "office seeker", in which instead of seeking to win elections in order to implement a certain set of policies in line with its ideological aspirations, political parties implement certain policies in order to win elections (Downs, 1957).

By using North's theory this chapter shows that in fact ideological-partisanship and rational-strategic behavior are interconnected. The former refers to the party's perception of its environment and its judgments about it, while the latter explains the party's efforts of dealing with the environment - either changing or maintaining it. North's breakthrough lies in his model of human rationality. Different than proponents of partisan-behavior, who perceive that human behavior is bound to their history and societal structures, North argues that human actors have creative capabilities to resist structural constraints, and to change and modify the given structures. However, different than supporters of the rational choice theory, who deem the human creative capability as independent of any structural constraints, North suggests that

actors' creative capacities are limited by their knowledge and information. In theory, humans have the full capacity to change and engineer their institutional or structural environments; however, lack of knowledge and information may cause them to be unable or unwilling to do so (North and Denzeu, 1994).

This chapter will thus point out how the ideological formulations of PKS run parallel with the existing institutional settings. On the one hand, ideology contains the party's political objectives and agendas, but on the other hand it simultaneously contains strategic elements of how to handle the environment and achieve these objectives. I apply Hinich's and Munger's definition of ideology as a worldview that explains three major topics of human collective life: *ethics* or "what is good and what is bad?"; *economy* or "how should the society's resources be distributed?"; and *politics* or "where does power appropriately reside?". The first section of this chapter explains PKS ideology by analyzing the PK/PKS manifesto and statutes, followed by an explanation of parties programs as a derivative of ideology. The second section elaborates institutional contexts in which the party operates, focusing on the electoral system and the party system as the main institutions that determine party competitions and distribute resources. The last section concludes and compares the parallelism between PKS ideology and programs and its institutional environments.

2. PKS IDEOLOGY AND PROGRAMS

In Chapter II I analyzed two major Islamist parties in Indonesian history, the Sarekat Islam and Masyumi. Applying the Northian institutional perspective I pointed out how the two political organizations interpreted Islam differently as a political ideology or in fact as a political program, according to their respective institutional context. Although both parties similarly used Islam as the solution for the political problems arising among the Indonesian people, in reality they came up with significantly different ideological and programmatic formulations. For SI which operated under colonial government, which for centuries had implemented not only repressive and exploitative politics, but also discriminative policies that undermined and marginalized native Indonesians, Islam emerged as an ideological source providing doctrines and values by inter alia stipulating universal equality for human being, and denouncing social and cultural discrimination and economic exploitation. In the hand of SI leaders, Islam became a strongly socialistic ideology that propagated anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism.

While the Masyumi operated in a very different institutional context, as a transitional post-colonial Republic after World War II that was desperately struggling to build the state

almost from the scratch and having to cope with difficult negotiations with the former colonial power, as well as being under the shadow of a competing world of ideologies and super powers. In such situations, even though it aspired to implement Islam as the political system — quite similar to that of SI, and, in fact, many of Masyumi's leaders were former SI members — they came up with significantly different ideological and programmatic formulations. For the Masyumi, Islam is the best ideological option for Indonesian Muslims and for Indonesia in general in which Muslims constitute the majority of the population. In their eyes, Islam appears to be better than both Capitalism, which had caused wars and colonialism due to its doctrine of unlimited economic quests, and Communism, which contradicts the basic nature of humans as spiritual beings because of its underlying atheist ideology and its materialist and collectivistic interpretations of history producing a dictatorship by the proletariat. For the Masyumi Islam provides a balanced view on human nature and human history, in which individuals have full rights to pursue material achievements according to their ability while at the same time having collective duties to take care of and supporting the poor and the needy. The Masyumi also believed that Islam has democratic and progressive traits, which lead the party into formulating political and economic programs in the most rational ways, including the acknowledgement of the status quo of the dominance of foreign economies and signing security cooperation with the US.

It is interesting to start discussing PKS ideology by exploring how the party leaders perceived the historical context of their own party. Similar to SI and Masyumi, PK was an Islamist party founded upon the values and the teachings of Islam. The PK Statute stipulated that its ideologic base was Islam and its objectives were to bring about justice and prosperity to Indonesia that pleased Allah (Basic Statute PK, Article 2, 5). The wording (phrase) of the PK political objective was, in fact, a literary translation of traditional wisdom of the ideal objective of Muslim politics (Arabic: *Baldatun Thayyibatun wa rabbun ghafur*). This phrase has been slightly edited in the PKS statute, stating that the party is based on Islam as a political ideology and its objectives are: "*PKS is a party of religious propagation (dakwah) which objective is to realize a justice and prosperous society approved by Allah, in the Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.*" And it adds that PKS will achieve those objectives through the following efforts: (1) Freeing Indonesia from all kinds of oppression; (2) nurturing Indonesian society into an Islamic society; (3) preparing the nation to tackle future problems and challenges; (4) building societal and governmental systems which are in line with Islamic values; (5) developing a new just, prosperous and respected Indonesia (Basic Statute Chapter V, article 5 and 6).

In terms of substance or content, PKS ideology is quite similar to those of SI and Masyumi, however, given the fact that they were a part of different historical settings, which all produced different perceptions as to what the respective problems, solutions and opportunities are, each party understands this similar substance differently. According to the political manifesto pf PK, the core group of its founders was made up by student activists who were part of the so-called "Generation 1998"—the term refers to groups of academicians, journalists, opposition politicians, NGOs and student activists who advocated political reform that, in the end, forced Suharto to resign. This means that the founders perceived PK as an agent of democratic reformation, toppling authoritarian power that repressed political rights of Indonesians and installing democratic politics (PK Political Manifesto).

The party founders consider that the party, which was declared in 1998, was a continuous part of Muslim political history back to the colonial era.

> The party which was declared in 20 July 1998 in Jakarta has a deep historical and ideological root. Its supporters include generations that were actively involved in taking over the country's independence. And the younger generation in the party constituted a determinant element in student movement during political reformation. They are part of "generation 1998", and the heirs of the historical mandate from the previous generation (PK, 1998: 1).

In its historical recollection, the PK manifesto states that Muslims have played significant role in political development of the country in its colonial period and after gaining independence. Unfortunately, the political establishment tended to treat and discredit Muslims as threats to the political stability of the country, while in fact the ideological and political commitments of Muslims were intended for the good of the nation (1998: 7). The party manifesto admits that the coup attempted by the communist PKI was irrefutable evidence about the validity of Muslim political conviction during the Sukarno era, in which the Communists who repeatedly launched military coups were a latent threat, because of its atheism, anarchism and radicalism. Thus it was really strange—from the party's point of view—that the new political establishment under Suharto's New Order government took anti-Muslim political attitude, which is undermining the fact that Muslims had great contributions to the history of the nation. The regime even carried out systematic political engineering to weaken the Muslims' political roles by simplifying the party system. All in all, the course of policy pursued by the New Order regime had caused historical disaster for Indonesians (PK 1998: 8).

Hence, PKS perceives its historical context as facing the challenge of an authoritarian and dictatorial regime; and Islam emerges as the solution to the challenge, in other words Islam is interpreted as the liberating and democratizing ideology.

2.1. PKS Ethics

The first fundamental point of PKS ideology is defining what is good or the ethical norm. And for this point, the most fundamental concept was the party's name "Justice". The party was named "Justice" (Arabic and Indonesian: *Adil*) to summarize what it sees as the most important value in Islam, adopted from a Qur'anic verse (*Maidah*: 8): "Justice brings you close to Allah."

> The name "Justice" was chosen, because it represents the most fundamental nature of the universe. It was upon this principle that God created heaven and earth. According to the Islamic tradition, justice means to put everything in its proper place... The highest level of justice is the justice of faith, in acknowledging the truth of Monotheism, and God's right to be worshiped, gratified and remembered (PK, 1998: 14).

Thus for PKS, the word justice has three different, but interconnected, levels of meaning. The first is the "*cosmic sense*" of the word, by which justice refers to the order of universe, in which the universe in its complexity is balanced and has consistent orders. In fact, those natural laws are nothing else but God's own laws, since God created and maintained them. The word "Justice" was chosen as the name of the party, since it signifies 'God's natural law,' that bound all of His creatures (*Jati Diri PK*).

The second sense of the term was its "*moral sense*", in which justice also constitutes the highest ideals of human life. God is the creator and humans are the creatures, therefore the most appropriate and just thing humans must do is to follow God's guidance, i.e. through Islam. The founders and supporters of the Justice Party believe that the Islamic teaching is comprehensive, encompassing all aspects of human life.

> The all-inclusiveness of Islam is in the nutshell of Muslim's understandings of their religion. "Islam is a complete system of life, governing all aspects of human activities. Islam is the state and the country, the government and the citizens, moral and power, blessing and justice, culture and law, science and judiciary, material and natural resource, business and wealth, jihad and propagation, army and doctrine, true belief and rights observance." The inclusiveness of Islam is a prescription to be observed. Islam is a way of life which includes religion, politics, the state and the society (PK, 1998: 10).

The third sense of justice is the "*technical-sense*". Since justice is seen as the most prevalent character of cosmic and historical orders and processes, it is also the most rational and the most effective way of succeeding in any human activity. Politics is perceived as having no exception, while justice is seen as the most effective way to reign, and injustice as the road towards total destruction (Chapter II, Article 5). In short, the ultimate ethical value for PKS lies in justice, which in religio-cosmic terms is understood as completely and consistently abiding by Islamic teachings, in all aspects of life.

The next important issue in examining the ethical formulation of PKS can be seen in its standpoint towards religious pluralism or rather its perception of people of other persuasions. At first glance, an irritating impression can arise while studying the political manifesto of PK, due to its ambiguous views on the topic. Yet otherwise, it acknowledges political equality of all people from different primordial backgrounds - be it ethic, culture or religion - within the state. In fact, PKS membership is not defined as welcoming only Muslims (PK/PKS Statutes). Instead, the manifesto mentions:

> It is through the state that human rights are guaranteed, and human dignity is protected equally in spite of the different religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds (PK Manifesto).

At this point the position becomes obvious that the party acknowledges the equality of the Indonesian people, regardless of their respective background, guaranteeing them to have similar rights in front of the satate, and to deserve equal treatments. Yet other parts in the document seem to try to differentiate between the Muslim community and other persuasions within the Indonesian population.

> The Justice Party seeks to crystallize the ideals of Indonesian nation, represent the spirit of intellectual and social reforms (*tajdid* and *islah*). We try our best to become a safe place for everyone who is concerned about what is happening with the *ummah* and the people (PK Manifesto).

> Democracy has become the spinal cord of the struggle to accommodate political aspirations of the entire society. Starting from this understanding, we are forming a political party as a vehicle of religious propagation (*dakwah*), in order to bring about universal ideals and to promote political aspirations especially from the Muslim community and the Indonesian people, in general. This party will from now be called the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS Declaration).

The passages clearly show that PKS differentiates between Muslim and non Muslim actors, and it prioritizes the Muslim community without neglecting the interests of other Indonesian people. Of course this is simply a general principle, since, in practice, politics are no more than a rivalry of interests. Another notion in the standpoint of the PKS party is that it holds on to a "proselytizing" ideology. In the first citation, the PKS seeks to promote *tajdid* and *islah* - two basic concepts in Islam - which in fact means reforming and developing society, in an Islamic kind of way. In similar vein, the PKS declaration stipulates that the party is a vehicle for *dakwah*, or for propagating Islam in and through politics. The proselytizing agenda is also clearly found it the following PK manifesto:

> The resignation of Suharto has opened the windows for freedom and opportunity. Yet, it does not mean that the task of propagation is over. The road is a long way to go, since in many aspects of life the community of Muslims still lagged behind. Their worldview and way of life are still not inline with Islamic guidance and teachings. The existing social structure is still unsupportive to efforts for building an Islamic society.
> The struggle for Islamic propagation must go on. The deliberation of propagation activists has led to the conclusion that we have to take the opening opportunity, in seeking to bring about an Indonesian state appreciated by Allah. The formation of a political party with an Islamic ideological orientation is necessary to achieve the objectives of propagation of Islam, in a democratic way, and acceptable to the wider public. Therefore they agreed to establish the Justice Party (Manifesto PK)

Finally, the fundamental issue in of the PKS ideology is pertaining 'gender equality'. Recent studies suggest that gender equality is the lowest point within Muslim democracy (Norris and Inglehart, 2003). Traditional Islamic values—derived from Qur'anic teachings—strongly discourage women's participation in public activities and especially in politics. Among the most popular Qur'anic verses being used to discourage women's roles in politics are (4: 34) "*The men are leaders for the women, as God has granted superiority for the former over the latter, and because men earn the living. Good women are those who obey of Allah and take care of themselves*"; and a prophetic tradition which says: "*A nation would not be in luck if they give the leadership to a woman.*"

Again, one finds that stance of the PKS for gender equality is ambiguous. The standard statement is that basically women have the same rights as man in politics but since they are – by nature - different than men they must adjust the equality according to their nature. PK Manifesto mentions:

Civil society is the model for a just society, when plurality becomes the potential for the development of a nation. When members of parliaments are thoughtful and critical, ministers are professionals, and judges and attorneys are wise and brave. Businessmen become a blessing for the state and the people, religious leaders and artists are a vanguard of the nation's culture and civilization. The military men are professional soldiers who provide security for the people without losing their political rights as citizens. Women are sisters of men with equal rights and obligations according to their respective natures, and working together equally for the good of the nation (PK Manifesto).

Yet in fact, it is a sensitive issue for the party. During the PK period, the Shariah Council (*Dewan Syariah*) issued a statement regarding women's participation in the party. The statement imprints a strong patriarchal perspective of women as naturally inferior, incapable and less rational, whose natural inclination is sexual attraction:

Politics has religious values (*ibadah*) in Islam; therefore women have equal opportunity from men according to the natural division of labor. When women should become active in politics, they must obey the guidelines prescribed by Islamic ethics: (1) Wearing decent dress, the ones that are not body-fitting and not transparent; (2) Do not resemble men in appearances and in behaviors; (3) Should not use perfumes, wearing accessory or showing-off their beauty; (4) They must not artificially soften their voice, or whispering sensually when they speak; (5) Control their gaze; (6) Do not cause controversies; (7) Do not neglect their main tasks as housewife (Dewan Syariah PK, 3/III/1999).

The same Council, now part of the PKS, issued another fatwa on women's participation in politics, in this case regarding women candidating for becoming a Member of Parliament. In this time, women participation in politics is only allowed in an emergency situation.

(1) Politics is an integral part of Islam, (2) Seeking the good and refusing the vice is collective duties of both men and women; (3) Since politics is part of the effort to seek the good and to refuse the bad, women's participation in politics is needed; (4) Female participation, including becoming a MP is allowed on the basis of riel benefits and emergency needs, under the following requirements: [a]. permission by their husbands, [b]. non-interference with the tasks in their family, [c]. have the moral and structural ability to avoid controversies, [d]. strictly follow Islamic rules in meeting with men, in their dressing and speaking, and in getting along with men other than their relatives; (5) The minimum and maximum number of women in the parliament is confined to the need, and not of certain quota (Shariah Council PKS, 17.07.2003)

Another document, an anonymous fatwa included in a volume published by PKS and put next to the fatwa from the Shariah Council on women participation in politics, pointed out that

women are not allowed to become the national leader. It cites various sources to support the argument, especially coming from classical Muslim jurists, who denied women's right of obtaining the position of any national leadership, and from the history of Muslim politics in which the common practice never elected women as the caliph (PKS DIY, 2004).

2.2 PKS Economy

The ideological concept of an economy, following Hinnich and Munger's definition, is defined by the concept of how collective economic resources of the society should be distributed. In fact, PKS has no clear ideological concept of economy. However, following its worldview of interrelatedness between natural, moral and technical moral laws, the party's documents indicate that economic prosperity is a natural consequence of people complying with the principle of justice. Justice ensures the mechanism of social control.

> Justice paves the way to the truth, righteousness, beatitude and happiness. Justice provides for everyone their fundamental human rights, and accommodates for their creative potentials. Justice spreads security, and frees people from fear and intimidation. Justice guarantees proportional redistribution of the state's resources and equal opportunities for economic activities (PK, 1998: 4).

The document also states that, since prosperity stems from justice, it is thus obligatory for every citizen to enact the principle of justice in their own personal conduct (PK, 1998: 6). According to the Islamic tradition, there are two different but interconnected rules for human collective life. The first is the rule of personal obligation (*shariah*), namely the obligation of every individual to follow God's rule, while the second is the rule of collective strategy (*siyasah*) which emphasizes people's collective physical and economic well-beings. Both of them stem from justice. The triumph of the ruler and the prosperity of the ruled depend upon the enactment of the principle of justice. When an individual ignores his personal duty, it implies that he is doing harm to himself, which at the same time affects the collective well-being (PK, 1998: 24).

To some extent, the economic concept of PKS resembles the "social market-economy" of a Christian democracy, albeit in a primitive form, in which it prefers prioritizes economic empowerment to the lower-level economic segments, such as peasants, laborers, fishermen and small businesses, without refusing free competition of market economy. Yet, it is still highly symbolic and tainted with politics of identity, meaning that its formulation is intended to highlight and strengthen the Islamic identity.

The institutionalization of justice politics and economy, in addition to strengthening political institutions in general, will prevent the emergence of totalitarianism, anarchism, individualism and excessive capitalism which have proven negative to people's well being. The Justice Party commits to efforts of economic redistribution and development, and enactment of democratic, clean and just governance (PK Manifesto)

In line with this economic concept, the PK and PKS programs on economy mention:

Economy: The development of a robust national economy based on justice; developing productive industries which are not dependent on foreign capitals; endorsing people's participation in creating a competitive economy; empowering agricultures, farms and maritime industries to create sustainable supply for the people; improving export-oriented industries such as oil and mines based on fair distribution for people's prosperity and developing small-scale industries; improving the exploration of natural resources that provides the opportunity for equal participation and avoids monopoly; developing welfare service systems such as tax and alms for resource redistributions (PK Programs).

Economy and Welfare: (i) projecting Islamic values in economic behavior and policy, (ii) building economic power for Muslims and the nation through independent projects, rejecting cartelism and the monopoly system which destroy people's economy, (iii) maintaining Muslim wealth by endorsing the development of Islamic industries and economic projects, (iv) not to let a single coin drop into the hand of the enemy of Muslims, (v) protecting natural resources from exploitation averse to public interest, (vi) developing problem-solving economic projects to develop the people's economy, in collaboration with committed national and overseas partners (PKS Programs).

2.3. PKS Politics

With regard to the ideological concept of politics, or where the power appropriately resides, the party perceives that the ultimate authority belongs to God, and therefore the society and the state should be run according to God's laws:

This means that the absolute sovereignty belongs to God (Qur'an, 3: 26-27). And God as the owner of absolute authority wants humans to act as His vicegerents on earth. Therefore, one can only claim to have the legitimate authority as long as it is implemented to fulfill His will (Qur'an, 6: 165). Therefore, according to Islam the government should be practiced through the principle of sovereignty of the people, in order to realize God's sovereignty (PK, 1998: 21)

On the one hand, this concept implies that pious people should take over the leadership positions in society, as they have better knowledge of God's laws. A further

document of PKS cites a Qur'anic verse: (Nuur: 55): "*Allah has promised those among you who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the country, as He granted it to those before them, and that He will grant them the authority to practice their religion, the one He has chosen for them i.e. Islam.*" When applying the ideological point of view of the PKS to this verse, it can be concluded that being pious, following God's guidance, is morally the most legitimate and technically the most effective way to come to power. After all, He was the creator and He is the authority who decides what will happen and what will not.

It is interesting to note at this point that, even though this view on that matter seems similar to the one of the Masyumi, it is in fact significantly different. According to the PKS the rights to take over political power is in the hand of pious people, i.e. people who thoroughly and consistently practice the divine rules; the Masyumi term, in comparison, is *Ulama* which means "people who are knowledgeable on religious matter". This also emphasizes the specific character of PKS's religious view, which is populist and stresses the practice and implementation of religious teachings, rather than learning them in scholastic and elitist manner, as was proclaimed by the Masyumi.

On the other hand, the political worldview of the PKS implies the adoption of democracy, in which the political authority is in the hand of the people, and which acknowledges the equal rights of all people. It also advocates people's political participation, to struggle against tyranny and to obey the constitution. The people's active participation in politics represents a high value of patriotism, culture and religiosity. It also pledges the supremacy of a civilian government, while criticizing the tyranny of a military dictatorship. The civilian government must follow democratic principles, support the development of the potentials of all segments within the nation, protect the weak and guarantee citizens' freedom. The military should limit its functions to protecting the nation from external threats and maintaining domestic stability (PK, 1998: 4).

It also promotes and supports the people's participation in politics. Ideally, citizens should know about their proper rights and duties. One of the most important duties is to exercise control over the government, when it ignores the principles of justice. And this proactive participation can only be realized if the citizens have the political capacity and capability. Therefore, for the PK political education and empowerment for the citizens is substantial for creating any form of democracy. And the development of the people's political capacity to achieve a balance of power between the ruler and the ruled is the objective of the PK (PK, 1998: 4).

Finally, it is important to add here that for the PK, democracy is basically a procedure to regulate political process. It is not an end in itself. Democracy is only one mean to achieve the real duty, which at last is the will of God.

> One of the basic principles of democracy, namely the participation of the people in the political process is in line with the Islamic principle of deliberation (*shura*). In Islam deliberation is a procedure of exercising in politics and government. Since humans are vicegerents of God on earth, in writing laws and regulations, legislators must obey and must not contradict God's law and regulations (PK, 1998: 21).

As the extrapolation of those ideological concepts of politics, programs of the PKS state the following:

a. Building an Islamic system at societal and state level.

b. Building political communication to persuade people to participate in politics by: (i) building a public awareness for the importance of Islamic politics as the solution to the nation's and the state's problems, (ii) strengthening the credibility and effectiveness of the communication between the party and the society.

c. Building political cultures by: (i) enhancing the role of Islam as the source of cultural values in politics, (ii) developing egalitarian and democratic patterns of political behavior, (iii) developing rational political behavior and (iv) developing an inter-party solidarity.

d. Endorsing political participation by: (i) nurturing situations that could appeal to the people's consent for political participation through PKS, (ii) preparing a favorable atmosphere to attract the voluntary participation of the people in the party programs.

e. Building external relations by collaborating in order to achieve goodness and piety, and avoid sins and law breaking. Moreover, the relation with other Muslims would be based on a flexible amity (*wala*), and the connection with infidels would be footed on strict commitment to the Islamic principles (*barra*), through: (i) collaboration and loyalty towards the Islamic party, its organizations and its institutions at the national or even at the international level, (ii) actively participate in creating conducive conditions for the realization of collaboration and unity among Muslim organizations, (iii)

positive thinking toward other Muslim organizations, (iv) denying a compromise with all institutions fledging the flags of infidelity.

2.4 PKS Platforms

In the terminology of party studies the term 'party platform' refers to policy formulations or policy positions promoted by a political party. Commonly, parties formulate their platform during election campaigns, to tell the public what kind of issues or policies the party stands for. A platform is more specific than an ideology, since it reveals the interpretation of the party's ideological worldview in a given context of political competition; yet, it is still more general and more abstract than party programs. Therefore, a party platform records its ideological aspirations, as well as its strategic and programmatic visions.

The fundamental message of the platforms are found in its "visions and missions." The PK's political vision was "*Justice that leads into the truth, the good, the beauty, and the happiness of life. Justice provides the people not only with an opportunity to achieve their fundamental rights as human beings, but also with a support mechanism for their innovations and creativeness. Justice spreads the sense of security and frees people from any kind of intimidation and fear; under just systems there will be no discrimination, both towards minorities or the majority. Justice guarantees a fair and proportional distribution of the state's resources and offers equal opportunities for economic entrepreneurships*." Its political missions were: "*To bring about Indonesia as a strong nation as the carrier of Blessing for human beings, so that Indonesians would be able to contribute to human civilization and the World becoming a tranquil garden of life*."

In the statutes of PKS, the party's visions and missions are reformulated more systematically, that it is: *(1) A party of religious propagation which strives for Islam as the solution for political issues and problems. (2) An agent of transformation of Islamic values and teachings in all processes of nation building. (3) The pioneer to build cooperation with various groups with the similar mission to establish an Islamic system and values as a universal good (not only for Muslims). (4) A contributor to the achievement of civil society in Indonesia*. Their political missions are: 1. *Spreading the Islamic propagation and creating cadres as elements of reform. 2. Developing Islamic societal institutions as centers for reform and solutions. 3. Building the Islamic public opinion and creating a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of problem-oriented Islamic teachings. 4. Advocating political education of the society, protecting and empowering citizens' rights. 5. Promoting goodness in politics, under the framework of Islamic laws and ethics. 6. Cooperating actively with other Islamic*

organizations to achieve unity among the Muslim community, and with other organizations to follow the agenda of national reformation. 7. Participating actively in supporting the oppressed Muslim countries.

Those political visions and missions are then translated into what the party calls "Basic Principles", which include the following ten points:

1. *Integral*, in which every action and policy must take various relevant aspects into consideration. This point also shows the perceptions of PKS that Islam provides a complete system of life, so that good Muslims should follow Islamic guidance in every aspect of their life. And perhaps it is interesting to note here that the meaning of the French term '*integriste*' is equal to 'fundamentalism', and to a concept in party studies 'total-integration' that refers to a type of political party that seeks to totally integrate its members into its programs, exemplified by communist and fascist parties.

2. *Reformist*, all the party's policies lead into reform and the refinement of individuals, society, the government and the state, in order to enact Gods' words, to make His laws prevalent, and to establish His kingdom. This point affirms what I call the 'proselytism' character of PKS's politics, as it seeks to convert people to their value system.

3. *Constitutional*, in terms of following God's constitution which regulates the very relation between humans as such and between humans and their Creator. Upholding and following Islamic Law in every aspect of life is a mandatory requirement for Muslims as a consequence of their faith. The Qur'an and the Prophetic Traditions are constitutional foundations for the party's policies, programs and behaviors.

4. *Moderate*, in thoughts and actions, in individual behaviors and in organizational policies. At practical level, it means rejecting any form of extremism, oppressions and vices.

5. *Committed and consistent*, to Islamic teachings by turning the "transcendental laws" found in the Qur'an and Prophetic Tradition—and the thoughts of qualified *ulama*—into the foundation of the party's policies, programs and actions.

6. *Growing and developing*, endorsing creativity in improving the party vertically as well as horizontally based upon the Islamic values. The key factor in continuous development is a sustainable program on human resource development, to enable vertical mobility and horizontal expansion.

7. *Gradual and proportional*, in party programs and development being in line with both the divine and natural laws. Hurrying is a wrong way of carrying out programs, and will inevitably lead into imbalance and failure. This gradualism strongly reflects the political

agenda of the Muslim Brothers, with its bottom up Islamization programs: starting from teaching Islamic values to individuals and families. After the people have been made familiar with it, Islam can be promoted by public norms without much resistance, and when the societal system has been Islamized the people will naturally demand for an Islamic political system.

8. *Priority on effectiveness*, in which PKS takes the good of Muslim community as its main objective, and thus the benefits for the community are the main scale according to which the evaluation of party programs shall be undertaken.

9. *Future oriented*, in which the PKS focuses not only on short-term achievements but also on long-term targets, without neglecting the current and past situations. This is in fact a very important point for the party, as it pays very high attention to recruitment and indoctrination in order to guarantee the sustainability of their organization.

10. *Global awareness*, in terms of the PKS acknowledging that Islam is a universal religion and *da'wa* activities should follow the nature of Islam itself, without loosing attention to the unique context in which ones live. And this also explains the party's concerns towards international issues in Muslim countries.

3. INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT OF INDONESIAN POLITICS (1980-2006)

After explaining the key points of the party ideology and platform, in this section, I will discuss the setting of the institutional environment in which the Tarbiyah movement and the PK/PKS operate. *Firstly*, I will explore the institutional settings of Indonesian politics under the New Order regime, especially focusing on the dominant role of the military in national politics, state engineering and coercion of electoral system and party system, and the feebleness of the legislative bodies in front of the executive branch of government. *Next*, I will discuss the regime change and its institutional implications, in which— in the word of the American Indonesianist Dwight King—the old political institutions were only half-heartedly reformed. *Finally*, I will elaborate, in detail, the further democratic consolidation marked by 2004 parliamentary and presidential election.

3.1. Institutional Settings in New Order Period

When one studies the history of Indonesian politics under the New Order regime, it becomes clear how it massively engineered and coerced political institutions, on its way towards power. The political manufacturing was started immediately after the Suharto rose to power in

1965. There were four fundamental elements or stages through which the authoritarian regime engineered the political institutions.

Firstly, the increasing proportion of the role of the military in national politics. In fact, although the participation and intervention of the military in politics are not uncommon in new democracies such as in Southeast Asia, the role of the Indonesian military in politics was quite unique. While usually military involvements in political affairs are interventionist and temporary in character, Indonesian armed forces had been able to obtain a constitutional, a legal as well as a cultural basis for its political functions. Historically, the Indonesian armed forces—especially the army—had played the most important role during the early years of the history of the republic, and proved itself as the most resilient institution at the time when the new nation went through various political and security crises. Initially, political doctrines of the Indonesian military emerged as a response to the political instability during the liberal democracy era of the 1950's, when political parties driven by various ideologies were in prolonged quarrels among themselves and against the president that led into national political deadlocks amid an increasing public dissatisfaction, which triggered regional rebellions. At that moment, the doctrine was rather humble, a middle-way policy in which the military should be involved by stabilizing the national politics. It was neither a full political actor nor a mere spectator (Lev, 1963, Feith, 1964).

When Suharto came to power in 1965 he established a new political regime—the New Order—with the military as its backbone. The regime then installed a legal and institutional basis for the new political roles for the military. *Firstly*, the preamble of the 1945 Constitution stipulates that the struggle for independence should be continued by social, political and economic struggles to achieve a united, sovereign, just and prosperous Indonesia. It means that the armed forces which had been involved in the struggle for independence should become an integral part of the social, political and economic developments. *Secondly*, the 1945 Constitution also stipulates ,in article 30 paragraph one, that all citizens have the right and duty to participate in defending the state; which implies that if the civilians have this very right and duty in defense activities then the military which basic function lies in defending the state should also be allowed to participate in politics. *Thirdly*, article 10 of the Constitution stipulates that the president is the highest commander of the armed forces, and therefore he has the full range of rights to use the military for other functions other than defense. *Fourthly*, the statement made by the Defense Minister in May 1966, demanded that the idea of the armed forces being the instrument of revolution and the instrument of the state, and the perception of its socio-economic functions to protect the spirit of revolution should be

recognized and guaranteed. *Finally*, the decree of the Security Minister no 177/1966 stipulates that, outside the defense functions, the Indonesian armed forces have the status of a functional group and are organized as one, as well, and therefore should participate in social, economic and political affairs and national developments (Moertopo, 1972: 48-50).

Under the banner of the dual functions, Indonesian armed forces gained a dominant position of influence in every major national enterprise, from security to economy and from politics to governmental administrations. In 1960s it was successfully eliminated and banned what they called the 'extreme left' of the communist party and communist ideology. And during 1970s it sought to do the same thing to the 'extreme right' of the political Islam. The regime passed a package of five Political Laws in 1985 which marked the apex moment of its totalitarian control over the nation. *Firstly*, the law No. 1/1985 on Election, which stipulates that only three organizations—Golkar, PPP and PDI—were the official participants; and that the election committee was in the hand of the government, itself led by the Ministry of Interior Issues and the national military commander. *Secondly*, Law No. 2/1985 on Composition and Status of the Parliament, which ensures that half of the members of the representative bodies were chosen by the government. *Thirdly*, Law No. 3/1985 on the Political Parties, in which required the election contestants to adopt Pancasila as their organization sole base. *Fourthly*, Law No. 5/1985 on Referendum, which specifies that a national referendum to acquire the consent from the majority of Indonesian citizens is required in order to amend 1945 Constitution. And *Finally*, Law No 8/1985 on Mass Organization, which also required all mass-based organizations operated in the country to adopt the state ideology Pancasila as the sole base.

The law package 1985, was the final blow from the regime to take control Indonesian political system. Some analysts argue that in this policy the regime, in fact, targeted Muslim politics, since Islamic ideology is the only significant social force not yet brought to heel, not yet accept the regimes' opinion on where authority ultimately resides. The policy received vast criticism not only among Muslims who felt that the regime tried to elevated the Pancasila above their religion, and a small group of hardliner Muslims did react provocatively which then repressed by the authority violently caused hundred of casualties. Yet, the rejections and suspicion also expressed by Christian communities who feared the regime would implement secularization policy. (Ramage, 1995: 36-37).

The armed forces also took control of Indonesian economy especially the state own oil company (PERTAMINA). The armed forces divisions also developed their own business institutions and enjoyed large portions of state projects. In running its businesses, the army

officers received assistances and collaborations from Chinese community. Meanwhile the domination of active as well as retired ilitary officers in politics and governmental administrations were very conspicuous. By 1980 almost 50 percent of the cabinet positions, 75 percent of the posts of secretary-general, 80 percent of the posts of director-general, 84 percent of the posts of minister secretary, and 75 percent of provincial governors' posts were taken up by military officers (Koekebakker, 1994).

The second factor that constituted the fundamental structure of political institutions in New Order era was the establishment of Golkar as the regime's political vehicle. Golkar (*Golongan Karya*, or Functionary Group) was originally established by a number of military officers in 1964 as an association of anti-communist organizations. When Suharto gained power, the new regime was dominated by the military that held prevalent negative sentiments toward political parties and civilian politicians—a trauma from 1950s. When eventually the regime was forced to call for elections, as the proper way to legitimize the regime change, it turned into Golkar which, in February 1970, was switched into political organization of the government to compete in the upcoming elections. Interestingly, in line with anti-political party sentiments prevalent among the military and was now imbued with economic developmentalism, the regime claimed that Golkar was not a political party and that its objectives were not ideological—like those of political parties—but rather tangible economic developments (Moertopo, 1972: 50).

In the course of its development, Golkar evolved into a tool by which the regime accommodated, structured and exploited major elements in Indonesian political system. Internally Golkar consisted of three major factions that represented three main political resources: i.e. the military which was known as the 'A section' (stand for ABRI or Indonesian Military); the bureaucracy which was called the 'B section' (Indonesian *Birokrasi* or bureaucracy); and other groups outside the military and bureaucracy, such as business and other social and cultural groups, that was called the 'G section' (stands for *Golongan* or groups). The regime had been able not only to accommodate those major political resources but also structured them to work for its interests. Among the most consequential was the so called 'mono-loyalty doctrine' for public servants, civil as well as military, to the government. The presidential decree No. 6/1970 stipulated that civil servants could join political parties with approval from their superiors and should resign if they were elected as candidates. However, since Golkar was not a political party, civil servants could join Golkar and became its candidates. Meanwhile the military personals were not eligible to vote, yet still they could become candidates for Golkar (Antlov and Coderoth, 2004: 7).

Thirdly, New Order political manufacturing was not only at organizational levels, but also went down deeply into the political rules of the games. In 1973 it engineered the party system by forcefully merged ten political parties present in 1971 elections into two political parties: all four Muslim parties joined into United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) while five secular and Christian parties merged into Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*). In this way, the regime co-opted and discredited political parties into right-wing and left-wing ideological organizations, while depicting Golkar image as centrist non-ideological economic-oriented organization (Liddle, 1978). The government officials had been also notorious in their interventions into parties' internal affairs, by endorsing cooperative politicians to lead the parties and hindered unwanted politicians from taking strategic positions in the parties (Weatherbee, 2002).

Moreover, it also launched controversial policy known as "floating mass" politics, intended to stripped off ideological sentiments and ideological identifications from the masses by banning activities of political parties under district level, hence the lowest level of party organizations were at district levels. Again, since Golkar was not qualified as a political party, it was allowed to have its branches at sub-district (*Kecamatan*) and village levels. According to the architect of the policy, it was designed to overcome the latent political instabilities among mass-people especially in rural areas which constituted the largest portion of the Indonesian citizens caused by competing political parties that marshaled the people in line with their respected ideological orientations. In order to prepare the Indonesian people to be ready for national development, focusing primarily in economic achievements, the mass-people at village levels should be depoliticized and be freed from conflicting political ideologies (Moertopo, 1972: 96).

Therefore, nothing was surprising when Golkar disproportionately dominated all elections during the new order era. In the first elections 1971, it already emerged as the majority winner by collecting 63 percents of national votes, and made Indonesian party system practically dominant party system:

Elections' Results during the New Order Era (1971-1997)

PARTY	1971	1977	1982	1988	1992	1997
Golkar	62.8	62.1	64.1	73.0	68.1	74.5
Parmusi	5.4					
NU	18.7					
PSII	2.4					
Perti	0.7					
PPP		29.3	28.0	16.0	17.0	22.4
PNI	6.9					
Christian Party	1.3					
Catholic Party	1.1					
IPKI	0.6					
MURBA	0.1					
PDI		8.6	7.9	11.0	14.9	3.1

It is important to note at this point, however, that although the military and Golkar had dominated Indonesian politics, the actual dominant player was indeed President Suharto himself. Suharto ruled Indonesia following traditional Javanese political culture, which perceived political power as personal property—that work like magical power; it should not be shared, since distribution and decentralization of power will dilute the power (Anderson, 1972). Suharto sustained his power in Indonesian politics not by nurturing systematic support from the military and Golkar, but rather using old colonial trick of "divide and rule" by playing personal loyalties. In this way, he actually kept the military and Golkar weak institutionally, as the military personnel as well as Golkar politicians knew that the only way to advance their career was not by following the standard procedures of their organizations but rather through personal credits to Suharto.

And Suharto had to reap what he seeded. By mid 1980s, a number of senior military officers, under the leadership of the chief commander Gen. L. B. Murdany started to be critical toward Suharto's politics, which they perceived as hindered the development of a professional Indonesian military. Murdany criticized what he saw as excessive expansions of

the business of Suharto's children. He even tried to expose Suharto's corrupt policies to international attentions (Kingsburry, 2002: 92. Jenkins, 1986). Subsequently, the critical attitude toward Suharto increased among the military when he appointed as vice president Maj. Gen. Sudharmono who was unpopular among military officers. Inconvenience with the development in the military, at the end of the decade Suharto took surprising political maneuver by moving closer toward Muslim community. Firstly, he removed the Catholic Murdani from the chief commander of the armed forces, moved him into less influential position of defense minister, and replaced him with pious Muslim Try Sutrisno in 1988. Suharto also brought more Muslim generals into strategic positions. Suharto also approved the bills on religious subjects in public schools and marriage bill special for Muslims. Even personally he changed his public image from an earnest follower of Javanese mysticism into a pious Muslim when in 1993 he brought his family and closest aides into royal pilgrimage to Mecca to perform one of the basic pillars of Islamic religion.

The most substantial Suharto political swing to cooperate with Muslims took the form of his approval of his closest aide Habibie, then minister of Science and Tecnology, to head the Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI, *Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*) founded in 1990. ICMI was in fact a loosely organized hybrid association whose members came from different segments in Muslim community and with different agenda.There were at least three different groups of ICMI members, activists and leaders each with their own different interpretations of what the organization should achieve (See Hefner, 1993).

The *fist* was government bureaucrats, which include technocrats who worked under Habibie in Agency for Research and Technology (BPPT), a number of high ranking Golkar functionaries, some cabinet ministers, university professors and businessmen. This group of people did not really actively take part in ICMI activities, and their participations were more symbolic and politically motivated.

The *second* was moderate Muslim figures and thinkers like Nurcholish Madjid, Emil Salim and Sitjipto Wirosardjono who perceived ICMI as an arena through which Islam could be developed as public discourses, how Muslims could discuss their religion and adapted it into contemporary social and economic context, and fashion it into more active social force to improve the education level and economic fortunes for Muslim community.

The *third* was modernist Muslim activists, like Amien Rais, Adi Sasono and Imaduddin Abdurrahim, who held a more ambitious political agenda for the organization. The main agenda of this faction was the so called "proportionalization" of political and economic

resources for Muslim community as the majority of Indonesian population. In politics, they argued, the New Order regime was unfairly gave more share to the Christians in political, governmental as well as military posts—which was in fact true—and they demanded that the trend should be reversed in favor of Muslims. In economy they took the blame to the Indonesian Chinese community who disproportionately dominated the countries business and economy, and they also requested that Muslim economic actors should be given wider opportunity to play their part (Ramage, 1999: 90-105).

ICMI was quite phenomenal, in term that in relatively short term it had been able to attract and organize huge national political resources that significantly influenced the balance of the country's politics, brought more Muslim figures in strategic posts in bureaucracy as well as military positions, and culminated in the election of Habibie as Vice President in 1997. Therefore it was natural that criticism and negative reactions toward ICMI were soon emerged to the surface. Interestingly, the first and perhaps the most ardent critics came from internal Muslim community, represented among other by Abdurrahman Wahid, then the chairman of NU Muslim organization, who accused ICMI as merely a political vehicle of Suharto and the new order regime, and a Trojan horse to co-opt Muslim from within. Another strong reaction—naturally—came from the Christian community who feared that ICMI could become a pretext for fundamentalist Muslim group to discriminate them. Finally, mixed reactions came from the Indonesian armed forces where the internal tensions already visible between the so called "green" or Muslim-minded and "red and white" or nationalist officers. A group of senior military generals reacted critically to ICMI's expanding influence, and warned the public that it could be divisive and counterproductive for national unity; while other groups enjoy cordial cooperation with the Muslim organization (Hefner, 1993).

3.2. Regime Change and Institutional Reforms

In 21 March 1998 Suharto stepped down under the double pressures both from various political oppositions and monetary and economic crises that severely hit the country for several months. He transferred the power into the Vice President Habibie, who subsequently formed a transitional government to prepare elections.

Before proceeding to discuss Habibies' government, it is important to note at this point, that since the later years of Suharto government and during Habibie's term of presidency, the most dominant political actors were the military and Muslim groups. The military was the most robust and influential institutions. After the temporary sour relations with Suharto during Murdani's period of leadership, the military was able to get the favor

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from Suharto when it was succeeded in bringing its commander in chief Sutrisno into vice presidency in 1993. Sutrisno's successor Hartono was also able to get closer into Suharto's inner circle. While Hartono's successor Feisal Tandjung was even seemed to have closer relation to the regime's inner circle than to the military. During Tandjung leadership a number of younger generals rose and started to play important roles in the armed forces, which include Wiranto who was to be the next armed forces commander in chief, Prabowo who is Suharto son-in-law, and S. B. Yudhoyono the future president.

In the meantime, the greater clout enjoyed by Muslim groups in national politics was undeniably caused by Habibie's support through ICMI, which injected a considerable self confident for Muslims to take parts in public affairs. Among the most prominent Muslim figures in this period were Nurcholish Madjid a Jakarta-based professor of Islamic studies, whose thoughts on Islamic neo-modernism—focusing on how to make Islam a moral force for Muslim who live in modernizing and religiously plural Indonesia—attracted wide followings across the country; Amien Rais then the chairman of Muhammadiyah who constantly advocated critical views on Suharto that made him expelled from ICMI; and Abdurrahman Wahid then the chairman of the largest Muslim organization NU who was well known of his close relations with Christians and Chinese communities.

It is also interesting to note that at during this period both the military and the Muslim groups were internally divided between those who were in favor of political reform and those who favor status quo. Thus the Muslims and the military involved in an antagonism yet also strange collaboration. On the one hand, among the military, the so called 'green' generals like Tandjung and Prabowo because of their personal attachment to the president involved in various maneuvers in hindering political reformations. Tandjung and Prabowo were closed to radical and fundamentalist Muslims, and reportedly involved in the establishment of Indonesian Committee for Solidarity of the Islamic World (KISDI), a notorious radical Muslim group which advocated the greater role of Islam in Indonesian politics. Prabowo also created a think-tank that produced pamphlets accusing the Christians and the Chinese as the perpetrators of the country's economic crisis and the fall of Suharto. And Prabowo's men in the military were also involved in kidnapping students and other political activists to intimidate the proponents of political reform (Hefner, 2000).

Meanwhile other group of militar generals, the so called 'red and white' under the leadership of Wiranto and Yudhoyono—albeit un-publicly—were supportive to the reform movements, and were in bitter rivalries with Prabowo and his men in taking control the military. When Suharto eventually step down, Wiranto and his faction won the rivalry and

Prabowo and his men were dismissed from the military. On the other hand, Muslim groups were also divided between the pros and the cons for political reform. The former included most of the ICMI figures, and especially Amien Rais and Abdurrahman Wahid whose keenness in promoting reformation had attracted sympathies and supports from the 'red-white' generals; while Muslim groups—like KISDI—were involved in collaborations with other military faction in defending the status quo (Mietzner, 1999).

Move on into Habibie's administration. The common wisdom was that it was intended as transitional government which main task was institutionalizing the reform and preparing elections for the new government. And in only one year of time—a very short time by any measure, interjected with political blunders such as the referendum that led East Timor into independent—it managed to underwent fundamental institutional reforms that paved that way to the democratization process. At least three institutional reforms had been undergone quite successfully: i.e. (a) reform of the party system by providing freedom to organize political parties and remove the ideological constraint; (b) reforms on electoral system especially on setting up independent election committee and the neutrality of public servants; (c) and reforms on the legislature system by adding new chambers and decreasing the number of unelected legislative members, especially from the military.

Revising the Party Law was the first significant step taken by Habibie's administration, by passing the Law No. 2/1999. There were significant changes in the new law compared to its predecessors. *Firstly*, it called-off the old provisions of party laws that limited the number of political party, and provide the legal basis to organized political parties in quite easy way, in which it required at least 50 people aged 21 and over as founders, acquiring legal notary notification and submit it to the ministry of justice. The law at the same time stripped off the special status of Golkar as elections participant of non-political party organization. *Secondly*, it cancelled the old stipulation that required political parties to adopt Pancasila as the only base, and permit parties to adopt various ideologies provided they do not contradict with the state ideology. *Thirdly*, it also abolished the old policy of 'floating mass' by allowing political parties to set up branch organizations at sub-district and village levels (Stockman, 2004).

The next institutional reform pushed forward successfully by the administration was on electoral system, which revised and improved the system from pseudo democratic during the New Order era into a more genuinely democratic one under the Law No 3/1999 on Elections. The fist significant revision dealt with the Election Commission (KPU). In the previous regime the Commission was under direct control of the executive from the national

down to village levels. Now it was changed into an independent body which members were recruited from government officers, representative of political parties and independent representatives, neither of which dominate the institution. It also stipulated the establishment of an independent election oversight body (Panwaslu) to administer violations of elections' rules, and the law regulated the strict and fair rules regarding the role of civil servants in elections. While the old 1975 law unfairly prohibited civil servants from participating in parties electoral activities but allowed them to do so for Golkar, the new law stipulates that they could not participate in any kind of electoral activities and should maintain strict neutrality, while retaining the right to cast ballots. Finally, it required that in order to be able to present in elections, political parties should have branch at least in half of the total number of provinces, and in at least half of the total number of districts in those provinces (King, 2003: 52-55).

Lastly, substantial reforms were also undergone in restructuring the system and the performance of the legislatures under the rubric of Law No 4/1999 on structures and functions of the legislatures, to provide it with more independent power and remove possible interventions from the executive branch. The law restructured the composition of the legislative body into three chambers: (a) The House of Representative (DPR) with 500 members consisted of elected representatives of elections' participants; (b) Regional Representative Body (DPD) which was composed of 165 appointed members representing 27 provinces; (c) People Consultative Assembly (MPR) with 700 members—formerly 1000—consisted of the whole members of DPR, DPD and additional 165 group representatives. In the new structures the elected members were 95 percent, while in the old structure it was only 43 percent. It also took substantial effort to reform the legislative body by reducing unelected military representatives, from 100 to 38, which significantly reduce the political clout of the armed forces in the institution.

When the elections were eventually took place in 7 June 1999, most of local as well as international observers deemed them as free and fair; while many analysts perceived them as more resemble to those of 1955 than any single election during Suharto Era. Out of 48 parties participated in the polls, 21 parties acquired sets in DPR, out of which only 10 parties had more than one seats.

!999 Election Result

PARTY	VOTES	SEATS
PDIP	33.73	153
Golkar	22.43	120
PKB	12.60	51
PPP	10.70	58
PAN	7.11	34
PBB	1.94	13
PK	1.36	7
PNU	0.64	5
PDKB	0.52	5
PKP	1.01	4
PDI	0.62	2

The aftermath of 1999 elections clearly bear the fruits of institutional reforms carried out by the transitional government. *Firstly*, the composition of the House of Representative clearly reflected the new constellation in the nations' politics. Golkar, which in the previous six elections always earned absolute majority could only garner about one-third of the least of its previous achievements. The plural-majority in the House was taken by PDIP, which was a reformed faction of the old PDI under charismatic leadership of the daughter of the former president Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri. *Secondly*, the elections witnessed the comeback of Muslim politics. During Suharto era, PPP as the only party for Muslims could only collect 29 percents in 1977 elections, yet in 1999 at least nine Muslim parties gained seats in the House with more than 35 percent of the total votes and 37 percents of the total seats.

The new constellation in the legislature inevitably brought new face for Indonesian politics, with the most prevalent phenomena being the diminishing dominance of the status quo and the rising power of Muslim politics. In the MPR session 2000 to elect new president the parliament seemed to be dominated by rivalries between the election winner PDIP and Golkar. As events unfolded, however, both PDIP and Golkar were proved unable to utilize their political capitals. On the one hand Golkar was unable to continue its nomination for presidency when its candidate Habibie withdrew from the race after the Assembly (MPR) rejected his presidential reports. On the other hand PDIP which seemed over confident ruled

out communications and lobby with other parties, which eventually caused it ended in big lost.

The winner in the aftermath of the institutional reforms was unexpectedly Muslim groups. Under the skillful leadership of Amien Rais who organize 'Central Axis' faction in the Assembly to accommodate aspirations from Muslim parties. When Golkar failed to continue nominating Habibie as its presidential candidate, the Central Axis lobbied Golkar to support its candidate Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid nomination was in fact very much unanticipated since for years he had been Rais' most bitter rival and no one at that time expected that Rais would nominate him, and it also controversial since in the last month he and his party had been very close to Megawati and PDIP. The defining moment opened up in the Assembly session to elect new chairman of the Upper House legislature (MPR) which was won by Rais with support from Golkar, followed by election of the chairman of the Lower House (DPR) which was won by Golkar chairman Akbar Tandjung with support from Central Axis. Yet the height moment was the election of president, with Central Axis nominated Wahid and PDIP nominated Megawati. Live broadcasted in national televisions, Wahid was elected president, after won tight race with Megawati.

3.3. Democratic Consolidation

Although some analysts and observers seems dubious on the effectiveness of institutional reforms carried out during Habibie's term—on the fact that it was unable to eliminate the old players from taking part in the new government, when Golkar still command a large portion and the military retained its unelected faction in the legislature—a close observation utilizing institutional analysis suggests that it did make difference in providing a better playing field in which potential political actors could expect to play a fair, peaceful and sustainable political games.

A substantial example in which ones can examine the impact of the institutional reforms is on party system or the structure and system of inter-party competition and cooperation. Political Scholars, most notably Linz and Stephan, deem political parties and party system as one of fundamental arenas of democracy. Hence, the condition of party system indicates the condition of the country's democracy: the more stable the party system, the more stable its democracy, and vice versa (Linz and Stephan, 1996). Traditional party system theories, built on experiences of industrialized democracies count the number of parties and the spectrum of ideology as the main parameter to the system's stability. The fewer the number of parties in a system and the less polarized their ideology indicate a strong

and stable party system, and the more the number of parties in the system and the more polarized their ideology imply that the system is unstable and the parties could easily in conflict with one another (Sartori 1976).

However, recent studies pioneered by Mainwaring and Scully have shown that the indicator cannot accurately explain party systems in new democracies in Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia, as countries in these regions have very different historical trajectories than those industrialized democracies. Mainaring and Scully then propose that the most important indicator of the stability of party systems in new democracies is 'degree of institutionalization' of the systems. They listed four elements of institutionalization. Firstly, whether the inter-party competition is competitive in which parties moderately compete against each other, collusive in which parties collude with each other to fool their constituents, or combative when parties behave as if taking down the opponents is more important than the survival of the system (see also Norden, 1998). Secondly, to what extent parties have their root in the society, in terms that the parties have stable supports from portion of the society in one election to the next, so that parties are not easily come and go. Thirdly, the legitimacy of election in the eyes of party as the only procedure to be in power, that will minimize the possibility of extra democratic ways. And fourthly, the stability of the organizations of political parties (Mainwaring and Scully, 2005).

To asses the impacts of institutional reforms to the behaviors of political actors, it would be sufficient by measuring the pattern of political competitions. At this point Deborah Norden theoretical scheme, which is derived from the experience of Latin America countries, is useful to explain to what extent democratic transition and institutionalization structure the pattern of political behaviors. In her scheme, party system competition refers not only to the interactions among political parties, but also includes other non-party actors such as the military and revolutionary groups. Such situation is typical in new democratic countries.

According to Norden the best possible pattern is competitive system, where political parties genuinely strive to represent different political interests in the society but at the same time accept the uncertainty of the process and ready to accept defeat. Moderate competitions prevent any violent maneuvers from the military or revolutionary groups, as it is able to absorb and incorporate different interests smoothly. It doesn't mean all the violent and revolutionary drives are gone, but rather have no opportunity to emerge because violent and revolutionary are unlikely to get popular supports. The second possible pattern is collusive competition. Referring to Katz and Mair theory on Cartel party system (1995), Norden suggest that during democratic transitions there are several examples in which the political

elites collude with each other, exploit the resources of the state for their own interests and advantages, yet at the same time pretending to represent the interests of the people. In some cases such situation is helpful to prevent and reduce horizontal conflicts between groups in the society by confining political interactions only at elite level, as was proposed by Arend Lijphart in his Consociational Democracy. But she notes that Latin America experiences show that such competitions hindered genuine democratic transitions. Lastly, the worst pattern of political competition is combative competition, a situation where the drive of competition is excessive. In such situation, political actors play a zero-sum type of political game, in which defeating the rivals is more important than maintaining the stability of the whole system (Norden, 1998: 430-433).

In the aftermath of 1999 election that marked the democratic transition, the political competitions were still unstructured, tinted with bitter ideological rivalries and the significant involvement of the military in the national politics. The political competitions were unstructured because the democratic transition took place in a relative sort period of time. Previously, during the New Order era, political competitions were severely restricted, and no one had any experience of open competition. When eventually democratization provided open arena for political competitions, nor one really knew who their competitors were and what they would like to do. The rivalries were delicate and did not match with formal institutional or organizational groupings. There were overlapping lines of competitions: between the reformers and the supporters of the status quo, between civilians and the military, and between the Islamic and the secular groups.

Thus among the reformers there were internal rivalries between the civilians and the military as well as between the Islamic and the secular. Inside the military there were also divisions between the supporters of political reforms and the supporters of the status quo, as well as between the symphatizers of Islamic and the secular politics. And there were divisions among the supporters of political Islam between the reformers and the pro-status quo. As a result, the political competitions by and large did not rely on the formal rules of the game, but rather exploiting informal systems and networks, such as religion, ideology, regionalism and other primordial elements (see Walters 1999: 59-64, Mietzner, 1999: 65-104). The competition was then tended to be combative, in which political actors sought to advance their political agenda without too much concerned about the sustainability of the newly installed democratic institutions—as was elaborated in the previous section.

Dwight King has called it "half-hearted reform" because of reformers unwillingness or inability—or both—to carry out the reform thoroughly and started genuinely new pages of

Indonesian politics. The reformed institutions were barely effective in producing democratic politics, since the playing field still populated by old players from the previous regimes who desperately protect their interests. Yet, as King also noted, the successful institutional reforms were indeed huge achievements, since they were achieved in remarkably peaceful political negotiations, and there were no visible alternatives around. And in fact, what actually happened in the period was similar to the often cited illustration from O'Donnel and Schmitter who likened democratization process with multy-layer chess game:

> "with people challenging the rules on every move, pushing and shoving to get to the board, shouting out advices and threats from the sidelines, trying to cheat whenever they can—but nevertheless becoming progressively mesmerized by the drama they are participating in or watching and gradually becoming committed to playing more decorously and loyally to the rules they themselves have elaborated" (1986: 66)

The obvious indications of the progress were constitutional amendments, which was taboo and practically impossible in the previous regime which venerated it as sacred. At least four amendments are relevant to our discussion. *First* is revision on chapter three that stipulates that president and vice president are elected directly by the people and no longer by MPR. This would increase the political clout of the president since he would have a direct mandate from absolute majority of Indonesian people. However, the revised constitution also put constraints to presidential power in which he no longer have the authority to draft laws.[2] Furthermore he also can no longer dissolve the parliament, and his terms were explicitly limited into twice. The next points of amendments dealt with MPR, which was stripped-off of its status as the supreme institution, and no longer held the rights to elects president ant vice president. Yet it acquired new right to amend the constitution. Other major revisions were also carried out on the structure and functions of DPR. It has more members, from 500 to 550, all of whom elected, and the unelected military faction was abolished. The abolishment of military faction in the legislature was great democratic achievement. DPR also acquired exclusive rights to write laws and budgeting and monitoring functions. Lastly, the amendments added new clauses on Regional Representative Body (DPD) as new chamber in the legislature which tasks are representing the interests of the regions, and on Elections which are formerly only regulated under laws.

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[2] Among the most bizarre institutional formula in the original 1945 Constitution was that the President has the rights to writhe laws. Even the most learned expert of constitution could not make sense how the writers of the constitution did not understand this (Manan, 2005: 25)

The second significant institutional development was the ratification of new Law No 21/2002 on Political Parties. At least three major revision were administered that significantly would influence party behaviors and thus party system, i.e. requirements to form new party, party's right to recall its representatives in the legislatures, and on party funding. On the formation of new party, in addition of having at least branches in 50 percents of the total numbers of provinces, and 50 percent of districts or municipalities in those provinces, the law added that it also had to establish branches in 25 of the total number of sub-district regions in each of those districts. This regulation was clearly intended to simplify the party system by making new parties more difficult to emerge. The next revision in the party law, the granting of rights to parties to withdraw its representative in legislatures, was controversial. Critics said that the clause would inevitably create oligarchic political parties that would recall any dissident representative, and subsequently would undermine the performance of legislative members who inevitably would concern about their parties' interests than those of their constituents. Yet the proponents—party leaders who drafted the law—maintained that it was designed to facilitate a more effective organizational performances. Lastly, the law added new section on party finance that provisioned that parties permitted to receive limited amounts of money from individual and organizational donators. This clause was designed to make party competition more balance, by limiting the financial gaps between small and big parties.

Further reforms were also done on electoral systems to elect legislatures (Law No 12/2003) and president (No 23/2003). There are two different electoral systems applied for two different chambers: Majoritarian System was used to elect four DPD members in every province, while DPR members were elected using closed-list Proportional Representation. The law also regulates campaigns funding to guarantee its transparency. Perhaps the most significant element in institutional reform was the provision to make the electoral committee (KPU) as independent and permanent body. Finally, the new electoral regulation was created to elect president and vice president, which can only be nominated by political party, and that to be elected to presidency the par-candidates must acquired absolute majority of votes, and if the first round election does not produce the result a second round is needed.

As was expected the institutional engineering produces impacts on the behavior of political parties and influence the institutionalization of party system. First they influence the electoral outcomes that subsequently influenced party behavior. Series of elections were carried out during 2004, and Indonesians like to say "year of voting frequently" in the way of saying "year of living dangerously". The first round was legislative elections, to vote for DPR

and DPD representatives, held in 5 April 2004. Out of 24 contestants 17 parties received seats in DPR and 12 parties acquired more than one seat.

The Result of 2004 General Elections

PARTY	VOTE	SEATS
Golkar	21.58%	158
PDIP	18.53	109
PKB	10.57	53
PPP	08.15	58
Democrat	7.45	57
PKS	7.34	45
PAN	6.44	52
PBB	2.62	11
Pelopor	0.77	2
PBR	2.44	13
PKPB	2.11	2
PDS	2.13	12
PPDK	1.16	5

The second round of election was the first-round presidential election, in 5 July 2004 with five pars of presidential candidates:

The First Round Presidential Candidates

CANDIDATE	PARTY	VOTES
S.B. Yudhoyono - M.J. Kalla	Democrats	33.57
Megawati - H. Muzadi	PDIP	26.61
Wiranto – S. Wahid	Golkar	22.15
Amin Rais – S Yudhohusodo	PAN	14.66
Hamzah Haz – A. Gumelar	PPP	3.01

Since no absolute winner came out in the first round, the presidential election needed the second round which was held in 4 October 2002 with two pars of hopeful:

The Candidates of the Second Round Presidential Race

S.B. Yudhoyono – M.J. Kalla	Democrat	60.62
Megawati – H. Muzadi	PDIP	39.38

The 2004 legislative and presidential elections marked the new pattern of competitions as the result of further institutional engineering and democratic consolidation. To return to Deborah Norden theoretical scheme, at this point the political system was more competitive with significant atmosphere of collusive character. *Firstly*, the rivalry between civilian and the military was significantly reduced as the new system has reduced the political roles of the military, and the new leaderships in the armed forces endorsed professionalism of their institutions (Rabasa, 2005, Walters 1999). *Secondly*, the ideological rivalry between the Islamist and the secular was also diluted by the stability of interests-based competitions. By 2004 the members of the Central Axis coalition which were solidly and enthusiastically promoted primordial ideological programs against the secularist have dispersed and pursued their diverse political interests (Ananta *et al*, 2005: Chapter 1). *Lastly*, the rivalries between the reformers and the supporters and symphatizers of the status quo was also disappear, because democracy has become the only viable choice for most of Indonesian citizens as well as for the majority of the political actors. A number of opinion surveys that recorded the preferences of both the public and the elites convincingly indicate that Indonesian public and elites have strong confident not only to the idea of democracy as the best political system, but also to the process through which democratic process were carried out (IFES 1999, 2002, 2004 (I-XVIII); TAF 2002, 2004, LP3ES 2004). Although the people's confidents toward democratic system and its institutionalizations had been lower in 2004 compared to 1999—apparently because of the prolonged tough economic conditions—the scores are still high.

5. CONCLUSION

This chapter explores the ideological formulations and political programs of the PKS. In terms of ideology, PKS is a direct heir of PK political missions since the core actors of both parties are the same, i.e. activists from the Tarbiyah movement. Both parties adopted Islam as political ideology, and promoted the teachings of Islam throughout society and polity level.

However, different from SI which perceived Islam as a socialistic ideology to freeing Indonesians from colonial oppression, or from the Masyumi party, which perceived Islam as a pragmatic-and-democratic ideology that provides an alternative identity for Indonesians amid conflicting international ideologies, the PKS founders saw Islam as a liberal-democratic ideology that untying Indonesians from authoritarian regimes and instead leading them into democracy. Under the influence of Egyptian Muslim Brothers, PKS develops gradual visions of political agenda: starting from Islamizing individuals, the family, the society, and then the politics. Therefore, it perceived democracy as perfect system that accommodates their political missions.

On morality, or what is good for society, the key term for PKS is the word "justice". Understood as "to put things in their proper places," justice is understood in three different levels: *Firstly*, cosmic sense, in which justice refers to the natural laws that are constant and in perfect balance, and in fact they are God's laws. *Secondly*, moral-sense, in which justice is moral law that human being must follow and enact as God's creatures. *Thirdly*, technical-sense, because justice represents natural and moral laws, it is also the most effective way to pursue political power. On economy, or how the society's resources should be distributed, PKS vaguely indicates that they should be distributed fairly, and giving priority to the poor and weak societal segments, yet do not neglect economic growth. While on politics, or where power appropriately resides, PKS perceives that since the ultimate power belong to God, the pious people should take the power. However, interestingly, different from Masyumi which perceived pious men as special group of people, the *ulama* or intelligentsia, PKS understand it as moral consent and capacity that could be owned by every Muslim.

This chapter also explains institutional settings in which Tarbiyah movement and PKS operated, started from New Order era, the regime change, and the democratic consolidation. Institutional settings during the New Order era had authoritarian characteristics. *Firstly*, it was characterized by dominant roles of the military in national politics. This produced undemocratic political process, when the military used its intelligence services to curb not only the potential oppositions but rather to abolish political capacity of the public. *Secondly*, the manipulation of political system, by co-opting political parties, forced them into two parties and banned their organizational activities below district level, while on the same time the regime setup Golkar as political vehicle, which was allowed to present in election and since it was not a political party I could operate below district level. *Thirdly*, other institutional settings in this period were the engineering of electoral system, in which the

government controlled the electoral committee, and Legislature in which half of its members were appointed by the government.

After the regime change, Indonesia underwent democratization process. Initially the process was in the form of 'pact' democratization, in which the system changed but the actors remained the same. This 'half-hearted reform' had slowed down the democratization process, and even produced intense and sometimes violent political competitions. However, by 2004 the reformers were able to push further the democratic consolidation, by passing bills that stipulates more democratic election system, direct presidential election, and stronger legislatures. This produces smoother political process and moderate political competitions.

To return to Douglas North theoretical proposition, ideology and institutions are in fact two sides of the same coin: the former represent the inner side, the perspective by which actors interpret and understand their environment, the latter is the outer side or the tools by which actors handle and structure the environment. People, as political actors, need ideology-and-institutions—the structures that we commonly refer as 'institutions'—to facilitate political interactions, transactions and collaborations, by regulating the behaviors so that each actor knows what he and his rivals can and cannot do. Institutions thus reduce the uncertainty in political games, by providing schemes of possible options of behaviors actors can do. Under such conditions, according to North, ideology and institutions have mutual-substitutive and complimentary relations. When the existing institutions can provide certainty for stable and sustainable interactions, actors tend to follow the formal rules; yet when the formal institutions cannot provide certainty for stable and sustainable institutions actors tend to rely on ideology in their behaviors in interactions, transactions and collaborations. The next three chapters will discuss PKS political behaviors—in organization, in elections, and in government—in which I expect to see that the behaviors will reflect the dynamics relations between its ideology and the existing institutions.

CHAPTER V
BETWEEN IDEALS AND EFFECTIVENESS:
PKS BEHAVIOR IN ORGANIZATION

1. INTRODUCTION

The previous chapters have discussed PKS ideology and its institutional contexts, in order to understand the basic elements that structure PKS political behaviors. Ideologically, PKS strongly exhibits Islamist characteristics, with a religious-moralist political worldview. It perceives political processes as merely an extension of an individuals' religious morality wherein the good or the bad of political conditions are simply reflections of the conditions of morality of the people. Thus, the logical way to reform and improve political conditions is by improving the morality of individual citizens. This political outlook is rooted in religious interpretation that perceives social and natural processes to be regulated by one divine law which governs natural orders. Both laws have common source and have common precision and effectiveness.

PKS emerged in a time of democratic transition and consolidation in a predominantly Muslim country. Democratization has restructured the pattern of political competitions from a previously authoritarian system in which a strong leader took control over almost all fundamental political structures into a more open and more competitive political system. Although at that time Indonesia adopted representative political system exemplified by regular elections and representative legislatures, the system had been heavily manipulated to serve the interest of the regime and did not function democratically. Political parties were strictly regulated and stripped of their representative capacity, elections were rigged to guarantee the domination of the government party, and the legislature was no more than rubber stamps for the executive. Following the regime change, democratization has successfully, if incrementally, introduced more open party laws to accommodate pluralities of political interests in society, free and fair elections, as well as an increasingly stronger and independent legislature. Successful direct presidential elections have also brought a government with stronger popular legitimacy.

This chapter discusses PKS's organizational behavior, focusing on the internal structures and mechanism of the party organization. By definition, organization is a means to achieve goals, and one can expect with certainty that different goals will need different types of organization. And there are different organizational types within various political parties,

which are designed to achieve different political objectives. Thus, one can infer a parties objectives from its organizational structure. The last chapter has outlined PKS ideology and political objectives and the institutional setting in which it participates in political competitions. This chapter will discuss how PKS adapts its ideological objectives to existing opportunities in political competitions structured by the democratizing political institutions. The first section introduces theories of party organization which show distinct basic structures and mechanisms of party organization. The second section explains the organizational structures of the PKS, and the third section discusses the internal mechanism of leaders and candidate selections. Special discussion on female participation is elaborated in the third section, focusing on how PKS had negotiated its conservative ideological perceptions of female participation in politics with democracy's demand of women greater political participation.

2. THEORIES OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

2.1 Party Orientation and Organizational Consequences

Political parties are unique organizations both in their functions and their structures. The most fundamental and unique function of a political party is what scholars call *linkage*: i.e. to connect peoples' preferences to government policies. It includes functions such as '*interest articulation and interest aggregation*,' '*socialization and mobilization*,' as well as '*elite recruitment and government formation*.' Sometimes, scholars further classify the linkage functions into three stages: (a) connecting people to a party's programs, (b) connecting a party to the state, and (c) connecting people to the state (Lawson, 1988: 33-34). Others add that linkage can be formal, in which a party integrates people into the governmental process through formal party membership or informally through direct communication via mass media and surveys (Poguntke, 2002: 44-46). In short, the distinctive function of a political party that differentiates it from other organization is that it is the means by which people participate in political decision makings.

Scholars tend to agree that political linkage is the universal function of political party, or its meta-function (Jonasson, 2004: 17). However, there are several linkage types, by which different parties link people's preferences to government policies in different ways. Since linkage is the most fundamental function of a party, different linkage types produce different organizational setting as well as different patterns of behavior. Following Katz and Mair's typology, there are four party types, i.e. the elite party, the mass-party, the catch-all party and the cartel party. Each of these maintain different organizational structures because they serve

different linkage type, or the way they connect the people with the state. There are five organizational structures which function differently in different party types: (i) party goal, (ii) style of representation, (iii) party membership, (iv) the relation between members and leaders, (v) its principal resources, and (v) how they organize their works:

a. **Elite Party**, has the political goal of redistributing of power among its members. Secondly, it acts as a trustee that represents the political interests of the elites. Thirdly, this type of party is elitists and its membership is restricted, and therefore there is no need for active recruitment. Fourthly, there is no hierarchical relation in party organization. Fifthly, its principal resources are personal contacts with those elites who mobilize their contributions. Sixthly, party work is irrelevant since party membership is restricted and there is no need for mass-mobilization.

b. **Mass-Party**, has the goal of representing the interests of certain group or groups in society—including regional, class, religious, or ethnic, etc.—in order to promote or to maintain social conditions according to the interest of the group it represents. Secondly, party is part of the society and acts as delegate of the group into the state. Thirdly, party membership is large and expands as the party needs more members to legitimize its cause and to support its work; yet at the same time it is also homogeneous and restricted as membership is based on certain collective identity. Fourthly, on leaders and members relation, since parties represent societal groupings, party leaders are accountable to their members. Leaders-members relation is bottom-up in character. Fifthly, a party's principal resources are members' dues and contributions. Sixthly, since members are the main resource, party works are labor-intensive, and party workers are unpaid.

c. **Catch-All Party**, has the political goal of offering social ameliorations or developments beneficial for all groups in the society, and does not represent the interest of a certain group. In this case, the party is a political entrepreneur which sells its programs to voters from various societal backgrounds. Secondly, party membership is large and open to all segments in society, hence it is heterogeneous. Thirdly, members-leader relations are top-down, in which party leaders represent certain policy preferences that compete with other groups of leaders with different policy options, while party members can only support their leaders or chose an other party. Forthly, party funding comes from wide sources, not only from members' dues. Fifthly, party works are both labor and capital intensive. On the

one hand, since a party develops a large membership it can mobilize its members for party activities; on the other hand, since party leaders act as political brokers offering better policy alternatives and not as members' delegates, they commonly also heir professional workers for party activities especially during election campaigns.

d. **Cartel Party**, has the political goal of subtracting state resources for the interests of politicians and for the survival of the party, and does not represent the political interest of citizens. Secondly, the party acts as an agent of the state that mobilizes public supports for governmental activities. Thirdly, membership is open to different societal segments, but there is neither specific obligation nor specific rights for members. The difference between members and non-members is blurred. Fourthly, since the ultimate goal of the party is to serve the interests of politicians, not the members who have neither specific rights nor obligations, the relationship between leaders and members is mutually independent. Fifthly, in line with its political goal, the party's primary funding sources are state subventions. Sixthly, as the party has no significant attachment to its members, party activities relied heavily on professional workers.

What is interesting from the previous classification is that party organizational structures and mechanisms are a combination between the ideals of linkage functions and organizational effectiveness. The former rooted in ideological orientation pertaining to the objectives of the party's political activities, while the latter is a product of the adaptation of institutional settings such as social structures, party laws and regulations, and inter-party competition (Katz and Mair, 1995).

2.2. Party as Non-Unitary Actor

Party organizational distinctiveness is not only confined to external functions and behaviors but is evident in internal structures and behaviors as well. American political scientist Joseph Schlesinger found that political parties combine the organizational properties of business firms, pressure groups, and government bureaus (Schlesinger, 1984). He explains his argument by asking three basic questions applicable to any organization in order to unveil its basic characteristics. One is how does the organization maintain itself? Two is what is the principal work or principal output of the organization? Three is how does it compensate its workers or participants? In answering the questions, Schlesinger develops three trichotomous

variables: (1) an organization maintains itself through market exchanges or non-market devices; (2) it primary output is either collective or private goods; and (3) it compensates participants either directly or indirectly. Applying these principles to party organization, he found that it uniquely combines properties of three different organizational types mentioned above.

Like a business organization, a political party sells its product to a political market of elections to earn profits through votes. The votes collected from elections for the party, like money earned by a business firm from it's trading in economic market, is a value-neutral currency usable for other political transactions to gain offices or even to form a government or initiate other transactions—high or low. The market-oriented character of political parties has a major impact on its organizational arrangement. One is that earning votes from an election becomes a goal in itself for party to maintain its survival, confirming Downs' statement that "Parties formulate policies in order to win elections rather than win elections in order to formulate policies (Downs, 1957: 28). Second is that the orientation affects internal competitions in party organization since the political market of election, just like economic market, sends clear signals of whether the party gains profit or lose in its business. Consequently, individuals or units responsible for the success of the party in elections gains considerable influences in organizational decision-makings. People who contribute to the party's electoral success will rise to power, and vise versa.

Unlike a business firm that sells *private goods* that are available only to the people who pay for them, a political party produces and sells *collective goods* that are usable for all people both who buy them and who do not. Parties formulate programs and policies for the society as a whole, and never only for its voters. It is in this respect that political party organization resembles the organization of a bureau or a governmental agent. This brings decisive consequences for the mode of survival of political party, namely how it pays or compensates its workers or participants.

With regards to the mode of compensation to its activists who support it, a political party has another organizational model. Different from business firms and bureaus that pay its participants directly, political party compensate its workforces indirectly through promises for future policies. In this respect, a political party is similar to a voluntary organization. This organizational property also has significant impact to the party's organizational behavior, especially in relation with the participants and other stakeholders. Direct compensation such as in a business firm or a bureau permits the organization to have great control over participants and their activities, and to motivate them to exercise their skills to achieve the

organizations' goal without so much concern for the goal itself. Indirect compensation, on the contrary, forces political party to always be concerned with the aspirations of its participants and try to formulate policies in that direction. Political party's have only loose control over its activists, it cannot direct the activists' behavior, and it is unable to prevent or deny its activists from gaining benefits from other sources.

The unique characteristics of party organization—that combine the properties of business firms in selling product in a market, bureaus or agencies in producing and selling public goods, and voluntary or pressure group in its indirect compensation to its participants—makes party organization formulate distinct internal structures, what Stephen Katz and Peter Mair call the "three faces of party organization" (Katz and Mair, 1993). Following other party scholars (Daalder, 1983; Laver and Schofield, 1990) Katz and Mair maintain that a political party does not represent a unitary actor in its behavior. There is always internal heterogeneity in party organization, and they outline three basic faces of party organization, namely the party on the ground, the party's central office and the party's in public office. Although each of these faces contains further heterogeneous elements, they represents independent organizational parts that are influential for the party's organizational behaviors.

a. ***Party on the ground*** refers to a party's local activists, members, loyal voters and regular donators whose main task it is to maintain party organization at the lowest levels, as well as to promote party programs to potential voters. Highly voluntary works characterize this face of political parties. For example, although most members see the party's success in an election as primarily important but ones cannot expect them to work all-out for this. Similarly although there are organizational procedures of entering and exiting party organization, what matter for people to enter or exit the party is their personal will. This face, thus, always reflect the ideals and normative tendencies of the party. Party on the ground embodies strong power when it comes to national or local congress, where it has the ability to put pressures to fix any unsatisfactory performances of party leaderships. Party on the ground also has control over important resources, such as members, activists, and local funding sources. However, it also has obvious limits in which it is unable to participate in decision-makings on party policies, let alone on wider public policies.

b. ***Party in public offices*** consists of party representatives who hold offices in the executive as well as legislative branches of government. In democratic politics, the party in public office depends on its success in electoral competitions. One of the unique features of party in public office is that many of the benefits it earns are, in fact, personal benefits for the persons who hold the office, both material and status. For party organization, party in public office bring at least three benefits: *one* is participation in decision-making for public policies; *two* is patronage which means that a party representatives who hold a positions in a governmental office can become a financial source for the party; and *three* they also bring knowledge, skills, and experiences of governing that are very important for the party. However, party in public office also faces several constrains in performing their activities. *First* is the fact that their offices are a direct or indirect result of the voters' support and should therefore be attentive to the political aspirations of the voters which limits them in doing any political maneuver. *Second* is they must compromise with and make concessions to the party's coalitions partner(s), and also going through interactions with non-partisan or career government officials who have a different perception on how government bureaucracies should be run, or how public policies should be made. This puts them in a risk of disappointing party followers.

c. Lastly, ***party central office*** is the party's top leadership, usually located in the national capital and consists of two different, but often overlapping, parts: one is national board committee(s), and the other is the central party staff or secretariat. They are either elected in party congresses or recruited in some other ways to represent the party on the ground, party in public office or other party stakeholders. Being the central management that is responsible for any external communications and relations, the party's central office also connects other faces of party organization. On the one hand, it coordinates national campaigns in which it supervises the party on the ground on behalf of the party in public office; while on the other hand, it may also supervise the party in public office on behalf of the party on the ground. However, it centrality may also put the party central office in an ambiguous situation. If its members are united it becomes the dominant part that controls other faces of party and draws resources from them for its own use; otherwise, when its members are not united, it will turn into merely a battle-ground or empty shell that is impotent and ignored.

Internal Structure of Political Party

Market-Oriented
Organization

*Party on the
Ground*

*Party in The
Head Quarter*

Party in Public Offices

Collective-Good-
Producing organizations

Indirect Compensations
to employees

2.3. Party Internal Mechanisms

As is clear from the previous paragraphs, political party is internally a plural actor, because of its basic functions and organizational structures. There are plural actors inside the party organization, with different orientations and different patterns of behavior. In line with this idea of the internally plurality of orientations in the party's organization, John D. May proposes an interesting theoretical framework to explain this asymmetrical orientation which he calls the *Special Law of Curvilinear Disparities* (May 1973). According to May, party activists can be classified into three organizational levels, i.e. top-leaders, intermediary-leaders, and followers, in which top-leaders and followers tend to be more pragmatic in their orientation and behavior while the intermediate-leaders tend to be ideological and are potentially a source of extremism. There are, at least, three factors leading to these polarizing ideological orientations.

   Patterns of intra-party surveillance and control: In party activities followers embody the parties most important element in that they determine the party's success or failure in elections, hence its coming to power, and therefore a party tend to be receptive to what its followers say. It is natural that top leaders are more exposed to followers' scrutiny and tend to be more receptive to the dynamics of the constituent. Intermediary-leaders, on the contrary, are less exposed to public inspections and follow strict interpretation of the party's ideological orientations.

Patterns of recruitment to intermediary-echelons: Intermediary-leaders of a party's social base commonly come from the economically middle class. This group of people, characterized by dynamic social and economic mobility, is sensitive to policy issues that will influence their living-conditions. Therefore it is expected that they will enthusiastically support policies advantageous for their living-improvement and denounce opposing policy preferences.

Political socialization. The nature of the followers' commitment to a party's ideological orientation is often low because they commonly live in plural communities and in constant interaction with other people who hold different political beliefs. In the same vein, top-leaders of a party, many of whom hold public positions, are also in constant interactions with leaders from various political parties. Top-leaders' interactions with their rivals make them flexible and tolerate of differences of opinions. Intermediary-leaders also tend to interact mostly with likeminded fellows and colleagues that make their ideological outlook stronger and more rigid that both the mass and the top-level leaders.

It is crucial, therefore, to analyze internal mechanisms of a party's organization in order to arrive at a fundamental understanding of the impact of ideological orientation to the behavior of different actors inside the party.

2.3.1. Leaders Selection

The first basic mechanism of a party's organization is leadership selection, through which party chose group of people to lead the organization based on who is eligible to be elected leaders, and who is eligible to elect the leaders.

a. On the eligibility of the candidates of party leaders, the options can be closed system in which only members and activists can be nominated as leaders. Alternatively, the procedure can be open, in terms that anyone interested to participating in party leadership, even without prior formal acquaintances with the organization, can also be nominated.

b. Regarding the eligibility to participate in selecting the candidates, the procedure can be (i) confine to only top-level leadership, (ii) to party activists, or (iii) open to all party members. Some scholars evaluate the procedures of electing leaders as the reflection of the quality of a party's internal-democracy. Parties whose decision making processes are controlled by a small group of people exhibit a lower quality of internal-democracy, while parties whose decision making processes are controlled by a large group of party members exhibit a high quality

of internal-democracy. Thus the first procedure is the least, and the last procedure is the most, democratic. (Scarrow, 1999). Yet in a closer inspection, considering the asymmetry in ideological orientations between the top leaders, the intermediary leaders, and the followers, the situation is not so linear. The first procedure is undemocratic, but the third procedures may produce similar result. When the decision makings are in the hand of the members—who commonly indifference toward ideology—it is intended to facilitate the top leaders political pragmatism, and by-pass activists' ideological preferences (Katz, 2001: 287-289).

2.3.2. Candidates Selection

The second most fundamental party organizational process is candidate selection, in which it nominates persons to hold positions in governmental offices, both legislative and executive branches. And it goes without saying that this process is very important for a party as it is the *sine qua non* of its participation in democratic processes. The candidates, if elected to public offices, will assume several task such as distribute(??) resources—material, knowledge, networks, etc.—from their positions within the party, deliver constituent preferences into policies, and shape party's public image for the next elections. Quite similar to the procedures of leader selection, options of procedures utilized in candidate selections revolved around the asymmetrical relations between party followers, intermediary-leaders, and top-leaders with regard to who is qualified to be nominated and who is qualified to participate in the nomination process.

a. With regards to who is qualified to be nominated as party's candidates for public offices, it can be closed or open. The first is when only persons from inside the party can be nominated as candidates; while the second implies that anyone from outside the party—commonly with certain additional requirements—can also be nominated as candidates.

b. With regards to who is eligible to participate in the nomination process, there are three options: it can be limited to the exclusive and top-level leaders, it may involve party activists, or it can include wider participation by members and sympathizers. Again, similar to the situation in a party selection of leaders, the options of various modes for candidate selection do not necessarily imply degrees of a party's internal-democracy. The decision to include party followers and sympathizers in the candidate selection processes often serves as pretext for party top-leaders to maintain full control over the course of party policies and evade the

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ideological baggage of party activists and local leaders (Pennings and Hazan, 2001).

2.3.3. Women Representation

The last but by no mean the least, an organizational aspect of political party which is important to be discussed is women representation. For the current research, this point is relevant, with regard to the issues of democracy and political Islamism.

For the former, it has become irrefutable fact that women are underrepresented in politics, in virtually all countries in modern world (Rule, 1994). Given the fact that in most societies women constitute around the half of the population, political under representation of women directly reflects deficiencies of democracy. The notion that female representation reflects the degree of democracy is consistent with empirical data that shows that female representation is higher in advanced democracies compared to less democratic and non-democratic countries. In other words, female representation constitutes an integral element of democracy, and the empowerment of women in politics directly contributes to the effort of democratization (Inglehart, Norris, Welzel, 2003).

Gender equality is perhaps the least democratic aspect of Islamist politics. Interesting findings by Norris and Inglehart show that the widest gap between Western and Islamic cultures exists not in their democratic orientation, but rather on their conception of gender equality. Intended to refute Huntington's argument on the nature of clashing civilizations in which he points to the antagonistic political visions as the root of future clashes between the democratic Western and undemocratic Islamic civilizations, they offer statistical data of Islamic countries on the quality of democratic practices in Islamic societies that are relatively equal to those of Western societies. The true difference between the two, they argue, is in the perceptions of gender relation in which Westerners uphold egalitarian views while Muslims maintain ordinate gender relations. Thus the article dubs Western and Islamic antagonism as a "clash of Eros" rather than a "clash of Demos" (Norris & Inglehart, 2003).

Female representation in a party's organization is therefore crucial for its participation in democratization processes. Comparative analyses on the roles of political parties in promoting gender empowerment and representation have shown at least four factors are at stake; two of which are internal while the other two are external. The first is organizational factor, with regard to the degree of centralization of decision-makings. Centralistic parties, in which decision-makings are in the hand of small number of elites, tend to be more receptive to the demands and pressures for promoting greater female representation; while parties

which have a decentralized decision-making procedure tend to resist giving women greater roles. The second is ideological factor, in which leftist-oriented parties tend to be more accommodative to women roles and participation in politics; while rightist-oriented parties tend to oppose greater roles and participation for women. The third is societal factor, namely the presence or absence of women's organizations and their relative degree of activeness. The presence of women organizations in the society and their activeness in dealing with political issues is conducive to a party's willingness to accommodate female participation—and vice versa. The fourth is institutional factor, namely whether or not female participation is stipulated (or implied) by party laws or electoral laws. Formal institutional endorsements, such as quotas for female candidates, significantly influence parties to encourage greater female participation (Caul, 1999: 80-84).

3. PKS ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE

Let start now to discuss PKS's organizational structures and mechanisms. This sub-section explores the party's organizational elements with a view to determine its organizational type as elite, mass, catch-all, or cartel type. The primary sources of information are PKS official documents that record agreements and conventions among the party's leaders with regards to party policy and habits. Special attention is drawn to differences between PK and PKS, as they represent different phases of development and different institutional contexts.

3.1. Party Goal

The *first* point is on the party's political goal. What does it want to accomplish through political participation? Both PK's and PKS's statutes definitely stipulate that their objective was/is to promote social reform, to promote Islamic values in society and in the polity. PKS's statute outlines the party political visions: (1) it is a party of religious propagation that promotes Islam as the solution in politics, (2) it represents the transformative force of Islamic values in the development of the *ummah* and the nation, (3) it will cooperate with other elements which have objectives to enact Islamic values, (4) it will promote the development of civil society in Indonesia.

Its political missions is to: (1) mobilize Islamic religious propagation and train its activists as agents of change, (2) developing Islamic social institutions, (3) encourage the Muslim population to support the implementations of Islamic teachings in the society, (4) cooperate with other Islamic groups and non-Muslim groups, and (5) advocate supports for other (??) Muslim countries under oppressions (PKS Basic Policies).

Cursory readings of the party's official documents will show ambiguity in the way it addresses its constituents. On the one hand, there are many basic statements that show that the party works to promote Islamic values as well as Muslim's political interests. PK 'Party Identity' (*Jatidiri*) stats:

> Deliberations conducted by activists of Islamic *dakwah* have arrived at the conclusion that the developing situation should be utilized in order to achieve our ideals, to realize an Indonesian nation and state that Allah is pleased by. The formation of a political party based on Islamic teachings is necessary to achieve the objective of Islamic *dakwah* democratically so that it is acceptable to the society. And, they agreed to form a political party named PK.
>
> The social reality in Muslim countries necessarily requires opportunities for Islamist parties to emerge. Muslims have never given up their struggle to realize their political ideals since religious propagation (*dakwah*) including the struggle to enact virtues and reject vices are vital to the survival of Muslim *ummah*. Therefore, the formation of the party as a formal and legal political modus will serve, on the one hand, the empowerment of Muslims' collective potential and, on the other hand, to accommodate Muslims aspirations to prevent discontents and extremism. The party is a structured method that represents the political aspirations of the Muslim *ummah* (Jatidiri PK, p. 4).

Other official statements gives the impression that the party's political goal is to promote Muslims political interests in a way that represents the mass-party,. vis-à-vis, other societal groupings. A recommendation from the 'Sharia council' on communal conflicts between Muslims and Christians in eastern province of Maluku stipulates:

> The Shariah Council considers that it is obligatory for Muslims in Ambon to arm themselves and to take any actions in self-defend against any attack that will happen, individually and collectively. Allah has revealed in the Qur'an (Haj: 39) that 'Permission has been granted to fight for those who were fought, because they have been wronged. And Allah is surely able to give them victory' (Dewan Syariah, No. 3/III/1999).

PK central office also released similar statements:

> With regards to concern over the worsening situation in Ambon, PK's Central Office recommend that: (1) muslims in Ambon use their right of self-defense to arm themselves, to fights against enemy's attacks, and to overcome enemy's plans to attack. This right of self-defence is among fundamental human rights that should be used whenever ones life is under threat while protection from the authority could not be expected…; (5) PK underlines clear indications that riots in Ambon seems to be well organized and controlled by actors highly skilled in mass-agitation and have access to munitions, logistics and transportation, and utilizing local thugs and criminals as field operators. We strongly believe that these riots are controlled from

outside the province, as direct manifestation of political competition among national elites (PK, *Sikap Kami*, 2001: 44, 47).

However, on the other hand, there are also a number of statements that suggest PK/PKS works not only for Muslims interests but for all other Indonesians. PK declaration statement states:

> In order to realize the true objectives of the Indonesian Proclamation of Independence, actualize political independence, maintain national sovereignty and unity, and engender a spirit of democratic reform with the endorsement and support of the Muslim community (*umat*) from various regions we, as the sons of the nation, declare the formation of PK (PK Declaration Charter).

Similarly, PKS declaration statement states:

> Democracy is the fundamental framework that accommodates the political aspirations of the society. Based on this notion, we founded a political party to be part of our dakwah activities to realize our universal ideals and to promote the political aspirations of the Muslim community in particular and all Indonesian in general. The party is PKS (PKS declaration charter)

PK's manifesto also states:

> The strategic position of PK is to become a movement that crystallizes the ideals of the nation and reflects the spirit of political reform and social improvement in modern history. We do our best to become a place for all people from different groups who are concern with the conditions of Muslims (*umat*) and Indonesian people (*rakyat*) who are disenfranchise and marginalize from politics and economy.

The ambiguity in addressing its constituents is found in other official documents, especially in party programs, which articulate the party's objectives as representative of the interests of Muslims and Indonesians as if the two are different entities with common interests. It seems that PK/PKS takes a simplistic logic of democratic representation in this point, by implying the fact that Muslims constitute the majority of Indonesians and therefore the interests of Muslims represent the interests of the Indonesian people in general. Theoretically, however, the simplistic logic of democracy bears a fundamental defect which potentially leads to the so called 'tyranny of the majority,' in which the majority perceives itself as representing the whole community and thus undermines the rights of the minority. Organizationally, with regard to linkage type, this position causes ambiguous linkage type. To some extent it resembles the mass-party type that promotes social reform for the interests of the Muslim community, yet it also exhibit the linkage characteristics of catch-all parties

that promote social amelioration as being beneficial for to whole society, and therefore also seeks support from non-Muslim voters.

3.2. Style of Representation

PKS calls itself the '*dakwah* parties'. This term has two connotations: on the one hand, it can mean that it is a party that takes religious propagation as its political mission. Yet on the other hand, it can also means that it is the party of the activists of *dakwah*. It is this second sense of the term that is the source of the style of the representation of the party. Dakwah activists are preachers and religious guides, whose task is to provide moral and religious guidance and role model to the community.

In this sense, the style of representation of the PKS resembles that of elite-party, in which it acts as a trustee of their constituents, which has full authority and capacity to act and make decision on behalf of their constituents. Party leaderships are elected by party members through national congresses. Once they are elected the leaders have internal mechanism to make decisions and direct party's course, without consulting to their members. Following its ideological visions, the party leaders are not only political, but also moral, leaders. It is customary in PKS to call the party leaders '*ustadz*' (Arabic: (religious) teacher), even though the person in question is not a cleric and has no religious educational background. This has two implications: *firstly*, PKS maintains its culture as religious-propagation organization, which leaders command religious knowledge and authority. *Secondly*, it implies that in organizational procedures and mechanisms, obedience and loyalty to party leaders are not merely administrative or political matters but also moral and religious duties. Therefore in PKS, the leaders' conscience and wills are morally higher than the followers' consents. Answering a question on the possibility of PKS members' protest to the party's decision to support Yudhoyono presidency, as he has came from secular party and has no Islamic credential, PKS leader Almuzammil Yusuf answered confidently that it is uncommon in his party for members to protest the decisions taken by the party leaders, and therefore highly unlikely, that his members will protest about it (Kompas 28.08.2004).

The highest leadership level in PKS is the *Majelis Syuro* (Deliberation Assembly), which members represent all important elements in the party. It is this institution which represents the locus of the representative style of the party. The assembly's tasks include: (1) It selects party leaders at the national level. (2) It formulates party objectives, programs and agendas for the national congress. (3) It holds the right to discuss and submit amendments of party statutes to the national congress. (4) It drafts the budget of the party and oversees its

evaluations. (5) It drafts the guidelines for party annual programs, and oversees the implementations. (6) It adjudicates complaints, critics and accusations that harm party's public image (PK-ART, art. 18; PKS-ART art. 20).

Another example of the parties' perception about their representative function is the formation of the Sharia Council (*Dewan Syari'ah*). During PK period, its function was more administrative, to provide religious grounds for party programs to guarantee that no program would breach religious norms, and to provide religious perspectives and answers for issues and problems faced by the party (PK statute, article 20). In PKS statute, meanwhile, the functions of the Council extends from administrative-advisories to 'stipulative' (*fatwa*) in which it passes religious edicts related to party programs as well as for general religious issues. These edicts are binding for party members and followers. Moreover, it also has the capacity to conduct 'arbitrary' (*qadha*), to arbitrate disputes among party members, based on sharia laws (PKS-ART, art. 12).

3.3. Membership

Officially both PK and PKS have open memberships. PK statute stipulates: "every Indonesian citizen is eligible to become party member" (PK-AD Article 6). Other document breaks down the membership requirements: (1) Male and female who hold Indonesian citizenship, (2) Seventeen years of age or over, or married, (3) Have no criminal record, (4) Agree with party objectives, (5) Apply membership to local branches, (6) Comply with members' duties, (7) Pledge membership and loyalty oath to party principles.

In closer observation, however, it is clear that the membership is homogeneous, as the membership requirements lead into religious uniformity. Point four in the membership requirement entails that ones have to agree with the objectives of the party, which is promoting Islamist politics. Therefore it is highly unlikely that non-Muslims will be interested to become a member. Moreover, point seven stipulates that in order to become a party member on needs pledging the membership's oath, which reads: "*I witness that there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger. I pledge to follow the Book of Allah and the examples of His Messenger, to commit to PKS political vision and mission, and comply with members' duties. Allah witnesses my oath.*" (PKS Membership, Art. 4). If there are non-Muslims who are interested to become members of the party, the membership administration will inevitably make them Muslims. Thus, officially PKS membership resembles Catch-All party which membership is open and plural to different segments in society, but in practice it is more like Mass-Integration party whose membership is open but homogeneous.

3.4. Elites and Members Relation

PK/PKS evolved from the Tarbiyah movement, and the parties members are mostly members of the Tarbiyah groups. The activists of the movement, being trained and grew in unique tradition of organization, constitute a single group of interconnected networks. Virtually, all Tarbiyah activists are connected with each-other by senior-junior organizational relations. The relations are highly personal and therefore the organizational solidarity is also very solid.

When the network was turned into a political party the senior activists became the leaders and the juniors became rank-and-files and members. Organizational relation between PK/PKS leaders and members is almost identical with the relation between senior and junior activists in Tarbiyah movement. Since the party leaders command not only political but also moral authority, and that politics is extension of morality, the leaders' actions are accountable to God, and not to the members. Again, in this point PKS resembles Elite party, in which leaders are not accountable to members.

3.5. Funding Sources

PKS's statute stipulates that the party has a number of funding sources. *Firstly*, from members, which include: (a) Membership regular dues (b) mandatory contribution, mainly religious alms which are—following traditional Islamic law—mandatory for persons with income more than the price of 520 kg rice, which is around US$ 30, per month. The amount of mandatory alms are 2,5% for regular incomes, 10% for non-regular additional incomes, and 20% for grants. (c) Voluntary contributions.

Secondly, party also received alms and other voluntary contributions from non-members. PKS founded several filial organizations which are active in collecting religious alms not only from the party members and supporters but also from the wider Muslim community. Given the fact that many people do not know that the institutions belong to PKS, they have been able to collect alms and contributions from Muslims who do not support and do not agree with PKS political programs. *Thirdly*, it also collect regular and irregular grants and contributions from any institution, as long as they are legal and unbinding (PKS-ART, Art. 30). Regarding the stipulation of its statute on primary funding sources, PKS resembles Catch-All party in which it can collect funds not only from its member's contributions, but virtually from everywhere.

3.6. Works and Campaign

In its organizational activities PKS combines both unpaid and paid workers. For regular administrative activities in party offices and bureaucracies, it heirs paid workers. Most of them are recruited from its activists. Some worked in full time while many others are part timers. The party recruited professional workers for more serious organizational tasks, such as legal and financial administrations. For public activities, such as public gatherings or other public socializations, it commonly mobilizes activists who will organize the activities voluntarily.

With regard to campaign activities PKS also hired both professional and voluntary workers. Party professional workers were responsible for management, financial and legal matters, and were also responsible to carry out campaigns in mass-media. Meanwhile, for mass-mobilization activities, such as canvassing, lawn signing, or distributing leaflets and other campaign publications, PKS relied heavily on its voluntary activists. At this point, PKS organization resembles the organization of Catch-All party.

4. THREE FACES OF PKS ORGANIZATION

4.1. The Party on the Ground

As was explained in the previous section, officially the membership of the party is open. All Indonesians are eligible to become a party member with the following requirements: Indonesian citizen, seventeen years of age or over, or married, no criminal record, agree with party objectives, apply to party branches, comply with party regulation, and pledging membership oath. However, at the practical level this open membership is highly unlikely in term of religious identity, as the process of recruitment requires one to become a Muslim by swearing party oath, which includes Islamic consecration by pledging *shahadah* (acknowledgement statement that 'There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is His Messenger').

The administrative process of membership enrollment consists of five steps: (1) Membership admission is granted in a formal party forum organized specially for that purpose. (2) Party branches organize administrative selection process, to make sure that the applicants meet the requirements. (3) Newly admitted members read and sign membership oath. (4) Party functionaries responsible for the membership admission sign the oath as witness. (5) The signed oath document is formally handed down to the new members (PKS Membership, Art. 5)

There are six levels of party membership. The levels are then classified into three different types of membership, which refers to seniority and degree of organizational rights. All members from different levels of memberships are subjects to similar duties to the party. With regard to the rights of the members, there are general rights shared equally by members in all levels, and there are special rights according to different levels of membership. The general membership rights include: (1) The rights for communal supports and solidarity from other members, (2) the rights to express ideas and initiatives, (3) the rights to propose and initiate activities, (4) the rights to request rights for self-defend, sue, and appeal to higher level of arbitration (PKS Membership, Art. 6).

The first category of membership is Supporting Members (*Anggota Kader Pendukung*). This membership represents the lower level of activity, in which members are not expected to participate in the party organization more than supporting party programs and activities. There are two different levels of supporting members. The first is Newbie (*Anggota Pemula*) whose membership is granted by Sub-District party branches (DPC). To become a newbie one needs to apply for formal membership, meets administrative requirements, and participate in 'training orientation' organized by party. A Newbie has the rights to participate in party official activities at Sub-District level, to join trainings organized by party, and to hold party ID card. The second is Junior Member (*Anggota Muda*) whose membership is assigned by party branch at district level (DPD). Junior member has the rights to participate in party official activities at the district level (DPD), to join trainings organized by party, and to hold party ID card.

The second category of membership is Core Members (*Anggota Kader Inti*). As the name indicates, this type of membership represents a more active level of involvement in party organization. At this level, the members become party activists who are not only support their organization passively but also have more say and opportunities to propose and initiate activities. There are three different levels of this membership type. The Third is Intermediate Member (*Anggota Madya*) whose membership is assigned by party branch at district level (DPD) and legalized by party provincial branch (DPW). To achieve this level of membership ones need to participate in second level party training. The fourth is Senior Member (*Anggota Dewasa*) whose membership was assigned by party provincial branch (DPW), and has participated in advanced-level party training. The fifth is Specialist Member (*Anggota Ahli*) whose membership is assigned by party central office (DPP) and hold ID card issued by the central office. The sixth is Top-Level Member (*Anggota Purna*) whose membership is assigned by party central office and has participated in expert-level party training.

The core members (the third to the sixth membership levels) have greater organizational rights, such as: (a) the rights to elect and be elected in various organizational positions, (b) the rights to participate in party activities and decision makings at organizational levels in which they are members, (c) the rights to advise and criticize party, (d) the rights to be protected from arbitrary measures out of their activities for the party, (e) the rights to have defendant in dispute settlements, and in public court, (f) the right to hold party ID card.

Lastly, the third category of membership—which constitute the seventh type of membership—is Honorary Members (*Anggota Kehormatan*). It is a special membership granted by party to non-member individuals who made exceptional contribution to the party. Honorary members have the rights to participate in party activities at all levels, and have capacity to make suggestion and advice to the party.

All party members from all level of memberships are subjects to general duties, which include: (a) To follow Islamic values and norms in their personal activities. (b) To adopt Islamic interpretation specified by the party as is elaborated in the decrees passed by the National Congress and the Deliberation Assembly. (c) To participate in Islamic programs and events organized by the party. (d) To protect the party from any accusation according to his/her own ability and opportunity. (e) To seek to become public exemplars in doing good deeds and patriotism. (f) To comply with party guidelines in daily activities. (g) To do their best to achieve the objectives and ideals of the party. (h) To participate actively in party meetings. (i) To seek to build and strengthen the relations between the party and other organizations. (j) Loyal to the leaders and follow the will of the majority. (k) To seeks to strengthen the ties between the party and the wider public. (l) To avoid any action that is counterproductive to the objectives of the party. (m) to carry out responsibly any mandate assigned by party. (n) To take care and to protect the properties belonged to the party. (o) To follow the edicts and suggestions passed by the party with regards to public issues. (p) To pay membership dues regularly. (q) To give alms and charities to the party. (r) To raise funds and contributions for the party (PKS Membership, Art. 12).

Since PKS perceives itself as a *dakwah* party, and thus party activities are none other than religious activities, in addition to those administrative requirements there are other ideological requisites for the party members. On the one hand, it requires its activists to have religious and spiritual qualities, which include '*strong faith*', '*correct enactments of religious rituals*', '*firm morality*', '*healthy body*', '*good intellectual capacity*, '*independent economically*', '*personal management*', '*strong determination*', and '*willing to help others*'.

On the other hand, the party also requires the activists to have collective organizational and political qualities or what it calls 'profile' of PKS activists. *Firstly*, party members have to be 'strong and independent,' in which party activists must have degree of stability in moral, intellectual and economic qualities. *Secondly,* they have to be 'dynamics and creative,' in which PKS activists are required to always improve their knowledge, skills and achievements. *Thirdly*, they have to be 'specialists with global insight', in which the activists have to master a special vocation and profession, yet at the same time knowledgeable to the dynamics of wider situations. *Fourthly*, they have to become 'effective recruiters' in which party activists have to be able to socialize the party's visions and missions to their surroundings and recruit people to join the party. *Fifthly*, they have to have 'collective solidity and solidity' in which party activists have to maintain internal collective solidarity, and give priority to it over personal interests and ambitions. *Sixthly*, they have to be 'reformers' in which activists have to able to make positive contributions to their environments. *Finally*, the y have to become 'public role-model' in which PKS activists are required to seek to become figures and leaders in their society (PKS, 2005)

From the preceding explanation, it is clear that PKS party membership is highly demanding. According to Susan Scarrow, given the fact that political party is a voluntary organization, if it requires anything from its members it must provide incentives which are equal to the requirements to its members. Otherwise, the requirements will not be effective (Scarrow, 1994). And what incentives PKS offers to its members and activists? The first is "tangible incentives," namely career opportunities in the party leaderships which certainly will bring incomes as well as prestige. However, since career opportunities are highly competitive, and will only motivate limited numbers of aspirants, PKS provides another "intangible incentives," namely religious and spiritual rewards which are available to everyone who willing to seek it. It consistently indoctrinates its activists and members that politics is an integral part of religion, and thus all party works are no other than religious activities which will be rewarded by God. This proved to be very effective incentive to mobilize party workforces.

Such religious motivation strongly has been successfully motivated members and activists of the PKS to carry out the party programs actively, assertively, and even aggressively. One of the favorite strategies of the PKS's activists is socializing the party's programs through religious institutions such as mosques, religious forums, schools, universities and other institutions. Such strategy gives PKS both positive and negative credits. On the one hand, socializing party visions, missions and programs through religious events

have been very effective, as the audience the to receive the messages not only as political but also as religious messages. However, the assertiveness and aggressiveness of PKS activists in infiltrating religious institutions—many of them belong to other Muslim organizations which have different religious interpretations and different political affiliations—have triggered strong reactions from established Islamic organizations, especially two mainstream organizations NU and Muhammadiyah. The latter, Muhammadiyah, even issued an official decree to 'clean-up' its organization from PKS elements and activities, because it perceives PKS has taken advantage arbitrarily and contaminates the organization with foreign elements (Muhammadiyah Central Board, decree No. 149/2006).

4.2. The Party in Public Office

In contrast to the tendency of the party on the ground, which is dominated by idealistic tendency to embody and promote party ideal values, the party in public office is characterized by pragmatic and flexible behavior. These characters rooted in the unique function of the facet of party. The party in public office represents the 'pragmatic' nature of political party which ultimate goal is gaining power. Therefore for the party in public office ideals and ideology are oftentimes merely instrumentals. This brings several consequences to the party in public office. *Firstly*, since its ability in achieving and maintaining positions in the governmental posts depends on the votes of constituents, which is an external element of party, it needs to be receptive to what the voters want. *Secondly*, its interactions with leaders and representative of other parties, and professional bureaucrats who have less partisan views on how the government should be run, force the representative of the party in public office to be flexible in their behaviors. However given the nature of its political mission, which is to achieve and to maintain power, for the party in public office political pragmatism and flexibility are positive rather than negative (Katz and Mair, 1993: 595-597).

The PKS face in public office also exhibits greater tendency of pragmatism and flexibility. During the PK period, the tendency was less visible because its organization had not fully diversified. The party faces, thus, still had similar mood and most organizational decisions were taken unanimously among different party faces. However, even at that phase, the public office facet was the most dynamic in terms that PK frequently changed its decisions. The first example was on presidential nomination. Following deliberation conducted by the Deliberation Council (*Majelis Syuro*), the party decided to nominate Didin Hafiduddin as its presidential candidates, who won the nomination against more 'real' candidate such as Amin Rais and Nurcholish Madjid. Clearly, the nomination was to boost its

idealist credential rather than a genuine competition for power. However, when Amin Rais organized 'Central Axis' political caucus to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid, PK changed its policy, cancelled Hafiduddin' nomination and endorsed Wahid.

Wahid was a controversial figure, whose liberal thoughts and statements often perceived by the conservative Muslims as insulting. Therefore, initially the PK responded to Wahid's nomination cautiously. In an official statement 17.09.1999 about Central Axis' nomination of Wahid, the party stated:

> It is beyond doubt that the formation of Central Axis and Amin Rais's maneuvers to nominate Wahid as presidential hopeful is controversial and raise a big question among members of the caucus, given the fact of who Wahid is and what he has done in the past. Therefore on this matter we have a number of notes:
> 1. It is possible that the members of Central Axis have different political objectives, at organizational and at individual levels.
> 2. The caucus members have not yet agree on any candidate for presidency.
> 3. Abdurrahman Wahid, the chairman of PKB, was a unique man whose statements were often controversial and insulting for the Muslims community.
>
> However, in spite of those mentioned points—especially the controversial nomination of Wahid—and the possibility of hidden agenda about the candidacy, from practical-pragmatic point of view, the Central Axis is still preferable than the other caucuses, and therefore PK must retain its involvement in it. The ideal basis of the involvement is to promote the interest of Muslim community, and it reflects PK's commitment to maintain the unity of Muslim *ummah*…
>
> PK has decided *not to participate in the next government*… This abstain from government position will be used as bargaining leverage, including with Wahid as the presidential candidate. We will support any political group and leader that commit to promote Islam and the interests of Muslims, and commitment not to pursue policies contrary Islamic values and not to make *statements* insulting to Muslims, since Muslims are majority in this country and have always been abused. What we want are those commitments, and not ministerial positions in the cabinet (PK 2001: 80-82).

Eventually the PK endorsed Wahid candidacy, because the other candidate was Megawati Sukarnoputri, a women and came from secular party. PK took the decision on the basis of 'minimum risk', and voted for Wahid. Furthermore, although the aforementioned statement stipulates that PK would not participate in the upcoming cabinet, when Wahid elected president it agreed to receive one ministerial position. With regard to this decision, PK issued an official statement to their constituent, that the decision to accept the cabinet post was intended to maximize the achievements of party's missions. It also argued that the previous statement to abstain from government position was under consideration "*if the formed government is weak, has minimal public supports and unstable*," (PKS 2001: 94)—a

reserve which does not exist in the former statement. In line with what Katz and Mair explain on the characteristic of the party in public office, changing statements and positions are positive, instead of negative, since they are perceived as the party's ability to win political competitions.

During the PKS era when party organization has become more complex and differentiation of organizational functions have been more institutionalized, the pragmatic characters of PKS facet in the public office started to be in conflict with other faces, especially with the party on the ground. Perhaps the most significant was the controversial decision to support the government policy to raise oil price and cut subsidy. At first the PKS leaders explicitly rejected the government plan because the policy was unpopular and caused more economic burden to the economically already suffering Indonesians. PKS was clearly understood that supporting the government policy would incite unpleasant reactions from their supporters and constituents. Therefore, PKS president Tifatul Sembiring and former president Hidayat Nurwahid maintained that their party rejected the plan, and they quickly added that this was a positive-critical attitude of the party as a member of coalition government. However, after they met with the president one week later, PKS leaders changed their position drastically, by giving full support to the government policy. "We have to come to term with political realities," said Tifatul Sembiring, referring to the fact that the majority of parties in the parliament supported the plan, and the fact that PKS is part of the government, and abstaining from supporting the government policy in decisive moment would risk its cabinet portfolio (*Tempo*, 28 Maret-03 April, 2005).

The decision triggered strong reactions from PKS supporters. KAMMI, student organization affiliated with the Tarbiyah community and PKS, protested PKS support to the policy. They sent their representative to the PKS Fraction in parliament to deliver they protests, and questioned the party's commitment to struggle for the poor. KAMMI's branches in some provinces were also voiced similar demands (*Tempo*, 21-27 March 2005). Even some PKS regional branches also voiced their disappointments toward the party's decision to support the unpopular policy. Few of them even urged their leaders to withdraw from coalition government, since the support had deteriorated PKS popularity. The damaging impact of oil price policy has caused great concerns among PKS leaders, since some surveys indicated that the party's public rate had drop drastically from 7.3 in 2004 election to 2.6 after the controversial decision (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007).

4.3. The Party Central Office

As was elaborated in the opening section of this chapter, the party central office is a meeting point between the party on the ground and its section in public office. PKS central office has its headquarter in Jakarta, and it manage the national party bureaucracy.

PKS central office can be classified into several layers of organizations. The first and the most important is the **Deliberation Assembly** (*Majelis Syuro*) which is the ultimate decision-maker in party. However, there are slight different official statuses of the assembly during PK and PKS periods. During the former period, it was explicitly mentioned that the Assembly was the second highest institution after the National Congress, while during the PKS period the Deliberation Assembly has become the highest decision making institution.

The requirement to become members of the DA according to PKS statute are: at least 30 years of age (25 in PK statute), hold Expert Member qualification, loyal to party and shows commitment to follow party's guidelines, have no criminal or administrative sanctions in the last three years, sufficient knowledge of Islamic teachings, respected and trustworthy (PKS ART, 16). The requirements clearly include not only formal-administrative qualifications, such as involvement in party activities indicated by holding high grade of membership and show no record of violating laws and regulations, but also personal-ideological prerequisites such as knowledge of Islamic teachings, loyalty to the party, and even respected and trustworthy qualifications.

The tasks and the rights of DA are fundamental for the party. (1) It prepares and carries out the party National Congress. (2) It selects and appoints the DA chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary. (3) It selects the chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary, and the members of the Party Advisory Assembly. (4) It selects the chairman, the vice chairman and the secretary, and the members of the Shariah Council at national level. (5) It selects the chairman and the vice chairmen, the general secretary, the general treasury, and some other personnel of the Party Central Office. (6) It drafts the party objectives, and drafts decrees and recommendations for the National Congress. (7) It has the capacity to amend the party statutes. (8) It drafts the party budgets and oversees the reports, (9) It drafts the party programs and oversee the implementations. And (10) it has the responsibility to protect and to take necessary actions against any action harmful for party public image (PKS ART, Art. 7).

The second institution in PKS central office is the **Party Advisory Assembly** (*Majelis Pertimbangan Partai*). The number of PAA members is at maximum one-third of the number the DA members, and are selected from among the DA members. Its formal status is as the care-taker of the DA tasks on the daily basis: (1) It elaborates the policies taken by the

National Congress and the DA into the party programs. (2) It supervises and oversees the implementation of the party policies. (3) It takes the responsibility to responds to general public issues. (4) It prepares the National Congress and the DA sessions and meetings. (5) It submits recommendations for the party programs and strategies in elections, and verify (legalizes) the party candidates for public offices. (6) It selects the party representatives and delegates to other organization, institutions or events. (7) It drafts the operational guidelines for the party programs and strategies. (8) It ratifies the budgets which is proposed by the Central Leadership Council to the DA. (9) It assigns the personnel for the departments in the Party Central Office. (10) It takes the responsibility to protect and to take necessary actions against any actions harmful to the party public image (PKS-ART, Art. 8-9).

The third institution in the party central leadership is the **Shariah Council** (*Dewan Syariah*), which provides reasoning and arguments of Islamic laws for the party programs and policies. It holds several functions. *Firstly*, it issues edicts from the Islamic perspective on politics and other matters, both for the party members and for the wider society. In fact, the SC edicts, recommendations, and guidelines cover a wide range of topics, from international politics such as terrorism and US invasions to Iraq and Afghanistan, to the dynamics of national politics such as elections and ethnic conflicts, to general religious discourse such as the role of women in politics and political party, to very detail guidelines of religious conducts such as Ramadhan fasting, religious alms, even on whether or not a milking mother should perform fasting (Dewan Syari'ah PKS, 2000).

The last institution in party central leadership is the **Central Leadership Council** (*Dewan Pimpinan Pusat*), which is the executive body of the party bureaucracy. It has three types of responsibility for the party organization. The first is the conceptual functions: (a) To draft the party annual programs and budgets for the party executive bureaucracy at national and lower levels, and propose them to the Party Advisory Assembly. (b) to draft the proposal for the amendments of the party statutes to the PAA. (c) To provide strategic policies for the party bureaucracy at lower levels. The second function of the Central Leadership Council is the structural functions: (a) Responsible to accept legal contributions for the party. (b) To write the annual accountability reports of the party programs and spending to the PAA. (c) To propose the list of the tentative party candidates. (d) To write reports to the Deliberation Assembly every two months. The third function is managerial functions: (a) To assign the personnel for the departments in the party bureaucracy. (b) To lead, supervise and oversee the party bureaucracy at the lower levels. (c) To initiate and to coordinate the supporting institutions of the party. (d) To legalize the leadership at the provincial level. (e) To supervise

and evaluate the party programs at the provincial level. Finally, the fourth function is operational functions: (a) It implements the party policies and programs formulated by the Deliberation Assembly. (b) It issues the party official statements. (c) It recruits members and develops human resources for the party. (d) It coordinates the party representatives who hold positions in public offices (PKS ART, Art. 14-117).

From the previous explanations, there are two crucial points important to be noted at this point. The first is the changing structure of the Deliberation Council, in which during the PK period its functions were more as advisory body and deliberation forum for the representatives of various segments in the party. The PK statute was also explicitly mentioned that the DA was the second highest party institution after the National Congress, which tasks were to implement policies taken by the Congress. In the PKS statutes, however, the DA has assumed new roles as the highest decision-making body, and the National Congress become merely procedures to elect the members of the DA. The long and detail articles explaining the functions of the National Congress found in the PK statute were also absent in the PKS statutes. The DA organizational rights have also been expanded. Formerly it had the right only to propose amendment of the statutes, which would be assigned by the National Congress. Now, it has the right to assign the amendments. These changes indicate the process of centralization of the party organizational structure, from the hand of the members through the National Congress into small group of leaders in the Deliberation Assembly. From the perspective of the theories of party studies, this indicates the process of 'oligarchy', yet at the same time it also indicates a process of organizational maturity by seeking the more effective organizational structures (Katz, 2002: 87-118).

The second is the changing relations between the party in central office and, on the one hand, the party on the ground and, on the other hand, the party in public offices. During the period of PK, the decisions and the statements of the party central office reflected more of the aspirations of its activists and constituents (the party on the ground), characterized by critical stances toward government policies. Yet during PKS period the opinions of the face in public office started to dominate the central office. A noticeable example was during 2004 presidential elections in which it only reluctantly supported Amien Rais who represented Muslim politics, and then supported and joined S. B. Yudhoyono who has neither Islamic background nor Islamic credentials. The same tendency was also apparent in the party decision to support the government policy in increasing oil price. And perhaps the most controversial have been its willingness to join coalitions with the secular parties—and even with a Christian party--in regional elections. More policies taken by central office generated

protests and resentments from party activists who see their party started to give priorities to political success over *dakwah* missions.

5. THE INTERNAL MECHANISMS

5.1. Leaders Selection

Leaders' selection in PKS follows principle of deliberation, a system deemed as fundamental for Islamic politics, based upon Qur'anic teaching. According PKS general secretary, Anis Matta, deliberations (Arabic: *syuro*) is an Islamic way of collective decision-makings. It is a procedure through which a group of people bring together 'collective reason' which is superior to 'individual reasons'. He acknowledges that there is no guarantee deliberation will bring the best result, because information can be inaccurate and human analyses are never perfect. It is possible in which people trough deliberation collectively decided something that would be proved to be wrong. However, being a collective effort, mistakes taken in deliberations are more likely to be noticed and corrected since participants have different views and perspectives that will scrutinize each other. And if they do make wrong decision, collectively-made decisions will enable the participants to share the burdens of the mistake and handle the consequences. Therefore, the most difficult part with deliberation as the method of decision-makings is how to accept deliberated decision when someone knows from his personal perspective that it is not the best alternative. Hence, according to Anis, given the fact that politics is always transient, it is much better for Muslim politicians and activists to stick with their collective unity and solidarity than following their individual opinions, as the former is better in self-correction than the latter (Matta, 2002).

According to PK statute, deliberation is the official procedure for the party decision makings. At the national level, there is National Congress in which party representatives elect the members of Deliberation Assembly, and deliberative sessions for other national level institutions. At the provincial level, there are Provincial Deliberations where provincial party branches held meeting to elect party executive personnel for provincial branch levels. And so on in the lower branches levels (PK ART, Art. 13).

PKS uses both election and appointment in choosing their leaders. At the national level, the highest institutional deliberation forum is the ***National Congress***. It is held in every five years, participated by representatives of provincial and district levels of the party branches across the country. The number of representatives from provincial and district levels are taken in proportion with their memberships, in which large provinces have more representatives than the small ones.

It is interesting to compare the statutes of PK and PKS with regard to the National Congress. In the PK statute, there is detail exposition on the status, functions and procedures of the congress. *Firstly*, "National Congress is the highest authority in the party, which holds the rights to elect and impeach members of Majelis Syuro, and evaluate the accountability reports of Central Leadership Council, the Shariah Council, and Party Advisory Assembly (MPP)" (PK AD, art. 8). *Secondly*, on the event of the congress, PK's statute stipulates that: (i) National Congress is held every five years; (ii) the participants of the national congress include: representatives of provincial branches, members of the party Central Bureaucracy, members of the Shariah Council, members of the Advisory Assembly, and members of the Deliberation Assembly; (iii) Deliberation Assembly can invite additional participants for the National Congress, such as professionals of certain expertise (PK ART, Art. 14). *Thirdly*, the tasks of the National Congress, according to PK statute were: (i) Elect and impeach members of the Deliberation Assembly, (ii) Impeach members of the Advisory Board, (iii) Impeach members of the Shariah Council, (iv) Impeach members of the Central Leadership Council, (v) Assign the party statutes and its amendments, (vi) Formulate the party policies and its revisions, (vii) Evaluate the performances of the party leaderships and their accountability reports, (viii) Discuss and decide the party strategies in elections, (ix) Formulates strategic decisions and other recommendations, (x) Assign the event of the next National Congress (PK ART, Art. 15)

Those details on National Congress are absent in PKS' statutes, and the highest organizational structure is now the Deliberation Assembly. The body also assumes all the fundamental functions formerly held by the National Congress, such as assigning the party statutes and its amendments, formulates the party strategies in elections, discussing and assigning strategic party policies, and overseeing and evaluating the party leaderships. According to Zulkieflimansyah, this organizational process is inevitable to make the party more effective, in which party decision makings are in the hand of few capable personnel (Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, 25.06.2007). However, referring to Michels' theory of party oligarchy, the organizational effectiveness in PKS has been in expense of the members' rights. Following PKS statutes, although Members still have the capacity to participate in electing party leaders, they have been stripped off of many of their previous organizational rights.

5.2. Candidate Selection

Candidates' selection is among the most fundamental organizational processes for political party, since it represents the core relations between the party and its constituents. In democratic politics, the success of party candidates in bringing votes in elections is decisive not only for the success of party in public offices, but also for party survival in general.

PKS adopts unique procedures of candidates' selections, which reflect both democratic and oligarchic tendencies. On the one hand, party candidates for public offices were selected by party members and the process of selection is systematically bottom up. Yet on the other hand, members have no rights to nominate the candidates, and the nomination was carried out by the party leaders.

A good example is the the procedures of candidate selection in one of the PKS provincial branch of Yogyakarta during 2004 legislative elections (See, PUI PKS-DIY, 2004). PKS calls this process Internal General Election. But before explaining the process of party internal election, it is important to review the requirements of candidacy set by PKS. There are administrative and 'rules of thumb' requirements. The formal or administrative conditions for the nominees of the candidates are: (i) hold at least 'senior' membership level for candidates for national and provincial legislatures, and 'intermediate' level of membership for district legislatures; (ii) holds at least high school diploma of educational qualification; (iii) not in a condition of under party disciplinary sanction; (iv) not under any condition the party deems as obstructive for public office activities; (v) not in the third terms of the same level of candidacy.

The last point stipulates that PKS candidates can only be nominated for legislative offices maximum for two terms in the same level of legislatures. If they want to be nominated for the third terms, it has to be in different level of legislative posts. This rule has two main objectives. *Firstly*, it is intended to share experiences in public office positions to as many party members as possible. Public office posts will bring knowledge for the holders and networks for the party, hence the more party members have opportunities to hold positions in public office, the more networks will be brought into party. *Secondly*, PKS perceives governmental positions as parts of party missions, i.e. religious propagation (*dakwah*), thus the limit of maximum two terms in office is intended to avoid governmental positions become personal property of the candidates (Interview with Zulkieflimansyah, 25.06.2007). However, not all PKS members are happy with the rule. The limited terms in office will imply that PKS members of legislatures are always new in every two period, and this will cause no PKS members are senior enough in legislature. *Firstly*, it will cut the accumulation of legislative

knowledge and skills, as the members are periodically renewed. *Secondly*, it will prevent PKS from holding leadership positions in the legislatures, since commonly ones who are elected for the positions are senior legislative members who have long serving experiences, as well as respected by members from different parties and factions (confidential interview, Jakarta 08.05.2007).

On the meantime, the informal requirements or the rules of thumb for candidates nominees are: (i) *moral commitment*: which include commitment to the Islamic sharia, such as to reject bribes; commitment to the party and the Tarbiyah community, for example by regularly attending party's meetings and paying dues; and acceptable among party community. (ii) *have interest and potential in political activities*: such as keenness and sensitivity to social conditions and problems, and have ability to analyze and propose solutions. (iii) *organizational and administrative capabilities*: such as fluent and articulate in expressing ideas, able to organize and manage forums and conduct negotiations; preferable to have expertise that fit with the sectional commissions in the legislatures, such as commerce and industry, budgeting, constructions, and social-cultural. (iv) *well known in wider community*, which implies that the person should be known for its good deeds an not the contrary.

The Internal Election Committee had around two weeks to announce and socialize the process of the internal election to the party members. In this period, party functionaries selected the nominees, which number was 120% of the intended number of candidates. The next step was selection process, which consisted of two successive phases. In the first phase of internal election, the participants were confined to the 'core members' level or above. Perhaps the most interesting point was that PKS did not allow its members to nominate their own selves. Ones could only be nominated, as well as nominate, other people. This rule is intended to prevent personal competition and to discourage personal ambitions for political positions. A senior PKS MP, in explaining this rule, said that the Prophet forbid us to give position to ones who ask for it, because it indicates ambition, and ambition will only gives trouble (Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). No campaign, either positive or negative, was allowed in the first phase of internal election. Participants selected four names to be nominated for each of the five district legislatures in the province, four names for the provincial legislature and four names for the national legislature. Out of this, the Committee ranked the selected names according to the votes they acquired, up to 120% of the allocated seats in each legislature. At this point, the Committee has the right to add additional candidates outside those names selected from the first-phase internal election, under the permission of the party.

The second phase of internal election was started by socializing the event to the party members, which was accomplished in around two weeks. Different from the first-phase that did not allow any campaign; in the second phase campaign was obligatory for the nominees, in the form of short article containing their visions, missions and programs if they were to be elected as party representatives. The campaign-articles were then distributed to the party activists and members as part of internal-election socialization. In the second phase, the participants of the internal election were open to all PKS members from all levels of membership. They selected candidates from the list provided by the committee 30% of the total number of seats in each legislature. Out of this, the Committee ranked the nominees according to the votes they acquired, to be nominated officially as the candidates of the party. In addition to the candidates who were selected through internal-election, the Committee— under the party's permission—could add 'Honorary Candidates' (*Caleg Kehormatan*), selected from among party 'honorary members', provided that they agreed with party programs, they had potentials to attract voters, and their rank in the candidate list must be lower than the candidates selected through internal-elections. The Committee could also included 'additional candidates,' from the party members did have potentials provided that it did not exceed the 120% of allocated candidate; *and this procedure was also intended to meet the quota for female candidates*.

6. WOMEN REPRESENTATION

In the previous chapter on ideology, I have explained how PKS ideological perspective on women's participation in politics has been changed in line with the development of democratic political institutions. Initially, during PK period, it issued religious decree that stipulates discouraging and redundant rules on women involvement in political activities. Stipulations such as 'should not wear body-fit dresses,' and 'should not artificially soften their voice to make it attractive,' and 'should not show-off their beauty' are certainly redundant, because under normal conditions no female activists would do that, as those behaviors are explicitly contradict the Islamic values of decency. It would be equally redundant and unnecessary to stipulate that male PKS politicians should not make tattoo in their body, because basically no one would do that. The fact that the Sharia Council released the decree was more reflected their religious outlook, which follows traditional and conservative notions on women, who are depicted in classical Islamic literatures as less-rational and less-capable than men, and have natural tendency for show-off and seduction, therefore should be restricted in public activities. However, during PKS period, without specifically revise the old

decree the party develops more encouraging and supportive attitudes toward women participation.

With regard to women participation in organization, PKS gives relatively open opportunities for women, and women politicians and activists participate in every section of party structures. Women were among the original founders of the party, five out of fifty, and the party allocates seats for women in every organizational structure. In the powerful Deliberation Assembly, ten out of one hundred members are women; in the Party Advisory Board three members are women; even there are two women members in the Sharia Council—something very unusual for Islamic organizations. In addition, PKS also has its special department for women, which deals with special women issues (Interview with PKS MP Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). In comparative perspectives with other mainstream Muslim organizations as well as with older Islamist party such as Masyumi, PKS give their female members greater opportunities in organizations. In the other Muslim organizations, women are commonly given a special section in the organization. This special organization is run by women, focusing its activities on women matters—reproduction, family, children, education, welfare, etc.—and they do not involve in the main organization. While in PKS, in addition to special Women Department, female politicians and activists involve in various segments of the main organization.

Women are also constitutes a major portion of party workforce. In the socialization of the party and especially during election campaign activities, women contributed significant roles for the party. Since 2002 PKS has created a filial organization called "Justice Women" (*Wanita Keadilan*). This organization is intended to empower female activists and members, provides trainings on women knowledge and skills, as well as on politics. The organization subsequently created local posts (POS Wanita Keadilan), which have been growing in number, more than one thousand such posts across the country, with around forty five thousands participants (PKS-online, 24.12.2007). According to its statute, the objective of the organization are: (i) to improve the relation between PKS and the society; (ii) to help the society to improve their living conditions; (iii) to improve women's roles in realizing healthy and happy family; (iv) to train women as the problem solvers for women and family issues; (v) to provide reserve resources for the society in emergency situations; (vi) to improve PKS women activists in socializing the party to the society; and (vii) to promote the female activists as leaders in the society. Interestingly, the statute include a "disclaimer" article to disband the organization whenever the party perceives it as "disadvantageous, impedes party programs, or trigger internal conflicts" (see, *Guidelines for Justice Women*, 2003)

A closer inspection to the 'curriculum' of the Justice Women organization shows that PKS seek to combine a training methods that would produce women activists who are on the one hand highly commit and loyal to the party ideology and programs, while on the other hand they are progressive and capable in socializing and carrying out party programs. It seems quite natural, but when one remembers PKS ideological vision on women participation in politics, the programs is not so natural, because in a sense it contradict the parties discouraging view on women public activisms. The programs of the organization can be classified into three clusters: *Firstly*, ideological trainings, to strengthen the understanding and commitment of those female activists to the party ideals, which mostly consist of learning details of Islamic theology and ethics. *Secondly*, domestic trainings to endow female activists with knowledge and skills to handle family managements ranging from household economy, children education, emergency assistances, to reproduction health. At this point, there is en explicit suggestion that the primary—or the proper—role of women is in domestic affairs as the managers of their husband's properties, while public activism are secondary and require explicit permissions from their husbands. *Thirdly*, political trainings, where the activists learn not only the party objectives and strategies, but also the wider sociological and economical aspects of why such programs are necessary, as well as analyzing other political parties' programs, their strengths and weaknesses (see, *Guidelines for Justice Women*, 2003). The programs seem unusual, in which it would produce female activists who are submissive and complementary in the domestic affairs, while active and independent in the public affairs.

PKS gives significant portion for women for candidates of M embers of the Parliaments during 2004 elections. PKS did fairly well in providing women candidates. At the national level it had 446 candidates and all of them passed the qualification requirements. Although there is no further information on how many of them were actually elected as MPs. As a comparison, the female candidates of other Muslim parties were as follow: PPP 497 candidates; PKB 551 candidates; PAN 554 candidates, and PBB 372 candidates. With regard to the recommended 30% quota for female candidates PKS did even better, where it fulfilled the quota in 65 electoral regions (*Daerah Pemilihan*), which was the highest number compare to all other parties, while PAN and PKB did it in 45 regions, PBB did it in 42 regions and PPP only in 30 electoral regions (*Republika*, 29.01.2004). At the national legislatures, PKS had one female out of seven MPs (14%) during 1999-2004 period; while it has more female MPs in the current period of 2004-2009 but their percentage is lower, i.e. three out of forty five (6%). Although small in number, PKS female MPs are active in the parliament. For example, Yoyoh Yusroh is the vice-chair of Commission VIII of DPR, and is the secretary of Women

Caucus in Parliament (*Kaukus Perempuan Parlemen*), an informal forum in the parliament to organize and mobilize support for women's role in the legislative bodies and to promote and support regulations and laws deal with women's interests. Yoyoh acknowledges the impact of the new party law which stipulates quota for 30% female candidates. Although the law does not make the quota mandatory, it does make significant impacts, in which more female candidates have been nominated by parties. And she points to an interesting by-product situation, in which following the stipulation of the quota some parties put more female candidates in the second list, thus when some replacement do occurred for MPs, many females entered the legislative body. At the beginning of the current term, female MPs were only around 11.3%, but the number has been increased in the middle term into around 12% (Interview with PKS MP Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007).

6. CONCLUSION

This chapter elaborates the organizational behavior of PKS. Given the fact that party organization is always internally plural, where there are different elements with different logic of mechanisms, it is natural to expect inconsistencies in party organizational behaviors. There are three major elements inside party organization: i.e. the party on the ground which represents ideal element, the party in public offices which represent realist element that seek to maximize power interests, and the party Headquarter that functions as the meeting point between the two conflicting elements. Moreover, party organizational behaviors are also under simultaneous influence of ideological aspirations and institutional constraints; therefore party is in constant tension between sticking to its internal codes of behavior and following external rules in order to win the game.

There are conflicting drives inside PKS organization, between idealistic elements commonly associated with the party activists versus the realist element represented by its politicians. Interestingly, the balancing power played by the party headquarter underwent a rhythmic change, from previously in favor of the idealistic camp but then moved into favoring the realist camp. During PK period, for instance, after 1999 election it nominated Didin Hafiduddin as its presidential hopeful, rather than Amin Rais and Nurcholish Madjid, on the ground that the former is preferable from moral point of view given the fact that he did not involved in any aspect of New Order Regime—although the party eventually withdrew Hafiduddin candidacy and joined other Muslim parties to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid coming the real presidential election.

In the national party leadership, furthermore, PKS has also indicated a symptom of 'oligarchy' in which the party is increasingly under the control of small number of key leaders, and minimize the role of activists and members in party decision makings. In the PK statute, for instance, the highest decision making body in the organization was the National Congress, while in the PKS statute the status is assumed by the Deliberation Assembly which also takes on greater control over party organization and its mechanisms.

Other interesting features of PKS organization unfolded in the previous paragraphs were unique combinations of organizational characteristics, in which it combined different features of different party types. It resembles the Mass-Party in terms of party activities, in which its organization and networks were active around the year and not only during election. Yet it also resembles the Catch-all Party in its memberships, in which its memberships is open to all Indonesians and not only for Muslims, which meant that it sought to mobilize supports from different segments in society. Again, it also exhibited element of the Elite Party with regard to the relation between leaders and members, in which the party perceived party leaders as guides for members and they act as trustee on behalf of its constituents, the relation is up down, and thus the party leaders are not held accountable to their members.

And perhaps the most intriguing reality in PKS organizational behavior pertain to women roles. Ideologically PKS holds conservative views on women and gender relations. The Syariah Council released several statements, which the party deems as binding, suggesting discouraging views on women public roles and political participations. In reality, however, female activists of PKS play significant and important roles for the party organizations, and the surprising fact was that PKS had the highest percentage of female candidates during 2004 election. Not only do they participate in all organizational posts—including in the powerful Deliberation Assembly and the Ulama Council—but also in organizing campaigns, and mobilizing mass supports. Thus, in sum, PKS organizational behaviors bear imprints not only its ideological inspirations, but also constraints of democratic institutions.

CHAPTER VI
BETWEEN MORAL PROPAGATION AND POLITICAL PROPAGANDA:
THE BEHAVIOR OF PKS IN ELECTIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, the behavior of PKS in organization was discussed, revealing its organizational structures and mechanisms. The most important point laid out in the discussion was that a political party is not a unitary actor. In other words, there are plural actors within the organization of a party, each having their individual objectives and logic of organizational mechanisms. Therefore it is natural to expect inconsistencies in the organizational behavior of a party. Furthermore, it has also been shown how the behavior of PKS in organization is simultaneously influenced by ideology and its institutional context. The former supplies guidelines on what the party's objectives are, while the latter provides the context for competitions which compels the party to focus on how to win the competition, so that it sometimes neglects its long-term objectives. It is interesting, then, to witness how PKS seeks to combine the two influences which, in many points, are not in line with each other. With regard to party goals, for instance, PKS has developed an ambiguous character: on the one hand, following its ideological inspirations, it is an Islamic party with the ultimate objective to establish Islamic systems in society and in politics. However, in line with the institutional requirement to be successful in democratic competition, on the other hand, it offers open memberships, with every Indonesian citizen being eligible to become a member, irrelevant of their religious affiliations. Another interesting example is PKS's perception and behavior with regard to women participating in politics. Inspired by its ideology, PKS has issued guidelines discouraging the participation of women in politics, which mirrors its conservative religious outlooks. Yet, as a result of institutional constraints of party and electoral laws which promote intra-party democracy and women's representation, PKS has opened opportunities for its female activists and politicians to take up virtually any organizational post, and formulated programs that provide opportunities and encourage female participation in party activities.

This chapter will discuss the behavior of PKS in election and examine, on the one hand, the influence of ideological inspiration and, on the other hand, the impact of institutional constraints. The first section opens the discussion by explaining the key points based on theories of electoral behaviors, such as the articulation and aggregation functions of a party in election, frequently occurring odds between electoral objectives and the strategies to achieve them, as well as positive and negative campaign practices. The subsequent sections

of this chapter will then describe the behavior of PKS in election in more detail. The first section explains how the party articulates the political interests of its constituents and aggregates the competing articulations within the system. The next section explores PKS's electoral objectives and how the party seeks to formulate strategies in order to win electoral competitions without neglecting its ideological objectives. The following section examines PKS's campaign practices, and in the final section PKS's impressive electoral success in the 2004 election will be discussed in the light of emerging theories of electoral behaviors in Indonesia.

2. ELECTORAL BEHAVIORS: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Election is undoubtedly the most fundamental procedure in democratic politics. It facilitates the basic function of democracy, i.e. governance by the people. Through elections the citizens of a country elect their representatives and give them the mandate to form the government, and through regular elections those citizens are able to express their approval or disapproval to the performance of their representatives, i.e. of the government. If the citizens approve of its performance - or if there is no alternative to it - they will continue to support the government, but if they disapprove - or if there is a better alternative - they will withdraw their support and mandate and give them to whom they believe to be this alternative.

Due to the centrality of elections in democratic processes, political parties as the main actors of those events will do their best to succeed. And it goes without saying that elections are benchmarks for a party's success or failure. Given the fact that, as elaborated in chapter V, parties have different organizational types with different political goals as well as internal structures and mechanisms, they also perceive elections and how they should act in them differently. Elite parties and mass parties, both having constant social bases and representing the interests of given societal groupings, tend to see an election as an opportunity to activate their networks, whereas catch-all and cartel parties, which do not have such permanent bases in society, tend to perceive elections as marketing events for promoting and selling products to the voters. However, since electoral behaviors are not merely routine activities as parties implement their programs, but rather political competitions in which parties seek to defeat the others, research on electoral behaviors of parties has found that competition strategies in elections do influence parties as much as their political objectives. And since strategies to win the competition are sometimes not in line with requirements imposed by the objectives, it is possible that a party's electoral success contradicts its own political objectives. This section

explores theoretical insights on complex situations parties are confronted with in their efforts to align competition strategies with political objectives.

2.1. Electoral Functions of a Party

The main actors in elections are political parties, and as practically all the functions of an election are performed by the parties, they are the actors of democracy. So substantial is the parties' role in democracy, so that scholars dub the 20th century not only as a century of democracy and democratization, but also as a century of party democracy (Mair, 1989). Of all the functions parties perform in elections; those which are relevant to the topic of this chapter will now be discussed.

a. *Interest articulation*: The term interest articulation refers to, perhaps, the most fundamental function of a political party in democratic politics, which is to represent a given set of interest in society. For example, a conservative party represents the interests of groups in society wishing to retain the existing social and cultural orders, while a radical party reflects the interests of other groups who want to alter these structures; labor parties expresses workers' interests, while religious parties promote the interests of different religious groups - and so on. Students of political science commonly refer to those different party orientations as 'party ideologies'. Scholars vary in their analyses of the relation between orientations, i.e. ideologies, and political interests of the societal groupings. Scholars using sociological approaches suggest that different party ideologies merely reflect different historical developments in society that have frozen into political cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). Other scholars using psychological approaches have found that what we call ideological aspiration is in fact partisan alignment to a political identity which was acquired during formative years in human development and is commonly inherited from the parents. Once the partisan identity has been acquired or formed, people will make life-long efforts to rationalize and legitimize their political preferences (Campbell *et al*, 1960, 1966). However, scholars with economics approaches admit that parties are the independent variable taking the initiative to formulate the ideologies to be offered to their constituents. Proponents of this approach point to many different sources of evidence to support their notion, such as political records showing how parties changed their political orientation or shifted their ideological formula as their constituents changed, or as they wanted to target different voters (Downs, 1957).

However, whether party ideology is the product of deliberate initiative or merely of structural necessity, it is clear that, in elections, parties provide choices for voters, and thus it is parties which articulate the interests of society. In this way, parties help voters to simplify the complexity of politics into a definite alternative set of 'policy packages'. The options in elections are choices parties provide (Budge & McDonald, 2006).

b. *Interest Aggregation*: The next function of a political party is what scholars call 'interest aggregation,' a process by which the party articulates a given set of political interests and, at the same time, accommodates alternative or competing interests. Etymologically, the term *aggregation* is synonymous with 'combine' or 'compromise' and refers to the act of gathering elements from various sources, on the basis of which a compromise is worked out. This is the unique way of political parties to articulate and promote political interests, which differentiates them from other organizations such as pressure groups or NGOs. Although the latter also articulate and promote interests of society, the way they do it is rather straightforward, not really taking into account what other groups or organizations advocate. Political parties, however, in articulating and promoting a certain set of interests, directly take into account the issues other parties are promoting and accommodate those issues into their own. Thus, when eventually one or a number of parties have won the election and form the government, their policies would not only represent the interests of a certain group, but also to some extent accommodate the other groups (King, 1969: 137-140). This function also calls to mind the organizational property of parties as producers of 'public goods', as discussed in the previous chapter, i.e. the product of a party's policy should be valid for all members of society and not only for the party's supporters.

In a more technical analysis, the parties' aggregation of interests serves to make the democratic process work. According to the so-called 'Arrow's impossibility theorem', plural options by plural actors could lead into a cycle of choice:

Actor 1 prefers A over B
Actor 2 prefers B over C
Actor 3 prefers C over A.

The Arrow theorem suggests that plural options lead into a cycle of choice, and there is no best option people agree upon. In such cases, arbitrary decisions need to be taken to stop the cycle arbitrarily and nominate one option as the best. Applied to political processes, the theorem implies that elections with plural parties cannot be really democratic because they lead to a cycle of choice, in which there is no best option, and therefore arbitrary measures will be taken by political elites, most probably behind closed doors, to decide which option is the most preferable. However, political parties can minimize the likelihood of the cycle by 'aggregating' the options, i.e. by formulating an option which accommodates the elements of other options (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: 14-16).

c. *Leaders' Recruitment*: Maybe the most straightforward function of a political party in election is to provide candidates for voters to choose as their political leaders. As discussed in the previous chapter, a party may select its candidates from different sources - from inside or outside the party - and in different ways – by selection or nomination. However, a party's capacity for the recruitment of national leaders can extend beyond what one may commonly think. In many countries, for instance, military leaders as well as leaderships of the police and the judiciary and senior administrators are appointed by the government. Therefore, although a party , through elections, provides candidates only for elected posts in the legislative and executive branches of the government, it will indirectly affect the recruitment of other non-elected government officials (King, 1969: 43-45).

d. *Voters' Mobilization*: The last function of a political party to be discussed is mobilizing voters to cast their votes at the polling stations. Contemporary scholars frequently point to the diminishing influence of parties on the public, saying that parties no longer have the full capability to mobilize the masses, as people now have other alternatives to express their political aspirations. However, although they no longer have the capability of previous decades, a political party is still the most effective organization when it comes to political mobilization. It is important to add at this point that the expression 'mass mobilization' does actually include, or rather imply, the act of political communication in general. A political party articulates political interests and communicates them to the public. In this way, the party acts as a channel of communication between the government and the citizens. In previous decades, a party would communicate through its organization, by recruiting people as party members and providing them with information, or it

trained activists to provide information to the public. In line with the development of mass communication, political information has now become more accessible to the public, which reduces the role of parties as the providers of political information. However, political parties seem to accept, and adapt to, the new development and even take it as their advantage. In fact, instead of becoming marginalized by the proliferation of mass communication technologies, parties use them to maximize their ability to communicate to a wider audience. Thus it is customary for a contemporary political party to develop double communication channels and mobilization methods, i.e. formal channels through party organizations, and informal ones through mass media (Poguntke, 2002).

Interestingly, research suggests that the process of mass mobilization can take place in three different ways, incidentally corresponding to three theories of the relations between party ideologies and voters' orientations. *Firstly,* a party's mobilization activities are merely the catalyst of already existing political cleavages to foster the cascading aspirations. *Secondly,* mass mobilizations are contingent to the existing institutional settings, and thus built upon the structures of opportunities, incentives and constraints at hand. *Thirdly,* it is also possible that parties create new layers of political discourse and identity which are independent of social cleavages and institutional arrangements (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992).

2.2. Election Objectives and Strategies

As the most fundamental procedure in democratic politics, elections are also on top of a party's agenda, and therefore it will spend a lot of time and energy on preparations for the event. However, given the fact that different party types have different political objectives and different types of organizational activism, parties perceive elections differently and prepare for them in different ways.

For a mass party, as its political objective is to represent the interests of a certain cleavage in society, and its organizations are commonly active all year round in recruiting members, training activists and socializing its missions and programs, elections are merely a moment of verification of these activities. For this type of party, political mobilization is a regular activity, and during election times it only activates its network of supporters to make sure that they cast their votes in the polling stations. This also applies to elite parties, which commonly have a static social basis. Similar to mass parties, elite parties normally mobilize their support from a given societal group and do not aim to reach other groups.

For catch-all and especially cartel parties, however, which do not have firm social bases, and the main objective of which is to sell political programs and policy packages to all groups of society, elections are precious and decisive moments. These parties are commonly active only at election times, and dormant in other months. During elections they will recruit paid professionals to build temporary networks in order to socialize their platforms and political programs, and appeal to all citizens to cast their ballots for them.

Although parties may have different objectives in elections, research on electoral behavior suggests that objectives or orientations are only starting points, since electoral actors need to adjust their objectives in line with the reality of the electoral competition. There are many examples in which the adaptation to the existing structures of the competition becomes more important for a party than its original objectives when generating the campaign strategy. A party which is confident that it will win the election tends to pursue offensive strategies, commonly by broadening its rhetoric and expanding its audiences. By adopting this strategy, of course, the party risks to lighten its original identity and thus to disturb its traditional supporters. A party less confident of winning the race tends to pursue conservative or defensive strategies. It will tighten its ideological grip, highlight its identity and focus on mobilizing its core supporters, in order to get a better chance in the elections (Hinich and Ordershook, 1974). Considering party competition and cooperation, if a party has no information on how other parties are likely to act in the elections, it tends to apply a zero-sum game strategy and is not likely to cooperate. However, if a party does have information on what the others are going to do, or if it even has information about public ratings on current issues relevant to the elections - through the media or its own survey - it tends to take a softer approach and may be willing to cooperate with its competitors (Ferejohn, 1978)

Although, with regard to its objectives, a mass party perceives elections merely as formal events to verify its political work, different perceptions regarding the chances to win the elections and different degrees of information about competitors and their strategies can therefore affect the party's actual behavior during the elections. If the party is confident to win the elections, it may decide to maximize votes by appealing to potential voters different from its traditional supporters. It will then need to accommodate the other groups' aspirations and at the same time risk to lose its core supporters. Moreover, if the party has no information at all about what other parties may or may not do, it is predictable that it will adopt all-out strategies. If such information is available, however, the party will be more likely to adopt cooperative strategies. In the same vein, a catch-all party, which is traditionally open to all constituents, will be most likely to adopt a defensive strategy and focus on given target

constituents if it perceives the competition to be disadvantageous or if it does not have sufficient information about other parties' strategies.

2.3. Election Campaigns: Positive and Negative

Campaigning is an activity a party is busy with during election times, i.e. different kinds of activities by which the campaign actors – the party, its candidates, and other organizations - seek to maximize their electoral gains (Farrell, 1996: 61; 2002: 63-64). One may think that campaigning is just a natural part of a party's electoral activities, however, from a historical perspective, this is not the case. Looking at the two-century history of political parties, in fact, campaigning during elections is a new invention in most democracies. Activities specifically devoted to mass mobilization during election times have taken place since the second half of the last century, in line with the birth of catch-all parties and the development of television as the new mass medium.

Scholars call this phenomenon 'Americanization' of party politics (Farrell, 2002), since the type of party described above and its activities during elections originated in the Us. They were then adopted by European countries during the 1970s and by many other countries across the world in the following decades. In fact, until the 1980s, only four democracies - the US, Canada, Australia, and Japan - permitted the use of television as a commercial medium for election campaigns (Farrell, 1996: 173). During the 1960s, Leon Epstein predicted the coming of what he called 'contagion from the right' as a new development in party politics, meaning that right-wing party organization would become the trend in democracy (1967). This was an answer to a previous theory by Maurice Duverger, who suggested that in modern democracies - referring to the post-war period - mass parties invented by leftist groups would become the norm in democratic politics, which he called 'contagion from the left' (Duverger, 1954).

Systematically, campaign activities can be classified into the following five clusters of actions (Howell, 1982: 406-407):

a. *Research* or gathering information on the constituency. This activity is normally conducted implicitly, since a party should already be informed about its potential constituents. However, as society changes, there is always the possibility that the party will need to adjust to changing situations, such as new parties or new voters. Furthermore, in recent years research has almost become necessary because party competitions now tend to focus on party programs rather than ideology, which means the party needs to keep up-to-date with the issues that matter to the public.

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b. *Personal contact*, in which party leaders, candidates or other campaign actors meet with potential voters, commonly through rallies or mass meetings. Such events provide the opportunity for campaigners to communicate with voters in interactive ways, not only to promote themselves, but also to learn more about what their supporters want and how to deal with it.

c. *Mass mobilization*, which refers to different ways of mobilizing support through proactive and direct contact, ranging from door-to-door canvassing and distributing flyers and stickers to lawn signings. The idea of mass mobilization, in this case, is to persuade the public to support and vote for the party. In recent years, the internet has become an increasingly popular way for parties and politicians to get in contact with their constituents, as it is relatively cheap and far-reaching.

d. *Elite mobilization* is another vital activity in election campaigns. Like mass mobilization, elite mobilization is a proactive way of campaigners to approach and persuade prominent individuals or leaders of organizations to lend their support to the party. Yet, unlike mass mobilization, which can be carried out easily by party workers and activists, elite mobilization requires special skills and abilities and can therefore only be performed by specialists, so a party will normally have the resources for this special task.

e. *Advertising* in newspapers, on the radio or on TV is a special type of campaign activity which involves rather complex procedures requiring considerable skills, so that parties commonly recruit outside professionals. Furthermore, it is also very expensive - particularly TV adds – so that governments in many countries set tight regulations to ensure the fairness of the competition between big and small parties.

f. Finally, fund raising is a decisive part of a campaign. People commonly think that rising funds is only a supportive event in preparation for the actual campaign. However, many studies have proven that fund raising is a campaign in itself, in which people who are willing to contribute to a party's funds tend to cast their votes for it.

Interestingly, scholars of party politics have found that a campaign can be positive or negative in its nature. Positive campaigns refer to campaigns one usually witnesses during elections, in which campaign actors promote their parties or candidates and try to persuade the

public to vote for them. Negative campaigns, on the contrary, are campaign efforts that focus on negative elements of a party's opponents, which include:

a. *Attack Advertisements*, which are common in electoral campaigns using mass media, in which campaign actors portrait negative aspects — from ideology, reputation and intellectuality to physical conditions — to ridicule and defame their opponents.

b. *Fear Mongering* or scaremongering refers to campaign techniques which take opponents' issues or programs and exaggerate them into something negative, fearful and threatening. For instance, turning issues on pro-choice (the right to abortion) into threats of legalizing homicide, or presenting a program for national defense as a promotion of war and conflicts, etc.

c. *Smear Campaigns* are another dirty tactic popular in election campaigns. Smearing is a way to implicate negative images, to stigmatize opponents or competitors with something demonic by exaggerating their identity disproportionately or incorrectly: labeling people who promote poverty alleviation as 'communists,' for example, calling those ones who support freedom of expression 'anarchists', or tagging those who promote religious values as 'fundamentalists,' etc.

d. *Push Polls* are also increasingly observable in election campaigns. This refers to polls using tricky questions to pass certain political messages on to the respondents. For example, in the US presidential campaign in 2004 a pollster asked the question: 'Would you be likely to support John McCain if you knew he had fathered an illegitimate child who was black?' McCain in fact adopted a Bangladeshi girl (www.pollster.com).

e. *Voters' Suppression*, as the last type of negative campaign, concerns any kind of intimidation to discourage people from supporting a certain party or candidate. This can be carried out by government agencies — including the police and the military — as well as other campaign agencies and other interests groups. It is usually more effective if a large number of voters are intimidated individually since those individuals may not consider a single vote to be significant.

Scholars believe that negative campaigns are negative for politics, and thus for democracy, since they discourage people's participation. *Firstly*, a negative campaign demobilizes partisanship, reducing the incentives to participate in elections by discouraging potential supporters from voting for their candidates more than deflecting them from

supporting the sponsor of the campaign. *Secondly*, such a campaign also affects independent voters who will become less interested in the targets, but who may also have negative sentiments toward the sponsor of the campaign. *Thirdly*, this type of campaign is likely to result in a negative atmosphere of the elections, as it inflicts negative and nasty images to the political process, and thus discourages the public from participating in democratic politics (Ansolabehere *et al*, 1994).

However, other scholars do not agree that *all* negative campaigns demobilize turnout, and are thus defective for democracy. In some cases, real world experiences have proven that negative campaigns do mobilize people to come to polling stations and cast their ballots. Three arguments are put forward to explain why this is the case. *Firstly*, negative campaigns can help to raise public awareness on crucial problems by exaggerating them, sometimes disproportionately, and in this case they motivate people to take part in the political process to address them, i.e. in the elections. *Secondly*, contrary to the previous inference, negative campaigns actually stimulate potential voters, both partisan and independent, to participate in politics by raising anxieties about the targets. And *thirdly*, surveys indicate that negative campaigns to some extent remind people that the election race is tight, the competition is close, and every vote counts. Such conditions do motivate people to see that a single vote matters, and thus to cast their ballots on the Election Day (Martin, 2004).

It is important to mention here, that the debate between proponents and opponents of negative campaigns seems to confirm other research findings on the effectiveness of election campaigning. An interesting survey on the survivability of campaign messages finds that issues touching the emotions of constituents tend to last longer during the campaign period, so the writer concludes that effective campaign rhetoric must be able to touch the voters' emotional awareness and understanding (Jerit, 2004). Thus, negative campaigns may work as effective as the positive ones as long as they target people's emotions rather than their cognition.

3. PKS'S ARTICULATION AND AGGREGATION OF INTERESTS

One of the most fundamental functions of a political party is to articulate political interests. It seems very plausible to follow Downs' proposition that what people want in politics, and from their government, is policy and not philosophy. People want government policies and programs to make their lives better. However, seen from any viewpoint, it is impossible for voters to name every detail of the government policy options they want, since political activities and processes are too complex for ordinary people to comprehend: therefore, they

need "shortcuts". Parties provide shortcuts for people to understand policy options using a simple label, named ideology. Thus, for Downs, interest articulation implies that it is an act of simplification, and it is ideological. Ideology enables a party to formulate a given set of political preferences which is distinguishable from its alternatives. Ideology is useful both for voters and parties: for the former, it simplifies the complexity of political enterprises by means of an understandable set of propositions, while for the latter, ideology helps to appeal to given groups and mobilize their support (Downs, 1957: 98-99).

3.1. Continuity and Discontinuity of Muslim Politics

PKS declares itself an Islamist party, adopts Islam as its political ideology and seeks to promote Islam as the solution to the nation's political problems. In its Platform of Basic Policies (*Kebijakan Dasar*), the party declares its visions to be: 1. Party of religious propagation (*dakwah*) which strives for Islam as the solution to political issues and problems. 2. Agent of transformation of Islamic values and teachings in all processes of nation building. 3. The pioneer in cooperating with various groups having similar missions to establish the Islamic system and values as public goods for the Indonesian people. 4. A contributor to the development of civil society in Indonesia (PKS Basic Policies).

Meanwhile, PKS's political missions are: 1. Spreading Islamic propagation, recruiting and training party activists as elements of reform. 2. Developing Islamic social institutions as centres of reform and for the solution of societal problems. 3. Influencing the public opinion and creating a conducive atmosphere for the implementation of Islamic teachings to solve problems. 4. Advocating political education, protecting and empowering citizens' rights. 5. Promoting political correctness in the light of Islamic laws and ethics. 6. Active Cooperation with other Islam organizations to achieve unity among the Muslim community, and with other organizations to achieve the agenda of national reformation. 7. Active support of the oppressed Muslim lands (PKS Basic Policies).

Those objectives certainly indicate that PKS seeks to represent the political interests of the Muslim community. This intention is also affirmed by the PK manifesto which repeatedly mentions that the party is a continuation of the political ideals and struggles of previous Muslim organizations. The document states that the Muslims in Indonesia, constituting the majority of Indonesian citizens, bear the collective burden to build Indonesia as a respected nation. And in fact, 20th-century history records that Muslims have tried to do that: from pioneer Sarekat Islam in the early decades of the century to the Youth Oath in 1928to the national independence in 1945, Indonesia eventually gained a significant role and status

among non-aligned nations. However, the dawn of hope turned out to be a 'fake-dawn' (*fajar kadzib*), and the country fell into internal colonialism, exploited and corrupted by its own rulers. The Old Order regime under Sukarno, who made 'politics as the leader', failed to empower the nation, and the New Order regime under Suharto, who built his authoritarian regime upon economic development, was also unable to stand as its foundation was crippled by regional financial crises. In the post-New Order era, the party emerged as a continuation of the long history of Muslim political struggle (PK manifesto).

However, one may ask at this point which Muslims PKS wants to represent. Indonesian Muslims are a diverse community with different strands of theology, social movements, as well as political orientations. Scholars of Indonesian Islam have formulated several typologies to map the internal varieties in the Muslim community (see Geertz, 1960; Effendy, 2002; Liddle 2002). One which is relevant to this chapter is Allan A. Samson's classification of the political strands into radical-fundamentalist, reformist, and accomodationist. The *first* refers to the political tradition of DI/TII, which sought to replace the existing secular-democratic republic with an Islamic political system, involving violent programs and actions to pursue their objectives. The *second* strand is represented by Masyumi, whose ultimate goal is also to establish an Islamic system in politics, but with no intention to replace the republic form of state or the democratic political system. This political tradition is called reformist, as it wants to reform, not to replace, the existing system in line with Islamic values. The *last* strand is the tradition of NU, which was also supportive to the idea of establishing Islamic systems; however, its immediate concern was political survival, which leads to flexible political behaviors, such as cooperating not only with nationalists but also with communists (Samson, 1971-1972). Contemporary assessment of internal dynamics in the Muslim community at the micro-level shows that the three strands do exist and can explain the differences in religious orientations among Muslims (Permata, 2005).

Surprisingly, although PK/PKS claim to be the continuation of Muslim political organizations in the past, they formulate a political articulation which is very different from those of major traditional strands in Muslim politics. According to Machmudi, PK/PKS, stemming from the Tarbiyah movement, marks a new phase in the political history of Indonesian Muslims. The new Muslim generation was a product of complex political processes in the Muslim community, in national as well as international politics. Machmudi suggests three simultaneous factors that produced this new generation. *Firstly*, the failure of old-style political Islam to stand up to the repressions and the infiltration by the New Order regime, which caused Muslim activists to split into three different camps: those who refused

the regime and switched their political activities into non-political ones, such as religious propagations, those who remained in the political lines, yet under heavy restrictions and co-optations, and those who joined the regime and sought to do something from within. *Secondly*, intriguingly, although it was repressive toward the Muslim politics, the New Order regime facilitated the systematic Islamization at the societal level, by stipulating laws that made religious education mandatory in public schools, and through the empowerment of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which was actually dominated by Muslim affairs. All of this made students of public schools become familiar with Islam, and thus receptive to Islamic ideas and ideals. *Thirdly*, international influences, such as the Islamic Revolution in Iran, as well as the direct encounters of Indonesian students studying in the Middle East with new political trends and movements, injected a global sense to the new Muslim generation. Thus, following Machmudi, the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement and PK/PKS was a rejection of the old legacy of Muslim politics. In his own words:

> One of the most salient characteristics of Indonesian Muslims since the 1980s has been their tendency to connect themselves with global issues and movements. This has undermined the authority of local scholars in dealing with religious issues. They were considered to have been co-opted by the governing regime and so not to speak for the interest of the ummah. The younger generation of Indonesian Muslims has been attracted to foreign movements because of their "original" and "authentic" cachet and their image of not having been manipulated by the state. Jemaah Tarbiyah has adopted new models in carrying out its dakwah activities derived from the Muslim Brothers of Egypt…(Machmudi, 2006: 34).

So, does PKS constitute a continuation or a rejection of the legacy of Indonesian Muslim politics? Taking into account both the party's history and its objectives, it is clear that it constitutes both a continuation and a rejection of the old legacy. It is a continuation of moral ideals and a rejection of historical institutions. PKS, like other Islamist groups, perceives history as a continuous moral narrative of the eternal battle between good and evil, sincerity and corruption, which dates back to the time of the Prophet Muhammad. The party views itself as a manifestation of the eternal 'spirit' of truth, which is to enact justice in human history:

> Contemplation to the history of the nation reveals that the crises rooted in human actors and the values they expressed in collective life. The key terms are tyranny and wrongdoing. Our society had been polarized into the strong group who oppressed, and the weak group who was oppressed. Tyranny demolishes human dignity, deprives human rights and creativity, and eventually weakens the nation.

Enacting justice is the only way toward better Indonesia, since justice is the nature of things, the very principle upon which Allah created heaven and earth (PK Manifesto).

It is no coincidence that PKS calls itself 'dakwah' party, or party of religious propagation. The term has given the party a strong Islamic brand, since dakwah or propagation — with various levels of meaning: (a) advocating moral righteousness, (b) proliferating Islamic teachings, (c) proselytizing people into Islam — is fundamental in Islam and all Muslims appreciate it as a religiously important activity. Yet, on the other hand, the term dakwah has also enabled the party to be neutral in relation to the existing theological and political frictions inside the Muslim community.

3.2. A Moral Problem Needs a Moral Solution

As was explained in the previous paragraphs, political parties have a unique way to articulate their interests, namely that they do not only represent, but also aggregate interests, taking into account the alternatives and accommodating the competing interests. By articulating their political rhetoric in terms of dakwah, PKS is able to claim a connection with the legacy of Indonesian Muslim politics. However, ideologically, it represents a new strand in Muslim politics and has adopted its inspirations from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, which is significantly different from the mainstreams of political Islam in Indonesia; and sociologically, it also claims to be a brand-new movement being concerned with international politics and feeling a strong solidarity to the fellow Muslims overseas, which is also dissimilar to mainstream Islamic movements.

To understand how the party aggregates the plurality of interests within Indonesian politics, let's have a look at its political rhetoric with regard to electoral activities. In line with its brotherhood ideology, PKS perceives societal and political realities and processes as the direct continuation of individual morality. Thus, any serious and meaningful effort to reform society must start from the individual. Good individuals will create a good society, and a good society will produce good political systems. Good individuals will also start good families, bringing up a good new generation and thus guaranteeing the sustainability of the good system (Interview with Chalid Machmud, Yogyakarta 19.04.2007).

This argumentation proved to be very timely, at a time when the nation was hit by a severe financial crisis: economic conditions plunged drastically, the currency exchange value devaluated up to 700%, and prices of basic goods rocketed, this beingcombined with a national political atmosphere of strong sentiments of anti-status quo, which the public

perceived as corrupt, collusive, and nepotistic (or KKN in the Indonesian acronym). At that time, playing with a personal-moral rhetoric was very effective because it was parsimonious and in line with people's experiences in daily life. PKS argued that the core of the muddled problems faced by the nation — what the media dubbed a multi-dimensional crisis — was rooted in the nation's morality. This was, in short, a moral crisis, and if one really wants to improve a situation, one needs to start right at the heart of the problem, i.e. by improving people's morality. Arguing like this, the party was able to introduce itself to the wider Muslim community, and to appeal for their support.

However, there has been a change in PKS's way of articulating morality as the solution. During its early period, PK would expressively, and rather innocently, declare its mission to promote Islamic values, support the interests of Muslim politics, and defend Muslims and their interests against external competitors and threats. The PK website archives [which are now closed; some files, however, are still available at www.geocities.com]do not only contain the regular party program and information on recruitments, trainings, and other organizational activities, but also show PK's attention toward and direct support of Muslim groups during inter-religious conflicts in the Maluku province. One report even mentions that one of the local leaders was killed in the conflict, which was later denied by the Central Office (Press Release, 18.07.2000). The web archives list a number of reports written by PK activists, describing the conflict as systematic efforts by enemies of Islam to persecute Muslims, and they appeal for support from Indonesian Muslims to help their persecuted brothers in waging Jihad. One of the reports reads:

> Dear Brothers, we could not let the tragedies of Ambon, Tual, and Malifut occurr again in Tobelo, in which the Muslim minority was persecuted and forced to leave from their villages. These actions were planned and organized by the Protestant Church of Ambon (GMP) where there are militant Christians who want to destroy Islam.
> The Christians have prepared themselves in Tobelo. A Muslim guy who converted to Christianity told his Muslim relatives in Tobelo that the Christians had piled up bombs to destroy minority Muslims' houses in the area.
> Dear Brothers, we have to get ourselves ready for Jihad. If they sell, we must buy. However, we are in shortage of funds, arms, and logistics.
> One thing is sure, dear Brothers, in this region where we are a minority, we cannot rely on the government apparatus. The Ambon, Tual and Malifut cases were a clear indicator, and we must learn from it.
> And who will help them other than we who are aware of the meaning of brotherhood?

So please, dear brothers, help with whatever you have, to support our brothers who are preparing to defend their religion and humanity. Please contact us in this Justice Post (Report of Justice Party Ternate).

Note how the passage constantly portrays Muslims as a persecuted minority, and thus implies they have the moral right to self-defense and the need to be supported. PK's Central Office also released an official statement demanding that the government declare the conflicts were actually religious conflicts, as well as advising Muslims in conflicting regions to arm themselves and to defend themselves with whatever they had, and even to stop the enemies from attacking and planning to attack [which can be understood as advising to take preemptive action], and appealing to Muslims across the country to help and pray for the sufferings and the blood of their brothers (DPP PK, 12.01.1999).

These religious enthusiasms, including direct confrontations with other religious groups, were actually uncommon among mainstream Muslim groups in Indonesia. Muslim groups involved in the conflicts were radical, the most infamous of which being Laskar Jihad who sent thousands of fighters from Java to conflicting regions, reportedly escorted by elements of Indonesian military (Hefner 2000). By taking part in religious ethnic conflicts, PKS showed solidarity with those radical groups that made it unable to reach the wider, more moderate, Muslim audience. The 1999 legislative election, in which it gathered 1.7% of the national votes, was hard evidence that the party would only reach a small audience.

After the election, and especially after PKS began to play an active role in parliament and in the cabinet, wherein PKS leaders experienced real politics in a democratic system, in which they had to articulate interests as well as cooperate, collaborate and make political deals with and concessions to other political actors with different religious backgrounds and political affiliations, the party maintained its moral rhetoric, but changed its tactics. It would still advocate a gradual moral reform, starting from the individual, to the family, society, and polity. It also maintained elements of confrontative rhetoric to defend Islam against its enemies. However, at this time, the enemies who oppressed and persecuted Muslim fellows were in far-away countries, such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. Both PK and PKS organized hundreds of demonstration rallies to protest against Israeli actions against the Palestinians, and against the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. The party's Central Office also released a number of statements, appeals and summons against injustices toward Muslims overseas. It even issued an official statement refusing the participation of Israeli delegates in the International Parliamentary Union (IPU) meeting in Jakarta 2000 (DPP PK,

10.10.2000). In doing so, it was able to use religious rhetoric against the enemies of Islam without jeopardizing relations to moderate Muslims and non-Muslim groups in the country.

In actual fact, the party used rallies and demonstrations as public relations campaigns. Through such events it wanted to get credentials as a heroic party being concerned with Muslim problems and willing to show solidarity toward fellow Muslims in difficulties, and as a courageous party challenging the international superpowers. This Islamic heroism was in fact a catchy issue, which easily attracted sympathies from the public, especially from youngsters in urban areas — who, in addition to their psychological need of a hero, were fairly well-informed of international affairs. Furthermore, the party also used such events to promote the moral quality of its activists and members, as they always carried out the activities in a peaceful manner. It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that PKS has transformed political rallies, which had formerly been identical with a show of force, almost always having chaotic effects, into orderly and peaceful political entertainment.

With regard to domestic politics, especially after the metamorphosis into PKS, the party reformulated its moral rhetoric to be more neutral, with a focus on concrete actions. It now calls itself "Clean and Care" party. The *first* term refers to its moral credentials, which the party deems as the solution to national crises. It has been able to prove that its politicians at various levels of legislature command superior moral values, by refusing bribes or returning illegitimate kickbacks. Helped by massive media coverage, PKS politicians have successfully built up a strong reputation as the defender of high politics, in a situation when the public started to distrust politicians and political parties who appeared to be busy quarreling against each other rather than finding solutions to ease people's tough life conditions. The *second* term points to PKS's proactive actions, such as providing help and support to the people in difficulties, especially during natural disasters like floods, which are regular events in urban areas during the rainy season, and also earthquakes, which frequently occur across the country. In such situations, PKS activists and sympathizers often arrived at the scene — complete with party uniforms and flags — prior to government agencies to provide emergency assistance. Facilitated by the media, again, the party has steadily built on its record as a caring party.

It is at this point that PKS starts to exhibit the characteristics of a catch-all party, in terms of seeking to mobilize support from different segments of society — although its political goals remain reformative and not ameliorative. PKS leaders have started to recognize the nature of Indonesian electorates, which is normally curvilinear with the majority located

in the middle of the curve. Thus, in order to attract more voters, they will have to move into the center of the political spectrum (Zulkieflimansyah, 2005).

4. PKS'S ELECTORAL OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

PKS has changed its political articulation, from representing the interests of conservative Muslims, which in many ways implies confrontations with the interests of other groups, into a political rhetoric which is more open, representing the interests of the wider community of more moderate Muslims and non-Muslims. In this way, the party has succeeded in attracting more support and votes, while, at the same time, it risks to lose its conservative supporters. This section discusses PKS's objectives in elections and the strategies to achieve them. Again, at this point, there are two different opinions on what a party really does when it participates in elections: the first represents the ideological drives perceiving elections as test-cases to monitor the public acceptance of the party's moral callings, while the second reflects the rational camp suggesting that elections are opportunities to mobilize support for the party's political projects and programs.

4.1. Moral propagation

PKS declares itself a *dakwah* party, whose main objective is to reform the political system in the light of Islamic values through a gradual process, starting from the individual, to the family, society, and polity. It is this gradualism — adopted from the political programs of the Muslim Brotherhood — which has made PKS's history relatively peaceful.. The development is consequential, such that later developments are logical results of the previous ones - in other words, the initial parts of the process constitute preparation stages for the subsequent ones; so, in order to maximize achievement in any one stage, one needs to maximize the preparation stages.

There is a standard term commonly used in the Tarbiyah community and therefore also by PKS leaders, on the structure of their dakwah agenda. The term has been widely used, although it is not found in PKS documents. Apparently it is extracted from the teachings of Sayyid Qutub, the martyr of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (Correspondence with an IM activist in Germany, April 2008). There are five different stages of dakwah, commonly called *mihwar* (orbits) of dakwah: The first is *Ta'sisi*, the formation stage or orbit of dakwah which refers to the initial process of the formation of the dakwah movement. The second is *Tandzimi*, the foundation stage, which refers to the establishment of organizations, including the recruitment of cadres as well as the development of organizational networks. The third is

Sya'bi, the socialization stage, in which the dakwah movement starts to introduce its activities to the wider public, and to openly recruit members. The fourth is *Muasasi*, the penetration stage, which consists in the participation of the dakwah movement in institutional political processes, such as joining elections. The last stage is *Dauly*, the government phase, in which dakwah actors eventually take governmental positions. These stages are continuous, such that the initial ones are preparations of the subsequent ones (Sembiring, 2005).

This logic of gradualism also applies to PKS's electoral activities, as the party perceives elections as an indicator of the public acceptance of its political missions. Using dakwah terminology, constituents are nothing but 'dakwah targets' to whom the party as an agent of religious and moral reform directs its programs. This reflects the extent to which the Indonesian public, the majority of which are Muslims, understands and supports PKS's missions and programs. Commenting on this point, Imam Nur Azis from Bapilu explains that elections provide easy and accurate facts on the public acceptance of and support for PKS (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007).

Electoral activities are normal communication activities, which are in fact *dakwah* activities. Therefore PKS actively organizes routine meetings, trainings, indoctrinations, and consolidations. Undoubtedly, PKS is the most active party organization in Indonesia, its local branches having regular meetings on a weekly basis (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007). These activities, especially at local branches, are facilitated by the fact that PKS mixes religion with politics, by using religious forums to socialize their political programs. In many cases, weekly meetings are held in the form of religious forums, in which party leaders deliver religious speeches containing political messages. Religion provides a double advantage for PKS: on the one hand, it motivates people to attend the party's meetings and activities, which they believe to be religious activities which will earn them religious rewards, and, on the other hand, it conceals the political messages delivered in the meetings, which helps to create a religious image of PKS politicians and conceals the political dimension that tends to be negative for them. In addition, using religion in party forums has also enabled PKS to reach wider audiences. In fact, in some cases they have deliberately concealed their political identity, apparently holding politically unaffiliated religious forums, in order to attract wider audiences.

This perception of electoral activities was very strong during the PK period. In preparation of the upcoming 1999 elections, the party's central office issued a statement to its members and symphatizers, advising them on the following points: *Firstly*, all members and symphatizers need to strengthen their determination to dedicate party activities as religious

actions to serve Allah's will. *Secondly*, all need to bear in mind that the party's ultimate mission is to enact God's laws on earth, to achieve correctness, justice and happiness in worldly life and thereafter. Party activities are not the end, but rather the way to realize it and to prove that Islam is a universal blessing. *Thirdly*, the first priority is unity among Muslims. Differences in religious interpretations and political orientations among Muslims should not trigger prejudices or prevent cooperation. *Fourthly*, the party is a tool among many others and has no self-legitimacy, and thus party members have to avoid chauvinistic attitudes and behaviors. *Fifthly*, electoral success or failure is not an indication of the ultimate value of the party's activities. What matters is to do one's best in learning and practicing Islamic teachings, to cooperate and seek unity among Muslims, and let Allah do the rest. *Sixthly*, one needs to nurture and improve one's expertise in carrying out the party programs because expertise is the key to success. *Seventhly*, one has to be cautious not to do any wrong to other people through one's speech, actions, or behavior, both toward Muslims or non-Muslims, because inflicting unpleasant things to others will cause equally bad things to the doer (PK Central Office, 22.08.1998).

The official statement clearly reflects PK's perception at that time: the party is merely a tool for personal piety, and not even the only one. Therefore party activities — including those in elections — are not the yardstick for party success or failure because what matters are the personal efforts to achieve personal piety. Indirectly, the passage also reflects the party's belief in God's omnipotence. In another statement, specifically for Election Day, the party suggested that its activists and members: (a) purify themselves by repenting to God upon their wrongdoings, (b) intensify religious activities such as prayers and reciting the Qur'an to bring them closer to God, (c) intensify social activities and welfare activities through party organizations, (d) be prepared for any difficulties and challenges and be patient with them, (e) seek to find the positive in people, and persuade them accordingly to support the party's mission, (f) do not forget to pay alms because material capability is fundamental for dakwah (PK Central Office, 13.5.1999).

4.2. Political Propaganda

However, there is another interpretation of the nature of electoral and other political activities inside PKS. This view has a similar starting point to the previous one, namely that PKS is a dakwah party whose ultimate mission is to islamize the political system. It also agrees that PKS follows the gradual political agenda of the Muslim Brothers, in the form of the dakwah orbits or stages. However, this perspective argues that the political orbit is unique

and needs to be understood according to its own context. Proponents of this camp agree that the dakwah stages constitute a continuous programs in which the later parts are products of the previous ones and the success of the initial stages is necessary for the success of the subsequent ones (Rama Pratama, in his dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 25.02.2007. The following information is taken from the dialogue unless stated otherwise).

According to this viewpoint, politics deals with power. There is nothing wrong with seeking power and, as a political party, PKS is doing just that. The point is not whether a dakwah party should seek power or not, but rather how it should go about it. A party needs power, and dakwah needs power, to be able to reform society according to Islamic values. The party's task is to find out how to do politics according to Islamic guidelines. However, different from the logic of dakwah activities in the initial stages, which is measured on the consistency with internal-collective doctrines, in the political stages, the yardstick by which one can measure successes and failures of dakwah activities is their public acceptance. In politics, a party is not only accountable to its own principles and members, but also — and more importantly — to the public. This is what one calls public accountability. Given the fact that the public is diverse, with heterogeneous cultural identities, religious backgrounds, and political orientations, party actions and behavior have to be rational and transparent. For instance, in politics it is no longer sufficient to use internal deliberations (*syuro*) to elect party leaders, not because *syuro* is no longer valid or ineffective, but rather because political actions require public accountability.

In the Sya'by stage, whose purpose is to socialize the dakwah movement to the wider public, dakwah actors charmed the public with their moral superiority, and PKS was quite successful to influence the public opinion. However, to be really successful, charming the public with personal piety is not enough. At this point, real actions are needed to effect changes and make real contributions to the improvement of life conditions. The parameters of politics are public acceptance and public utility. A party cannot cite Qur'anic verses or prophetic sayings to support political programs, but must use rational explanations to show that they will produce objective benefits for the public. If PKS manages to do that, the public will approve and support it - not only the Muslim community, but also non-Muslims.

At this point, a party needs different resources to carry out political tasks to achieve public accountability. There are four requirements for success in politics: *firstly*, human resources with both ideological (*manhaj*) and personal (*fikr*) capacities, since many decisions need to be taken in transient situations in which there is no time to consult with party leaders, no time for deliberation sessions, and no time to ask fatwa from the Syariah Council. These

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people should have a sufficient understanding of the party's ideological principles, and the capacity to make maneuvers and take decisions according to the respective context without transgressing the basic principles. They need to understand *Syariah* not in terms of rigid lines but as corridors that enable flexible interpretations. They should go in a principles that basically all are allowed unless specifically forbidden; not the other way around in which all are forbidden unless there are specific guides. *Secondly*, party activists need to develop supporting infrastructure, such as organizational networks, professional assistance, and funds. *Thirdly*, one needs media strategies to achieve wide media coverage of party activities. The public must know what the party has done. This is not about personal piety, but rather about political strategies. It is true that — according to prophetic sayings — if one gives something with her right hand, the left hand should not know about it, meaning that she must be sincere in doing so. However, when it comes to political actions, what is at stake is public accountability. When PKS helps people in need, one must bring reporters and make sure they publish it. This is not about personal piety, but about public accountability. *Lastly*, all the potential should be directed to motivate and persuade people to participate in the party's programs and activities (Rama Pratama, in his dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 25.02.2007).

This perception of political communication is different from the former one during the PK period. Previously, political communication and also electoral activities were perceived merely as tools for moral propagation, and not as objectives in themselves. Now, although religious morality is still the ultimate objective of PKS politics, party activities are perceived as having an independent reality which needs to be pursued in line with its own nature and logic. The PKS Syariah Council released a statement which suggests that mobilizing as many followers as possible is permitted for the dakwah movement, and thus PKS needs to formulate a strategy for it. Since Indonesian people are heterogeneous, the party needs to adapt to this heterogeneity in order to mobilize support of people with different backgrounds:

> Our society has heterogeneous cultures, and as a party which represents the state, it would be unethical for us to refuse people's participation only because they do not match our standard. The party needs to function like the state, to protect and to accommodate the plural inspirations of its members and sympathizers, although we have regulations to select and to filter people's participation in line with our principles. **But the principle is, vote first and later on we can propagate them.** (Syariah Council, 17.07.2003, bold added).

At this point, it is quite clear that PKS starts to perceive political and electoral activities as an independent reality which needs to be pursued in its own rights. In order to be

successful in political competitions, including elections, PKS does not only need pure hearts and compliance with Islamic principles, but also professional capabilities regarding political skills and tricks - and PKS does take this issue seriously. PKS has organized various programs to improve the party's capacity as well as the individual expertise of its politicians. For instance, it has held several training sessions, inviting consultants to help them improve their organizational capacities, sent its politicians to pursue postgraduate studies and conduct research on various aspects of the party and its activities (Interview with Imam Nur Azis, 22.05.2007), and even invited TV consultants to train PKS politicians to perform in front of the camera (Al-Muzamil Yusuf, dialogue with PKS-Japan radio, 23.07.2004).

5. PKS'S CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES

In line with its changing attitudes toward electoral activities, from formerly perceiving them as insubstantial and contingent to efforts of moral –struggle, to the view that political activities have their independent realities and need to be pursued in their own logic, PKS has also made different experiences in conducting election campaigns. During the PKS period, campaign activities were carried out in a spontaneous manner and rather innocently; the party would socialize and promote their program and appeal to people to vote for it. Later on, during the PK period, the party began to realize that a campaign is not like an athletic sprint in which participants only need to do their best, but rather like a football game in which a team not only has to do its best, but also needs to make sure that it can beat its opponents, and thus needs to adjust its strategies to those of the opponents as well as the dynamics of the game.

As a reaction to the tense political atmosphere before the 1999 elections, in which party supporters clashed with each other and claimed casualties, the PK Central Office released a statement (*Seruan*) repeatedly stressing the need for the party cadres and activists to focus on the bigger picture of politics, such as to maintain harmony and unity among the Muslim community, to avoid conflicts and violence, etc., and not to be preoccupied with the campaign objectives only. It reads:

> Recent developments pertaining to conflicts and violence clashes between followers of parties during the General Election (1999) campaigns have disturbed faithful people. How could we have such a fragile sense of Islamic –unity –and solidarity (*ukhuwah*), and neglect the sanctity of human life and property, especially among Muslims?
> The Justice Party as a party of moral propagation does not want its cadres involved in such violence, conflict, and other dirty conducts to win votes. Therefore we appeal to our members and supporters: (1) to maintain harmony among Muslims and Indonesians, (2) to seek to play as examples for Muslims and Indonesians by

consistently practicing clean politics and avoid dirty political tricks, (3) to become pioneers to enact a political culture that prioritizes public services and dedicates its efforts to the benefit of the public (PK Central Office, 13 May, 1999)

Again, in terms of the internal party organization, one can see how the party on the ground which was characterized by ideal orientations dominated the mood of PKS's campaign activities. However, in the following elections of 2004, when political competitions were more stable than in 1999, PKS focused its objectives on how to maximize its electoral achievement, and thus designed the electoral campaign accordingly. Considering the elections, it is apparent that PKS deemed them not only important but also urgent, or even as an emergency, and it framed the elections using Syariah terms in which it is obligatory (*wajib*) for people to vote - if they do, they will be rewarded, and if they don't, they will be punished (spiritually).

> Elections represent the struggle between good and evil, the result of which is decisive for the nation and the state. Therefore the participation of the Muslim ummah in elections is obligatory, to increase the votes and to elect a just and wise national leader who will be able to bring our state into a just state according to Islamic teachings. Otherwise the political power will fall into the hands of evil groups (*ahlul batil*), and thus they will control us, set rules and laws for us. And this would be very bad for us.
>
> A formula in Islamic jurisprudence says that if an obligation can only be achieved by doing certain things, then those things become obligatory. Since to enact a just society and state is obligatory for Muslims, the participation in elections as a necessary requirement is also obligatory. Another formula says that an instruction to do something implies the prohibition of doing the opposite, and thus, since the participation in elections is obligatory, to abstain from voting is forbidden (PKS Syariah Council, 17 July 2003)

fLooking at the party's behavior, PKS then got more focused on the small picture of political procedures —the elections, the campaigns —than on the wider picture of social harmony, since it had sensed what was at stake - however, it has to be noted here that it still maintained its normative tone of political ideals. For instance, the party published the so-called "Campaign Ethic", suggesting that:

> Campaigns are essential for political competitions because through them a political party introduces and socializes its program and mobilizes voters to vote for it. Due to the fact that campaigning is very important, we need to set rules so that it will be in line with Islamic ethics and does not transgress the Islamic Shariah. Even more because PKS has declared itself an Islamist party, it has the moral obligation to follow Islamic ways in conducting campaigns.

A campaign is political propaganda for a party to appeal for support from the public. A campaign is similar to dakwah, i.e. to advising good deeds both toward good people as well as bad people. Thus PKS campaigners should follow the following guidelines: (1) to be sincere and free themselves from low motives; (2) to use polite and sympathetic ways to introduce the party and its programs; (3) to not force people; (4) to not cheat or lie; (5) to not give exaggerating, unnecessary promises; (6) to maintain Islamic solidarity; (7) to not promote themselves unnecessarily; (8) campaigns have to be solution-oriented; (9) to conduct campaigns in an orderly manner, and to not disturb other parties; (10) to not forget prayer times; (11) to be good examples for the people (PKS Central Office, 05.03.2004, bold added)

With regard to actual campaign activities, the pattern is also similar in that during the PK period, in the 1999 election, the party perceived the activities as contingent to higher, idealistic objectives, while during the 2004 elections in the PKS period, the party, without abandoning its moralistic vision, would recognize the activities in their own right. *Firstly*, in preparing for campaigns, the party consistently advised its members to intensify their religious activities. This was simultaneously directed toward two ends: first, to generate self-confidence — being close to God — so that their performance would be maximum; and second, to impress the public by showing that the party is run by pious people, and thus constitutes the best alternative in times of moral crisis. Meanwhile, during the 2004 elections, PKS prepared for the vote in quite a professional manner: the party —like everybody else — followed various surveys and polls on public opinions closely and used them as information for their strategies. More specifically, it formed an ad hoc committee to write down the party platform, and to elaborate the party visions and missions for a wider audience.

Secondly, during campaigning the most common activities are personal contacts in which party leaders and other campaign actors meet people in mass rallies or other gatherings. It is interesting to see how, during the PK period, there was a strong tendency among PK campaign actors to perceive their party as a brand-new Islamic movement, different from the existing mainstream Muslim organizations, and how they tended to rely on their own network of institutions and activists in their efforts to reach the voters. In addition, in 1999, most of the top party leaders were known only within their networks, and it would not have been very effective for them to introduce themselves using individual figures of their politicians. Thus, the only effective alternative was to reach the voters through creating a personal image of their activists, showing that they were in fact a group of pious, faithful Muslims, and Muslims could trust them to represent their political aspirations (Interview with Chalid Machmud, 19.04.2007). Yet, in the 2004 elections, when the Indonesian public knew more about the party and its key figures, the party took a different way to get in touch with the voters and

started using personal charms of their leaders. Figures like Hidayat Nurwahid, Anis Matta, and Nur Machmudi Ismail were known by the public outside the Tarbiyah community, and they were able to attract public attention. This was quite successful, which is shown, for example, by the fact that Nurwahid was one of very few candidates who could garner the full quota for their votes.

Thirdly, with regard to elite mobilization as an element of campaigns, during the PK period, the party was still preoccupied with the representation and articulation of the political interests of the Muslims - thus, their efforts to mobilize support from the elite were limited to the Muslim community. During the PKS period, in the 2004 elections, PKS was quite confident to appeal for support from elites who, traditionally, are not associated with political Islam.By way of illustration, PKS people published a pocket book with the title *16 Public Figures Talk about PKS* (Pustaka Saksi, 2004), in which they interviewed sixteen famous persons from various backgrounds: from preacher to military general, from actress to professor, from businessman to poet. All of them give positive comments on PKS, especially regarding its clean record and its sympathetic behavior. What is interesting is the fact that these people have different cultural-religious backgrounds and different political affiliations: from committed supporters of political Islam to independent-minded professionals, secular-nationalist military figures, and leftist political activists, as well as a number of Christians. This means that PKS was deliberately seeking to get the support from the elites outside the boundaries of traditional support of political Islam - and they would surely not have had such confidence had they still clung to strict ideological interpretations in their electoral activities.

Fourthly, with regard to mass mobilization, there were also interesting developments. During the PK period, in the 1999 elections, there were strong ideological perceptions among the party electoral actors, who believed that the party represented the political aspirations of conservative Muslims, so PK would only seek to woo support from the Muslim communities. Actually, at that time, as the party emphasized moral reforms as its political mission, to Islamize the society and the polity, it would reach a given segment of the Muslims only. However, during the 2004 elections, the party shifted its rhetoric, portraying itself no longer as an agent of Islamization, but rather of high politics, to fight corrupt practices and recover from the moral crisis. PKS had greater confidence to reach a wider audience. A case in point can be found in a pocket book of thirty pages called "Handbook for Cadres for the 2004 Election". In the book, compact step-by-step techniques of mass mobilization are explained. It specifies what a cadre has to do to mobilize support: (1) door-to-door canvassing to introduce the 6W + 1H (what, who, why, which, when, where, and how — very concise information on

the party, its candidates and how to vote for it); (2) organize welfare services and disaster emergency assistance to gain public sympathies; (3) approach local figures, both the ones who do and those who do not support the party; (4) outdoor signings using party flags, stickers, billboards, etc; (5) mobilizing family members, relatives, and friends during campaign rallies; (6) actively monitoring election processes; (7) report practices of money politics of other parties; (8) cooperate with activists from other parties to prevent any conflict during campaigns; (9) inviting the media to every public event; (10) inviting public figures to party events; (11) standardization of campaign issues and rhetoric, such as anti-corruption, anti-America, etc; (12) saving money to mobilize funds; (13) distributing Party ID cards, since Indonesian people tend to feel unethical to change their party affiliation once they are assigned to one of them; (14) recruiting new activists; (15) campaigning tours to remote villages; (16) routine physical exercises and midnight prayers; (17) purify the intention that these are religious activities, and Allah will reward them. The book also details techniques and tricks how to talk to known people and to strangers in the streets, using popular direct selling methods (PKS, 2004).

Fifthly, one feature which has become more and more dominating in campaigns is media advertising. As was explained in the previous section, media advertising is the most expensive campaign activity, and thus commonly only affordable to big parties. This also happened to PKS: during the 1999 election, the party was still small and had only limited funds, so, naturally, it could only pay for cheaper advertising in local and communal Islamic media. The situation changed during the 2004 elections, in which the party organization and funding had unfolded, PKS was able to pay for space in national media, including TV ads. One interesting example was a PKS TV ad featuring the popular rock band SLANK, which was infamous for being involved with drugs. These ads were consistent with the main tone of PKS's electoral behavior: on the one hand, it modernized its campaign techniques by hiring professionals; on the other hand, it sought to reach a wider audience beyond the conservative Muslim community.

Sixthly, related to the previous aspect, the modernization of campaign techniques has shifted the pattern of party work, from labor-intensive to capital-intensive activities. This means that funding is more and more substantial for election campaigns. As was explained in the previous chapter, in discussing organizational features, the party has changed its major funding sources from members' contributions to open contributions from other sources. This changing pattern can also be observed in campaign activities. During the 1999 elections, the party relied almost exclusively on membership dues and contributions, while in the 2004

elections, it had more funding sources, including contributions from non-affiliated businessmen. One unique technique of PKS to mobilize material support was collecting small contributions from its supporters and sympathizers, as well as using recycled materials, for example, turning unused headscarves into party flags, or printing the party logo on unused t-shirts.

Finally, important to discuss at this point are the elements of a negative campaign in The behavior of PKS. As was defined earlier, a negative campaign is any attack on negative characters of political opponents. Although PKS consistently advises its campaign actors to stick to high politics and avoid dirty tricks in their electoral behavior, negative campaigning does still occur due to the party's usage of religious forums and religious language in promoting its political visions and missions. It is typical for PKS activities that party leaders use religious forums to socialize their politics, even though in many cases they would seek to conceal the political elements. Coincidentally, in Islamic traditions of religious propagation, there are two central terms referring to fundamental dakwah activities: *amar ma'ruf* (persuading the good) and *nahi munkar* (preventing the evil). The two are inseparable. Thus, when party campaigners use religious forums, they inevitably promote what they perceive as good and denounce the opposite, and sometimes even the alternatives. One example is found in religious speeches by Dr. Daud Rasyid Sitorus, a lecturer at the State Islamic University of Jakarta and former party functionary during the PK period. One of his favorite themes is criticizing liberal Muslims - and, given the fact that he used to attend religious forums, he followed the principle of *nahi munkar* in referring to liberal Muslims. In one of his speeches he said that liberal Muslims should not count as Muslims because they conduct their activities based upon greed and lust, and their true intention is not to promote or defend Islam, but rather to destroy it (downloadable from www.pks-anz.org). These are, of course, very strong and inflammatory words, which would spontaneously provoke the audience.

7. EXPLAINING PKS'S ELECTORAL SUCCESS

PKS was very successful in the 2004 elections, multiplying the votes it had gained in the previous elections. For most people, this was surprising because, in spite of the fact that the party and its key leaders were well-known to the Indonesian public compared to the 1999 period and had the reputation of being a moralist party with an unparalleled record of anti-corruption, many people would not expect PKS to gain such a high number of votes. *Firstly*, PKS was still less known than other Muslim parties, such as PPP, PKB, PAN, and PBB. These parties have prominent figures in their organizations who are widely known by the

Muslim community because they have been active in politics or other public activities since the New Order era, while all PKS figures have only appeared in public after the regime change. *Secondly*, and perhaps more importantly, other Muslim parties are commonly regarded as continuations or representations of previous Muslim organizations: PPP was the official political party for the Muslims during the previous regime, PKB was created by the largest Muslim organization, NU, in a similar fashion as PAN was formed by Muhammadiyah activists, and PBB claims to be the reincarnation of Masyumi. Therefore they have permanent supporters in the Muslim communities; while PKS, stemming from a network of student organizations, is regarded to have only a narrow and transient societal basis.

However, pre-election surveys had actually predicted that PKS would be able to pass the three-percent electoral threshold and gain between three to seven percent of the national votes (Mujani, 2004). There are two factors which analysts believe to have substantially contributed to PKS's electoral success: the first is its track record as an anti-corruption party, with its parliamentarians rejecting briberies and returning kickbacks repeatedly, which was exposed by the media. Before the 2004 election, PKS was a very small party, nevertheless, it was able to raise the issue that the nation's multi dimensional crisis was rooted in a moral crisis, and that the country needed to find a moral solution by bringing pious people to power. The public easily bought this understandable rhetoric. It also had a good record to not only "talk the talk" but also "walk the walk". The second factor deemed to have helped PKS to succeed was its willingness to change its campaign rhetoric from communal issues, such as religious reforms or Islamization, to institutional ones like a clean government and anti-corruption. This shift enabled the party to move into the center of the political spectrum and to mobilize support from a wider spectrum of the society (Mujani, 2004).

PKS's success has motivated students of Indonesian politics to figure out what really happened with Indonesian political behavior. There are now two different camps trying to theorize the recent developments. The first follows the psychological approach of William Liddle and Saiful Mujani, who suggest that PKS's success was not unique, since there is another party, the Democrat Party, which did not yet exist in the 1999 election, but managed to collect 7.8% of the votes in 2004, which reflects a more fundamental change in political behavior, i.e. the increase of rational voters and the waning of communal politics (*politik aliran*). The last term originates in Clifford Geertz's theory on religious variants among Javanese people and has been popularly used to explain the political streams in Indonesia, which are divided along religious-cultural lines of secular-nationalist (*abangan*) and Islamic politics (*santri*), the latter camp being further subdivided into traditionalist and modernist

factions. Using data from four national opinion surveys conducted after the elections in 1999 and 2004 and after the presidential elections, Liddle and Mujani state that, in order to explain the electoral behavior of Indonesian voters, party identification and social background (the main components of communal politics) are insignificant compared to the leadership factor. The data show that in the 1999 elections, 88% of the respondents who preferred Megawati voted for her party PDI-P, 89% of the ones who preferred Habibie voted for his Golkar Party, 95% of those who preferred Abdurrahman Wahid voted for his PKB, and 75% of those who preferred Amien Rais voted for his PAN. This pattern was similar during the 2004 elections. Yet, the most telling data has been collected in the presidential elections, as S. B. Yudhoyono - who barely had party support - won the election and gained the votes of 82% of the Golkar partisans, 78% of the PPP partisans and even 29% of the PDI-P supporters — at a time when the national leaderships of these three parties pledged to support Megawati. For Liddle and Mijani, this is clear evidence of the significance of the leadership factor in structuring voter behavior (Liddle and Mujani, 2000, 2006; Mujani 2004a, 2004b, 2004c).

Although Liddle and Mujani's arguments look very convincing, other analysts have different opinions. In his discussion comparing patterns of voting behavior in the democratic elections of 1955 and 1999, using district level data, Dwight Y. King found that there are strong correlations between the two elections despite the four-decade interval: the major Muslim parties in 1999 — PPP, PKB, PAN — collected support from regions which had supported Islamic parties in the 1955 elections (Masyumi, NU, PSII), while the secular parties PDI-P and Golkar garnered support from areas which had supported secular parties in 1955 (PNI, PKI). Referring to Liddle and Mujani's theory, King argues that communal politics — including religious, regional, and social factors — are still useful in structuring the voters' choices in the 1999 elections, and that party identification is the source of the political leaders' popularity, rather than the other way around, which Liddle and Mujadi had suggested (King 2003, Ch. 7). King's findings are affirmed by Anis Baswedan's analysis of the vote circulation during the 1999 and 2004 elections. Focusing on the spectacular success of PKS and PD, Baswedan shows that the PKS voters in 2004 were modernist Muslims who had voted for PPP, PAN and PBB in 1999, while the PD voters had formerly been supporters of nationalist parties, such as PDI-P and Golkar. This means that the behavior of these voters can be explained by religious, sociological and regional factors (Baswedan, 2005). King *et al* also present data from the 2004 elections which further support this point: *firstly,* the rising number of votes for PKS, which had, in fact, no prominent leadership figures compared to other Muslim parties; *secondly*, Golkar's success in collecting votes despite the fact that it had

not nominated any presidential candidates; *thirdly*, the personal success of S. B. Yudhoyono referred to by Liddle and Mujani, which might also have been influenced by other factors, such as the massive media coverage following the Bali bombing in 2002, when he was the minister in charge and gained people's sympathy after being mistreated and sacked by Megawati - and *lastly*, there are two additional factors — poverty and education levels — which explain the voters' party choices: poorer regions voted for PDI-P and PKB, whereas electors with higher education levels preferred Golkar and PAN. All of this evidence indicates — according to King *et al* — that the emergence of rational voters in Indonesia as claimed by Liddle and Mujani cannot be supported, and that the Indonesian voters' behavior is still strongly influenced by communal factors (King, Baswedan, Harjanto, 2005).

Which theory, then, is better to explain PKS's electoral success in 2004? Interestingly, it seems that both theories have the capacity to explain the party's success story in the last election. King and Baswedan provide solid empirical data showing that the PKS voters came from regions which are traditional supporters of political Islam, and that the party did less well in regions of traditional supporters of secular parties. This means the people voted for PKS because of its religious credentials, and PKS was able to promote its image as the party of pious people who cannot only preach high politics, but also practice what they preach. This also reminds one of the famous Downsian theorems: a party may shift its position within the political spectrum, but it cannot leapfrog its neighbors, since in a multi-party system, a party articulates the political interests of a given cleavage which embeds the party position in the political spectrum (Downs, 1957). However, Liddle and Mujani are also correct in pointing out the emergence of rational voters and the diminishing influence of old-style communal politics. This is supported by the fact that a large portion of the traditional supporters of political Islam decided not to vote for the inheritors of their old favorite parties, but voted for the brand-new Islamist party because PKS had been better in articulating their political interests. And this is undeniable evidence of the rationality of — at least — PKS voters.

Both theories on the pattern of Indonesian electoral behavior sum up the findings of this study to, namely: there are two factors which have simultaneously contributed to PKS's success in increasing its votes, the first being its ability to build up and maintain Islamist credentials, and the second being its willingness to use a democratic rhetoric, using phrases like clean government and anti-corruption rather than ideological ones.

8. CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, holding elections is one of the most fundamental elements of democratic politics, as it is the process by which citizens, as the owners of political authority and sovereignty, exercise their rights. Elections are also crucial activities for political parties because they are the benchmark of a party's survival, which might depend on its success or failure. This chapter has explored The behavior of PKS in elections, focusing on the influence of ideology and the democratizing political institutions which regulate electoral competitions.

Firstly, this chapter has traced the way PKS has been articulating its political visions and missions. It is interesting to see how it developed an unusual way in presenting itself to its constituents: on the one hand, the party claimed to be a continuation of the long history of Muslim politics in Indonesia, starting from the colonial era, then leading to the struggle of independence and the Old Order era, to the resistance against hostile treatments of the New Order regime, and into the democratization era. On the other hand, however, PKS also insists that, with the development of the party, a new history of Muslim politics in Indonesia has begun. This is because the party has adopted its political inspirations not from local Muslim politics, but rather from overseas, i.e. from the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. Party activists have explained that their party preferred to draw on foreign inspirations because during the 1970s and 1980s — the period of the party's genesis — Muslim leaders in Indonesia were co-opted by the regime and did thus not really represent the interests of the Muslim community.

Secondly, this chapter has elaborated the pattern of PKS's political aggregation. During its early years, the party portrayed itself as the representative of the political interests of the Muslim community. It formulated political programs to promote religious and moral reforms, in order to improve and empower the Muslim community and to establish Islamic systems in the society and the polity. Given the nature of political competitions, in which promoting certain interests often means conflicting with other groups who have different interests, PKS's enthusiasm in promoting the interests of the Muslims led to its (indirect) involvement in the inter-religious conflicts in Maluku In this context, PKS demanded from the government that those conflicts be declared religious conflicts. This way of articulating political interests pushed the party away from the mainstream Muslim communities, which led to its poor performance in the 1999 election. Having learned from this experience, during the subsequent years PKS changed its political articulation in that it no longer promot religious and moral reforms, but focused on a less ideological rhetoric, using phrases like anti-corruption and clean government. In this way, it was able to attract the mainstream Muslim

communities and thus performed very well in the 2004 election, increasing its votes to six hundred percent compared to the previous election.

Thirdly, the chapter has also analyzed PKS's electoral objectives during the 1999 election, compared to those of 2004. The party's electoral objectives during the 1999 election were heavily influenced by its ideology, which made the party formulate them in idealistic terms. At that time, the ultimate objective of all party activities was to promote Islamic teachings, which included the elections. Elections were perceived merely as a contingent means to moral propagation. Thus, the party consistently advised its activists and members to focus their attention on promoting and propagating Islamic moral values, and not to be too concerned and preoccupied with how many voters they would mobilize. In the ultimate analysis, the party's success lay in the ability of its activists to propagate Islam to the Indonesian public, and not in the number of votes they collected at the polling stations. However, during the 2004 election PKS held a completely different opinion on what the election was about, and on the role the party played in it. By this time, it no longer perceived the election merely as a contingent activity, but rather as a substantial one which was worthwhile to be pursued in its own right. The party then devoted serious attention and effort to collect as many votes as possible, not really being concerned with the question whether the voters really understood the party's missions.

Fourthly, with regard to campaign activities, the party developed different patterns of activities during the 1999 election and during the 2004 election. In the former, because of its heavily ideological rhetoric, it could only reach its core supporters and networks, and was hardly able to mobilize support apart from its traditional followers. This led into a vicious circle, in which limited networks meant limited resources, which further implies a limited scope and limited capacities in campaign activities. However, during the 2004 elections, as the party was no longer constrained by its ideological burden and began to formulate its political articulation more rationally, its electoral activities developed in a virtuous circle, i.e. when it moderated its rhetoric, it could reach a wider audience and develop wider networks, which enabled it to accumulate more resources, and thus expanded the scope of its electoral campaign activities.

Finally, this chapter has explored the theoretical explanations for PKS's surprising success during the 2004 elections, by analyzing two competing theories by, first, William Liddle and Syaiful Mujani and, second, Dwight King and Anies Baswedan. Liddle and Mujani have argued that PKS's drastic increase in electoral gain reflects the overall change in the electoral behavior in Indonesia, i.e. the decline of ideological politics (*politik aliran*) and

the emergence of rational voters. One indication for this is that voters cast their ballots for political leaders rather than parties. Another indication is the fact that S. B. Yudhoyono won the presidential election even though he was supported only by small parties. In contrast, King and Baswedan have suggested that ideological politics are still in place, and that rational voters have not yet emerged. They provide empirical data showing that Indonesian voters in various regions still vote for the same party as in the 1955 elections! They point out that PKS could increase its votes only in regions which are traditional supporters of Islamic parties and did not perform well in regions which are supporters of secular parties. Upon closer inspection, however, the two theories can be seen as complementary rather than conflicting. The fact that PKS voters come from traditional supporters of Islamic parties clearly supports King and –Baswedan's thesis that ideological politics is still in place. However, the fact that those voters prefer PKS to their former parties means they are able to chose the more articulate party, which supports Liddle and Mijani's theory that the electors have become more rational.

In sum, the findings of this chapter confirm that PKS's patterns of behavior have changed, from heavily ideological in its early years and during the 1999 elections to more rational in subsequent years, and especially during the 2004 elections. Given the fact that the party has not changed its ideological orientation, the change in the electoral behavior must have been caused by other factors. Referring to the findings of Chapter IV, which have shown how political institutions in Indonesia have been successfully democratized during the period of 1998-2006, this chapter's findings also confirm North's theoretical formulation that an actor will behave ideologically when the existing institutions are unstable and more rationally when the institutions are stable and function effectively.

CHAPTER VII
BETWEEN OFFICE AND POLICY:
THE BEHAVIOR OF PKS IN GOVERNMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

So far we have discussed that the political party is the actor of democracy. It performs fundamental functions of democracy, such as articulates citizens' interests, channels political communications, mobilizes the masses in elections, and facilitates the recruitment of political leaders. All of these processes lead to the final destination of political enterprises, i.e. to win the elections, form government and execute policies. To be in power is perhaps the most substantial part of party political activities. So substantial is this aspect that scholars include power seeking in the very definition of political party. Schumpeter, for instance, among the earliest scholars to elaborate on the modern theory of the political party, defines it as "*a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power*" (Schumpeter, 1942: 287), a definition echoed by Anthony Downs in his classic treatise that "*political party is a coalition of men seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means*" (Downs, 1957: 24), and reiterated by Sartori decades later when he wrote "*a party is any group that presents in elections and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public offices*" (Sartori, 1976: 64).

One clear point in those definitions of a party's struggle to power is that it is pursued by regular and legal means called elections. The last chapter has discussed party behaviors in elections, which include '*interests articulation*' in which the party translates people's political preferences into political programs; '*interests aggregation*' a mechanism by which the party not only voices the political aspirations of certain groups of people but also accommodates the other competing aspirations and their articulations into a set of policy preference; '*leaders recruitment*' in which parties directly provide candidates for public offices and indirectly, if these candidates are elected, will influence the recruitments of other unelected officials such as the military, the judiciary and other senior administrators; and '*mass mobilization*' where the party—through all sorts of campaigns and other political communications—brings people into the process of voting to decide who will have opportunities to hold public offices and/or form government.

Interestingly, empirical observation on what PKS had done in elections shows that party electoral behaviors are driven by two different logics and motivations, i.e. an ideological

drive to achieve the party's political missions, and institutional contexts to survive and succeed in party competitions. During the 1999 elections, under the influence of its political ideology that it is a *dakwah* party, it perceived elections as merely instrumental to moral propagation activities, and it strongly advised its members and symphatizers not to be preoccupied with efforts to collecting votes but rather intensifying their spiritual activities. However, during 2004 elections, the party changed its tone, started to see elections as a legitimate objective in itself needing to be pursued in its own logic, and organized and mobilized its activists and members to carry out virtually all sorts of campaign techniques and strategies in order to win as many electors as possible—without so much concern whether those electors really understand the party's visions and missions.

The situation is consistent with the theoretical formulation of Northian institutionalism perspective. The party relied, where party relies on ideology in their behaviors in a time when formal political institutions are not stable and have not functioned effectively. And it changes its behavior in the later period not because it abandons its ideological orientation but rather because the existing institutions start to function more effectively to reduce uncertainty and facilitate fair interests distributions.

This chapter discusses the aftermath of elections when a party elected into government positions. It explores to what extent PKS behaviors in government are driven by its ideological aspirations and to what extent they are products of institutional constraints. The first section of this chapter outlines the theoretical framework on party government, especially the conflicting influences of ideology and institutions. First it opens with discussion on the nature of party behavior in government, by exploring debates between spatial and saliency theories on party competitions each with different consequences for party behavior in government, and second it continues the discussion by applying such theoretical frameworks to observe PKS political behaviors in government.

2. THEORIES OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

2.1. Party Government and Democracy

Scholars commonly agree that there are two different types of democratic procedures, i.e. direct and indirect. *Direct Democracy* is a political procedure by which the citizens decide directly what their government should do, commonly associated with the political tradition of ancient Athens. Although it is regarded not as the standard form of modern democracy, interestingly enough, direct democracy has occurred more often in recent decades in the form of referendums in which citizens directly decide specific policy to be taken by their

government, mostly on general policies such as constitution, sovereignty and independence, international agreement and treatise, allegedly because of the widespread feeling among citizens that governments have become remote and disengaged from the interests of the constituents, and elections alone cannot guarantee sufficient choice and accountability (LeDuc, 2003: 16).

The more common practice in modern democracy is indirect democracy, commonly called *Representative Democracy*, in which through elections citizens elect a group of people to run the government. This group of people, commonly organized in political parties, is chosen by either *majority* or *plurality* of citizens who are eligible to vote, serve in a definite period of time and are accountable to the regular process of elections. Interestingly, although often heralded as the grand invention of modern politics, representative democracy become the norm in modern politics because of its practicality and effectiveness to carry out large scale popular political enterprises, rather than its 'democratic' characters. Some even accused representative democracy as not fully democratic because the elected governments act as trustee which formulate policies based on their own considerations, and not as delegates who always consult to the constituents what policies to be taken (David Held, *Models of Democracy*: 84-88).

It is this representative concept of democracy which is widely adopted by students of party studies. Richard Katz explains that democracy is equal to party government because: (a) government decisions are made by party officials or those under their control, (b) government policies are formulated within political parties, (c) these parties then act cohesively to enact and implement policy, (d) public officials are recruited through political parties, and (e) public officials are held accountable through political parties (Katz, Future of Party Govt, 1996: 196). Elections as basic procedures in democracy are not designed to produce internally-democratic parties, but rather as effective parties to carry out policies, and enabling citizens to regularly assess the parties' performances. Thus, according to this dominant view, the basic requirement of democracy must be 'internally-effective' political parties, rather than 'internally-democratic' ones (See, Schumpeter 1943: 269, Sartori, 1976: 152).

With regard to party government, the view implies that the party is the office-seeker, whose ultimate objectives are to maximize control over the benefits of political-offices. Proponents of this notion view politics as a sort of competition and offices are the fixed prize. Thus, although parties seem to be immersed and preoccupied with the intensity and the thrill of the processes of competition, their ultimate aims are none other than winning the competition and get the prize (Rikke, 1962: 33-34). However, this pragmatic view on parties'

behavior in government has its own opponents, who suggest that political parties are basically policy-seeking animals, which ultimate mission is more than merely to compete in democratic politics and win governmental offices, but rather a step further to influence government policies. Based upon empirical evidence of the formation of coalition governments, supporters of this theory contend that government coalitions are almost always be formed by parties of 'connected' ideologies (De Swaan, 1973: 87-88).

Interestingly, then, this last notion on the nature of party government, i.e. that parties in their political competitions are not only concerned about winning public offices but also influencing public policies, brings us into a notion of the nature of party democracy, namely that government by the party—the representative government—is in fact democratic government, because it does concern with policy preferences of the constituents.

2.2. Spatial vs. Saliency Theories of Party Government

Is it true that representative government by parties is democratic because parties in government are not only concerned with winning competitions but also with formulating certain policies? Anthony Downs presents a negative answer. In his opinion, the ultimate objective of parties is to win the present and following elections, and thus they will be motivated to change their positions in order to maximize public support. Consequently, government parties in power are always willing to enact policies which have maximum capacity to garner public supports, in order to be reelected in the elections (Downs, 1957: 93-94). This also means that the policies are possibly different from what parties said during elections.

However, if Downs' spatial model of party competition is true, why do parties—especially the major ones—look consistent in their campaigns and policy proposals for decades? Why do leftist parties consistently propose leftist programs even though sometimes it forced them out of governmental positions, and so do the rightist parties? Why don't politicians leave their parties when it lost in elections and found new and better ones? Why don't new parties emerge in every election? These are among the questions spatial theory of party competition cannot answer satisfactorily.

Revising Downs 'Spatial' theory, David Robertson proposes a revision theory he calls 'Saliency theory' of party competition. In it he suggests that parties cannot change their ideological and policy positions arbitrarily, because they are bound by their constituents who do not change their preferences arbitrarily. If there are changes in public discourses and issues, instead of changing their positions to be as closer as possible to the popular issues,

parties accentuate or highlight certain aspects or elements of the issues from their respective positions (Robertson, 1976:). For example, during the raising popularity of 'environment' as political discourse in Europe that gave rise to the so called 'Green parties', other established parties adopted the issue and portrayed it from their vantage ideological perspectives, so that they could accommodate the new issues without changing their ideology and general policy positions.

2.3. Campaign's Premises and Government Policies

Using Robertson's saliency theory of party competition, a group of scholars of party studies analyze the policy capacity of party governments in various democratic countries. The researches are intended to answer two different levels of questions: on the one side, they explore organizational mechanism of party behaviors in their competitions for power, especially with regard to the consistency between what they said in electoral campaigns and what they actually do when elected government. On the other side, and related to the previous point, the studies intend to provide evidence on the 'democraticness' of representative government run by parties. The findings convincingly support Robertson theory, i.e. that on the one hand parties are flexible in responding to the dynamics of political issues and public preferences, yet on the other hand they do so while maintaining their own respective ideological positions.

A research conducted by Budge, Robertson and Hearl found significant correlations between party manifestos in nineteen democracies in Europe, America and Asia with government policies in forty years period (1940s-1980s). The study also provides answers to the widespread perceptions among students of party studies: firstly, different from what scholars believe, that 1960s marked 'the end of ideology' in democratic politics (Bell, 1966), where parties and governments had been less ideological and more pragmatic, Budge and his colleagues found that parties consistently use policy pledges in ideological terms, because such vocabularies are useful both to tell the public about the parties programs and to differentiate them from their competitors. Secondly, the study also suggests that—contrary to the allegation that parties' representative governments are less democratic because parties acts as trustees rather than as delegates—party governments showed a high score of consistency between what they promised during elections and what they actually do when elected as government (Budge, Robertson, Hearl, 1997).

Furthermore, in another study conducted by Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge in analyzing ten advance democracies in Europe, US, Asia and Australia, which focus on the

party governments policy capacity, the data indicate that more than fifty percent of average party governments implement policies in line with what they promised during elections—the highest score was France with 80%, the lowest was Australia with 40% (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994). This study, thus, also confirm that party governments have democratic capacity to deliver their electoral premises, formulated in three different parameters: agenda, mandate, and ideological factors (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: Chapter 1 and 2).

Firstly, *Agenda* capacity of party behavior refers to the capability of political parties that participate in democratic politics to react to the popular political discourses and issues. Researches on party performances in various democracies across the world indicate that the score is relatively high, where trends in party programs and rhetoric do reflect the general concerns of the society in given period, and the changing issues and concern at the societal levels were usually also followed by changing in parties' programs. In Europe and America, for instance, almost uniform trends of party programs for disarmaments in post WW II years, the soft resurgence of rearmaments following Korean and Vietnam wars, and the shifting budgetary programs from foreign policies into domestic welfare, closely reflected the concerns of wider society (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994). Hans Keman calls this 'party sensitivity', referring to the extent of parties responsiveness to the issues the people deem as important, and his observation also substantiates that parties are commonly sensitive to the concerns and preferences of their constituents (Keman, 2002: 232-234).

Secondly, **mandate** capacity refers to the willingness and capability of parties in government to implement *their own* policy programs, rather than those of outside the government. If parties in government implement policy based on their programs they presented to the electors, it can be said that the governing parties have the mandate capacity, which means that they follow the wants of their constituents. In Keman's term it is called 'party responsibility' in which parties have ability to bring the political preferences of their constituents into policies (Keman, 2002: 217-223). However, the governing parties do not have mandate capacity if, when elected government, they implement policies based on other parties programs. Such situation is not impossible where parties adopt their opponents' programs either for collusive motives to share resources with opponents in cartelistic system, or because they want to increase popularity for the next elections by changing policy positions—as is envisioned by Downs' spatial theory. Yet, studies by Budge *et al* and Klingeman *et al* found that parties in government have strong mandate score, and although

there are negative scores, in which party governments adopt policy of their opponents, these are very rare (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994; Budge, Robertson, Hearl, 1997).

Finally, **ideological** capacity refers to the extent of which party governments' mandate capacity—their ability to implement policy based on their own electoral programs—is inline with their ideological tradition. This point assesses to what extent parties are willing and able to change their ideological and policy positions in expense of their identity. The study by Klingeman *et al* confirms that parties in government are very stable in their ideological basis, although from time to time there are constant dynamics where parties converge and diverge. In all countries being studied, the leftist governments constantly implement leftist policies, the liberal governments implement liberal government programs, and the religious parties in governments advocate religious oriented programs (Klingemann, Hofferbert, Budge, 1994: 247). Even more interesting is the fact that the three different ideological strands have their own respective policy styles. Governments by the Leftist parties were the most persistent to their ideological positions, governments by the Rightist parties were flexible and pragmatic, while the Religious parties' governments situate in the middle of the two opposite styles (Budge and Keman, 1993: 217).

2.3. Coalition Formation and Portfolio Allocation

In democratic politics, governments are formed either by one political party or a coalition of a number of parties. The former is common in two parties or dominant party systems of democracies, whereas the latter is customary in multi-party political systems. Given the fact that Indonesia has adopted a multi-party system the latter is the one that is relevant for this study. Coalition government is a government that is formed by a number of parties that agree to each other. There are a number of theories which seek to explain based on what parties reached agreements with their competitors to form a join government, which generally can be classified into two broad categories, i.e. office-oriented and policy-oriented coalition theories.

Office oriented theories, as the name indicates, maintain that the only plausible ground for parties to come to an agreement with their opponents is power, i.e. in the form of government positions. Thus, these theories assume that parties are always willing to join with whichever rivals to form a government provided they received power sharing. The oldest theory of this type is '*winning coalition theory*' that proposes that parties are willing to join in coalition to form a majority in parliament (Riker, 1962: 280). This proposition derived from Parliamentary Government in which a majority in government is necessary to the survival of

the cabinet; yet it also applies to Presidential Government in multi-party system (like Indonesia) in which majority in parliament is needed to ensure the effectiveness of government programs. Because if the President has only minority supports in Parliament, he or she will face difficulties to get her or his proposed bills passed by the legislature, and thus the government programs will not be effective.

Other scholars observed that winning proposition is insufficient to explain the mechanism by which parties agreed to form a joint government. This is due to the fact that, following the office-seeking assumption, parties will maximize their office share, and thus they need to minimize the number of coalition partners. These scholars propose '*minimum wining theory*' which suggests that parties will agree to join forces in forming government, but they will not seek to collect as many partners as possible to reach absolute majority in parliaments. On the contrary, the objective of parties in joining coalition government is to hold government positions as many as they can, and in doing so they have to minimize the number of participants in the coalition just enough to reach majority status. This will prevent coalition partners to share their power unnecessarily (Gramson, 1961; Laiseson, 1966).

However, some others perceived that although office-seeking coalition theories have a solid logical base they are not really able to explain real-world politics, in which parties oftentimes refuse to join in coalitions, or that certain parties tend to form coalition government with certain type of parties. These scholars contend that office is not the main objective for parties in taking part in government, but rather policy is the main reason. Parties want to be in government not just because they want to hold office positions, but rather because they want to influence policies—either for ideological reason, or for pragmatic grounds to increase their votes in the next elections.

This camp thus proposed '*minimal connected theory*' of coalition that suggests that parties will participate with other parties only if they have close-connected ideologies. This theory has normative as well as pragmatic grounds. Normatively, because the main objective of parties to be in public offices is to influence government policies, it would be irrational to recruit coalition partners that will pursue the opposite direction of policies, and thus will neutralize their policy courses. Pragmatically, moreover, recruiting coalition partners with similar ideologies will strengthen the government because all coalition members have similar or almost similar policy orientations, and thus will likely make governance function more effective so that in the end it will increase it's rate in the eyes of their constituents and the public (Axelrod, 1970).

Yet, still, another scholar suggests that parties with similar ideological positions are not necessarily pursuing similar policies. This is because, as was explored in previous chapters, parties are internally-plural actors with heterogeneous competing interests inside their organizations. Thus, given the different internal dynamics in each party, it is highly likely that even parties with close ideological orientations accentuate different policy priorities in given period of time or in given political situations. Therefore, if parties' main objective in governance is influencing policies, policies' congruence among coalition partners is substantial. De Swaan, the pioneer of this approach, proposes '*minimal policy distance*' as the norm for parties to join in a coalition, in which in order to be successfully forming a joint government, the participants have to agree on certain courses of policies the government will pursue, although they may have wide ideological distances (De Swaan, 1973).

The next fundamental point in coalition government is portfolio allocations among coalition partners. There are two main perspectives on this. *Firstly*, some scholars argue that the only parameter for power sharing in a coalition government is the relative size of each participant. This rule is so fundamental so that its proponent dubbed it as 'iron law of proportionality' (De Winter, 2002: 190). This perspective suggest that a coalition distributes governmental positions to its members according to quantitative contributions to the parliamentary power of government, and that cabinet and other office portfolios are translatable into quantitative values, or into ordinal hierarchy such as senior, core, ordinary, and junior ministries. Thus the biggest party will receive the biggest share in form of more number of ministers or few ministers but with high quantitative values, while smaller partners have to be satisfied with fewer shares (De Winter, 2002: 189-191).

However, *secondly*, it turns out that government positions are not neutral, i.e. that different cabinet positions have different values for different parties. In line with research findings mentioned in the previous paragraph, that parties in government tend to pursue policies inline with their ideological orientations, observations on the portfolio allocation in coalition government is also indicates that ideology play substantial roles in influencing parties' choice of government offices. Not all parties are willing to receive any position. On the contrary, different parties tend to give priority to different positions inline with their ideological orientations. Budge and Keman propose an interesting systematic scheme on how parties from different ideological traditions give score to common cabinet positions (Budge and Keman, 1993: Chapter 4). Of course the chart is hypothetical, but it provides a sound logic of the relations between party ideologies and their priorities for government positions.

Ranking of Cabinet Ministries according to Party Ideologies
(Budge and Keman, 1993: 97)

CONSERVATIVE	LIBERAL	RELIGIOUS	SOCIALIST
Interior	Economy/Finance	Religious	Social Affairs/ Health/Labor
Foreign Affairs	Justice	Education	
Justice	Education	Agriculture	Economy
Agriculture	Interior		Industry
Economy	Trade/Industry Commerce	Social Affairs/ Health/Labor	Education
Education Trade/Industry/ Commerce			

3. PKS BEHAVIOR IN GOVERNMENT FORMATION

One of the unique features of Indonesian politics is the tradition of 'deliberation and consensus' (*musyawah dan mufakat*) where, according to the common wisdom, every decision should be taken on the consent of all participants. This means that majoritarianism, or decision taken by the majority, has never really been popular. Even absolute majority will not meet the ideal requirement, let alone plurality majority. During the New Order era, the regime had always been heralding deliberation and consensus as the highest norm of Pancasila democracy, differentiating Indonesian political culture from foreign ones—Western or Eastern, Left or Right. The regime then manipulated this spirit of harmony as its best tool to protect its dominance in national politics, legitimized its power by contriving rubber stamp legislatures by carrying out theatrical political shows of 'deliberation and consensus' in due time every five years, and using the same reasons—sometimes violently—to suppress political opponents and dissents. The spirit of political harmony is still prevalent in post-Suharto Indonesia, in which virtually all cabinet administrations during this period have tried to include as many factions in the system as possible, to form highly oversized coalition governments.

It is in such political context that PKS has been participated in governmental positions. It held governmental posts in two out of four post-Suharto administrations, i.e. during Abdurrahman Wahid and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono administrations. Those are coalition cabinet that involved political processes of coalition formations. This sections explores the institutional processes of PKS involvements in government formations and coalition building, focusing on the influence if the party ideological aspirations vis-à-vis the impacts of democratizing political institutions.

3.1. Abdurrahman Wahid Administrations

The 1999 election was the first free and fair one in the last forty years. The political processes preceding and accompanying the election made it the most ideologically charged political process in reform era, because it was the first direct contest between various factions—religious vs. secular, military vs. civilian, reformers vs. pro status quo. Political factionalism was taboo during New Order era, and thus the proponents of the existing factions had virtually no channels of political communications. When the barrier of authoritarianism was eventually lifted and the democratic arena for political competitions was set up, those factions entered into competitions in a very tense atmosphere because they hardly knew who the main players were, which ones are friends and which are ones opponents. Although the rules of the game were set, no one really knew with whom they were going to compete. In such situation—exactly like what the Institutionalist describe—the politicians relied on the informal system of information and rules of the game, i.e. ideology.

The substantial role of informal institutions during the early years of democratization was clear from the track record of PK. During those years the party carried out its political programs based on information and networking with other Islamic groups and parties, which convinced that they had similar visions and missions as well in competition with similar opponents. The first political move taken by PK as a political organization was the formation of Communication Forum of Islamic Parties (FSPPI, *Forum Silaturrahmi Partai-Partai Islam*) in mid-1998, founded during a meeting of the Indonesian Islamic parties with Malaysian PAS in Puncak, West Java. The parties which joined the forum were United Development Party (PPP), Crescent Star Party (PBB), Justice Party (PK), Islamic Ummah Party (PUI), Indonesian Islamic Party of Masyumi (PII-Masyumi), Ummah Awakening Party (PKU), Nahdatul Ummah Party (PNU), Indonesian United Islamic Party (PIPI), Indonesian Islamic Thariqat Party (PITI), Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII).

The Forum's first political action was a statement requested the government to call off Law No. 3 and 8/1985 that required mass and political organizations to adopt Pancasila as the sole base. Next, fully realized their minute caliber, eight of the Forums' members—ten minus PPP and PBB—agreed to join their remaining votes in the election to get additional seat, the so called *Stembus Accord*. However, there were different interpretations on how the accord should be carried out. The Forum interpreted it as agreements among parties to combine their remaining votes among themselves and get additional seats for them. In this way the Forum would receive 58, out of which PK would get 10. On the other side, the Indonesian Voting Committee (PPI, *Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia*) suggested that members of a *stembus accord* would be counted as a single party, and consequently if they still have remaining votes it should also be distributed among other parties. In this way the Forum would only get 39 seats, with 7 for PK. This controversy led into prolonged debates, that made the General Election Commission (KPU) propose to abolish the accord and the remaining votes would be distributed to all parties according to their ranks—in which the Forum would receive 43 seats, and PK would have 7. Eventually, voting in KPU decided to cancel the accord (IFES, 2002: 5-7).

With only 7 sets and failed to pass electoral threshold, PKS was in fact a tiny party in the parliament, and it needed to join other party to form a parliamentary fraction. There were two different groups invited PK to form a joint fraction. The first was of course comprised of members of the Forums—again, minus PPP and PBB which had enough votes to form its own—that requested PK to join the Daulah Ummah fraction. At the same time, there was another offer from PAN which intended to increase the size of its Fraction. Finally PK decided to join PAN, and formed a reformed fraction. According to Hidayat Nurwahid, there were a number of reasons why PK chose to join nationalist PAN rather than those Islamic parties: *firstly*, Amien Rais factor was somehow more reliable warranty for PK in uncertain situation. PK leaders knew Amien and other PAN top leaders very well as Muslim political activists, and they believed that they would pursue political agendas parallel with their own. *Secondly*, Rais and PAN also had excellent credential as reformist, which was inline with PK political visions. Hidayat said that he proposed the name 'Reform Fraction' because at the same time Golkar intended to name its fraction 'Golkar Reform'. In his opinion Golkar was going to hijack the term 'reform' because the party was in fact the representation of the status quo, and if it got opportunity to claim the name, the iconic term 'reform' would be destroyed indefinitely. *Thirdly*, in line with the spirit of democratic reform PK decision to join PAN made Reform Fraction the fifth largest fractions in the parliament with 41 seats and thus had

the right to receive vice chairmanship in the legislature, defeated the Military Fraction which held 38 seats from the position. Had PK not joined PAN, the military would have leadership position in the parliament, which meant counterproductive to democratic reform. *Finally*, by joining PAN, PK would have opportunities to learn real politics from PAN politicians (Damanik, 2002: 282-286).

The next political coalition PK joined in was the formation of Central Axis and the presidential election by the parliament. Different from the widely held belief that the coalition had been initiated by Amien Rais in order to mobilize support from Muslim politicians, closer observation revealed the opposite situation, where the forum was initiated by a number of senior Muslim politicians to bring Rais back into his proper habitat of Islamic politics. It was triggered by Rais agreement to join forces with Megawati and Abdurrahman Wahid in furthering reform agendas. This move was responded with anxiety by Islamic politicians, based on ideology as well as democratic considerations. On the one hand, ideologically, they associated Megawati and her PDI-P as representing secular and Christian politics; while on the other hand many perceived both Megawati and Wahid as not really reformist, because they were reluctant to support reform agendas such as amending the constitution and demilitarization of politics (Suharsono, 1989: 86-88, Eep Syaifullah Fatah, *detik.com* 12.05.1999).

Central Axis grew into more solid coalition and attracted major Islamic parties such as PPP and PBB to formally join in. Rais surprisingly nominated Abdurrahman Wahid as the alternative candidate. Meanwhile, other coalition members such as PBB and PK was still willing to accept Habibie, on the fact that he had considerable Islamic credential as the founder and patron of the powerful Association of Indonesian Muslim Scholars (ICMI). At this point, Yusril Mahendra the chairman of PBB said to the media that Wahid's nomination was Rais personal initiative and did not represent Central Axis agenda, while PK although as a member of Reform Fraction with PAN did not reject Rais proposal to nominate Wahid, in fact its members of parliament did not put their signatures in the official document of Reform Fraction when dominating Wahid (Wahono, 2003: 115).

PK's attitude seemed perplexing, and needed further explanation. Three factors are worth to be elaborated. *Firstly*, the fact that PK was a new party and its leaders were also newcomers in real politics. As was unfolded in the last chapter, during this period PK leaders still perceived party as merely tool to achieve objectives of propagating Islam in politics. Thus, well before the June 1999 election, in December 1998, it had carried out a selection process for its presidential candidate, and came up with Didin Hafiduddin, a lesser known

Muslim figure from Bogor, West Java. In its official statement dated March 1999, the party explained that Hafiduddin was chosen because he met the PK qualifications: such as considerable religious knowledge and moral integrity, common political visions with the party, as well as not involved in previous regime (PK *Bayanat*, 13 March 1999).

Secondly, PKS had strong negative sentiments toward Abdurrahman Wahid, because he was a controversial figure who advocated liberal Islamic interpretations and easily criticized established notions and traditions, and also has close relations with secular and Christian communities. This had made the PK reluctant to publicly endorsed Wahid candidacy. This sentiment was clearly expressed in the party statement in September 1999, in which it suggested that Wahid was a controversial figure who used to made statements insulting to Muslims. Therefore, if the PK would support Wahid candidacy, the party needed to ask Wahid commitment to promote the interests of Islam and Muslims, not to implement policies that contradict Islamic values, and not to make *statements* offensive to Muslims (PK *Bayanat*, 17.09.1998).

Thirdly, despite the fact that the party was still in idealistic political mood, plus a boiling negative sentiment toward Wahid and suspicions of personal interest from Rais in nominating him, the PK found no alternative better than program and agenda put forward by Amien Rais in Central Axis. Indeed, the previously mentioned the PK statement, after expressing aversion toward Wahid as well as suspicion toward Rais, added that "from pragmatic point of view Central Axis political agendas were much preferable than the alternatives" (PK *Bayanat*, 17.09.1998). What it meant by 'pragmatic' point of view was in fact not merely a power-oriented political agenda, but rather a simple way in understanding the whole picture of political environment. It was beyond doubt that the PK preferred Habibie much more than Wahid. However, the fact that Habibie was nominated by Golkar meant that he stood in the way of democratic reform, and the PK would be in jeopardy had it supported him. It seemed that the familiarity of PK's leaders with Rais personal records was the major guideline for the PK in its grappling effort to understand the uncertain political environments (Wahono, 2003: 134).

Habibie eventually cancelled his candidacy after his Presidential Report was rejected by the Parliament, and thus in the D day of presidential election in 20.10.1999, there were only two candidates, Wahid vs. Megawati. For PKS the choice was, then, between two non-ideal candidates, and thus it needed to take the closest one to the ideal position. Wahid had more points than Megawati (PK *Bayanat*, 13.10.1999). Strategically, Wahid was also more preferable than to be abstained, due to the fact that he was nominated by coalition of Islamic

parties and also supported by major Muslim politicians, and thus abstaining would made PK separated from their fellow Muslims. Quoting the spiritual leader of Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Mustafa Masyhur, PK official statement said: "Accepting an un-ideal choice in unity with other Muslims is preferable than choosing the ideal one but in separation from other fellow Muslims" (PK *Bayanat*, 13.10.1998).

When Wahid was elected president, he offered the PK one ministerial position in his cabinet, and PK accepted the offer and nominated its chairman, Nur Mahmudi Islamil, for the position. In a meeting held following the offer, PK leaders discussed which department was the most preferable, and they agreed for several criteria: *firstly* it must be populist ministerial in term that it facilitates the party propagation mission, *secondly* it should be in accordance with the party's human resources in order to maximize its performance, *thirdly* it was preferable to have a department which didn't receive foreign funds, and *fourthly* it also preferred a department with the least amount of problems. Based on this criteria, the PK proposed to have the Minister of Agriculture in the coming cabinet. Wahid seemed to agree with the PK proposal, so that Ismail was on the cabinet list as the Minister of Agriculture until the last hour of the official announcement of cabinet formation. However, when the new Indonesian United cabinet was wade public, Ismail was shifted into the Minister of Forestry and Horticulture (PK, Bayanat, 29.10.1999).

3.2. Megawati Administration

Abdurrahman Wahid's administration did not last for long, because of the very nature of the oversized coalition he built, in which he recruited ministers from every corner of political camps, which had not only different but also contradictory agendas. He swore in his 35 ministers in October 1999, and by August 2000 he already needed to reshuffle his cabinet, changing 17 ministers and reducing the number of ministers in his cabinet to 26. Unfortunately, the composition of the new cabinet did not reflect the original constellation of his supporters from Central Axis and thus triggered strong reactions from the latter. Furthermore, Wahid's acrobatic and controversial managements earned him increasing number of political opponents, especially from Central Axis which felt he had abandoned them, the conservative Muslim groups who were angered by his plan to open diplomatic relations with Israel and to lifting up the bans for Marxism and Communism, and from the military that was upset by the president's interventionist policies toward the armed forces.

The antagonism between the president and his opponents, especially in the parliament, mounted because of the complexity of the situation as well as 'zero sum game' behaviors of

the major political actors. In May 2001 the parliament launched investigation against Wahid on the allegations of corruptions. When Wahid was unable to prove that he was innocent, his opponents in the parliament started to prepare for his impeachment. Wahid occasionally threatened to disband the Parliament if it was going to impeach him—which only increased the latter enmity. In a desperate situation on July 22nd, 2001, president Wahid invited the leaders of the military fraction in legislature, told them he would fire the commander of the armed forces if they do not back up his plan—a threat which met with negative response. Eventually in one o'clock early morning 23 July 2001 Wahid issued a presidential decree to dissolve the parliament, disband Golkar party, and call for an election in one month. However, without support from the disenchanted military, the decree practically ineffective, and by 08:30 AM the MPR—the upper house parliament, then the highest political institution which elected president and vice president—opened its special session to impeach the president, and in 16:45 PM the MPR chairman Amien Rais removed Abdurrahman Wahid's presidential mandate, and sworn vice president Megawati as the president.

The PK fully supported Wahid impeachment and Megawati's raise to presidency. Interestingly, the PK did not join the cabinet, although Megawati reportedly offered one ministerial position. This decision to refuse a governmental position by political party was unusual in any measure, especially amid the office-thirsty atmosphere in the Central Axis coalition in which the PK was the most junior partner. At least four factors might have motivated PKS to take the decision.

Firstly, Megawati presidency was controversial among conservative Muslim because of her gender. PKS conservative ideology perceives political leadership was the privilege of male politicians, and thus Megawati was not a choice when there were many capable male politicians. *Secondly*, joining the government under Megawati presidency was not preferable from policy point of view, because she and her party was perceived as the reincarnation of secular-nationalist PNI during previous era, and thus the archrival of Islamic politics. *Thirdly*, another anti-Megawati sentiment was because many people perceived PDI-P as the political camp for Christian politicians. One of the most notorious figures was Maj. Gen. (ret.) Theo Syafe'i, one of Megawati closest aide, who was believed to have strong anti-Islam sentiment. *Fourthly*, PK leaders felt that they needed to improve their party organization as it failed to pass the electoral threshold and was unable to contest in the next election.

3.3. Yudhoyono Administration

Fully motivated to continue participation in election PK was renamed into PKS in 2003. No significant changes occurred, in terms that PKS inherited everything from PK including leaderships, memberships, assets, and networks. Its decision to stay outside government was proven correct, and it was fruitful during the 2004 election, when it increased its votes from only 1.7% in the last election to 7.3% and became the 6th largest party, bypassing many others including former coalition partner in Central Axis such as PAN which earned 6.44% and PBB which shrunk into 2.62% and failed to pass the new electoral threshold.

The 2004 election also marked a new development in Indonesian democracy, where for the first time the people had opportunity to choose their president and vice president directly. This new development was designd to increase the stability of democratic institutions by giving the president greater legitimacy. This was, in a sense, a full circle for the democratization of political institutions. During the New Order era, the president dominated the national politics while the legislative branch was merely a rubber stamp authority. The democratic institutional engineering, through the 1999 elections, increased the authority and legitimacy of the legislature, which in fact came at the expense of those of the president. Thus, in the aftermath of 1999 election, the legislature was so powerful vis-à-vis the executive, that it impeached the president when he started to challenge the legislature. The popularly elected president would have greater as well as an independent legitimacy, to balance the power and the legitimacy of legislative branch of government.

It is interesting to note how the PKS prepared its electoral actions seriously, not only in achieving as many votes as possible, but also in anticipating the aftermath of the election. During the 3rd National Meeting of Majelis Syuro in early January 2004, the party laid out a number of options to anticipate the electoral result: *Firstly*, if the party collected more than 20% of national votes, it would nominate its own presidential or vice presidential candidates. Although no one would really expect such achievement, as a matter of principle this must be anticipated because the party believes that God is omnipotent, and He grants power to whoever He wants. *Secondly*, if its votes would be less than 20% it would not nominate its own candidate, however if the vote would be more than 3% or pass the new electoral threshold it would join in the government. *Thirdly*, if PKS votes would be more that 3% but less than 20% it would consider supporting candidates from other parties provided that the candidates met PKS criteria (PKS *Bayanat*, 26.08.2008). Interestingly, though, there was no option for the worst scenario, i.e. how if the party failed to pass 3% votes. Perhaps, although the party strongly believes that God is omnipotent and do what He will, pre elections surveys

already indicated that the party would garner between 3 to 8 percents of national votes (Mujani, 2004)

After the election result was available, and the party successfully increased its votes six hundred percent higher than the previous one, the PKS held another national meeting of Majelis Syuro in late April 2004, to discuss the party's further plans. Based upon the previous meetings, it decided not to nominate its own presidential candidate but would participate in government and thus would support candidate from other parties. At this point, the PKS was still obsessed with what it called "coalition of the *Ummah*" (*koalisi keumatan*), i.e. grand coalition from Islamic parties. In a press release it said:

> Thanks to God that in the legislative election held in 5 April 2004 PKS collected 8.3 millions votes or 7.34% of national electors, and thus would receive between 45 to 48 seats in the parliament—three seats still in dispute—or about 8% of total seats in legislature. This number, however, is far from the target set by the 3rd Majelis Syuro meeting in order to nominate presidential or vice presidential candidate. The votes are also far from significant if we refer to Golkar that collect 21.58% and PDI-P with 18.53%. However, the number of votes collected by Islamic parties in this 2004 election was in fact significant, in which PKB collected 10.57%, PPP 8.15%, PAN 6.44%, PBB with 2.62%, PBR with 2.44% and PNUI with 0.8%. In sum these Islamic parties garnered more than 39%, and if they could join forces they are stronger than either Golkar or PDI-P (PKS press release, 25.05.2004).

When its initiative to build grand coalition of Islamic parties did not avail, as easily predicted because of increasing frictions inside, as well as between, Islamic parties, in the meeting PKS discussed two option: *Firstly*, to continue participating in the government despite the failure of "the coalition of the *ummah*", in the risk of increasing friction and polarization inside Muslim community. *Secondly*, not to participate in government and focus its energy to legislative activities—with more than 1100 legislators in all levels—in order to increase its capacity and opportunity in the next election. Eventually, the 4th MS meeting decided to take the second option, and at the same time gave mandate to the party highest institution (MS) to observe the development of the presidential elections, in order to provide further recommendation to support or not to support any candidate (PKS press release, 25.05.2004, see also *Kompas* 17 April 2004).

When presidential election kick-off was approaching, the debate inside the PKS was mounting on whether to abstain from the race or support a candidate. In the next meeting of Majelis Syuro, the forum agreed to take the recommendation of the 3rd meeting, i.e. to participate in the government and consequently support the candidate of the other party. The

argument was that the PKS needs real experiences in running the government, as part of the preparation to become a ruling party. And such experiences can only be gained through participation in government administration (Interview with Zilkiliemansyah, 25.06.2007). But which candidate would it support? For most of the supporters of PKS, as well as external observers, the option was quite easy, i.e. there was a candidate who had very close ideological as well as organization relation with the party: i.e. Amien Rais. However the choice was not that easy for the party leaders. The forum was in fact split evenly into two different camps, the one mostly supported by younger leaders who prefer Rais because of his Islamic as well as reformist credentials, in addition to the increasing pressure from its supporters to back up Rais (*Kompas*, 17.04.2004). However, other groups led by the more senior leaders highlighted more pragmatic elements, i.e. the chance to win the race, and they found that the former military chief commander Wiranto was preferable to Rais, because he was most likely to win. In addition, another line of argument suggested that PKS's main concern was not winning the election, but rather stopping Megawati and thus Wiranto was the choice (See, Syu'bah Asa, *Tempo* 5-11 July 2004).

Eventually it gave its support to Rais. However, the internal debate had prolonged for weeks, that in the end when it decided to support Rais candidacy there was only less than two weeks time left before the Election Day, and Rais' strategists complained that this last minutes back up meant very little because most of voters would already made up their minds. In a bigger perspective, however, PKS's apparent difficulties in deciding which candidate it would support, was not unique for the party but rather common phenomena among Islamic parties, especially former members of Central Axis coalition. The PKB was split for on the one hand, its leaderships supported Wiranto who had run with Abdurrahman Wahid's little brother Solahuddin, while on the other hand large portions of its supporters stood behind Megawati who picked NU's chairman Hasyim Muzadi as her running mate. The PBB was also split, as it's chairman Yusril Mahendra sided with secular general Yudhoyono, while other more ideologues leaders such as Sumargono backed up Rais. Meanwhile PPP's attitude was no less ambiguous by nominating its chairman as its own candidate albeit with very slim popularity. Some argued that Haz had been involved in a behind-door agreement with Megawati to stop Rais, because of the overlap constituents between PAN and PPP, so that Haz running would reduce Rais's supports (Syu'bah Asa, *Tempo* 5-11 July 2004, Denny J.A., *Lingkar Survey Indonesia*, 03.11.2003).

The first round presidential election in July 26th, 2005, decided that no candidate won absolute majority—50% + 1—and thus a second round was needed. And the two pairs of

candidates who collected the most motes was Yudhoyono-Kalla with 33.57% and Megawati-Muzadi with 26.61%. Thus, the PKS candidate failed to go through the next round. However, differing from the first round in which the party was slow in deciding its choice, the option during the second round was clear, i.e. other than Megawati. The PKS was quick in made up its mind to stand behind Yudhoyono-Kalla, together with PBB. The party reportedly sent an envoy to both Yudhoyono and Megawati to get to know their programs and agendas, although these lobbyers had no rights to negotiate any deal with those candidates (*Kompas*, 17.08.2004). In the 6th Majelis Syuro meeting in August 2004, it unanimously agreed to support Yudhoyono-Kalla, because: (a) they were closer to the party criteria than the contender, (b) PKS supporters were inclined to Ydhoyono, and (c) surveys indicated that he would win the contest. In late August 2004 it released official statement, explicitly stated as binding to its members and supporters, to support the Yudhoyono-Kalla ticket during the second-round presidential elections that following month (PKS *Bayanat*, 26.08.2004).

The party also explained that it had signed an agreement with Yudhoyono in exchange for its supports. There were five points in the agreement: *Firstly*, the candidates agreed to pursue political reforms to achieve a clean, sensitive and professional government marked by, among others, a willingness to fire ministers proven guilty of corruption. In addition, they agreed not to repeat the same mistakes of the previous administration, and not to abuse the political power against Muslim community as well as Indonesian people in general. *Secondly*, they agreed to defend the sovereignty of the United Republic of Indonesia (NKRI) from international intervention. *Thirdly*, they agreed to continue democratic reforms, to develop a civil society with civil supremacy in politics, and not to invite a militaristic government nor to create a police state. *Fourthly*, candidates agreed to promote the nation's morality and social prosperity, as well as improving law enforcements and protecting human rights. *Finally*, the candidate agreed to support the Palestinian struggle for an independent state, and to not establish diplomatic relations with Israel (PKS press release, 27.08.2004). The last point is perhaps the most interesting part, because it marks a purely ideological drive in the party behavior within the government formation.

When Yudhoyono won the second round held in 20 September 2004 convincingly, with 60.62%, the PKS automatically became governing party. Given the fact that the PKS was one among three parties officially supported Yudhoyono in second round—the others were the PBB and Yudhoyono's Democrat Party—the party should receive a significant share. Initially Yudhoyono offered four cabinet position to PKS, in which the party responded by nominating four candidates: Soeripto for Attorney General, Adhyaksa Dault for minister of

Youth and Sport, Anton Apriyantono for minister of Agriculture, and Yusuf Asyari for minister of Housing—but only the last three were accepted by Yudhoyono when he announced his 'United Indonesia Cabinet' (*Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu*) late October 2004 (www.pks-jakarta.com [accessed, 08.03.2008]). PKS choices for ministerial positions were consistent with its attitude in previous time, in which it sought to get portfolios which could facilitate it to reach the wider public, to help socializing the party's popular image for the subsequent elections (www.zulkieflimansyah.com, 08.06.2006 [accessed, 19.05.2007]). Interestingly, during the negotiation of cabinet formation, the PKS strongly suggested Yudhoyono not to recruit in his cabinets persons who were in support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and those who have association with corruptors or black big businessmen (*konglomerat hitam*) (www.pks-jakarta.com [accessed, 08.03.2008]).

4. PKS BEHAVIOR IN POLICY MAKING

As was explained earlier, there are two competing theories on what political party really seeks after it obtained public office positions. The first theory suggests that the party will likely use the positions to advance its chance to get reelected. This means that, since the ultimate objective is being in power, a party will do anything accordingly, including changing its policy and ideological positions. The second theory, meanwhile, contends that party is not only a power-seeking animal, but also a policy seeking one, which implies that for the specific party, public office positions are merely instrumental for its ideological mission to implement certain policies. Of course these options are not completely mutually exclusive. The common situation is that those options occur simultaneously with different balance of portion: in some cases parties give priority to office-seeking behavior while relaxing its policy or ideological positions, while in other cases they take policies as the more important agenda than office positions.

To examine which position PKS takes in its participation in democratic politics, this section explores the party's policy capacity to understand whether positions in public office are more important than implementing public policies. Following the theoretical framework laid out in the beginning of this chapter, *firstly*, this section will examine the relationship between PKS's policy promises during the election campaigns and the political aspirations of the Indonesian public, to discover the party's electoral sensitivity. *Secondly*, this section examines whether the party ought to implement the policies it has promised during the election campaigns, or if it should, in fact, pursue different ones.

4.1. PKS Electoral Responsiveness

4.1.1. 1999 Election

The main sources of PKS's electoral promises are the party electoral programs, or the party platform. These documents are intended as explanations to its potential voters about what it stands for and what policies it will implement when succeed in gaining governmental positions. During the 1999 election, the party issued a document called "National Agenda" that contains general outlines on policy positions the party promoted and supported (See, *Agenda Nasional Partai Keadilan*, 1998). As a typical party platform, the document contained mostly broad and abstract statements on what it will promote if it achieved public office positions. These policy pledges will be measured against aspirations of Indonesian citizens during the time around the election. Fortunately, there are a few public opinion surveys conducted in the country on politics, democracy and religion, such as by International Foundation for Electoral Studies (IFES), The Asia Foundation (TAF), and Center for Studies on Islam and Society (PPIM). All of these are national surveys designed to provide national level data on the subjects.

The PK's "National Agenda" is a short document of about 1,500 words and classified into 14 sections. The first section is a short introduction, under the heading "General" (*Umum*), which explains the broad outline of the party's policy orientations. The first paragraph reads: "*Character building using religious norms and religious values*". The second paragraph reads: "*promote a strong united country, in which ulama, intellectuals and government apparatus cooperate to develop the nation*". The last paragraph, however, refers to different point: i.e. "*Reorient national development programs in order to revive the nation's potentials from economic, political and social destructions caused by the New Order*".

To what extent did Indonesian public concern about the role of Islam and the Ulama in politics? The general political orientation of the party to "*build the nation character through religion*" did not reflect the general aspirations of Indonesian voters, because several surveys consistently found that the majority of Indonesians perceived economy (e.g. inflation, high price of basic goods, difficult to find jobs) as the major problem faced by the nation (TAF, 2001; IFES 2002: 12), the community (IFES, 2002: 12), and the family as well (IFES 1999b: 10). However, people did concern with the morality of their political leaders, in which 47% of them were dissatisfied with the leaders' moral credential, while only 32% were satisfied (IFES 1999a: 12) A survey by PPIM even found that the majority of Muslim community (57% in 2001, 67% in 2002) agreed with the idea that the best solution for Indonesia is an

"*Islamic government led by the Ulama*". Thus, although religion and cultural identity were not the urgent problems for the Indonesian people in general, the ideas of giving chance to religion and religious leaders in politics were preferable for majority of Muslims (Liddle, 2003).

The second section was on Economy. There are three main points in the party economic programs. The first was: "*to develop moral economic system* (sistem ekonomi moral) *in which transcendental values are the foundation of ethic, conceptual as well as operational of all economic activities*". It also promised socialistic economic programs such as: "*justice economy that takes side to the poor*", "*to reduce unemployment*", "*enforcing the rights of laborers*", and "*promoting agriculture and supporting the farmers*". Finally, it promised to strengthen the state role in economic development.

There is no direct information on public aspirations on the moral factor within the economy, and 65% of the public believed that the economic problem could be solved through democratic reform, i.e. by electing more accountable government (IFES, 1999a: 7). Yet there was a portion of the public who believed in moral matters within the economy: *Firstly*, the majority (54%) of the population thought that the economic condition was bad, out of which 47% (or 25% of the total population) believed that it was due to mistakes made by their leaders (IFES, 1999a: 13), while another survey showed many indications that the public perceived corruption, collusion and nepotism (*KKN*) as among the main causes of infectiveness of government and state institutions (TAF 2001, IFES 2002: 13). With regard to populist economic ideas such as pro-poor initiatives, reducing unemployment, or enforcing the laborers' rights very much matched the aspirations of the public, because more people preferred greater state role in the economy—41% for, and 31% against (IFES, 1999a). However, this trend was significantly changed after the election, in which 62% preferred little state control in economy, while only 30% desired greater state control in economy (IFES, 1999b: 26)

The third section deals with politics, in which the party promises to enact "justice" in every level of social lives: from individual, to family, to society, to the state. In the next point the document offers "*to strengthen national unity and to eliminate any element of separatism*". It also promised to further democratic reforms, such as "*empowering citizens to monitor and evaluate the performance of their political leaders*," "*promoting transparency, clean government, and faithful governmental leaders*," "*developing free and fair election*", and "*professionalism of the military*"—which commonly understood as reducing military involvement in politics.

The idea of reforming politics through gradual bottom up process from individuals, to families, to societies, and to polities were in fact the PK's ideological agenda and did not reflect the opinion of the public. On the contrary, surveys show that Indonesians were keen to see institutional reforms, such as improvement of government policy effectiveness (IFES, 1999a: 7), finding capable leaders through direct presidential elections (78% in IFES 2002: 14), as well as decentralization of power (IFES, 1999b: 16) as preferable methods to recover from political crises. No indication was found that people perceived separatism as a major national problem. The public was keen to support further democratic reforms—after regime change: 23% believed that Indonesia was already a democratic country, 28% believed it was not yet a democratic country but becoming one, and only 8% said that the country was not becoming democratic—although large portion of them, 33%, did not sure or did not know what democracy is (IFES, 1999a: 6). Interestingly, public opinion on the political role of the military was mixed. On the one hand, the majority (65%) still regarded the armed forces as a politically favorable institution, yet on the other hand many of them (54%) did not agree with the existing military role in politics (IFES, 1999b: 22-23)

The fourth section is on law (*Hukum*), which include two promises with a strong ideological tone: Firstly, the party promised to "*direct the priority of the law and the judiciary practices to support the weak in order to achieve sense of justice*". Secondly, the party also promised to focus on national identity of Indonesian law by "*putting an end to the hesitation to choose the legal system that is inline with national identity. Efforts to impose Western legal system have made Indonesian laws disconnected from the philosophical, sociological, and historical roots of its society*".

Pledges to reform judicial systems were parallel with general aspirations of the Indonesian public, because the majority of them (57%) believed that the systems were severely corrupt, and 54% of them said that the existing legal system did not protect them. Even more, 66% of respondents reported that they would never go to any official legal institutions to solve their problems (TAF, 2001: 4). However, no opinion was reported that the people believed the failure of their legal system was because of the adoption of Western systems. It was true that the majority of the public perceived that the existing legal system and institutions were corrupt and ineffective, and they preferred to go to informal institutions such as deliberation (*musyawarah*) or religious and local leaders to solve their problems, they did not think that the system was wrong. Instead, the public believed that the problems were caused by corruption, unprofessional staff, and low professional and ethical standards, and 87% of the respondents believed that the system could be improved (TAF, 2001: 4-5).

The fifth section is on education, which contains three articulate statements: firstly, the party would promote "*the professionalism of education and the role of teachers*", and thus secondly, it would "*increase the state budget for educations*", and lastly it promised to implement policy on education which "*give priority to religious values*".

A survey by IFES indicated that education was in fact among the major problems the Indonesian public concerned about. Given the fact that the concern about education was dealing with the increasing costs because of the worsening economic conditions, the party promise to increase government budget on education was answering public demand (IFES 1999a: 10). In this regard, the point of the public concern about education was focused on the costs, and no data was found about the role of religious values in education.

The sixth is on science and technology, in which the party promised to "*provide moral framework to the development and applications of science and technology*". The seventh is on environment, in which the party made only abstract promises to use natural resources for the benefit of the nation, while protecting them from illegal exploitations. The eighth section is on regional government (*Pemerintah Daerah*), in which the party promised to support decentralization of governmental systems and develop clean and respected governments. The ninth is on youth (*Kepemudaan*), promising "*to endorse the increase of governmental budget for youth programs*", and "*endorse the promotion of national leaderships from among the youth*". It must be noted here, the fact that despite the party leaders being young themselves, the statement can nonetheless be interpreted as self-reassurance for the party leaders.

Except for the improvement of regional government—which is parallel with public sentiments that perceived district level governments were more influential to their lives (54%) as well as trustworthy (58%) than both national (18% said influential, 21% said trustworthy) and provincial (13% influential and trustworthy) levels of government (IFES, 1999b: 17)—none of these subjects were reportedly mentioned by the public as among the major problems they were concerned about.

The tenth point is on art and culture (*Seni Budaya*). In these subjects the party promised to "*develop the arts and cultures oriented toward [morally] high-values*," "*to optimize institutions to control artistic and cultural productions*", and "*to filter the incoming of foreign cultures, to protect the nation from their destructive missions*". The eleventh is on information (*Penerangan*), in which the party promised "*to endorse freedom of the press guided by sense of responsibility toward justice and national unity and identity*", "a*dvocate the presses to be selective of their publication materials*," and "*will dissuade partisan mass-media*".

With regard to these subjects, the aspirations of Indonesian public were mixed. *Firstly*, the idea to direct, limit or control freedom of expressions—which include arts, cultures, and press—run counter the general sentiment of the public who prefer to have greater freedom of expression as part of democratic reforms and human rights, and they believed that the freedom is beneficial for the public (IFES, 2002: 25-26). Surprisingly, however, the conservative promise to filter foreign cultures in a belief that they are destructive was reflected the sentiment of the large portion of Indonesian public, although the opposite opinion was also strong, in which 47% respondents perceived Western cultures threatened their way of life, while 41% opined that the West as being a source of things which will improve their lives (IFES, 1999b: 25).

The twelfth section is on women (*Kewanitaan*), in which the party pledged to empower women through "*the implementation of family welfare programs*", and to promote "*the role of women as guardian of the nation's morality*".

These points strongly reflect the party discouraging views pertaining with women public roles. However, this view did not match with public opinion during that time, as was shown by survey report where the majority of respondents (64%) believed not only that a women could become president—thus assuming major public roles—but also an effective one, and only half of them (30%) suggested that a president should be a man—thus opined a limited public roles for women (IFES, 1999b: 18, 46).

The thirteenth point is on health (*Kesehatan*), in which the party promised to "*promote the extensions of health services for the society*", "*to reform the structure of health management, to give priority to the consumers rather than the providers*", "*promoting professionalism for medical practitioners*". And finally the fourteenth section is on society (*Sosial*), in which the party pledged to promote "*social system framed by values of justice*".

Certainly, health is one of the basic components in any society, and Indonesians were also concerned about it. Although no survey data directly mentioned it as the major problem they were facing, some respondents did mentioned "lack of public facility" as among the bad situations faced by the community (IFES, 2002: 12). Lastly, promoting the values of justice in a transitional society would surely be echoing everybody's desire.

4.1.2. 2004 Election

During the 2004 elections, the PKS produced more sophisticated and well-prepared platform or electoral programs, under a grandeur title "*The Agenda for Saving the Nation: Outlines of PKS Policy Platform*". The 80-pages document is divided into three main

sections: firstly, introduction which includes prefaces from the coordinator of 'Committee to Win Election' (*LPP, Lajnah Pemenangan Pemilu*) Muhammad Raziqun, and from the party's chairman Hidayat Nurwahid. This section ends with a summary of the ideological visions of the PKS and missions under the heading of "Great Leap to Re-establish a Justice and Prosperous Indonesia" as the background and foundation for its policy proposals, which main points are the following: *Firstly*, multi-dimensional crises suffered by Indonesian people for several years were in fact divine punishments (*adzab*), because Indonesian citizens had neglected Divine guidance in their collective lives. *Secondly*, one of the most significant contributors to the crises and the punishments was bad political leaders (*penguasa dzalim*) who abused power, deceived the public, and stole the nations' wealth to enrich their families and cronies. God rebuked and humiliated the arrogant ruler through 1998 reform movement. *Thirdly*, the next step to restore the dignity and decency of collective lives, Indonesians need to prepare good—i.e. religious—political leaders, because God has promised He will bring pious people into power. *Finally*, the party proposed three consecutive steps: (i) establishing religious foundations in collective lives, (ii) conducting radical reforms to the existing structures of collective lives, (iii) maintaining the sustainability of the potentials of collective lives. The next section contains the twenty one points of policies the party promised to promote. The last section is an appendix on the significant of the party platform, written by Sapto Waluyo.

The document—especially the 21 policy points—will be examined against survey reports on public opinion around the time of the 2004 general election, to find out to what extent those policy promises reflected the general aspirations of voters. By then more public opinion surveys will have been conducted, thus more data is available regarding the political aspirations of Indonesian public, which include the IFES 2003 National Public Opinion Survey, and 18 series of Tracking Surveys conducted between January to October 2004, LP3ES 2004 Survey on the popularity of parties, The Asia Foundation 2004 survey on public opinion, and a number of national polls conducted by Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) on the topics of Islam, politics and democracy.

The first point of PKS platform was on strengthening the macro economy (*Pemantapan Ekonomi Makro*), which included two substantial points: i.e. "*to end the contract with International Monetary Fund, IMF, in order to develop an independent national economy*", and "*to eradicate moral and bureaucratic hazards, i.e. corruptions and monopoly, to encourage economic investments*".

Economy was still the most important issue in public aspirations, and economic improvement was all what everybody wanted. The Indonesian public also perceived that improper conducts such as corruptions and mismanagements (which should include monopoly) were the most important contributing factors. However, drastic policy such as cutting relations with the IMF did not seem to be in the mind of the public. There has been no data recently, but in the previous years, a large portion of Indonesians believe that foreign aid (79%) and foreign investments are beneficial for Indonesia (IFES, 1999b: 21).

The second point was on establishing regional autonomy (*Pemantapan Otonomi Daerah*), where the party proposed to make sure that political decentralization must guarantee national unity by "*balancing resources distribution not only between central and regional governments, but also between regional governments to avoid resentments and secession,*" "*increasing revenue sharing for regional governments*", "*giving priority to district level of governments, rather than provincial ones*", and to introduce "*direct election to elect regional governments*".

In line with the increasing pessimistic mood of public opinion, the confidence toward regional governments also decreased, where in 2002, 73% respondents said that supervising regional governments would be easier, while in 2003 the number reduced into 64%. Moreover, the public was also increasingly worried about the misuse of power by local governments—51% in 2001, 56% in 2002, and 60% in 2003. Thus, while decentralization was favorable, adding local government power capacity stood in contrast to the public mood (IFES, 2002: 23-24; IFES 2003: 62-63)

The third point was on empowering people's economy (*Pemberdayaan Ekonomi Rakyat*), wherein the party promised to establish "*vocational training courses*", to improve "*laborers' skills and professionalism*", as well as to "*establish Islamic economic institutions as an alternative for capitalist systems*".

Since economy was the number one problem faced by Indonesian people, economic initiatives were absolutely in line with their aspirations. However, proposing Islamic economic institutions as the alternative for the secular systems was not in public aspiration, since they believed that the problems were mostly due to the failure of policy makers rather than a matter of system (IFES, 2003: 22). Even the majority of Muslim respondents believed that Shariah is a personal, rather than structural, system (TAF, 2003: 11).

The next points—fourth, fifth, seventh respectively—were on agriculture (*Perjuangan Petani*), where the PKS promised to "*conduct land and agrarian policy reforms on rights of land ownerships, import limitations, and access to capital and investment*"; on labor

(*Perjuangan Buruh*) in which pledges for "*improving better regulations*", and "*advocate and supervise labor unions and laborers religious lives*, were made; and on fishery (*Perjuangan Nelayan*), in which it promised to help fishermen "*to form strong and effective unions*" and to create "*alternative jobs*" as well as "*to improve products management*".

Again, given the general mood of the public on the worsening economic conditions, proactive economic programs and especially toward people from lower economic levels—many of whom felt the government did not care about them (TAF, 2003: 3)—reflected the general aspirations.

The eighth point was on national politics (*Politik Nasional*), for which it proposed six packages of policies, which include: "*improving the effectiveness of the parliament*", "*implementing direct elections for regional governments*", "*setting political leaders as moral exemplary for the public*", "*promoting modest life-styles for public politicians and public leaders*".

From 2002 to 2003, the public rating toward state and government institutions was in steep decline: in 2002 the net rating (the number of the satisfied minus the dissatisfied) for the President was +20, in 2003 plunged into -18 (or declined 38%), for the DPR from +6 in 2003 into -13 in 2003 (or dropped 19%), and for the MPR the score was constant -20 (IFES 2003: 27). Improvements of the institutions were highly expected by the public, and what the public wanted from the politicians in the institutions was more professionalism (IFES, 2003: 22-23), rather than personal piety.

The ninth point was on defense and security (*Pertahanan Keamanan*) in which it pledged to support the division of labors in which the police is responsible for security, while the military is in charge for defense. The tenth point was on law enforcement and human rights protections (*Penegakan Hukum dan Perlindungan HAM*), where the PKS proposed to focus on the eradication of corruptions and to solve human rights abuses conducted by previous regime. The eleventh point was on foreign policy (*Politik Luar Negeri*) where it deemed important to be cautious of fraudulent intentions of global power such as the IMF and the US, and to strengthen the principle of free and active participation in international politics based on regional proximity, i.e. to have a closer relation with geographically closer countries.

These first two points pertained with the effectiveness of state institutions which the people started to lose confidence, and they certainly would support efforts to improve its performance. The last point on international politics was not so much part of the people's agenda, although there were indications of an increasing nationalism, and negative sentiments

toward foreign cultures and interests, accompanying the democratic reform (IFES, 1999b: 25).

The twelfth point was on education (*Pendidikan Nasional*) in which the PKS proposed to implement low costs education policies, implementing constitutional mandate to allocate 20% of the state budget to education, and decentralization of education policy. This pledge was for sure in line with general public aspirations.

The next three points—thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth—were the party's typical ideological programs: i.e. on youth pioneers (*Kepeloporan Pemuda*), which focus on the protection from demoralizing cultures, and preparing the youth as the next generation of leaders. On Indonesian women (*Perempuan Indonesia*) was the next point, where the party promised to promote women's rights to observe Shari'a, women empowerment through family and welfare programs for women and children, supporting 30% quota for women in legislative. Plus, family empowerment (*Pembinaan Keluarga*) added the party stance on the primacy of family as the most important social unit, in which it pledged to implement policies to promote happy family lives.

It is interesting to note that although these are ideological programs, in fact most of them—except for the first point—reflected aspirations of the general public. *Firstly*, 95% of Indonesian public recognized that freedom of religion as a basic human right (IFES, 2003: 67). *Secondly*, plurality of respondent (42%) believed that the existing percentage of women in parliament was too low and would need to be increased through various possible ways (IFES, 2003: 37), and public was also supportive to the idea of 30% quota for women candidates. *Thirdly*, majority of Indonesian public (81% in 2002, 78% in 2003) believed that their family life was very good or good (IFES, 2003: 17), and logically they would only supports policy to maintain—and not to change—the existing conditions.

The following three points—sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth—were general pledge on populist themes: i.e. on Social Health and Prosperity (*Kesehatan dan Kesejahteraan Sasial*), where it agreed to increase government budget to 20% for health, and to pay attention to public services for disable people. Then, on Conservation of Environments (*Pengelolaan dan Pelestarian Lingungan Hidup*), which focused o the party's consent to improve law enforcements as substantive policy to promote conservations. After that, promised by science technology industry (*Ilmu Pengetahuan, Teknologi, Industri*) was also allowed to endorse government support for the development of these fields.

The first point was definitely to confirm public demand for affordable health services (IFES, 2003: 16), while the second and the third proposals were too broad to be implemented as programs, and served more as campaign rhetoric.

The nineteenth point was on arts, culture and tourism (*Seni, Budaya, Pariwisata*), in which it promised to "*promote religious arts*", and "*religious culture and traditions*" in society, as well as to "*support tourism as medium for promoting national potentials*". And the twentieth points was on religious missionary and supervision in religious communities (*Dakwah dan Pembinaan Umat Beragama*), in which it promoted what it calls "Madinah Charter" that obliges followers of religions to observe their own religious teachings. Lastly, the twenty-first point was on communication and information (*Komunikasi dan Informasi*) in which the party pledged to support the ratification of anti-pornography law to reduce the negative effects of the freedom of the press.

The first point reflected the ideological programs of the PKS and did not mirror public inspirations. The second point was also in direct opposition with public aspiration that observing one's religion is a right rather than an obligation (IFES, 2003: 67), while the third proposal to implement anti-pornography laws for the media somewhat echoed the public worry about the negative impact of foreign cultures (IFES, 1999b: 25), which were transmitted through modern mass media.

4.2. PKS Mandate and Ideological Capacities

This section discusses the PKS mandate and ideological capacities in policy makings. The former refers to the party's willingness and ability to implement policies in line with its promises delivered before elections, while the latter refers to the fact whether those policies it implemented are in accordance with its basic ideological positions.

4.2.1. Policies during 1999-2004

Perhaps the first significant political move by the party as part of government institutions, i.e. in legislature, was the PK's decision to join the Central Axis coalition and then join the PAN to form the Reform faction in parliament. The main mission of Central Axis was to stop Megawati who was representing secular politics from becoming president, and support Abdurrahman Wahid as the representation of Muslim politics to the presidency. This maneuver was clearly in line to its promise to bring "religion and the ulama" into government processes, as well as its ideological stance as Islamist party to promote Islam as the solution for Indonesian politics. Together with the PAN, PK formed the Reform fraction that

prevented the Military faction in parliament from assuming leadership. This action was also match with its electoral promise to support "professionalism of the military", and was also in line with its ideological position as an anti-New Order party given the fact that the military was the central element in the previous regime.

Secondly, the political actions of PK in government—this time in executive branch—took place when Wahid gave the party a cabinet position, as the ministry of forestry. This was a very tough situation for the party that pledged to promote moralist politics, because it had no experience whatsoever in government and the department of forestry was among the most corrupt departments, especially with regard to illegal deforestations and embezzlements of plantation (*reboisasi*) projects (Environmental Investigation Agency, 2007). To back up his mission, Murmahmudi Ismail appointed Suripto—a former intelligence officer—as the department General Secretary (PK, Bayanat). Suripto eagerly ran after suspects of illegal loggings and brought more than a dozen of major names to the persecutor (*Jakarta Post*, 16.05.2001). However the policy brought him and the ministry in conflict with the president who had close relations with big loggers—and soon they were sacked after only less than ten month in office (*Tempo Interaktif*, 27.03.2001). The eagerness to take up corruption scandals was in line with the party strong pledge to enact moralist politics and eradicate corruptions, and it was also reflected its basic ideological stance.

Thirdly, political actions taken by the PK in the government were series of political maneuvers together with other Central Axis coalition members to impeach president Wahid in July 2001, and appointed vice president Megawati into presidency. As was elaborated in the previous section, the PK was perhaps the only Central Axis member that was not under office-seeking motivation in impeaching Wahid—in the fact that it refused to join the next administration—but rather because of disagreements with Wahid's policies especially his corruption scandals as well as his intentions to recognize Marxism-Communism and to establish diplomatic ties with Israel (see, PK Statement, 05.04.2000). However, its consent to support Megawati's presidency contradicted its pledged to promote Islamic politics, and contradicted its ideological positions of anti-secularism and rejection of women as political leader. The PK tried to redeem it by refusing cabinet bid from Megawati, and became opposition.

Fourthly, from 1999 to 2002, the PK as part of Reform fraction was involved in amending the 1945 Indonesian Constitutions—which was deemed as sacrosanct by the New Order regime. In fact, the PK proposed an amendment to verse 29, which guarantee the rights of Indonesians to hold religion and observe its teachings, into a regulation that obligate

followers of religions to observe the teachings of their religions, but to no avail (Interview with Hidayat Nurwahid, 06.07.2007, see also Nurwahid 2004: 153-162). The constitutional amendments were in line with the party promises to support democratic reforms and parallel with its anti-New Order ideological stance. More specifically its initiative to amend verse 29 was strongly reflected its electoral pledge and ideological position.

Finally, in 2003, the PK—again as part of Reform fraction, together with other Islamic parties—supported the ratification of National Education System bill, which became controversial. The bill, among other things, stipulates that students should received religious instructions according to their respective faiths. It was controversial because many Muslim students attend Christian and Catholic schools, and these latter institutions rejected the bill as political interventions (see, US Dept. of State, *Religious Freedom Repot 2003*). Meanwhile, the proponent of the bill argued that Muslim students deserve appropriate religious instructions, in addition to widespread suspicion among Muslim community that Christian and Catholic schools are instruments to proselytize Muslim students. This political action was similar to PK's electoral pledges to strengthen religious elements in education, and certainly reflected its ideological position to promote Islam in society and in polity, as well as to protect Muslim political interests.

4.2.2. Policy during 2004-2006

During this period, the PKS had 45 members in parliament and formed its Prosperous Justice Party Fraction (F-PKS). The first major political actions for the new PKS fraction pertained with the government plan to increase oil price by 30% in March 2005. As was easily predicted, this plan triggered widespread protests from the society as well as from parliamentarians. The government maintained that the national budget was in deficit 23, trillions IDR (App. 2.3 billions USD), thus it needed to cut oil subsidy from 113 trillion into 89 trillion. Immediately, six fractions—FPDI-P, FKB, FPAN, FPPP, FPDS, and FPBR—categorically rejected the government plan, while the PKS as a member of ruling coalition was undecided. The PKS unclear decision triggered protests among its supporters, and a group of students from the KAMMI handed over a chicken (as a symbol of cowardice) to the PKS fraction leaders (Detikcom, 15.03.2005). Under widely publicized pressures from its supporters and regional branches, the PKS leaders in the parliament immediately changed their mind, and joined the fractions that rejected the plan. The PKS senior politicians said to the media that they strongly opposed the plan, and convinced its constituents that the party will be on their side. Nurwahid even confidently said that such decision will not affect the

relations with the president because one of the agreements in the coalition between his party and Yudhoyono was that the PKS would still be critical toward government policies (*Tempo*, 04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005).

However, after its chairman Tifatul Sembiring met with the president Yudhoyono discussing the topic, the PKS changed its side again by supporting the government plan to increase oil price. The PKS was not alone in changing side, because the PPP did also the same thing. Thus during the parliament session the majority of parliamentarians supported the government plan (*Tempo*, 04/XXXIV/21 – 27.03.2005). The PKS decision prompted resentments and protests from its supporters, and even some local branches in Yogyakarta and West Nusatenggara provinces demanded the party to withdraw from government coalition (see, *Tempo Interaktif*, 18.10.2005; 19.10.2005; and 28.11.2008,). In its official press release, however, the PKS said that it sought a win-win solution, but was defeated during voting because it has only 8% of the parliament members. According to the PKS MP Rama Pratama, there were two options put forward during parliament session, i.e. to support the plan and to increase government budget but burden the people' economy, or take the people's side by rejecting the plan yet causing government deficit. The PKS actually proposed a compromise solution to cover the deficit not by cutting oil subsidies but rather by saving government extra-expenditures in some major ministerial departments, which could add up to 20 trillion IDR, yet other fractions did not support it (*Republika*, 03.10.2005).

The second policy actions of the PKS in legislature was in 2006, supported proposal for Bill of Anti Pornography and Pornographic Acts (*UU Anti Pornografi dan Pornoaksi*), which would regulate the ethical standards for media and public behaviors. The bill caused nationwide controversies, because of its unclear definitions of pornography—which include phrases such as "exploiting sensual parts of adult human body," or "resemble acts of sexual intercourse and masturbation" etc (Part II, Chapter 14). It allowed public exposure of adult human bodies only for arts, sports, and educations—carried out in special places with licenses from the government—as well as traditional costumes if they are parts of rituals (Chapter III, Verse 10.1). On the one hand, it was widely supported by conservative Muslim organizations and communities who believed that moral decadences were the root of all crises and miseries suffered by the country. On the other hand, it was rejected by non-Muslim communities because it would intervene their religions and cultures with Islamist ethics (*Bali Post*, 12.03.2006), and by secular political parties as well as moderate Muslim communities who perceived the bill as merely political agenda of Islamist groups. The bill was also controversial in term of its procedure, because it was a program from the previous period

(1999-2004), and was not in the program of 2004-2009 legislative period, but suddenly introduced by Commission VIII, and then listed as a program by parliament's consultative body (*Badan Musyawarah DPR*) (Suara Pembaruan, 21.03.06).

The PKS was of course a staunch promoter of the bill, inside and outside the parliament building. Philosophically, the bill reflected the core PKS ideology that personal morality is the root of social and political well beings, and protecting the people's morals would be the most effective way to get out from multidimensional crises. According to PKS female MP Yoyoh Yusroh, pornographic materials that are widespread and easily accessible have motivated people to conduct sexual violence and crimes, and can cause workers to lose their work ethics and performances and cause students to loose their motivations to study. She also added that, in her investigations, there are business organizations that systematically disseminate pornographic materials, some of them with purely economic motivation but some of them apparently have social and political agendas to degenerate the morality of Indonesian people, in which the majority are Muslims (Interview with Yoyoh Yusroh, 21.06.2007). However, former PKS chairman Hidayat Nurwahid rejected allegations that the bill was part of his party agenda to islamize the political system, by pointing to the fact it was inherited from the previous era during the Megawati administration (fpks-dpr-ri.com [accessed 12.12.2007]).

The next policy capacity of the PKS in legislature worth being discussed was on the government policy in October 2005 to import 500 tons of rice per year from Vietnam between 2005-2007. This policy was controversial because the Minister of Agriculture—from the PKS—informed that national stock was enough because the country had produced surplus between 2004-2005. The policy was also resisted by fractions in parliament who believed that it was unnecessary, because the stock was enough and the rising price was just right because of the rising prize of oil. During session on January 17th, 2006, six fractions in the parliament—including the PKS, the only governing party that opposed the policy—agreed to form a special committee to investigate the government policy. However, when open voting was held in 24 January, the proposal failed to collect support from the majority of parliamentarians (*Tempo Interaktif*, 24.01.2006).

It was because of, rather than despite, the fact that the Minister of Agriculture was a member of the party, and he was bypassed by the president in this case, that made the PKS insist on investigating the policy of importing and forming independent committee, together with the PDIP fraction. The committee became a hot topic in the media when it was unfolded that the police sent five intelligent agents to spy on it—which caused strong reactions from

the parliament. PKS then sent Soeripto to Vietnam to get information pertaining the import deals. By mid-February the coordinator of the PKS independent committee, Tamsil Linrung, reported that there were striking irregularities in the government project. *Firstly*, the government decision to import rice was based on manipulated data, in which the Central Bureau of Statistic (BPS) published a report which indicated national rice stock was short, while the Minister of Agriculture confirmed it was enough. *Secondly*, the price set by the government was too high, which was 280.5 USD per ton, while PKS investigators received information from the Vietnamese Farmer Association that their standard price was 247 USD per ton. *Thirdly*, there was inconsistency in government report, wherein it reported the price was 281 USD/ton when in fact it paid 280.5 USD/ton (*Sinar Harapan*, 16.02.2006). Based upon its findings of the unaccountable irregularities in rice import programs, the PKS fraction suggested that the chairman of National Logistic Board (Bulog) should resign (fpks-dpr-ri.com).

The last, but not the most unimportant, action, which the PKS conducted with the government, was its coalition with other parties in regional elections to elect provincial governors and district mayors. Up until 2008, the PKS won in 92 regional elections, where 8 of them were provincial and the other 84 were district levels. There are two important points in this case: *Firstly*, out of the 92 regional government positions won by the party, only in five districts, the PKS won independently without coalition (or 5.4%), the other 86 were in coalition with other parties. From these eighty-six coalitions that the PKS won, only twelve (or 13.9%) of the elected leaders were PKS members. Thus, in these regional elections the PKS was only a rather unimportant junior coalition partner or it recruited candidates from outside the party. *Secondly*, and perhaps more interestingly, was that in the regional elections, the PKS joined a coalition not only with Islamic parties (60%) but also with secular ones (40%), and even with a Christian party although in this case they did not win. In those 86 coalitions 33 were with the PAN (Muslim-based party), 29 were with the Golkar (secular party), 24 were with the PPP (Islamic party), 22 were with the PD (secular), 20 were with the PKB (Muslim-based party), 17 were with the PBB (Islamic party), 14 were with the PDIP (secular party)—and a lost coalition with the PDS (Christian party). The typical response of the party leaders to questions about its coalitions with non-Islamic parties were that it shows to the public that the PKS is not an exclusive party but an open one and willing to cooperate with other parties under the framework of democratic politics, and that the party needs real experience in conducting real politics that means it has to deal with political actors (i.e.

parties) from different ideological backgrounds (Imam Nur Azis interview 22.05.2007, Zulkifliemansyah interview 25.06.2007)

Discussions in the previous paragraph show how the policy capacity of PKS was more dynamic compared to the previous period. With regard to mandate capacity, its support to the Bill of Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts was the only behavior that fully match its electoral promises—to promote moralist societal systems, to control media, arts and cultures—as well as its ideological stance that morality is the root for collective well beings. The others were rather mixed. Its decision to support raising oil price was clearly contradicted its promises to pursue socialistic, populist, economic policies, although there is no ideological point that are not in line with the decision. The next two governmental behaviors were in the same pattern, in which policy motivations were strong but office seeking motivations were also almost equally strong. In the case of rice import policy, PKS conducted independent investigations to alleged corruptions and irregularities in the government project, but beneath the surface it was also motivated to protect the political position and capacity of its Minister of Agriculture. In the same vein, the PKS formed many coalitions with other Islamic parties during regional elections, but in fact it also built similar coalitions with secular parties—and thus, the main motivation was getting into power, either with Islamic or secular parties.

V. CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the behavior of PKS within the government to unfold the influence of ideology in their behavior. The chapter was opened with theoretical discussion on what a party does after it won election. In a multiparty system such as in Indonesia, after finishing election, a party is often involved in coalition building to form a government. There are two theories that explain the process of coalition and government formations: i.e. office-oriented and policy oriented theories. The former perceives the party as being willing to participate in any coalition provided it receives good portfolio share, while the latter sees the party as being willing to participate in administrations only if it has capacity to influence policy. Furthermore, after holding public office positions, the party will involved in public policy implementations, where it may follow two possible logics: *firstly*, it may implement what it promised to its constituents during election campaigns regardless whether it is suitable or not to the existing conditions, or *secondly*, it may follow the existing political development and implement policies accordingly in order to be reelected, without so much concern about its electoral promises.

As far as the coalition building and government formation are concerned, the PKS has been involved in two out of the four government administrations in post-Suharto Indonesia. The first was its involvement in Central Axis, a coalition of Islamic parties in the post-1999 election that was responsible in stopping Megawati from becoming president after her party won plurality in election, while nominating and electing Abdurrahman Wahid as president, and then impeaching Wahid in 2001 and swearing in Megawati as the fifth Indonesian President. The second PKS involvement was in 2004 after it successfully increased its votes up to six-hundred percent. Initially, it only reluctantly supported Amien Rais nomination—as some of its leaders deemed Wiranto as more preferable because he had more chance to win the race—but after both of these hopefuls failed to get into the second round, it took side with S. B. Yudhoyono against Megawati. When Yudhoyono eventually won the presidency, the PKS become a governing party, receives three portfolios in the cabinet.

There was a noticeable pattern in the behaviors of PKS regarding coalition building and government formation. During the post-1999 election, its behaviors were heavily ideological, where it was only willing to cooperate with other Islamic parties, and refused to participate in Megawati government because she was representing secular politics. Meanwhile during post-2004 elections, it started to adopt the calculations of real politics, where it was reluctant to support prominent Muslim politician Amien Rais because he was less likely to win the competition than secular former military chief commander Wiranto, and eventually supported another secular retired general Yudhoyono and joins his administrations. From the perspective of Douglas North's institutional theory, the party behaviors were ideological during earlier years because at that time the political institutions were still in the making and were not yet functioning properly as mechanisms to reduce uncertainty in political interactions, as well as instruments for distributions of resources. During the times of political uncertainty—when no one really knew who was going to take which kind of action—the PKS relied on ideology as the only guidelines for political behaviors. Whereas in the subsequent years, when the political engineering started to bear fruits and the political institutions started to be stable and function more effectively as rules of political game—i.e. specifying who are eligible to play, and what actions players can and cannot do—the party started to behave rationally following the formal rules of the game.

Similar patterns also took place in the behavior of PKS during the creation of policy. During 1999-2004 it implemented policies following its electoral promises which were fully inline with its ideological stance, i.e. supporting democratic reforms and promoting moralist politics. For the former, together with the PAN, it successfully prevented the military fraction

in the legislature from gaining a leadership seat, while for the latter—especially when it held the position for Ministry of Forestry within the Wahid cabinet—it enthusiastically ran clean government and anti-corruptions programs, that led to the loggerhead incident with the president and caused it's minister sacked. Whereas during the 2004-2006 period, its policy courses were more nuanced, motivated not only by ideological-drives but also office-orientations. In early 2005, it supported the unpopular government policy to raise oil price that brought it into confrontations with its own loyal supporters, while later that year it eagerly promoted and supported the ratification of Bill of Anti-Pornography and Pornographic Acts (RUU-APP) that reflects its deepest ideological position that individual morality is the root of collective well beings; and in early 2006, ran against its coalition partners, it conducted an independent investigation of the government policy to import rice from Vietnam that bypassed its Minister of Agriculture. Again, the behaviors of the PKS are consistent with Northian's theory of the relation between ideology and institutions, where the political actor tends to rely on ideology when the formal rules of the game (the institutions) are unstable, and will depend on it when they are stable.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research studies the political behavior of an Indonesian Islamist party named the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS). The party attracted public and scholarly attention after it successfully increased its vote by six hundred percent—from 1.7% in 1999 to 7.3% in 2004. It also triggered heated debates among people on the streets as well as among observers and scholars because of its Islamist ideology, which intends to promote Islam as the solution to the current political problems faced by the Indonesian people. Indeed, the PKS adopted an Islamist ideology from the Egyptian Society of Muslim Brothers (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*), which perceives individual morality as being the root of collective well-being. Critics have argued that there are undemocratic elements in the PKS ideology—such as mixing religion with politics and its perceptions on gender equality and religious pluralism—and thus its participation in democratic politics seems to be neither serious nor sustainable. Driven by its ideology, the argument goes on, it will eventually implement Islamist policies that are not in line with democracy, or even replace democracy with Islamic system.

This problem is in fact not uniquely Indonesian, and there have been a number of political parties, participating in democratic politics in Muslim countries, that have adopted and promoted an Islamist ideology A doctoral dissertation written by Ann-Kristin Jonasson from Guttenberg University Sweden, compared such parties in three different countries, i.e. Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Jonasson found that these parties organized linkage activities in a quite similar way; i.e., that internally they behave like 'mass-integration' parties by demanding that their members and activists follow ideological prescriptions (i.e. religious teachings)--based on the idea that party members must practice what they believe. Externally, however, they resemble 'catch-all' parties which promote their political programs to all segments in the society, as they believe that Islam is a universal religion and its teachings should be adopted by all people. Jonasson also notes that this linkage model is similar to that of Christian democratic parties. The three parties studied by Jonasson operated in three different countries with very different societal backgrounds, electoral systems, as well as regime types. Yet despite these very different institutional contexts, they behaved quite similarly, and Jonasson concludes that what united them was their Islamist ideologies. In this way she sees ideology as being overwhelming and capable of overcoming institutional constraints. Her conclusion on the encompassing influence of ideology in Islamist parties'

political behaviors seems to confirm the suspicion that Islamist parties are by default ideological and their democratic participation is merely a camouflage.

The current research studies this issue by applying a neo-institutionalism perspective formulated by Douglas C. North in order to examine the impact of ideology on the political behaviors of the Indonesian PKS, vis-à-vis the democratizing of political institutions in the country. According to North, institutions—simply defined as 'humanly devised rules of the game'—have two basic functions: (a) reducing uncertainty in human interactions, transactions and collaborations by specifying who is eligible to participate, and by stipulating what actors can and cannot do; (b) facilitating fair resource distributions. Furthermore, for North there are 'formal' and 'informal' elements of institutions. The former refer to the codified rules of the game from constitutions, to laws and by laws, to individual contracts, while the latter point to informal systems of practices that regulate repeated human behaviors such as culture, religion and ideology. On the one hand, formal institutions help informal practices to function more effectively, while on the other hand informal institutions provide outlets for actors when formal rules become too rigid. This research hypothesizes that ideology will be dominant as a guideline for party behavior whenever the formal institutions are ineffective, and it will be less so when the formal rules of the game function properly.

As a backgrounder to understanding the wider picture of political Islam in Indonesia, the current research reviews the history of Islamist parties in the previous decades namely *Sarekat Islam* (1912-1929) and *Masyumi* (1946-1960). Using North's new-institutional perspective, it argues that these two parties formulated Islam as a political ideology in different ways, given the different institutional contexts they were facing. Operating during the colonial era, *Sarekat Islam* defined Islam as an 'anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, socialist' ideology, while *Masyumi* defined it as an ideology that is 'neither capitalism nor socialism, combining the virtuous elements of them and discarding their vicious elements'. Interestingly, institutional analysis also shows a typical pattern of the influence of ideology on the political behaviors of the two parties. *Firstly*, when the existing institutions were advantageous they tended to behave rationally, proactively and cooperatively. During the first half of its history, *Sarekat Islam* was proactive and cooperative, willing to collaborate with Marxist activists and adopting cooperative programs with the colonial ruler. They supported *Indie werbaar* and joined *Volksraad* because during this period the colonial government implemented cooperative policies as a response to their intensifying worries about World War I. Similarly, decades later *Masyumi* also behaved proactively and cooperatively, promoting and supporting constitutional democracy at a time when political parties dominated national leaderships,

during which Sukarno was only a figurehead president and was powerless because of his enmity with the military. *Secondly*, the Islamist parties' behaviors tended to be ideological and reactionary (they distrusted the rules of the game) whenever the existing institutions were disadvantageous to them. Starting from 1920, after WW I was over and the Dutch rulers returned to the business of politics of colonialism as usual—i.e. repression, discrimination, exploitation—*Sarekat Islam* leaders turned the course of their organization around by 180 degrees: they expelled the Marxists from the organization, refused to join the *Volksraad*, launched non-cooperative relations with the Dutch and demanded full independence for Indonesia, and even later on promoted international Pan-Islamist programs. In the same vein Masyumi turned reactionary toward Sukarno and his policies after 1957, and even a number of its top leaders joined regional armed insurgencies against the central government, after Sukarno reached agreement with the military, dissolved the parliament, enacted martial law and ran an authoritarian government.

The same pattern of relations between ideology, institutional contexts and political behaviors was also found in the history of the PKS. It originated in a religious community known as the 'Tarbiyah group', a loose network of *dakwah* activists founded in early 1980s which was organized according to the methods of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, by combining a religious hierarchy a la Sufism and Communist-like cell organizations. Its core belief was that individual piety is the root of human conditions, and its ultimate mission was pursuing gradual Islamization: from individuals, to families, to society, and to the polity. Its simplistic yet clearly articulated ideology made it very popular among university students, and its gradualist programs had enabled it to survive and thrive in a hostile political environment. During 1980s it was practically a clandestine organization, conducting only very limited public activities. By the early 1990s, Tarbiyah activists started to pursue more public activities, especially by taking control of intra-campus student organizations.

By the end of the 1990s, it already had strong networks among student activists in major cities across the country. After the regime changed and there was the opportunity to form new political parties, the Tarbiyah community agreed to form a party, under the name of the Justice Party. Participating in the 1999 election, the party was unable to attract much support from outside its networks, because of its rudimentary organization, strongly ideological rhetoric about Islamizing the society, as well as its idealistic perception that political activities as merely contingent and instrumental for building up *dakwah* activities. During the post election years the party also behaved ideologically, built coalitions only with Islamic parties and refused to join the Megawati administration. After it changed its name to

the Prosperous Justice Party in 2003, it pursued similar objectives but with different strategies. Its organization was improved and diversified, it also changed its political rhetoric from 'moralizing the society and the polity' into 'promoting clean government and anti-corruption' (both of which in fact implied similar meanings) and started to perceive political activities as being valuable in themselves. It performed spectacularly in the 2004 general election, and this success was followed by further significant changes in its political behavior, through the adoption of increasingly pragmatic strategies.

The noticeable change in pattern of the PKS's organizational behaviors—from clandestine, to open-but-ideological, to programmatic-pragmatic—ran parallel with the changes in Indonesian political institutions, which underwent processes of freedom and democratization. During 1970s-1980s the military-dominated regime was hostile toward civil liberties—and especially toward Muslim politics—so that clandestine activism was customary. In early 1990s the political constellation changed, when Suharto built a new alliance with the Muslim community that significantly boosted the community's self confidence in carrying out public activities. In the second half of 1990s, Muslim politics had gained a strong influence in national politics both among civilians and the military. When the moment of democratization eventually arrived, in the form of free and fair elections, Muslim politics already had a strong influence and considerable networks and was able to stop the secular election winner PDI-P from winning presidential office. At this point, however, although democratic institutions had been installed, they were not yet functioning properly as mechanisms to reduce uncertainty, let alone to facilitate fair resource distribution. No one really knew what others might or might not do, and hence no one really trusted the formal rules of the game, and instead they relied on more trusted guidelines: i.e., ideology. Indeed in this period most of the Muslim political actors behaved ideologically, using 'Islam' as the lens through which to understand and make sense of the developing political events, to define what is right and what is wrong, as well as to differentiate friends from foes. Nevertheless in around 2003 the major political actors had acquired a sufficient understanding of each other's and their own patterns of behavior as well as the virtues and the vices of the existing rules of the game. The ratification of the new political laws—especially new party and electoral laws, the deletion of reserved parliamentary seats for the military, and direct presidential elections—have motivated political parties to play according to the rules: i.e. rationally and pragmatically. The presidential election in 2004 witnessed how the ideological attachments among Islamic political actors that were conspicuous five years earlier had vanished almost without trace.

Democratization has enabled Muslim political actors to behave rationally and pragmatically, and the PKS represents the most dramatic and delicate case. During the 1999 elections the party sought to articulate the political preferences of the most conservative segment in the Muslim community, and therefore its ideological formulation was located on the far right of the ideological spectrum. However, in line with the increasing stability of the democratic political institutions, the PKS has changed its image from a conservative party into a pragmatic one—without abandoning its conservative ideology. This occurred in an intricate way because a political party is not a unitary actor. There are, at least, three main actors inside the political party, each with different logics of behavior: the *party on the ground*, which represents the idealist element; the *party in public office*, which represents the realist element; and the *party central office*, which mediates the conflicting tendencies. During its formative years, the party was dominated by the idealist element, indicated by the fact that members had the highest authority over the organization. Every major decision was consulted on by the members and the party organization was treated merely as a tool to achieve the objectives of Islamic *dakwah* (and thus disposable). During this time, the party also advanced discouraging views on women's roles in politics. Democratic competition nurtured the party to undergo a process of 'organizational maturation' by motivating it to build a stronger and more effective organization. As a result, it experienced what Michels famously called 'iron law of oligarchy', i.e. the increasing authority and control of the leaders over organization at the expense of the members, and the emerging perception that the survival of the organization was equally as important as ideological objectives, if not more urgent. The democratic system also encouraged the party to seek a more democratic image, and thus it appointed women politicians and activists in virtually all segments of its organization.

The changing balance in the PKS's organization, from the influence of the idealist to the realist elements, affected its behaviors in elections—one of the most important procedures in democracy. During the 1999 election—in addition to the poor organization and networking—it saw electoral activities as merely contingent to religious activities, so that in preparing for the election it constantly reminded its activists and members to intensify their religious activities, and warned them not to be too preoccupied with mobilizing voters. This was because it believed that the election was merely a means, and one should not distracted by it from the true objective of moral propagation. However, during the 2004 election this behavior changed dramatically when the party perceived the election no longer as an optional means, but rather *the* means to achieve ideological objectives. As a result, it motivated its

members and activists to mobilize as many voters as possible without so much concern about whether the voters understood the party's mission. This new perception enabled the party's campaign actors to reach out to a wider audience outside its traditional supporters, as well as to mobilize funds from wider sources. Outside election time, PKS activists actively propagated and socialized the party through publicized religious, social and welfare activities, which in a sense contradicted its ideological dictum that good deeds must be dedicated exclusively to pleasing God and not to mundane targets such as increasing party membership or fund raisings.

In combination with the increasing stability and effectiveness of the democratic institutions as arenas for political competition, the changing mood in the PKS organization from idealistic into pragmatic also affects its behavior in government. During the 1999 to 2004 period it behaved ideologically by collaborating exclusively with other Islamic parties and showed strong sentiments toward secular politics. For instance, it collaborated with other Islamic parties to form a Communication Forum for Islamic Parties (FSPPI), and joined other Muslim political actors in the Central Axis to nominate Abdurrahman Wahid as president against Megawati. It also supported the Central Axis in impeaching Wahid and appointed Megawati as president, but refused to join the Megawati administration. During the Wahid administration, the party joined in the cabinet but its uncompromising investigation of corruption scandals disturbed the President's relations with big businesses, and the minister was sacked after only ten months in office. In 2003, the party also joined other Islamic parties in ratifying the bill of the National Education System. However, after the 2004 election its behavior in government changed significantly. During the presidential election it supported Amien Rais only reluctantly, and then supported and joined the S. B. Yudhoyono government. Except for its fervent support for the draft Bill on Anti Pornography and Pornographic Acts (RUU-APP), the PKS's behavior in government was by and large power-oriented. For example, it supported the unpopular government policy of increasing the oil price under heavy criticism from its own supporters; it formed an independent committee to investigate the government's policy of importing rice from Vietnam, because this decision had bypassed the Minister of Agriculture, who was from the PKS. And finally, it won many regional elections in coalition with both Islamic and secular parties.

The changing pattern of PKS behaviors is an indication that the democratization process in Indonesia is working, and that political institutions have been able to provide a sense of certainty for political actors—especially the Muslim ones—to conduct interactions, transactions and collaborations according to formally codified rules, motivating them to act

rationally and cooperatively in pursuing political objectives. More importantly, as far as the PKS's behavior are is concerned, the democratic system works quite substantively, in terms of providing a system of competition that stimulates the party not only to formulate a platform and policy programs following the preferences of its constituents, but also to deliver what it promised during the election campaign. Democratization has been able to convince the PKS that the only way to advance its political cause is by acting democratically and by following the rules, even though this sometimes contradicts the party's ideological tenets. Unless there was increasing stability in democratic institutions, it would be unlikely that the PKS would declare itself to have an open membership for people from different religions. This is particularly so, since the party is pursuing Islamization programs, and one of its membership requirements is that one needs to read the '*shahadah*', which makes one—at least formally—become a Muslim. Likewise, democratization would explain the fact that, although the PKS have the highest percentages of women candidates and it appoints female activists and politicians in every section of its organization—including in the traditionally male-dominated *Shariah Council*—it still holds unequal conceptions of gender relations.

Using Douglas North theory of cognitive new-institutionalism, this research found that the discrepancy between the PKS ideological aspirations and its actual behaviors is not a result of a deliberate plan or hidden agenda to cheat democratic game. But rather it indicates an unavoidable influence of institutions on the behaviors of rational actors. As rational actors, PKS politicians are subject to the law of human cognitions. Seeking to maximize their interests and to minimize risks, the Islamist politicians who participate in a consolidating democratic game have no other choice than to comply with the agreed rules of the game, to the extent that they have to compromise their ideological principles.

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