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KFN

Fear of Crime and Criminal Victimization

Edited by
Wolfgang Bilsky, Christian Pfeiffer, and
Peter Wetzels

Enke

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Errata

p. 99 last line, should read:

... As an alternative *hypothesis, one could conjecture that fear about "violent crimes" and, say, fear about "property* crimes" are really ...

p. 174 Copies of Attachment A should be requested from the author.

Preface

Early in 1991, the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN) was given the task of carrying out a representative survey of victims throughout Germany by the Federal Ministry for the Family and Senior Citizens (BMFuS). The aim of this survey, entitled *Feeling of Personal Safety, Fear of Crime and Violence and the Experience of Victimization amongst Elderly People*, is to gain knowledge about the extent and the structure of self-reported criminal victimization. More specifically, comparing elderly with younger people with regard to the risk of victimization, the spread and expression of fear of crime, and the connection between victims' experiences and fear of crime is a core feature of this study. In addition, analyzing the meaning of victims' experiences and fear of crime in terms of their day-to-day lives, their feelings of well-being and their personal feelings of safety with reference to relevant theory is another topic of research.

Aside from earlier regional studies, three victim surveys have recently been completed in the Federal Republic of Germany: (1) The German section of the International Crime Survey (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990; Kury, 1991a). (2) A comparative victim survey in the old and new Federal States following the opening of the border; this survey was carried out in 1990 by the Max-Planck- Institut, Freiburg, in cooperation with the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA; cf., Kury, 1991b). (3) A victim survey carried out in 1991 by Boers, Ewald, Kerner, Lautsch and Sessar (1991). Distinctions between these three recent studies on the one hand, and the KFN study on the other - alongside methodological aspects - fall into three main categories:

Victim surveys available until now have so far offered no representative knowledge about the specific group of *elderly people* over 60 years of age for the whole of Germany. However, specifically in this age group, the results of the Anglo-American research point to a possible theoretical and policy related Fear Victimization Paradox (cf., Kreuzer, 1991). This suggests that the risk of victimization seems to be ever lower, whilst, paradoxically, the fear of crime seems to be more strongly marked in elderly people in comparison with younger people. However, these connections have yet to be fully justified because we do not have sufficient empirical knowledge about the dark figure of victimization specific to elderly people. They need, together with more widely descriptive investigations, a particular analysis which includes intervening variables. In this context, age-related differences with respect to social integration, the availability of social support systems, and coping competencies, to name but a few, come to mind. The KFN Victim Survey would like to offer some theory led empirical analyses in this respect for the whole of Germany.

In the KFN Victim Survey, the area of *intra-family victimization* is especially emphasized. Among other things, this is achieved by referring back to knowledge and methods from the field of family violence research. Until today, this branch of research has been largely ignored by criminologists, although it has expanded into a major research programme in the USA in the last two decades (cf., Hotaling, Straus, & Lincoln, 1990; Straus & Gelles, 1990). This probably implies a neglect of additional factors, influencing fear of crime, attitudes to crime and crime control, methods of

coping with being a victim of crime, and the needs of victims. Particularly with respect to the group of elderly people, inclusion of experiences of family victimization can be especially important. Thus, the KFN Survey presents a starting point for a critical reexamination of the thesis of a small rate of victimization among elderly people.

Alongside the investigation of *public opinion on current criminal justice issues* relating to criminalisation and alternative criminal reactions to delinquency, a detailed study of *attitudes to crime control* is included within the framework of the KFN Survey. This study focusses on the purpose and severity of punishment, preferences for reacting to crime and the readiness to report crime.

The design of the KFN Victim Survey came about as a result of extensive preparations: In spring 1991, the KFN organized a *workshop* with experts from the USA, Canada, Great Britain, Switzerland and Germany. This workshop was held in Hannover and sponsored by the BMFuS. It provided important ideas for the theoretical grounding of the study, the construction of special parts of the research instrument, and the methodological approaches.

The revised papers and statements that were discussed during our meeting in Hannover are summarized in this reader. They range from reports about the authors' own experiences with specific problems of research to broad theoretical and methodological reviews. The texts presented on our workshop are supplemented by two contributions from colleagues, Helmut Kury and Vince Sacco, who could not participate in our meeting, but who were nevertheless willing to share their expertise, and, thus, definitely promoted our joint venture.

Of course, the whole project would not have been possible without the financial support of the BMFuS and the stimulus and help of many colleagues. Alongside those contributing to this book, the following should be named: Our colleagues who worked on this project from ZUMA Mannheim, Susanne Augustin, Margrit Rexroth, Hans-Jürgen Hippler, and Michael Schneid, and from GFM-GETAS, Barbara von Harder and Wolfgang Schulz. As our partners, they dealt with our questions and wishes very willingly and promptly and contributed over and above what was required for the development of this questionnaire. Günther Kräupl and Britta Schubel from the University of Jena supported us at short notice in conducting the pilot study in the new Federal States. Further people, who helped with advice and criticism are Edwin Kube, Michael C. Baurmann, Uwe Dörmann, Monika Plate, and Rüdiger Weiß from the BKA; Theresia Brechmann, Bielefeld, and Uwe Ewald, Berlin. Last not least, Doris Habenicht, Kirsten Riedel, Wolfgang Raczek and several anonymous helpers spent lots of hours patiently translating and editing the texts in this book.

Hannover, June 1993

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INTRODUCTION

Crime and Crime Control from the Elderly People's Point of View

Christian Pfeiffer

Introduction

There are few definite answers in the Federal Republic to the question of the extent to which elderly people are the victims of crime, and whether they are affected in any specific way by fear of crime. Unlike in Britain and America, representative national surveys on criminal victimization have been carried out only recently (Boers, Ewald, Kerner, Lautsch, & Sessar, 1991; van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990; Kury, 1991a, 1991b). However, they do not pay special attention to the situation of the elderly.

Furthermore, little is known about the elderlies' attitudes towards and beliefs about crime and crime control - neither before nor after the opening of the German-German border. Since preconditions of criminal policy have changed completely with the German reunification, information about the public's acceptance of official measures of prevention and intervention is of particular interest with respect to policy planning.

Public Opinion

Currently, the scarce information on public opinion and attitudes toward crime is probably best reflected by data from a study conducted by the Emnid Institute. In 1989, on behalf of the so called 'Violence Commission of the German Government', this institute posed various questions to a representative sample of the population of the Federal Republic. Within the framework of this study, the population sample was asked the following question:

> In 1982 about 115,000 Federal citizens were victims of violent crimes. Do you think that, over the past few years, this figure has: fallen considerably, fallen, remained the same, increased or increased considerably?

According to Police Criminal Statistics, the correct answer would be "fallen". Between 1982 and 1988, these statistics show a small but continuous decline from about 115,000 to about 109,000 victims of violence. Only 3% of those aged 65 and over expected this result. 16% assumed the situation had stayed the same, 67% answered "increased", and 12% "considerably increased". In comparison with other age groups, it is clear that *estimates of trends in violent crime* become increasingly less realistic with increasing age when compared to these statistics. Actually, even in the 18-21 age group, whose answers most clearly resembled reality, only 33% thought that the

number of victims of violent crimes had slightly fallen or remained the same. Nevertheless, the difference to the answers given by those aged 65 and over, is considerable.

Within the framework of the above mentioned Emnid study, there were also clear age related differences in responses on questions of *criminal policy*. The older the respondent, the more they favoured, for example, the death penalty - 40% of those aged 65 and over as against only 22% of those aged less than 22. As age increases, so too does the willingness to permit the police to "go beyond the bounds of existing law" in dealing with violent demonstrators. The answers ranged here from 17% in agreement amongst juveniles to 27% amongst the over 65 age group.

The findings that elderly people in the Federal Republic are considerably more conservative in their views on criminal policy than members of younger age groups does not mean, however, that it is the ageing process which is responsible for these different viewpoints. In addition to the ageing process, the longitudinal effects of previous socialisation experiences may be relevant. It must be born in mind that today's 70 year olds were influenced in their views as young people by National Socialism. At that time the death penalty, for example, was used for a broad spectrum of offences. The fact that this age group now professes more often to supporting the death penalty may also be a consequence of its different socialisation experience with respect to criminal policy.

In the Federal Republic, research into this question will be particularly important because those over 60 will form an increasing proportion of the voting population over the next 20 to 30 years. If it is shown that elderly people have considerably different views on criminal policy than younger people, then the demographic changes in the Federal Republic could produce a greater orientation in criminal policy towards the views of the elderly. This in turn may seriously restrict the scope for action in opening up the juvenile criminal law to new ways of reacting to offences. For example, this could apply to offender-victim reparation, which is now being applied in an attempt to deal better with the victim's interests and problems than established criminal procedure. One aim of the planned study would, therefore, be to obtain information on which groups of elderly people in particular tend to reject such reforms and for what reason. Information could thus be obtained about how to proceed if the objectives of such reforms are to be effectively explained to elderly people and how their agreement for correspondingly related criminal policy could be secured.

The *state of scientific knowledge* with respect to the above outlined research questions must be regarded as very unsatisfactory as far as the Federal Republic is concerned. In particular the Emnid survey was only able to determine the population's opinions towards and experiences of a very small part of crime. Furthermore the sample of 2012 - of which only 222 were aged 65 or more - is at the lower limit of what may be considered acceptable for a national representative survey of attitudes. The findings can, therefore, only be used as an initial indication of age related differences in attitudes and opinions about crime. Thus they should only serve to provide initial reference points for the plausibility of the following *initial hypothesis* of the proposed research project.

The feeling of being threatened by crime, which is particularly characteristic in elderly people, often goes hand in hand with a greater readiness, in contrast to younger people, to employ stronger measures to fight crime and to provide the police with extensive powers of intervention and control.

The General Role of the Mass Media

Aside from the content of attitudes and opinions, the way they come into being is of additional interest. In this context the possible impact of mass media on public opinion needs special consideration.

By way of example, the tabloid newspaper 'Bild' published, on 18 March 1990, a detailed article on the criminal statistics for 1989 under the headline "Be careful when the doorbell rings - it could be your murderer". The subtitle read: "Violent crime in Germany - ever increasing, ever more brutal". The basis of the article was a press release issued by the Federal Ministry of the Interior which, however, is scarcely recognisable in the 'Bild' article. The Ministry of the Interior correctly pointed out that in 1989, as in previous years, serious crimes of violence, such as homicide, rape, crimes involving firearms, bank robbery, theft from residential premises and burglary involving a particular threat to residents, had again noticeably declined. This information was withheld from the 'Bild' reader as was the fact that crime overall had not increased in recent years. Instead, the article presented a selection of specific pieces of information which were supposed to support the overall evaluation - "Soon it'll be like New York here" - a quote attributed to an unnamed police officer.

The article, which was interspersed with certain pieces of false information, was introduced by two examples which are particularly likely to disconcert elderly people:

> The Hamburg pensioner, Karl Steffen (81), was strangled by a 'door bell' gangster with an electric cable. The murderer's haul: DM 202. A burglar rang at Paul (88) and Elisabeth L's (96) home. When these old people opened the door they were immediately stabbed with a kitchen knife. The haul: a gold chain worth DM 120. Superintendent Peter Walter: 'The criminal's inhibitions are falling. Now they are prepared to murder someone for just a few marks'. Be careful when the doorbell rings - it could be your murderer!

Such articles are not uncommon in the popular press in the Federal Republic of Germany. Reports of disasters and horror stories about murder sell much better than the good news that premeditated homicides recorded by the police have steadily fallen from a high point in 1982 of 3012 cases, to 2385 cases in 1989. It presumably cannot be ruled out that elderly people in particular, who have only a limited freedom of action and therefore rely to some extent on the information offered by the mass media for constructing their views of social reality, are strongly influenced by such articles.

American scientists (e.g., Friedberg, 1983) partly support the thesis that the development and the extent of fear of crime are strongly influenced by the mass media. They were actually able to show that people who watched a lot of television, particularly films containing shocking images of crime, were more affected by fear of crime than people with low *television consumption*. Fattah and Sacco (1989, pp. 221), however, rightly point out that such correlation measurements do not prove a cause-effect relationship. Straka, Fabian, and Will (1990), in their research into the attitudes of old people to using the media, were able to show the range of different functions which television fulfills, which not only casts doubt on a simple cause-effect relationship between the use of the media and its effects, but similarly undermines the possibility of a direct, one-dimensional relationship between current social situation and attitude towards the use of the media (Straka, Fabian, & Will, 1990; Fabian, 1990). With these caveats in mind, additional research on the interrelation of the media use and the public's view of crime and crime development seems both necessary and imperative.

Aside from an overall impact of media on public opinion in general and on the elderly in particular, differential effects must be considered as well. Thus, elderly people are supposed to react in different ways to press reports such as those cited above. Some will not let themselves be influenced by such threatening information in their assessment of the reality of crime and their personal risk of falling victim to a violent crime. Others will react with increased fear and, in certain circumstances, alter their behaviour accordingly.

When attempting to discover the personal characteristics which may lead to the second reaction, it will be necessary to consider both people's predispositions and attitudes and their social situation. For example, it seems possible that a newspaper article similar to the one above can cause a considerable reaction amongst readers whose general emotional state is characterised by more pessimistic or resigned attitudes towards life. Because of failing health which often accompanies increasing age, elderly people may be more prone to translate threatening news into increased fear, without even checking the factual content of the news. If, in addition, they have little contact with other people and, therefore, have little opportunity to express their fears and receive correct information by those better informed, a combination of mutually reinforcing factors can consequently lead to a serious increase in the fear of crime. In this context, social integration, the availability of social support systems and the effect of possible consequential changes related to age in resources to help people cope with crime and the behaviour of people trying to cope with crime, come to mind as variables mediating opinions, attitudes and fear. Evidence for this line of reasoning can be found in various American research studies (cf., Sacco, 1985a, 1985b; Eve & Eve, 1984).

Research Perspectives

Alongside the investigation of opinions on *current criminal justice issues* relating to criminalisation and alternative criminal reactions to delinquency, a detailed study of *attitudes to crime control* is planned to follow within the framework of the KFN Survey. It will focus on the purpose and severity of punishment, on the readiness to report crime and on preferences for reacting to crime.

Thus, after questions assessing the severity and aims of punitive reactions to crime as a whole, a series of questions on the readiness to report using fictional cases will be asked. Then preferences for different reactions to different crimes will be surveyed, using vignettes. By systematically varying the cases presented in terms of offence and offender characteristics, it will be possible to test for the effects of age, sex, previous convictions and compensation on reaction preferences. Finally, a series of questions on reporting behaviour and motives, as well as attitudes to concrete reactions to own factual experiences of victimization will be asked.

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Blanks and Open Questions in Survey Research on Fear of Crime

Wolfgang Bilsky

During the past twenty years there has been considerable interest in fear of crime and related problems, both in North America and in Europe. This interest is reflected in a large number of research reports and publications on this topic (cf., Bernard, 1992; Boers, 1991; Fattah & Sacco, 1989; Garofalo, 1981; Maxfield, 1984; Winkel & van der Wurff, 1990). In the face of this development, the question arises whether and to what extent an additional study can contribute to the information aggregated thus far. This paper sketches out some considerations which are central in answering this question.

Conceptual Analysis

At first glance, the term 'fear of crime' suggests that research conducted under this label deals with one homogeneous concept. Closer inspection reveals, however, that quite a few analytical dimensions or facets can be distinguished:

With regard to the *criminal act*, for instance, distinguishing property from personal crime is supposed to be useful when elaborating on fear of crime. This distinction is well established in criminological literature (cf., Skogan, 1987); it points to different targets of a criminal act as well as to different costs incurred by the victim. Being a victim of theft, robbery, or assault are examples that convey an intuitive understanding of this distinction.

Closer examination of the *costs* incurred by a victim suggests a further refinement of the fear concept (Fattah & Sacco, 1989). While theft is normally associated with the anticipation of material loss, robbery often results in both material loss and physical harm. In addition, psychological impairment of the victim can often be observed in the latter case. Finally, assault is likely to result in high physical as well as psychological costs (strain and anxiety). A similar distinction is made by Young (1991, p. 30) who identifies three primary injuries that cause major distress to victims: financial injury or loss, physical injury or loss, and emotional trauma.

Looking at a person's *reaction* opens a third perspective on fear of crime. From this perspective, differentiating between affective, cognitive, and behavioral modes of reaction is not only a conceptually useful but a necessary specification of fear reactions. As in other domains of research (e.g., in attitudinal research; McGuire, 1985), reactions belonging to different modalities may either covary or differ substantially, depending on the respective situation. Consequently, this conceptual distinction is of considerable importance with respect to the choice of adequate measurement procedures.

Concentrating on the victim and the criminal act without paying attention to the *offender* and the situational *context* would omit consideration of the dynamic character of crime. Although, according to lay concepts of delinquency, crime is likely to be specified as an illegal outdoor activity of a stranger, this is only part of the truth. As known from criminological research, there are many different forms of intrafamily violence, for instance, that clearly conform to legal definitions of crime. Nevertheless, these acts are very often labelled differently, and relatives, close friends, and family members are rarely called criminals in everyday language.

This short sketch has shown that fear of crime is a collective term used for summarizing some more or less related manifestations of fear. Consequently, a thorough conceptual analysis is a necessary first step in identifying theoretically and/or pragmatically significant dimensions of fear of crime. Next these dimensions must be explicitly and systematically defined in such a way as to make empirical studies possible and to specify those particular aspects of fear that are subject to empirical analysis. In the past, however, quite a few studies on fear of crime have been conducted without adequately analyzing and defining their research objective prior to empirical investigation. The validity of these studies is at best questionable, therefore.

Operationalization

Even if the complexity of fear of crime has been adequately considered in conceptual analyses, this does not mean that operationalizations used in empirical studies satisfy the same standards of complexity. Problems arising from inadequate operationalization are illustrated in Figure 1. This figure is a modification of the Brunswick lense model referred to by Wittmann (1988) in his work on reliability theory. Wittmann used this model for illustrating asymmetrical relations of predictors to criteria which are detrimental to predicting behavior. In this context, however, the asymmetry of concept and indicators is the focus of concern.

As can be seen on the *concept* side of Figure 1, we conceive fear of crime as a general construct that is made up of a number of more specific subconcepts. Following the conceptual analysis sketched out above, for example, one out of several possible ways to distinguish subconcepts of fear is to refer to the (predominant) anticipated costs resulting from a criminal act, i.e., material, physical, or psychological. Likewise, subconcepts may be differentiated according to the type of criminal act (i.e., personal and/or property crime), according to the modality of the respective fear reaction (i.e., affective, cognitive, or behavioral), and so forth. Of course, these subconcepts should not be understood as mutually exclusive. Rather, they represent different perspectives that can be taken by the researcher in order to take fully account for the complexity of the phenomenon under study. These subconcepts, in turn, may be further differentiated into specific fear responses.

On the *indicator* side of this figure, (questionnaire) items are assigned to the lowest level of complexity; they are supposed to cover specific fear responses but do not adequately mirror the

respective subconcept of fear. This can be achieved by aggregating items into homogeneous scales, however. The complexity of the general fear concept can only be represented by using the whole set of scales. These can be related to each other on a higher order level of statistical analysis in order to arrive at an overall picture of fear of crime. Figure 1 gives examples of both adequate (symmetric) and inadequate (asymmetric) relations between (sub-) concepts and indicators.

Figure 1: The hierarchical lens model, indicating symmetry between concept and indicator (cf., Wittmann, 1988)



Scanning the literature on fear of crime reveals that many if not most of the studies published in the seventies and early eighties are based on operationalizations of the asymmetric, i.e., inadequate, concept-indicator-type (for a critique, see Fattah & Sacco, 1989; Sacco, 1990; Smith & Hill, 1991). One of the most common measures of fear of crime, for example, is a dichtotomous response to the National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) question, "Is there any area near your home - that is, within a mile or so - where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?" (cf., Smith & Hill, 1991, p. 219). Not surprisingly, the validity of studies using only this kind of indicator is extremely limited. Despite the fact that multiple indicators have been increasingly employed in recent years (e.g., LaGrange, Ferraro, & Supancic, 1992; Smith & Hill, 1991), there is still considerable need for research that is grounded on both well defined concepts and adequately operationalized indicators of fear.

From Description towards Explanation

Realizing that people differ with respect to fear of crime and describing these differences systematically requires the aforementioned steps of conceptual analysis and operational definition. Of course, description is a necessary first step of scientific analysis. However, learning about the conditions of fear, i.e., learning about what factors affect and control fear, is of even more interest. Knowing such factors is a prerequisite for making predictions about the occurrence and the amount of fear to be observed in special classes of situations, thus moving from description towards explanation.

In past years, research has definitely profited from sociological studies, investigating the impact of variables like city of residence, neighborhood conditions, communication networks, etc., on fear of crime (cf., Garofalo, 1981; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). Concurrently, however, psychological research has been widely neglected (the study of Sacco & Glackman, 1987, on vulnerability, locus of control, and worry about crime is one of the few studies which deviate from this general trend). This is very surprising since decades of research on fear and anxiety, stress and coping, critical life events, loneliness, social support, to name but a few domains, could very well have contributed to a better understanding of fear of crime.

To get an idea of such contributions, Figure 2 sketches out Spielberger's (1972) model which summarizes some variables that influence fear reactions.

In addition to external stimuli, internal stimuli as well as cognitive and affective processes are determinants of the resulting fear reaction in the Spielberger model. According to this model, individuals are, for example, supposed to differ with respect to anxiety proneness. Thus, fear of crime may in part be attributable to differences in trait (as opposed to state) anxiety. Furthermore, beliefs and thoughts about ones own ability to deal with conflicts and about the probability of their occurrence are likely to differ between individuals, thus affecting the cognitive appraisal of a (supposedly) stressful situation. In addition, individual differences in specific coping competencies

and general coping styles may be another possible predictor of fear of crime (for more detail, see Fröhlich, 1983; Jerusalem, 1990; Laux, 1983).

This differential analysis could be expanded by including further variables, such as former victimization experiences, critical life events, etc. However, it should be evident by now that focusing only on external stimuli and social factors unduely restricts the explanatory approaches to fear of crime. Therefore, psychological variables should be paid more attention to in future studies.

Figure 2: Spielberger's process model of anxiety (cf., Spielberger, 1972)



Generalizability and Specificity

Investigating problems which are of particular importance for the subpopulation under consideration, i.e., the elderly, requires additional precautions in order to arrive at valid research results and interpretations. Of course, quite a lot of information on fear of crime and the elderly has been accumulated during the past decades (e.g., Fattah & Sacco, 1989; Goldsmith & Goldsmith, 1977; Yin, 1980). However, information concerning this special population cannot simply be generalized since the living conditions of the elderly vary across cultures and between countries. Furthermore, statements about a special population only make sense when compared to some common standard, i.e., some baseline data characterizing the population in general. Finally, even if both specific and standard information were available for the German (sub-) populations which

are of interest here, its utility would probably prove rather limited in the light of the rapid political and social changes in the Federal Republic of today, and it would therefore have to be supplemented and updated.

Context of Research

One final point must be made when discussing the necessity of additional research on fear of crime. Studying this phenomenon in isolation may result in overemphasizing its importance relative to more urgent topics. The present changes in Germany, for example, are likely to give rise to (existential) fear and anxiety, concerning housing, unemployment, health care, etc., at least for some parts of the population. These topics might doubtlessly eclipse other problems like fear of crime. The mere fact that fear of crime is currently widely discussed in the public domain cannot be taken as evidence of its importance as regards the individual's perspective. Instead, such discussions may result from agenda setting that is determined by political or other interests.

Of course, the general question of whether and to what extent fear of crime - as opposed to other topics of concern - is worthy of study cannot be answered without referring to a theoretically sound frame of reference that encompasses this particular phenomenon. To our knowledge, however, such a frame has not been used in past research in order to answer this question empirically. This is another gap in research that can only be filled by designing a comprehensive study that clearly goes beyond the mere assessment of fear of crime.

Research Perspectives

Having pointed to several questions left at least partly unanswered by past research, some suggestions are made on how to deal with them in future studies.

Firstly, in order to arrive at a viable definition of fear of crime, psychological theories on motivation as well as research findings on fear and anxiety should be taken into consideration. Expectancy x value theories, for instance, suggest distinguishing three broad components when dealing with fear of crime (cf., Heckhausen, 1980): available information about the probability of occurrence of a criminal act (i.e., perceived risk), anticipatory evaluation of this event given that it does occur (i.e., subjective costs), and behavior (resulting fear reaction).

Secondly, the symmetry of the fear concept and the fear indicators used must be guaranteed in order to arrive at nonequivocal, valid results. This can be accomplished by making explicit which of the fear dimensions, distinguished conceptually and prior to measurement, can be assessed by the instruments employed. Depending on the theoretical approach and the research objectives, different dimensions might prove useful. One promising way to analyze crime is to understand it as a special form of interpersonal interaction, namely conflict (Christie, 1977). If so, at least the

following dimensions should be distinguished: agents (victim and offender characteristics), criminal act (classified according to the injury incurred, judicial categories, etc.), and context (historical and situational, including local, temporal and social facets).

Thirdly, researchers should neither confine themselves to producing descriptive analyses (i.e., to 'tallying' the frequency and the intensity of self-reported fear of crime), nor to using only external (social) variables for predicting fear or crime. It is common knowledge that bystanders' (e.g., experts' or judges') classifications of external stimuli or situations as dangerous or risky need not coincide or even correlate with the afflicted individual's perception and reaction; this difference is reflected in distinguishing stress from strain in psychological literature (cf., Kahn, 1970; Spielberger, 1972). Consequently, individual (internal) indicators should also be used when trying to explain systematic variance in fear of crime. Variables such as trait anxiety (Hodapp, 1989; Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981), perceived coping competencies and coping styles (Krampen, 1991; Laux, 1983), critical life events (Filipp, 1990), interpersonal trust and attitudes towards crime and justice (Ouimet & Coyle, 1991; Wrightsman, 1991), loneliness (Russel, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980; Stephan & Fäth, 1989) should be considered as possible predictors. Of course the relative importance of predictors will vary, according to the population(s) under study. Thus, perceived loneliness might be an effective predictor as regards the elderly when compared to middle-aged persons, but may be a poor one when comparing the middle-aged to juveniles.

Fourthly, embedding research on fear of crime in a more general scientific frame of reference is a necessary precondition for judging both its social and political relevance. Understanding fear of crime as a negatively evaluated deviation from an otherwise neutral or positive state of being (cf., Bayley, 1991) seems to be an adequate approach to this objective. If it is chosen, research on well-being (e.g., Abele & Becker, 1991; Levy, 1990; Strack, Argyle, & Schwarz, 1991) may serve as the respective wider frame of reference within which to locate fear of crime. According to Mayring (1991), at least four aspects of well-being should be differentiated as outlined in Figure 3.

Following this taxonomy, fear of crime and lack of strain can be understood as complementing each other. However, fear of crime is not the only factor that causes strain. Thus, relating it to those factors investigated in former studies and known to negatively affect well-being provides a sound empirical and theoretical basis for conducting studies on fear of crime.

The fifth and final suggestion on how to conduct further studies on fear of crime relates to the methodological approach that might be chosen when trying to transform theoretical reasoning into testable hypotheses. Since facet theory (FT) developed by Louis Guttman (1957) is an integral approach to the construction of theory and the analysis of data, it is particularly useful for the construction of instruments required in this research project (cf., Bilsky, 1991; Borg, 1990, 1992). Therefore, some of its core features are sketched out briefly (for a detailed discussion, see Borg, in this book).

Figure 3: Aspects of well-being (cf., Mayring, 1991, p. 53)



In this context, the term facet is used for specifying one particular aspect which is supposed to be theoretically relevant when observing a phenomenon of scientific interest. Categories used for describing this aspect of the observation (i.e., the elements of the facet) must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.

Facetting of theoretically relevant variables can be found throughout the criminological and sociological literature in discussions of victim related problems (although neither under this name nor with reference to Guttman's approach). Kiefl and Lamnek (1986), for example, attempted to classify offences according to victim variables. The multi-dimensional typology presented by these authors contains four content facets (type of victim, type of relationship victim has with offender, power differential between offender and victim, and involvement of the victim in the offence) which are further specified by a varying number of elements (3, 4, 2 and 5, respectively) for each incident (cf., Table 1).

Identifying theoretically relevant facets, however, is only the first step to be taken in FT orientated research. In a second step, the logical relations among the facets as well as among their elements are defined. This is done by specifying the formal relation of the facets under investigation in a so-called mapping sentence. Such a sentence can be read from top to bottom like a sentence in ordinary language by combining the appropriate elements (1...n) of the different facets (A...Z) in order to specify a special case of the phenomenon under study.

Having specified research questions accordingly, the researcher is finally able to check whether his conceptual distinctions are reflected by empirical observations. This can be accomplished by applying a variety of multidimensional scaling procedures (MDS) to the empirical data.

To our understanding, the suggestions outlined above directly emerge from a review of past research on fear of crime. Therefore, they are not meant to be some general, more or less vague and non-committal proposals for future studies. Instead, they briefly summarize some central aspects of our reasoning on how to conduct our own research on fear of crime and feelings of personal safety (see Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, in this book).

Table 1: *Classification of offences according to victim variables*
(cf., Kiefl & Lamnek, 1986, p. 127)

Offence	Victim type	Offender-victim relationship	O-V power difference	Victim involvement
	1 = individual 2 = group 3 = organisation	1 = none 2 = one way 3 = casual 4 = stable	1 = large 2 = small	1 = none 2 = slight, unintentional 3 = intentional 4 = victim instigated offence 5 = false victim
Homicide	1	4, 3, 2	1	2, 3, 1, 4
Grievous bodily harm	1	4, 3, 2, 1	1, 2	2, 3, 1, 4
Child abuse	1	4	1	1, 2
Rape	1	3, 2, 4	1	2, 1, 5
Sexual abuse of children	1	2, 3	1	2, 3, 1, 4
Incest	1	4	1, 2	2, 3, 4, 5
Theft	1, 2, 3	1, 2, 3, 4	2	2, 1
Burglary	1, 2, 3	2, 1, 3	2	2, 1
Robbery	1	2, 1	1	1, 2
Car theft	1, 3	1, 2	2	2, 1
Fraud	1, 2, 3	3	2	2, 3, 4, 1
Economic offence	3, 2, 1	2, 3, 1	2, 1	2, 1
Extortion	1, 3	2	1	4, 2, 1
False accusation	1	4, 2	2	2
Environmental offences	2	1	1	1
Vandalism	3, 1	2	1	2

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Victimization Experiences in Close Relationships: Another Blank in Victim Surveys[1]

Peter Wetzels

Introduction

With the "rediscovery of the victim" during the forties victimology as a subdiscipline of criminology emerged (cf., v. Hentig, 1948; Kaiser, 1989). Since the middle of the sixties a great number of victim surveys have been conducted in several - mainly western - countries (cf., Kaiser, Kury, & Albrecht, 1991; Kury, Dörmann, Richter, & Würger, 1993). Data on criminal victimization accumulated from surveys of representative random samples of the general population were seen as a means of overcoming the "double-edged bias" of the official crime statistics by providing "... information on victims, offenders, and relationships between them of far greater scope and detail, and in more directly usable form, than is the case with data from official records" (Biderman, 1975, p. 157).

The types of criminal incidents which can be captured in victim surveys are restricted by the sampling procedure and the method of data collection to those incidents which have been experienced individually by the interviewees and which can be recalled in retrospective questioning. Within this subset of criminal incidents, however, victim survey research strives to paint a picture as complete as possible of the crime burden of a given society.

In this article we will describe factors which may contribute to the fact that victimization experiences within the family are largely underrecorded in official crime statistics. These contributing factors so far have been only partly overcome in victim surveys. Existing victim surveys suffer from a systematic underestimation of the prevalence of victimization within close relationships between offender and victim.

Since victimizations within close relationships are not equally distributed across the general population, this underestimation disproportionately affects certain subsets of the population - especially old people and women. Therefore past victim surveys are plagued with a systematic methodological error and thus offer a distorted picture of the relative frequency of certain types of victimization.

This error is relevant to the theoretical explanation of fear of crime. The well-known high fear-low victimization paradox (see Fattah, in this book) might be the result of inadequate methods of

[1] I am especially grateful to Wolfgang Bilsky, Ezzat Fattah, and Agnes Roemer for reading and commenting on the manuscript and their joint help in translating this article.

data gathering that tend to undercount victimization experiences in close victim-offender relationships. Consequently the "high fear - low victimization" paradox may simply be a methodological artefact of previous victim survey research.

To correct the problem we propose an integration of methods used in the area of family violence research into the empirical research on victimization experiences within criminology. Following a criticism of the vagueness, inconsistencies, and lack of precision in the operational definition of the term "family" as used in family violence research, we will then focus on the distinction between close vs. non-close relationships as a central dimension of victim-offender relations.

Normative ambiguity concerning the evaluation of the same behavior within different relationships, as well as the vagueness of evaluative terms such as "violence" and "abuse" that are used in family violence research are further obstacles which so far have prevented an integration of both areas of research. A classification of individual victimization, which can be applied to different social relations between victims and offenders will be proposed as an alternative approach. Finally, consequences for the structuring of the interview setting and the development of the survey instruments for the planned KFN Victim Survey will be described.

Underreporting and Underrecording of Intrafamily Victimization in Police Crime Statistics

Research on police responses to domestic violence bears out a rather high demand for police services in the area of domestic violence (Buzawa & Buzawa, 1990, p. 10). Despite this, there is a very *poor record-keeping* of such incidents (Smith, 1990, p. 40), resulting in a significant distortion of official crime statistics. This could be due to the fact, that police officers are rather reluctant to intervene within the privacy of the family. Of relevance in this context are the prevalent attitudes among law enforcement officers, according to which certain behaviors should remain private if they take place within the family, even when they are undoubtedly crimes according to the criminal law (Steffen, 1987). Such attitudes act as a systematic informal filter. This selection leads for example to an overly high proportion of violence within families never becoming subject of official investigation and recording (Janssen, 1991). Such cases - even when they become known to the police or the district attorney - are not treated and recorded in the same way as offences occuring outside the family. Furthermore, reports of victims in cases of violence within the family are often seen as not reliable or provable and are therefore not at all or not as intensively acted upon.

Additionally, a high proportion of the incidences of intrafamily victimization *is not reported to the police*. Help from the police is not the first to be sought (Bowker, 1983; Smith, 1990). The stigma of victimization could induce reluctance to admit being victim in cases of marital rape or a serious assault by a cohabitant. In case of reciprocal victimization the belief that the behavior of the other may have been justified might contribute to non-reporting too. On the victims' side internal causal

attributions as well as self blaming are psychological processes interfering with selfdisclosure, thus leading to non-reporting too (Weis, 1982). Furthermore, incompatibilities between legal definitions and society's view of certain matters as private are also relevant to the victim's evaluation of a family victimization experience as criminal or non-criminal. Finally, victims' beliefs, that the police or the court might not find their complaints credible may also affect the likelihood of reporting.

These are only some of the factors that negatively affect the reporting and recording of certain kinds of criminal victimization, i.e. crimes which occur in the social context of an intimate relationship between victim and offender. High underreporting to the police combined with poor record-keeping by the police can thus be seen as the result of an interaction between selective filtering processes by the official system and judgements of the victims themselves. As a consequence, the proportion of unrecorded and unreported crimes in the area of criminal victimization within the family is particularly high (Smith, 1990, p. 7; Langan & Innes, 1986).

Victimization in Close Relationships: The Conceptual Failure of Victim-Surveys and its Consequences

While data on victimization derived from crime survey research are not distorted by record failures inside the police system, the operationalization of victimization as a legally defined criminal act produces problems of non-reporting for survey research as well.

As we have pointed out earlier (Bilsky & Wetzels, 1992; Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, in this book), there is only partial overlap between victimization defined according to legal categories and individual feelings of victimization resulting from perceived injustice or injuries. Consequently, victims may perceive acts which are criminal according to legal definitions as a just response to their own behavior or as an acceptable kind of conduct, which is to be tolerated. Thus these behaviors are not evaluated as criminal and are not reported to interviewers when the main focus of questioning is on crime. The amount of overlap between legal definitions and individual standards of evaluation, which is central to reporting, varies intra- and interindividually. It depends on the type of victim-offender relationship. This overlap is probably especially low in cases of close victim-offender relationships.

Evidence for this can be found in the results of record-check studies of survey interviews. These studies demonstrated from the beginning, that property crimes were covered relatively reliably, while in the case of assault, victim-survey interviews failed to yield reliable results (Biderman, 1975). Crimes of sexual assault and crimes of violence involving nonstrangers in particular are likely to be underreported to survey interviewers (Block & Block, 1984).

Twenty years ago Biderman already argued that assaults

> "...in a high proportion involve as victim and offender family members, lovers, and others who have an ongoing social relationship to each other. ... 'crime' may not be the category of the mental card file under which that event is stored by the respondent and hence is not an event to which his memory associates when in the context of an interview about crimes, he is asked whether an event of a certain type happened to him" (Biderman, 1975, p. 162).

Although these results emerged already twenty years ago, suggesting that there is a systematic underreporting of crimes experienced in close relationships, they had no discernible influence on the design of victim survey questionnaires and the structuring of the interview setting. In all large-scale studies questions about experiences of physical violence, sexual victimization and property offences continued to be set in the context of crime. This was the case with the National Crime Survey (NCS) in the USA (US Department of Justice, 1989) as well as with the British Crime Survey (BCS) (Hough & Mayhew, 1985), the International Crime Survey (ICS) (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990) and recent crime-surveys conducted in Germany (Boers, Ewald, Kerner, Lautsch, & Sessar, 1991; Kury, 1991; Kury, Dörmann, Richter, & Würger, 1993).

The NCS screening questionnaire for example is introduced with the statement "Now I'd like to ask some questions about crime". Acts of physical violence, threats and property crimes are operationalized without reference to different social contexts of victim-offender relationships. Only after the screening and filtering are questions asked concerning the victim-offender relationship, which also include close relationships. The ICS screening questionnaire is introduced with a similar statement, indicating that the questions asked are related to crime. In the case of personal crimes the items contain clues about different environmental settings in which victimization may have occured, including the home of the respondents. Here again the clues do not refer to the social relationship between victim and offender and once again specific details about the victim-offender relationship are asked only after screening (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990, p. 155). The same order can be found in the first comparative crime survey carried out in the old and new Federal States in 1990 by the Max Planck Institute in Freiburg (MPI) in cooperation with the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) following the opening of the border of the former GDR (Kury, Dörmann, Richter, & Würger, 1993). This is also true for the crime survey carried out by Boers,Ewald, Kerner, Lautsch, and Sessar (1991) in the new Federal States.

With respect to the structuring of the interview situation, Hough and Mayhew (1985) admit, that the BCS for methodological reasons probably underestimates the rate of domestic assault. Underreporting to survey interviewers may have occured as a result of the interview setting. This setting with respect to intrafamily victimization involved the possibility of interviewees and their assailants being in the same room at the time of the interview (see Heidensohn, 1991). The same is true for all aforementioned crime surveys, because all employed face to face interviews.

Lynch (in this book) also points out, that the operationalization of victimization experiences as criminal incidents leads to a systematic underestimation of victimization in certain victim-offender relationships.

> "Many events that satisfy the conceptual definition of crime are not regarded as such by respondents because they are committed by intimates or acquaintances or because retribution is exacted instantaneously. These do not enter into the frame of reference when the respondent's mind is on crime" (Lynch, in this book, p. 173).

This systematic underreporting of certain victimization experiences in close victim-offender relationships is a kind of nonsampling error. More specifically, this failure occurs, because the questionnaires "may not effectively convey the frame of reference and the meaning of basic crime definitions" (Lynch, in this book, p. 173). Thus, this selective underreporting is the result of a *conceptual failure*.

Results of experimental studies with a special short-cue-screener (Lynch, in this book) suggest that underreporting has been reduced. They show clearly that higher rates of victimization in the area of violent offences have been reported, as well as a higher number of victimizations by known relatives as compared to the conventional screening questionnaire. But neither estimates of incidences of serious violent crimes by known relatives nor crimes of violence experienced by women were significantly higher (Lynch, in this book, p. 178). Altogether the improvements in recording due to the short-cue-screener concern mainly victimization experiences of male victims and incidents of lower intensity as, for example, attempted assault. These experiences are subject to faster forgetting. By increasing the density of cues, memory failures may be reduced effectively. But this optimization of cueing strategies only addresses memory failures and will not solve the problems of conceptual discrepancies. Thus the results reported by Lynch may be due to the fact, that crime remains as the frame of reference in the short-cue-screener. A further explanation could lie in the fact, that close relationships are not singled out as a social context of victimization which is an area of particular concern for the survey interview.

The aforementioned conceptual failure of victim surveys has certain consequences for research into fear of crime. The so called "high fear - low victimization" paradox is well documented in the research literature (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981; Boers, 1991; Fattah, in this book). According to the results of most victim surveys, women and elderly people experience relatively low rates of criminal victimization, yet they express relatively high fear of crime compared to young men.

As mentioned before, victim surveys fail to measure victimization adequately when there is a close relationship between victim and offender. Furthermore several authors have argued that

> "...victimization patterns for men and women differ, both in the nature of the social settings within which victimizations typically occur and in the nature of the typical victim offender relationship" (Sacco, 1990, p. 486).

Results of the NCS, for example, indicate that most violent crimes by strangers were committed against males, while most crimes by relatives were committed against females (Timrots & Rand, 1987). Obviously the risk of victimization by non-strangers is not distributed equally across the general population. Thus the underreporting of criminal victimization by nonstrangers distorts the estimates of victimization risk for women and elderly people in particular. If sound empirical evidence could be found, proving that systematic underestimation of victimization risks for women and the elderly people is due to methodological problems, the high fear-low victimization paradox could be at least partially explained as a methodological artefact.

First empirical evidence for this hypothesis can be found in the Islington Survey (Jones, Maclean, & Young, 1986), a regional survey conducted in a district of London, in which - in contrast to large national victim surveys - domestic violence was specifically asked for. The results show a slightly higher rate of victimization for women, which coincided with a higher fear of crime.

Family Violence Research and Criminology

Coincidental with the development of crime-survey research the importance of intrafamily violence was increasingly recognized within the social sciences and became the subject of empirical research. In the sixties research efforts concentrated on physical child abuse. After Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, and Silver (1962) introduced the term "battered child syndrome", there was an increase in public awareness of children as victims of violence. In the sixties however most empirical studies were based on small clinical samples. At that time society, as well as social science, remained "selectively inattentive" to other forms of family violence (Gelles, 1980). In the seventies and eighties there was an exponential growth in the research on family violence, including children as well as partners, siblings and elderly people as victims of violence and maltreatment (Gelles, 1980; Gelles & Conte 1990; Straus, 1992). New estimates of incidence and prevalence of intrafamily victimization were based on methodologically more sophisticated studies, including the first US national survey on family violence in 1975 (Straus, Gelles & Steinmetz, 1980) and its replication in 1985 (Straus, 1990a).

Today family violence researchers constitute an established interdisciplinary scientific community. They represent a broad array of different disciplines (Hotaling, Straus, & Lincoln, 1990). Family violence research today is not only research on physical violence. Studies on sexual child abuse (Finkelhor, 1984) marital rape (Russel, 1990) as well as neglect, psychological abuse, and financial exploitation (Douglas & Hickey, 1983; Johnson, 1986) have also been conducted (Gelles & Conte, 1990; Straus, 1992). Consequently Straus feels that "family violence" is a misnomer. Although "family maltreatment" is seen as a more accurate term, "family violence" continues to dominate the field and is used by convention (Straus, 1992, p. 212).

Interestingly, family violence research in the past developed quite separately from criminological research in general and victim survey research in particular. At first glance this seems surprising,

taking into account, that most behaviors studied clearly meet legal definitions of certain criminal acts such as assault or rape. As Hotaling, Straus, and Lincoln (1990, p. 431) prosaically note:

> "Over the past ten years there have been sporadic reports of family violence researchers attending the meetings of criminological research societies. Likewise, there have been rumors of criminologists sighted at conferences on family violence research. Some people say, that they have actually witnessed family violence researchers and criminologists talking with one another, but there is no hard evidence that these events actually have taken place."

Results of family violence research were taken up by some criminologists (e.g. Fattah, 1989), but no systematic efforts were made to integrate theoretical models and methods used into crime survey research. This lack of integration of criminological and family violence research is, interestingly, restricted to research on nonlethal violence. There are criminological studies on family homicide (e.g. Wolfgang, 1958; Sessar, 1975, 1979) which indicate, that criminology - and especially victimology - has, for some time, been well aware of the significance of close victim-offender relationships for the emergence of crime and in some cases has also empirically analyzed this significance.

This exception provides some indication of where the causes for the insufficient integration of both research traditions are to be found. Homicidal offences are easily defined and distinguished, while in the area of non-lethal violence considerable difficulties of definition arise. Patterns of behavior that are clearly labelled violent and criminal when committed outside the family are tolerated by society if they occurred in minor intensity within the family. In the special context of family relations such violent behaviors are neither regarded as criminal by societal norms nor by criminological research. Hotaling, Straus, and Lincoln (1990, p. 435) argue, that this normative ambiguity is one of the factors that inhibit the integration of criminological research and family violence research.

In addition, problems associated with "criminalizing" (Hotaling, Straus, & Lincoln, 1990, p. 435) all intrafamily acts that meet the legal criteria of a criminal offence inhibit criminologists from integrating this kind of victimization experiences into their systematic empirical efforts. However, if individual victimization experiences are seen as theoretically relevant factors contributing, for example, to the explanation of psychological vulnerability (Sacco & Glackman, 1987) or fear, problems associated with criminalization and prosecution by the justice system operate as a kind of scissors in the mind of criminologists, hampering a sufficient empirical testing of theory. The reluctance to systematically integrate intrafamily victimization into empirical criminological research results in the exclusion of possible explanations of phenomena empirically observed, which, in turn, promotes incorrect or misleading conclusions.

Integration is furthermore hindered by conceptual confusion. In family violence research "abuse" has become a central concept. Abuse, however, is a very broad and vague term which encompasses many different forms of physical, sexual and psychological maltreatment, all under the same

general heading. "Abuse" is difficult to integrate into criminology, because it is neither clearly defined nor a clear-cut category of criminal offences. This term, in particular, exceeds the scope of victim survey research, focused as it is on legally defined types of victimization.

The same is true for the term "violence". Within family violence research there are discrepancies in the operational definitions of physical violence, making it difficult for criminology to empirically use this concept. While crime survey research adopts a fairly consistent definition of assault based on its legal definition, family violence researchers use a wide array of operational definitions. Some refer to certain violent acts, while others use injuries or syndromes of repetitive physical violence and psychological harm (Hotaling, Straus, & Lincoln, 1990, p. 434).

Despite these conceptual differences, we have to recognize that those family violence research projects which use measures of violent acts similar to the way assault is operationalized in victim surveys, yield results clearly different from those gained by victim surveys.

In the National Family Violence Resurvey (NFVR), for example, the Conflict Tactics Scales (CTS) were employed to measure violent acts (Straus, 1990d). The instrument is based on a definition of violence as acts carried out with the intention, or perceived intention, of causing physical pain or injury to another person (Straus, 1990b, p. 76). The CTS items ask about the frequency of occurrence of each of the violent acts during a given time period. In this the instrument is quite similar to those used in victim survey research.

Comparing the results of the NFVR and the NCS, Straus and Gelles (1990) found a huge discrepancy, with the NFVR prevalence rate of physical violence against a spouse being more than 73 times higher than the rate of the NCS. Positive results of validational studies (Straus, 1990c, 1990d) suggest that it is not reasonable to attribute such a huge discrepancy to overreporting in the NFVR. Another explanation given by Straus and Gelles (1990) seems much more plausible. Like Biderman (1975) Straus and Gelles state:

> "The most likely reason for the tremendous discrepancy lies in differences between the context of the NCS versus the other studies. The NCS is presented to respondents as a study of crime, whereas the others are presented as studies of family problems. The difficulty with a 'crime survey' as the context of determining incidence rates of intrafamily violence is that most people think of being kicked by their spouse as wrong, but not a 'crime' in legal sense." (Straus & Gelles, 1990, p. 99).

However, methodological differences between the NFVR and the NCS do not only result from different foci of the respondents' attention induced by questionnaire instructions. Another important difference is that the CTS used in the NFVR concerns incidents experienced in specified relationships, for example acts committed by husbands. This explicit specification of a certain victim-offender relationship seems to be of special significance from a psychology of memory

point of view - as we will see later on - when victimization experiences in close social relationships are of focal concern.

With respect to the need of specifying certain victim-offender relationships we are confronted with an additional problem in family violence research. There are confusing differences in the definition and operationalization of the victim-offender relationship under study. For example most studies of marital violence do not require a legal marital relationship to include subjects in the sample. Most refer to a man or woman in an intimate marriage-like relationship (Geffner, Rosenbaum, & Hughes, 1988, p. 461). While some authors use the term family violence (e.g. Straus, 1990a), others prefer domestic violence (e.g. Walker, 1985) or domestic abuse (e.g. Douglas & Hickey, 1983). A third term used is violence among intimates (e.g. Stark & Flitcraft, 1988). However, specifying which kind of victim-offender relationship is the focus of the empirical investigation is important to define the population under study (Weis, 1989). Furthermore it is essential to determine the central dimension of victim-offender relationship in order to avoid underreporting of victimization experiences to survey interviewers. This is the only way to get information about the adequate methods of investigation to increase the respondents' willingness to report. Knowledge about this dimension of victim-offender relationship is furthermore needed to develop adequate operationalizations of victimizing incidents, that are compatible with respondents' memory representations and meet their repertory of relevant cognitions.

In sum it seems quite promising on the one hand to integrate empirical methods used in family violence research into a victim survey, in order to overcome the shortcomings of previous victim survey research pertaining to the aforementioned conceptual failure. On the other hand, because of inconsistencies in family violence research, a conceptual framework is needed to specify the victimization experiences to be studied and the theoretically relevant dimension of the victim-offender-relationship to which problems of underreporting in crime survey research can be attributed.

Specifying the Victim Offender Relationship: The Concept of Close Relationship

There is a universe of social, economic, legal and psychological aspects, which characterize relations between victims and offenders. One distinction frequently made by criminologists is that between strangers and non-strangers as offenders (Timrots & Rand, 1987). However this is a rather arbitrary distinction, because the underlying criterion and the theoretical dimension relevant to victimization experiences are not clearly specified.

As mentioned before, family relationships seem to be associated with lower willingness to report victimization experiences within these relationships to survey interviewers. But the reason for this is still unclear. Therefore the question remains unanswered, which aspects of family relationships cause this kind of underreporting? Weis (1989), for example, points out, that at least three different kinds of relationships can come under the heading of family violence:

1. Kin relationship, i.e. victims and offenders are related through birth or marriage.
2. Intimate relationship, i.e. victims and offenders know each other in a close and personal way.
3. Domestic relationship, i.e. victims and offenders share the same household.

However these categories are not distinct, i.e. there are differences and inconsistencies in the use of the concept "family" and its operational definition.

Figure 1: Concepts of "Family" in family violence research



All of the aforementioned forms of relationships have one aspect in common: They differ from other relationships to persons known only peripherally or from non-relations (strangers) in the dimension of shared biographical experiences and intimacy. These are central elements of a psychological definition of family, which - in contrast to a genealogical or legal definition - is oriented towards the characteristic of a common life conduct (Schneewind, 1991). According to Schneewind (1991, p. 99) this common life conduct can be specified through the following four criteria:

1. Delimitation: Persons structure their joint life in delimitation to other persons, according to certain implicit or explicit rules in mutual reference.

2. Privacy: There exists a delimited life space, which allows the realisation of intimate interpersonal relationships.
3. Intimacy: Within the relationship physical, mental and emotional intimacy comes into being.
4. Continuity: There is a common time frame through reciprocal commitment, bonding and inclination towards longer-term duration.

In summary, systems of interpersonal relations which meet these criteria are characterized by a high degree of interpersonal involvement. We will call such interpersonal relations *"close relationships"*[2].

Figure 2: Dimensions of closeness



[2] The concept of "close relationship" as outlined here is very similar to the psychological definition of "family" given by Schneewind (1991) and to the operational definition of "family" as used by the Study Group on Violence against Elderly People (1992, p. 21). However, we prefer the term "close relationship" because "family" has been used inconsistently in the literature (see above).

Generally speaking three central dimensions of closeness can be defined, according to which all of these relations can be classified:

First of all, closeness can be the result of external social attribution processes (*alter*). Through normative settings from the outside the society ascribes for example closeness to marital partners, regardless of the quality of the marital relationship. Closeness can also be based on heredity (*nature*), i.e. result from biological relation as for example with children by birth. In this case closeness can develop even without common life conduct. Close relationships based only on biological bonds constitute a special case, since closeness here results not from actual shared biographical experiences and social interaction, but from biological bonds and their subjective representation. Lastly, closeness can be attributed by the persons themselves (*ego*), i.e. internally attributed to the relationship. Thus, for example, closeness is experienced in close friendships or non-marital partnerships, which are largely missing the two first mentioned dimensions of closeness.

Each of these three dimensions can contribute by itself or together to the attribution of closeness. A close relationship is at hand, if on at least one dimension the criterium in question is met. Of course a close relationship exists also, if on all three dimensions combined a critical measure of the attribution of closeness is reached.

In the experience of the persons themselves social relations can be distinguished according to the intensity of normative, socially attributed and/or subjectively experienced closeness. There is a continuum of closeness, but it is not possible to determine a priori for all possible cases, to which degree one or more of the three dimensions have to be present in order for the persons themselves to experience a relationship as close and as special in comparison to other relationships.

"Close relationship" is therefore a fuzzy concept, into which subjective and interindividually varying measures enter. This means, that in some cases marital partnerships, blood relationships, etc. might well not or not any more be experienced as close relationships. Graphically this can be shown with the following venn diagram, which depicts the different forms of "family", as they are operationally defined by family violence research as close relationships. The margin areas are necessarily fuzzy, since there exist relationships in each subset, which are generally described as "family", but which nontheless might not have developed into a close relationship.

In contrast to the rather vague term "family", the concept of close relationships makes it possible to subsume a large number of different relationships under one category. While these relationships may differ strongly in a legal or social sense, in a psychological sense they show significant similarities in relation to the four criteria specified by Schneewind. To name a few examples: marital relationship, natural parent-child relationship, foster parent or adoptive parent-child relationship, non-marital relationship, shared cohabitation, etc.

Of relevance for victimological questions is the fact, that within close relationships there exist special implicit and explicit rules for social interaction. Through these rules the delimitation of the relationship towards the outside is guaranteed, in order to allow privacy and intimacy. Therefore the rules about the evaluation of acts within the relationship are at least partially separated off from the outside. They can be of a very individual character and they may differ dramatically from general measures of social evaluation. This means, that the categories by which these acts are classified, evaluated, perceived, memorized and recalled may be very different from the evaluation and mnemonic representation of incidents experienced outside close relationships.

Figure 3: Close relationships



The psychological and social characteristics of close relationships have consequences for the method of surveying experiences of victimization within such relationships. In the first place, special instructions have to be placed in the survey instruments in order to show the interviewees, that acts and experiences within close relationships are the subject of the questioning. Secondly, while developing the research instrument, one has to take care not to use evaluative terms in operationalizing certain acts, because these might contradict the implicit or explicit rules existing inside close relationships. Thirdly, the survey instrument, as well as the interview setting, have to be designed in such a way as to allow the interviewees to talk about victimization experiences

within close relationships without risking a violation of delimitation and privacy, i.e. without endangering the relationship.

Classification of Criminal Victimization

Criminal victimization is a multidimensional construct. In addition to the aforementioned victim-offender relationship the behavior of the offender and the primary injuries experienced by the victim are important characterizing aspects.

According to Young (1991) victimization can result in three primary types of injuries experienced by the victim: Financial injury or loss, physical injury or loss and emotional trauma. Therefore in this dimension victimizations are classified with respect to the mode of distress, i.e. material, physical and psychological injuries.

Figure 4: Dimensions of individual victimization.



With respect to the behavior of the offender injuries can be caused by activity or passivity (see Fattah, 1989, p. 185). Consequently, in this dimension, victimizing incidents are classified with respect to the mode of the behavior of offenders.

In this three dimensional model every kind of crime committed against human beings can be included. However non-criminal victimizations are still included in this model too. Therefore we have to introduce a fourth evaluative dimension, which distinguishes incidents according to normative criteria derived from penal law.

The penal code as ultima ratio of law is intentionally incomplete. I.e. not every form of harmful behavior is penalized. There are incidents, which are not covered by the penal code, although they carry a high potential of physical and psychological injuries or material harm. This is the case especially with certain forms of psychological harassment, as for example the intentional segregation and debasing treatment of old people, as well as with certain kinds of sexual victimization, as for example rape within marriage, which in the FRG is not punishable as rape but only as sexual molestation. Another example would be the corporal punishment of children by their parents. This physically and psychologically damaging act within a close relationship is to a large extent not covered by criminal law.

The victimization incidents covered by the penal code can be further differentiated. The measure of penal rules in the FRG are "Rechtsgüter", which should be protected by the deterrence of criminal law sanctions. As main types of "Rechtsgutsverletzungen" (infringement of the legally protected individual rights) offences against other persons should be differentiated from offences against property. This differentiation concerning the direction of the criminal acts is however not unambigous, since mixed types exist. Holdups, for example, can be classified as an offence against another person as well as an offence against property.

Concerning the mode of offence, a further distinction can be made between primarily verbal vs. primarily physical acts. Sexual offences are a special type of physical acts, which intrude furthest into the area of individual privacy. Similar to Johnson (1986) we see sexual offences therefore as a special type of offence, i.e. a subset of primarily physical criminal acts.

Within the proposed fourdimensional model all victimization experiences that can happen to human beings can be clearly classified. For example a knife stabbing by a stranger would be classified as primarily physical injuring, active, criminal act, directed against the victim, and committed by an offender, with whom the victim does not have a close relationship. Legally this act is classified as grievous bodily harm (§§ 223, 223a, 224 StGB). If parents fail to feed their children, this is classified as primarily physically injuring, passive behavior, directed against another person with whom a close relationship exists. Such incidents, which are also labelled physical neglect, can actually take place only within a close relationship, since they presuppose an obligation to take care of the welfare of the victim. Legally they are recorded as a breach of parental obligations (§ 170d StGB).

Figure 5: Classification of criminal acts



The advantage of this kind of classification is that it is neither necessary to use evaluative terms (such as abuse or violence) nor to revert completely to abstract legal classifications in order to operationalize victimization experiences. It is possible to formulate different acts for each cell of the fourdimensional classification system and to ask for these in the context of a screening questionnaire.

The important aspect of the evaluation of such experiences concerning their intensity, their frequency, and the amount of damage experienced can be estimated by the interviewees themselves in a different subset of questions following the screening. Thus a rash selection, as well as denial due to discrepancy between individual standards of evaluation and evaluative terms used in the survey instrument, can be avoided.

Conclusion

So far one of the problems of victim-survey research has been the inadequate measurement of intrafamily victimization. In order to overcome this conceptual weakness of previous victim surveys, special attention has to be paid to incidents of victimization in close social relationships. We have looked at methodological experiences made in the area of family violence research and we have proposed to integrate these experiences into crime survey research.

This has consequences for the development of adequate survey instruments as well as for the structuring of the interview setting.

Concerning the survey instrument we propose the following improvements:

1. In order to capture victimization experiences in close relationships in the survey it is necessary to refer specifically to the area of close social relationships, so that the interviewees will know, that acts and experiences in this area are of particular concern for the interview. Therefore victimization experiences in close relationships should be surveyed with an additional specially developed questionnaire which in its instruction explicitly refers to such relationships. They should be operationalized as partnership, common living arrangements or blood relations.

2. In order to capture victimization experiences in close relationships it is also necessary to avoid incompatibilities between individual evaluative standards of the interviewees and the operationalizations of victim experiences in the screening questionnaire. Therefore the additional questionnaire should not be introduced as an instrument for recording "criminal" victimization experiences but rather as an instrument for the recording of behaviors in the context of conflicts in close relationships.

3. Incidents of victimization furthermore should be operationalized in the screening without either reference to their consequences or value judgements concerning their justification. The acts in question concern - parallel to the screening as used otherwise in crime surveys - verbal, physical and sexual acts. According to the proposed fourdimensional classification system of victimization, this includes criminal offences against other persons as well as criminal offences against property.

4. The nevertheless important aspects of evaluation concerning the intensity and the consequences of victimization experiences should not be part of the screening questionnaire, but should follow later.

One last advice concerns the structuring of the interview situation:

5. It is absolutely necessary, that the interviewees can realize, that they can talk about victimization experiences in close relationships without any risk of breach of delimitation, privacy or intimacy. Therefore this part of the interview should not be conducted as a face to face interview but rather as a written questionnaire which can be completed by the interviewees themselves. This guarantees a higher degree of anonymity for the respondent. At the same time the interviewee has the opportunity to make statements about offenders who still share the same household without the risk of being overheard while speaking by them. Furthermore the change from a personal interview to a written questionnaire serves to point out the change of frame of reference not only verbally, but also concerning the method of data collection, i.e. the change from criminal victimization as the subject of the questioning in the main questionnaire to conflicts and victimization experiences in close relationships as the primary focus of the additional questionnaire.

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BASIC ISSUES

Research on Fear of Crime:
Some Common Conceptual and Measurement Problems

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Conceptual and Measurement Problems

Difficulties of Defining Emotions

Research on fear of crime conducted to date suffers from serious conceptual and measurement problems and the findings, therefore, have to be treated with extreme caution. One of the major problems has to do with the concept of fear itself. Fear is an emotion. Like other emotions (love, hate, etc.) it is difficult to define and hard to measure. Attitudes (such as concern about crime) or perceptions (such as estimates of the chances of being victimized) are, on the other hand, easier to deal with on both counts. It is, of course, possible to monitor and measure the physiological changes and reactions that result from, or accompany a state of fear, but this is not done by means of surveys and questionnaires. By recognizing and treating fear as an emotion we can avoid the common mistake of having fear of crime branded as rational or irrational. Emotions, by definition, are irrational and there is no such thing as a "rational emotion". The same can be said about attempts to determine whether the level of fear is, or is not, commensurate with the real risks to which the group in question is exposed. Emotions, such as fear, are not based on rational objective assessments of the chances of becoming victim. There is no sense, therefore, in trying to determine whether they are proportionate or disproportionate to the real dangers and the objective risks of victimization.

Despite the large number of studies dealing with "fear of crime" during the past two decades, it is hard to come across a definition of the concept. Most of the studies treat "fear of crime" as if it were self-explanatory. This flagrant omission is probably due to the insurmountable problems of trying to come up with a clear, accurate, and easy to operationalize definition of what is in essence a basic human emotion. And yet, if research on fear of crime is to be informative and enlightening it has to use standardized definitions that are operationalized in a manner that ensures both continuity and comparability of research findings. This, however, is not the case. In his 1980 paper, Peter Yin deplored the fact that his thorough review of the literature yielded only one definition of fear of crime, namely the one by Sundeen and Mathieu (1976) who defined it as "the amount of anxiety and concern that persons have of being a victim". Yin's complaint is echoed by Brillon (1987) and others.

Confusing Fear with other Concepts

Another problem with research on "fear of crime" is the interchangeable use of different concepts without taking into account the subtle distinctions between them. One encounters references to

fear, fright, anxiety, worry, feelings of safety, feelings of security/ insecurity, as if they are all one and the same. Quite often, no distinction is made between fear of global crime (with crime treated as a general, vague, and somewhat abstract category) and fear of concrete forms of victimization. Sometimes, although the talk is of "fear of crime" what is being measured is not fear at all. For example, although the study by Wiltz (1982) bears the words "fear of crime" in the title and although the author refers to same repeatedly in the text, what was actually measured are the respondents' perceptions/estimates of their chances of being victimized.

It is true that some authors have tried to differentiate between certain concepts. Such is Furstenberg's (1971) distinction between *fear of crime* and *concern about crime*, between how worried people are about being victimized and how concerned they are about the level of crime in their neighborhood, community, or society at large.[1] Another distinction is the one made by the Figgie Report (Figgie, 1980) between *concrete fear* (that is the fear of becoming the victim of a specific violent crime) and *formless fear* (that is a non-specific fear about safety in one's home, neighborhood and larger community). A third researcher, Warr (1984) differentiates between *fear of victimization* which he describes as "fear of criminal acts committed against one's own person or property" and *fear of crime* which refers to a general fear of crime (or its consequences) without necessarily fearing personal victimization. Warr insists that the matter is not simply a terminological quibble. He explains that his rejection of the phrase "fear of crime" is due to its having acquired so many divergent meanings in the literature that it is in danger of losing any specificity whatsoever.

In view of the problems and difficulties outlined above it would certainly be more beneficial to abandon the concept of "fear of crime" and to concentrate the research on more easily definable and measurable concepts such as perceptions of safety, estimates of risks, and so forth.

Lack of Theory

Another problem from which suffers research on "fear of crime" is the lack of theory. Most of the studies conducted to date have not been undertaken within a concrete theoretical framework or to test specific theoretical postulates and propositions. The majority are carried out in the hope that the findings will advance our understanding of fear and will ultimately lead to the

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[1] Furstenberg (1971) is critical of the fact that "concern" about crime and "fear" of victimization have been used interchangeably. He insists that they are two different reactions that are completely unrelated to each other. In fact, he found those most concerned about the problem of crime to be no more or less afraid of victimization than anyone else. In their analysis of the British Crime Survey, Hough and Mayhew (1983) insist that fear and anxiety about crime are conceptually distinct from people's assessment of the prevalence of crime. They further suggest that "anxiety about becoming a victim of crime must be distinguished from people's assessment of crime as a social problem, or their concern about crime" (p. 22). They add that people may be concerned about burglary, robbery or vandalism without having any anxiety that they themselves become victims (p.23).

formulation or development of theory. Yin (1980), for one, is highly critical of the fact that findings on fear of crime are usually presented as unrelated hypotheses with no conceptual framework allowing cohesive interpretation of the data.

Related to this is the fact that most of the research on fear of crime has been descriptive rather than explanatory. The main objective has been to find out who is "afraid" rather than why they are afraid. Naturally, there are exceptions to this general trend (such as Skogan, 1986; Warr, 1984; to name but a few). Most of the attempted explanations were aimed at unraveling the apparent paradox of low victimization/high fear among women and the elderly. So while there are countless attempts to measure the levels of fear of crime and to establish its correlates and determinants, there is relatively little in terms of exploring its roots or explaining how and why these determinants do cause fear. And while research on the correlates of fear is abundant, there is little research on its sources except, may be, for few attempts to examine the effect of crime news and media portrayals of crime on the levels of fear, (Doob & MacDonald, 1979). Needless to say that observing associations and correlations is not very helpful in explaining the nature and the cause of the relationship. Of course, it could be argued that it is a necessary first step. Usually, however, the research is not taken further to the next explanatory stage. For example, while there have been some attempts to explain why the elderly as a group are more afraid than younger age groups (Eve & Eve, 1984; Janson & Ryder, 1983; Kennedy & Silverman, 1985; Lindquist & Duke, 1982; Silverman & Kennedy, 1985; Warr, 1984) there has hardly been any serious attempt to explain the variations in the levels of fear among elderly of similar background living in similar residential settings.[2]

To be fair, we have to acknowledge that research aimed at explanation is faced with several, as yet, unsolved problems, some of which are outlined below.

Causal and Temporal Ordering of the Observed Relationships

One problem is the difficulty of establishing the causal ordering of the observed relationship, to determine whether fear is the cause or the effect or both. Another problem is the time ordering of the observed relationship, the difficulty to determine which occurred first; fear or the variable correlated with fear. The following examples are meant to illustrate the ordering problems.

- Norton and Courlander (1982, p. 391) report that "individuals who said that they often discussed crime with others reported higher levels of fear". The question is: did they often discuss crime with others because they were more "worried" about becoming a victim than the rest, or did

[2] Another shortcoming of fear of crime research is its failure to explain why the levels of fear recorded through the use of the same instrument can vary, sometimes substantially, between people with similar sociodemographic characteristics living in the same areas and similar residential locales (Yin, 1980). How, for example, could the differences in the level of fear among elderly living in the same housing project or the same neighborhood be explained? A general problem of research on fear of crime (and on victimization) is that it treats the elderly as a homogeneous group, assumes that the effects of victimization as well as responses to victimization are uniform or quasi-uniform among elderly victims.

they become more "fearful" as a result of the frequent crime conversations they had with those others?

- Balvig (1979, quoted in Christie, 1981, p. 63) has clearly documented that the anxiety for being a victim of crime increases the more isolated a person is. Yin (1982) found that those who felt very unsafe on the street were more likely to be more isolated than the rest of the sample. Clearly, there seems to be a positive relationship between being socially isolated and being fearful. But which occurs first? Does fear of victimization lead to social isolation or is it the state of being isolated that produces or promotes fear? Do fearful individuals tend to isolate themselves as a means of protection against crime, or do they become more fearful because they feel isolated, thus unprotected?
- Lawton and Yaffe (1980) report that those with high fear were more mobile. They see this finding as contradicting the belief that fear leads to less mobility and more social isolation. The conventional wisdom, of course, is that fear affects mobility and not the reverse. Yet, the opposite proposition cannot be dismissed outright. It could well be that it is mobility, particularly unavoidable or imposed mobility, that influences the level of fear. In other words, the higher level of fear could be the outcome of those mobile individuals having to leave their residences and to venture outside into unsafe streets or public means of transportation for a good part of the time or during the hours of darkness.

Yin (1980) argues that the problems with the temporal ordering of events are not likely to be overcome or untangled until rigorous, longitudinal research becomes available. He correctly points out that the different time ordering of mobilization behaviors relative to fear of crime creates different expected relationships between the two. Thus, when mobilization behaviors are treated as consequences of fear of crime (as did Lawton, 1980) then they could be expected to be related to high fear. If, on the other hand, mobilization behavior is treated as the independent variable (as did Patterson, 1977, 1978) then it could be expected to be related to low fear.

Failure to Differentiate between Various Types of Crime

Global Measures versus Crime-Specific Measures

Crime is a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional phenomenon. Criminal offences vary greatly in their seriousness, their consequences, and the likelihood of their occurrence. It is obvious, therefore, that people do not fear all crimes, or even the most common ones, to the same degree. They might feel very vulnerable to certain types and quasi immune to others. Women, for example, might fear rape more than any other crime while the elderly might be mostly afraid to have their house or apartment violated or broken into, particularly while they are inside. Not only the level of fear, but also the nature of fear, may vary according to the type of victimization most feared. Fear of physical or sexual assault may be qualitatively different from that of having one's car stolen or one's purse snatched. One general shortcoming of fear of crime research (particulatly the earlier studies) is the failure to differentiate between various types of crime. It relied on "global" measures of fear rather than offence - specific measures (Warr, 1984).

Like other researchers (Gibbs, Coyle, & Hanrahan, 1987; Miethe & Lee, 1984; Yin, 1980), Fattah and Sacco (1989) are critical of the "global measures" inability to distinguish levels of fear associated with particular offenses. The global measures do not allow us, for example, to detect the difference between respondents who might be afraid for their personal safety because of a concern about being sexually assaulted and others who may be unconcerned about sexual assault but are "anxious" about being robbed or having their purse snatched. Early research made no distinction between fear of personal violent crime and property crime. It did not recognize the fact that some crimes are more fear-provoking than others. Questions about feeling "unsafe when out alone at night" or being "afraid to walk alone in an area in one's neighborhood" can only tap one's fear or anxiety about the types of crime likely to be committed on the street. They do not capture people's "worries" about other victimizations to which they may be subjected while at home, nor crimes that are committed against the household: burglary, vandalism, motor vehicle theft, etc. Skogan and Maxfield (1981), for example, admit that the way they operationalized fear by asking "How safe do you feel or would you feel being alone in your neighborhood at night?" misses entirely one emotion-arousing crime, burglary.

Questions asking respondents whether they think that "neighborhood crime rate has increased", or whether "there is more violence on the street now compared to a year ago", and similar others, are not only global measures but they do not, as mentioned above, measure fear at all.

Research on fear of crime among the elderly, quite popular in the 1970s and the 1980s, generally failed to assess their worries and anxieties about certain types of victimization to which they are particularly susceptible such as consumer fraud, abuse by a caretaker, exploitation by a younger relative, and so forth. The type of questions asked did not lend themselves well (or at all) to tapping or measuring the elderly's feelings and attitudes vis-à-vis these types.

By using global measures, or by mostly asking questions about safety in the streets, fear of crime research has advertently or inadvertently focused on some crimes and neglected others. The questions asked meant that only anxiety about certain crimes will be tapped but not others, for example, crime in the streets but not household crime; crimes by strangers but not crimes by intimates; burglary, vandalism, car theft, etc., but not fraud and swindling, and so forth.

Another problem with the use of global measures is the failure to realize that attitudes about crime and fear of crime might be largely determined (or at least greatly influenced) by one single type of victimization. Warr (1984), for example, believes that fear of rape is central to women's fear of crime, that it is the "master offense" that shapes women's attitudes and reactions to crime. He feels that for younger women, in particular, fear of crime is in reality fear of rape. He writes: "There can be little doubt, then, that rape occupies a central place in the fears of many women. The use of an omnibus measure of fear ... does not permit us to isolate the unique effect of rape in producing differential sensitivity to risk among men and women ..." (p. 700).

Recent Improvements: The Use of Indices, Scales and Multidimensional Questionnaires

Despite considerable improvements in recent years, the measures currently used to tap "the fear of crime" still leave much to be desired. Except for non-scholarly surveys, such as those conducted by the Gallup Institute, which continue to use a single question, most of the recent studies on fear have used multiple questions, a scale or an index meant to capture the various aspects and dimensions of fear. A combination of questions aimed at both cognitive and behavioral dimensions is not uncommon.

Ollenburger (1981) used three questions: the first was related to the extent of security precautions required by the individual in order to feel protected from intruders. The second concerned fear of going outside after dark; and the third addressed the perception of town safety. The fear variable was a summation of the three questions ranging from 0 (the lowest fear) to 3 (the highest fear of crime) (p. 106).

Lawton and Yaffe (1980) used a summation index composed of indicators of personal anxiety over crime from 10 closed-end and 16 open-end questions. The latter questions were coded by two independent raters, between whom any disagreements were resolved by a third rater (p. 771).

Newman and Frank (1982) used an index of several items pertaining to various aspects of fear such as perceived safety of certain areas, estimated likelihood of being burglarized, fear of being robbed or attacked, comparison of crime in the development where respondents live to crime in the surrounding area, and estimates of the change in crime.

Skogan (1986) used separate "worry" and "concern" measures for personal and property crime as well as indicators of defensive and preventive behavior with respect to personal and property crime.

The research instruments outlined above were developed in response to the severe criticisms made of global measures, unidimensional questions, univariate and bivariate analyses, and so forth. Although they constitute a definite progress over the crude measures used in early research, they still have not solved other conceptual and measurement problems. For example, many researchers continue to use the concept "neighborhood" despite its vagueness and ambiguity. Quite often, the term "neighborhood" is given no specific reference and is interpreted differently by different respondents (Fattah & Sacco, 1989, p. 209). Moreover, no consideration is given to the fact that the amount of time respondents spend outside their homes or unattended on the streets can vary greatly. And yet this amount of time could have a direct impact on the level of fear/anxiety/safety of the respondents when they are asked how safe they feel when out of their home. Distances could have very different meanings in rural and urban areas. The "mile radius" which was used in questions asked by the Gallup Institute and some others has a very different connotation in an urban context from that in a rural setting.

Failure to Disentangle the Confounding Effects of Different Variables

Being a complex and multidimensional phenomenon, fear of crime is bound to be influenced by a large number of variables and it is often difficult (sometimes impossible) to isolate the impact of each single variable on the existence of fear and its level. The use of aggregate data and bivariate analyses masks the effects of other variables not included in the analysis. Multivariate measures, on the other hand, cannot include every single important variable and often fail to disentangle the confounding effects of several variables. The following examples are meant to illustrate the problem.

- If it is true that women in general are more afraid than men, then aggregate measures of fear among the elderly (over 65) are bound to yield higher levels of fear than those of younger age groups because of the disproportionate number of women in the upper age groups.
- Most studies that examined age and gender in relation to fear report a higher level of fear among elderly women than among elderly men. Is this a function of sex differences or the fact that most elderly males live with a spouse while a much higher percentage of elderly women live alone?
- Most studies that examined income in relation to fear report that low income is associated with higher fear. Is the higher level of fear among the elderly (compared to other age groups) a function of age or the fact that a disproportionate number of the elderly belong to low-income groups? Is higher fear among lower income groups (U.S., 1977) a function of material need (greater consequences of financial loss, inability to secure medical help, to recuperate as easily as the rich, etc.) or is it a function of area of residence (low income —> poor areas —> high crime rates —> high level of fear)? Or is it a combination of both? Are the lower levels of fear of crime observed among the wealthy a function of their relatively safer residential areas or their higher ability to overcome the financial burden of victimization?

A concrete illustration of the problem of confounding variables is given by Skogan and Maxfield (1981) in their analysis of the Census Bureau's large city victimization surveys. Victims of weapon crimes reported lower levels of fear than did non-victims, for they were overwhelmingly young males!

One possible solution to this problem is to use multivariate statistical techniques to control for the confounding factors. However, as Skogan (1986) points out, the use of such techniques can only control for what was available - a few simple demographic factors - but not others.

It should also be noted that the relationship between a certain variable and fear of crime may not be constant but may differ when another variable is introduced or taken into account. In other words, a certain variable can affect the level of fear differently in the presence or absence of another variable. For example, when Lebowitz (1975) analyzed National Opinion Research Center data he discovered that the level of fear expressed by the elderly was higher than that of the younger population in urban areas, but there was no significant difference by age in rural

areas. Pauline Ragan (1977) found that sex was related to levels of fear in one racial group but not in others. She reports that black females were more fearful than black males but that the level of fear was similar for the two genders among whites and Mexican Americans.

Yin (1980) gives several examples where the introduction of control variables altered or completely reversed the original relationship observed between a given variable and the level of fear of crime. For example, when multiple regression technique was used to analyze the findings of a national sample of elderly residents of subsidized housing (Lawton & Yaffe, 1980) gender was not found to be associated with fear. And when Reynolds and Blyth (1976) combined lifestages with gender to assess the variations in fear levels they found that except for the "established adult stage" females reported less threat of victimization than males for all other life stages.[3]

Placing too much Confidence in the Respondents' Ability to Assess their Exact Fear Level

Fear can be, and is sometimes, treated as a dichotomous variable with the respondents divided into two groups: those who are afraid and those who are not. This is usually the case when the answer to the question about fear is a "yes" or "no" answer. Most studies, however, try to measure the level of fear using a three to five point scale (ex. Kennedy & Silverman, 1985). The Figgie Report (Figgie, 1980) gave respondents a choice between four answers: very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, very unsafe. The problem with such a scale is rather obvious. While the difference between those who feel very safe (or declare themselves not at all afraid) and those who feel very unsafe (or declare themselves very afraid) may be somewhat real, the demarcation line between "somewhat safe" and "somewhat unsafe" is very blurred. Categorizing the former group as feeling safe and the latter as feeling unsafe surely stretches the data beyond its informative limit and casts doubt on the accuracy of the findings. And since what is being measured is nothing but a subjective estimate of risk, treating those who report being "somewhat safe" and those reporting being "somewhat unsafe" as two distinct, even opposed, categories assumes an unwarranted level of sophistication and discrimination ability in the respondents and unjustifiable confidence in their ability to assess their feelings and to choose the truly corresponding level among the different choices.

In their relentless attempts to differentiate between varying levels of fear, some authors (Savitz, Lalli, & Rosen, 1977) have gone as far as dividing those levels in as many as seven categories: no fear, minimal fear, some generalized fear, fear (below midpoint), fear (above midpoint), much generalized fear, and extreme fear. Naturally the more choices respondents are offered, the more difficult it will be for them to pick the one that truly corresponds to their level of fear, and the more inaccurate the distinctions are bound to be. As mentioned above, although the intentions

[3] In his study of the relationship between victimization and fear, Garofalo (1977) found that almost all attitudinal differences between victims and nonvictims in the general sample were attributable to the impact of victimization on elderly respondents. For other age groups those differences were virtually nonexistent.

behind such attempts are laudable, they are all based on the doubtful assumption that respondents are able to accurately assess and measure precisely their level of fear, or their feeling of safety/unsafety and to choose the correct point on the scale.

Specific Weaknesses of Various Measures

Measures of fear of crime may be divided into cognitive measures, affective measures, and behavioral measures (Fattah & Sacco, 1989).

Cognitive measures try to elicit from respondents their beliefs regarding the extent to which crime threatens them. Fattah and Sacco (1989) point out that such beliefs may be inadequate as measures of fear, if by that term is intended something akin to concern or anxiety. This is because there is an imperfect correspondence between cognitive assessments of personal or environmental risk and measures of fear and worry (Baumer, 1985; Clark, 1984; Giles-Sims, 1984; Miethe & Lee, 1984). Thus while people may believe that they face similar dangers, they may express quite different feelings about these dangers, a finding that led some researchers to treat these cognitive measures as causes rather than indicators of fear (Warr, 1985; Warr & Stafford, 1983; Yin, 1980).

The second type of measures examined by Fattah and Sacco (1989) are *affective measures* or questions asking respondents about how unsafe they feel, how much they worry or the extent to which they are afraid. They argue that these measures usually do not mention crime specifically although respondents' feelings of unsafety may be related to other factors such as unsafe or unlit construction sites or unleashed neighborhood dogs.

The third type of measures cited by Fattah and Sacco (1989) are *behavioral measures* which ask respondents not about the level of crime or their feelings of safety but about what they do in response to crime: restricting their activities, purchasing or carrying a weapon, locking their doors while at home, and so forth. While these measures are commonly regarded as better indicators of fear than cognitive or affective measures, they do not really tell us about how people behave but only how they say that they behave. The difference, Fattah and Sacco point out, is not a trivial one since many people do not recall patterns of personal action with great accuracy. Another problem with behavioral measures, to which we referred earlier, is that they may, in reality, be consequences of fear rather than indicators or manifestations of it.

Closed-Ended vs. Open-Ended Questions

A methodological critique of research on fear of crime, concern about crime, would not be complete without mention of the differences in findings usually reported by studies using closed-ended questions and those employing open-ended ones. The element of suggestibility inevitably present in closed-ended questions is probably responsible for yielding a higher percentage of respondents declaring being afraid than when an open-ended question is used. The discrepancy is abundantly clear when one compares Yin's (1982) findings with those of the Harris

poll (1975). Using an open-ended question resulted in only one percent of Yin's sample listing fear of crime as a serious personal problem or worry. Poor health was the most frequently mentioned (25 percent) followed by "not enough money" (9 percent). By contrast, the Harris poll which used closed-ended measurements reported that crime was the most serious personal problem of elderly people: 23 percent chose fear of crime, followed by poor health (21 percent) and not enough money (15 percent). To explain the difference in the findings, Yin suggests that the closed-ended measurements in the Harris poll might have sensitized the respondents to the issue of crime and directed their attention to it. He feels that the exaggeration effect of mentioning crime may be stronger than for other issues since crime involves unknown and uncertain situations that are often associated with physical injury.

Determinants and Correlates of Fear: An Inventory

To date, the main focus of research on fear of crime has been the search for the correlates of fear and the factors that might influence its degree. Researchers' main preoccupation was to establish whatever links may exist between the presence of fear (as well as its level) and four major categories of variables listed below:

1) Personal Characteristics of the Respondents

Relating fear of crime and its varying levels to the personal characteristics of the respondents. The most frequently examined variables in this connection are:

a) *sociodemographic variables*: such as age; gender; race; marital status; socioeconomic status (income); education; rural/urban background; etc.
b) *sociopsychological variables*: such as perceptions of risk, perceptions of vulnerability; perceptions of the seriousness of the effects of victimization; perceived ability to recuperate from the consequences of victimization; perceptions of social diversity; exposure to the media; loneliness and feelings of isolation; feelings of alienation; social autonomy; locus of control; feelings of powerlessness, helplessness, defencelessness; views of community resources to fight crime; etc.
c) *lifestyle variables*: such as levels of exposure to risk; strength/weakness of the person's social network; living alone/with others; frequency of contact and interaction with others; amount of travel away from home; degree of mobility; means of transportation; involvement in neighborhood networks; participation in crime prevention programs; etc.

2) Characteristics of the Physical Environment

Relating fear of crime and its varying levels to the characteristics of the physical environment and to specific ecological variables. Those most frequently examined in this connection are:

a) *area of residence*: research has examined the differences between those living in urban/semi-urban/rural areas; in large/medium-sized/small cities; other factors included: site and location of residence within the city; proximity of residence to city centre; length of residence in a particular area; and so on.
b) *type of dwelling*: researchers have tried to assess whatever differences in the level of fear might exist between those living in various types of dwellings: single family/high rise buildings; rented vs. owned accommodation; others examined the impact of building size on the degree of fear; and so forth.
c) *level of security*: researchers have assumed that there is a direct link between the level of security in the person's residence and the presence of fear and its degree. As mentioned earlier, some have considered security measures as indicators of fear while others regarded them as consequences of fear. Security measures examined include: special locks on doors and/or windows; possession of weapon (firearm); a watch dog; an alarm system; property identification; etc. More general measures include guarded entrances; private security patrols; and so on.
d) *territoriality*: research has also examined the relationship between certain indicators of territoriality (such as use of space, control of space, mastery of the environment, territorial markers, etc.) and the presence of fear and its degree.

3) Characteristics of the Social Community

Relating fear of crime and its varying levels to the particular characteristics of the community in which the respondents live. Frequently examined variables in this context include:

a) *size, homogeneity*: the assumption here is that a link exists between fear and community size, between fear and the degree of racial and age homogeneity/heterogeneity of the community, between fear and living in age-integrated vs. age-segregated housing projects, and so forth.
b) *crime rate*: one of the frequently examined relationships is the one that supposedly exists between fear and the crime rate within a given community. In addition to the crime rate, researchers (for example, Skogan & Maxfield, 1981) have analyzed fear levels in relation to certain community/neighborhood problems and conditions, in particular disorder, vandalism, "uncivil" behavior by youths, public drinking, etc. (Skogan, 1986).
c) *community integration*: the belief here is that the degree of community cohesion, of social integration, as well as the levels of disintegration, alienation, disorganization, deprivation, and distrust can have a significant impact on the presence of fear and its levels.

4) Respondents' Personal Experiences with Crime

Relating fear of crime and its varying levels to the respondents' personal experiences with crime.

Research on the relationship between victimization and fear was largely stimulated by earlier reports that women and the elderly, despite their relatively lower victimization rates, express the

highest levels of fear. Since the relationship was in the opposite (not in the expected) direction, researchers set out to find some plausible explanation for this apparent paradox. In the process, researchers were forced to make distinctions such as those between subjective (perception of) and objective risks of victimization; direct and indirect victimization; actual and vicarious victimization experiences; etc.[4] Among the questions that preoccupied fear of crime researchers, the following ones deserve particular mention:

a) does victimization promote (or reduce) fear? do victims exhibit higher (or lower) degrees of fear than non-victims? is the relationship between victimization and fear a positive or a negative one?
b) do actual and vicarious victimizations have the same impact on fear? do they influence the degree of fear to the same or similar extent?
c) what type of victimization has the strongest impact on fear levels?
d) does a high level of fear significantly reduce the victimization rate by inducing those who are afraid to become more cautious, to take more precautions, to avoid dangerous places, high-risk situations, etc.? In other words, does fear lead to avoidance and defensive behaviors that do actually reduce victimization risks and consequently victimization rates? Could this be the explanation for the low victimization rates of women and the elderly?

Space limitations do not allow for a detailed analysis of the methodological problems involved in, or associated with, each of these four categories. We will, therefore, focus on the fourth, namely the relationship between victimization and fear.

Relationship between Victimization and Fear: Some Research Problems

Although the relationship between victimization and fear may seem straight forward, almost axiomatic ("if you have been the victim of crime, you are clearly going to be more fearful of another incident" affirm the authors of "America Afraid", Friedberg et al., 1983, p. 50), in reality, it is a much more complex relationship than it may seem at first glance.

The assumption that victimization affects fear in one single direction by raising its level is highly questionable. Some authors have suggested that for those who are extremely worried about becoming a victim, who have amplified in their mind the consequences of victimization, being

[4] One issue that has not received much attention from researchers is the effect that multiple (or repeated) victimization can have on fear. Do those who are victimized once exhibit higher or lower levels of fear than those who are victimized more than once, often, repeatedly, or incessantly? Do subsequent victimizations increase or decrease the level of fear? Do they have additive or diminutive effects on the person's worry of, or anxiety about, being victimized? To this we might add Skogan's (1986) lament that little is known about the general impact of victimization, or about its differential impact upon victims (p.136).

victimized might reduce rather than enhance their fear level. Sparks, Genn, and Dodd (1977) have mentioned the possibility that victimization by robbery and assault might reduce fear. Explaining a negative correlation between the two, they raised the possibility that people may "fear the worst" before they have any direct experience with crime. Once they become victims and survive relatively unscathed, their anxiety may subside. The same hypothesis is advanced by Yin (1980) for the elderly. He suggests that any victimization experience that does not cause serious injury or harm to the elderly person "might actually aid the victim in forming a more realistic assessment of the nature of crime, thereby reducing fear of crime" (p. 497). Yin adds that rapid, uncomplicated recuperation from the victimization experience might also lower the elderly person's overall fear of crime (see also Skogan, 1986).

Despite the abundance of studies, no conclusive answers yet exist to many of the questions surrounding the relationship between victimization and fear.[5] The main reasons for this state of affairs can be traced to the manifold problems of doing research in this domain. For obvious reasons, research on the relationship between victimization and fear, suffers from the dual problems of both types of research and, in addition, is subject to various problems of its own.

One major problem is the operationalization of the victimization variable. Operationalizing victimization for the purpose of victimization surveys and for establishing its relationship to fear are two different things. In the absence of theory the decision on what types of victimization to include and what types to exclude has to be based on mere intuition.

Another problem is the determination of the length of the recall period. Here also the decision is not as easy as it is for victimization surveys which usually use a calendar year as the standard reference. But what about research exploring the extent to which victimization affects (or does not affect) fear? It might be argued that one should only ask the respondents about recent victimizations but not those to which they were subjected in the distant past. But what is "recent" and what can we consider as "distant past" that no longer has an effect on fear or its degree? As we explain below, treating respondents who have been victimized "long ago" as victims is problematic since their present fear (or its levels) might have nothing (or very little) to do with their "old" victimization experience.[6] On the other hand, limiting the definition "victim" to those

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[5] Skogan (1986) points to several incongruities in the findings of studies that examined the impact of victimization on fear. He notes, for example, that the sheer levels of the two seemingly do not match: survey measures of fear suggest that many more people are fearful than are victimized even in large cities. Skogan also stresses the difficulty in untangling the unique impact of a particular victimization experience on the fear that a person might have.

[6] One way of evercoming this problem, though not a perfect one, is to use a longitudinal design as Skogan (1986) did. Each respondent was interviewed twice with one year separating the two interviews. Such a design makes it possible to compare the levels of fear (of those who were victimized between interviews) prior and after the victimization in an attempt to assess the impact the victimization has had on their fear level.

who have been victimized during the six months or one year preceding the study fails to capture the impact "older" victimizations might have had on the respondent's attitudes, perceptions, and reactions vis à vis crime. After all, fear might be the product of one's cumulative life experiences. Victimization events, even the ones that have been forgotten or relegated to the back of the mind, may thus have been contributors to one's fears. It may also be argued that frequent or repeated victimizations have a desensitizing effect so that those who have been subjected to them are no longer afraid or are less afraid than those who have never been victimized or have been victimized only once.

A third problem is the problem of numbers. Since personal victimization is a relatively rare phenomenon, a sample of reasonable size will yield only few respondents who have suffered actual victimization. And the problem is compounded by the inverse relationship between the seriousness of the victimization and the frequency of its occurrence (see Fattah, 1991). As Skogan (1986) points out, many surveys are too small to uncover enough victims of personal crime for useful analysis. A brief "recall period" typically uncovers very few, usually about 6% of those interviewed, who had been victims of violent victimization. Skogan adds that generally, the more conventionally serious an incident is, the less frequently it occurs.

The Linkage Problems

Studies attempting to establish the role victimization experiences play in shaping people's fear and in determining the level of that fear encounter difficulties which may be crudely designated as linkage problems. To find out the effect that victimization might have on the fear level of those who are victimized, researchers have asked members of the sample whether they have been victims of certain offences in the previous six months, one year (Ollenburger, 1981), or even in the three years preceding the interview (Lawton & Yaffe, 1980). This way of assessing the relationship between victimization and fear is problematic for several reasons:

1) The arbitrariness of the victim designation

Respondents who give a negative answer to the question whether they have been victimized during the recall period are treated as non-victims for the purpose of assessing the impact of victimization on the level of fear. This is so although some of these "non-victims" might have suffered a victimization prior to the reference period, a victimization that might have influenced their fear level. As mentioned earlier, fear is likely the result of cumulative personal and vicarious victimization experiences occurring over a long period of time and not just the victimization that might have taken place during the year or three years preceding the survey. Probing respondents for their lifetime victimization experiences is even more problematic not only because of the serious memory decay but also because it inevitably includes victimizations that happened so long in the past that they might no longer have any bearing on the respondents' present fear level.

2) The impossibility of including every victimization type

Victimization surveys as well as studies examining the relationship between victimization and fear have, of necessity, limited their probing to few selected victimization types because of the impossibility of asking respondents about every single type of victimization. The underlying assumption is that the types included are the ones most likely to influence the fear level of the respondents. But this is just an unverified assumption. And as a result some respondents whose fear level has been shaped by victimizations not included in the survey are treated as non-victims.

3) The difficulty of isolating the impact of the victimization experience

As mentioned earlier, it is usually difficult to untangle the confounding effects of different variables even when multivariate measures are used. There is also the problem of capturing the effects of variables not included in the survey. This is particularly the case with vicarious victimization. Victimization surveys that include questions related to the respondent's fear are usually limited to victimization experiences suffered by the respondent or other members of the household during the reference period. They do no probe for victimizations by neighbors, friends, acquaintances, or relatives who are not members of the respondent's household. Such vicarious victimization experiences might have played an important role in determining the respondent's level of fear and yet are missed by the survey.

The Low Victimization/High Fear Paradox

In general, groups that suffer high victimization rates express higher levels of fear than groups with low victimization rates. This suggests a positive association (though not necessarily a cause-effect relationship) between victimization and fear. And while many factors associated with high victimization rates (such as low income, being black in the U.S., living in an urban centre, residing in a high crime area, etc.) are also associated with high levels of fear, some are not. The two glaring exceptions are age and gender. That the elderly seem to be more afraid than younger age groups despite their extremely low victimization rates, combined with the finding that women are more afraid than men despite their relatively lower victimization rates, seem to indicate that other factors may have more significance in determining the level of fear than objective risks or actual victimization rates. They suggest, for example, that:

- the level of fear might be more influenced by the *subjective perceptions of the risk of victimization* and personal estimates of that risk than by the objective risk of becoming a victim.[7]
- the level of fear might be more related to *perceived vulnerability to victimization* than it is to actual victimization rates.

[7] This is confirmed by Sparks, Genn and Dodd's (1977) conclusion that "expressed feelings of crime or insecurity appear to have many sources, and to be strongly influenced by beliefs, attitudes and experiences which have nothing whatever to do with crime" (p.209).

- estimates of the potential consequences of victimization and *perceptions of the potential impact victimization* is likely to have on those victimized might be important factors that affect the fear level.
- people's *perceptions of their ability/inability to cope* with the consequences of victimization and to recuperate from its impact could have a bearing on their fear level.
- *weak and ineffective defences against risks of victimization* might be influential in determining the level of fear even when the risks of becoming victim are relatively low.
- people's *weak (or weakened) control over their lives and their environment* could have a significant impact on their fear level even when their chances of victimization are relatively low.
- *powerlessness, helplessness, and defencelessness* felt and experienced by the weaker members and weaker groups in society (women, elderly, minorities, etc.) could be important factors in shaping their fear level regardless of whether their victimization risks and rates are high or low (see for example, Jones, 1987).

It has been suggested that low victimization rates of the elderly and of women might be, at least partially, an indirect result of their higher level of fear. It is argued that a natural response to a high level of fear is for fearful individuals to reduce their exposure to risk and their chances of being victimized by adopting specific avoidance and defensive behaviors (Cook & Skogan, 1984; Riger, 1981; Skogan, 1986). This is bound to reduce their victimization rates. This proposition has some intuitive plausibility. However, one has to ask: if it is true that the inverse relationship between fear and victimization in the case of the elderly and women is largely (or partially) due to behavioral changes aimed at reducing risk and minimizing exposure, then why is it that high levels of fear among other groups do not lead to the same outcome? Why do their victimization rates remain high despite their high fear level?

Other researchers warn that the low victimization rates of the elderly should not be taken at face value. Lindquist and Duke (1982), for example, claim that the apparent low rate of victimization of the elderly is a function of the analytical techniques used rather than a function of age. They believe that when the extent to which the elderly are "at risk" is taken into consideration, the victimization rate for the elderly will equal or exceed the victimization rate for other age categories. They conclude that: "This reexamination of the data, which takes into account the "at risk" factor, allows us to explain the paradox of low victimization rates and high levels of fear found among the elderly. The low rates are real. There is no question as to their existence. At the same time, the elderly are clearly afraid. Perhaps, indeed, the fears of the elderly are justified" (p. 125).

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper is to highlight some of the major problems that faced and continue to face research on fear of crime. In view of the wide array of conceptual and methodological problems outlined above that have plagued fear of crime research in general, and research on the

relationship between victimization and fear in particular, the question we should be asking is whether such research is still worth doing. We need to critically examine the research problems one by one to see which ones can eventually be overcome and which ones are virtually impossible to solve. Placing ourselves in a cost-benefit perspective, we have to decide how valuable is the information to be gained from studies using less than adequate methodologies. How likely is it that we will be able to come up with conclusive answers to the variety of questions that are central to the issue of fear of crime if we continue to use the same research strategies and techniques that have, up till now, yielded less than satisfactory results?

Some soul-searching might be in order. It is imperative that we clearly define our research objectives and to decide how useful and how fruitful this line of study is. What is it exactly that we are trying to achieve and why? Certainly there has been a notable decline in the number of studies dealing with this issue in the last five years or so when compared to the impressive number conducted in the 1970s and the early 1980s. One reason, no doubt, is a general feeling among researchers that not much new information or insights could be gained through the continuous use of present methods, as imperfect as they are. It is not difficult to detect a reluctance to pursue this line of research as long as adequate solutions have not been found to at least the most serious and pressing problems.

But there are other, mostly political, reasons as well. Research on fear of crime grew in popularity at a time when right wing politicians wanting to declare war on crime were anxious to raise public awareness of the impact of crime so that a policy of law and order may appear necessary and justified. It is certainly no coincidence that research on fear of crime became increasingly popular at the same time as the rediscovery of crime victims, the portrayal of elderly victimization, mugging, and so forth, as social problems. Once it was no longer possible to maintain that the elderly were disproportionately victimized, attention shifted from their actual rates of victimization to their disproportionately high level of fear! Rhetorical statements were made by politicians and American Congress members claiming that fear of crime has imposed a housearrest on the elderly and has rendered them virtually prisoners in their own homes, reluctant to venture outside for fear of being attacked and victimized.[8] Fear of crime among the elderly, among women, became salient issues in a policy process aimed at cracking down on crime in the streets thus diverting attention from crime in the suites. Small wonder that most of the early studies were asking respondents whether they felt safe walking in the streets at night! Although the political and the crime situation have not changed much in recent years, the policies have surely changed. By now, most of the punitive items on the agenda of right wing politicians like Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Thatcher have already been implemented. There is no longer a need for issues that might facilitate the sale of punitive policies to members of Congress or to the

[8] The frequency with which such statements were being made led Warr (1984) to start his article by saying "It is by now perfunctory to begin an article on fear of victimization with dramatic statements about the prevalence of fear in the United States, or with lurid stories about elderly citizens barricaded in their homes" (p. 681). An article published in Time Magazine on September 19, 1976, bore the title "The Elderly: Prisoners of Fear".

general public. There is little to be gained by further pursuing issues such as fear of crime, issues that can eventually backfire once a disgruntled public starts to hold politicians to task. As a research topic, fear of crime was bound to lose its currency, its importance, and its generous financial backing.

There is yet another reason that might explain why fear of crime research is losing popularity. It may very well be that the situation has changed drastically from what it was a couple of decades ago, that fear is no longer a salient fact of people's lives. It is quite possible that with time people resign themselves to the facts of life (particularly the ones they feel helpless or unable to change) and thus learn to live with, and become desensitized to, high rates of crime. In other words, they get so accustomed and so desensitized to crime news that it becomes a banal, almost inevitable risk, an unavoidable fact of everyday life. By becoming too common, crime is bound to lose its frightening qualities and its fear-generating properties. We often forget or underestimate the enormous and amazing capacity people have to adjust themselves, and to adapt their lifestyle to the wide array of risks, dangers and threats to which we are daily exposed in the highly technological, industrialized and urbanized society in which we live. People are able to go on with their lives and their usual activities without letting the thoughts of victimization whether by earthquake, disease, accident, or crime affect their lives or upset their daily routine. It is quite possible that people are able to, and do, remove the thoughts of potential mishaps from their minds. And this might explain the marked difference in the levels of fear of crime reported in response to open-ended questions and to closed-ended ones.

Finally, a common feature of fear of crime research needs to be critically examined. In line with the political interests responsible for the emergence of fear of crime as a major research issue in the 1970s and early 1980s, fear has been treated, almost invariably, in criminological research as an extremely negative aspect of people's lives, as something that adversly affects and greatly diminishes the quality of life. Hardly any attention was given to the positive aspects and positive consequences of fear. There has hardly been any talk about fear as a healthy emotion, as a necesssary mechanism of survival, of self-preservation, of avoiding risk and minimizing danger. The same treatment was also given to "concern about crime" although it is essential if something is to be done about crime and if resources are to be mobilized to control and prevent it. And yet, if it is true that fear and caution go hand in hand, if prudence is the response to fear, and if it is true that fear leads to lower victimization, then fear might be a positive mobilizing force that could be harnessed to achieve utilitarian goals. After all, we use fear almost exclusively in our attempt to deter people from committing crime, and for socializing children.[9] A useful

[9] In everyday life we constantly use fear and threats to influence and shape the behavior of children and adults alike, to produce conformity with the norms, rules, and laws, to impose certain lifestyles or patterns of conduct. We see nothing wrong with that. We even try to amplify the fear and magnify the threat way beyond its objective reality. This is regarded as a moral, justifiable means of achieving a desirable end: deterrence. The same logic could be used to justify maintaining the fear of crime and fear of victimization at a reasonable level, as a means of influencing the behavioral patterns of potential victims in a desirable direction, a direction that would ultimately lead to reducing their exposure

orientation for future research might be to try to establish the optimal level of fear for various groups in the population. Such research could be guided by the realization that attempts to reduce (or eliminate) fear at any cost may ultimately have an undesirable side-effect, namely higher victimization. Findings of victimization research may be enlightening in this context. Victimization research instructs us that a good part of crime is a function of opportunity, that a great deal of criminality is made possible through behaviors and situations created by those who are victimized, and could have been prevented by a simple change in the behavior of those victims (see Fattah, 1991). This should lead to a change in our outlook on fear of crime and concern about crime, to regard them in a positive rather than a negative light: as normal and healthy rather than pathological sentiments, as mobilizing and protective forces rather than restricting and destructive ones. Like other emotions, fear is an integral part of our human existence and performs a necessary and useful natural function, to alert us to, and protect us from, the dangers in our environment. To study it, to understand it, and to deal with it, we need a realistic approach free from political rhetoric and political interests.

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Conceptualizing Elder Abuse: Implications for Research and Theory

Vincent F. Sacco

Introduction

Since the early 1980s social scientists, politicians and social service providers have focused increasing attention on the mistreatment of the elderly in domestic settings. The definition of "elder abuse and neglect" as a significant social problem has gained widespread acceptance in rather rapid fashion. In little more than a decade, a large research literature has begun to develop, many new prevention and intervention initiatives have been undertaken and, in several jurisdictions, legislation directed toward the control of elder abuse has been enacted.

The current concern over elder abuse builds upon and elaborates two important themes that began to attract policy and research interest in the 1960s and 1970s (Cook & Skogan, 1990; Sacco, 1990). The first is the theme of family violence. Increasingly since the 1960s, it has been argued in many quarters that dominant ideological beliefs about the loving, caring and nurturing nature of family life have obscured our understanding of how the family may allow for the victimization of its most vulnerable members. The "discovery" of the social problems of child abuse in the 1960s (Nelson, 1984; Pfohl, 1977) and wife assault a decade later (Tierney, 1982) set the stage for the public recognition of the potential risks faced by those elderly family members whose care has been entrusted to others. Baumann (1989) has suggested that pervasive cultural beliefs about old age as a time of peace and serenity and about the family as a resource for older people continued to hide from public view the problem of elder abuse even while violence against children and wives gained recognition as urgent social issues.

The second theme relates to the victimization of the elderly (Cook & Skogan, 1990; Fattah & Sacco, 1989). Contemporary claims about the extent to which older persons are at-risk in domestic settings may be seen as only recently supplanting claims in the late 1960s and early 1970s which pictured the elderly as victims of more impersonal and more routine forms of criminal predation. It is maintained that the social problem of street crime against the elderly emerged when it did because the social and political climate was ripe for its emergence and because the problem was similarly and independently articulated by several different groups at the same time (Cook, 1981). In a sense, the problem of crime against the elderly brought together and encapsulated a variety of social concerns relating to the problem of criminal violence, the rights of victims, and the "greying" of the population. Accordingly, the issue had diverse sponsorship. Mass media managers, for instance, discovered the dramatic news value of reports that detailed crimes against older persons (Fishman, 1978). Advocacy groups concerned with the rights and the quality of life of the elderly used the issue to draw a link between the specific problem of crime and more general policy problems relevant to an aging population. Politicians,

eager to demonstrate their commitment to an emergent constituency made urgent declarations about the "national disgrace" of elderly victimization.

The contemporary construction of the problem of elder abuse combines and extends established images relating to elderly victims of crime and the violent family. Such imagery has helped legitimate claims about the social problem status of elder abuse (Baumann, 1989). That status seems well established in the early 1990s. Elder abuse is the subject of legislative debates and government task forces and the theme of scholarly conferences. It is also the principal subject matter of at least one learned journal and has attracted the attention of researchers from a variety of disciplines.

Within political, interest group and journalistic discourses, the meaning of elder abuse is generally non-problematic. The term is understood largely in terms of examples and anecdotes which are thought to typify the problem's nature. For social scientists, however, the issue is considerably more complicated. Since the earliest studies of elder abuse, researchers have bemoaned the lack of standardization of definitions of the phenomenon and the call for better, more rigorous conceptualizations has begun to assume an almost ritualistic quality in the professional literature (Abdennur, 1990).

However, any argument about how the need to clarify, standardize or make more rigorous research definitions of elder abuse presupposes that there is heuristic value in such an exercise. In other words, it is assumed that something is to be gained by adding yet another term to the already vast conceptual repertoires of criminology and victimology. As a practical matter, it is reasonable to ask whether or not the concept usefully organizes our research efforts. Such a question does not, of course, deny the value of the elder abuse concept as a rhetorical device for pressing social problems claims or for raising public consciousness about the plight of the elderly in modern society. Yet, the fact that a label has political utility does not guarantee that it provides a useful guide to empirical reality.

Elder Abuse: Rehabilitating the Concept

As stated, it is customary in the elder abuse literature to offer commentary on the conceptual ambiguities that characterize the field of study. We are routinely told that significant advances in research, theoretical explanation and public policy must await the refinement of our definitions. Interestingly, however, one is hard pressed to find evidence that the quantity (if not the quality) of empirical, theoretical or policy work has been significantly affected by the absence of a consensus about what it is exactly that the term elder abuse is meant to describe.

The dissatisfaction expressed by critics regarding the ways in which the concept is defined in the policy and research literature focuses on a limited number of themes.

Inconsistencies in Definitions of the Elderly

There is not a consensus in the professional literature regarding who should be defined as "the elderly" (Wolf & Pillemer, 1989). For obvious reasons, most writers employ a chronological definition of the group in question. However, the age which should serve as a cut-off point between the elderly and the non-elderly is, to a large extent, an arbitrary matter. While most studies focus on those over the age of 60 or 65, some researchers have included those under the age of 60 (Pillemer & Suitor, 1988).

Yet, the matter is complicated by the fact that the elderly may be defined in other than chronological terms (Fattah & Sacco, 1989). Age may be understood, for instance, in "functional" terms which emphasize ability and responsibility rather than chronology. Alternatively, Hahn (1976) makes a distinction between chronological age and three other types of ages:

1. personal age — how old a person feels;
2. interpersonal age — how old a person seems to others who know the person;
3. consensual age — the degree of agreement between the personal age and the interpersonal age.

The general point is that the literature on elder abuse lacks any standardized, non-arbitrary procedure by which the at-risk population may be identified. In this respect the literature on elder abuse reflects broader gerontological ambiguities regarding the conceptual and operational meaning of "later life".

Inconsistencies Regarding the Nature and Number of Abuse Dimensions

As McDonald, Hornick, Robertson, & Wallace (1991) argue, elder abuse developed as a "folk concept" and as a result there is little agreement regarding the number or nature of the behaviours that should appropriately be labelled "abusive".

Most analysts maintain that abuse is a multidimensional construct and, to a considerable extent, it is this multidimensionality which fuels the lack of consistency in the way in which the term is employed. In an exhaustive review of research studies and detection protocols, Johnson (1986) reports that the number of categories identified by analysts ranges between 2 and 6 and that the "(c)ommon constitutive elements include physical abuse, psychological abuse, material abuse, exploitation, and neglect" (p. 177).

Comparisons across studies have been impeded by the fact that similar empirical phenomena are differentially categorized while distinctive empirical phenomena are assigned similar labels (Crystal, 1987; Pillemer & Suitor, 1988; Quinn & Tomita, 1986). Thus, what is defined as "violation of rights" in one study is termed "negligence" in another (Baumann, 1989). Threats of

physical harm or of institutional confinement may be labelled "verbal abuse" by one author, "verbal assault" by a second, and "psychological abuse" by a third (Podnieks, 1990).

In this respect, several important conceptual issues remain unresolved (Fattah & Sacco, 1989):

1. What is the essential distinction between neglect and abuse?
2. How frequent or how intense must mistreatment be before it is properly labelled abuse?
3. Should "self-abuse" or "self-neglect" be encompassed by definitions of elder abuse?
4. If an elderly person tolerates or accommodates some form of mistreatment, does this accommodation negate the abuse label?
5. How relevant is the intention of the "abuser" to our decision to designate some form of behaviour as abuse?

Baumann (1989, p. 61) notes that with particular reference to the first wave of elderly abuse studies, definitions are so broad and categories of abuse so extensive so as to include any type of behaviour by an elder, caretaker or relative that leads to less than optimal conditions for an older person.

Confusing Actions and their Consequences

The inconsistent use of the term elder abuse often obscures the distinction between cause and effect. In other words, the same term, abuse, is used to describe the behaviour of the abuser as well as the consequences of this behaviour for the abused (Johnson, 1986). Thus, in some studies, shouting at or threatening an elder may be called abuse while in other studies, the lessened self-esteem or fear that is thought to result from being threatened or shouted at is termed abuse. By implication, a causal argument is reduced to a tautology of the order, "elder abuse results in elder abuse" (Fattah & Sacco, 1989).

Critics usually raise these objections within the context of the established elder abuse paradigm. Thus, they accept, by implication, the viability of the elder abuse concept and view definitional problems as essentially technical matters. We need to refine our definitions of elder abuse; to clarify its behavioural referents and to promote consistency in its usage. As a result, the viability of the concept as an organizing theme in research is not called into question. However, it is necessary to address the more basic issue. What does the concept of elder abuse contribute to our understanding of the empirical realities which it purports to describe? Is the conceptual basis of victimological research strengthened in any fundamental way by its inclusion?

The Meaning of Elder Abuse: A Critical Assessment

The concept of elder abuse may be seen to derive heuristic value to the extent that it sensitizes researchers to empirical distinctions that might otherwise go unnoticed. Three such possible distinctions may be identified:

1. The concept may describe forms of victimization that are distinguishable from acts that are described by existing concepts.
2. The concepts may describe problems that are relatively unique to the population of interest.
3. The concept may describe patterns or combinations of victimization experiences that are not adequately described by existing concepts.

Each of these issues requires further comment.

The Distinctiveness of Elder Abuse

It is frequently argued that the term elder abuse is meant to reference victimizing experiences that extend well beyond those covered by criminal law. The validity of this claim is, however, questionable. In many jurisdictions, what have been defined as the major dimensions of abuse fall rather squarely within traditional definitions of criminal victimization.

In the case of physical abuse, for instance, the Canadian Criminal Code quite clearly prohibits assault and sexual assault (Gnaedinger, 1989; McDonald et al., 1991). In addition, physical neglect is addressed by both federal and provincial legislation. In their more extreme manifestations, psychological or emotional forms of abuse are also prohibited by Canadian law. Specifically, if such abuse involves intimidation or threats of physical harm, it is well within the purview of criminal legislation (McDonald et al., 1991).

To be sure, there are forms of "chronic verbal aggression" (Podnieks, 1990) identified in the elder abuse literature which extend beyond the parameters of the criminal law. However, it is precisely at the margins of psychological abuse that the concept assumes a vague and inconsistent character. Yet, it is likely that existing research methodologies cannot very adequately capture less serious forms of psychological abuse; and, even if the behaviour in question can be captured by, for instance, survey research, the criteria by which the abusive nature of such behaviour is to be judged would be highly amorphous. In the case of legally serious violations, the law provides a standard which informs the researcher's decisions about the correspondence between the operational definition and the empirical reality. By contrast, Johnson (1986) notes "quips, barbs, sarcasm, banter or teasing" may be quite normal in the context of particular relationships and may not be a cause of suffering.

A similar point may be made with respect to the third major dimension of elder abuse, which is generally referred to as "financial exploitation" or "material abuse". Fraud, misuse of power of attorney, forgery and extortion are all categories of criminal victimization defined by Canadian law and by the laws of other nations (McDonald et al., 1991).

Several other forms of material abuse introduce a variety of measurement and conceptual problems. If family members, neighbours or even television evangelists try to convince older persons to give them money is this necessarily abuse or exploitation? The question has no

definitive answer. In many such cases, the application of the exploitation label may reflect assumptions that elderly people are less capable than the rest of us of making decisions about their finances or that the decisions they make in this respect lack wisdom.

It is frequently maintained that material abuse of the elderly is particularly problematic because it suggests one of the more pervasive ways in which abusers "take advantage" of older people. Like other forms of abuse, however, it occurs because elderly people are "vulnerable primarily or partly due to age" (Gnaedinger, 1989, p. 1). Such reasoning, however, encourages us to view being elderly as a form of disability (Baumann, 1989; Crystal, 1986). It is only because of this ageist assumption that it makes common sense to speak of "elder abuse" but not of "middle age abuse". Terms such as "wife assault" or "spousal assault", in contrast to elder abuse, focus our attention on the relationship in which the victim and the perpetrator are involved; and "child abuse" draws our attention not only to the chronological age of victims but more importantly to the web of social and legal relationships in which dependent children are immersed. It is not at all clear that a similar set of relationships is, or should be, referenced by the term "elder".

Much of what is called elder abuse may be expected to be revealed by traditional victimization survey methodologies although labels and categories may differ. Thus, victimization research may describe "physical abuse" as assaults or sexual assaults, "psychological abuse" as threats (Hough, 1987) and "material abuse" as theft or fraud. More serious incidents may also, in many cases, come to the attention of the police since being elderly and being the victim of a legally serious offence are both related to reporting decisions (Fattah & Sacco, 1989).

There can of course be no doubt that much of what is termed elder abuse is not revealed either to authorities or to researchers. A national Canadian study of elderly Canadians found, for instance, that most abuse victims did not report the abuse to a "friend, relative or law enforcement agency" (Podnieks, 1990). Only about 1 in 25 material abuse victims reported the incident to the police and only about 1 in 20 told some other authority. In the case of physical injury, about 1 in 4 notified the police.

Both more serious and less serious instances of abuse may escape scrutiny but for different reasons and with different implications. In cases of serious mistreatment victims may be reluctant to report the incident to authorities or researchers if the offender is an intimate. Lower rates of reporting of intimate victimization have been well documented, for example, in studies of spousal assault and sexual assault (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1980; Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1984).

It has been argued that in extreme situations of elder mistreatment, an abusive caregiver may be able to effectively control access to the victim. This would suggest that such situations, by their very nature, may be unresearchable. However, in their community study of elder abuse, Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988, p. 52) state that: "when interviewers contacting a household were informed that the designated respondent was incapable of being interviewed and were convinced that this

was not merely a subterfuge to prevent direct contact with the respondent, they conducted interviews with a proxy." For obvious reasons, the value of such a strategy is difficult to assess.

In the case of less serious forms of psychological or emotional abuse, as such concepts are typically defined by researchers, victims may not judge the incidents worth reporting to anyone. Victims described in studies of elder abuse, like crime victims more generally, most frequently report that they do not report incidents because they are "not serious enough" (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1980). Increasingly, we have come to recognize crime reporting as a rational form of decision-making which involves a consideration of the costs and benefits which reporting entails. This may be no less true of the victims of elder abuse than of anyone else.

Problems Unique to Elderly Populations

Perhaps the distinctive nature of elder abuse has less to do with the behaviours which constitute abuse and more to do with the population that is affected. Of course, to some extent this is true by definition since elder abuse can only affect the elderly. Although, as stated above, even this simple statement is problematic since there is no precise agreement regarding who the elderly are.

However, the issue is considerably more complicated. The empirical literature indicates that most elderly abuse occurs in one of two relational contexts. First, much of the abuse revealed in the limited number of community surveys that have been undertaken involves spouses (Mastrocola-Morris, 1989; Pillemer & Finkelhor, 1988; Podnieks, 1990). Yet, it is well known that spousal abuse is in no sense unique to old age. Rather, it occurs with varying frequency across all stages of the life-cycle (DeKeseredy & Hinch, 1991). In many cases, what we are calling elder abuse may more appropriately be recognized as spousal abuse among aging husbands and wives. To the extent that such abuse represents the continuation of a pattern that begins in young adulthood or middle-age, it would seem that the introduction of a new label adds little of substance. In fact, it may do more harm than good by encouraging the view that "the problem of spousal abuse ends naturally at some point in middle age" (Sacco, 1990, p. 123).

With respect to the second major context for elder abuse, the relations between elderly parents and their adult children, a similar objection may be raised. As is true in the case of spousal abuse, parental abuse is not restricted to elderly victims. American national self-report data indicate, for instance, that the annual prevalence rate of physical assault by adolescents on their parents is between 5% and 9% (Agnew & Huguley, 1989; Peek, Fischer, & Kidwell, 1985). If such patterns of abuse continue over the lifecycle, it is unclear what is gained by terming the problem elder abuse when the victim turns 60 or 65 years of age.

In any case, the available body of empirical evidence would seem to indicate that victimization by an abuser is in no sense a typical experience for the overwhelming majority of elderly people. Even studies which employ liberal definitions of abuse indicate that over 90% of older people are

free of abuse. Crystal (1986, p. 323) notes that, in fact, "one of the major problems in the research has been the difficulty in identifying sufficient numbers or truly abused victims to study." The national Canadian study estimated the cumulative rate of several different types of elder abuse to be 40 per 1,000 (Podnieks, 1990). Using somewhat different categories, the community study of elderly abuse undertaken by Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988) in the Boston area revealed an overall prevalence rate of 32 per 1,000.

Although the numbers are small, Pillemer and Finkelhor (1988) note that they translate into large absolute numbers, and that rates of elderly abuse are higher than rates of elderly poverty or Alzheimer's disease which are regarded as significant social problems. However, it remains to be seen whether various forms of abuse are, like poverty and Alzheimer's disease, more serious problems for older than for younger people. This would require not just studies of abuse in elderly populations but studies of how more generic categories of victimization vary across the life cycle.

Much of what is written about elder abuse focuses on the ways in which such abuse might result from inadequate or inappropriate caregiving. However, such an emphasis is problematic since presumably abuse of various sorts may also occur outside of caregiving relationships (Pillemer & Suitor, 1988). Data from the national Canadian study revealed that 40% of the cases of material abuse cases involved "friends, neighbours or acquaintances" (Podnieks, 1990). Moreover, the distinction between being in a caregiving relationship or not being in a caregiving relationship is not as straightforward as this conceptualization would imply since care is a continuous and not a dichotomous variable. Furthermore, to the extent that we construct elder abuse as caregiver abuse, it is no longer necessary to speak of elder abuse since those with diminished physical or mental capacity may be susceptible to such abuse, irrespective of age.

Baumann notes that even when abuse does occur in the context of caregiving relationships, it sometimes takes on a reciprocal character in that "older parents at times use abusive techniques to control caregivers, including adult children" (1989, p. 67). However, typifications of the abused as a dependent elder and of the abuser as an incompetent or pathological caregiver obscures the investigation of these issues.

Patterns in Abuse

It is argued that, in part, elder abuse derives its distinctive character from the manner in which particular forms of abusive behaviour are combined and patterned over time. Thus, elder abuse differs from other forms of elderly victimization because 1) the relationship between victimizer and victim may involve several different types of victimization and 2) it may involve repetitive victimization.

Such considerations are, of course, relevant as well to the study of spousal and parental abuse which, as was argued earlier, comprise most elder abuse. More generally, questions about the

patterning of victimization may be relevant to any situation in which victimization involves people who are immersed in relationships characterized by some degree of intimacy. The extent to which or the manner in which specific forms of victimization are empirically associated would appear to be very much an open matter. The national Canadian study found, for instance, that only 19% of victims reported more than one of the forms of abuse measured in the survey.

A more basic problem concerns the fact that the concept of elder abuse does little to clarify the patterns of victimization which such abuse is assumed to entail. It generally does not involve descriptions of the stability or the escalation of abuse as defining characteristics; nor does it illuminate the relationships which join specific forms of abuse to each other. Instead, most definitions do little more than catalogue types of abuse. In this respect the concept of elder abuse does not appear to take us beyond the insights already revealed through the application to empirical data of more the traditional victimological concepts of series or multiple victimization (Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1988).

Conclusion

In 1982, Pedrick-Cornell and Gelles wrote: "The concept of elder abuse has become a political/journalistic concept, best suited for attracting public attention to the plight of the victims. But while elder abuse may be a fruitful political term, it is fast becoming a useless scientific concept" (p. 459).

A decade later, this pessimistic assessment remains largely valid. Despite the continued growth of interest in elder abuse research, and despite the continual demand for conceptual refinement, claims regarding the heuristic utility of the elder abuse concept are made with great difficulty.

The foregoing discussion has reviewed some of the more serious problems in this respect. First, as a practical matter, the concept of elder abuse does not fruitfully complement the conceptual schemes traditionally employed by victimization researchers. Legally serious forms of abuse are recognized as assaults, threats, fraud and extortion. While many studies which employ broad operational definitions of elder abuse extend the investigation well beyond narrow legal categories, they frequently risk the inclusion of much behaviour to which the label abuse must be cautiously applied.

Second, the concept does not really describe behaviours that uniquely trouble older populations. Much of what is labelled elder abuse is really spousal or parental abuse which may find its origins much earlier in the life-cycle. How aging affects patterns of spousal or parental victimization will not be revealed by studies of elder abuse but by studies that explore variations in victimization experiences across age groups. While some authors define elder abuse as essentially a caregiving issue, this still leaves several ambiguities unresolved and introduces some additional ones.

Third, the concept of elder abuse does not inform our understanding of the inter-relationships among various dimensions of abuse. Nor does it increase our appreciation of how patterns of abuse stabilize or change over time. In this sense it is no significant improvement over the concepts of series or multiple victimization.

In general, the concept of elder abuse does not suggest an empirical problem that (at least in its more serious manifestations) is resistant to traditional victimization methodologies. Many of the distinctions that we are asked to draw between abuse and victimization are arbitrary and non-productive. We are left to ponder the meaning of statements such as the following:

"Offences committed by non-caregivers who are not family members are usually considered criminal acts and are classified as victimization rather than abuse" (McDonald et al., 1991, p. 3).

If we insist that line should be drawn between "abuse" and "victimization" we reify arbitrary distinctions.

None of this is intended to deny the existence of the empirical phenomena to which the label elder abuse has been applied. What is at issue, however, is the label itself as a system of categorization as an organizing theme for empirical work. Unlike more useful conceptual distinctions, elder abuse fails to "hold constant" any important dimension of victimization experience. "Spousal abuse", by contrast, holds constant the relationship between victims and victimizers while the forms of abuse are allowed to vary. Traditional crime categories hold constant the legal dimensions of the acts in question while other relevant considerations such as victim-offender relationship are allowed to vary. The concept of elder abuse holds constant - if somewhat imperfectly - only the age of the victim. Yet because it does not de-limit in adequate fashion either the relational or the behavioural dimensions of the phenomenon, its contributions are largely redundant. The age of the victim in and of itself would appear to be of dubious theoretical or empirical relevance.

It was stated at the outset that the real value of the concept of elder abuse derives not from its status as an empirical construct but from its political and symbolic character. Thus, the emotional imagery with which the concept of elder abuse is routinely associated may provide an effective means for raising public consciousness about the plight of the elderly in modern society. Such attempts at consciousness raising, however, are not cost-free. Claims by politicians and interest groups about the extent and nature of elder abuse will, given the vagaries of the concept, continue to generate a body of conflicting and inconsistent evidence which could facilitate the removal of the issue and those with which it is associated from the public agenda (Cook & Skogan, 1990).

Moreover, it is necessary to question whether elder abuse serves usefully as a master concept for organizing social and legal services to elderly victims. Popular, if empirically unsupported, constructions of the problem of elder abuse have in many jurisdictions informed the development of intrusive forms of public intervention (Faulkner, 1982; Gordon & Tomita, 1990; Salend, Kane,

Satz, & Pynoos, 1984). Mandatory reporting laws, for instance, forge a legalistic parallel between children and the elderly and in so doing suggest that older people may be treated differently than other categories of adults. These laws contend that persons who are over a certain age and who are the objects of harm at the hands of another, may be denied individual choice with respect to the situations in which they find themselves, and perhaps with respect to the subsequent actions taken by authorities (Bisset-Johnson, 1986; Katz, 1980). Members of various professional groups, rather than the elderly themselves, are defined by such laws as the appropriate judges of whether mistreatment requires official attention (Fattah & Sacco, 1989; Sacco, 1990).

Accordingly, there appears to be little reason not to integrate prevention, treatment or protection efforts directed toward the control of the various forms of intimate violence. Temporary shelters, the employment of legal sanctions, and self-help groups intended to empower victims may have as much applicability to elderly as to non-elderly victims and more applicability than strategies that emphasize the victim's age (Sacco, 1990).

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Victimization by Critical Life Events

Leo Montada

Victimization is characterized by some damages or losses, e.g. the loss of freedom, health, wealth, love, the feeling of security or invulnerability, social status, and so forth. Some losses may be realized, others are merely impending, nevertheless, they may yet be experienced as a loss of subjective security, of the belief in invulnerability, or of trust in other people.

The Issues of Responsibility and Injustice

Suffering losses through crimes, accidents, illnesses, plant closure, crashes at the stock market, or whatever event raises questions about whether the losses are just "bad fate", whether a deity is punishing the victims, whether the victim him- or herself is responsible, or whether others are responsible. Closely related to the question "Who is responsible?" are issues of justice: Is the loss deserved or not? Is anyone obligated to compensate the loss? Is anyone to blame or to punish?

Perceiving injustice presupposes the view that another person or institution has violated the victim's justified entitlements either by action or by omission. If losses were incurred through the victim's own behavior and decisions, if, in other words, they were self-inflicted, injustice is not an issue: the racing driver suffering an accident through his own fault, the gambler who lost his money in Monte Carlo or on the stock market, the AIDS-patient who was not willing to use safer-sex practices, or the heavy smoker with lung cancer, they all may not perceive their losses as unjust. Losses resulting from freely chosen risky activities are not conceived of as unjust, especially when the risks were anticipated and accepted in view of possible gains or pleasant experiences. At the core of injustice is the perception of a responsible agent or agency who is neglecting or violating the entitlements of others who thereby become victims.

It makes a difference whether those who suffer losses perceive themselves as victims of blind fate, as victims of actions or decisions of others, as losers in a game, or as victims of their own risky actions, of wrong decisions, or of negligent behavior. Whenever victims perceive themselves as being responsible for bad events and their consequences we might expect feelings of guilt, shame, or self-directed anger, not, however, feelings of injustice like anger, resentment or outrage, that motivate blame and punishment.

Experienced injustice adds to the primary experience of hardship, loss or strain. In a study on paraplegic accident victims (Montada, 1992), for instance, perceived injustice of one's own fate proved to be the best single (negative) predictor by far for adjustment measured as mastery of losses subjectively rated in comparison to other paraplegics. Issues of (in-)justice, however, are rarely focused explicitly in empirical studies. There is considerably more indirect evidence

suggesting that issues of justice are indeed raised by victims as well as suggesting that issues of justice have a significant impact on processes of adjustment and of mastering losses.

Victimization by Crime: A Special Case?

The question has to be raised whether psychological research on critical life events in general such as the experience of bereavement, injury, serious illness, divorce, unemployment, and so forth could provide knowledge that will be useful in understanding criminal victimization and in coping with it. The answer will be that there is a considerable overlap allowing the transfer of hypotheses.

Certainly, crimes are a special category of critical life events. There is an agent, the offender, who is held responsible for the victimization. However, other events may also be effected - or perceived as being effected - by agents who are held responsible: traffic accidents caused by cardrivers, loss of jobs caused by employers, losses at the stock market caused by a broker, loss of lodgings caused by the owners, loss of law suits due to an incompetent lawyer or an unfair judge, loss of a spouse by divorce, loss of one's health caused by a careless physician, and so forth. Some other people may be perceived responsible for the losses. Thus, victimization is not confined to crimes alone but can also be conceived of with other events that result in losses.

The main difference between losses through crimes and losses through other man-made events is that a crime means breaking a penal law not just a moral law, a promise, betraying trust, solidarity, social responsibility. However, it is frequently open to question whether a behavior is a crime or whether it is an excusable behavior or a justifiable act. The answer is quite often not unanimous: the victim, the prosecutor, the lawyer, the judge, the public, they all may have different views. Certainly, the prototype of unjust victimization is crime. There are, however, many other events which are made of the same core components.

The Experience of Victimization: A Subjective Construction

Different views are generally observed in all cases of loss caused by critical life events. The way these views are formed by both victims and observers or by members of the victim's social networks is the main concern of this chapter.

Victims may evaluate the experienced damages or losses that result form critical life events as more or less serious, more or less lasting, more or less unjust, or along some other dimensions (cf. Reichle & Montada, 1991). These evaluations are subjective ones, even when others contribute to their formation. They may depend on personal value or motive systems, on the availability of personal, social or economic resources for compensation, rehabilitation or adjustment as well as on specific subjective views about causation and responsibility, entitlements and obligations. These subjective views and evaluations contribute a good deal to the impact the loss or hardship will have on future life and development, they contribute to the morale of victims, to their mood,

to their mental and physical health, and to psychological problems as indicated by negative emotions of varying intensity (e.g., hopelessness, fears, shame, resentment). The impact of subjective views was not regularly compared to the impact of the objective seriousness of losses or problems. In studies by Frey and coworkers with accident victims it was demonstrated, however, that subjective views contribute significantly more to the process of recuperation than the seriousness of injuries rated objectively by medical experts (Frey, 1992).

In the process of taking or forming views about the victimizing event, causal explanations and the attribution of responsibility are particularly important. Some of the perceived causes may be actions or omissions of human agents (car drivers, criminals, physicians, brokers, etc.), other causes are not or only partially under human or societal control (some illnesses, natural catastrophes, some economic developments). The responsibility for losses may be attributed to the victims themselves as well as to other agents, to institutions, to the state, to society, or to a deity. Feelings of injustice, of helplessness, beliefs of uncontrollability are mainly due to these attributions of causation and responsibility, and these feelings and beliefs, in turn, will mainly determine adjustment (in terms of well-being, mood and morale) and health. There is empirical evidence that ascribing responsibility for losses to others goes along with poor physical or mental health, poor adjustment, and more intense negative emotions. Affleck, Tennen, Croog, and Levine (1987) reported this for victims of heart attacks, Bulman and Wortman (1977) and Albs and Montada (1991) for paralyzed accident victims, Frey and collaborators for less heavily injured accident victims and HIV-positives (Frey, 1992), Taylor (1983) for cancer patients.

Empirical evidence is only available for some cases of victimization. However, there are no a priori reasons why the issues of (in)justice and (un)controllability should not be applicable to all categories of experienced loss and hardship no matter if they result from crimes, accidents, illnesses, war, technical catastrophes, economic depression or whatever.

When victimized, many people tend to regain security by using specific coping strategies to avoid feelings of injustice, of helplessness, or loss of control. Taking specific views on critical life events may be a way of coping with them. In the present chapter, coping with victimizing events will be discussed under the specific perspective of two motives: the motive to avoid the view of being the victim of injustice and the motive to maintain the view to have control over one's fate and one's future. People want to believe that they live in a just and controllable world where everybody gets what he/she deserves and where they themselves (or, at least, trustworthy others) have control over their fate (for overviews see Lerner, 1980; Shaver, 1970; Steil & Slochover, 1985). Experiencing losses and hardships may imply that both beliefs are violated. There are specific aspects of the victimizing event as well as of reactions and comments of others that are particularly problematic with respect to these two motives.

In the following sections some aspects of events, some beliefs, and some ways of coping with perceived injustice are reported and discussed.

The Question "Why me?" and its Impact on Adjustment

Many victims, not all, ask the question "Why me?" after experiencing a serious loss. This question may reflect the justice problems victims might have with their fate. Why is it just me who is suffering this fate? If there is no reasonable answer, a justice problem is given. Imagine a cancer patient who did not smoke or who did not expose him- or herself to the known cancerogenes. Or imagine an elderly woman whose rental contract for her appartment, where she had lived half of her lifetime, was terminated while none of her neighbours lost their lodging. It has been empirically determined that asking "Why me?" is associated with a longer stay in the hospital, with more medical complications following an accident, with a poorer immunological state of HIV-patients, with poorer physical and mental well-being following the death of a spouse (Frey, 1992). I would like to add that health and adjustment may depend on what answers are given to the "Why me?"-question. It makes quite a difference whether or not a reasonable answer is found (Meier, 1991). I will come back to this point later.

The Number of Victims Suffering Similar Losses

Some events like war, natural, technical, or economic catastrophes usually affect a larger proportion of a population. In such cases, the experience of injustice is less likely than it will be in cases when only one or a few people are affected and are suffering. In the latter cases, the victims' question "Why me?" is obvious and, all other equal, the notion to be unjustly victimized will be more probable than in cases when others of one's own reference group and the population in general are affected similarly or even worse (Montada, 1991, 1992).

Several arguments may deliver a rationale for this hypothesis:
(1) Among other factors, the notion of injustice depends upon the observation that equal individuals "are treated" unequally. This is the Aristotelian definition of injustice. If no similar others, no "peers", are affected likewise, and if there are no obvious reasons to believe that the victim deserved his or her fate then it will become likely for a victim to respond with feelings of injustice.
(2) In general, victims tend to contact others who suffer a similar fate and many of them gain morale, a positive mood, and self-enhancement by downward comparisons (Taylor, Buunk, Collins, & Reed, 1992; Wills, 1992). The fact that others are suffering a similar or even worse misfortune offers the possibility to contact them and make downward comparisons that will result in a subjectively reduced loss experience.
(3) When many people share a bad fate, it will be far less likely that single victims are held responsible for the bad fate by assuming individual "internal" causes of the event. According to principles of common causal reasoning (cf. Kelley, 1973), internal causes of single persons are inferred when nobody else suffers the same outcome or fate. Assuming internal causes means that the "misfortune" is self-inflicted by the victim. This assumption motivates the expression of negative or derogative comments toward the victim as well as a refusal to give the victim support (cf. Montada, 1992). Either reaction may by experienced by the victim as a secondary

victimization which is especially unjust. I will come back to this issue when discussing secondary victimization.

Of course, shared fate as compared to individual fate cannot always prevent feelings of injustice. If, for instance, unemployment is unequally and inequitably frequent within one stratum or group of a population, the group as a whole may feel relatively deprived (Crosby, 1976).

Controllability

Losses through critical life events are not per se just or unjust. As stated above, injustice implies that another person or institution is held responsible. A person suffering disadvantages that were caused by one's own decisions does not have a target for complaints about unjust victimization. Racing drivers who survive an accident but are left physically handicapped will not complain about injustice as long as they consider the accident their own fault or a natural risk of this sport. Kidney donors will presumably not perceive themselves as victims but rather as moral heroes as long as they were free to decide whether or not to donate one of their kidneys (and as long as the surgeon did not make a mistake in transplanting the organ): feelings of injustice are unlikely when losses result from voluntary engagements; one's own decisional control implies responsibility for the consequences.

Self-Blame

Bulman and Wortman (1977) reported evidence that some paralyzed accident victims who accepted some of the responsibility for the accident were better adjusted than others, especially the ones who blamed others for having caused the accident. Schultz and Decker (1985) reported similar findings. Corresponding data were reported for parents whose children had died of leukemia (Chodoff, Friedman, & Hamburg, 1964), for people who had lost their relatives in concentration camps (Rappaport, 1971), for rape victims (Burgess & Holmstrom, 1979; Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Medea & Thompson, 1974), and battered women who frequently expressed self-blame rather than outrage about their husband's brutality (Frieze, 1979; Martin, 1978).

However, there are also contradictory findings. Rogner, Frey, and Havemann (1987), for instance, found a poorer course of recovery in accident victims who felt their accident would have been avoidable. In a study about rape victims, Meyer and Taylor (1986) found self-blame negatively related to adjustment.

Evidence of different or even contradictory effects of "self-blame" is not surprising. Self-blame - or more correctly, attributing responsibility to oneself - may result in various emotional evaluations which indeed are expected to have a different impact on adjustment (cf. Montada, 1992 for a more detailed discussion). In other words: the conclusions a victim draws from responsibility attributions to him- or herself may be quite different. Of course, self-blame is implied in feelings of guilt or anger about an avoidable own mistake, and these emotions are an additional stress. On

the other hand, attributing some responsibility to oneself may prevent, alleviate, or reduce the wish to blame others and the associated emotions of outrage, hatred, or bitterness, and it may be associated with the belief in future control and avoidability.

If responsibility implies avoidability, a victim might believe to be able to avoid a second victimization of that kind. Think of a woman who considers her careless behavior to have been the occasion for the rapist: She may feel safer compared to another woman since she believes that she was and will be in control of her fate. Of course, in order to be functional in this sense, self-blame must be related to controllable and changeable activities or characteristics (Janoff-Bulman, 1979). Attributing a victimization to stable internal characteristics like inabilities does not help to gain confidence in a future control.

Generalizing this view, self-blame may help some people to avoid viewing their own lives as being controlled by blind fate, a notion that is likely to undermine feelings of security and invulnerability. Chodoff et al. (1964) and Wortman (1983) suggested that some people prefer to blame themselves rather than perceiving themselves at the mercy of chance and blind fate.

In the above mentioned empirical study on paraplegic accident victims (Albs & Montada, 1991; Montada 1992) we were able to validate some of the above assumptions about the various effects of "self-blame". Attributing responsibility to oneself ("self-blame") was not substantially correlated with indicators of adjustment (e.g., mastering of losses, emotional balance, lack of continuing sadness). This is easy to understand, because attributing responsibility to oneself was positively correlated to guilt feelings by the victims and negatively to hostile feelings toward others who had contributed to the accident or the injury (hostile feelings like anger or outrage about others, or hate). Both guilt feelings and hostile feelings toward others had substantial negative effects on adjustment. Therefore, for the individual victim, the impact of "self-blame" depends on the resulting emotions: If the resulting emotion is guilt, the impact will be a negative one; if the result of self-blame is a reduction of hostility toward others, the effect will be a positive one. In the sample of accident victims as a whole there was not a general association between self-blame and adjustment.

Coping Strategies that May Help to Avoid Feelings of Injustice

The need for justice might be satisfied by asserting an entitlement and carrying it through all the way to court with the intention to obtain adequate compensation for disadvantages and/or with the goal of having the offender punished. I am not aware of systematic investigations of the effects court sentences have on victims' health and adjustment. Everyday experiences teach us, however, that outrage, helplessness, or bitterness will be evoked if a sentence is not accepted as just or if a procedure in court is not considered to be fair. These emotions constitute new problems that have to be coped with in addition to the primary losses. (Problems of raped women bringing their case to trial will be discussed in more detail later.) Tyler (1990) reported empirical studies evidencing that ratings of procedural fairness (for instance, having been given "voice",

objective consideration of one's arguments) are even more important for an overall contentment than ratings of the outcome itself.

I am also not aware of any research on the question of which people are willing to bring their case to trial, which ones aren't (possibly because they do not expect to succeed or because they fear the risk of a secondary victimization), and which people tend to subjectively reduce the strain of being victimized by using appropriate coping strategies. There are coping strategies that may be understood as strategies to reduce or avoid feelings of injustice. Self-blame may be one of these strategies (the strategic use may be assumed in cases that lack any objective evidence of a causal contribution by the victim), however, there are more (cf. Taylor, 1983): using downward comparisons, imagining things could still be worse, looking for gains in the victimizing event which would compensate the losses to some extent (e.g., gaining freedom by getting an unwanted divorce, gaining the experience of being loved and supported when falling seriously ill, gaining self-esteem by one's own morale vis à vis serious adversities or by one's rehabilitation progress after serious injury or a stroke). The functional value of these coping strategies in the sense of avoiding or reducing feelings of injustice is outlined elsewhere in more detail (Montada, 1991, 1992). Here I will discuss just one more coping strategy: the search for meaning.

The Search for Meaning

The question "Why me?" may be considered as an expression of the ongoing search for meaning in the event. What does it mean when we say that the event and its consequent losses are senseless or meaningless? Several answers can be given: (1) There can be no reasons found why the event occurred at all, or (2) why it occurred to the victim. (3) No positive consequences of the event can be identified, neither for the victim nor for anyone else.

A prototype of a senseless and meaningless event is an event which randomly happened to the victim causing him or her an irrevocable loss which the victim is not able to experience as a challenge or to make any positive use of (for instance, to consider it as an occasion to reorder the priorities in life, or to gain new insights into the self and the world, etc.).

Attributing meaning to an event causing a loss may possibly be twofold: (1) The event is not meaningless if it was produced by the goal-directed actions of an agent. If the event was intentionally aimed at by an agent it is meaningful to everyone grasping the agent's intentions. Take as an example an offender who has planned a robbery, and the victim suffered injury in trying to defend his/her property. This is a meaningful story: The victim's injuries can be understood as the normal side-effects of robberies. (2) The event is not meaningless if it happened as a well known risk of ongoing intentional activities including those of the victim him- or herself: the causal chain leading to the lossful event will at least be understood. Let us look at some examples. A fireman who is hurt while fighting a fire will find meaning in his injury by considering it an accepted risk of his profession. The mountaineer who tumbles off while climbing the rocks knew of this risk and accepted it as reasonable compared to the marvellous experiences

his beloved sport granted him. Losses that are self-inflicted or that result from freely chosen risky activities cannot be unjust and they will be understood as a consequence of taking these risks.

Losses that happened or were inflicted without a reason cannot be understood, and, subsequently, they cannot be considered as just or justified. The biblic Hiob must have felt a deep relief when he finally got the insight that all his suffered losses were due to God testing his piety. And some others may avoid feelings of unjust victimization by considering the bad event a deserved punishment for previous sins.

Not every cognition of an agent's reasons, of course, will take away feelings of unjust victimization. The victimizing agent may be blamed for his/her deeds, the state may be blamed for not having protected the victim or not having punished the offender, society may be blamed for producing a social climate favoring specific kinds of offences. Yet, identifying an agent and his/her reasons for an action may be a precondition for getting justice by having him or her punished.

A second category of meaning found (or generated) is not the (re-)construction of the occurrence of a loss but the identification of positive consequences from the event and the resulting loss. Victims who are finally able to say "It was terribly hard but I mastered my fate" state that they gave the loss the status of a challenge. Retrospectively, critical events may be viewed as creating the opportunities for experiencing gains: to meet one's spouse, to find out who one's true friends are, to reorganize life priorities, to discover new intellectual or philosophical insights, etc. (cf. Meier, 1991). All this provides the event with a positive meaning, just as if a deity would have manipulated the cause of the event in the victim's ultimate interests.

Finding a meaning in losses by focusing on mastering, on successful coping, or on subsequent gains changes the balance of losses and gains and reduces injustice.

Secondary Victimization by Others

When someone experiences a victimizing life event, the overriding tendency of others is to try to help or support the victim in some way. Support may have various forms: material help, advice, health care, emotional understanding, clarification of problems, help in making appropriate decisions, or sometimes simply listening to complaints.

In many cases, support may be helpful in coping with the actual problem and with distress. But support may also have problematic effects: it may create dependency, it may create an obligation to reciprocate, it may be problematic for the self-esteem of the victim, it may be ineffective and even awkward. One and all, the effects of support granted are not consistent across subjects, support-providers and situations (Schwarzer & Leppin, 1992).

What is much more consistent are the effects of *negative reactions* toward the victims by others. They have negative effects. There are some studies showing that negative social reactions are a much better predictor of well-being and adjustment (a negative one, of course) than positive support received is (e.g., Abbey, Abramis, & Caplan, 1985; Pagel, Erdly, & Becker, 1987; Rook 1984).

It is not seldom that others respond to victims in hurtful ways, either consciously or inadvertendly. These responses may mean a "secondary victimization" that might be experienced as being even more devastating than the primary loss. Research on various victimized populations (cancer patients, bereaved people, raped women, depressed people, victims of accidents, etc.) has unveiled ample empirical evidence of secondary victimizations and distinguished different categories of hurtful responses. The focus of research was both on the causes of negative responses and on the effects these responses had on the victims.

In a recent review of the literature Bennett-Herbert and Dunkel-Schetter (1992) list various negative social reactions towards victims such as rude/insensitive remarks, negative emotional reactions, negative evaluations, blame, derogation, physical avoidance, rejections and discriminations, inconsistency in terms of mixed positive and negative reactions, alternating support and absence of support (withdrawing support after having granted it initially might be particularly disappointing and depressing, just as promises of contact and support that are not fulfilled).

I would like to point to the particular problems of injustice that are generated by social responses toward people who suffer a hardship or a loss. It is the aspect of injustice that turns these responses into a secondary victimization. Again, to perceive a treatment as unjust requires the victim's entitlements to be violated by others. Which are the victim's entitlements? Are those who suffer a loss of health, wealth, loved ones etc. entitled to receive social support in terms of material, emotional, medical, or advisory help? Who is obligated to help? In which cases? Based on what reasons? These are the general questions. I will promote some suggestions for a few specific cases.

Secondary Victimization by Ignoring Victims' Claims

Remember that it is the expectations and claims of victims that are crucial for the arousal of feelings of injustice. Victims' expectations of support may be based on various "principles". Victims may feel they are living in a community of love and solidarity where every needy member receives support. They may think of the norm of reciprocity and expect support from those whom they have cared for earlier. They may think of generalized reciprocity and of their own prior investments for the community in general. They simply may expect continuity of the care and support that was offered right after the loss event. They may compare themselves to other victims and observe that others receive more support, attention, or loving understanding. Or they may consider their status as patients, as citizens, as family members etc. and expect others to have obligations toward them because of social positions and social roles.

Turning back to the case of being the victim of a crime or of careless or negligent behavior of others, we have to mention some entitlements that are more specific.

(1) Victims have beliefs or convictions about who is responsible for the victimization, and they frequently insist that their views are objectively true. Refusing these views or even doubting them may be experienced as unjust and as a biased ignorance of facts. If a victim feels that principles of procedural justice are not observed in court, e.g. his/her view of the case or his/her claims are not understood or considered objectively, resentment and outrage might result (Tyler, 1990).
(2) Attributing responsibility to the victim or blaming the victim for having self-inflicted the loss may be experienced as stigmatization. By bringing the rapist to trial, the rape victim may indeed not only risk the sentence "Not guilty" and subsequently her belief in a just society but she may also risk losing her reputation (cf. Krahé, 1985). In the end she herself will be stigmatized not the offender. Stigmatization may lead to isolation and to social rejection. Some rape victims who experienced this had to move from their neighbourhood (Symonds, 1975).
(3) Ignoring or refusing a victim's claims for restitution or compensation are a further kind of victimization: The victim may experience this as a violation of just entitlements and a case of injustice.
(4) Ignoring the victim's claims for blaming and punishing the offender may not be such an obvious case of secondary victimization. However, victims are frequently outraged if an obvious violation of a law is not persecuted. There are legitimate claims to enforce laws and regulations and to punish perpetrators. If this is not done by the police and by the courts, it may be viewed as a form of "structural" victimization (Nagel, 1979) which means victimization by state institutions (in this case by neglecting the obligation to protect citizens and to enforce the law). Structural victimization of minorities was identified as one of the events precipitating extreme outrage leading to overt aggression and riots (Lieberson & Silverman, 1965). Michael Kohlhaas in Kleist's Drama became a terrorist because his claims for having his case brought to trial were unjustly rejected or neglected. Societal rules and laws imply an entitlement to have them enforced.
(5) There are other cases of victims who are being cheated of their status as victims. We may encounter effects of this neglect in various phenomena. Nagel (1979) reported that in 1973 the psychiatrist Dr. Bastiaans founded a hospital for victims of the Nazi occupation in the Netherlands. He observed that many victims who already seemed to have gotten over their traumatic experiences developed psychiatric problems in their sixties again. Many of them reported enormous problems with two facts which they perceived as gravely unjust: 1) Most former collaborators of the Nazis (police-officers, judges, clerks, politicians) who had participated in the persecution and deportation of victims or who at least, did not protect them, now held their former positions in state and society again . 2) There was a collective denial of crimes that were committed during the war and the occupation which was experienced as a denial of their victimization. Statements such as "One must be able to make an end" or "One must be able to forgive" represented this attitude. The victims suffered from being cheated of their status as victims. If the harm done is forgiven by society it might hurt the victims and their claim for restitution through punishment. The victims may ask: "Who is entitled to forgive; the observer,

society or only the victims themselves?" Many victims feel that nobody but they are entitled to forgive the offender.

In this respect, Goffman's analysis of a true and complete apology is enlightening (Goffman, 1971). According to him a complete apology is characterized by the following components: 1) The apologizing offender expresses emotional distress, 2) knowledge of the applicable moral norms, 3) acceptance of responsibility for his or her actions or omissions, 4) acceptance of his or her liability for blame, 5) willingness to observe the violated moral or legal rule in the future, and 6) acknowledgement that the victim is the primary addressee for the apology. In fact, victims are more likely to forgive when the harmdoer confesses his or her guilt and accepts the blame or punishment as justified. Programs of victim-offender exchanges which try to bring together the harmdoer and the victim in order to have them negotiate an adequate restitution or compensation give occasion for an acknowledgment of the victim status by the offender (Schneider, 1979).

Indifference on the part of society, including the police, toward the victim's plight is a very common phenomenon (Symonds, 1975). Being the victim of a crime such as mugging or rape is an extraordinarily dramatic experience for the victim. For the police, this is daily routine work with a low probability to apprehend and convict the offender. Statements like "You are not the only one who was mugged today; we get plenty of other calls" deprive the victim of the very status of a victim.

For some victims it appears as if society is much more preoccupied with fairness towards the defendant than with fairness towards the victim. It is indeed a very valuable goal of the juridical system to give the defendant a fair and objective trial and to try to avoid his or her stigmatization as far as possible. However, victims and their entitlements get regrettably less attention. In court, the victim's role is that of a witness. In order to guarantee fairness to the defendant, it is legitimate to treat the witness with scepticism and entertain doubts about his or her credibility. These doubts are not only allowed, they are even prescribed as a duty in criminal investigation and in court. The consequences for the victim/witness are still only partially recognized (O'Hara, 1970). Correspondingly, victims may develop doubts about justice in society and about a state that not only failed to protect them against the offenders but also failed to side with them after they were victimized.

(6) Punishing the victim is the last kind of victimization to be mentioned. Not only may support and help be withheld, the victim may even become punished. A mother, whose young child dies in an accident, is frequently blamed for negligence. Of course, social blame and discrimination happens more frequently outside the courts. Consider AIDS-patients who lose their job or their lodging because of their illness (Blasband, 1989), or long-term unemployed people who are stigmatized as unable or lazy (Hayes & Nutman, 1981).

The effects of negative social reactions are obvious. They may mean a secondary victimization adding to the primary one, and this may indeed mean an even greater loss than the primary victimization was. Remember that many victims of misfortune reported that the experience of social support, especially emotional support including the understanding and the acceptance of their negative emotions, had helped them to master their fate and to gain adequate levels of well-being (cf. Dunkel-Schetter & Wortman, 1981). In contrast, negative social reactions are victimizing because they destroy trust in solidarity and justice and, therefore, they destroy trust in social security. It is interesting to have a closer look at the causes or rather the motives and reasons for negative social reactions.

Causes and Reasons for Negative Social Reactions

There is growing literature about the causes of negative social reactions. Recent reviews are provided by Gurtman (1986) and Bennett-Herbert and Dunkel-Schetter (1992). There are victim factors, factors of social network members and societal factors. Among the victim factors, victim's distress and depression and victim's lack of appropriate coping have been demonstrated as being influential. Both in experimental and in field studies it has been shown that distressed and depressed people are more likely to be rated as unattractive, and are more likely to be derogated and rejected. This is true across various categories of victims and respondents. As Silver, Wortman, and Crofton (1990) demonstrated with cancer patients, respondents seem to have standards for the expression of distress and depression, and deviations from these standards in either direction are critized. There are also standards for time periods during which sadness or distress will be considered adequate. It is for this reason that many bereaved people receive emotional support for a certain period following the death of a loved one. At the end of this normative duration of mourning, the feedback they get is more and more often that now it is time to look forward, to look for the positive sides of life, to stop the mourning, and so on. The message is that continuing sadness is not normal, that it is deviant. Winer, Bonner, Blaney, and Murray (1981) demonstrated that there were more negative reactions when the depressed did not show signs of improvement between the first and the second contact.

Concerning the social network members we need to know what motivates their negative reactions. Avoiding contact with victims may be due to helplessness vis à vis the victim or to being embarrased by empathic suffering with the victim. Quite often, blaming and derogating the victim may be explained by referring to one of the above mentioned motives: trying to preserve the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980) and/or the belief in having control over one's fate (Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966).

Attributing responsibility to the victim by assuming that the "misfortune" was self-inflicted helps the observer to avoid feelings of injustice since self-inflicted losses and hardships are by definition not unjust (stating injustice presupposes that others have caused the victimization). Quite a few studies demonstrate that belief in a just world (measured by Rubin and Peplau's scale, 1975, or by a scale developed in my group, cf. Dalbert, Montada, & Schmitt, 1987) is correlated with blaming

victims for having self-inflicted their misfortune (Lerner, 1980), their illnesses, unemployment, or accidents (Maes & Montada, 1988), their unemployment or poverty (Montada & Schneider, 1989), their AIDS-infection (Montada & Figura, 1988).

Blaming the victim may also defend the belief in having control over one's life and the belief in invulnerability. It is positively correlated with respondents' optimism and their belief of being invulnerable, and it is negatively correlated with felt helplessness when thinking about life risks such as cancer, traffic accidents, or job loss (Maes & Montada, 1988). A scale to measure the individual strength of the motive to preserve control has recently been developed (Kordmann, 1991): The motive to preserve control was positively correlated with attributing responsibility to accident victims.

In summary, it may be stated that observers' views of (in-)justice and responsibilities are also subjective constructions which frequently are not objective but biased and motivated. They might be quite influential, however, in interactions with the victims. Whether social network members support the victims or whether they derogate, isolate, or blame them will depend on their frequently biased views about justice and responsibility.

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Facet Theory: A Systematic Approach to Linking Survey Research to Theoretical Reasoning

Ingwer Borg

Introduction: Facet Theory-Design, Data Analysis, and Correspondence Hypotheses

Facet theory (FT) is a methodology for theory construction and data analysis (Guttman, 1959; Borg, 1977; Shye, 1978; Borg & Staufenbiel, in press). It provides, among other things, a language for designing empirical research, i.e., for making explicit what observations are to be made under what conditions. In this respect, FT is similar to experimental design and sample construction methods. But FT is more general, and formally includes these fields as special cases. Consequently, since neither experimental design nor sample construction are closed systems but are more like research programs, FT is also not a finished product, nor can it be used mechanically on given data.

FT has led to designs that, in turn, asked for particular ways to look at the data. This does not mean that FT excludes traditional statistical methods in principle as incompatible, as it is sometimes assumed. Yet, the data analytic methods developed within the FT context are typically more general, "softer", and, most importantly, they can be linked more easily to the features of the design. That is, e.g., for the analysis of similarity data (such as correlations) it is often much more revealing to analyze them via SSA rather than using factor analysis, because the latter forces various mathematically convenient but substantively unjustified ("extrinsic") restrictions onto the data representation that make it more difficult to directly see structural correspondences between data and design.

Figure 1 shows diagramatically how FT guides empirical research and theory construction in cooperation with two other key players, substantive theory on the one hand, and Mother Nature on the other. FT and substantive theory both contribute to set up a definitional system for a universe of observations. This system leads to a design of concrete "questions" to Mother Nature. Her answers are the observations. They can be looked at in many ways, for example through such particular glasses as SSA, MSA or POSA. The non-trivial question, then, is whether there exist correspondences between the definitional system and the structure of the observations as they are represented in some particular data-analytic way.

One may collect measures on the fear to become a victim of different types of crime, for example, and then check whether these data are correlated positively among each other. The rationale for looking at this particular aspect of the data is the hypothesis that there exists a common object of fear ("crime"), with different types of crime as different facets of the same object. As an alternati-

crimes" are really unrelated phenomena. Furthermore, looking at differences rather than commonalities, one might study if and how the different types of crimes are reflected in differences in the expressed fear.

Figure 1: An overview of basic concepts of facet theory, and their relations to other basic notions of empirical research



Both questions relate to FT. The first one makes it necessary to define what are and what are not fear-of-crime items. In this context it is useful to also clarify whether such items belong to a universe of items for which one has already succeeded to establish empirical laws and theories. The typical next step is to somehow structure such items by spelling out the dimensions along which they differ, i.e., their facets. The final question then asks if and how these facets are reflected in the fear-of-crime responses.

Further questions concerning replicability, extensions, subdomains etc. can then follow as usual. FT provides guidelines on how to proceed systematically. If, on the other hand, the conceptual-definitional considerations are not reflected in the data, one might ask where the violations are, whether there is reason to modify the definitions, whether the conditions for certain laws are violated, etc.

Observations

Basic Facets of Observations: S, P and R

The building blocks of FT are facets. Facets are sets that articulate distinctions that one wants to make with respect to the object of interest. For example, the facet "gender" partitions the set of respondents into two classes, men and women. The facet "intelligence" sorts people into the (ordered) categories of an intelligence scale. Intelligence tests, on the other hand, can be sorted by, say, the facet "kind of task" into arithmetical, geometrical, or verbal ones.

Facets are denoted by braces {...}, or, to simplify notation, by columns of parentheses. Formal facets have explicit rules for the inclusion of elements, expressed most often by giving the facet a name. An example is the facet "country of citizenship". One does not need a lengthy listing of different countries here, but can generate the elements of this facet quite reliably from knowing the facet's name. This is different with informal facets. They are mere collections of elements. The topics that are addressed in a questionnaire often form such an informal facet: Without having a complete listing, one cannot know what the questionnaire addresses. Those who constructed the questionnaire may have had some rule - like a particular substantive interest - for deciding that certain topics should be covered while others should be skipped. By making this rule explicit, one would turn the informal facet into a formal one.

Empirical research in the social sciences always involves three super-facets: S, the *stimuli* (questions, experimental conditions, situations, etc.); P, the responding *persons* (subjects, informants, rats, etc.); and R, the *responses* (reactions, answers, etc.).

Although it is not always necessary to spell this out explicitly, it is nevertheless important to conceptually distinguish the samples S, P, and R from their universes $\underline{S}$ (=universe of questions), $\underline{P}$ (=population) and $\underline{R}$ (=universe of observations), respectively. Inferential statistics is concerned with the relation of P and $\underline{P}$. Generalizability theory (Cronbach, Rajaratnam, & Glaser, 1963) considers the relation of S to $\underline{S}$. Both differ from FT by being formal theories that do not address the question how one should interpret or work with their parameters within a particular substantive context.

Observations as Mappings

$\underline{S}$, $\underline{P}$ and $\underline{R}$ are connected in the mapping $\underline{S}x\underline{P} \longrightarrow \underline{R}$, where $\underline{S}x\underline{P}$ is the Cartesian product consisting of all pairs of elements of $\underline{S}$ and $\underline{P}$. The sets $\underline{S}$, $\underline{P}$ and $\underline{R}$ are connected through empirical observations. Concretely, if S contains the questions of a questionnaire, say, one observes which answers out of R are selected by the persons in P.

SxP is the domain of the mapping, R its range. The mapping can also be understood such that S is taken as a set of operators which map the p's of P into R; vice versa, the p's can be taken as operators on S.

Definitional Systems

Facetizations

Facetizations of the Population (P)

Sociologists typically spend much time and effort on stratifying or cross-classifying ("facetizing") the set P into types. This is what they do when they construct a sample. They want, for example, both men and women in their sample; the respondents should vary in age; and they should have different levels of education. With P as the relevant set under consideration, we write such a crossing of classification criteria ("facets") as P1xP2x...xPn. In the given example, we have P1xP2xP3=Gender x Age x Education, where Age and Education are usually sets of just a few elements (age and eduction categories, classes, types, groups, etc.) and Gender = {male, female}.

Generally, if you think of P as an n-dimensional cloud of points, then each Pi slices up this configuration along the i-th dimension so that, in the end, P is "partitioned" into a system of n-dimensional cells. The number of such cells corresponds to $n(P1) \cdot n(P2) \cdot \ldots \cdot n(Pn)$, where n(Pi) is the number of elements of facet Pi. Each cell is technically called a "class", and the set of all classes is called the "quotient set" of P, denoted as P/P1x...xPn (see also Section 3.5).

Facetizations of the Questions (S)

Much less effort is typically spend on facetizing the set of questions, S. In survey research, the questions are often set up more or less unsystematically, with just a rough notion of commonality. This is different in the experimental sciences, where S is most often of particular interest. Designing experiments very much concentrates on finding a sensible structure for S, i.e., a facet product S1x...xSm. The facets S1, S2, ... are called (experimental) "factors" in this context. A simple example is an experimental design to study the dependency of the performance of P="rats" on S = "Deprivation x Habit Strength x Incentive" = {0, 1, 2 hours of food deprivation} x {0, 10, 20 previous trials} x {0, 1, 2, 3 pellets of food in last trial}.

It is little known that one can use exactly the same approach for constructing the questions of a questionnaire. A direct suggestion in this direction is the "factorial survey approach" (Rossi & Nock, 1982). It uses "vignettes" - bundles of short descriptions that characterize the "levels" of different "dimensions" - as objects for judgment. The basic idea here is to present different combinations of these dimensions to a person and then analyze (usually by linear regression) the contribution of each dimension to his or her judgment on these vignettes. For example, Rossi and

Anderson (1982), in studying sexual harassment, used eight dimensions such as "status of male" = {single graduate student, single graduate student TA, married graduate student, ..., married 65-year old professor}, "status of female" = {single graduate student, freshman, senior, married graduate student}, "woman's relationship to man" = {had rarely had occasion to talk to, had gone out several times with, ...}, "social setting", "woman's receptivity", "male's verbal behavior", "male's physical acts", and "male's threat". A vignette is produced by a computer program that combines elements from each dimension into an n-tuple such as the following. "Cindy M.: married graduate student; often had occasion to talk to; Garry T.: a single 65-year old professor; they were both at a party; she said that she enjoyed and looked forward to his class; he asked her about other courses; he said that she could substantially improve her grade if she cooperated." The respondent was asked to rate this event on sexual harassment on the scale {definitely not harassment ... definitely harassment}.

Vignettes are questionnaire items that are particularly obtrusive in their content. In contrast, consider the following. The set S = "questions on well-being" may be facetized by A = "life aspects" = {a1="work", a2="family", a3="friends", a4="education", a5="health", a6="in general"} and B = "environment" = {b1="primary", b2="secondary"} (after Levy, 1976). This leads to 12 different types of questions, where each type is characterized by its "structuple" aibj. The question "How satisfied are you with your current work?", e.g., can be understood as an a1b1 question. What is obtrusive here is "work", while the notion that the question refers to the respondent's primary environment is rather abstract and certainly not explicit to the subject. But things can get much less obtrusive. One example in this context is the question "Generally speaking, are you happy these days?" Levy and Guttman (1975) extended the above two-faceted design by adding four more facets, and then classified this question as a2b1c1d1e1f3. Briefly, the structs stand for a2="assessment: cognitive", b1="aspect of well-being: state of", c1="reference group: self", d1="environment: primary internal", e1="aspect of life area: general", f3="life area: on the whole". We do not have to discuss this much to make clear that the conceptual set-up of this question is intricate and not obvious at all.

More generally speaking, it is useful to free oneself from restricting the term "question" to those that are put forward in a verbal form. Rather, a question can be conceived of in a more generic sense as any inquiry or directed observation in the sense of "asking questions to Mother Nature". Together with its range, i.e., the set of what one wants to register as answers (also meant generically), the question defines an "item". The set of questions defines the "universe of content", just like the set of all elements of P defines the universe of respondents or the typical "population".

Facetizations of the Responses (R)

A facetization of R often arises naturally when the questions are mapped onto several ranges, R1...Rn. Consider the questions: "How satisfied are you presently with your income?" and "How important is it for you personally to make a lot of money?" Together with their ranges, we can express them as follows:

Person {p} assesses his or her income as

—> (presently very positive) and (very important)
(...) (...)
(presently very negative) (very unimportant)

An alternative version to formulate the same content is to pull the distinctions from R into S:

Person {p} assesses his/her *point-of-view* (satisfaction with / notion of value for) *object* {income} *time* at {not specified}

—> (very great ... very small) in the sense of the point-of-view

This "mapping sentence" better clarifies what the items distinguish and what further distinctions they contain in a rudimentary form. On the other hand, the range now needs to refer back to a "sense facet", because a scale like {very great ... very small} simply measures intensity without further meaning. Formally, this means that rather than having the simple range R = {very great ... very small}, we either have two sets R1 = {very great ... very small satisfaction} and R2 = {very great ... very small subjective importance}, or an "indexed" range Rs with two classes as elements, both of them equal to {very great ... very small}, but each one referring back to a different element si of the point-of-view facet above. Rs, then, is a facetization of the union of R1 and R2, where S induces the classes.

Formally, it does not make a difference if one chooses multiple range sets (R1, R2, etc.) or an indexed set Rs. For building substantive theories, however, the Rs approach is more natural when there exists a common meaning to the different ranges (see Section 3.4). On the other hand, when P is facetized into a set of background variables, then it may be better to actually express these differentiations through multiple R's. Consider the following example.

Person p here assesses two different life areas. Appropriate items could be, for example: "I like my job", "I am looking forward to go to work each day", or "My spare time is very interesting", with a Likert-type range of {very much agree ... very much disagree}. One notes that the facets gender and eduction are *not* addressed in these concrete items. They correspond, rather, to the

The	(female) ( ) (male)	person (p) with		(higher) (average) (minimal)	education assesses the
			satisfaction		
life aspect	(work) ( ) (spare time)	—>		(very satisfactory) (...) (very dissatisfactory)	

ranges of other items from the following mapping sentence:

	demographics		R1	R2
Person (p) has	(1. gender) ( ) (2. education)	—>	(female) (male)	(higher education) (average education) (minimal education)

It is usually better to separate such background-variable assessments from the content of the mapping sentence. First, one obtains two mapping sentences - one which features S and its distinctions, together with a simple "p"; another one which addresses background distinctions on P - which directly correspond to questions types actually used in an empirical investigation. This facilitates to formulate concrete items. Second, background-related and general content-related hypotheses can thus be expressed naturally in terms of the different ranges (here: satisfaction, R1, R2) and their relations.

Mapping Sentences

The abstract language of the SxP —>R mapping or a simple listing of facets does not lend itself easily to constructing items. It also makes it difficult to clarify the possible interdependencies or roles of the facets with respect to the observations. For this reason, FT often uses the device of a mapping sentence, which expresses the SxP —>R mapping as a set of sentences. We have already encountered several examples above.

A mapping sentence usually allows for as many ways to read it as there are elements in SxP. In advanced research, mapping sentences often contain many distinction on S, and thus define thousands of different structuples. (Note that such structuples characterize item *types*. The number of possible items is always infinite.) This does not mean, however, that the number of facets has to be very large. Kernberg, Burstein, Coyne, Applebaum, Horwitz, and Voth (1972), for example, studied the certainly complex question of "how the process of psychotherapy brought about changes in the suffering patient" (p. v) and observed that "one of the interesting results of the entire facet analysis was the fact that complex variables such as those needed to measure behaviors, treatments, etc., could be described by only 16 basic set of elements and that every

variable could then be defined in terms of this basic framework" (p. 92). This discovery is partly a consequence of the fact that the Cartesian product of Kernberg et al.'s facets - most of them quite simple ones with only four or fewer elements - contains over 278 billion elements. With good facets, this should suffice to classify even the most diverse phenomena.

What, then, are "good" facets? Good facets should certainly be conceptually clear so that different experts for the particular domain under study would be able to use them reliably in classifying observations. Moreover, the conceptual distinctions induced by good facets should ultimately be mirrored in some aspect of the structure of the observations. Formulating a mapping sentence is therefore always a demanding task. Marcus (1983) reports that his group worked almost half a year on the mapping sentence to guide an extensive study on the effects of toxins on child development (Marcus & Hans, 1982). Building mapping sentences requires solid substantive knowledge and much conceptual trial-and-error work in order to clarify which facets should be included and which roles they should play. In the end, the facets and the rules used to build the mapping sentence represent a theory for the considered universe of observations.

There is, unfortunately, no royal road for finding good facets. The researcher has to have the right hunch for those distinctions that will show up in the data and "explain variance". Solid substantive knowledge will usually help in this regard, but it is also true that "the initial choice of facets depends on the creativity and perceptiveness of the theorist" (Wiggins, 1980, p. 477). Methodologist will be usually not be able to come up with such facets.

It is important to see, therefore, that constructing mapping sentences involves a process of successive approximation of semantics on one side and observations on the other. Mapping sentences always have only a limited degree of semantic exactness. Their vagueness is unavoidable because of vagueness in the theory itself. This should not lead to too much concern: judging from how empirical sciences proceed in practice, a cumulative approach always starts out with something rather vague and then systematically builds on what went on before by making some of the informality more formal.

Methodologists tend to insist that all terms should be completely unambiguous before one proceeds to constructing items. Yet, a highly technical language is more a desired end-state: in practice, the scientist chooses a level of rigour that makes the semantics sufficiently reliable for the purposes at hand. E.g., the term "affective" is an undefined, every-day language word in most social sciences publications. It may not be sufficiently clear for the deeper study of emotions, but has been shown to be adequate for finding laws in attitude research. Without such laws in mind, there is little need for technical terminology. Only if a law of behavior is established which depends on a technical definition is there a scientific reason for consensus in adopting that definition.

The box below contains a mapping sentence that is phrased in a more technical language. Experimental psychologists should have no problems to agree on what is considered here, because everyone understands such key terms as "deprivation" and "habit strength".

Rat {r} performs in maze {m} under (high / ... / no) deprivation of

(hunger / ... / thirst) and (asymptotically high / ... / no) habit strength with

respect to behavior {b} towards the goal box that in

{last} trial contained (much / ... / no) rewards

—> (very strong / ... / very weak) appetitive behavior

Some researchers even felt that the level of understanding was high enough to formulate in mathemtical terms how the various facets work together to generate the performance behavior R. The formulas $R = D \cdot I \cdot H$ and $R = (D+I) \cdot H$ were proposed by Hull (1952) and Spence (1956), resp., where D = drive, I = incentive, and H = habit strength. This leads to a mapping sentence that is more technical and precise due to its analytical language. For Hull's formula, we get:

For rat {r} in maze {m} it is true that

$$m1\begin{bmatrix}\text{(t minutes)}\\ \text{(...)}\\ \text{(0 minutes)}\end{bmatrix}\text{ deprivation on }\begin{bmatrix}\text{(food)}\\ \text{( )}\\ \text{(water)}\end{bmatrix}\cdot m2\begin{bmatrix}\text{(n previous trials)}\\ \text{(...)}\\ \text{(0 previous trials)}\end{bmatrix}\text{ in \{m\}}$$

$$\cdot m3\begin{bmatrix}\text{(m units of reward)}\\ \text{(...)}\\ \text{(0 units of reward)}\end{bmatrix} = m4(\text{k units of performance \{x\}}),$$

where m1, m2, m3, and m4 are strictly increasing monotone real-valued functions, under the constraint that deprivation is not excessive.

Common Range

Consider the question "What is true for country xyz?" together with five different ranges: {very small ... very large GNP}, {low ... high child mortality rate}, {few ... many universities}, {few ... many illiterates}, {no ... many main frame computers}. It is easy to see that each range assesses a particular aspect of country xyz, but that there is something common to all these aspects which could be termed level of development. Hence, each range could be mapped into this "common range" (CR): {very low level ... very high level of development}. By definition, then, a CR means (1) that the range for each item is ordered, and (2) each range can be ordered with respect to a common criterion or meaning.

In order to find a CR, it is often advantageous to express the differences among items not through different ranges, but through appropriate facets in S. That is always possible. For the given case, we get:



Range B1 is the surface range to which the items refer quite directly. B2, on the other hand, is a product of our intelligence to see a common meaning in all B1 mappings. The respondent, of course, only generates B1 mappings. Whether she knows about B2 or, rather, behaves *as if* she knows about B2, is an open question and, indeed, a hypothesis. It leads one to predict, for example, that the answers to the different items should not be correlated negatively - provided the respondents are sufficiently familiar with the different countries.

If, on the other hand, we add the question "How large is this country?", then obviously B1 is still a valid formal range, but B2 becomes irrelevant. This shows that formally equivalent or even identical ranges are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a CR. Only common meaning is.

Normally, one does not "discover" a CR in a given set of items. Rather, CR notions are often the starting point for an empirical study. Take fear of crime. One could set up several items that measure different aspects of fear of crime. Such items need not have the same formal ranges.

Thus, the following two items qualify as fear-of-crime items: Do you feel comfortable walking around at night in your city? {yes, no}; Are you afraid to be burglarized? {very much afraid, much afraid, a little afraid, not at all afraid}.

Another universe of items may ask what people actually do in order to protect themselves from crime. Examples are: Do you usually lock your car doors? {always, often, seldomly, never}; I avoid going out at night {yes, no}.

It is easy to see that these two universes have a CR, i.e., they both express the person's behavior - *affective* behavior in one, *instrumental* behavior in the other case - towards the crime. Indeed, what we are assessing here is attitudinal behavior towards crime because an item belongs to the universe of attitude items if and only if it asks about behavior whose range is ordered from very positive to very negative towards an object (modified after Guttman, 1981b). This immediately implies three things: (1) We can combine the two universes into a single one with one CR; (2) we can consider yet another type of items, i.e., those assessing attitudes in a *cognitive* modality (What do people think about the threat of crime?); (3) we should be able to predict non-negative intercorrelations among the various items by the first law of attitudes (see Section 4, below).

It is important not to confuse the concept of a CR with the notion of one-dimensionality or scalability. Social scientist often argue that two variables do not measure "the same thing" because they do not correlate empirically. Intelligence tests, for example, all measure intelligence, but their structure is often complex and more than one-dimensional. This simply reflects differences in the questions, but not differences in their ranges. A hypothesis of non-negative intercorrelations does not exclude such multidimensionality, of course, as is evident from intelligence theory. Hence, the CR reflects in a sense the empirical similarity of the items, while the facets of S rather refer to their differences.

Some Remarks on FT Terminology

In FT, one often speaks about definitional "systems" to denote the mapping sentence and its facets. This language comes from mathematics, where a system is a set with a structure. That is, a system is defined (1) by a set and (2) one or more relations defined on this set.

As we have seen, facets are more than just sets. They play a particular *role* in any design, i.e., they induce distinctions into some universe of interest. Hence, a facet is formally defined as a component set of a Cartesian product.

To make some of these notions more precise, consider the set P. We first have to distinguish the population $\underline{P}$ (denoted here as $\underline{P}$) from the sample P. When we talk about facetizing the persons, we almost always mean that we want to facetize $\underline{P}$. The facetization P1x...xPn, then, partitions $\underline{P}$ into the quotient set $\underline{P}$/P1x...xPn, i.e., into a set whose elements are classes rather than points, or, in other words, into a set of person types rather than persons.

The elements of P are pairwise related to each other insofar as they either belong or do not belong to the same class. This establishes an equivalence relation E on any pair (x, y) as follows: xEy is true if and only if the structuples of x and y are identical.

Technically, a facet such as Pi does not directly induce a partitioning, but it entails an equivalence relation in P. This explains why the elements of Pi - or any other facet - are called "structs": they turn their base set into a structured set.

Given the quotient sets S/S1x..xSn and P/P1x..xPn, the natural question, then, is to ask what happens empirically to these types, i.e., are they reflected in similar typologies in the data. One can work out these notions into a detailled mathematical formulation. Then, FT turns out to be a very general case of measurement theory with the general hypothesis that the equivalence classes in the definitional system are reflected in some way in the observations. If that is true then the mapping SxP —> R is a homomorphism.

Items

Items: General Issues

The concept item has no universal meaning in the social sciences. Most often it refers somewhat vaguely to the questions or the "variables" of a study. In FT, in contrast, an item is defined as a question together with its range of admissible answers. Thus, items refer both to S and R, i.e., they are elements of SxR.

Items play a central role in FT. Definitions for objects of interest in FT are made by distinguishing particular types of items from other items, i.e., by discriminating item universes among each other (see Section 4.2).

In the above rat performance context, a particular item is simply a particular experimental condition, (d, h, i) in DxHxI, together with the observational range R. Hence, an item here is formally an element of the relation DxHxI —> R. In this case, it is easy to decide if a given observation satisfies this relation or not.

Similar decisions are required in other contexts: one should also be able, for example, to specify rules that allow one to decide if a given item is or is not an attitude item, a value item, or an intelligence item. Take the question "How much is 1+1?". Most psychologists would tend to classify this question as an intelligence "item", but in FT this remains open until we know what kind of response behavior will be recorded after asking this question (see Section 7.3).

Role of Items in Defining the Universe of Discourse

The common way to define the object of interest is to relate it, in a dictionary style, to other notions that are supposedly already clear(er). Attitude, for example, is often defined like this: "An attitude is a relatively stable disposition ... ", which assumes that one already knows, in particular, what is meant by disposition. Another and rather rarely used alternative is an operational defintion. It does not attempt to say what the object "is", but "relates a concept to what would be observed if certain operations are performed under specified conditions on specified objects" (Aschoff, Gupta, & Minas, 1962, p. 141).

FT proceeds differently, i.e., by defining the object of interest through characterizing the set of all items in its domain. Thus, for example, one does not really define the "concept" of attitude, but rather the universe of attitude items. The concepts are thus characterized indirectly through what the researcher actually does, i.e., ask certain types of questions and record certain types of answers. The concept as such is not avoided but left in the background. This has the advantage that one stays relatively close to actual observations, but does not get too close to very particular assessment procedures that later on pose the problem how one could pull everything together under a common label. Thus, in a way, the FT approach lies somewhere in between the usual nominal method and the operational one.

Defining a universe of items concentrates above all on the role of the item ranges. Items in a universe of items are held together by the common meaning of their ranges. They differ among each other by the distinctions made in the domain.

Two Particular Item Universes: Intelligence and Attitude

A person p responds to the "1+1=?" question in many different ways, and any one could be selected as data. E.g., we could record p's electrical skin resistance, p's reaction time for giving a verbal response, or p's verbal productions. One possible verbal response is "Two!", another one is "Leave me alone!". If we decide to restrict p's answers to verbal answers and here to utterances of numbers only, then the aspect of p's behavior we are observing is intelligence behavior according to the following definition: "An item belongs to the universe of intelligence items if and only if it asks about behavior whose range is ordered from {very right ... very wrong} with respect to an objective rule."

Hence, if the person answers "two", then his or her answer can be classified as "right in terms of arithmetic", and so the assessed behavior is intelligence behavior. If the answer is "zero", then it is wrong in terms of the same decision criteria. It is right in terms of binary arithmetic, but whatever the arithmetic, each one allows a grading of the answer on the right-wrong range. The categories "right" and "wrong" are always completely determined. Additional rules can be set up for what is meant by "more or less right". In speed tests, for example, one simply counts the number of correct responses per fixed time interval to arrive at such a grading.

If we restrict the range of our "How much is 1+1?" question such that verbal behavior of the kind "Leave me alone!" belongs to the universe of legitimate answers, then it might be possible to argue that the item is an attitude item, provided the set of all admissible answers is ordered from very positive to very negative towards an object. (The positive-negative range does not imply a good-bad evaluation on normative criteria, nor does it mean that some attitudinal behavior is good or bad for the person in some sense. Rather, it denotes an approach or avoidance direction of the person's behavior with respect to the object.)

The attitude object is, first of all and quite simply, the content of the question itself. Whether there is a higher-order object (like "mathematics" or "the interviewer") to which this and other items all refer, is a further question.

Evaluating Item Definitions

Item definitions should satisfy several criteria. First, they should be clear so that different researchers can use them reliably as decision rules. Second, they should be useful in structuring the concepts and also in "explaining" the observations. Hence, they are to be evaluated in terms of usefulness, but not in terms of truth (right-wrong).

Definitions are always set up with a purpose in mind. Good definitions serve this purpose, and poor ones have to be modified accordingly. This is true in all sciences. The physicists Misher, Thorne, and Wheeler (1973, quoted after Guttman, 1991) write: "Time is defined so that motion looks simple". Yet, even though definitions are arbitrary, there is good *scientific* reason not to change them unnecessarily once one has succeeded to establish empirical laws that hinge on them.

The above definition of attitude items has been shown to be successful in this respect. It does, in particular, not make a distinction between "attitude" and "behavior". Rather, feelings and beliefs are taken as special forms of behavior. The same is true for overt actions. The reason for choosing such a definition over others is that it is simultaneously broad and narrow enough to define items for which a particular empirical law holds, the positive monotonicity ("first") law (Guttman, 1978). It specifies how attitudinal behaviors are related among each other.

Formally, an attitude of person p towards object o is assessed by the element in the range "very positive ... very negative behavior towards object o" into which item i's question maps p. Thus, many attitudinal behaviors of a person towards object o are assessed, one for each i. The first law says that such behaviors should not correlate negatively in the population, provided a number of restrictions are satisfied (Guttman, in Gratch 1973, p. 36; Levy 1981). The restrictions are: (1) all items are attitude items; (2) all items have the same attitude object; (3) the population is not specially selected with respect to that object.

All of these restrictions are somewhat imprecise in the sense that different researchers would not necessarily agree whether the first law should or should not hold for a given set of items. Condition 3 seems least precise. Levy (1981) reports a study where negative correlations between items referring to religion and those of a different content were found for students in religious schools, but not for students in general. This suggests what is meant by "specially selected", but it is not more than a start. Clearly, more precision is needed.

For condition 2, Levy (1981) suggested a refinement by distinguishing between complementary and competing aspects of an attitude object: the law, of course, is only meant to hold for complementary aspects. In any case, a major route of further research is to clarify the boundaries of the domain for which it holds. No empirical law holds without limits.

Apart from such issues that require further work, it is important to see the wider issues. One feature of our attitude definition is that it is set up in such a way that testable empirical questions are not excluded by definition. By contrast, many definitions of attitude contain an element such as "a relatively stable predisposition to act" which automatically excludes all behavior as non-attitudinal for which one has not succeeded to show that it is related to overt action and that is, moreover, (relatively?) stable over time. By inversion one runs into even greater problems, since if all such predispositions to act are "attitudes" then age or social class are attitudes too. This would certainly stretch the concept too far.

Finding and Characterizing Concrete Items

After defining a relevant universe of items, one introduces facets on S and P, as shown above. Concrete items are then either constructed from scratch or culled from existing item pools by using the facets or the mapping sentence as guidelines.

In either case, this is where concrete items and abstract structuples have to be brought together. To make such assignments is often the most difficult task in FT-guided research. Consider an example. Elizur (1984) classified the item "advancement in job" - with the range {not important to me ... very important to me} - as a "cognitive" work value and not as an "emotional" or as an "instrumental" one, even though it is certainly true that advancing in your job may be joyful and lead to a higher income. Hence, one may be tempted to ask whether Elizur's struct assignment is "correct".

This question, however, turns out to be meaningless, because struct assignments are definitions and not assumptions. If they were assumptions one could test their truth (right-wrong). For definitions, other criteria are relevant (usefulness, clarity).

The clarity of the struct assignment reflects the clarity of the facet itself. Ideally, different experts should arrive at the same struct assignments. Obviously, the facet {emotional, cognitive, instrumental} leaves much lee-way for classifying work values. Advancement, in particular, seems

to belong to all of these classes, but one may argue that the cognitive aspect of advancement is most important.

Yet, do such considerations not really involve hypotheses about what goes on in the head of the respondent? Fischer[1] (1990, personal communiction) argued that structuples of concrete items should not be considered definitions but "guesses". I suggest, in contrast, that the structuple assignment is a definition, while its correspondence to an empirical regularity is a hypothesis. This implies that one cannot test out empirically - e.g., through "item analysis" - whether an item belongs or does not belong to a certain class. This point can lead to difficult philosophical discussions, but I believe that the issue is clarified readily by a thought experiment: try to figure out the meaning of variable y, given that y correlates perfectly with x="body height"! Obviously, $r(x, y)=1$ implies nothing about the content of y, and, hence, observations on items cannot falsify their structuples. (Amusingly, some argue that it would be easier to figure out what y is if r were, say, only .80!) That is not to say, however, that such observations may not hint at other facetizations in the sense of exploratory data analysis, but that is another matter.

How, then, is one to avoid ambiguities in struct assignments? The answer, quite simply, is by reducing the "semantic noise" through better facets. One finds occasionally that one particular expert arrives at structuple assignments that better correspond to the structure of the observations. This simply means that this researcher must use some unexplicated surplus criteria in his or her classifications. Since they seem to work, an effort should be made to bring them out into the daylight.

Correspondence Hypotheses

Structuples and mapping sentences imply hypotheses about the structure of the data they define. The first law of attitudes is one prominent example. Analogous "sign predictions" also hold for intelligence items and involvement items (Levy, 1981). "Order hypotheses" state that the partial order of the item structuples corresponds monotonically to observations on these items. "Regional hypotheses" predict that spatial representations of some aspect of the empirical structure of the items can be partitioned into simple regions induced by the various facets.

Meta Principles

Early attempts in FT were much concerned with exploring the possibility to derive formal principles for constructing correspondence hypotheses that could be used mechanically without attention to content. Not much resulted from this search for meta principles, but it is useful to briefly look at the results.

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[1] Discussion contribution at the symposium "The relevance of attitude measurement in sociology", Bad Homburg, Germany, June 1990.

Principle of Empirical Discriminability

We have already mentioned the very general principle of empirical discriminability. That is, distinctions that we make in the definitional system should be mirrored in some sense in the observations. Given a non-trivial sense of correspondence, we then have facets that are not only conceptually but also empirically useful. Expressed traditionally, the facets then "explain variance in the data".

Nothing guarantees that such a correspondence of definitional and empirical systems does indeed hold. Person p normally knows nothing about the facets used by the researcher to structure S. Even if they become obvious as, e.g., in factorial surveys or in typical applications of conjoint measurement, p responds to conjunctions of several facets and not to single facets in isolation.

Contiguity Principle

Another meta principle that is sometimes believed to be a cornerstone of FT is the contiguity principle (Foa, 1958; Guttman, 1959; Runkel & MacGrath, 1968). It is based on the general idea that "variables which are more similar in their facet structure will also be more related empirically" (Foa, 1965, p. 264).

Similarity, in this context, is typically defined as the number of elements that two structuples have in common (Foa, 1958, p. 233), but that is not essential. The contiguity principle is, in any case, faulty. Consider an example. Take three political parties, with structuples p1 = (liberal, big, new), p2 = (conservative, big, new) and p3 = (liberal, small, old). According to the contiguity principle, p1 and p2 should be "empirically more related" than p1 and p3. Obviously, it remains unclear what this is supposed to mean as long as there no specification on what is actually being observed. The structuples alone do not specify what is being asked, and who is being asked, and what is being recorded as an answer. We could, for example, ask voters (P1) how likely they will vote for each of these parties in the next election (R1). Another question might ask economists (P2) about the financial assets of each party (R2). The similarity of the R1 answers, then, conceivable depends primarily on the facet {liberal, conservative}, while the R2 answers may be more dependent on the size of the parties.

This example shows that a simple (unweighted) counting of the number of equivalent elements in the structuples cannot possibly establish a general correspondence hypothesis. Attempts to conceive of a weighting system without considering the range (Foa, 1965) are futile. Rather, the relation of each single facet to the range has to be studied. The contiguity principle can be valid only if each facet is ordered in the same sense as the range. Even then an unweighted summation is dubious in general: a partial order hypothesis (see 5.2.2 below) is usually all one can hope for.

Special Hypotheses

Meta principles are too general to be of much use in applications. More specialized hypotheses are therefore called for. There exist quite a few such hypotheses. Some of them (like scalability or partial orders) are used only seldomly, others (like regional hypotheses) have been found very useful in a wide variety of applications.

Scalability

Given a set of structuples or profiles of answers, a classical hypothesis is their scalability (Guttman, 1944). In its simplest form, the profiles consist of dichotomous data with a common range. For example, one could ask respondents whether they are afraid to become a victim of crime a, ..., z, and then allow for a Yes (1) or a No (0) in each case. This yields a data profile like 11010...1 for each person. If one can permute the columns of these profiles and order them over all persons such that one obtains a stair-case like pattern of 1's and 0's, then the persons and the crimes can be mapped onto a single dimension ("Guttman scale"). It simultaneously orders persons in terms of fear and crimes in terms of likelihood. One can predict such a scale from the design provided the structuples themselves form a Guttman scale. That is, in our example, one must have a "semantic" Guttman scale for the different crimes.

The hypothesis of scalability extends, however, to any sample of p's from P and s's from S. Hence, attempts to fit a scale to a particular data sample by eliminating certain misfits (persons, profiles, facets) are problematic because they refer, in the end, to an unknown universe of content. In other words, it may measure something - possibly even reliably - but it is unclear exactly what.

Partial Orders

Simple scalability hypotheses almost never hold up against the data. One possibility to deal with this situation is to drop the notion of a linear scale for something more general, i.e., a partial order. In a partial order, some pairs of profiles cannot be compared. Consider a case: A=1010, B=1100, C=1000. Clearly, A>C and B>C, because both A and B have a 1 where C has a 1, and they also have one more 1 where C has a 0. But A and B are not comparable unless one is willing to make assumptions on the relative weight of the 1's. Hence, we have a partial order of the three profiles. Partial orders of structuples/profiles can be found via the program POSA (Lingoes, 1973).

One can go further and ask for the dimensions that span a partial order. In other words, what dimensions pull the elements of a linear order into different directions away from the linear scale? This question can be studied with the help of POSAC (POSA with "C"oordinates; Shye, 1985).

Bivariate Hypotheses

A simple bivariate hypothesis predicts the sign of a (monotone) correlation. "First" laws predict that the sign for each pair of items of a particular variety is non-negative (in the population of respondents) because the items measure different aspects of the same thing, under certain side constraints. One prominent example is the first law of attitudes (see section 4).

First laws are meant only for comparable ranges. Given a question "How do you feel about the police?", an attitude item would ask for a range in terms of {very positive ... very negative} in a {cognitive, affective, instrumental} modality of behavior. Yet, one can also ask how strong this attitude is - i.e., use the range {very strong ... very weak} - whatever the attitude itself may be. The intensity range has been called the "second principal component" of directive behavior. The third one is closure behavior, the fourth one is involvement, etc. (Guttman, 1954).

First laws, then, presuppose that the various items use ranges from the same principal component. For items of different components, bivariate hypotheses are always polytone. The shape of the regression trend between an assessment of direction and of intensity, for example, is predicted to be U-shaped. That is, for attitudes, the more extreme an attitude in the positive or the negative, the stronger it should be.

Regional Hypotheses

Regional hypotheses are by far the most successful kind of hypotheses developed out of the FT context. They link the classes of the definitional system to regions of a representation space for the data. Most often a correspondence is established between the classes of S1x...xSn and certain partitions of an SSA representation of the correlations of the items. Thus, regional hypotheses are similar to what is studied in discriminant analysis, where one also asks if and how a set of points that belong to different classes (typically, groups of persons like males and females) can be separated optimally into non-overlapping sets. Discriminant analysis, however, only looks for partitioning lines that are straight and parallel to each other. Regional hypotheses include this possibility as a special case.

The S-facets typically play one of three roles in this context: They cut the space in an axial, modular, or polar way. An axial organization is similar to a dimensional pattern, i.e., the cutting lines partition the space in a parallel fashion into ordered regions. A modular pattern looks like a set of concentric circles, i.e., the regions define a set of bands lying around a common origin. The polar pattern, finally, is a system of wedge-like regions emanating from a common origin so that the structure looks like a tort cut into pieces (Borg & Lingoes, 1987).

A number of particular combinations of facets that play such roles lead to structures that were given special names because they are encountered frequently in practice. E.g., the combination of a polar and a modular facet in a plane leads to a "radex", a structure similar to a dart board.

Adding an axial facet in the third dimension renders a "cylindrex" (see Figure 5 for an example). Another interesting structure is a "duplex", a conjunction of two axial facets in a plane. It shows that the usual dimensional system is but a special case of a duplex (or, more generally, a multiplex), i.e., one where the facets are densely ordered and the cutting lines are straight and parallel to each other or orthogonal, respectively. Such patterns can indeed occur empirically, but if they do they result as the particular way in which the data reflect the definitional system and not because one forces a preconceived formalistic notion onto the data.

Let us illustrate some of these concepts with a small example. Table 1 shows a matrix of correlations among eight intelligence tests. The tests were classified by two facets, S1 = content = {N=numerical, G=geometrical} and S2 = task = {A=achievement, I=inference}. An inspection of the correlations reveals a gradient: the coefficients are highest along the main diagonal, then taper off as one moves away from the main diagonal, and rise again as one approaches the corners. This seems to support the contiguity principle, because the structuples form a circular pattern in terms of their similarity as measured by counting the number of common elements.

Table 1: Intercorrelations of eight intelligence tests with two-facet structuples (after Guttman, 1965)

structuple		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
NA	1	1.0	.67	.40	.19	.12	.25	.26	.39
NA	2	.67	1.0	.50	.26	.20	.28	.26	.38
NI	3	.40	.50	1.0	.52	.39	.31	.18	.24
GI	4	.19	.26	.52	1.0	.55	.49	.25	.22
GI	5	.12	.20	.39	.55	1.0	.46	.29	.14
GA	6	.25	.28	.31	.49	.46	1.0	.42	.38
GA	7	.26	.26	.18	.25	.29	.42	1.0	.40
GA	8	.39	.38	.24	.22	.14	.38	.40	1.0

An SSA representation (Borg & Lingoes, 1987) of this matrix - it shows the tests as points that lie the closer to each other the higher they correlate - shows an approximate "circumplex", i.e., a circular manifold of points (Figure 2). We can, on the other hand, also partition this configuration by each facet in turn. Since the facets are only dichotomous and since we have so few points, there are many possibilities. A duplex partitioning is shown in Figure 3. (Note that the frame of in these Figures is without significance. It does not, in particular, suggest any "dimensions".) Another possibility is exhibited in Figure 4. Its somewhat peculiar appearance is motivated by thinking *beyond* the given sample of items, i.e., by considering the universe of all intelligence tests. Figure 5 shows what has been found to hold for the universe (Guttman & Levy, 1991). This universe structure (cylindrex) reflects three facets: The polarizing content facet {verbal, numerical,

geometrical}, the modulating performance facet {inference, application, learning} - which together form a radex -, and the axially stratifying presentation facet {oral, manual manipulation, paper & pencil}. Even though the items in Table 1 are not differentiated with respect to the presentation facet, and even though they only reflect four out of six possible distinctions on the first two facets, their SSA representation nevertheless reflects a section of this universe structure.

Thinking beyond what was observed is always necessary. One is typically interested in generalizing the findings, most often to the universe and/or over replications. The system of partitioning lines should therefore be robust in this respect, and not attend too much to the particular sample. "Simple" partitionings with relatively smooth cutting lines are typically better in this respect.

To predict such regional patterns requires one to first clarify the roles of the facets in the definitional framework. This involves, first of all, classifying the "scale level" of each facet. Most often, it is sufficient to decide whether a facet is ordered or unordered (nominal). Then, conjoining several facets with particular scale levels entails particular types of predicted structures. E.g., the radex turns out to be the only possible partitioning of a plane by an ordered and a nominal facet that can be expected to hold up (1) if one increases the number of elements within the facets and (2) if one adds ever more items from the universe of items.

The differentiation of facets into different scale types is really a "role assignment" (Wilkinson & Velleman, 1991, p. 8) that reflect "hypotheses on some features of certain experimental [i.e.: empirical; my comment] regression curves" (Guttman, 1981a, p. 44). Hence, a facet cannot be said to have this or that scale level independent of context. To see this, consider Color = {red, yellow, green, blue, purple}. This seems to be a nominal facet. Yet, with respect to similarity judgments on colors, Color has been shown to be ordered empirically - in a circular way! Furthermore, with respect to physical wave length of colors, the facet is linearly ordered. This shows that here too the observational context (i.e., the range) cannot be ignored. The scale level of a facet is not a property of the elements that make up the facet; rather, it is a context-specific definition arrived at by the researcher through substantive considerations.

Definitions and data, thus, are intimately linked not only in a particular point of time through correspondence hypotheses, but also over time through data-induced modifications in the definitional framework. Hence, a correspondence between data and definitions can also be established a posteriori. This is achieved by projecting the definitions onto the data representations, and then looking for regularities. In SSA, for example, it is common to replace the usual labels of the points in the multidimensional space by the structs of these points on facet A, B, C, etc., in turn. This yield an item diagram for each facet and each plane, where the distribution of the structs often shows how the space can be partitioned.

Figure 2: A 2-dimensional SSA representation of the correlations in Table 1; broken line shows an approximate circular order of the tests; for meaning of structuples, see text



Figure 3: SSA representation of data in Table 1; broken line from South-West to Nord-East partitions the space on the first facet (G- vs. N-tests); other line distinguishes A- from I-tests



Figure 4: An alternative partitioning of the SSA representation, where line distinguishing A- from I-Test



Figure 5: Structure of the universe of intelligence tests (after Guttman & Levy, 1991) with three facets partitioning the SSA space



Finally, one should point out that regions are only geometrical representations for certain regularities in the data. A facet that plays a modulating role in a 2-dimensional SSA representation of a correlation matrix, for example, implies that the correlations of the items tend to become greater the more these items lie in a "central" region. An axial facet, on the other hand, bears no simple relation to the size of the correlation of pairs of items, but only to the overlap of distributions of item classes. It is often much simpler to express such regularities in geometrical terms.

Facet Theory as a Theory

One may ask why FT is called "theory"? One answer to this question can be given by referring to what mathematicians understand when they talk about theory: "The principles concerned with a certain concept, and the facts postulated and proved about it" (James & James, 1976). In this sense, FT is a theory since it provides a system of concepts and definitions, and a number of (empirical) facts and findings related to these definitions, as, e.g., the first law of attitudes.

But FT is also a theory in the sense of the empirical sciences. The approach of designing observations in a facetized way and using intrinsic data analysis makes two hypotheses that are both empirically testable:

H1: The higher the technicality of semantics used in designing observations, the higher will be the reliability of {communicating about, constructing, making} the observations in the field.

H2: Designing a universe of observations in terms of an appropriately analytical mapping sentence will lead to more fruitful results for cumulative science than will less formal definitional systems.

Facet Theory and Fear of Crime: Some Elementary Issues

The major topic at the KFN Workshop in the Spring 1991 was fear of crime. A vast array of other notions were brought up, more or less frequently, in connection with fear of crime. For me as an outsider to this field, it was difficult to always see what exactly was being considered here. In one session, I made a list of key terms. It comprises perceived risk, threat, fear, anxiety, risk, uncertainty, strain, concern, worry, stress, coping, avoidance behavior, attitude, belief, perception, insecurity, social anxiety, life quality, and well-being, to name just a few. Were all of these notions meant as different aspects of fear of crime, or were they taken as (partial or complete) synonyms, or were they just correlates of fear of crime?

Definitional Issues

We are thus naturally led to definitional issues. Let us start with writing the original notion of fear of crime in a simple mapping sentence:

```
Respondent {p} behaves towards crime-related condition {c}

      (strong )
—>    ( ...   )      fear
      ( no    )
```

A simple extension could be this:

```
                        (scientist          )
According to observer   (                   ), respondent {p}
                        (p him/herself      )

      ( had     )                          ( x )
who   (         ) been a victim of crime   ( y ) before
      (had not  )                          ( z )

                    (general    )  (crime-related       )
behaves towards a   (           )  (                    )
                    (particular )  (not crime related    )

(very problematic )                          (home          )
(     ...         )  condition in life domain (neighborhood  )
(not problematic  )                          (   ...        )

      (strong )
—>    ( ...   )     fear
      ( no    )
```

Such extensions are obviously easy to find but peripheral to the issue of defining the universe of discourse. We will therefore not deal with them any further. What is important is to systematically organize the above array of notions into one definitional framework.

Two types of behavior can be distinguished from the start: coping and well-being. Writing this in a first preliminary mapping sentence, we obtain:

Respondent {p} behaves towards condition {c} with

	(strong)	(coping)	
—>	(...)	( )	behavior
	(no)	(well-being)	

The well-being behavior in this mapping sentence primarily comprises negative emotions (stress, fear, anxiety, strain, insecurity, worry), whereas coping refers to what people actually do the situation (instrumental behavior, actions, avoidance behavior, etc.). Another variety of "intra-psychic" coping behavior was referred to by Martin Killias during the workshop as "dissonance reduction", i.e. any form of coping with the problem cognitively.

Pondering about the term well-"being", one notes that by sustituting "being" by "making" or by "coming", one arrives at two notions which correspond to two forms of coping: "well-making" attempts to change the objective situation for the better through attacking the problem; "well-coming" means that one comes to grips with a problem through psychological means or accomodation. All of these behaviors can be assessed in terms of the extent to which they exhibit adjustive behavior towards condition c.

This then links us to a more general mapping sentence which distinguishes a variety of different behaviors with respect to a common range, adjustive behavior. Guttman and Levy (1989) proposed a mapping sentence for such items whose core reads as follows:

	------mode-------		-------directive------	
	(m1=satisfied)		(d1=be)	
	(m2=uneasy)		(d2=continue)	
Respondent {p} is	(m3=motivated)	to	(d3=attack)	with
	(m4=able to try)		(d4=accomodate)	
	(m5=likely)		(d5=protect)	

respect to condition {c}

	(strong)	
—>	(...)	adjustive behavior (towards p's situation)
	(no)	

High fear of crime, then, would be an instance of (m2,d4) or strong "uneasiness to accomodate" behavior; "satisfied to be" items directly relate to traditional well-being items; evaluations of one's means to cope with crime problems are (m4,d3) behaviors; plans to move into another neighborhood to deal with crime are (m5,d2) behaviors; etc.

These classifications may appear somewhat peculiar and cryptic. One is tempted to immediately modify the wordings in this mapping sentence. (I feel, in any case, that more semantic clarity is needed.) Yet, one should not change semantics before one has not considered what this mapping sentence leads to on the side of the data.

Hypotheses: Signs of Correlations

All of these behaviors are adjustive behaviors of a respondent towards his or her own situation. Guttman and Levy (1989) argue, furthermore, that "the First Law of Attitude might be explicitly invoked for these data, because the common range of the mapping sentence can be interpreted to be attitudinal, namely from positive to negative adjustment" (p. 469). Formally, this means that the above range "strong ... no adjustive behavior" is not, inspite of its appearance, to be interpreted as an intensity range, but as the "approach-avoidance" range of the first principal component of attitudes. (Note, however, that "avoidance", in this case, may indeed be adjustive behavior. Hence, the negative end of the range scale here has to be taken as "not adjusting".)

Statistically, it is thus predicted that adjustive behaviors are positively correlated - assuming, of course, that each one is appropriately assessed, i.e., for example, with "uneasiness to accomodate" measured on some form of {no ... very much} and "satisfaction to be" on {very high ... very low}. This is a far-reaching hypothesis, which says, among other things, that adjustive behaviors relative to crime should be positively correlated not only among each other, but also with adjustive behaviors in other domains. Guttman and Levy (1989) present some evidence in support of this prediction. If it should turn out not to be supported in larger samples of items from the universe of adjustive behavior items, then it becomes necessary to discriminate among different types of the respondent's situations.

Hypotheses: Regions

Rather than studying what different adjustive behaviors have in common, one can also concentrate on their differences and how they are related to the data.

Many hypotheses can be studied here depending on how one complements the above mapping sentence with respect to "condition". Guttman and Levy (1989) added here, in particular, two facets: the {primary, secondary, unspecified} environment of the respondent; the life area={health, work, economy, social, leisure, residence, eduction, unspecified} to which the content of the item refers. When other facets are held constant, they find that the items form a radex with respect to environment and the life area facets, where the latter partitions the space into different "wedges", the former into concentric bands, all relative to a common origin.

More interesting in our context, however, is the finding that items of the "be", "continue" and "attack" type, respectively, come out ordered on an axis perpendicular to the radex. Hence, one gets a structure similar to the cylindrex in Figure 5, except that the radius of the cylinder decrea-

ses as one moves to the top ("conex"). That is, in terms of the data, well-being items have, on the average, lower intercorrelations than "attack" (coping) items, with "continue" items in between.

Guttman and Levy (1989, p. 477) have few items that are not either "be", "continue" or "attack" items, but from what they have they suggest that "the axial partitioning of the cone corresponds to the combination of elements from the two main facets of adjustive behavior (mode and directive). Thus, the vertical order of the cone corresponds to the following order of adjustive behavior, based on both facets:



(The parentheses indicate the tentative positioning of the respective classes due to the scarcity of items.)

If such an order can be confirmed in further studies, it would be natural to ask for an explanation. One possibility that comes to mind easily is the observation that the "ability" regions on top refer to cognitive assessments of a person (about his or her abilities), while "motivation" is primarily related to instrumental behavior or actions, and, finally, "satisfaction" and "uneasiness" are emotional. Thus, adjustive behaviors are ordered from beliefs about one's abilities to feelings about one's present situation (with the post possibly serving as a standard), with volitions about one's future behavior in between. But then we have two orders, cognition-volition-emotion and a time-reference like past-presence-future. This formally establishes a simple order (of three classes) if one is willing to think of volition as a mixture of emotion and cognition.

Needless to say that these are only elementary considerations, but they should suffice to see how a systematic approach like FT can help to give order and direction to survey research in this substantive domain.

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SPECIAL TOPICS

The Various Meanings of Fear

Wesley G. Skogan

The Various Meanings of Fear

There have been several efforts to clarify the meaning of the concept of "fear of crime" (for examples, see Dubow, McCabe, & Kaplan, 1979; Ferraro & LaGrange, 1987). Most found it troublesome that there is no clear consensus among researchers on what the concept fear of crime means or how it is best measured. This chapter argues that this apparent heterogeneity of meaning simply reflects the fact that fear of crime is a general concept. It is suited for everyday conversation (Americans frequently talk about fear of crime and its social and political effects), but the concept needs to be refined for research purposes. How it is best defined depends upon the purpose of the research and the theoretical framework within which the research is being conducted. Therefore, any specific definition of fear of crime is not correct or incorrect; rather, it is either useful or not useful, and that is revealed by the results of the research.

Most research on fear of crime seems to conceptualize fear in one of four ways. Three of these definitions are cognitive in nature; they reflect people's *concern* about crime, their assessments of personal *risk* of victimization, and the perceived *threat* of crime in their environment. The remaining approach to defining fear is *behavioral*; some studies (such as the 1989 International Crime Survey; see van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990) conceptualize fear entirely in how it is reflected in things that people do in response to crime. Dissecting these variations in how fear of crime is defined is important, because they make a great deal of difference in what researchers have found. Different definitions of fear can lead to different substantive research conclusions. This is particularly apparent in research on the elderly, one of the special foci of the KFN's victimization research.

A large body of research (summarized in Fattah & Sacco, 1989) suggests that for many older persons fear of crime, rather than actual victimization, presents the biggest problem. It is often claimed the elderly living in American cities are over-concentrated in bad neighborhoods and are concerned about conditions and crime in their neighborhood. It is also claimed that the elderly feel hopelessly vulnerable to crime, which can be evaluated using measures of self-diagnosed risk. Finally, it is claimed the elderly are "prisoners of fear," traumatized by the thought of venturing out because of the risks they would face. Cook and Cook (1976) concluded that "... the major policy problem associated with the elderly and crime is probably not crime per se. Rather, the problem is related to the elderly person's fear of crime and the restrictions to daily mobility that this fear may impose." They argued that "the policy response to victimization of the elderly should be targeted to alleviating fear."

However, an inspection of the various meanings of fear indicates that this conclusion is highly dependent upon what definition of fear is used. By many measures the elderly are not more fearful at all. This chapter illustrates this, using surveys from the US, Britain, and the Western area of the Federal Republic.

Concern about Crime

The "concern" definition of fear focuses on people's assessments of the extent to which *crime is a serious problem* for their community or society. Concern is a judgment about the frequency or seriousness of events and conditions in one's environment.

There are a number of approaches to measuring concern. Opinion surveys ask whether crime is increasing or decreasing, and whether respondents would place crime on their list of the nation's most important problem. Most research adopting this definition of fear examines neighborhood conditions. In my research I have asked about "how big a problem" respondents think that various conditions are in their immediate area. These problems have been of two types. *Disorder* has been assessed by questions about neighborhood deterioration and deviant behaviors that are closely linked to fear of crime. City residents take them as signs that neighborhood conditions are out of control, which is fear provoking. These conditions include public drinking, vandalism, graffiti, begging, street harassment, juvenile truancy, street prostitution, gang activity, and abandoned buildings (see Skogan, 1990). Concern about *serious* crime also is reflected in responses to questions about neighborhood problems with burglary, robbery, assault, rape, and theft.

The relationship between concern about crime and age is first examined in Figure 1. The data presented there were drawn from the 1988 British Crime Survey (BCS), a national survey of England and Wales which questioned over 11,000 respondents. They were given a list of disorders and asked, "... how common or uncommon they are in your area?" Figure 1 charts the age distribution of four of these problems: "teenagers hanging around on the streets", "drunks or tramps in the streets", "vandalism and deliberate damage to property", and "graffiti on walls or buildings". In each case respondents were asked to rate the problem on a four-point scale, from "very common" to "not at all common". Figure 1 presents average scores on these measures for persons in each age category. In the BCS these disorders were closely linked to fear of crime.

These disorders (and three others included in the 1988 BCS) were significantly related to age, but it was the youngest respondents who thought they were the most common in their area. These forms of behavior are violations of what James Q. Wilson (1975) called "standards of right and seemly conduct." He argued that they are read by "proper" citizens as signs that the social order is in disarray. While between 20 and 30 percent of those interviewed in the BCS thought these problems were very common or fairly common in their neighborhood, they were not particularly bothersome to the elderly.

Figure 1: Concern about Disorder and Age. Average BCS Concern Scores



A somewhat different pattern emerges when one considers concern about serious crime rather than disorderly conduct. In this case, the highest levels of concern are expressed by those in their 40s; on the other hand, the elderly are again the least likely to be concerned. Figure 2 reports the findings of surveys conducted in five American cities, including Newark, Houston, Baltimore, Oakland, and Birmingham. Respondents were asked about whether they thought crime in their neighborhood was increasing or decreasing, and "how big a problem" burglary and robbery was in their immediate area. As Figure 2 indicates, about one-third of those who were interviewed thought crime was going up in their neighborhood, and a few less thought that burglary was a big problem in their area. Fewer were concerned about robbery, which is much less frequent.

Risk of Victimization

The second common meaning of fear meaning is the perception that one is *likely to be victimized.* Since the surveys sponsored by the US Crime Commission in the mid-1960s, researchers have been asking people to rate their chances of being victimized. For example, respondents may be asked to rate "how likely" they are to be attacked or burglarized, on a scale ranging from "not very likely" to "very likely". Assessments of risk are respondents' perceptions of the likelihood of things happening to them, and are recommended as measures of fear (Biderman, Johnson, McIntyre, & Weir, 1967; Yin, 1980;).

Figure 2: Concern about Crime and Age. Percent Concerned in Five US Cities



Of course, if these assessments of risk are realistic reflections of patterns of victimization, they generally should be *lower* for elderly persons than the risks reported by younger persons. Most common crimes are less likely to involve elderly victims. Therefore, if the elderly perceive that they face particularly high levels of risk, it would be fair to label them fearful.

Figure 3 indicates that this is not the case. In the 1988 BCS, respondents were asked to rate their risk of being victimized in the next year, on six-point scales ranging from "certainly not" to "certain to be victimized". Figure 3 presents the age distribution of estimates of risk of victimization by burglary and robbery. Residents of England and Wales gave the highest rating to risk to burglary, which is congruent with the frequency of burglary in contrast to personal crime. However, burglary is almost four times as frequent as robbery (Mayhew, Elliott, & Dowds, 1989), a difference in rates of victimization that was not accurately reflected in these assessments of risk. As in most surveys, BCS respondents overestimated the relative risk of violent crime.

Likewise, from an analytic perspective older Britons overestimated their risk of victimization relative to younger age groups, while younger people underestimated them. For example, respondents who were under 30 years of age were almost four times more likely to be robbed than those who were 50 years of age and order, a difference which is not reflected in the perceptions of risk illustrated in Figure 3. On the other hand, there was little difference in burglary victimization between various age groups (although the elderly had the lowest risk). This

was also not accurately reflected in Figure 3. However, Figure 3 does indicate that the elderly still were among the least fearful groups in the population, based on their own assessments of their risk of being victimized.

Figure 3: Risk of Crime and Age. Average BCS Risk Scores



Threat of Crime

Definitions of fear focusing on threat emphasize the *potential* for harm that people feel crime holds for them. Threat levels are high when they believe that something *could* happen to them, if they exposed themselves to risk. The concept of threat is distinct from those of risk and concern. People may adopt various tactics to reduce their vulnerability to victimization, and as a result they may not rate their risk as particularly high because they avoid exposure to risk. However, they might rate the threat of crime as high if they were to be exposed to risk. Because many people believe that they are capable of dealing with crime, threat also is distinct from concern about the issue. Threat is measured by questions that ask "How safe would you feel if you were out alone?"; or "How would you feel if you were approached by a stranger on the street or heard footsteps in the night?"

Data from numerous surveys indicate that the threat of crime is felt most strongly by the elderly, and in comparison to measures of risk or concern, questions measuring threat clearly differentiate senior citizens from the remainder of the adult population. This is confirmed in Figure 4, which

illustrates the relationship between age and one measure of threat of crime, responses to a question about how fearful respondents would feel if they were out alone at night in their local area. Variations of this question have been used in surveys in the United States, the Federal Republic of (West) Germany, and the BCS. Figure 4 presents the percentage of respondents in each of those nations who indicated that they were fearful on these measures.

These surveys point to strikingly similar conclusions; the perceived threat of personal attack is relatively low among younger respondents, and increases in frequency only slowly through about age 50. In each survey, there is a tendency for those under fifty to report similar perceptions of threat, but for levels of threat to be much higher among older age groups.

Surveys also indicate that this expression of fear is very much confined to night-time risks. For example, in the US Census Bureau's surveys of five large cities, about 48 percent of all residents indicated some degree of concern about going out alone after dark, but only 11 percent had any hesitation about their daytime safety. The elderly were more likely than others to express uneasiness about their safety during the day (17 percent as opposed to 9 percent under sixty years of age). In a survey in Hartford, 28 percent of those over sixty expressed at least some worry about "street crime" during the day, but that figure stood at more than 60 percent after dark. A Texas survey using similar measures also indicates that this fear is confined to on-street as opposed to at home risks. In that study (a statewide mail questionnaire with a reasonable rate of return) older people were more likely than others to indicate fear of walking alone, but were less likely to express fear about being home alone at night (Jeffords, 1980).

Figure 4: Threat of Crime and Age. Percent Threatened in Three Nations



Figure 5: Household Protection and Age. Average Protection Score in Three Cities



Fear as Behavior

This section turns to another important conceptualization of fear of crime, what people do in response. This meaning of fear reflects a focus on the behavioral rather than cognitive aspects of the attitude. From this perspective, fear is best assessed by how it is manifested in the frequency with which people go out after dark, restrict their shopping to safer commercial areas, fortify their homes against invasion, and avoid contact with strangers (Skogan, 1981). Claims about fear of crime among the elderly frequently dwell on such behavioral indicators. It is often stated that the elderly are "prisoners" of fear; that their daily activity patterns are significantly shaped by the threat of victimization.

The analyses reported here deal with two general classes of responses to crime: those which limit risk of personal attack by avoiding potentially threatening situations, and defensive tactics which reduce the vulnerability of households to burglary and home invasion. This distinction was first drawn by Furstenberg (1975), who dubbed them "avoidance" and "mobilization". The data are drawn from large surveys in Houston, Newark, and Baltimore. Figure 5 illustrates the relationship between age and a measure of the extent to which respondents fortified their homes against crime. The latter is based on the number of positive responses to questions about the adoption of five security measures, including special outdoor lights, door locks, window bars, and interior lights, and whether they had marked any of their property with a special identification number.

The average number of "yes" responses is presented in Figure 5, for each age group. It suggests that the elderly are not particularly likely to fortify their homes against crime. In two cities the elderly stood at about the over-all mean, and in Baltimore they were less likely than others to reporting taking these defensive actions.

On the other hand, Figure 6 does point to distinctive levels of fear among the elderly, based on a definition emphasizing behaviors aimed to reducing their risk of personal crime. The fear measure presented in Figure 6 is based on the average number of positive responses to three questions about avoiding dangerous places and people, and walking only with an escort rather than alone after dark. In all three cities, those in their sixties were more fearful than younger residents, and those seventy and older were even more fearful.

Figure 6: Personal Precautions and Age. Average Precaution Score in Five Cities.



Lessons for Research

Are the elderly more fearful? To illustrate the impact of the definition of fear that a researcher employs, this chapter examined the relationship between age and fear in several nations. The data suggested that by many definitions fear of crime is surprisingly *undistinctive* among senior citizens. The elderly did not report disproportionate concern about crime, nor did they perceive their neighborhoods as excessively plagued by the minor "incivilities" of urban life. They also did not rate their risk of being victimized as particularly high, when compared to other age groups

(although from an analytic perspective one might conclude that they overestimate it relative to their actual risk). The distinctive fears of the elderly were few and clearly focused upon personal attack, primarily after dark. Behavioral indicators of fear suggested that they did not place themselves in situations that threatened this very often.

In the United States, the National Council on Aging (1975) found that in a number of areas of life the general public seemed to have an exaggerated view of the importance of the problems facing the elderly. Respondents younger and older than age 65 were asked to rate the importance of a list of problems for the elderly, and a comparison of their responses indicated that younger respondents gave most of them higher significance than did the elderly themselves. One of these presumed problems was fear of crime, which was much more highly ranked as an elderly problem by younger respondents than by older respondents. The "prisoners of fear" issue may be another example of this phenomenon. Perhaps the aged "... are not as easily daunted as our stereotypes of the 'vulnerable elderly' might have thought them to be" (Lawton & Yaffe, 1980, p. 778).

A more general implication of the analysis presented above is that what researchers find can be highly contingent upon how they operationalize their concepts. In this example, fear was either distinctively high or distinctively low among the elderly, depending upon which of several reasonable definitions of fear was employed. Similarly, research on the effects of mass media coverage of crime is contingent upon the conceptualization of fear that is employed. For example, Tyler (1980) and Tyler and Cook (1984) found that exposure to media stories about crime increased people's *concern* about crime, as it is defined here as the belief that crime is a growing community problem. However, they also found that it did not affect people perception that their own neighborhood was unsafe, or that their personal safety was at risk. Other researchers have found that political attitudes and measures of ideological position are correlated with concern measures, but not with risk or threat measures. Victimization, on the other hand, has clearer effects upon both risk and threat measures, and both are more closely linked to behavioral measures of fear. In each research project it is necessary to consider carefully the relevant meaning of the fear of crime construct.

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Reporting Crime to the Police: The Contribution of Victimization Surveys

Pat Mayhew

Introduction

Whether or not victim report offences they have experienced to the police is a critical factor for criminal justice. What is reported will largely determine the nature and size of the police workload since the vast majority of offences remain outside the scope of action by the police unless brought to their attention by victims (e.g., Burrows, 1982). Reports by victims, and police procedures for dealing with these reports, underpin the statistics of offences *recorded* by the police, though these are clearly an unreliable guide to the actual amount of crime experienced. Police figures are also an unreliable guide to *changes* in crime if these merely reflect shifts in reporting and/or changing practice in recording procedures.

This chapter takes up the issue of reporting to the police as it has been tackled in conventional household victimization surveys. The issue is of course central to them. One of their major purposes is to measure offences whether or not they are reported to (or recorded by) the police, and to contrast the fuller survey picture with that from the subset of offences in police records. Reporting to the police is an important topic not only for national but for locals surveys too, especially if these are conducted to examine the effectiveness of policing or crime prevention programmes. Such programmes often encourage greater public responsiveness to the police and local surveys can help identify changes in reporting which may indeed actually lead to an increase in recorded crime.

Surveys have focused on several aspects of reporting and three issues are dealt with first: (1) how reporting varies across offence types; (2) why people do and do not report; and (3) the link between reported and recorded offences. Then, some attention is paid to two other reporting matters in which surveys have interested themselves: (4) the 'mechanics' of reporting: how people report (whether by telephone, a visit to station etc); who actually tells the police; and (5) the victim's response to reporting (whether they were satisfied with police response; and why they were not satisfied). Finally, there is a brief discussion on the topic of (6) reporting crime on the part of bystanders. Much of the evidence drawn on is from the British Crime Survey, with which I am most familiar, though results from elsewhere are not ignored. The chapter ends with some suggestions for those involved in designing victimization survey questionnaires as to how to maximise the usefulness of information collected on reporting behaviour.

Reporting across Offence Types

While it has long been recognized that a sizeable proportion of offences are not brought to police attention, it is only since the advent of surveys of victims that it has been possible to document - at least for the offences which victimization surveys typically cover - the extent of unreported crime, and its characteristics. Table 1 shows results from the third British Crime Survey (BCS), conducted in 1988 to measure crime in 1987. Two points stand out. First, different forms of crime have different reporting rates. The BCS showed that there is particularly low reporting for vandalism, theft in a dwelling (thefts committed by people with authorized entry), miscellaneous household and personal thefts, sexual offences, common (less serious) assaults, and thefts from the person. Burglaries with loss and thefts of motor vehicles are very well-reported in comparison, and this suggests - given the imprecision that will arise from questioning only a sample of people - that police statistics on such offences may provide a more accurate count. It is also known, incidentally, that victimizations of businesses are more likely to be reported to the police than those against private individuals; in fact, the high reporting rate for the burglaries and robberies counted in the US National Commercial Crime Survey was one of the reasons the survey was disbanded.

Table 1: *Percent of BCS offences reported to the police*
(1988 British Crime Survey)

Household offences	% reported	Personal offences	% reported
1. Vandalism	24	7. Other household theft	26
2. Burglary	63	8. Sexual offences	21
Attempts and no loss	44	9. Common assault	33
With loss	86	10. Wounding	43
3. Theft in a dwelling	17	11. Robbery	44
4. Theft from motor vehicle	40	12. Theft from the person	34
5. Theft of motor vehicle	95	13. Other personal theft	31
6. Bicycle theft	62		
		All BCS offences	37

Notes:
1. Question: "Did the police come to know about the matter?"
2. The table includes incidents which occurred in the full recall period, which was slightly longer than twelve months.
3. Weighted data (unweighted n=5,023). 1988 BCS core sample.

Secondly, the BCS - and it is not atypical in this respect - uncovered more crimes that were unreported than were reported. Only some 37% of the offences measured by the BCS were reported to the police. Differences in survey coverage will produce a 'mix' of offences which will

give rise to a different overall reporting percentage. Differences in sampling, field procedures, offence definition, data processing and so on, are also likely to influence this mix of offences. However, the 1989 National Crime Survey in the United States, for instance, also gave the same (37%) overall reporting figure (US Department of Justice, 1991).

Results from the 1989 International Crime Survey (ICS) (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990), in which a number of European and non-European countries participated in a standardized exercise to get comparable measures of crime and reactions to crime, are shown in Table 2. For a selection of offences which were slightly more slanted towards the serious end of the spectrum than in some other surveys (e.g., the BCS), a majority of incidents in about half the countries went unreported to the police. Differences across country in the propensity to report will reflect in part the types of offences which are characteristic of particular countries. Analysis *within* offence types, however, also points to differences in reporting propensities similar to those in Table 2. This underlines the point that comparisons of statistics of offences recorded by the police will be misleading to the extent the number of potentially recordable crimes they come to know about differs. Adjusting ICS data to produce solely rates of victimizations reported to the police showed a much closer correspondence with levels of recorded crime in countries participating in the ICS (Mayhew, 1991).

Table 2: *Percentage of incidents reported to the police in 1988*
(1989 International Crime Survey)

	%		%
Scotland	62.3	Belgium	48.6
France	60.2	Canada	48.3
England & Wales	58.8	West Germany	47.9
Switzerland	58.7	Australia	46.9
Netherlands	52.6	Northern Ireland	45.8
USA	52.1	Norway	42.6
EUROPE	50.0	Finland	41.8
TOTAL	49.6	Spain	31.5

Notes:
1. Based on all crimes covered by the ICS. Figures refer to the last incident experienced in 1988.
2. The 'total' figure treats each country as being of equal statistical importance. The figure for Europe weights individual country results by population size.

Reasons for Reporting

Although most survey ask victims why they did not report to the police,[1] fewer ask why they *did* choose to do so. Results from the second (1984) sweep of the BCS showed that, overall, over a third (36%) of victims offered motives stressing the advantages in reporting: recovery of property, reducing the risk of further victimization; getting help from the police and notifying the police to satisfy insurance requirements. Another third (33%) referred to the obligation on victims to notify the police. Retributive motive - the hope that the offender would be caught and punished - weighed with 16% of victims.

Reasons for reporting vary by type of offence. Analysis of NCS results (Harlow, 1985; US Department of Justice, 1991) suggest that economic reasons weigh more as financial losses rise. For less serious incidents involving no loss or damage, reasons relating to personal obligation are more often cited: that it was a crime, it was a duty to report, or to keep it from happening again or to others. Obligation is also stressed more often for violent crime than household crime. Reporting for reasons of retribution is also more common for violent crime than for household offences, although in the BCS retribution was a comparatively common reason for reporting vandalism (which the NCS did not measure). Both the NCS and BCS show that getting help in recovering property is a particularly common reason for reporting motor vehicles thefts and bicycle thefts.

Reasons for not Reporting

In a review of results from a range of national and local surveys, Skogan (1984) finds that reasons for non-reporting to the police are surprisingly consistent. The 1989 ICS also showed relatively little international variation. Across countries, inconvenience; dislike of the police; and fear of reprisals are *rarely* cited reasons for not reporting. Rather, the fact that incidents involve little loss or damage, or a feeling that the police would (or could) not do anything about the offence are the main reasons for not bringing in the police. Analysing 1981 NCS results, Gottfredson and Gottfredson (1988) show that one-fifth of survey-reported rapes, nearly two-fifths of robberies, three-fifths of thefts, and one-half of household burglaries were not reported to the police because victims believed that "nothing could be done" or that it was "not important enough".

Variations in the reasons given for non-reporting reflect the type of incident involved. For one, there is a broad correspondence between the 'clear-up' rate for different types of crimes and the frequency with which they are reported, suggesting that victims are making fairly realistic judgements about the effectiveness of bringing in the police (cf. Skogan, 1976). A large proportion of victims of rapes and assaults, moreover, think that what happened was "a private

[1] The 1978 Swedish national survey is a major exception (see Sveriges Officiella Statistik, 1981).

matter", or not one for the police. Thefts of personal property - often taking place at work - are frequently reported to someone other than the police. For crimes between strangers, victims often feel "nothing could be done".

Some reasons for non-reporting are not without ambiguity. "Nothing could be done" can mean both that the harm, loss or damage cannot be rectified; that there is insufficient proof of what happened; or that it seems impossible that an offender could be apprehended. "The police would not be interested" may signify that the victim feels uneasy about bothering the police on a relatively minor matter; or that he/she feels that the police would not want, or be able to give the matter due attention. This point is returned to.

Taken in the round, though, the reasons given both for reporting and not reporting underpin some fairly straightforward insights about the way people think about criminal justice. Whatever their conception of 'serious crime', most people would tend to agree that a serious offence is one which by definition *ought* to be officially dealt with; and if they are the victims of such crimes, they are inclined to feel they ought to notify the police. And for most people trivial crimes are by definition instances of law-breaking where there is less of an obligation to report to the police.

Victims' perception of the seriousness of what has happened can therefore be expected to be a main factor in determining whether they notify the police. Perceptions of seriousness will inevitably be related to the objectives characteristics of the crime, and not surprisingly the overwhelming conclusion of research to date is that the main determinant of reporting is the nature of the crime - the extent of loss for instance, or the degree of injury (cf. Skogan, 1984). But overlaying victims' sense of what properly is or is not grist for the mill of formal justice is a calculation of the costs and benefits to themselves in reporting, and of the chances that the police will actually achieve anything if they are notified. Reporting to the police, in other words, appears to be influenced more by a personal cost-benefit analysis than by any more general sense of social obligation. Thus, some incidents which 'ought' to be drawn to official attention go unreported because victims foresee no personal gain; others go unreported because victims judge that the police would be unable to take any effective action, or because they have other reasons for keeping quiet.

Pragmatic considerations may sway cost-benefit calculations. There is some evidence, for instance, that if victims feel in some way culpable for what happened, they are less likely to report. Block (1974), for one, found that assault victims who reported that they had been drinking at the time of the incident reported less than others (see Kirchhoff & Kirchhoff, 1984). Neither can insurance factors be discounted. For instance, NCS data shows that 85% of robbery victims who had theft insurance reported to the police, as against only 51% of those without it (Gottfredson & Gottfredson, 1988).

The 1984 BCS tried to assess how far reporting behaviour could be explained simply in terms of the seriousness or triviality of the offence (Hough & Mayhew, 1985; Pease, 1988). Victims were

asked to judge the seriousness of 'their' offence on a 20-point scale. (They were also asked what priority the police should give to an incident like their own.) As might be expected, the more serious the offence was rated, the more likely it was to be reported; but many incidents rated highly on the seriousness scale nonetheless went unreported, while many were drawn to the attention of the police despite their low ratings. Details are shown in Table 3. The results of a study by Gottfredson and Hindelang (1979) in which three years of NCS data on personal crimes were classified according to the Sellin and Wolfgang seriousness scale also found a similar association between seriousness and the report of the event to the police. For the four categories of seriousness used, the percentage of victimizations reported varied from 38% for the least serious events to 74% for the most serious.

Table 3: *Reporting to the police by perceived seriousness of the offence* (1984 British Crime Survey)

	% not reported
Least serious (scores 0-4)	77
Less serious (scores 5-9)	54
More serious (scores 10-14)	42
Most serious (scores 15-20)	32

Notes:
1. Weighted data; unweighted n=4,742.

Analysing the 1984 BCS data, Pease (1988) also used seriousness scores to analyse differences in the types of offences experienced, and to pinpoint 'anomalies' in reporting. He showed, for instance that those in high-crime areas suffered offences which were judged more serious; sexual offences showed low reporting relative to judged seriousness; and those not reporting serious offences more often gave police-related reasons (the police could do nothing, or would not be interested). Bicycle thefts and thefts from cars were better reported than their average seriousness scores would suggest, with notifying the police for insurance purposes more evident than in relation to other offences.

Socio-demographic factors are very much less important in influencing reporting than are characteristics of the incident. As Skogan (1984) puts it:

"Within major crime categories there are few impressive differences between blacks and whites, men and women, or high- and low-income families in the extent to which they mobilise the police. Nonreporting is also not particularly related to the size or type of community in which victims live."

Skogan's review found some evidence of a small but consistent tendency for women to report more often than men, controlling for type of crime. Class-related factors in reporting appear to be mediated mainly through home ownership, which itself is probably related to insurance cover. Race differences in reporting seem surprisingly small; in some surveys, blacks even appear to report at a higher rate than whites - though this is often put down to differences in the types of incidents recalled in interview (blacks 'producing' more serious offences and relatively fewer trivial ones). The elderly appear slightly more likely to report, though differences in the type of crime experienced cannot be ruled out entirely. (Assaults against young men, for instance, are less frequently reported, but may involve a greater degree of culpability.) In any event, though, the evidence does not support the argument that crimes against the elderly are being unduly hidden from the police.

Attitudes to the police also appear to have less impact on reporting decisions than might be thought. Garofalo (1977), for instance, looking at the NCS City Survey data found only minor variations in the proportion of crime reported according to the victim's rating of the police. Some 'police attitude' effect on reporting was not discounted in relation to less serious crimes, although these go unreported for a variety of reasons. Similar results have emerged elsewhere (e.g., Hough & Mayhew, 1985; Schneider, Burcart, & Wilson, 1976).

The Reporting and Recording Relationship

Survey classification procedures are usually meant to allow comparisons with police figures, although survey analysts differ in the precision with which they try to match up police and survey counts. Some coverage differences can be dealt with by concentrating only on comparable offence categories, and by making certain adjustments to survey and police figures to bring them more into line. This done, surveys give a consistently higher figures for all offences except motor vehicle thefts, which are well-reported to the police. Table 4 presents some ratios of survey to police counts for England and Wales and the US. (The US figures are based on O'Brien's analysis (1985, p. 85)). In both countries, rather more than twice as many burglaries are logged by the surveys as by the police, and in Britain there are over three times more thefts from motor vehicles measured by the BCS. Only the BCS measures vandalism, where the survey-police ratio is particularly high, as one might expect. The survey-police ratio for robbery and assault is higher in Britain than in the US, but sampling error may explain this and/or the fact that the NCS excludes victims under 12 years old for which no adjustment seems to have been made. In the US nearly three times as many rapes are uncovered by the NCS as by police figures.

Table 4: *Ratio of survey to police counts, by selected offences: England & Wales and the USA*

	Ratio of survey counts to police counts	
	England & Wales (1)	United States (2)
Motor vehicle theft	1.16	1.29
Burglary	2.44	2.52
Theft from motor vehicles	3.33	n.a
Vandalism	9.61	n.a
Robbery	5.90	3.31
Aggravated assault	4.80	3.45
Rape	n.a	2.56

Notes:

(1) Source: Mayhew, Elliott, and Dowds (1989, p. 15). Adjustments are made to police figures to improve comparability (e.g., commercial vehicle thefts are excluded and an estimated number of offences known to the police in which victims are younger than the age-limit for the survey).

(2) Source: O'Brien (1985, p. 85). The data relate to 1976 and combine robbery and burglary measured in the NCS in both the National Household Survey and the Commercial Surveys. There seems no adjustment made for the fact that the NCS excludes victims under 12 years which may affect robbery and aggravated assault somewhat.

The most discussed shortfall between police and survey figures has centered on non-reported crime. Another more overlooked discrepancy is that between the number of crimes supposedly reported by victims, and the number which end up officially recorded. In analysis of BCS data, it has been usual to set estimates of the numbers of reported crimes for selected offence categories alongside the number recorded by the police.[2] The matching allows for comparison of trends in crime according to the two sources, but it also allows some estimate of what seems to be an inevitable 'recording shortfall' in reported offences.

[2] Offences are classified from details collected in the *Victim Form* according to police rules for classifying crimes. (Other surveys often take victims' descriptions of events - e.g., as a 'burglary' - as given, without checks as to whether they meet legal or police criteria.) The process of matching BCS offence categories with those of the police involves some adjustments to police figures (for instance, to disregard non-residential burglaries, or offences against those under 16, who are not covered by the survey). The matching is only done for a sub-set of 'matchable' offences. Some offences - e.g., 'common assaults' - are not regarded as 'notifiable' offences and are therefore not counted by the police. (Others are recorded by the police in very broad categories spanning offences both against institutional victims and private individuals.)

Precise estimates of this shortfall are difficult, both because of sampling error on survey estimates and because of the problems of comparing like with like when matching survey offences with those used by the police, even if in principle the same rules are adhered to. For example, some incidents *will* be recorded but not in the same categories as suggested by the victim's description (for example, an assault which according to survey rules is an aggravated assault may be downgraded to a simple assault; or an incident which appears to meet the criteria of attempted burglary may, in practice, be recorded as vandalism by the police if they feel evidence of attempted entry is weak). Police discretion about what to treat as a recordable offence is another main factor; the police may not officially record a complaint, or they may later discard it. Many incidents are not recorded because of police compliance with the victim's wish not to proceed with action. Or the police may not accept a victim's account of the incident: they may think a report is mistaken or ingenious, or feel there is insufficient evidence to say a crime has been committed. Nor can it be ruled out that survey estimate of 'reported crime' exaggerate the amount of reporting insofar as some victims, conscious of the social desirability of informing the police, say they have reported when in fact they have not.

Nonetheless, some shortfall between 'reported' and 'recorded' crime is indisputable. Table 5 shows results from the 1988 BCS. For the complete set of offences comparable with police categories, the number recorded by the police was only two-thirds of that estimated by the survey to have been reported.

Who Informs the Police

Information from victimization surveys has complemented studies of police workload (e.g., Burrows, 1982) in highlighting the fact that the vast majority of offences which the police come to know about are reported to them by victims or someone acting on their behalf. Table 6 shows results from the 1988 BCS: nearly nine out of ten incidents were said to have been known to the police in this way. The pattern of results in not particularly variable across different offence categories, with the exception of assaults which are more often known to the police on account of their being on, or called to the scene.[3]

[3] It is somewhat surprising that 'personal' offences (i.e. incidents such as robbery which are perpetrated against the respondent him/herself) are not reported to a greater degree by the respondent directly than is the case with 'household' crimes, which are usually so defined because they affect the family as a whole (burglary is a case in point). The fact that selected interviewees say that they take the initiative in contacting the police more often than other household members may evidences some 'response bias': i.e. selectively better recall by respondents of incidents which affected them most (e.g., something was taken from *their* car rather than their husband's).

Table 5: *British Crime Survey estimates of reported and recorded crime, 1987*

	Number of crimes, 1987 (000s)	% reported	% recorded of reported	% recorded of BCS total
1. Vandalism	2931	24	43	10
2. Theft of motor vehicle	385	95	91	86
3. Theft from motor vehicle	2087	40	75	30
4. Bicycle theft	387	62	55	34
5. Residential burglary	1180	63	65	41
6. Sexual offences	60	21	77	17
7. Robbery	177	44	38	17
8. Theft from the person	317	34	36	12
9. Wounding	566	43	49	21
All offences comparable with Criminal Statistics	7810	41	64	27

Notes:
1. The figures in the first column are derived by applying BCS rates to the 1987 household population for England and Wales for categories 1-5, and to the population aged over 15 for the remainder. Only women were asked about sexual offences; the figures are based on women only.
2. Categories 5, 6, 7 and 8 include attempts.
3. Weighted data. Source: 1988 BCS, core sample.

Table 6: *How the police came to know (percentages)* (1988 British Crime Survey)

	Respondent told	Other people told	Police there	Other
Vandalism	59	35	6	-
Theft from vehicle	58	40	1	2
Burglary	55	43	<1	1
Theft of vehicle	58	35	2	5
Bike theft	54	45	-	1
Other HH theft	62	34	2	2
Other personal theft	54	44	-	3
Assault	42	41	10	8
Robbery/theft from the person	65	31	2	1
ALL OFFENCES	55	39	3	3

How the Police Are Informed

In the UK at least - where about 85% of households have a phone - the telephone is the most common way of contacting the police. As Table 7 shows, seven out of ten offences were reported by telephone, with burglary and robbery victims resorting to the '999' (emergency lines) most often.

Table 7: *Method of reporting to the police (percentages)* (1988 British Crime Survey)

	999 call	phoned local station	visited local station	stopped officer	other
vandalism	8	64	14	5	8
theft from vehicle	4	61	32	2	1
burglary	33	53	9	3	1
theft of vehicle	11	66	19	2	2
bike theft	1	56	40	4	-
other household theft	8	65	22	3	3
common assault	17	54	20	1	8
wounding	10	36	52	2	1
robbery	20	31	30	15	5
theft from person	5	43	39	8	6
other personal theft	11	63	21	2	3
ALL OFFENCES	12	59	23	3	3

Satisfaction with the Police Response

Victims are likely to be a state of distress after a crime which may well heighten their expectations of an appropriate and sympathetic police response. The ICS showed that a sizeable minority of victims in all fourteen countries said they were dissatisfied with the way in which the police dealt with their last report - a third in all countries combined. Relatively low satisfaction was expressed by victims in Norway, Spain, France and Belgium. Satisfaction was highest in Australia and Canada and - within Europe - in Finland, the Netherlands, Scotland and England and Wales. Table 8 gives details.

For England and Wales, the 1988 BCS gave a rather higher figure of 40% of reporters saying they were fairly or very unhappy about the way they had been dealt with. Those expressing most dissatisfaction were: younger, male, urban residents, lower social class, and non-white. The main reasons for dissatisfaction were that the police "didn't do enough", were insufficiently interested, or failed to give enough information on the case (see Table 9). Those who felt they were kept

well-informed by the police (a separate question) were more likely to be satisfied, as were those who had had some personal contact with the police after reporting.

Table 8: *Dissatisfaction with the police on reporting crime* (1989 International Crime Survey)

	% very of fairly dissatisfied		% very of fairly dissatisfied
Australia	22.1	USA	34.8
Canada	25.9	EUROPE	37.8
Finland	26.2	Switzerland	39.4
Netherlands	28.0	Northern Ireland	41.6
Scotland	28.1	Belgium	47.3
England & Wales	29.2	France	50.6
West Germany	32.3	Spain	52.6
TOTAL	34.5	Norway	67.2

Notes:
1. Based on all crimes covered by the ICS. Figures refer to the last incident experienced in 1988.
2. The 'total' figure treats each country as being of equal statistical importance. The figure for Europe weights individual country results by population size.

Table 9: *Reasons for dissatisfaction with police on reporting (percentages)* (1988 British Crime Survey)

Didn't do enough	40
Weren't interested	39
Failed to keep respondent informed	34
Didn't apprehend offenders	21
Didn't recover property	15
Kept me waiting/slow to arrive	7
Made mistakes/handled matter badly	6
Were impolite/unpleasant	5
Unweighted N	588

Notes:
1. Percentages do not total 100% because multiple answers allowed. Not all response options shown.
2. Weighted data. Source: 1988 BCS (core sample).

Witnessing Crime and Reporting

Another slant on reporting has been through questions on whether respondents have been willing to tell the police when they have witnessed crimes against others. Table 10 shows results from the 1988 BCS on the proportion of witnesses to four types of incident, and the number of witnesses who told the police. Relatively few did so - a result in line with studies of both actual and deliberately staged crimes. Many people probably do not report because it is inconvenient or difficult; others may be fearful of the consequences. But it may also be ambiguous whether an offence was taking place, and bystanders may be unsure, in fights for instance, whether the apparent victim would have welcomed intervention. Bystander non-reporting was not related to many social factors other than a tendency for witnesses under 30 years to report fewer incidents. Nor was it clearly related to impressions of the quality of police service.

Table 10: *Reporting by witnesses* (1988 British Crime Survey)

	% witnessing over 5 years	% witnessing who reported
A serious fight	19	8
Someone vandalising property	14	22
Someone shoplifting	11	12
Someone stealing from a car	3	29

Notes:
1. Weighted data. Source: 1988 BCS (core sample).

Suggestions

Even an 'economy model' victimization survey will ask victims whether or not they reported to the police in order to ascertain the extent and nature of the 'dark' figure of crime that escapes official notice. Most surveys will also want to ask reasons for non-reporting, notwithstanding the considerable consistency of evidence from existing surveys as to what these reasons are. While accepting these minimum standards, I conclude by offering some suggestions for how reporting issues might be best dealt with in victimization surveys to maximize the usefulness of results.

Do the police know or not. As an elementary point, it is better to ask a question along the lines: "Did police come to know about the matter" (rather than "was it reported to the police?"). Some offences come to police attention other than through a direct report. In the 1988 BCS, for instance, victims said that in 6% of survey-measured cases the offence came to police attention other than through a report by them or by someone acting on their behalf. For calibrating recorded offences against survey-measured offences, the issue is more whether something

happened which would have been precluded from being recorded by the police because of lack of police knowledge, rather than whether the victim him or herself drew it to police attention.

Why is crime not reported. Various coding frames are available for inspection by designers of surveys who are energetic enough to compare different questionnaires. The coding frame if printed for interviewers will have to be a long one, and it is preferable to leave the question open-ended to be coded afterwards. There is a need to allow for multiple response, and there will be a high proportion of residual 'other' answers which do not fit into the main categories easily.

As mentioned, there can be some ambiguity about what some of the commonest answers actually mean (e.g. "the police would not be interested"). There is undoubtedly room for more probing to ascertain what precisely respondents have in mind - notwithstanding the fact that, in practice, reasons are typically grouped together to avoid an over-complex table of results.

'Recording shortfall'. If survey estimates are to be linked with police recorded crime categories, one should be prepared to be able to explain why all crimes that are said to be 'reported' are not recorded. (Many people, even those informed about criminal justice issues, find this surprising.) In order to contrast 'reported' and recorded offences, the *number* of reported offences needs to be calculated. (Readers should be told to bear in mind sampling error on the 'reported crime' figures.) Obviously, one should compare 'like with like' as much as possible.

Validity of the reporting measure. There are, as said, a number of reasons why the estimate of reported crime does not tally with recorded crime. Although these are in practice difficult to quantify, this does not excuse survey analysts from trying to assess the importance of one of the factors involved: a likely exaggeration of how many incidents are made known to the police. Survey analysts usually accept the answer that a crime was reported (or made known) to the police at face value. Reporting levels, however, may well be overstated. Crime reporting is usually seen as a responsible reaction to victimization and some victims may well say they reported an incident even if they did not. 'Record checks' to try and match so-called reported offences with what is in police files, or more stringent questions on the reporting 'event' should not be ruled out as a way of assessing the validity and reliability of the self-report measure of crime-reporting.

Measuring seriousness. There is a strong case for asking victims to assess the seriousness of what happened (using some sort of point scale, with the top and bottom ends anchored to a very serious and a relatively trivial offence respectively). There are two reasons for this. First, seriousness scores can offer a defence against the criticism that victim surveys only identify a rump of unreported, extra crimes 'not worth worrying about'. It will be shown, rather, that a proportion of crimes, even though rated seriously, will nonetheless not have been reported to the police. Second, serious scores are a useful way of assessing differences in the nature of crime experienced by different groups. This will have several analytical benefits and if the temptation cannot be resisted of investigating differences in reporting behaviour across social groups, then seriousness scores may well be the most convenient 'control' variable. (In my view, there is little

to be gained from spending valuable analysis time in pursuing socio-demographic differences in reporting *unless* controlling for the nature of the offence.) Even if a seriousness scale is not used, reporting could be linked to other variables. Degree of emotional distress is one example: the 1988 BCS showed that 51% of offences which left the victim "very upset" were not reported.

Insurance. It is useful to link reporting behaviour to insurance cover (i.e. was stolen or damaged property covered by insurance). But other controls will also need to be made.

Telephone ownership. On the assumption that interviews are face-to-face, checking household telephone ownership may illuminate differences in reporting levels (since having a phone will influence the ease of being able to contact the police). Other controls would again need to be made in pursuing any 'telephone effect'. A telephone ownership question is also useful to allow analysis of possible differences in victimization rates between owners and non-owners - a important issue as regards the reliability of (cheaper) telephone surveying.

Victims' dealings with the police. There is a case for putting priority on asking victims how they feel they have been dealt with by the police after they reported to them. Data from the British Crime Survey has proved forceful in showing that the police could do much more in the way of providing information and feedback. If other types of contact with the police are to be asked about (e.g., reporting disturbances, or emergencies), it can be helpful to use the same form of some 'satisfaction' questions so that levels of satisfaction can be compared across different types of police-public contact. For what will probably be the main "Why were you dissatisfied?" question, multiple answers should again be allowed. Existing questions will provide a number of example of coding frames.

Information offered by the police. If the police are under an obligation (as in the UK) to pass on information to victims about facilities such as Criminal Injuries Compensation schemes, or Victim Support Schemes, it might be useful to ask victims whether this happened. (From BCS results, it would appear information is not always passed on where is should be.)

Bystander reporting. The issue of bystander reporting has been given much less attention than that of victim reporting, though there are a large number of potential witnesses to crime who if they acted positively by reporting what they had seen might enhance the effectiveness of the criminal justice system. (A fundamental assumption behind Neighbourhood Watch, for instance, is that ordinary members of the public *are* prepared to take action in response to seeing suspicious behaviour.) Where bystander reporting has been addressed, it has often been through 'hypothetical' questions on "If you saw x happening, would you report it to the police?" - which possibly risks only getting a socially acceptable response. Rather better questions have been used about the reporting of actually witnessed incidents, though typically with inadequate follow-up questions on *why* the decision was made not to report - apparently the commonest response. Ways of teasing out why bystanders, do not report would be a useful new way forward, especially if questions could be designed to avoid self-justifying answers. Obviously one needs to ask what

was witnessed. And in the interests of accurate recall it may be best to restrict the length of the recall period, even at the risk of reducing the number of witnessed events.

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The Effects of Survey Design on Reporting in Victimization Surveys - The United States Experience[1]

James P. Lynch

Introduction

Victimization surveys were first used in the United States in the 1960s (Biderman, Johnson, McIntyre, & Weir, 1967; Ennis, 1967). Since that time they have become a major component of crime statistics in the US. The National Crime Survey (NCS)[2] sponsored by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and conducted by the Census Bureau is the second largest continuous household survey administered by the federal government.[3] Data from this survey is routinely used to determine the level and change in level of crime in the US. Estimates from the NCS are given as much or more credibility than those from police statistics (Biderman & Lynch, 1991). Policy analysts and academic researchers also make extensive use of these data.

As the use and acceptance of victimization surveys has increased, so has our awareness of the limitations of the method. There are a number of ways that surveys can "go wrong". Since surveys

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[1] Many thanks to Leah Benedict of the American University for locating and reviewing many of the sources used in this paper as well as a number that were not. Thanks also to Joyce Newberry for preparing the tables.

[2] As of 1991, the NCS is known as the national criminal victimization survey (NCVS).

[3] The National Crime Survey (NCS) collects data on personal and household victimization through an ongoing national survey of residential addresses. The survey employs a rotating panel design of a sample of addresses in the United States. Housing units are retained in sample for a 3 1/2-year period during which interviewers return to a housing unit every 6 months to conduct interviews with the current residents of the unit. The data obtained the first time a unit is in sample is not used to estimate victimization rates. It serves as a bound for the reference period in order to reduce temporal displacement. Subsequent interviews at the housing unit are used because the previous interview bounds the subsequent interview. All household members are asked about their experience with personal crime, but only one member is asked to report on crimes involving theft or attempted theft of household property. Each respondent is asked a series of screen questions to determine if he or she was victimized during the 6 month period preceding the first day of the month of interview. Seven screen questions concern crime against the household and are asked only of a single household respondent. These questions ask about break-ins or attempts, and stolen household items, including motor vehicles and motor-vehicle parts. Another 13 screen questions, asked of all respondents, concern specific types of personal crimes. At the conclusion of the screen questions, an individual victimization report is completed for each incident mentioned in response to the screen questions.

are administered to only a subset of the population of interest, sampling error must be considered when using these data. More recently, survey researchers have become concerned with sources of error in surveys other than sampling error (Groves, 1989). This category of "nonsampling" errors is rather broad and ill-defined. Differences in question wording or question order can affect reporting (Schuman & Presser, 1981), for example, or differences in the length of the period over which respondents are asked to report. Because sampling theory and statistical theory are very well developed, the magnitude of sampling error can be reasonably well estimated. "Nonsampling" errors, however, are of greater concern because we know so little about them. We cannot say with any certainty which types of survey procedures and instrumentation will have a substantial effect on reporting. Indeed, we do not even have an exhaustive typology of sources of "nonsampling" error (Groves, 1989).

Nonetheless, the importance of "nonsampling" error is such that sharing the limited information that we do have is useful. To this end, I would like to describe what we have learned in the United States about the effects of several different procedures on reporting in victimization surveys. Specifically, I will address the effects of mode of interview, recall period length[4] and cuing strategies in screening interviews. Mode refers to whether the interviews were conducted in-person or on the telephone. Recall period length refers to the period of time for which respondents are asked to recount their victimization experience. Screening strategy refers to the method by which the general population is screened to identify victims. This filtering of the population is usually done with some sort of brief screening interview.

These particular facets of survey design were chosen for examination because they have major cost and error implications for victimization surveys. Telephone interviews, for example, are substantially cheaper to conduct than in-person interviews and would be more desirable as long as there is no radical effect on data quality. Similarly, longer, as opposed to shorter, reference periods would yield more victimization per interview and substantially reduce the sample size require for sampling error purposes. But longer recall periods could result in less complete reporting of events occurring in the period and differential reporting of events across types of respondents. Finally, screening the population to find victims is the most costly part of victim surveys. In the NCS ten persons must be screened to identify one victim. Significant savings as well as increases in accuracy could result from screening methods that reduce the ratio of persons screened to victims found.

In the first of the following sections, I will describe the manner in which the effects of these procedural differences will be assessed. The second, third and fourth sections will present the evidence from the U.S. experience on the effects of mode, screening strategy and reference period respectively.

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[4] The term recall period is used throughout this paper to refer to the period of time for which a respondent is asked to report. The term reference period is customarily used to refer to this period, but the multiple meanings attached to this term make its use here undesirable (see Biderman & Lynch, 1981).

Assessing the Effects of Design Differences

Although I have used the term "nonsampling error", we cannot determine the amount of error resulting from the use of one design as opposed to another. Error requires some absolute standard, some "true" estimate of crime. We do not have one for criminal victimization (Biderman & Lynch, 1991). Reverse record checks using police data have been as a standard to be used in assessing error (Turner, 1972). Biderman and others (Biderman, 1966; Biderman & Lynch, 1981) have argued, however, that it is unwise and virtually impossible to use police records to validate victim survey data. Consequently, we can only speak of differences across designs or design features. In general, we assume that, given the evidence of under reporting in victim surveys, designs that yield higher reporting are preferred.

The importance of a difference in reporting across procedures depends to a large extent on the use to which the data are put (Bennett & Lynch, 1990). If the primary purpose of the survey is to estimate the level of victimization, then any large difference in reporting is consequential. For surveys that are primarily used to estimate change in victimization differences across designs that are stable over time are not as consequential as those that vary over time. Surveys that are used principally to identify the causes and correlates of victimization will be more sensitive to differences in reporting that are variable across levels of major independent variables. Consequently, whenever possible, I will describe differences in terms of level estimates, change estimates and distribution across the values of major independent variables, e.g. age.

The Effects of Mode Differences

In examining the differences between telephone and face-to-face interviews, it is important to differentiate the effects of being interviewed on the telephone from the selection effects resulting from the fact that only certain people have or answer telephones. This distinction is important because selection effects will have different remedies than a purely mode effect. It is also important to differentiate telephone designs according to the nature of the sample design used because different methods of sampling in telephone designs can influence selection effects (Traugott, Groves, & Lepkowski, 1987). Finally, it may be useful to distinguish computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) designs from other methods of telephone administration. The enhanced control over the interview process afforded by CATI can substantially change the nature of the interview and the resulting data.

Evidence from the National Crime Survey (NCS)

The National Crime Survey has used telephone interviewing extensively. Since 1980 the majority of the interviews conducted in the NCS have been administered by phone. Prior to increasing the proportion of phone interviews, the Census Bureau conducted an experimental test of mode

effects (Turner, 1977). After the proportion of telephone interviews was increased in 1981 another post hoc test for mode effects was carried out (Roman & Sliwa, 1982). The experimental test of mode effects found significant differences across modes in the estimates of level of crime and in the distribution of reported crime across demographic groups. The post hoc test of the effects of the maximum telephone procedure found no significant differences between telephone and personal visit procedures used in the NCS. Serious flaws in this research cast doubt on these findings and they certainly cannot be generalized beyond the particular circumstances of the NCS.

The experimental test of mode effects in the NCS compared three different treatments - one in which personal interviewing was used to its maximum potential, one that employed telephone interviewing to its maximum potential and one that used a mix of personal and telephone interviewing similar to that used in the NCS. Two sets of analyses were conducted. The first compared the maximum telephone procedure and the maximum personal visit procedure to the mixed procedure currently used in the NCS (Bushery, Cowan, & Murphy, 1978). The results indicated that the maximum personal visit procedure produced slightly higher victimization rates than the mixed procedure and the maximum telephone procedure slightly lower rates than the mixed procedure. Moreover, the procedures yielded different victimization estimates for population subgroups. Males in the maximum telephone group, for example, reported fewer thefts than males in the mixed procedure group. Blacks in the personal visit group reported more aggravated assaults than blacks in the group exposed to the standard NCS procedure. Overall, the differences observed across modes and between groups was slight, but significant.

Table 1: Estimates of the Magnitude of Effects on Reporting by Telephone Designs and Use of the Data

Design	*Data Use*		
	Level Estimates	Change Estimates	Analytic Uses
Telephone Interview w/equivalent sample	X	NA	X
Telephone RDD Sample	X	NA	X
Telephone List Frame Sample	NA	NA	NA
Telephone Dual Frame Sample	NA	NA	NA
CATI	X	NA	X

Table 2: Comparison of Three Interviewing Procedures in the NCS; Maximum Person and Maximum Telephone Visit Experiment

Type of Difference Crime	*Victimization Rates*				
	(1) Standard NCS Procedure	(2) Maximum Personal	(3) Maximum Telephone	Difference 1-2	1-3
Total 12+					
Ag. Persons	129.4	130.2	119.1	-0.8	10.3 *
Violence	32.0	34.1	31.8	-2.1	0.2
Assault	25.2	26.3	24.6	-1.1	0.6
Stranger	6.2	6.3	4.9	-0.2	1.3
Non-stngr	3.4	5.4	5.2	-0.2 *	-1.8 *
Simple	15.6	14.5	14.5	1.1	1.1
Theft	97.4	96.1	87.3	1.3	10.1 *
w/o contact	94.5	92.8	84.6	1.7	9.9 *
Whites					
Violence	30.7	31.8	31.6	-1.1	-0.9
Theft	98.7	97.5	87.7	1.2	11.0 *
Blacks					
Violence	42.4	56.4	33.6	-14.0	8.8
Theft	88.1	89.6	83.3	-1.5	4.8
Males					
Violence	42.5	43.3	42.2	-0.9	0.3
Theft	109.0	103.7	90.6	5.3	18.4 *
Females					
Violence	22.4	25.7	22.2	-3.3	0.1
Theft	86.7	89.2	84.2	-2.5	2.5

* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level

The second analysis was restricted to "identical repeat households"[5] and emphasized direct

[5] Because the experiment was conducted within the ongoing NCS, certain rules were established to ensure that the experiment did not contaminate data used for annual estimates. Specifically, the NCS requires that the first contact with a household be made in person while subsequent contacts can be made by phone. When households move into sample housing units, the occupants were interviewed in-person even though the unit was designated for the maximum telephone procedure. This practice being interviewed in-person. This "contamination" of the experimental groups could have distorted the study. Consequently, the second analysis excluded all replacement households from both the maximum telephone and the maximum personal visit groups. The households remaining were referred to as "identical repeat" households because they were identical in that they

comparisons between the maximum telephone and the maximum personal visit procedures. This analysis was hampered by small sample available, but it did indicate that the personal interviewing procedure produced higher reports of victimization than the maximum telephone procedure (Turner, 1977) . On average, across thirteen types of crime, the personal visit procedure yielded crime rates 11% higher than those produced by the maximum telephone procedure. The rates from the maximum personal visit procedure were higher than those from the telephone procedure in 11 of 13 crime categories. In addition, the different procedures produced different rates across sex and race groupings. This was particularly pronounced for white males who reported much less crime than others when the maximum telephone as opposed to the maximum personal visit procedure was used.

Table 3: Comparison of Telephone and Personal Interview From Census Mode Effect Experiment by Type of Crime

Type of Victimization	Personal Visit	Telephone Visit
Stranger to Victim Aggravated Assault	5.50	4.32
Stranger to Victim Simple Assault	6.38	6.80
Nonstranger to Victim Aggravated Assault	3.31	3.17
Nonstranger to Victim Simple Assault	5.63	3.92
Robbery	5.32	4.90
Personal Theft	86.10	76.33
Forcible Entry Burglary	24.15	22.23
Unlawful Entry Burglary	35.66	31.43
Attempted Forcible Entry	19.75	16.63
Household Larceny less than $ 50	67.11	63.42
Household Larceny $ 50 or more	30.00	33.35
Completed Motor Vehicle Theft	8.70	7.31
Attempted Motor Vehicle Theft	5.98	5.36

The post hoc analysis of the effects of changing the proportion of NCS interviews conducted by phone cannot shed much light on the question of mode effects. This test was not an experiment. The choice of mode was determined by the rotation group that the sample unit was in. So the first, third, fifth and seventh interviews were conducted in-person and the second, fourth and sixth interviews were administered by phone. Consequently, mode of interview was hopelessly confounded with what the Census Bureau calls "time-in-sample" bias – the empirical regularity that the rate of reporting incidents decreases with the number of times a person is interviewed. Roman and Sliwa (1982) attempted to adjust for "time-in-sample" effects in their analysis, but there is little consensus as to how that should be done. Given the importance of adjusting for the "time-in-sample" effect (given the way that mode of interview was determined), the arbitrariness of the method of adjustment calls this entire analysis into question. Although Sliwa and Roman found no significant mode effect, the flaws in their analysis make it suspect.

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were not replacement households and all had been interviewed previously.

Table 4: Comparison of Telephone and Personal Interview from Census Mode Effect Experiment by Type of Crime and Characteristics of Respondents

Type of Personal Crime	Total Sample	Difference between Rates from Personal and Telephone Interviews			
		Sex		*Race*	
		Males	Females	Whites	Blacks
Stranger Aggr. Assault	1.18	1.44	1.01	0.91	5.17 *
Stranger Simple Assault	-0.42	-0.25	-0.51	0.01	-2.79
Nonstr. Aggr. Assault	0.14	2.05	-1.57	0.24	0.85
Nonstr. Simple Assault	1.71	0.74	2.60	1.83	-0.87
Robbery	0.42	-0.73	1.50	0.55	-0.87
Personal Theft	9.77 *	17.77 *	2.54	11.62 *	1.45
Type of Household Crime	Total Households	*Race*		*Tenure*	
		White	Black	Owner	Rental
Forcible Entry Burglary	1.92	-0.32	17.03	-1.67	10.74
Unlawful Entry Burglary	4.23	1.41	27.77	3.98	7.28
Attempted Burglary	3.12	4.00	-4.01	5.39	-1.68
Larceny under $ 50	3.69	4.92	1.20	8.60	-11.30
Larceny $ 50 or more	-3.35	-3.70	-1.75	-2.65	-4.77
Comp. Mot. Veh. Theft	1.39	1.59	-0.16	2.83	-4.25
Attmpt. Mot. Veh. Theft	0.62	-0.02	5.91	2.65	-4.47

* Indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level

Evidence from Non-NCS Tests

In 1974 William Klecka and Alfred Tuchfarber conducted a telephone survey of victimization in Cincinnati, Ohio using random digit dialing (RDD) techniques. The results of this survey were compared to those obtained from face-to-face interviews conducted by the Census Bureau on the same population. Klecka and Tuchfarber (1978) reported no significant differences in the reporting rates from the two surveys. This comparison has been used to justify the use of RDD designs and telephone interviewing more generally in the area of victimization surveys. There are, however, a number of reasons to be skeptical of these results.

First, there may be a substantial "house" effect because the two surveys were conducted by different survey organizations. The telephone survey was done by the Behavioral Science Lab at the University of Cincinnati and the in-person interviews were conducted by the United States Census Bureau. While the instruments were essentially the same, the training and instruction that the interviewers received could have been very different. It is possible, for example, that the telephone interviewers were less restrictive than the Census interviewers in terms of what they would accept as a report of a crime incident.

This is relevant to second point, that is, the use of a one-tailed significance test for assessing the statistical significance of the difference in reporting between the two modes. The authors assumed that, since the expectation was that telephone reporting of crime incidents would be lower than reports from in-person interviews, the null hypothesis should be that telephone interviews should not produce less crime than face-to-face interviews. This hypothesis can only be rejected if the telephone reporting rates depart from the in-person rates substantially in the negative direction. When the rates were compared, the ones from the phone survey were substantially *higher* than the reports from the in-person survey. On that basis, Klecka and Tuchfarber (1978) fail to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is no difference between RDD telephone and in-person interviews. The differences between the rates are substantial (as much as 70%) and would have been statistically significant with a two tailed test. There is then a significant difference between reporting in the two designs, but not in the direction predicted. This difference merits explanation and should not be construed as support for the contention of no difference. Consequently, Klecka and Tuchfarber's results must be viewed with skepticism.

Table 5: Comparisons of RDD and NCS In Person Interviews by Type of Crime from Klecka and Tuchfarber (1978)

Type of Crime	RDD (1)	NCS (2)	Difference 2-1 1 tail test	Difference 2-1 2 tail test
Household Crimes				
Burglary	187.5	143.3	n.s.	<.05
Household Larceny	148.8	103.4	n.s.	<.05
Motor Vehicle Theft	42.5	25.0	n.s.	n.s.
Total	378.8	271.7	n.s.	<.001
Personal Crimes				
Robbery	15.7	14.6	n.s.	n.s.
Assault	55.6	46.5	n.s.	<.1
Crimes of Theft	143.9	109.9	n.s.	<.01
Total	217.0	172.6	n.s.	<.01

In sum, the evidence from the U.S. suggests that telephone interviewing produces level estimates of victimization that are somewhat lower than those resulting from face-to-face interviews. There is also some evidence that the two modes would produce different level estimates across population subgroups. These differences are not large, however.

Limitations of the Evidence

The US experience must be used with some caution in generalizing to Germany. First, there are number of methodological flaws in the studies that could affect the results observed. The flaws in the Roman and Sliwa study (1982) have been noted and the small sample sizes in the Census

experiment could affect the results. Second, the Census experiment did include in-person interviews with non-telephone households, even though they were designated for the maximum telephone procedure. If a "pure" telephone design was used which excluded non-telephone households, then the difference between the telephone and in-person design could be more substantial. This difference would be due more to selection effects, i.e. differences in the composition of telephone and non-telephone households, than mode effects. Consequently, telephone designs may affect reporting of victimization while telephone administration per se may not. The importance of differences in victimization experience between telephone and non-telephone households is supported by the fact that the victimization rates of persons interviewed by phone in the NCS are substantially lower than those interviewed in person. Third, the NCS is a rotating panel design while most victimization surveys are cross sectional. Telescoping could occur at different rates for telephone and in-person interviews and thereby lessen the differences between the modes. These differences in design may interact with mode effects and therefore make it unwise to generalize from the NCS experience. Finally, differences between the United States and other countries in the prevalence and distributions of telephones as well as differences in the social organization of phone use may also limit generalization from the NCS (McGowan, 1981).

Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing

Computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) refers to telephone interviewing in which the instrument is presented to the interviewer on a computer display. The computer is programmed to guide the interview in a manner determined by the skip pattern of the instrument and the responses of the respondent. The interviewer reads the question from the display to the respondent. When the respondent answers, the interviewer types the response (or codes it) into the computer. On the basis of that response, the computer displays the next screen containing a question to be asked of the respondent (Nicholls, 1983; Nicholls & Groves, 1986).

The NCS began experimenting with CATI in 1986 to determine whether this technique could be used in the survey and what the effects would be on data quality (Hubble & Wilder, 1988). The experiment was based upon a sample of housing units from the NCS sample. To minimize disruption of the on-going survey, the sample was drawn from hard-to-enumerate areas – "large, multi-interviewer areas in which it is difficult to hire and retain interviewers." Within these "hard-to-enumerate" areas, the housing units were randomly divided into an experimental group that was interviewed by CATI and a control group interviewed using the standard NCS procedures,

that is, by telephone from the local interviewers home.[6] In all approximately 7,000 households were assigned to be interviewed in each group.

The results of this experiment suggest that we can expect a substantial *increase* in the reporting of victimization when CATI rather than decentralized telephone interviewing is employed. Overall, Hubble and Wilder (1988) report a 29% higher personal crime rate for the experimental as opposed to the control group. When the comparison is restricted to telephone interviews conducted in the two groups, the personal crime rate for the CATI group is 56% higher than that for the control group. There is no significant difference between the experimental and control groups for personal crimes reported in face-to-face interviews. The reporting rate for household crimes is 13% greater for the experimental as opposed to the control group and 23% greater when only telephone interviews are compared. Comparisons of CATI and other telephone interviews within the experimental group indicate that the CATI group reports at a much higher rate. This provides further evidence that the differences observed between the experimental and control groups are driven by CATI.

[6] Because this experiment was conducted within the on-going NCS, all of the housing units must be interviewed even though some will not have telephones or will refuse to be interviewed by phone. Consequently, some portion of the experimental and control group will necessarily be interviewed in-person. Since this type of situation will affect any phone survey, it should not reduce the usefulness of this experiment. The experimental group also contains some interviews that were done by local interviewers from their home. This occurred because of the need to get interviews from all possible households. If, after 7 days the designated household was not interviewed by CATI, then the case was sent to the field so that local interviewers could attempt to contact the household before the end of the interviewing period (14 days). Again, this "contamination" of the experimental group need not be distorting, since a similar procedure might be used in the on-going NCS. In order to demonstrate more clearly the effects of CATI and traditional telephone interviewing, Hubble and Wilder (1988) differentiate members of the experimental group interviewed by CATI from those interviewed in person and those interviewed by phone but not CATI. In all, 75% of the interviews in the experimental group were conducted using CATI.

Table 6: Results of NCS CATI Experiment for Quarters 1-4 1987
(Taken from Hubble & Wilder, 1988)

Personal Crime (rate per 1,000 population age 12 and over)				
	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
Total Interviews	87.9	113.4	1.29	**
Personal Interviews	116.4	108.6	0.93	
Telephone Interviews	73.9	115.5	1.56	**
CATI	NA	131.7		
Field	73.9	66.9		
Household Crime (rate per 1,000 housholds)				
	Control	Experimental	Esp/Control	
Total Interviews	172.4	194.8	1.13	*
Personal Interviews	194.8	185.8	0.95	
Telephone Interviews	161.1	198.9	1.23	**
CATI	NA	229.5		
Field	161.1	114.7		
* Significant at the 90 percent level (alpha = 0.10)				
** Significant at the 95 percent level (alpha = 0.05)				
(12,219 household interviews)				

Hubble and Wilder (1988) strike several cautionary notes in their analysis concerning the size and the enduring nature of the increased reporting seen in the CATI experiments. First, there seems to be a trend toward reducing differences between CATI and the current NCS procedure as the experiment continues. This could mean that the benefits of CATI could disappear as interviewers get accustomed to the new technology. The experiment continues and should indicate if the positive effects of CATI disappear. Second, there is some speculation that the bounding procedure used in the NCS may not have worked as well in CATI as it does in the field.[7] This could account for some of the higher rates observed in the experimental group. Hubble and

[7] To avoid counting events from outside the reference period, the NCS requires interviewers to maintain a list of all crimes reported in previous interviews on the back of the control card. When incidents are reported in subsequent interviews the interviewer checks them against the list on the control card to ensure that no previously mentioned incidents are included. In the CATI system, this information was keyed from the control card and had to be accessed during the interview. Hubble and Wilder (1988) speculated about the potential problems of implementing this procedure in CATI. They suggested that because CATI interviewers had not interviewed these household before (while field interviewers had) they may not be able to recognize duplicates as easily. The quality of the information keyed into the system may not be as rich as the handwritten descriptions on the control card and this may hamper the identification of duplicate incidents.

Wilder compared the recency distributions for the experimental and control groups to find evidence of differential telescoping, but the results were inconclusive.

Table 7: Results of NCS CATI Experiment for Quarters 1-4 1987

Household Crimes by Collection Quarter (rates per 1,000 households)				
Quarter 1 1987				
	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
Total Interviews	154.9	179.3	1.16	
Personal Interviews	181.5	87.8	0.48	*
Telephone Interviews	138.8	222.5	1.60	**
CATI	NA	260.7		
Field	138.8	93.2		
Quarter 2 1987				
	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
Total Interviews	153.3	182.1	1.19	
Personal Interviews	146.7	193.4	1.32	
Telephone Interviews	156.7	177.1	1.13	
CATI	NA	198.7		
Field	156.7	97.6		
Quarter 3 1987				
	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
Total Interviews	185.7	217.6	1.17	
Personal Interviews	214.6	178.1	0.83	
Telephone Interviews	171.5	236.1	1.38	**
CATI	NA	261.6		
Field	171.5	175.5		
Quarter 4 1987				
	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
Total Interviews	188.2	193.3	1.03	
Personal Interviews	236.8	240.4	1.02	
Telephone Interviews	166.6	172.4	1.03	
CATI	NA	214.9		
Field	166.6	78.9		
* Significant at the 90 percent level (alpha = 0.10) ** Significant at the 95 percent level (alpha = 0.05) (12,219 household interviews)				

Table 8: Results of NCS CATI Experiment for Quarters 1-4 1987

Crime Rates by Reference Month				
Personal Crimes (rates per 1,000 population age 12 and over)				
Reference Month	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
1 (farthest from interview)	64.4	79.4	1.23	
2	64.5	101.2	1.57	**
3	66.6	100.8	1.51	**
4	95.8	100.3	1.05	
5	89.7	127.4	1.42	**
6 (closest to interview month)	146.2	171.0	1.17	
Household Crimes (rates per 1,000 households)				
Reference Month	Control	Experimental	Exp/Control	
1 (farthest from interview)	117.9	132.7	1.13	
2	87.4	160.2	1.83	**
3	152.3	168.5	1.11	
4	217.8	234.6	1.08	
5	210.9	201.6	0.96	
6 (closest to interview month)	247.8	271.4	1.10	

* Significant at the 90 percent level (alpha = 0.10)
** Significant at the 95 percent level (alpha = 0.05)
(12,219 household interviews)

Even if we assume that the results observed by Hubble and Wilder are accurate, we do not know why they occur. This is a problem if you are trying to derive practical advice from the U.S. experience. Hubble and Wilder attribute the increase in reporting with CATI to the increase in control over interviewers. They maintain that NCS interviewers had developed short-cuts in the administration of the screening interview. Certain questions that seemed redundant may have been routinely skipped or abbreviated. With CATI and especially centralized CATI, the interviewers may have been more reluctant or less able to take these short-cuts. Although this explanation seems plausible, it is not clear exactly what difference between CATI and decentralized telephone interviewing inhibited the use of short-cuts. Was it the computer assisted nature of the interviewing because the interviewer does not control the flow of the interview as much? Or was it the centralized nature of the administration that increased supervision and thereby reduced interviewer discretion?

Summary

The evidence on mode effects from the U.S. experience is incomplete and mixed. The mode of interview is inextricably linked with sampling designs and the resulting selection effects that can produce differences in rates independent of strict mode effects. Many of the varieties of sample designs that could be used with telephone interviewing have not been used extensively in the U.S., so we cannot use the NCS experience to speak to mode effects in these designs. The evidence from the NCS and other victim surveys in the U.S. is that there is a slight negative effect on the reporting of victimizations in telephone interviews as opposed to interviews done face-to-face. The modes produce different rates across demographic groups as well. The big news, however, is that centralize CATI seems to produce substantial increases in reporting over that observed with decentralized telephone interviewing that is not computer assisted.

The Effects of Cuing Strategies

The reporting of victimizations in self-report surveys is determined, to a large extent, by the questions asked on the screening interview.[8] In spite of the importance of this screening interview, very little work has been done on developing alternative strategies for screening the population. Most victimization surveys seemed to have used the screening questions employed in the NCS or the pilots that preceded the fielding of that survey. The derivation of the NCS screening interview, however, is shrouded in mystery. It, like much of instrument construction in sample surveys, seems to have been guided by common sense and some anecdotal wisdom about how questions should be asked (Schuman & Presser, 1981). There appears to be no underlying model of how respondents encode and retrieve information that guided instrument construction.

A major focus of the National Crime Survey (NCS) Redesign Program was the development and implementation of an improved screening strategy based upon a theory of recall and reporting in retrospective surveys. The movement toward a theory of recall and reporting began with a *Workshop on Applying Cognitive Psychology to Recall Problems in the Survey* (Biderman & Moore, 1980). This meeting assembled cognitive psychologists and survey researchers to consider and discuss how the two disciplines might develop a theory about recall and reporting in sample surveys. The effort continued in the instrument design work of the Redesign. Members of the Crime Survey Research Consortium (CSRC) discussed models of recall and reporting (Biderman, Cantor, Lynch, & Martin, 1986). Drawing on these discussion, Betsy Martin with the assistance of Naomi Rothwell, Robert Groves and Peter Miller fashioned several screening interviews and

[8] The term screening interview refers to the series of questions asked of all contacted persons in order to determine if they may have been the victim of a crime that is within the scope of the NCS. If a positive response is received to a screening question, then respondents are asked to provide additional information that can be used to determine if the incident should be included in the crime counts. This additional information is collected by means of questions on what is called an incident form.

tested these instruments on small samples during the course of the Redesign. The results of these tests were sufficiently encouraging to warrant further testing of the what had come to be called "the short-cue" screener (Martin, Groves, Matlin, & Miller, 1986). Further tests by the Census Bureau confirmed the ability of the short-cue screener to increase substantially the rate at which victimization were reported in response to the screening interview (Hubble, 1990).

The Short-cues Screener

The model underlying the short-cues screener attributes the failure to report incidents in the NCS to three factors – conceptual failure, memory failure, and response inhibitions and distortions. The NCS asks respondents to report on their experiences of criminal victimization during a specified period of time. Conceptual failure occurs when the questions used in the screening interview do not convey clearly the cognitive task that the respondent is being asked to perform. Memory failure occurs when the respondent understands the task but cannot find in his memory behavior that falls within the concept. Response inhibition and distortion refers to situations in which the respondent cannot or will not report crime events that he has located in his memory.

The model further specifies that failures of concept in the NCS occur because the instrument may not effectively convey the frame of reference and the meaning of basic crime definitions. Many events that satisfy the conceptual definition of crime are not regarded as such by respondents because they are committed by intimates or acquaintances or because retribution is exacted instantaneously. These do not enter into the frame of reference when the respondent's mind is on crime. To help the respondent the NCS asks about behaviors and components of crime acts such as whether the respondent was attacked or threatened. There can be disagreements or misunderstandings between the designers of the survey and the respondents regarding the meaning of these terms.

Failures of memory occur because of premature termination of memory search, inadequate cuing, restricted recall and telescoping. The rare event nature of crimes and the fact that many crimes are not classified as such prompts respondents to scan their "meta memory" and conclude that they have no crime events to report. Inadequate cuing refers to the situation in which too few specific cues are used to jog the respondent's memory. Another inadequacy of cues can be the fact that they refer to one attribute of an event, e.g. the act, when the respondent has encoded the event under another attribute, e.g. the location in which it occurred. Restricted recall refers to situations in which a salient aspect of a crime that is not specifically cued may be suppressed by the presence of other cues in the same category. The use of a gun or knife as a cue may restrict the respondent's focus such that he fails to mention an event that involved another weapon such as a club.

The short-cue screener attempts to remedy these sources of failures to report by 1) setting the frame of reference more clearly and allowing for multiple frames of reference, 2) substantially increasing the volume and varieties of cues presented per minute of the interview. Rather than

introducing the topic of the survey as "crime", an extensive set of illustrations are presented. This is intended to help orient the respondent to the broad categories of behaviors that are of interest to the survey. It is designed to also inhibit equating crime with police matters as well as quick "meta-memory" searches that lead to premature termination of recall. The instrument is organized around several different frames of reference to help respondents retrieve events that are not encoded under one attribute of the event. Some of these frames of reference emphasize illegal acts such as taking or forcible entry. Others emphasize locations, activities and potential offenders. Within each of these frames of reference the short-cue screener attempts to provide a much greater density and a greater variety of cues. Increasing the density of cues should reduce the chance of having an insufficient number of cues. Efforts were also made to vary the nature of the attributes used to allow for the fact that events may be encoded under a wide variety of attributes. Increasing the density of cues per unit of time in the household was done by departing from the practice of using long and syntactically correct sentences. Introductory sentences are followed by lists of one and two word cues.

Portions of the current screening interview and the "short-cue screener" are presented in Attachment A in order to give you some idea of how these strategies differ.

Results of Field Tests

Versions of the short-cue screener were tested a several points during the NCS Redesign (Martin et al., 1986). The last of these tests indicated that the short cue screener produced crime reporting rates approximately 19% greater than that observed when the current NCS screener was used. This test was hampered by small samples and Martin and her colleagues were forced to make adjustments for differences in scope and design. Nonetheless, the tests served as probable cause for investigating further the use of the "short-cue" strategy.

Subsequently, the Census Bureau built upon these early efforts. They adapted the original short-cue screener for use in the Bureau environment and conducted several field tests of the instrument. A sample of 1200 households was interviewed using the short-cue screener in February and March of 1988. These households were contacted again in August and September of 1988 and again in February and March of 1989. Results of these interviews were compared to those from the current NCS administered to a comparable sample.

The results from the 1988 administration showed dramatically higher reporting for the experimental group compared to the control group. Annualized crime rates for crimes of violence were 118% higher for the group receiving the new questionnaire than that obtained using the current NCS screener. Reports of personal theft were 17% higher. Reporting rates for burglary were not significantly different for the two groups and reports of household larceny were 26% lower for the experimental as opposed to the control group. The results from the August and September test were not statistically significant across the two groups. The third test produced

results similar to the first-dramatic increases in the reporting of crimes of violence and a reduction in reports of property crimes.

Table 9: Results of Census Phase I Tests of Short-Cue Screener

February-March 1988 Results (Annualized Crime Rates per Thousand)				
	Test Group	Control Group	% Difference	
Crimes of Violence	79.2	36.2	118.8 %	***
Assault	67.2	31.0	116.8 %	***
Crimes of Theft	129.0	110.2	17.1 %	
Household Crimes	250.4	289.0	-13.4 %	
Burglary	91.4	96.0	- 4.8 %	
Household Larceny	127.0	171.4	-25.9 %	*
August-September 1988 Results (Annualized Crime Rates per Thousand)				
	Test Group	Control Group	% Difference	
Crimes of Violence	31.2	30.2	3.3 %	
Assault	27.8	25.0	11.2 %	
Crimes of Theft	70.2	80.8	-13.1 %	
Household Crimes	210.0	185.8	13.0 %	
Burglary	71.2	67.8	5.0 %	
Household Larceny	112.4	98.0	14.7 %	
February-March 1989 Results (Annualized Crime Rates per Thousand)				
	Test Group	Control Group	% Difference	
Crimes of Violence	39.5	22.3	77.5 %	*
Assault	34.2	19.3	76.3 %	*
Crimes of Theft	71.9	73.8	-2.7 %	
Household Crimes	139.5	153.3	-9.1 %	
Burglary	33.6	66.4	-49.4 %	**
Household Larceny	84.0	75.5	11.1 %	

* Significant at the 90 % level
** Significant at the 95 % level
*** Significant at the 99 % level

The results of these tests were encouraging enough for BJS and the Census to conduct further tests of the short-cue screener with larger samples and under conditions more similar to production interviews in the on-going NCS (Hubble, 1990). The results of these tests are consistent with findings of the first and third tests conducted in the first phase of study. The short-cue screener produced higher rates of reporting violence and all personal crimes than the current NCS screener. The reporting of household crimes was not significantly different for the experimental and control groups. Most of the increase in reported crimes is attributable to less

serious crimes – attempts as opposed to completions and crimes not reported to the police as opposed to crimes reported to the authorities.

Table 10: Results of Phase 2: January-December 1989 (Take from Hubble, 1990)

Personal Crime Rates (Rate per 1,000 population age 12 and over)				
Type of Crime	*Test Group* (New Questionnaire)	*Control Group* (Current Questionnaire)	Percent Difference	
All Personal Crimes	117.0	90.7	29 %	**
Serious	43.7	40.9	7 %	
Non-Serious	73.3	49.8	47 %	**
Crimes of Violence	45.0	27.9	61 %	**
Completed	12.8	10.6	21 %	
Attempted	32.1	17.2	86 %	**
Rape	1.2	0.8	56 %	
Robbery	4.1	5.7	-27 %	
Completed	2.3	3.9	-42 %	
Attempted	1.9	1.7	9 %	
Assault	39.6	21.4	85 %	**
Completed	10.2	6.6	53 %	
Attempted	29.4	14.8	99 %	**
Aggravated	10.2	8.2	23 %	
completed w/injury	2.5	3.3	-25 %	
attempted w/weapon	7.7	4.9	56 %	
Simple	29.4	13.2	124 %	***
completed w/injury	7.7	3.3	132 %	*
attempted w/injury	21.8	9.9	121 %	***
Crimes of Theft	72.1	62.9	15 %	
Value less than $ 50	41.2	32.6	27 %	
Value $ 50 or more	30.9	30.3	2 %	
Series Crimes	4.4	1.9	134 %	

Serious personal crime is defined as completed crimes of violence and crimes of theft with value $ 50 or more.

* Significant at the 90 % level (alpha = 0.10)
** Significant at the 95 % level (alpha = 0.05)
*** Significant at the 99 % level (alpha = 0.01)

Table 10 (cont): Results of Phase 2: January-December 1989 (Take from Hubble, 1990)

Household Crime Rates (Rate per 1,000 Households)			
Type of Crime	*Test Group* (New Questionnaire)	*Control Group* (Current Questionnaire)	Percent Difference
All Households Crimes	189.8	183.6	3 %
Serious	116.8	115.5	1 %
Non-Serious	73.0	68.0	7 %
Burglary	71.4	56.8	26 %
Completed	57.4	47.3	21 %
Forcible Entry	24.9	20.2	23 %
Unlawful Entry w/o Force	32.5	27.2	20 %
Attempted	14.0	9.5	48 %
Household Larceny	103.6	112.9	-8 %
Value less than $ 50	55.0	54.7	1 %
Value $ 50 or more	48.6	58.2	-17 %
Motor Vehicle Theft	14.9	13.8	7 %
Completed	10.8	10.0	8 %
Attempted	4.0	3.8	5 %
Series Crimes	4.8	3.3	46 %

Serious personal crime is defined as completed crimes of violence and crimes of theft with value $ 50 or more.

* Significant at the 90 % level (alpha = 0.10)
** Significant at the 95 % level (alpha = 0.05)
*** Significant at the 99 % level (alpha = 0.01)

The differences between the old and the short-cue screener differed across demographic groups. Males reported much higher rates with the short-cue screener than they did with the current NCS interview. Higher reporting rates with the short-cue screener were observed for respondents under 20 years of age and over 30, but not for those between 20 and 30.

Table 11: Crimes of Violence Rates by Interview Type and Selected Demographic and Event Characteristics

	Crime	Test Group	Control Group	% Difference
Age (yrs)				
< = 20	Total	16.8	7.9	111 % **
	Completed	5.8	2.6	122 %
	Attempted	11.0	5.3	106 % **
21-29	Total	13.1	11.9	10 %
	Completed	3.7	4.7	-20 %
	Attempted	9.3	7.3	28 %
30+	Total	14.1	6.0	137 % **
	Completed	3.1	2.4	31 %
	Attempted	11.0	3.6	206 % ***
Sex				
Male	Total	58.2	31.7	83 % ***
	Completed	14.6	11.3	28 %
	Attempted	43.7	20.4	114 % ***
Female	Total	33.9	24.4	39 %
	Completed	11.4	10.0	15 %
	Attempted	22.5	14.5	55 %
Victim/Offender Relationship				
Known Relative	Total	3.7	3.3	14 %
	Completed	1.7	1.8	-7 %
	Attempted	2.1	1.5	39 %
Known Non-relative	Total	23.2	11.2	107 % ***
	Completed	7.9	3.9	104 % *
	Attempted	15.3	7.4	108 % **
Not Known (Stranger)	Total	16.2	12.1	34 %
	Completed	3.3	4.7	-29 %
	Attempted	12.8	7.4	74 % *

* Significant at the 90 % level (alpha = 0.10)
** Significant at the 95 % level (alpha = 0.05)
*** Significant at the 99 % level (alpha = 0.01)

Summary

It is clear that the choice of screening strategy used in victim survey can substantially affect the results obtained. The short-cue screening strategy seems to show promise as a method for reducing under-reporting in victimization surveys. Some may argue that the major increases in reporting occur in those crimes with less injury or monetary loss and therefore the advantages of the new screener may be slight. I would argue that the concept of seriousness should not be restricted to utilitarian terms. Events with little physical injury or loss can have substantial psychological or social effects. Victim surveys should measure these events as completely as possible because if the surveys do not capture them no other statistical system will (Biderman & Lynch, 1991).

The Effects of Recall Period Length

There is good evidence from the NCS and other retrospective surveys that the length of the recall period affects reporting of the events in questions. From the earliest experiments with the victim survey method, a substantial recency effect has been observed, that is, more victimization events are reported in more recent as opposed to the more distant months of the recall period (Biderman & Lynch, 1981). In the NCS, 26% of all incidents are reported as occurring in the month most proximate to the interview and only 12% in the most distant month (see Figure 1). Given the rotating panel design of the survey, there are no readily apparent explanations for why reported incidents should not be rectangularly distributed over the recall period, i.e. 16.6% in each month. The most common explanation of this recency effect is that respondents "forget" events in greater proportion as time passes (Cannell, Marquis, & Laurent, 1977). If this is true, then a short recall period would be preferable both for estimation and analytical uses of victim survey data in that we would obtain a more complete recounting of victimization events occurring in the recall period. Shortening the recall period, however, could require substantial increases in sample size to maintain the same standard errors for rate estimates.

Methodological studies done in support of the NCS have attempted to determine the trade-off between shortening the recall period and sample size reductions in terms of total survey error. To this end, reverse record check (RRC) studies using police data have been conducted as well as experiments with varied recall periods. The former were used to support a six-month reference period in the NCS, but methodological flaws in these studies raise doubts about the conclusions drawn from them. The experimental studies suggested that recall periods of less than six months may be desirable, but here again methodological considerations may have resulted in an underestimate of the benefit of shorter recall periods. Reappraisals of the evidence seem to suggest that there is no point at which shortening the recall period is not worthwhile from a total survey error standpoint. That is, the reductions of total survey error are greater than the increases in sampling error (Kobilarcik, Alexander, Singh, & Shapiro, 1983).

Figure 1



Reverse Record Checks and Recall Periods

The Census Bureau conducted three reverse record check studies using police records in Washington, DC, Baltimore and San Jose. In these studies, samples of incidents reported to the police were taken from police records. These samples were structured such that roughly equal numbers of incidents were taken from each month of the recall period. The victims noted in the police reports were located and asked to report on their victimization experience. Reports from the interviews were matched with those from the police records to determine 1) if the incident was reported at all and 2) if the reported incident was correctly dated.

The major conclusions of these studies was that 1) "forgetting" incidents was not the major problem, but the inaccuracy of respondent incident dating and particularly the tendency to "telescope-in" incidents was and 2) a 12 month recall period would not be significantly worse than a 6-month recall period. The authors recommended a 6-month recall period to meet BJS' desire for quarterly reports with accurately dated incidents and more timely annual reports (Biderman & Lynch, 1981).

There are a number of peculiarities of RRCs generally as well as some irregularities in the specific Census tests that tend to underestimate recency effects and thereby minimize the effect of different recall periods. They include:

1.0 A typicality of RRC Events. Crimes that become known to the police are different from those that do not. Moreover, events reported to the police do not exhibit the same recency

slope in the NCS as crimes *not* reported to the police. For events not known to the police, the ratio of events reported in the most proximate as opposed to the most distant month of the recall period is 2.9; while for events known to the police, it is 1.6. Consequently, any effect of recall period length should be muted in RRC studies.

2.0 A typicality of Respondents. RRC respondents are 1) harder to interview and 2) have a much higher victimization rate than the general population. Types of non-response in RRCs are correlated with recency in a way that reduces the recency slope. The proportion non-respondents who refuse to respond (as opposed to those who moved or died) is greater among the more recent rather than the more distant police-reported events. Consequently, there are fewer hard to interview cases in the more distant as opposed to the more proximate months. If respondent performance is viewed as a continuum with refusal as the lower end, then we could extrapolate these data to say that respondents with more recent victimization will include higher proportions of less cooperative persons than respondents with more distant victimizations who can be contacted. This would also contribute to a flattening of the recency slope and an underestimate of the effects of recall period length.

The high victimization rate of RRC respondents increases the probability of multiple events occurring in the recall period and therefore the probability of mismatching target events with other victimizations. Since the probability of multiple events occurring in the recall period is correlated with recency, so too is the probability of mismatching. This will result in the appearance of more complete reporting of events among respondents with more distant target events because events other than the target events will be accepted as the target event. This would reduce the recency slope. This mismatching should also reduce the accuracy with which target events appear to be dated, since non-target events probably occurred at different times than the target event.

In addition to these problems which affect all RRCs, another has been suggested that is unique to the Census studies referenced here. This problem has to do with the difference between the recall period as opposed to the recall interval. The recall period refers to the duration of the period for which a respondent is asked to report victimization experience e.g. January to June of 1990. The recall interval is the elapsed time between the actual interview and the historical calendar period for which the respondent is asked to report (Biderman & Lynch, 1981). If a respondent is interviewed on July 8, 1990, for example, and is asked to report events between January 1 and June 30, then his recall period is January 1 to June 30 and his recall interval is from July 1 to July 8. Most interviews in the NCS are conducted within the first week of the recall interval. Interviewing in the RRCs, however, was extended over a much longer period of time, thereby lengthening the recall interval. In the San Jose test, interviewing did not begin until two weeks after the calendar period for which respondents were asked to report and continued for four weeks after that.

The length of the recall interval can affect the reporting of events in the recall period. The longer the recall interval the greater the chance of "forgetting" or misdating events that occurred in the recall period. Since the recency slope is steepest in the first month of the recall period, "forgetting" explanations would suggest that the longer recall interval would disproportionately reduce the reporting of proximate as opposed to distant events. This, in turn, would flatten the recency slope and lead to underestimates of the effects of differences in recall period length. It is unclear what the larger recall interval would mean if misdating explanations were most appropriate, because the predominant form of misdating is not clear. Forward telescoping from the recall period into the recall interval would result in under-reporting and a flattened recency slope. "Backward telescoping" would result in a steeper recency slope and an over estimate of the effects of recall period length. Most of what we know suggests a predominance of forward telescoping and therefore, likely under-estimation of the effects of recall period length in the RRCs.

Census "Reference Period" Experiments

The Census Bureau conducted a study comparing the effects of various recall periods on reporting in the NCS. Sub-samples of the NCS sample were selected for interviewing using three month and twelve months recall periods. Those not selected into these sub-samples (about 5/6 of the NCS sample) received the standard NCS interview using the six-month reference period. Respondents in the three month recall period group were interviewed twice using a three month recall period before being returned to the NCS sample. Persons in the twelve month recall period group were interviewed once before being returned to the NCS sample.

Table 12: Comparisons of Victimization Rates (per 100) by Recall Period Length for Types of Crime and Demographic Groups

Type of Crime	Total			Total Population	Blacks	
	6-mon.	3-mon.	Diff/S.E.	6-3 mon.	6-3 mon.	Diff/S.E.
Total Personal	6.39	7.82	-5.16 *	-1.43	-2.55	1.23
Violence	1.72	2.17	-3.10 *	-0.45	-1.65	2.09 *
Theft	4.67	5.56	-3.85 *	-0.89	-0.91	0.03
Total Household	11.68	13.50	-3.43 *	-1.82	-0.75	-0.62
Burglary	4.31	4.84	-1.65 *	-0.53	-1.45	0.75
Household Larceny	6.49	7.68	-2.97 *	-1.19	0.50	-1.50

* Significant at the 95 % level (alpha = .05)

When the reporting behavior of the experimental and control groups were compared, the rates reported in the three-month-reference-period group were greater than those for the six-month-reference-period group and the six-month group greater than those for the twelve-month group. The shorter the reference period, the higher the reporting. Reporting rates also differed across the treatments for demographic groups. Victimization rates for blacks in the three-month group were significantly higher than their rates in the six-month group. The same differences across treatments were observed for persons 12-24 years old (Kobilarcik et al., 1983).

The reference period research studies go on to note that "based on a simple mean square error (MSE) calculation ...the 3-month reference period gives a better MSE for estimates of level than does a 6-month reference period....This is in spite of the fact that, within the present NCS budget, using a three-month reference period would roughly double the sampling variance" (Kobilarcik et al., 1983).

In sum, the research on recall period in the NCS suggest that shorter periods are better than longer periods for the accuracy of level estimates and analytical uses of the data. The effects on change estimates are less clear. The preference for a six-month recall period in the NCS seems to have been based upon methodologically suspect reverse-record-check studies as well as a disproportionate emphasis on sampling error. More powerful experimental comparisons of recall periods indicate that shorter periods are preferable. Moreover, the increases in reporting obtained with short reference periods, e.g. 3 months, seem to be worth the tradeoffs in sampling error that would occur when resources constrains prevent increases in sample size.

Conclusion

Victimization surveys have added immeasurably to our information on and our understanding of crime, its causes and its repercussions. They tell us things that police statistics cannot. For all of its strengths, however, the victim survey method is fragile and must be used carefully. The choice of survey design can substantially affect the resulting data. These sources of error should not be ignored for fear of impeaching the credibility of the method. Rather, we should explore these known sources of error to determine their magnitude and direction. We should attempt to understand why they occur and to improve survey designs to reduce them.

The US experience with the National Crime Survey (NCS) has added significantly to the literature on non-sampling error in victim surveys. Since the survey is large and continuous, a great deal of work has been done on the effects of different design features on estimates of the level and change in level of victimization. The results of this work pertinent to screening strategy, recall period and mode of interviewing were discussed in the forgoing sections. Other studies of the error structure of the survey can be found in Biderman and Lynch (1991) and Biderman et al. (1986).

The generalizability of the NCS experience to other surveys is limited by the fact that most victim surveys other than the NCS do not employ rotating panel designs with "bounding" procedures. There is evidence that not using rotating panel designs or otherwise accounting for "telescoping" will result in substantial reporting of ineligible incidents in the survey (Biderman & Cantor, 1984). It is unclear how this feature of the NCS interacts with the other design features discussed here to affect the results of the methodological studies done on the NCS. The effects of recall period length, for example, may not be as great in cross-sectional surveys as they are in rotating panel designs.[9] We can speculate as to the probable effects of these design feature in cross-sectional designs, but we do not *know* what the effects will be.

Whatever the limitations on our ability to generalize from the NCS experience, the development work done on the NCS suggests strongly that cross-sectional surveys that do not attend in some way to "telescoping" will capture many ineligible events. Moreover, it suggests that long, i.e. 12 month, recall periods will result in substantial under reporting. These facts seem to have been ignored as the victim survey method gains popularity throughout the world. Cross sectional designs with year long (or longer) recall periods seem to be the dominant design (Block, 1989; van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1989). While I do not necessarily advocate rotating panel designs as the only solution, some attention must be paid to the measurement errors that we have good reason to believe exist.

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[9] Surveys that employ long reference periods, e.g. 12 months, and cross-sectional designs may benefit from off-setting errors. The long reference period will result in substantial under-reporting while the failure to "bound" the recall period will result in "telescoping" and over reporting.

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Measuring the Effects of Crime in Victimization Surveys

Pat Mayhew

Introduction

An integral purpose of victim surveys is to examine the effects of victimization. This is in part to help classify offences (when a seriousness dimension can be important); in part to consider effects in relation to different types of victims (to see whether some people are particularly hard hit); and in part to offer more information on what 'crime is like' (a matter on which there is generally little to offer in police statistics, or at least the main compilations of these). The main advantage of large-scale population surveys is to offer a balanced view of the impact of *more commonly experienced crime* - in terms of physical injury, financial loss and, to a degree, emotional distress. Surveys can also - if relevant questions are included - examine other effects of crime, in particular, fear of crime and precautions taken by both people victimized themselves, and those who might expect to be.

However, random sample surveys undertaken to measure 'ordinary' household and personal victimization do not cover all crime.[1] And even within their own coverage, they will be of limited use in picking up adequate numbers of victims subject to the most serious and injurious crimes (or at least they will be until a number of surveys have been done which can be combined for analysis purposes). For these groups, special studies of individuals identified through means other than sample surveys can offer better information. To date, such studies have been mainly done by social and clinical psychologists on victims of rape, serious assault, child abuse and domestic violence, and by a few criminologists concerned mainly with victims of robbery and burglary identified through police records (see Mayhew, 1984; Newburn, in press, for reviews). Other than looking at the effects of victims' contacts with the police, random samples of victims will also offer relatively little about the way victims are treated by criminal justice or social welfare systems. Among 'normal' victims, few get seen by non-police agencies, and relatively few get embroiled in court proceedings as a result of their offender(s) getting apprehended or dealt with formally by the courts.

This paper starts by itemising some of the main conclusions about the consequences of crime for victims, in particular conclusions underlined by victimization surveys (Section 2). For illustration, much of the evidence drawn on is from England and Wales, in particular from the British Crime

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[1] Typically, victimization surveys do not measure crimes for which an organisation is the victim (e.g., fraud, shoplifting or fare evasion); nor commercial burglary or robbery. Nor do they count offenders involving drugs and alcohol abuse, consensual sexual offences, or crimes where people may not have been aware that they have been victimized, as in an assortment of frauds. Usually omitted, too, are crime against children.

Survey (BCS).[2] The emphasis is on the direct effects for individual victims of the sort of 'conventional' crime which surveys usually measure. The broader effect of crime on public opinion about law and order - which surveys sometimes also encompass - are not considered since current research throws little light on the complex determinants of public attitudes. Differential risks of crime are also left much to one side, though these are one aspect of the effects of victimization. After a brief overview of the value of victimization survey methods for assessing effects (Section 3), some suggestions are made as to how the effects of crime might be best addressed in questionnaire design, and best interpreted in data analysis (Section 4).

The Effects of Crime: Some Broad Conclusions

The first general conclusion about the effects of crime, which victimization surveys have underlined in particular, is that crime in its most typical form does not usually have serious consequences - at least as judged by the more objective indicators of loss and injury. Thus, if one is a victim, it is most likely to be of a crime which is non-violent in nature. In Britain, for example, offences of theft and damage outnumber personal offences involving violence (including those resulting in negligible injury) by a factor of four to 4:1. Moreover, what generally happens is such as to count as only one of life's many vicissitudes - irritating and inconveniencing as these may be. Methodological research shows, for instance, that past victimizations are often not even memorable enough to be recalled for survey interviewers (see, e.g., Skogan, 1986). In England and Wales, according to the 1988 BCS, only 5% of people in victimized households had to take time off work, and even the more inconvenienced groups - victims of burglary, contact thefts[3], thefts of cars about 15% of whom lost time - absences were generally short. Most violent crime[4] did not result in any serious physical injury: in 15% of cases did the victim need any sort of professional medical treatment, and in 1% of cases the victim was admitted to hospital. Some 23 out of 1,000 adults in the year (half of them young men aged 16-30) were victims of incidents which fell under the heading of 'street crime' - the focus of particular public and media concern. And offences involving property theft or damage quite often incurred relatively small losses; some 28 in 1,000 households had a burglar in the home in England and Wales in 1987 (a few more than once admittedly), though in nearly a third of incidents the loss from theft or damage amounted to less than £ 25.

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[2] The BCS has now been carried out three times, in 1982, 1984 and 1988. It samples a large, representative sample (n = c. 11,000) of the adult population of England and Wales to assess the level of household and personal crimes experienced, whether or not reported to the police (see, e.g., Hough & Mayhew, 1985; Mayhew, Elliott, & Dowds, 1989). A fourth sweep of the BCS is currently underway.

[3] Contacts thefts in this paper refer to robbery, attempted robberies and 'snatch thefts'. They exclude other thefts from the person in which stealth was the major element.

[4] Violent offences are taken to comprise: wounding, common assault, robbery and sexual offences.

Table 1 summarizes some details the extent of loss and damage for a variety of property offences. (The currency is pounds sterling, and the values are at 1987-88 prices.) In terms of the initial 'take' for different crimes, stolen vehicles[5] had - as one might expect - the highest value, followed by burglary. Nearly three-quarters of victims of thefts from (or off) cars and motorcycles had theft and damage losses under £ 100, while victims of robbery or snatch theft generally suffered low financial losses, though - as will be seen - these were distressing incidents.

Table 1: *Some aspects of the costs of property crime*

	VICTIMS OF				
	Burglary with entry %	Theft of vehicle %	Theft from vehicles %	Robbery, snatch theft (1) %	Other property crime (2) %
VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN					
Under £25	31	5	52	72	79
£25 - £99	20	5	25	19	13
£100 - £249	14	8	14	9	4
£250 - £499	13	19	17	-	2
£500 +	22	63	2	-	1
VALUE OF PROPERTY DAMAGED					
Under £21	68	66	77	91	82
£21 - £99	18	8	16	5	13
£100 - £249	8	7	5	5	3
£250 - £499	4	9	2	-	2
£500 +	3	11	-	-	1
VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN OR DAMAGED:					
Under £25	24	3	46	66	60
£25 - £99	17	5	25	22	27
£100 - £249	17	7	14	8	7
£250 - £499	15	17	9	4	4
£500 - £1000	14	21	4	-	1
£1000+	13	47	1	-	1

NOTES:
1. Robbery, attempted robbery and thefts from the person involving a 'snatch'.
2. Includes attempted property offences.
3. Weighted data. Source: 1988 British Crime Survey (core sample)

[5] Vehicles comprise cars, vans, motorcycles and other motorised two-wheelers, Motorcycles etc. account for about a seventh of vehicles stolen and were targets in about one in twenty thefts from vehicles. They are included as their value can often be as great as older cars, and items stolen from them as costly.

The BCS (in common with other surveys) shows that those who have property taken do not usually get it back (the exception being stolen cars), and while by no means all victims with financial losses are insured (or make a claim even if they are), recovery and compensation make some difference to the picture of *net* losses. Net losses were similar for victims of both car theft and burglary: about a quarter reckoned they were out of pocket by £250 or more.[6] Table 2 shows details.

Table 2: *Net losses from property crime*

	VICTIMS OF				
NET LOSSES	Burglary with entry %	Theft of vehicle %	Theft from vehicles %	Robbery, snatch theft %	Other property crime %
Less than £25	39	40	54	73	71
£25 - £99	22	18	28	21	21
£100 - £249	15	19	12	6	5
£250 - £499	11	11	5	-	2
£500 - £999	8	7	2	-	1
£1000+	5	5	1	-	1
Total	100	100	102	100	101
Unweighted n	383	282	1357	61	3500

NOTES:
1. Victims were asked to assess the value of property stolen and damaged, and also to assess total costs after recovery and insurance payments. Net losses are the sum of property and damage losses, taking into account property recovered or compensated for.
2. Percentages do not total 100% because of rounding.
3. Weighted data. 1988 British Crime Survey (core sample).

As a counter to highlighting the relatively small proportion of victims who suffer high financial loss and serious injuries, it must be said that the *absolute* number of victims so affected form a not insubstantial pool. The criteria against which to judge serious impact is, naturally, a matter of choice, and the numbers of victims meeting these will vary from country to country. But for England and Wales in 1987, for instance, there were over 500,000 incidents of theft and damage

[6] Owners of stolen vehicles are usually insured, though many victims do not claim - presumably because they recover their vehicle in a condition that does not justify a claim. The fact that victims carry some costs themselves will also partly reflect insurers' condition that owners carry a proportion of any loss, and partly differences between victims' and insurers' valuations.

involving household property where the net losses to victims totalled more than £250. In the United States, where admittedly violent crime is commoner than in European countries, some half a million people a year sustain injuries in violent victimizations which require emergency room or hospital treatment (Harlow, 1989). Such figures provides a baseline for considering how many victims might be seriously harmed; some of those outside the pool, of course, will also see themselves in similar terms.

The second conclusion borne out by victimization surveys is that assessing the effects of victimization means facing the rather difficult issue of victim culpability. Victimization risks are heightened by many structural and 'lifestyle' factors over which the potential victim may have little control: example, having to park a car on the street in an inner city area, having to leave the house empty in the day because everyone works or is at school, or having to travel to work at night on public transport. At the same time, victims' behaviour is clearly implicated in providing the basic 'opportunities' for crime. Disregard for basic household and vehicle security adds to risk in a way that provides some justification for the claim that the victim "asked for it". And in relation to personal offences, too, it is clear that victims do not always conform to the passive, innocent stereotype. Evidence from the BCS shows, for instance, that those most at risk of assaultive offences are heavy drinking young men frequently out at night; and nearly half of those who admitted to having committed assaultive offences themselves over the past year were victims of such offences in the same period (Gottfredson, 1984).

Third, emotional upset following victimization may be greater than may be guessed from its objective consequences - perhaps because crime violates moral values and, unlike many other misfortunes, is not accidental. Victimization surveys have considered the emotional effects of being a victim less than they have injury and financial losses, and indeed sound evidence of the extent of emotional upset is less available than some of the more emotive pro-victim writings suggest (cf. Fattah, 1989, 1991).

The 1984 and 1988 sweeps of the BCS addressed (in slightly different ways) the emotional impact of crime for samples of about 4,000 'typical' victims. When asked in the 1988 survey whether they personally had been emotionally affected, nearly four out of five victims answered affirmatively, one out of three saying they had been emotionally affected "very much" or "quite a lot" (see Table 3). Robbery and snatch thefts were the most upsetting, with burglary slightly more so than vehicle thefts, assaults and threats.

For this sample of typical victims, the most likely emotional response was one of anger: overall, nearly half of victims said they had been angry at what had happened. Fear, sleeping difficulties, and distress were mentioned in roughly equal degrees, though by fewer than those who were simply angry. Of those who admitted to being emotionally affected, nearly half said it had only been for a matter of hours; a quarter were upset for a few days. On the base of *all* respondents, somewhat under a fifth were affected for at least a week.

Table 3: *Emotional effects of crime*

	No effect %	Very much %	Quite a lot %	Just a little %	Total %	Unweighted number
Burglary with entry	24	28	28	19	99	344
Theft of vehicle	35	20	25	20	100	247
Theft from vehicle	47	11	14	28	100	1156
Robbery, snatch theft	10	45	31	14	100	59
Other property crime	46	12	15	26	99	2405
Assaults (1)	37	21	23	20	101	423
Threats	33	18	24	25	100	286
All offences	42	15	18	25	100	4920

NOTES:
1. Assaults: wounding, common assault and sexual offences.
2. Victims were asked whether they, or anyone else in the household, had any emotional reactions after the incident. Responses above refer to respondents themselves.
3. Percentages may not total 100% because of rounding.
4. Weighted data. 1988 British Crime Survey (core sample).

Such answers about the degree of emotional upset pose a 'pint pot' dilemma. Is it to be seen as half full, or half empty? Should one highlight the minority of victims who are distressed for some time, or the majority who are able to shake off the experience and get on with life. One perspective on this is to weigh emotional effects against the practical impact of victimization, and to balance the two in terms of what victims feel was the worst aspect overall of their experience. Data from the 1984 BCS (the question was not repeated in the 1988 survey) shows that victims who had their cars or motorcycles stolen reported most practical difficulties, particularly in terms of being inconvenienced. Many victims - 58% of the 'typical' victims identified in the 1984 survey - reported no practical difficulties at all, and even for those who had a burglar in the home the figures was 41%. On balance, more victims of property offences (with the exception of burglary) reported practical than emotional effects; for contact crime, the picture was in reverse.

The balance between emotional and practical effects is further illustrated by what was cited in the 1988 survey as the *worst* effect of victimization (see Table 4). For the full sample of 'typical' victims, the inconvenience and nuisance were what upset them most, particularly those, who experienced vehicle offences. The next most common worst effect was the anger. The fear and shock experienced at the time weighed with one in ten victims overall, though with three in ten victims of contact thefts and threats. One in ten victims were also most put out by financial losses. Heightened fear of what might happen in the future also weighed with one in ten victims, though much more for victims of contact thefts. The sense of invasion of privacy was very common for

burglary victims. Roughly separating practical effects (inconvenience and financial loss) and the various emotional effects, shows that overall emotional effects were rather more often a worse aspect of being a victim than practical implications. Overall, 52% of the BCS 'typical' victims cited one or other emotional effect (including anger), against 36% citing practical difficulties. Emotional impact was the worst aspect particularly among victims of burglary, contact thefts, and - not surprisingly - violence and threats. For one in ten victims of violence, actual physical injury took precedence over emotional impact.[7]

Table 4: *The worst problems of victimization*

	Burglary with entry %	Theft of vehicles %	Theft from vehicles %	Robbery, snatch theft %	Other property theft %	Violent offences %	Threats %	All offences %
Inconvenience, nuisance and other practical problems	14	55	45	6	35	14	7	30
Anger	7	11	21	9	19	10	11	16
Fear/shock at the time	13	6	3	27	5	19	30	11
Financial loss	10	10	15	5	13	2	<1	10
Fear/insecurity afterwards	23	5	5	40	8	13	12	10
Other emotional effects	8	10	5	11	9	14	18	10
Invasion of privacy	33	8	8	6	7	<1	<1	7
Sentimental loss	6	2	3	4	3	1	-	3
Injury involved	1	-	-	8	<1	12	<1	2

NOTES:
1. Question: "Thinking about everything, any loss, damage, injury, inconvenience and any reactions afterwards - what would you say was the worst thing about the incident from your point ofview?" Multiple responses were allowed.
2. The percentages do not total 100% because of multiple response and "other answers" not being shown.
3. Weighted data. 1988 British Crime Survey (core sample).

The findings above bear out a *fourth point: that fear of crime is often heightened by being a victim, particularly when this involves contact with the offender, or a burglary.* This is not to say that fear is an inevitable consequence of victimization: nine out of ten 'typical' victims in the 1988 BCS said fear was not a emotional reactions they had; and for some, actual victimization may reduce fear

[7] Practical effects subsume inconvenience and financial losses. Emotional effects cover invasion privacy, fear/shock at the time, fear/insecurity afterwards, sentimental loss, anger, and other emotional effects.

as the offence is likely to be less serious in reality than in previous imaginings (cf. Cozijin & van Dijk, 1976; Sparks, Genn, & Dodd, 1977). Nor is it the case that patterns of victimization account well for the distribution of fear of crime in general: many more people are fearful than direct experience would sustain; and the groups who are most fearful are often less likely than others to fall victim. Nonetheless, there is some reason to think that victims who are less physically and socially well-equipped to deal with crime become more fearful when their fears are actually realized (Maxfield, 1987; Skogan, 1977); and even petty crime for these groups might reinforce fear, signifying that worse things are to come.

Fifth, it seems inescapable that the material, physical and emotional effects of crime strike hardest at disadvantaged groups. Leaving aside the point that (partly because of where they live), the unemployed, single-parent families, lower-income groups and ethnic minorities face higher risks of crime, the consequences of victimization are likely to be worse for them. For instance, elderly victims are more likely to need medical attention when they are injured (e.g., Harlow, 1989; Ministry of the Solicitor General, 1983), while lower income burglary victims have less insurance cover (e.g., Lewis & Mo, 1986). In an analysis of the data on the effects of victimization from the 1988 BCS, Mawby (in press) showed that those who were most emotionally affected by what happened to them were those: on lower incomes; in subsidized housing (overlapping groups); women (though they might be more prepared to admit upset than men); non-whites; and those in single person households or in one-parent family situations. Perhaps contrary to what might be thought, victims who had some knowledge of 'their' offender were, on a variety of measures, more likely to be upset than when a stranger had perpetrated the offence, reflecting to a degree the greater likelihood of serious injury when the victim knew the offender. The results suggest a tendency for elderly victims to be more emotionally upset, but not to any marked degree. Older women appear worse off on some measures, but this seems as much the result of living alone, as of being old. The most distinctive feature of effects in relation to age was the emotional robustness of young adults.

Sixth, the need among victims for specialised, intensive and largely professional help in coping with the immediate aftermath of victimization should be kept in perspective. Such assistance is clearly necessary in some cases - particularly among victims of serious personal and household crimes, among some multiple victims who may not come to official notice at all, and among domestic violence victims who are less well-served by normal social support. However, the burden of research evidence (see, e.g., Chesney & Schneider, 1981; Maguire & Corbett, 1987) is that many victims may need more in the way of routine practical assistance, moral support, and reassurance about personal safety. Family and close friends are important for meeting these needs, but rather little assistance is directly sought from either specific victim support services, or - other than for medical problems - from welfare services. To an extent, this may be because knowledge of available provision is poor, but often it will be because coping can be done 'in-house'.

The BCS has taken up this issue. The 1984 BCS showed that some 17% of victims felt there was some "information, help and practical advice" they needed but had not received, but the biggest

proportion of these (a quarter) wanted crime prevention advice. The same number said they would have liked to have been contacted by a Victim Support Scheme, higher among lower socio-economic groups and particular types of victims (e.g., those experiencing burglary and contact thefts).[8] Those who would have appreciated help were more likely to have called in the police, though there was a minority of non-reporters who also said that they would have liked contact. It was clear that victims who were receptive to the idea of assistance from VSSs would have appreciated a quick response. Nearly half said a call would have been most helpful on the day after the incident; a third would have preferred one on the day of the incident itself.

Using a different approach, the 1988 survey showed that among victims who reported to the police (thus a group who will have generally speaking have experienced more serious offences), about one in ten were offered help by the police additional to that in the course of their investigations, or another agency. Another one in ten asked for some help. All, told, 17% had help either because they asked for it or were approached with an offer of assistance (in the main from VSSs).[9] The figure was higher for victims of contact crimes. Not all those with help at hand felt it had been useful. Those who had experienced less serious contact crimes were more likely to have seen the assistance as actually beneficial than those exposed to more serious contact crime; on the whole, though, contact crime victims felt more had been achieved than did property crime victims. The police were the most common supporting agency, though victims also mentioned housing departments, medical services, VSSs, and (for property crime victims) Neighbourhood Watch. The majority of those who had not been given any help by the police or other outside agencies did not feel they wanted help. Of those who did, just over a third said help from the police would have been useful; a fifth mentioned a VSS. Mawby's analysis (in press) shows that by and large support is being reasonably well-targeted in that those helped were more emotionally affected by what had happened to them.

Seventh and finally, the way the police routinely respond to those who offences come to their notice appears an extremely important aspect of the immediate aftermath of victimization experience. Three aspects of the police response have been consistently borne out by victimization surveys. First, lack of information given by the police about the progress and - if relevant - the outcome of the case has consistently been cited as a source of victim dissatisfaction. Secondly, much research suggests that when the police are called in, this is less in the expectation of that the offender will be 'bought to book' than for administrative purposes and to elicit reassurance and the recognition

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[8] In England and Wales, Victim Support Schemes (VSSs) recruit and train volunteers to offer information, help and advice to victims of crime. Such schemes have existed for about 15 years and have grown rapidly. Schemes receive most of their referrals from the police, and either visit the victim or send a letter offering sympathy and the offer of a visit. The focus of the victim support movement in Britain is on short-term work with victims across the broad range of all those who report to the police. This contrasts with counterpart schemes in, e.g., the USA which concentrate on the most grievously affected victims.

[9] Among 1988 BCS victims who had reported to the police, 2.7% had asked for or been offered help by a VSS. Of these, the majority were burglary victims.

that something untoward has occurred. Thus, victims want the police to take the offence seriously at the initial contact and to give due time and attention to the 'rituals' of investigation. Third, and not unrelated to this, is the fact that victims expect the police to attend to their calls, and are dissatisfied if this does not happen. (There is no clear evidence in England and Wales at least that victims want a very fast response; rather, they seem to want to know when a call will be made, and have the promise kept roughly in time.)

These, then, are some of the main conclusions relevant to the impact of victimization particularly as they have been revealed in victimization surveys. This is not to say that the matter rests here: rather, that these are impacts identified mainly from a particular research methodology. Other types of research have identified other consequences: very briefly, for instance, that victims are not treated very sympathetically or efficiently if they appear in court; and that *typical* victims are unlikely to be much helped either by restitution from the offender in the form of monetary repayment or services rendered, or by state compensation programmes. (The obvious limitation to restitution, for instance, is that it applies only where an offender has been caught.)

Overview

Many studies of 'special' groups of victims have overemphasized serious types of crime (e.g., rape or serious assault), and have inevitably drawn conclusions about the effects of crime which are odds with the 'normal' complexion of victimization. The chief merit of victimization surveys is that they are the best vehicle for assessing what usually happens when people fall victim to other people's offending. Victim surveys can assess financial losses, time off work, and degree of injury. The contours of such practical and emotional needs as arise from 'normal' victimization can be sketched in - though this may only be lightly. It can be difficult do justice to the nuances of reactions to crime, which will depend on such factors as personality, whether there was any feeling of being in some way responsible for what happened, and variations in victim's circumstances - e.g., the availability of support from family and friends, and the resources on hand to cope, in particular financial ones (cf. Fattah, 1991). Nor is there typically much time for probing into needs and effects, which some respondents may anyway be unable or unwillingly to articulate in what is likely to be a relatively formal interview. Assessment of any negative consequences of the way victims are treated by the criminal justice system ('secondary victimization') can be best pursued with the relatively large numbers of victims who will come into contact with the police as a result of reporting their crime. It will be inappropriate to try and assess in victimization surveys any secondary effects victims may have from dealings with the courts or service agencies, since few will get thus involved.

Recommendations

What, then, are the questions most worth asking, in what way, and for what analytical purpose? I outline some points below, bearing in mind the particular focus here on the impact of crime on the elderly.

a. *Physical injury*. The degree and type of physical injury to victims is often needed to distinguish different types of assault, and surveys have often added questions on visits to doctors and/or hospitalisation. There is little to be lost from this, although the small numbers of victims with serious injury will not justify detailed questions.

b. *Financial losses*. Losses from both theft *and* damage need to be covered (and it is better to ask the absolute value of loss than to put in monetary bands, which makes for subsequent problems of averaging). Some questionnaires cover net losses taking into account insurance repayments, compensation, and recovered property. This is useful, but results are less clean-cut than they might be since differential time periods will have elapsed since victimization: some victims will still be awaiting settlement at the time of the interview, and others may recover property after it. Restricting 'net loss' questions to those whose victimizations were earlier rather than later in the recall period may be worth considering, though numbers will be lost. A longer recall period might appear helpful for assessing financial losses and recovery rates more reliably, though this brings added problems on terms of monetary inflation, and selective remembering of more serious incidents.

   It appears difficult to assess *relative financial losses*. The most obvious way of doing this would be to set losses against household (or personal) income, though income data can be hard to get (it is in Britain at least) and may not be particularly accurate.

c. *Sentimental value*. There is no harm in asking about the loss of property which has sentimental value. For the elderly, such losses may be particularly important.

d. *Practical effects*. It is rather easier to cover the practical effects of victimization than the emotional effects. The list of practical effects would need to cover: inconvenience, financial difficulties, getting repairs done, and so on. (Not many questionnaires, incidentally, cover gratuitous damage in burglary. It is a common myth that burglars often soil the home, though the BCS puts the figure at only about 3% of burglaries in England and Wales).

e. *Emotional effects*. The BCS has tried to assess these, though it is unlikely to have done justice to the range of symptoms have been identified in more specialized studies: anger, shock, depression, heightened fear, guilt, shame, reduced ability to cope with normal routines, and associated physical malaise. In the BCS, it was considered useful to ask about the effects of

what happened on other household members as well as the respondent since even relatively minor offences could be predicted to upset children and others in the family.[10]

f. *Support*. There is merit in trying to tap the extent to which support is available and used. The 1988 BCS took up what *agencies* were involved, and whether the help they provided was useful. However, these questions involved a rather cumbersomely long list of potential agencies, and the need to distinguish between whether they had been asked for help, or had offered it. Moreover, the numbers identified who had contact with particular agencies (e.g., Victim Support Schemes) was too small for any reliable interpretation of quality of service. Nonetheless, a valuable aspect of 'agency support' questions is to get an indication of whether particular groups (the elderly for one) want more help than others.

It is probably more straightforward (and arguably more pertinent to most victims) to cover *informal social support*. What degree of involvement was there from family and friends? Was the help they gave appreciated? What needs could informal support not fulfil? In this context, one should try and tease out the relative importance of age as distinct from family structure. As said, BCS analysis suggests that there might be as much a 'living alone' effect as an 'elderly effect' with respect to response to victimization.

g. *Control for offence seriousness in considering effects of victimization*. An analytical problem in considering the impact of crime is that different groups may experience offences that vary in seriousness terms, thus confounding any simple analysis of who is most affected. Some control needs to be made for this. At the very least, some distinction could be made between more and less serious personal and household crimes, using offence category to assess seriousness (e.g., aggravated versus simple assaults). An alternative would be to harness subjective ratings from victims on the seriousness of what happened, though there will inevitably be some overlap between judged seriousness and emotional impact.[11]

h. *Consider the cumulative effect of victimization*. Although 'effects' questions are usually asked about individual incidents, there is a case for taking account of multiple victimization in assessing the impact of particular crimes. People who have experienced several crimes, whether of the same type or not - e.g., those in inner cities - may appear more affected than the individual incident seems to warrant.

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[10] Moreover, if the design of the questionnaire is such that one representative of the household reports on incidents which can be assumed to affect the household as a whole (e.g., burglary, vehicle thefts, household vandalism), the selected respondent may not see themselves as the primary victim. A husband answering about the theft of his wife's car is a case in point.

[11] In the 1984 BCS, victims were asked to judge the seriousness of 'their' offence on a 20-point scale. (They were also asked what priority the police should give to an incident like their own.) The top and bottom ends of the scale were anchored to a very serious and a relatively trivial offence respectively. Pease (1988) reports results.

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How to Optimize the Use of CATI in Victimization Surveys?

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What this Paper is about

So far, the main reason for using CATI in crime surveys may probably have been cost considerations (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990, p. 6; Killias, 1989, p. 23, 1990). Given the low frequency of serious victimizations in any population, the costs per interview will have obvious implications on the sample size and, therefore, on the reliability of the results. These advantages of CATI are so obvious that one easily overlooks certain features of this method which should be carefully considered in order to optimize the quality of the research design - and, perhaps even more so, in order to avoid unfortunate surprises. It is important to realize that CATI is not only cheaper, but that it is a different method with its own characteristics. The greater anonymity of the interview situation, e.g., will make it the method of choice in research on deviant and sexual behavior, AIDS prevention, and other sensitive issues (Zeugin, 1992).

This paper is no defense of CATI. It rather summarizes a few points which proved to be critical in former research. In one word, it is on how crime surveys through CATI should be designed. Its empirical base is, to a large extent, this author's bad experience.

Potentials of CATI Questionnaires

Probably the most important advantage of CATI is its computer-based questionnaire. This offers the following benefits:

a) **No recoding** of the questionnaires is required. This eliminiates a source of error.

b) **Inconsistent answers** ("typing errors" by the interviewer) are, to a large extent, detected and eliminated by the system.

c) The **questionnaire** may be as complex as one might wish. In face to face interviews - and even more so in the case of written questionnaires - the number of filters is rather limited (Block & Block, 1984, p. 158). Beyond a certain point, even a well-trained interviewer is no longer able to handle it without mistakes or disturbing interruptions. In the case of the survey in German- and Italian-speaking Switzerland, the CATI questionnaire contained 669 variables - for an average length of the interviews of less than 30 minutes (Killias, 1989, p. 31).

d) The complex structure of the questionnaire allows to include many **control questions**, e.g. concerning the "legal" characteristics of an offense, the circumstances where it occured, etc. In case of robbery, one could, for example, insert the following control questions:
   - were you personally the victim, or was it somebody you live with?
   - how many times has this happened to you personally?

   About the last incidence:
   - where did it happen?
   - could you tell me when it happened, approximately? (this year/last year/last five years etc.)
   - did they really use force, or were you threatened?
   - with what instrument/weapon etc. were you threatened (attacked)?
   - did they really steal something from you? what? of what value?
   - have you been injured? what were the consequences?
   - who was the offender (sex, age; origin, known/unknown, etc.)?

e) Such **control questions** allow:
   - making the respondent repeat certain characteristics of the offense, which helps to avoid wrong classifications, e.g. concerning attempts vs. completed offenses. (In the case of the Swiss Crime Survey, up to 24 percent of the classifications made at the level of the screening questions turned out to be inaccurate, given the answers to the control questions.)
   - identification of the victim (often respondents indicate victimization of other family members);
   - locating the incidence in space and time (see below).

f) The possibility to make the questionnaire as complex as one might wish is particularly important in the case of a crime survey. In such a survey, we try to get an awful lot of (relatively short, often trivial) information from very few people (Killias, 1989, p. 31). Indeed, CATI may be the most appropriate way of data gathering whenever we need **short, precise information** on certain facts (as those asked in the examples given above); whenever we try to get the respondent's feelings about complex, weakly structured issues (for example: "What do you think is important for you in your life?"), CATI (just as the telephone in an everyday situation of this kind) may be less appropriate than a personal talk (Frey, 1983).

g) In any victimization survey, victims of serious crime will be a minority. Non-victims do not answer all the detailed questions on the circumstances of past victimization; they will - except for the screening and perhaps a few control questions - answer only those items which concern **independent variables**. Of course, statistical analyses do not become more precise if all of the 75 percent non-victims in a given sample answer all items concerning independent variables. Therefore, the program can be arranged in such a way that only one non-victim in three is selected by chance for a complete interview. This approach yields 25 percent completely interviewed non-victims which can be compared with the 25 percent victims. Whene-

ver there is a questionnaire with a large number of independent variables, savings of time and money can be considerable through this procedure.

Concentration of Interviewers in a CATI Laboratory

Another feature of CATI is the centralization of interviewing in a laboratory. This, again, has typical advantages and inconveniences.

a) For one, this feature allows permanent **supervision** of interviewers. They have, for example, sometimes a tendency to "simplify" or to "abbreviate" more complex questions, such as e.g. the screening questions. The permanent supervision allows the stopping of such distortions before they grow out (Killias, 1989, p. 30; Skogan, 1981, p. 27). For sure, the researcher sleeps better with face or written interviews: in those cases, he never will know what really went on during the interviews.

b) The potentials of supervision will prove beneficial only if the researcher takes the time to assist permanently the interviewers in the lab. Therefore, the **contract** with the firm conducting the interviews should entitle the researcher to be permanently present.

c) If the **researcher** is personally available in the lab, he can intervene, besides supervising as defined above,
   - assisting interviewers in classifying unclear incidences;
   - deciding how "unforeseen" cases should be handled (there always will be such cases!);
   - explaining to reluctant respondents the purpose of the survey, answering their questions, e.g. on the use of the data gathered, etc. (Our staff did so in many cases during the surveys conducted in Switzerland; the impact on the response rate might be substantial, although we do not know to what extent);
   - helping with training and motivating interviewers (the latter is most important to keep the attrition rate low, see below).

d) Since the number of interviews performed per interviewer is usually much higher in the case of CATI compared to face to face interviews, **interviewer effects** (Skogan, 1981, p. 28) might be much more important in case of CATI, too. A frequent change of interviewers is, therefore, desirable. Then, however, permanent training, supervision, and motivation of interviewers would become much more important throughout the survey. The presence of the researcher can be most beneficial in such cases (to the pollster's firm as well).

e) The **researcher** will, by assuming some responsibility in supervising the interviewers, have the unique chance to see how the questionnaire worked, and particularly to realize what did not work as intended. (Our staff came to realize, during the ICS, that e.g. the question on the

acceptance of community service orders had been misunderstood by many Swiss respondents due to a lack of familiarity with this type of sanction. Pretests do not always allow identification of such problems in advance!).

f) The **number of interviewers** working at the same time should not exceed what one researcher may be able to supervise and assist efficently. Six to eight interviewers may be the upper limit.

The Response/Attrition Rate

For some scholars, CATI became synonymous with low response rates, but generally, response rates obtained with CATI are just as high as those of face to face interviews (Frey, 1983). However, a certain number of **precautions** should be taken.

a) The selection of **telephone numbers** should be done in a way which allows checking at any time the size of the attrition rate, according to the several possible causes of non-response (nobody answering the phone, no possibility of communication due to linguistic difficulties or high age, refusal). Whenever the staff of the pollster's firm informs you that there is "no problem", you really should be worried!

b) A good way to keep this problem under control from the beginning is to fix in the **contract** with the pollster's firm a maximum level of the attrition rate (several options can be worked out in this context).

c) In the case of face to face interviews, the interviewer will invest most of his time finding the respondent. Therefore, once he gets there, one can expect him to give his best to obtain cooperation from the respondent. In the case of CATI, however, the interviewer has to contact up to 12 eligible persons per hour: this is, in a psychological rather than a physical sense, a very tiresome task. After some time, even good interviewers will need to be **motivated** in order to continue to give their best. And for the pollster's firm, it is, economically speaking, more interesting to switch to the next eligible phone number instead of investing a lot of time to get cooperation from a reluctant respondent. These features of CATI will inevitably increase the attrition rate if no special precautions are taken to avoid this.

d) The **sample size** may also have a possible effect on the response rate. In the ICS, for example, there has been a significant correlation (Spearman's Rho) of -.741 between the sample size in the 12 CATI countries, and the response rate. Whenever a huge number of interviews has to be performed within a very short time, the pollster's firm will inevitably be obliged to use many badly trained, unexperienced, or notoriously inefficient interviewers. However, if the length of the period of time allowed to perform the complete task is reasonably long, i.e. if the average number of interviews to be conducted per work day does not

exceed certain limits, the pollster's company will be able to assign only its very best interviewers to this task. This is tentatively illustrated by the correlation of -.462 (n.s.) between the number of interviews per day and the response rate[1]. Thus, bigger is not necessarily better.

e) The importance of selection, training, and supervision/motivation of interviewers is well illustrated by the German part of the ICS. In Germany, the overall response rate was 30 percent, but it varied among interviewers between as high as 70 and as disastrous as 10 percent (Kury, 1990). In other words, the **response rate** problem is primarily an **interviewer problem** and may not be related to German culture or CATI as such. In a pilot survey in Heidelberg (Germany), Baurmann, Hermann, Störzer and Streng (1991) got, for example, a response rate of 71 percent through CATI. In German-speaking parts of Switzerland the response rate (through CATI) was equally 71 percent (Swiss Crime Survey, Killias, 1989, p. 29). Therefore, there is no reason to believe that CATI will necessarily go along with lower response rates.

f) The way of **selecting the respondent** within the household has also an impact on the attrition rate. Theoretically speaking, a strictly random selection of the household member to be interviewed is preferable; in practical terms, this is not so obvious. Experience shows that the need to obtain cooperation of a second respondent, as well as the frequent need to call back in order to reach him, increases the attrition rate by several percent points. On balance, one loses then (at the level of the response rate) what one may gain in theoretical randomness. This is particularly ironic in the case of crime surveys which contain many questions concerning the household as such, and not the individual member. In other words, one loses randomness at the household level without obvious gains at the individual level.

Problems with the Location of Incidences in Space and Time

Many researchers are very concerned about under-reporting in crime surveys. However, **over-reporting**, particularly through telescoping effects, may be just as serious a problem whenever surveys are supposed to assist in policy making. To illustrate this point, earlier work in Tokyo (Kühne & Miyazawa, 1979), Stuttgart (Stephan, 1976), and Zurich (Clinard, 1978), for example, suggested that burglary rates in these cities are about twice as high as in American inner-city areas according to the NCS. Many surveys also showed much higher rates than those suggested by police statistics, even if only offenses said to be reported to the police are taken into account. How can we prevent this?

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[1] This correlation may be weaker than expected due to the way the number of days available for the fieldwork in the 12 countries (where the ICS has been carried out through CATI) has been computed: in lack of information on the number of effective days of fieldwork, the whole period from the first to the last day of interviewing has been considered.

a) As we know, **telescoping** effects are a dramatic source of distortion in this area, particularly as far as serious victimizations are concerned. One first step in addressing this problem is to strictly separate the location of incidences in space and time from the screening questions (Sparks, Genn, & Dodd, 1977).

b) CATI allows this to be done very smoothly due to the possibility of adding **follow-up questions**. Whether the screening questions should contain any time limit may be a matter of choice. As long as the bounding and panel design of the NCS is unavailable to Europeans, however, there should not be a time limit just as long as the reference period one is interested in. The follow-up question should read as open as possible, e.g.: "Can you tell me when that happened?" If the respondent is unable to give a straightforward answer, one may add: "Was it in (1991, i.e. the last year), or was it before, or was it in 1992?" In a recent experimental study conducted by the Nederlands Instituut voor Maatschapij en Markt Onderzoek (NIMMO) of the University of Amsterdam, screening questions inspired by this model produced much lower prevalence rates of victimization than those where respondents were asked about experiences "during the last 12 months"(Scherpenzeel, 1992). The difference was roughly 3 to 1 for robbery, 2.5 to 1 for burglary, and 1.5 to 1 for bicycle theft, suggesting a larger telescoping effect for more rare and serious victimizations (as one might have expected). Therefore, allowing a long reference period within the screening questions, combined with a follow-up question concerning the more precise location of a reported incident in time, helps to control much of the telescoping effects which, otherwise, will lead to unreasonably high estimates of victimization rates.

c) The same procedure can be applied to the geographic location of an incidence. Again, a possible **geographic** limitation (which the researcher may wish to apply for this analytic purpose) should not appear in the screening questions. The latter are difficult enough in themselves - being ultimately a kind of legal definition.

d) A frequently used argument is that more remote incidences will often be **forgotten**. The experience of the ICS and the Swiss Crime Survey shows that this is indeed the case with more trivial offenses, but not necessarily with burglary and other more "impressive" victimizations. In the case of burglary, for example, the five year rates are almost exactly five times the 1988 rate in Norway, Finland, and Switzerland, i.e. in three countries with low crime rates; in countries with higher prevalence rates of burglary, the rate for the last five years is approximately three times the 1988 rate. This suggests that in areas with rather low crime rates, as presumably in the former GDR, and for serious victimizations, one might get even fairly reliable estimates over a five year recall period.

e) Whatever our view on this may be, there is no doubt that a longer reference period will increase substantially the number of serious victimizations in the sample. This will allow many analyses on potentially interesting issues, such as the reporting behaviour, the impact of independant variables such as life-style, and geographic distribution of crime. Since the

survey of the KFN is supposed to grasp the differences between the **new federal states** and the old ones, the latter aspect may prove particularly important. A long reference period is also necessary whenever the long-term consequences of victimization and different coping strategies are to be assessed.

f) In the case of the Swiss Crime Survey, the approach described here resulted in estimates of the number of victimizations which came reasonably close to those derived from **police statistics** (Killias, 1989, pp. 45-52; once only offenses were considered which the victims said the police did know about). In other words, the notorious tendency of crime surveys outside the USA to yield unreasonably high estimates of victimization is not beyond redemption.

A Few Suggestions Inspired by Curiosity

The survey of the KFN offers several possibilities for conducting highly stimulating **experiments** if it were performed through both, face to face interviews and CATI. Let me end with a few suggestions how one could take advantage of such a design.

a) The assignment of respondents in the former FRG to either the CATI or the face to face version could be done at random. We would then get a perfectly **experimental design**, allowing us to answer certain critical questions concerning the differences between the two survey methods (response rate, "productivity", internal validity, etc.). Such an experiment had been conducted more than ten years ago by Evans and Léger (1979) in Canada and, more recently, in the Netherlands by Nederlands Instituut voor Maatschapij en Markt Onderzoek (NIMMO) of the University of Amsterdam (Scherpenzeel, 1992). The Canadian as well as the Dutch experience suggest that crime survey results are not much affected by different survey methods - contrary to what many people tend to assume.

b) Given the large size of the sample, a few other experimental tests could be made, e.g. concerning the way respondents are being approached. Nowadays, almost everybody seems to be convinced that an **"advance letter"** will allow the response rate to increase substantially (cf. for example Bruinsma, van de Bunt, & Fiselier, 1992). I am not so convinced about that, since many CATI surveys did get excellent response rates without such a letter, and the increase of the response rate in the few cases known used to be all but dramatic (Kury, 1990). Given the considerable costs of such a letter, particularly if the sample is large, a little experiment at the pretest stage might prove useful and cost-efficient.

c) Crime surveys suffer, so far, from a too exclusive focus on verbal information. In the case of the Swiss Crime Survey, a second (face to face) interview had been conducted with 95 victims and 95 non-victims (matched according to sex, age, and place of residence; Killias, 1989, p. 24); although that second interview served mainly to assess the reliability of the data gathered

through CATI, it offered the chance to collect (tacitly) a certain number of non-verbal pieces of information on the respondent and his place of living.

d) Of the information gathered during this second interview, the following items turned out to be particularly helpful:
   - The difficulty (or the ease) with which the respondent's dwellings might be broken into (as assessed tacitly by the interviewer during the interview) turned out to be highly correlated with the risk of **burglary** (Killias, 1989, p. 97).
   - The respondent's physical shape (i.e. the information that the respondent might be an "easy" target, as seen from a robber's or assailant's perspective) has been highly correlated with fear of crime. A verbal question concerning the respondent's self-assessed ability to resist or escape in the hypothetical case of an attack, asked in the next wave of the survey through CATI, produced much lower correlations (Killias, 1989, pp. 166-167). It is probably the visible **vulnerability**, rather than the objective health of the respondent, which influences fear of crime.

e) A few non-verbal items as those in the German face to face questionnaire, combined with verbal questions on the same topics in the CATI version, might offer a bulk of fascinating and possibly surprising results. Why should not research, from time to time, offer some surprising new insights which we really might not have thought of before?

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GERMAN SURVEY STUDIES

Crime in East and West Germany
- Results of the First Intra-German Victims' Study

Helmut Kury

Introduction

Victims and their consideration in the legal process have been known for a long time. During the course of the development of criminal law, the victim has, however, been pushed more and more into the background, and the courts have concerned themselves increasingly, and almost exclusively, with the sentencing process and the sanctioning of offenders. Only during this century has the victim of crime been newly discovered. According to empirical criminological research, this took place essentially after the Second World War (Schneider, 1981, p. 683). The victim was "*discovered* and afterwards it was unclear how their obvious neglect could have so long gone [sic] without attention and remedy" (Geis, 1990, p. 255).

Since the rediscovery of the victim of crime, and the development of victimology, surveys of victims have become an integral part of empirical victimology research. In particular, the great victims' studies of the United States of America, which began in the 1960s, contributed heavily towards the development of empirical research on victims (see summary Sparks, 1981). Pioneering investigations, particularly concerning methodology in this area of research, were carried out in the form of various preliminary studies when American investigations first started (see e.g. Biderman, 1967).

Today there are, both in Europe and worldwide, a range of, in some cases, highly structured victim studies (see the recent contributions in Kaiser, Kury, & Albrecht, 1991). In the Federal Republic of Germany, victim surveys were carried out in the seventies and eighties by the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law - Criminological Research Group (MPI), including an international comparative victim survey (see summary Kaiser, 1991). Further regionally based victim surveys have been carried out in Germany by Baurmann, Hermann, Störzer, and Streng (1991), Boers and Sessar (1991), Pitsela (1986), Plate, Schwinges, and Weis (1985), and Schwind (1991). The first Germany-wide victim study, in which a representative sample of N = 5,000 people was taken, was carried out at the beginning of 1989 within the framework of the International Victim Survey (see van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990) by the Max Planck Institute working with the Criminalistic-Criminological Working Group of the Federal Crime Department (BKA) (see Kury, 1991a).

The issue of the development of crime in communist countries, particularly those in Europe, has always been of great interest, not only for West European countries, in particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, but also for non-European industrial states. The number of opportunities

to carry out comparative criminological and victimological investigations over the last few years has increased due to the opening up of borders to the Eastern Bloc countries. For the Federal Republic of Germany, the opening of the border, and, latterly, the reunification of both states, resulted in an extraordinarily interesting and unique opportunity for comparing the former GDR, as a socialist-communist led state, with the former FRG as a democratic-capitalist orientated country. In order to establish the differences between the two German states, and, in particular the process of reorientation in the former GDR, it was important to carry out empirical, social scientific investigations as soon as possible after the opening of the border.

Below, initial findings from the victim study carried out by the MPI in collaboration with the BKA are presented (see also Kury, 1991b, 1992). For reasons of space, we shall restrict ourselves to the following areas:

- description of the sample and methodology,
- results on frequency of criminal activity and an assessment of the development of crime,
- findings on reporting behaviour,
- satisfaction with the police, and
- fear of crime.

Sample and Methodology

In order to ensure comparability of the results with the first international worldwide victim survey (van Dijk et al., 1990), we decided to use the questionnaire developed for that exercise, in terms of the categories of offences used. Above all, we wanted to achieve a comparison with the telephone interviews, which were carried out within the framework of this international study undertaken in the former FRG in 1989, using a random sample of N = 5,000 respondents. The questionnaire was amended and supplemented to meet the specific requirements of the situation in the former GDR.

The questionnaire is structured as follows: after some preliminary questions on size of family, in particularly the number of members over 14 years of age, there follow some questions on the ownership of motor vehicles, motor cycles, bicycles, etc. Then come the individual questions on the 11 types of offence. The interviewee will asked each time if, for example, they, or with respect to some offences, another family member, have been a victim of one of the 11 types of offence during the last five years. If yes, then in which year, and how often was the person a victim. The 11 types of offence concern themselves with the following crimes, and groups of crimes:

1. theft of a motor vehicle,
2. theft from a motor vehicle,
3. vandalism of a car,
4. theft of a motorcycle,
5. theft of bicycle,

thefts in the category "car" i.e. theft of bicycle

6. breaking and entering (including theft or attempted theft),
7. unsuccessful attempt at break in,
8. robbery,
9. general theft,
10. sexual harassment,
11. physical assault or threat of it.

In addition to the occurrence of these offences, it was established where the offence took place, whether it was reported, and if not, why not, how high the damages were, whether the perpetrator of a personal assault had a weapon, the relationship between the victim and the offender and the circumstances of the offence (use of violence, etc.).

In addition, as is normal with victim surveys, information on fear of crime was collected and the work of the police was assessed. Finally, the survey instrument contained questions on opinions of victims' support schemes, on the situation concerning alcohol and illegal drugs, as well as attitudes to criminal sanctions. Questions about the interviewees' living conditions, education, profession, income, age and size of community concluded the questionnaire.

The collection of data was carried out by an experienced, commercial opinion research institute during the second half of 1990. Because of the low incidence of telephones in the new Federal States (former GDR), a telephone survey would have been pointless. Therefore, the data was collected through face-to-face interviews. A random sample of 5,000 people aged 14 and over were questioned in the new Federal States (NFS) and a further 2,000 people in the old Federal States (OFS). The sample in the new Federal States was selected on a random basis from local data bases, broken down by local authorities and the size of local communities. For the approximately 800 sample points, a random walk method was used. In the old Federal States, the basis and method for collecting information was the constituency - based figures used in the elections for the Federal Parliament in 1987.

What is essential to note regarding the validity of survey data is the level of drop off, that is, refusal rate. Table 1 gives an overview in this respect. From the gross sample of N = 10,860, N = 1,269 (11.7%) dropped off for reasons not related to the subject matter; it can be assumed that they did not corrupt the results of the study (streets could not be found, residence uninhabited, etc.). From the sample of N = 9,591, N = 7,026 interviews were actually carried out, amounting to a response rate of 73.3% (74.6% in the NFS and 70.1% in the OFS). There were no important differences between the two samples in terms of demographic variables, such as age and sex. It can be safely assumed that possible distortions due to drop off will be small, so the results

obtained are valid and meaningful. Also, in comparison with other international victim surveys, a relatively high response rate was achieved in our study (see Kury, 1991a, 1991b), which constitutes the first victim study in the new Federal States, and the largest of its kind that has hitherto been undertaken in the FRG as a whole.

Table 1: *Description of sample (comparison NFS/OFS)*

Size of sample achieved and reasons for non response	**NFS**		**OFS**	
	N	%	N	%
Gross sample	7,500	100.0	3,360	100.0
Non-response due to neutral factors:	799	10.7	470	13.9
Given street/house number could not be found	27	0.4	54	1.6
Residence/flat uninhabited	-	-	61	1.8
No member of target group living in the household	5	0.1	84	2.5
Sample points or individual addresses not approached	719	9.6	223	6.6
Other non-response factors	48	0.6	48	1.4
"Cleaned sample"	**6,701**	**100.0**	**2,890**	**100.0**
Systematic non-response factors	**1,681**	**25.1**	**860**	**29.8**
Met no-one at house	335	5.0	182	6.3
Failed to meet targetted interviewee despite several attempts	215	3.2	122	4.2
Targetted interviewee temporarily ill	173	2.6	53	1.9
Household refused to give any information	390	5.8	205	7.1
Targetted interviewee not residing at home during the period of the investigation	120	1.8	64	2.2
Targetted interviewee refused to give interview	448	6.7	234	8.1
interviews carried out	**5,020**	**74.9**	**2,030**	**70.2**
Interviews which cannot be evaluated	**21**	**0.3**	**3**	**0.1**
Evaluated interviews	**4,999**	**74.6**	**2,027**	**70.1**
Taking out those cases of non-response caused by neutral factors, percentages are based on the "cleaned sample".				

Frequency of Offence, and Evaluation of the Development of Crime

Whilst no fewer than 32.6% of interviewees in the OFS were victims of one or several of the 11 offences at least once during the 5 year survey period (1986 - 1990 inclusive), at 28.2%, the figure in the NFS was markedly lower. The victimization rate in the NFS over the last five years, of which approx. four fall into the time of the former GDR, was in total lower at the end of 1990 than in the OFS ($Chi^2 = 13.71$; $df = 1$; $p < .01$).

Looking more closely at these different victimization rates for West and East Germany based on the 11 areas of offending, it is apparent that the victimization rate in the NFS is lower for each offence than in the OFS, with the exception of theft of a motorcycle, bicycle and attempted breaking and entering. The differences are, however, quite slight, and for this reason should not be over-emphasized. As far as the average number of victimizations per victim is concerned, there is a statistically significant difference between the eastern and western federal states in terms of repeated victimization, which is markedly less frequent in the NFS compared with the OFS. Over the five year period, 28.1% (N = 396) people in the NFS had been a victim of one of the 11 types of crime stated earlier more than once, whereas the figure for the OFS is 36.2% (N=239; $Chi^2 = 18.23$; $df = 2$; $p < .01$).

Since the opening of the border, a more or less sharp increase in crime in the NFS has increasingly been reported in the media of the united Germany, and to a lesser extent, also in professional journals. Sometimes, reports containing quite dramatic and frightening projections are made, which often, given a lack of accurate data, amount to no more than speculation. In our study, we asked those interviewed whether the victimization reported by them over the last five years took place in the four years before the opening of the border, or in the short year between the opening of the border (9 November 1989) and survey (September 1990). We did this because, over the 5 year period in question, assuming a constant crime rate, one would expect approx. 4/5 (80%) of the offences quoted taking place before the opening of the border, and approx. 1/5 (20%) thereafter. Taking into account the fact that recall problems become greater as the period asked about gets longer, this difference will, understandably, be reduced. However, the recall rate should be less important when talking about relatively serious offences (such as car theft, robbery or actual assault), because relatively infrequent, but serious crimes tend to be remembered for longer.

From Figure 1, we can see clearly that the share of victimizations in the NFS in all 11 areas of offence for the period after the opening of the borders is clearly above, indeed more than double what was expected. Thus, for example, for damage to a motor vehicle in the NFS, 43.7% of victimizations took place after the border was opened, for robbery 43.2%, theft 42.7%, actual assault 39.2%, and car theft 38.5%. These differences can no longer be explained by the recall rate, but must instead be put down to an increasing crime rate for these offences in the NFS since the border was opened. A comparison of the development in the NFS with that in the OFS shows at first glance a sharper increase in the victimization rate in the NFS. Since the change, of the 11

types of offence reported on, the number of victimisations in the NFS is higher than in the OFS for 7 offences. In West Germany, the rate of increase is actually higher for bicycle thefts, breaking and entering, attempted breaking and entering, and physical assaults. As can be seen in Table 2, the differences between the NFS and the OFS are only statistically significantly different for bicycle theft (higher share in the West), and theft of personal possessions (higher share in the East). If we take into account the comparatively low number of victims, it is clear that the differences between East and West Germany ought not to be over-estimated.

Figure 1: Frequency of crime NFS/OFS Breakdown of those stating 1 offence before and after 9 November 1989



The impression of a sharper increase in crime in East Germany since the opening of the border is also borne out in the individual assessments of the development of crime given by those citizens interviewed in the NFS. Concerning opinions on the development of crime before the opening of the border, i.e. in the former GDR, 53% (n = 2,325) are of the opinion that the crime rate remained about the same, and 37.7% (N = 1,653) believe that it increased somewhat during that period. For the period after the opening of the border, the situation is reversed: now, only 22.8% (N = 1,035) are of the opinion that the crime rate has remained the same, whereas 71.1% (N = 3,220), nearly three quarters, believe that crime has risen (Chi^2 = 3,194; df = 9; $p < .01$).

Table 2: *A comparison of victimization rates in the NFS/OFS before and after the opening of the border*

Offence	New Federal States		Old Federal States		Significance		
	before 9 Nov 1989	After 9 Nov 1989	Before 9 Nov 1989	After 9 Nov 1989			
	N	N	N	N	Chi^2	df	p
Theft of car	8	5	13	6	0,16	1	.69
Theft from car	172	81	120	48	0,56	1	.45
Damage to car	181	140	136	93	0,49	1	.48
Theft of motor cycle	65	30	9	4	0,00	1	.95
Theft of bicycle	401	150	132	72	4,67	1	.03*
Break in to home	78	27	34	16	0,67	1	.41
Attempted break in to home	70	40	21	13	0,04	1	.84
Robbery/attempted robbery	21	16	25	9	2,18	1	.14
Theft of personal effects	146	109	98	46	4,52	1	.03*
sexual harrassment/assault[1]	36	19	29	13	0,14	1	.71
violent assault/threat	98	63	45	39	1,21	1	.27
[1] Women only							

Concerning the future, 10.3% (N = 475) of the citizens of the NFS think that the crime rate will remain the same, and 86.8% (N = 3,988), clearly more residents in the NFS for their share of the area, expect an increase than those in the OFS. In fact, 40.5% (N = 691) are of the opinion that crime will remain the same, and 53.7% (N = 918), considerably fewer than in the NFS, are of the opinion that crime will rise in the future. Relatively few residents in both areas expect a decrease in crime (NFS = 1.3%; OFS = 2,6%). The differences between East and West Germany are highly significant (Chi^2 = 815; df = 3; $p < .01$). These interviewees' own impressions on the development of crime after the opening of the border coincide with the established trend of a higher increase in the crime rate in the NFS, as compared with the OFS for the same period (see also Institute for Practice Orientated Social Research [Institut für Praxisorientierte Sozialforschung], 1991).

Reporting Behaviour

The number of officially (i.e. to the police) registered crimes depends on whether the victims of crimes report them to the police. "Victims of crime are the first, and proportionately the greatest screeners of events that enter the criminal justice decision-making process" (Gottfredson, 1986, p. 256). The simplest interpretation for why the police are not informed is that victims think that nothing will happen, and often they are right (Skogan, 1976). One of the most frequent reasons why crimes are not reported are, according to victim surveys, the insignificance of the damage, and the meaninglessness of the offence.

As far as the situation in socialist countries, including the former GDR, is concerned, the special relationship between the police, as the agency of control and surveillance of the state and the general public plays an important part. Bienkowska (1991, p. 52) states: "Unquestionably, in some socialist states including the GDR, a very strict control is exerted by the state over its population. The police force acts more like an agent of the state coercion than one which protects citizens from crime. There may be a general unwillingness therefore to report to the police, and crime may therefore be significantly underreported."

The data from our study clearly show that the citizens of the NFS report a smaller proportion of crimes committed against them compared with the residents of the OFS. Exceptions to this are offences of theft of a motor vehicle, general theft and physical assault. The number of reported cases for these offences is higher in the NFS (see Figure 2). A surprisingly high discrepancy in the reporting rate in both areas of Germany can be seen in theft from motor vehicles (NFS: 45.7%; OFS: 86.5%), damage to a motor vehicle (33.0%; 54.6%), breaking and entering (69.5%; 84.0%), and robbery (51.4%; 70.6%). Although we are talking here about relatively serious crimes, particularly breaking and entering and robbery, citizens of the NFS report relatively few of these crimes to the police. Sometimes at least, conditions laid down by insurance companies can have an influence on reporting rates. In order to receive damages from an existing insurance policy, it is normally necessary to get a note from the police which states that you have reported an offence. The reporting rate could therefore be strongly related to trust in the police and criminal prosecution bodies. Especially here, however, we would expect continuing differences between the two areas because of the considerable differences in, and after effects of, their respective societal conditions in the past.

Figure 2: Reporting Behaviour by type of offence "Did you then report it to the police?"



Satisfaction with the Police

The open and continuing discussion, which became possible after the opening of the border, and which has also been carried out in the press, about the sometimes questionable role of the police in the GDR's past has obviously further shaken trust in the police. According to Steinke (1990, p. 670), the events of October 1989 put a burden on police/public relations, as before. The police are distant from ordinary citizens, which hinders collaboration. Within the police, this has led not only to a reduction in personnel, but also to massive uncertainty. In addition, considerable uncertainty has evolved out of a lack of confidence in judicial procedures due to moving to the little known legal system in the FRG and people's lack of practice and experience in it. The public have been informed about the partial inability of the police and the criminal justice system to function effectively through widely circulated press reports.

This growing dissatisfaction with the work of the police can be confirmed from our data. Citizens of the NFS are clearly less content with their police than those in the OFS, whether before or after the opening of the border. What is particularly striking is that the level of satisfaction with

the work of the police in the NFS has continued to decrease since 9 November 1989 (see Figure 3). 31.1% (N = 1,509) of interviewees were completely or largely satisfied with the police in their area before the opening of the border, but for the period afterwards, this fell to only 25.3% (N = 1,214). For the same period after the "change", 16.7% (N = 800) considered the work of the police to be either quite or very bad. For the period before the change, this figure was 12.8% (N= 623).

In comparison with this, 52.0% (N = 1,008) of OFS citizens are very or quite satisfied with the work of the police, and only 3.8% (N = 73) considered their work was either quite or very bad. These results basically confirm earlier results from surveys on citizens' attitudes towards the police in West Germany. A positive impression of the police has generally been found in earlier West German studies (see latterly Dörmann, 1991, p. 77 ff.). Whilst the picture of the police in the public eye in the OFS is relatively good, it is relatively bad in the NFS, and even worse after the opening of the border than before (for further details, see Kury, 1992).

Figure 3: Satisfaction with the Police (NFS) before and after 9 November 1989



Fear of Crime

An important element of victimization studies is the recording of the population's fear of crime. However, the results are by no means consistent. One fundamental reason for this can be found in the equivocal way in which fear of crime is defined and recorded. The findings on the relationship between a victim's experience of crime and their fear of crime are particularly contradictory. A large proportion of researchers are of the opinion that experiencing crime as a victim does not necessarily lead to an increased fear of crime (see Boers & Sessar, 1991; Villmow, 1979). Schwarzenegger (1991, p. 712), using multi-variable analysis (regression analysis), comes to the conclusion that previous experiences of being a victim of crime are not directly, but indirectly related to fear of crime, via cognitive perceptions of the risk of being a victim: people who have previously suffered from being the victim of a crime more frequently express a negative prognosis of being a victim than non-victims, which, in turn is positively correlated with fear of crime.

Fear of crime can (considerably) reduce the quality of life of citizens and presents a criminal and socio-political problem (Schwind, Baumann, Schneider, & Winter, 1989, p. 45). Fear of crime results not only in an emotional burden for citizens, but can also lead to a considerable reduction in activities, mobility and consequently quality of life. Because of this, it must surely be considered an important duty of the state to ensure "that citizens can not only actually walk through the streets at night, but also believe that they can" (Kerner, 1986, p. 155).

Rightly it is pointed out that fear of crime is, understandably, dependant on subjective assessments of the police and their effectiveness (see, e.g. Conklin 1989, p. 104f.). Schwarzenegger (1991, p. 713) found that those people who viewed the work of the police as very good or good, were not so frightened of crime. Ultimately, the police is the particular state institution whose duty above all others is to protect the citizen from crime. As noted above, the police in the NFS are viewed less positively than those in the OFS. Taking this into account, it can be presumed that, with the increase in crime in the new Federal States and the relatively negative assessment of the police, fear of crime among citizens has also increased.

Data on fear of crime was only indirectly generated by our study (see also the van Dijk et al. investigation 1990, p. 77 ff.). Thus, as is common in other studies, questions were asked which gave an assessment of how safe interviewees felt in the area in which they lived. Additionally, the interviewee was asked to give his/her assessment of the likelihood that they would be the victim of any of 10 types of offence during the next 12 months. On the basis of the established and persistently discussed increase in crime in the NFS, it was, as previously explained, expected that feelings of safety in neighbourhoods would be assessed as lower than in the OFS; this was also confirmed by our data. Thus, 17.3% (N=859) of inhabitants in the NFS assess their neighbourhood as either quite or very unsafe in comparison with only 13.0% (N=263) of the inhabitants in the OFS. At the same time, 11.8% (N=587) of interviewees in the NFS (OFS: 13.9%; N=281) judge their area to be very safe, and 71.0% (N=3,533; OFS: 73.1%; N=1,480) as

safe. The differences established between the OFS and the NFS are statistically highly significant ($Chi^2 = 22.99$; $df = 3$; $p < .01$).

A further inference on fear of crime could be drawn from the assessment of the probability of being a victim of crime during the 12 months following the day of the interview. The risk of becoming a victim of crime was assessed with regard to the 10 offences of varying degrees of seriousness listed below:

- becoming the victim of a road traffic accident,
- robbery / theft on the street,
- being beaten up,
- being pestered,
- being sexually assaulted (only asked of women),
- of being raped (only women),
- burglary,
- theft of a motor car,
- car broken into, or damaged, and
- theft of a bicycle or motorcycle.

Here too, the findings on feelings of safety in the neighbourhood are confirmed: in these 10 types of offence, the inhabitants of the NFS assess the probability of being a victim of crime in the future as statistically significantly higher than those in the OFS.

The assessment of neighbourhood safety, which enables us to draw inferences about the fear of crime, also depends on the status of the victim. People who have repeatedly been a victim of a crime feel both in the old and the new Federal States, equally insecure in their neighbourhood as those who have only been victimized once. The differences are greater in the new Federal States than in the old, but they are statistically significant in both areas (NFS: $Chi^2 = 21.53$; $df = 6$; $p < .01$; OFS: $Chi^2 = 16.32$; $df = 6 < .05$; see Table 3). Further, those who have been the victim of serious crimes, particularly violent crimes, estimate the safety of their neighbourhood as lower than those who have been the victim of a property or traffic offence. This was also greater for the inhabitants of the NFS, but the trend for those from the OFS was still of considerable significance.

The results point to a connection between the frequency and the severity of victimization and the fear of crime: those who have been more frequently and more seriously victimized, appear to have developed a higher fear of crime, a result which is not surprising even from a theoretical point of view. At the same time, it must be noted that, for example, life in a high crime area increases the risk of being victimized as much as it simultaneously influences the perceptions of safety in the same area (through which fear of crime is indirectly realized). In a further evaluation, the influence of intervening variables such as age and sex will be tested (see Kury, Richter, & Würger, 1992).

Table 3: *Perceptions of neighbourhood safety and its dependence on the number of victimizations (comparison NFS/OFS)*

Frequency of victimization	NFS									
	Total		very safe		quite safe		quite unsafe		very unsafe	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Once	1007	*100*	73	*7,2*	705	*70,0*	208	*20,7*	21	*2,1*
Twice	284	*100*	17	*6,0*	176	*62,0*	80	*28,2*	11	*3,9*
3 times and over	109	*100*	2	*1,8*	68	*62,4*	37	*33,9*	2	*1,8*
Significance	$Chi^2 = 21.53$ df = 6 $p < .01$ **									
Frequency of victimization	OFS									
	Total		very safe		quite safe		quite unsafe		very unsafe	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Once	421	*100*	52	*12,4*	293	*69,6*	72	*17,1*	4	*1,0*
Twice	154	*100*	9	*5,8*	99	*64,3*	41	*26,6*	5	*3,2*
3 times and over	85	*100*	8	*9,8*	53	*62,4*	21	*15,7*	3	*3,5*
Significance	$Chi^2 = 16.32$ df = 6 $p < .05$ *									

Discussion

The merging of the two former German States is an "historically unique and outstanding event" (Allerbeck, Esser, Mayer, Scheuch, & Tack, 1991, p. 6). Because of this, it is no wonder that increasing numbers of social scientists are using this unique chance to follow and understand processes of societal change and restructuring. At the beginning of 1990, the Max Planck Institute for Criminal Law - Criminological Research Group (MPI) in Freiburg, together with the Criminological Research Group of the Federal Department for Crime (BKA) began to prepare and conduct a large study of victims in both former German states. The study was planned and carried out by the MPI and the BKA as a part of the world wide Victim Study (see van Dijk et al., 1990; Kury, 1991a). By using the survey instrument adopted in this Victim Study, it will be possible to compare data. Because of the relatively high sample of N = 4,999 interviewees in the NFS and N = 2,027 in the OFS, it will be possible to obtain relatively meaningful results on the situation regarding victims, particularly given the comparatively high response rates of 74.6% in

the NFS and 70.1% in the OFS. This means the findings will be representative. In comparison with other victims' studies, which likewise carried out personal interviews, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, our response rate is very high (see Kury, 1991a).

With regard to the 11 offences or types of offence, of which 5 are vehicle-related offences / thefts of bicycles, the number of victims was lower in the former GDR, with the exception of motorcycle theft, bicycle theft and attempted breaking and entering. With respect to bicycle and motorcycle theft, these findings can be put down to lower standards of security against theft in the eastern Federal States. In the western Federal States, bicycle and motorcycle thefts are also frequent offences, and this has led, in the last few years, to cycles being, through locks, etc. more efficiently and more often safeguarded against loss. Similarly with respect to the more frequent incidence of attempted break-ins, an important factor is the fundamentally inferior security in houses in the eastern part of Germany.

The often reported increase in crime in the former GDR can be confirmed by our study in so far as the majority of offences recorded by us since the opening of the border in the NFS has shown a trend towards a higher victimization rate than in the OFS. This factor alone shows us that the increase in crime in the east of the country is actually faster than in the west. It can be deduced from this that the citizens interviewed in the former GDR have experienced a much sharper increase in crime for the period after the opening of the border in comparison to the period before, or in comparison with those in the former FRG for the same period. Nearly three quarters of those interviewed from the NFS (71.1%) are of the opinion that crime has increased since the opening of the border. Also, concerning the future development of crime, considerably more citizens of the NFS expect an increase, compared with those living in the OFS (86.8%; 53.7%). Without doubt, the partly sensationally put together press reports, particularly from the West, could have played an important role here. Not surprisingly, our victim data show above all a clear increase in crime in the NFS since the opening of the border. In every criticism of the construction of the former GDR's crime figures (see Baier & Borning, 1991; von der Heide & Lautsch, 1991) "there surely remains in spite of this, an acknowledgement that there is a considerable difference in the crime situation compared with other western European States". (Borning, 1991, p. 23).

This different crime situation is also explicable. According to Borning (1991, p. 26) the differences in crime are in fact to be found in the different societal bases. Criminal tendencies in a "commando economy" receive less opportunity to develop. In addition, opportunity structures for committing crimes are clearly worse in the undeveloped GDR economy. Furthermore, the lower financial capacity of GDR citizens precludes some crime, or makes it less lucrative, which leads to a corresponding reduction (for example, in drug related crimes, break-ins, etc.). The relationships between politics and society were clearly different in the former GDR from those in western industrial nations, such as the FRG. Thus, informal social control functioned relatively well in the former GDR. In addition, and this should not be under-estimated, there existed a clearly repressive state power, which expressed itself above all in a larger number of police per head of

the population: before the opening of the border, there was one police officer for every 317 inhabitants in the FRG whereas, in the GDR, it was more than two (1:140-150). Borning's (1991, p. 28f.) explanation for the lower crime rate in the GDR is connected to their different system of morals and values, without doubt a very important consideration. "The realization of and compliance with social norms was relatively high for a large proportion of the population and constituted a significant societal process. A relatively safe feeling of protection from crime was an established value of individual and societal condition."

The number of officially registered crimes depends essentially on the reporting behaviour of the population. Readiness to report a crime is by no means constant, but varies with social change. Reporting behaviour is additionally influenced by attitudes towards the police and trust in the criminal justice system. The lower reporting figures established in our study for the majority of the offences recorded in the NFS will surely be partly attributable to different conditions of insurance. Thus, there is clearly a higher reporting rate in the OFS for thefts from motor vehicles, damage to motor vehicles, breaking and entering and robbery - crimes commonly covered by insurance. In order to make an insurance claim, an offence must usually be reported to the police, and confirmed in writing.

On the other hand, citizens of the former GDR are generally less satisfied with their police than those from the former FRG. This alone could account for the difference in reporting rates. For the period before the opening of the border, nearly every third citizen of the GDR (31.1%) graded the work of the police as good or very good, whereas for the period after 9 November 1989 this figure was merely one in every four people (25.3%). No less than 16.7% assessed the work of the police for this period as quite or very poor. In comparison, in the OFS, a relatively high level of satisfaction with the police was shown. More than half (52.0%) judge the police to be very good or good. A mere 3.8% grade the work of the police to be quite or very bad.

On the basis of the clear increase in the number of crimes subjectively experienced by citizens of the NFS, an increase in fear of crime is also to be expected. Because the area fear of crime, which is highly complex, was only considered in our study indirectly in connection with the investigations of van Dijk et al. (1990), only a few limited statements can be made here. At 17.3%, more inhabitants of the NFS consider their neighbourhood as quite or very unsafe, than in the OFS, (13.0%). Particularly in the NFS, there was a clear relationship between the degree of victimization and the feeling of safety in the area. The more serious the crime, that is the more the perpetrator violates the privacy of the victim, that is directly injures (physically) or damages the victim, the more unsafe the neighbourhood will, understandably, be perceived, and the higher the fear of crime will be. Thus, 77.0% of victims of vehicle related offences (car crimes, etc.) consider their neighbourhood to be very or quite safe. For victims of property crimes, this figure is only 68.7%, and for victims of crime against the person, only 62.5%. These differences also exist in the OFS, but to a lesser extent. These results are confirmed by other victim studies.

The comparative victim study between the old and new Federal States of Germany presented here - the first of its kind - brought many interesting results, of which only a few can be presented here as a brief overview. Firstly meaningful, comparative data on the crime situation, particularly in the NFS, are presented here, which help to neutralize the many prejudices and horror stories reported in the press, and also to some extent in specialist scientific publications.

It was to be expected that, after the opening of the border to the GDR and the annexation of East Germany to the former FRG, not only the economic system and the citizen's standard of living would be brought into line with western standards, but also the burden of crime. Why should it be any other way? There were no convincing theoretical explanations available. The significantly lower crime rate which existed in the former GDR before the opening of the border will change, i.e. crime will increase, and, in the long term, reach the level of the old FRG. That this increase has begun is shown by our study. Nevertheless, at the end of 1990, the end of our data collection period, the crime rate in the NFS was still markedly lower than in the OFS. It cannot be discounted that in the future, the crime rate in the NFS may "overshoot" that of the OFS. It will depend on the other opportunity structures in the NFS, and the extent to which they facilitate special categories of criminal activities. Value systems are likely to play an important role here. It has been stressed by Borning (1991, p. 28), that "it was unnecessary for personal protection from crime to develop as it should because of the lower crime rate. This gives cause for concern that, when crime rises quickly, human adaptation, which usually functions quickly and well, may be subject to a certain lethargy, predestinating the 'typical citizen of the GDR' to being a victim of crime." Also according to Borning (1991, p. 29) "the incidence of crime in the NFS will, in the short or long term, reach the same level as in the area which takes it over. Perhaps this process will not manifest itself in a gradual alignment, but temporarily as an 'increase above the norm' in the old Federal States."

Since so much is undergoing radical change in the new Federal States and development is in full swing, comparable investigations should be carried out at regular intervals, in order to gain further insight into the link between societal conditions and the emergence of, and contact with, criminal behaviour. Empirical criminology has a unique chance here to broaden its state of knowledge using this "natural experiment" of the coming together of the two German states.

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Crime Rate Trends Before and After the End of the German Democratic Republic . Impressions and First Analyses

Klaus Sessar

Let us imagine a fully structured and internationally recognized political system, with all the ingredients of a state: with a constitution and laws based on it, a Government and administration, a judiciary and a strongly secured and guarded border, so that it also had its own identifiable population. We are speaking about the German Democratic Republic (GDR), founded in 1949, which, without any parallel in the history of states, disappeared voluntarily, without outside pressure, from one second to the next, by becoming a part of the Federal Republic of Germany.

This was in october 1990. Since then, criminologists from East and West Germany have been trying to understand and interpret the crime situation before and after the collapse of the socialist system. We know of the rather low crime rate in the GDR. We also know of the highly efficient network of social control by which individual initiatives were mostly suffocated, including, as one might assume, the commission of crimes. More recently, the crime rate has been increasing, while the old social control system has been removed. So, is there a relationship between crime and crime control? It is not as easy as that. A closer look reveals a number of highly differentiated insights of criminological and victimological importance. Some of these will be demonstrated by using official and informal sources as well as data from a crime survey.

It is advisible, however, to start with some aspects of the socio-psychological situation in East Germany to give a theoretical background to this discussion of conformity and crime.

Theoretical Backgrounds

At the moment, many discussions are taking place as to whether the GDR was a state committed to the "rule of law" (Rechtsstaat; see Rode, 1991), or a police state (see Wolfe, 1992, pp. 4-5). If one takes as one essential criterion the practical lack of legal control over the acts of the State or the Party (and the lack of the citizens' legal protection against the acts of the state or the party), then the GDR was a state not committed to the rule of law. If one considers as another essential criterion the omnipresence, not only of the police, but also of the Ministry of State Security with approximately 90,000 officials and many, many more unofficial associates, with whose help society was both controlled and simultaneously managed, then the GDR was a police state (Wolfe, 1992, p. 88, "The question ... whether the GDR was a police state, clearly has an affirmative answer"). Perhaps we can leave these questions open for the purposes of our discussion. In any case, the GDR must be defined as an intrinsically *authoritarian and dictatorial system*, with only a democratic facade consisting of elections, parties, parliament, and the like. As in all other

countries of Eastern Europe, the state was in reality governed by the one party, in our case by the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED), the parliament being nothing other than an acclamation machine, with canned applause for the power elite's decisions. The society was not only controlled by the police and the State Security but also by the schools, youth centers, trade unions, companies, and even neighbourhoods (neighbourhood watch meant something different in the East from in the West).

The *judiciary* was part of the socialist system in the sense that it was the instrument, or the weapon, of the system (see Schöneburg, 1991, p. 104). There were a number of judges and prosecutors who tried to avoid the Party's expectations and requirements for a severe sentencing practice when people displayed unlawful opposite opinions or demonstrated against the state, for example, by trying to leave their country without permission. But in general, the system could rely on the judicial authorities (for example, a citizen who had attached a bumper sticker "40 years UNO-Human Rights" to his car was sentenced to 16 months imprisonment because of "impairment of state activities", § 214 Penal Code). They consisted of legal professionals who had internalized the role of the law as the instrument to combat the class enemy or the state enemy (it is remarkable that the Attorney General of the GDR was responsible for the legal training of prosecutors at the University of Jena). The state courts were supported by a system of more than 30,000 social courts in commercial enterprises or residential areas (so-called Konfliktkommissionen and Schiedskommissionen) with about 300,000 members (lay persons, not professionals). They had, amongst other things, to judge minor criminal cases referred by the prosecutor's office, the decisions having real legal consequences. The social courts were an expression of the idea that social conflicts, which were deemed illegal under the criminal justice system, should be primarily settled in the social domain (see Ewald, 1991, pp. 93-95; Wolfe, 1992, p. 10). Another aim was self control with the help of self education. Because deviant behaviour was very quickly defined as threatening, it could happen that the smallest misdemeanour could lead to considerable stigmatization and long lasting supervision at work or school. In other words, the social courts were not infrequently more controlling than the state courts.

The purpose of *school education* was to instil the socialist personality, which presupposed the suppression of individual characteristics should they not fit into this picture. Punctuality, industry and tranquility were official virtues, whilst conformity and obedience were the means for establishing a silenced society. Since the parents were both gainfully occupied, an impressive network of nursery homes and kindergartens existed in which controlling educational styles dominated the securing of the state's didactic purposes (see Maaz, 1990, p. 34).

On the other hand, the education of youth was directed against "the enemy", which was mainly capitalism and fascism. Behind this, however, was a theory. The GDR associated anti-fascism as a consequence of historical experience with anti-capitalism as the dominating state doctrine. Capitalism and fascism were often considered the same, and that also meant that anti-semitism with the mass destruction of jews was associated with capitalism. In other words, anti-semitism was seen as economic, and combatted accordingly; the essential, completely uneconomic

dimension of the Holocaust, namely the racially based elimination of a people, was consciously eclipsed; thus the GDR did not take part in the reappraisal of the common German history (Diner, 1992). At this point, with the discontinuation of this doctrine, a double loophole became apparent: the concept of capitalism and fascism as the ultimate enemy disappeared - what will happen to anti-semitism?

Another point refers to the daily *economic situation*. Like the other eastern states, the GDR was characterized by central planning and the central distribution of goods and services which led, as everybody knows, to permanent shortages (and finally to the break-down of the system). I agree with Savelsberg (1991) that the central economic planning did not decrease the alienation of workers. The production process did not belong to them but exploited them, forcing many of them to work extra hours for no pay in the name of strengthening socialism. And the people worked without seeing much progress in terms of a better supply of goods. Of course, there was enough food. The question was rather that the variety of products (and of all other things) was heavily dependent on "the plan". The ruling Party, by organizing the availability (and thereby the unavailability) of goods, determined the menu of the people; shortages were the result of "structural conditions to maintain the economic and political order" (Hanf, 1992, pp. 66-67). It is said that the daily queueing for acquiring rare products (for example, nails and screws), or the humiliating patience which was needed to get a permit for something, acted as psychological means of control because they required subordination and submission (Maaz, 1990, p. 66).

The other side of the coin was a well developed *welfare system* which, by providing total social security, ensured strong social control as well: the Party was the big 'father' who took care of his 16 Mio. children from birth to death. Everybody, including ex-convicts, had a right to employment and housing and the medical system was free of charge.

The result of such long-term adaptation processes was a strong external control of behaviour and an equally strong internal control of behaviour. People obeyed not only the official rules but also the officially expected behavioural patterns, without knowing it. One might think that controls of this kind do not leave very much space for individualism and privacy. Indeed, the problem was to develop skills and strategies to cautiously extend private, unobserved space without risking the loss of too much of the benevolence of the big father. This required the development of a double existence with a system-oriented and a private-oriented sector; the difficulty was not to mix them up. Double-bind, double-thinking, and double-talk are some of the terms used to characterize the schizophrenic state of this society (see Savelsberg, 1991, p. 13).

The Crime Situation before the Upheaval

Criminologists usually know that any evaluation of crime rates depends heavily on criminal laws and their application. For example, socialist countries produced many more crimes against the state or public order than western countries, and they were enforced more rigorously (according to the 1988 crime statistics of the GDR, 16% of recorded incidents were crimes of this kind - see Bericht des Generalstaatsanwalts, 1989, p. 2). Other offences mirrored the structural deficiencies of this society; for example, pilfering, especially employee theft, was very common and almost essential to compensate for daily shortages.

In addition were the many manipulations by which a euphemistic picture of the reality of crime was deliberately constructed in order to demonstrate, at least in this respect, the superiority of the eastern system over the western system. For example, thefts of bicycles were usually registered by the police as "losses" not as offences. This means that, according to insurance statistics, more than 90,000 thefts were missing from the crime statistics of 1988, amounting to about 40% of all crimes known to the police (but not necessarily registered by the police; von der Heide & Lautsch, 1991, p. 13). When these manipulations and the structural differences between the crime statistics in both parts of Germany are taken into account, the crime ratio (per 100,000 population) was 2.364 (East Germany) to 7.114 (West Germany), or 1 : 3 (von der Heide & Lautsch, 1991, p. 13). This newly calculated gap between both social systems in the area of crime demonstrates a correction. Before the change, one assumed much larger gaps; in particular, eastern criminology stated it and arrived at an overall ratio of 1 : 7 and in Berlin, comparing both halves of the city, of 1 :10 (Lekschas, Harrland, Hartmann, & Lehmann, 1983, pp. 203-204). We should not be surprised, therefore, that western criminologists also discussed such differences, and made use of them for theoretical considerations; Adler, for example, conveyed a ratio of 1 : 6, which she put down, amongst other things, to the preventative effect of the participation of the general public in the process of criminal justice, e.g. in the social courts (1983, p. 50).

The reasons for low crime rates are manifold. They have, of course, to do with less developed opportunity structures, and this in a double sense: there was not very much to steal, and there was very much control to prevent stealing. But this is certainly not the whole truth. Hirschi's control theory (1969) might be helpful, if it is combined with learning theory. The search for reasons for a *low* crime rate implies the expectancy of a higher crime rate, so, we obviously look for factors to explain conforming rather than deviant behavior. It is true that control theory refers to individual behaviour whereas we are dealing with a whole people being placed on the couch for socio-analysis. We have, therefore, to modify control theory (see Hirschi, 1969, p. 16) for our purposes, by assuming that conformity results when the people's bonds to the ruling Party are strong. By analyzing the four elements of these bonds - attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief - we will discover a number of parallels which are worthy of further investigation. The main distinction is that in our case these bonds are less based on convictions but are more based on constraint and force.

Attachment existed because sensitivity to the opinion of the Party - the father - was essential for the citizens' political and social well-being. But conformity was also the price for comfort; indeed, the Party achieved conformity in exchange for an all-embracing welfare system and a plushy lifestyle, with 'bread and circuses' (panem and circenses). *Commitment* and *involvement* can both be seen as the citizens' participation in the numerous collective activities which were offered and at the same time required, and rewarded, by political organizations (trade unions, youth organizations, and so forth). Examples were the many sporting activities; the extra hours of work to clean up and embellish company houses and neighbourhoods, or to bring in the harvest; the organization of various festivities to celebrate socialism; the political and paramilitary training; the activities in all kinds of commissions; etc. The tendency was to keep society busy. Of course, people avoided these common duties whenever possible (it was counted that, on average, about two hours per week were actually expended on collective activities). Nevertheless, these engagements were a considerable factor in the prevention of criminal acts.

Finally the element of *belief*. According to control theory, conformity and deviance depend on strong and weak beliefs in the moral validity of social norms (Hirschi, 1969, pp. 23-26). Considering the total failure of organized political socialization, that is, socialization outside and without the family (Lemke, 1991, p. 152), it is doubtful whether there was anything like a socialist morality convincing enough to secure common, law-abiding behaviour, that is without external constraint. But, maybe, there was a petty bourgeois type of morality in the sense that a simplistic distinction between good and evil, between right and wrong, existed which might have helped to establish and to support a moral value system.

Attitudes toward deviance consisted largely of intolerance. Deviance included not only delinquent acts, but any behaviour which could disturb and threaten the minor virtues which remained after the more important things had gone: obedience, prudery, unobtrusiveness, law and order, harmony, silence. Such values had many sources. The people, after 1945, did not have very much of a chance to recover from nazism, where these values had suppressive functions. On the contrary, the new regime which was founded in 1949 maintained much of the old morality as its own morality. Secondly, parts of the middle and upper class left the GDR after waves of expropriation and persecution in the '50s and '60s. It is assumed that with the disappearence of this population, essential traits of an open society also disappeared (Engler, 1991), which meant that the more restricted codes to see and to organize the world received a greater chance than the more elaborate codes.

Thus, we have to cope with beliefs of a law-and-order type which, in combination with the other bonding elements, might explain low crime rates. But still, something is missing. Control theory assumes that more crimes are to be expected when social bonds are weak. This might not be a sufficient condition given the "social learning situation" of the society in question. Therefore, some additional remarks are necessary to make the crime phenomenon more understandable.

The huge social control machine which tried to seize everybody's life might have had paralyzing consequences for the individuals' behaviour. The question is whether under those circumstances, considerable possibilities existed to act differently. To become an offender, other than a petty thief in a department store or in the workplace, some additional conditions such as a run-down environment and a milieu for the acquisition of deviant values (and, sometimes, skills) to perform the role of an offender are needed (Cloward & Ohlin, 1960, pp. 148-149). One essential condition are delinquent peer groups. Of course, they existed. In the last years before the system's fall there was even a youth culture with traits of an apolitical subculture based on common leisure time activities (Stock & Mühlberg, 1991), or of a political counterculture based on, among others, antiwar or women movements (Lemke, 1991, pp. 164-166). The system which was terrified of anything not under its control, defined informal groups of this kind as delinquent groups which, according to the findings of empirical research, was untrue (see Kosewähr, 1982. In the late 80's, vandalism and violent acts against persons increased remarkably, however.). In general, the climate was unfavourable for sticking together and for learning deviant behaviour from each other; social bonds of a collective nature and strong social control led to enforced privacy and retreatism which were not appropriate breeding-grounds for crime.

Adler attempted a similar explanation, albeit long before the change and inevitably without the information which we have about the SED regime today. In a general attempt to explain the relatively low crime figures in some countries, of which the GDR was one (also Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Japan, Ireland, etc.), she introduced the concept of "synnomie" - as opposed to anomie (1983, pp. 135-158). Synnomie comprises a common, basic conviction in society (p. 158: "a convergence of norms to the point of harmonious accommodation"), which prevents crime in large quantities from occurring. This approach borrows from control theory and simultaneously goes beyond it in order to make the conformity of an entire society understandable. It must remain open, whether collective values in the societies studied actually existed, or whether considerable external social controls (religion, party, etc.) did not enforce them. Anyhow, this approach can only be applied to the GDR to a certain extent: if there had been strong, joint convictions and values there, then they were held together by the closed borders. In other words, citizens lacked opportunities to try out other lifestyles, to get to know alternatives, in short: "to be different", and, consequently, to choose to become criminal. Then, on top of this came the previously mentioned societal controls through nearly all political and social institutions, the extent of which has only gradually become known. But, naturally, the answer is still to come. It remains to be seen, now that everything is open and at peoples' disposal, whether the supposed common values will remain or disappear. Precisely this is the object of much research.

The Development of the Crime Rate Following the Upheaval

With the opening of the border in November 1989, western business, trade and industry seized the new opportunities. The market boomed, the shops were full with never-seen goods and West Germany and some other countries were emptied of used cars. There were times when no kitchen-machines were available because everything went East. This was the one side. The other side, which came a little bit later, was the disintegration of the social structure. Major issues were the break-down of the social welfare system, the non-competitive economy, the decreasing standard of living due to high unemployment rates and high prices, the dissolution of social relationships and social bonds, the new crime experiences, the emotional crises resulting both from the disastrous political, economic and ecological remnants of the old regime and from the methods of the new regime (West Germany) for dealing with these remnants. Most structures were (and still are) turned upside down and even commonly approved institutions and regulations were abolished and replaced by their western counterparts. Some headlines from newspapers in 1991 might help to illustrate the anomic situation: "Hospitals in East Germany on the way to ruin"; "Homelessness a new social problem"; "Women are the big losers in the labour market"; "Considerable increase in suicide rate"; "Brutal assaults on foreigners and minorities are commonplace"; "Unification leads to increase in economic crimes"; "Shelters for battered women overcrowded"; etc.

Part of the general disintegration was the collapse of the social control systems. Concerning the judicial authorities, there is a general attitude that criminal judges and prosecutors are politically incriminated a priori; many, maybe most of them, were discharged with those found to be "clean" (whatever this means; McCarthy is sending his compliments) given a minor chance to get their jobs back. For example, the senator of justice of Berlin (West), who became, from one minute to the next, responsible for the justice system of Berlin (East) as well, fired all judges and prosecutors and only reinstated approximately 10% of them after thorough investigation. The whole GDR justice system is being fundamentally reformed and reconstructed with the help of the West German authorities, which is an enormous task. In the first year after the reunification, there were only a few properly functioning prosecutor's offices and criminal courts, and law was only sporadically enforced.

The treatment of the police was different. Although the People's Police (Volkspolizei) had an essentially socialist or class mission (see Wolfe, 1992, pp. 23-59) and in spite of the fact that they were probably the most essential information system for the State Security Agency, they were obviously more essential to the re-establishment of public order than the criminal justice system. Therefore, many policemen remained on duty wearing just another (i.e. West-German) uniform (95% in the state of Brandenburg, almost 100% in the state of Saxonia; see Diederichs, 1991).

With respect to crime rates, they have been increasing since the opening of the border. According to the last calculations of the Attorney General's Bureau of Criminal Justice Statistics, before the end of the GDR (fall 1990), comparing the first six months of 1990 with the same period in 1989,

personal theft increased by 13%, property damage by 60%, robbery by 100%, and arson by 71% (Ewald, 1991, p. 87). Other calculations revealed much higher rates, for example, about four times more property offences and more than twice as many deaths from traffic accidents. The most common crimes were burglaries from homes, car thefts, assaults - mainly directed against foreigners and minorities - traffic offences (drunken and reckless driving) and many manifestations of fraud (for example, cheating customers on home or car repairs, insurance fraud and all kinds of business-related swindles). Also white-collar crimes were increasingly common. They were frequently the result of connections between West German entrepreneurs and speculators and East German managers and even officers of the former State Security Agency, who had privileged access to knowledge of the relevant personal and economic structures in the old companies. Illegal trade with eastern countries, illegal selling of estates, corporate frauds and embezzlements, frauds related to state subsidies, and tax evasions were some of the criminal activities in this area, the damages of which amounted to some Billion DM.

Criminologically, it is important now to make a distinction between two approaches to this crime problem. The developments could directly be attributed to the upheaval and its conditions. Or, the observable increase in crime might be the expected adjustment of an "unnatural" low crime rate to the usual rates in western countries.

Should the new crime wave be related to the deep-rooted social change, then it should display specific features reflecting the change. This applies to the above mentioned economic crimes as well as to all acts which have to do with the shift from a centralized market system to a free market system. Another point is the new "subculture of violence" directed against foreigners. There have been the first murder cases; frequently, hostels for asylum-seeking people are burned down or the inhabitants attacked. For the time being, it is impossible to present an analysis of this new phenomenon, especially, as there are some peculiarities which draw scientific, and even more political attention to the new States, such as the people's public applause when Skins are chasing, say, Vietnamese immigrants or asylum-seeking people. Initial explanations refer to the disastrous unemployment rates; it is said that foreigners (5 million) are unwelcome competitors in the labour market. The more essential point is a new type (and at the same time a very old type) of ugly nationalism, sometimes with fascist features - this in a so-called anti-fascist society!

Altogether, it is difficult to state that the fall of the system generated, and is generating, its own crimes like in revolutionary times. Indeed, the change was not the result of a bloody, but of a gentle revolution, of a peaceful liberation from below. And this is maybe why crimes that are emerging in the course of the actual transformation process are less often committed by people of the former GDR but by West Germans or by non-Germans - including Russian Mafias.

However, it is still possible that as a consequence of the anomic situation, the crime rate rises disproportionately. When, as mentioned, four times more property crimes are said to be registered in 1990 than in 1989, we should know whether the 1990 percentages are due to fewer crimes occurring (or registered) a year ago, or whether the increase must be seen independently.

Thus, it will become important for the development of crime after the change, i.e. after November 1989, to introduce further theoretical elements which supplement control theory. Opportunity structure theory from Cohen and Felson offers itself in this respect, with its three conditions for the existence of crime: a motivated offender, the absence of a capable guardian, and a suitable target (1979; see also Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 24).

As regards offender motivation, it can be supposed that the weakening of old social ties releases delinquent impulses which, among other things, are influenced by the perceived discrepancy between the economic standard of living and future life chances in the East and the West (this is borrowed from anomie theory) Concerning the *control issue*, it has already been mentioned that the general break-down included the social and crime control systems. Regarding the suitable target, that is the *potential victims*, the population of the former GDR was totally unprepared when western crime styles came with western life styles. Before the change, it was not necessary to lock up flats and houses or to install alarm systems in banks because burglaries and robberies were rare events. The streets were safe and crime was not a cause of fear. (When being asked about personal safety in one's own neighbourhood at night, 3% of the respondents felt "very unsafe" before the change as opposed to 24% after the change. In cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants, 32% felt very unsafe, which comes close to the so far unrivalled 33% rate of Newark in 1972). Now, it has become easier to enter homes illegally, to rob banks, or to cheat people by, for example, coaxing them into buying all kinds of over-priced goods. Another point is that people were inexperienced in dealing with potential or actual criminal events; decades of socialization into a state of dependency has made them defenceless against many of the new challenges.

Thus, two assumptions are at odds with one another. It is possible that old values and belief systems are still strong enough to overcome new challenges. If this is the case, we would expect only a slight increase in crime. Or perhaps the breakdown of the system undermined the old values and people's sense of direction, and replaced them with new temptations, so that higher crime rates must be expected.

That is why we shall be reporting further on the preliminary results of a longitudinal study (the first of three waves of interviews; the next will be in 1993, the last in 1995), namely a representative crime survey of the population of the former GDR of 2,011 people (April 1991), which is divided into three categories: a general survey on the social situation before and after the change, and crime-related problems of a general nature (fear of crime, attitudes towards the criminal justice system and towards punishment); a victim survey; and a self-report study, aimed at the 16 to 29 year olds in the main sample. The investigation is designed to be carried out in three waves, by the Criminological Research Centre in Berlin (Uwe Ewald, Erwin Lautsch), by the Institute for Criminology at the University of Tübingen (Klaus Boers, Hans-Jürgen Kerner), and by the Institue for Youth Law and Youth Welfare at the University of Hamburg (Klaus Sessar).

The Victim Survey

Respondents were asked to state which criminal incidents (from a list of 14 items which was more or less adopted from the 1989 International Crime Survey; see van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990) they were victims of during the last five years preceding the interview (April 1991). Additionally, identified victims among the respondents were asked how many crimes they had experienced after the change, more precisely, after November 9, 1989, when the wall in Berlin came down. The reference period is thus 18 months. The following calculations are based on prevalence rates, not on incidence rates.

Comparing the two periods before and after the opening of the border in Berlin, there were 177 respondents (53.3%) before and 155 (46.7%) respondents after this key date reporting victimization by property crimes (theft or fraud); the respective rates for violent crimes (mainly assaults and robberies) were 78 respondents (47.9%) and 85 respondents (52.1%)(one-time victims). With respect to the specific reference periods (42 months before and 18 months after the change), the differences are remarkable, even when the effects of memory decay are taken into account (Sessar, 1990). The results indicate that, indeed, part of the increase in crime might be explained by social change variables.

Another question is whether the new crime level is higher than expected. To study this, only those reported incidents which occurred after the change are taken into account. This means that respondents who had been victimized before this date are only counted as non-victims. For the purposes of comparison, fraud and sexual assaults were eliminated, since they were not part of the International Crime Survey. 26.3% of respondents were victimized at least once after the change (with the inclusion of fraud and sexual assaults, the rate would be 33.7%).

Although comparisons with the International Crime Survey are difficult because of different methods (for example, face-to-face interviews were conducted in East Germany, compared with telephone interviews in the other countries), the overall victimization rate in the former GDR does not seem to be higher than in the other countries in the international project. The rate for all crimes in 1988 is, for example, 28.8% in the USA, 28.1% in Canada, 26.8% in Holland, 21.9% in West Germany, and 19.4% in both France and in England & Wales (van Dijk, Mayhew, & Killias, 1990, pp. 41, 174). With respect to burglary, the rate of 2.1% is not higher, and is sometimes even lower than the corresponding rate in other countries, and this in spite of a longer reference period (see Figure 1).

The impression is, then, that the victimization rates in East Germany do not mirror the extraordinary social changes in this society. This result is supported by the 1991 Police Statistics. The overall crime rate (per 100.000 population) is 3.723 in East Germany as opposed to 6.903 in West Germany (the crime rate in Berlin, East and West, is 14.617) (Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 1991).

Figure 1: Prevalence victimization rates by country (all crimes and burglary) (1988; GDR from Nov. 1989 to April 1991)



The Self-Report Survey

The self-report study was restricted to respondents aged 16 to 29. There were 474 respondents - 24% of the total sample. The crime list consisting of 19 items was mainly adopted from the "International Study on Self-Reported Delinquency" (ISDR), which was developed by a working group in the Research and Documentation Centre in The Hague (Klein, 1989). Some items were replaced by "situation-specific" offences, such as illegal trade.

206 respondents (44%) reported committing at least one offence after November 9, 1989. Altogether, 1,306 offences were admitted, many of them trivial; for example, 702 offences, or 54% of all reported offences, referred to fare dodging. If this item ist eliminated from the analysis, then 36% of the respondents indicated committing another offence. The most frequent offence (after omitting fare dodging) was "illegal trade" with 34%, followed by illegal currency transactions with 15%, shoplifting with 13%, and pilferage with 12%. 11% of respondents reported committing violent acts, including vandalism and rowdyism.

The crime picture as displayed by offenders is not very alarming. Perhaps the results reflect the methods used. The interviewing technique was the so-called drop-off method. This means that

the respondents themselves filled out the self-report part of the questionnaire. But it is still possible that the participants distrusted the anonymity of the questionnaire, particularly as they were used to being suspicious of any kind of personal interrogation.

However, when the results are compared with those of similar studies, a sort of "concurrent validity" (see Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981, p. 92) is observable. This means that our findings are roughly consistent with the findings from (so far unpublished) pilot surveys which were conducted in Utrecht/Holland and in Mannheim/Germany (also in Belfast/Northern Ireland) where the same methods were used. (Of course, the comparison of a nationwide sample with city samples could provoke heavy biases; however in our sample, only 53 offenders lived in cities of a comparable size.) Consistency exists if differences in the crime rates can be attributed to different social conditions, and if similar crime rates can be explained by similar social conditions.

In East Germany, property crimes rated highest with 29% among all reported offence types; in Utrecht, the rate was 24%, and in Mannheim 13%. The assumption is that after the opening of the border, the opportunity structures increased; in other words, there was now much more to steal than before. Concerning violent offences, 11% of the respondents in the former GDR and in Mannheim, but 27% in Utrecht, admitted some kind of an assault, vandalism, or rowdyism. So property crimes are more common in East Germany. The reasons for these discrepancies and similarities have still to be studied. Whatever these reasons are, it seems as if the respondent from East Germany is as willing or unwilling to answer questions on his or her own delinquency as any other respondent. This would then mean that also self-report measures do not reveal extraordinary trends in crime rates.

Conclusion

Of course, it is still too early for conclusive results. All the same, the time since the fall of the wall and our first surveys have shown that crime has actually become a big problem in the former GDR, but because, in the first instance, it was previously a relatively small problem. In addition to this, the GDR society was trained to define nearly all forms of deviant behaviour as anti-social (and often as anti-socialist) with the result that even "normal" levels of crime would take on an exaggerated quality. Empirical research now shows us that, for the time being (1992) at least, crime seldom reaches western levels, but usually remains below them. There is no longer a shortage of suitable targets, and social control is no longer efficient enough to prevent crime. Is it therefore possible that offenders do not really want to be offenders, because, in the context of their traditional value system, they have internalized conformity sufficiently? This could explain, for example, why there is still no significant drug problem, and thus no drug-related offending problem.

With respect to violent offences committed against foreigners and asylum-seekers, this is increasingly becoming a European problem. However, the special characteristics currently typical

of the situation in East Germany should not be overlooked. It is the support of violence by parts of the public which makes it increasingly difficult to socially isolate offenders. On the contrary, they feel approved of and sentences of imprisonment are born with pride; even the description as a "neo-nazi" is accepted by them. Another special characteristic would appear to be that this violence is diffuse in that it doesn't necessarily decline long after foreigners have been re-housed. The violence is then re-directed towards the police, the handicapped, former communists, people with rational opinions, etc.

Is this the criminal inheritance of the old regime? Our study, which analyses the connection between the radical upheavel and crime, has with this criminal phenomenon discovered a central research target. Criminologically, this is a challenge since it is not often that criminal violence is not restricted to individuals or groups of individuals (including sub-cultures), but reflects instead a general willingness amongst certain parts of society to accept violence. It is necessary, therefore, also to study this society.

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Feelings of Personal Safety, Fear of Crime and Violence, and the Experience of Victimization amongst Elderly People: Research Instrument and Survey Design

Wolfgang Bilsky, Christian Pfeiffer, and Peter Wetzels

The central objective of the KFN Victim Survey is to supply information on the following topics (cf., public tender of the BMJFFG # 532-1720-307):

- fear of crime and violence, and strategies of elderly people to cope with these feelings;
- experiences of victimization and coping strategies of the elderly;
- interrelation between fear of crime and risk of victimization;
- attitudes of elderly people towards crime and crime control;
- variables likely to affect the forms and extent of fear of crime.

In this chapter, we shall outline the central aspects of our research approach. However, we do not elaborate in detail on our scientific reasoning with respect to the solution of the various research questions. Rather, this is largely a technical report, giving information on (1) the focal and referential populations considered in this study, (2) the specification and operationalization of variables investigated, and (3) the design of the study. For illustrative purposes, an appendix is attached which includes examples of items or item lists used to assess those variables which are most central to this survey.

Focal and Referential Populations

Elderly people are of focal concern in this study. However, accumulating descriptive data about their living conditions and their particular problems is of little use if there are no standards to be compared with. The finding that the subpopulation of elderly people is characterized by a high fear score cannot be interpreted, for example, if there is no access to data that are characteristic of other subpopulations or the population as a whole. Furthermore, even if such descriptive data existed, this finding would be trivial at best, or even misleading if relevant context variables are not controlled for by the researcher. The question of which context variables are to be considered as relevant, however, goes beyond mere description and aims at the explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. It can be answered only by referring to some substantive sociological or psychological theory.

While several theoretical approaches lend themselves to the explanation of observed differences between the elderly and other subpopulations (see below), there are no information and referential statistics in Germany to which data on the problems and concerns of elderly people could be related. Data from abroad (cf., Fattah & Sacco, 1989) do not apply as a frame of reference be-

cause of the differing socio-economic context. Even the research findings from Kury (in this book) cannot be used for this purpose because of the dramatic ongoing socio-political changes in Germany. Consequently, data to be used as a referential standard of evaluation must be collected in this research project too.

The most general and interesting frame of reference for evaluating the living conditions and concerns of the elderly is the *German population as a whole*. Thus, data are needed that are representative of both the German population in general and the subpopulation of elderly people in particular. Since the elderly form only a minor part of the whole population, a disproportionate sampling procedure must be used to achieve two subsamples (total vs elderly) of approximately equal size. Furthermore, the absolute number of cases investigated must be quite high in order to arrive at valid information about reported and unreported crime. Figure 1 outlines the sampling schedule used in our study, with separate samples in the old (OFS) and new (NFS) German States, including a disproportionate oversampling of persons aged 60 or more.

Specification of Variables

According to the different topics to be dealt with by this project, different groups of variables are of interest. The following paragraphs give a short overview over the most central variables of our study, including some information about their selection, specification, and operationalization (see Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993, for a complete overview).

Feelings of Personal Safety and Fear of Crime

Feelings of personal safety. The term 'feelings of personal safety' as used by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs and the Elderly (BMFuS) in specifying the title of the present survey derives from everyday language and does not have any clear equivalent in psychological or sociological theory. As used in this context, feelings of personal safety are supposed to be threatened by quite a few factors, including crime. In order to make this lay concept accessible to scientific research, we had to look for a theoretical frame of reference to which it could be affiliated.

A first step in this direction was to conceive factors likely to threaten feelings of personal safety as stressors. These stressors are supposed to cause *strain* in the individual because of the perceived discrepancy between the desired and the real status of personal safety. From psychological research we know that the absence of strain is a central and defining feature of *subjective well-being* (Mayring, 1991). In addition, results of a pilot study conducted in preparing this survey revealed that feelings of personal safety and subjective well-being are closely related in everyday reasoning.

Figure 1: Sampling schedule



Starting from these considerations, the second step was to specify those dimensions supposed to be helpful in distinguishing stressors of personal safety. This was accomplished by drawing on findings from research on quality of life and subjective well-being (e.g., Andrews, 1986; Andrews & Robinson, 1991; Levy & Guttman, 1989; Levy, 1990; Schalock, 1990) and integrating them into one common frame of reference by applying principles of *facet theory* (see Borg, in this book). The resulting mapping sentence is outlined in Figure 2. It can be read from top to bottom like a sentence in ordinary language by choosing only one element of every facet at the same time. In accordance with this mapping sentence, every stressor of personal safety is classified according to three basic facets named 'injury', 'social environment', and 'life area'.

Figure 2: Mapping sentence of feelings of personal safety

Person (x) feels strained

injury
(material)
by potential (physical) injury as a consequence of events in his/her
(psychological)

life area
(health)
environment (work)
(primary) social environment in life area (economy)
(secondary) (social)
(residence)

R_{strain}
(high)
—> (...) strain.
(low)

Recasting the lay concept of personal safety in terms of the facet approach by drawing on findings from the psychology of well-being was the basis for selecting items from past research and for constructing new ones for our survey instrument. As can be seen from Table 1, every item of item list A7, for example, is specified by a structuple relating to the three facets of the mapping sentence.

However, this mapping sentence was not only a useful means for selecting and constructing items systematically, but it also specifies hypotheses with regard to the organization of stressors. Thus, assuming that there is a stable and close relationship between feelings of personal safety and subjective well-being, findings from research on well-being as incorporated in our mapping sentence should apply when trying to answer the following questions:

(1) Are stressors that affect feelings of personal safety amenable to systematic organization (i.e., according to the facets specified in the mapping sentence)? Asking for a common *structure of stressors* is more promising than asking for a list of stressors because an infinite number of potential stressors might quite well be organized within a parsimonious structure.
(2) Where is the *position of crime* within this structure of stressors, both when used as one fuzzy concept, or when defined more precisely by special forms of delinquent acts?

(3) What is the *rank of importance* of crime (or of different forms of crime) when compared to other stressors of personal safety?

Table 1: *Item List A7 - "How threatened do you see your personal safety at the moment by the following events and risks?"*

No	Item (abbr)	structuple
A7A	Loss of job	c1 d2 e2
A7B	Inflation and economic recession	c1 d2 e3
A7C	Insecurity in provision for old age e.g. pension	c1 d2 e3
A7D	Serious illness	c2 d1 e1
A7E	War	c2 d2 e1
A7F	Violent injury by another person	c4 d3 e6
A7G	Natural disasters	c2 d2 e1
A7H	Crisis in the Health Service	c2 d2 e1
A7J	Separation from or loss of a loved one	c3 d1 e4
A7K	Ecological disaster	c2 d2 e1
A7L	Being dependent on others	c3 d1 e4
A7M	Accident	c2 d1 e1
A7P	Loss of residence	c1 d1 e5
A7R	Misfortune	c4 d3 e6
A7S	Fight or argument in the family	c3 d1 e4
A7T	Theft, burglary, or fraud	c4 d3 e6

c1 = material	d1 = primary	e1 = health
c2 = physical	d2 = secondary	e2 = work
c3 = psychological	d3 = unspecified	e3 = economy
c4 = unspecified		e4 = social
		e5 = residence
		e6 = unspecified

These questions can be answered empirically: questions (1) and (2) by using multidimensional scaling procedures (MDS) for example, question (3) by ranking stressors according to their perceived negative impact on feelings of personal safety. Given that stressors do in fact organize in the way predicted by our mapping sentence, rank ordering of stressors can be interpreted on the solid base of findings on subjective well-being, thus going far beyond an everyday understanding of personal safety. Preliminary analysis of data from a pilot study shows that the lay concept 'feelings of personal safety' and the theoretically founded construct of 'subjective well-being' can be linked quite successfully (Bilsky & Wetzels, 1992).

Fear of crime. Our approach to defining and measuring fear of crime in this study is closely related to our critique of past research and to the resulting suggestions for future studies (see Bilsky, in this book). Following these guidelines, we conceptualize fear of crime as a multifacetted construct which should profit from general theories of motivation, psychological analyses of fear and stress, and past criminological research.

Some distinctive features of fear are: (a) the evaluative character of the fear response, mostly directed towards a particular situation or object, (b) its relative stability over time, and (c) its influence on the directionality of behavior (approach vs avoidance). According to the facet approach (cf., Levy, 1985), these features apply to *attitudes* in general which are characterized by a range of responses towards an object from very positive to very negative.

From research on fear and anxiety we also know that the perception of a particular situation or object as threatening may vary between individuals who are high and low on trait anxiety, depending on the *type of stressful situation* encountered. The amount of ego-involvement induced, for example, proved to be an important characteristic in distinguishing between stressful situations (Laux, 1983). Similarly, victimological research has shown that crime cannot be treated as one homogeneous class of stressors because of the various targets and consequences of ciminal behavior (Kiefl & Lamnek, 1986). Consequently and contrary to many former studies on fear of crime, different classes of *criminal acts* are distinguished in our definition, depending on the respective target of crime, i.e., person and/or property.

In addition to these specifications, we tried to incorporate the distinction of *affective* and *cognitive* components in operationalizing fear of crime, thus following recent trends in this domain of research (Jerusalem, 1990). According to our understanding, there is a close relationship between this distinction and the differentiation of *value* (cost) and *expectancy* known from theories of motivation (Heckhausen, 1980). The value-expectancy differentiation in turn parallels the separation of *threat* and *risk* as discussed by Skogan (in this book).

Finally, it should be noted that fear of crime is but a special case of *feelings of personal safety* as defined before. Consequently, the type of *injury* likely to result from the crime under consideration should be incorporated in a formal definition of fear of crime. The defining features mentioned thus far are summarized in one mapping sentence (Figure 3) which served as a guideline for constructing those item lists which are central to assessing fear of crime in our survey (C6 and C11; see Appendix).

Figure 3: Basic mapping sentence of fear of crime



However, critical evaluation of studies on reported and unreported crime revealed that estimates of victimization vary considerably, depending on whether or not victimization in close relationships is a salient topic of research (cf., Wetzels, in this book). In addition, time of day and local characteristics are important parameters with regard to the likelihood of being victimized. In order to avoid biased estimates, we therefore also decided to assess the respective social and situational context of fear. This was accomplished by incorporating additional questions in our instrument, focusing on the potential *offender* as well as *place* and *time* of victimization (C8 and C9 in the Appendix; the time question was only used in the pilot study). Obviously, this is only another way of integrating the social environment and the life area facet into our mapping of fear of crime. Figure 4 displays the complete mapping sentence, including all features specified above.

As shown by Skogan (in this book), the term 'fear of crime' is often used in a much broader sense in criminological research. *Concern*, for example, does not show the defining characteristics of an attitude, i.e., relative stability over time and relevance with respect to the directionality of behavior. Therefore, this construct might best be understood as an *opinion* in terms of social psychology (cf., Bergler & Six, 1972). However, since this broader kind of definition has repeatedly been used in past research, we included several concern items in our instrument to facilitate comparisons with other studies (see Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993, for these items). Aside from this, there was a special interest in public opinion on crime development as related to recent

socio-political changes in Germany. A formal specification of concern as used in our study is given in Figure 5.

Figure 4: Expanded mapping sentence of fear of crime

				criminal act		
	modality			(personal	)	
Person (x)	(cognitively	)	evaluates	(personal and property	)	crime
	(emotionally	)		(property	)	

	offender		*place*	
	(stranger/s	)	(at home	)
committed by one or more	(acquaintance/s	)	(at work	)
	(relative/s	)	(outside	)
			(anywhere	)

time[1]			*injury*		
(during the day	)		(material	)	
(in the evening	)	and likely to result in	(physical	)	injury to self
(at night	)		(psychological)		
(at any time	)				

	R_{fear}		
	(high	)	
—>	(...	)	fear.
	(low	)	

[1] items including this facet were only used in the pilot study

Finally, one of the standard items for assessing fear of crime ("How safe do/would you feel ..."; cf., Boers, 1991) was also used in our study, as were several indicators of *precautionary behavior* likely to arise from (anticipated) fear (see Skogan, in this book).

Mediating variables. According to our interest in integrating 'feelings of personal safety' and 'fear of crime' into an established network of scientific constructs and to 'explain' them statistically, several psychological and sociological variables were included in our instrument too.

The rationale for our psychological approach is the assumption that both focal variables are partly mediated by habitual tendencies. Depending on whether or not a special form of victimization is associated with high ego-involvement, for example, trait anxiety is supposed to contribute to predicting the respective criterion variable. Furthermore, coping research has shown that the availability of resources (whether habitual or social) - as perceived by the afflicted person - is likely to mediate the individual stress response (Fröhlich, 1983; Jerusalem, 1990; Laux, 1983; Sacco & Glackman, 1987).

Figure 5: Mapping sentence of concern

Person (x) is concerned about

	criminal act				
	(personal	)			
the amount of	(personal and property	)	crime		
	(property	)			
	region				
	(Germany	)		*standard*	
in	(the old/new Federal States	)	relative to	(other time	)
	(the area where s/he lives	)		(other region	)

	$R_{concern}$		
	(high	)	
—>	(...	)	concern.
	(low	)	

In order to arrive at results that are not only instructive but also highly communicable, we chose indicators from *psychological* assessment instruments that conform to high methodological standards and that have been applied in a variety of research settings. Among these are items from the following domains of research: (a) trait-anxiety (STAI; cf., Spielberger, 1972; Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, & Spielberger, 1981), (b) perceived competence and control (FKK, i.e.,

an instrument based on the widely used IPC; Krampen, 1991; Lefcourt, 1991), (c) coping competencies (SVF; Janke, Erdmann, & Kallus, 1985), (d) loneliness (UCLA-LS; Russel, Peplau, & Cutrona, 1980; Stephan & Fäth, 1989) and (e) perceived social support (SOZU; Baumann, Laireiter, Pfingstmann, & Schwarzenbacher, 1987; Sommer & Fydrich, 1989). Since the respective intruments are well documented in the literature, we do not include sample items in the Appendix.

As regards *sociological* variables, several indicators of incivilities as perceived by the interviewee were used in our study, together with a number of socio-economic variables (see Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993, for detailed information).

Attitudes towards Crime and Crime Control

Aside from feelings of personal safety and fear of crime, attitudes towards crime and crime control are another central topic in this survey. As with fear, the term 'attitude' has often been used in a wider sense in criminology and in socio-political discussions, comprising *attitude* in a psychological (narrower) sense as well as *opinion*. This also applies to the use of this term in the public tender of the BMJFFG (see above). Therefore both attitudes and opinions have been assessed in our survey in some detail. However, in this short sketch we shall confine ourselves to commenting on two special aspects: the assessment of very general attitudes towards the severity of punishment, i.e., punitiveness, and to the recording of more specific preferences for judicial reactions to fictitious and experimentally varied cases (vignettes) of criminal delinquency.

Punitiveness. Attitudes towards the severity of punishment (punitiveness) can be explored as an end in themselves, for instance in order to characterize and possibly distinguish different populations of respondents, e.g., young versus older people. Or, they can be investigated as independent or dependent variables in connection with other variables, like fear, victimization, sentencing, etc. (e.g., Ouimet & Coyle, 1991). While the relation between fear of crime and punitiveness cannot easily be interpreted in terms of antecedents and consequences, it seems plausible to assume that prior victimization will have some impact on attitudes towards the severity of punishment. Whether or not non-victims and victims differ in fact with respect to their punitiveness, is therefore another question to be answered by this study.

The development of a general measure of punitiveness was accomplished by applying standard methods of test construction to a broad battery of items on punitiveness used in our pilot study; data clearly suggested a unidimensional solution. The resulting scale thus assesses preferences for severe as opposed to lenient sanctioning of criminal behavior (see B1 in the Appendix).

Aside from the between-groups comparison of non-victims with victims, another comparison imposed itself on our research design: the within-group contrast of victims' punitiveness in general and punitiveness towards their own offender(s). In order to make this comparison, another measure of punitiveness was constructed for victims only. This second measure (see F141 in the

Appendix) mostly parallels the first one despite the fact that it focuses on the respective offender and the victimization under consideration.

Judicial reactions. While punitiveness is an indicator on the severity-leniency dimension, it does not convey any information about the preferred type of reaction in response to a criminal act. Since the choice of special reactions is likely to be influenced by the respective social context of crime, investigating the influence of several independent variables on the perceived adequacy of judicial reactions is another task to be solved. This is accomplished by using an experimental between-groups design, which can be applied because the whole survey sample is composed of independent subsamples, each of which is representative of both the German population in general and the population of elderly people (see below). Interviewees are asked to put themselves in the position of a judge and to respond to a number of vignettes, each describing one delinquent act (see Palys & Divorsky, 1986, for a similar approach). The following variables of these vignettes are varied systematically between groups (subsamples): sex and age of the offender, previous conviction, victim-offender-reconciliation prior to sentencing. The interviewee is free to choose one, or more than one reaction, from a list (item list B3 in our study; cf., Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993). The experimental design used for investigating preferred types of reaction to crime is summarized in Table 2.

Table 2: *Question B3: Criminal reactions to different crimes. Systematic variations of variables age, sex, previous convictions and compensation*

Variants	Variant 1				Variant 2				Variant 3				Variant 4			
Details about perpetrator... / Details of crime	Age Group	Sex	Pr Con	Comp	Age Group	Sex	Pr Con	Comp	Age Group	Sex	Pr Con	Comp	Age Group	Sex	Pr Con	Comp
A Burglary/Allotment Damages DM 1,000	Y	M	no	no	Y	M	no	yes	A	M	no	no	A	M	no	yes
B Grievous bodily harm	A	M	no	no	A	M	yes	yes	A	M	yes	no	A	M	no	yes
C Residential burglary Damages DM 5,000	Y	M	yes	no	Y	M	no	no	A	M	no	no	A	M	yes	no
D Drunk in charge of vehicle (unfitness to drive)	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no
E Theft of handbag and bodily harm	Y	M	no	no	Y	M	no	yes	A	M	no	no	A	M	no	yes
F Break in/Car Damage DM 5,000	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no	A	M	yes	no
G Theft of bicycle Damage DM 1,000	Y	M	yes	no	Y	M	no	no	A	M	no	no	A	M	yes	no
H[1] Failure to stop after accident Damage DM 1,000	A	M	yes	no	A	F	yes	no	-	-	-	-		-	-	-
H[2] Attempted murder of spouse	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	A	M	no	no	A	F	no	no

Y = Youth, A = Adult, M = male, F = female

Of course, the within-group contrast of victims' preferences for judicial reactions in general (B3), and for reactions towards their own offender, is of interest too. As with punitiveness, we therefore constructed an additional item on this topic only for victims (item F140; cf., Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993).

Victimization and Coping Experiences

The third group of variables that is central to our study serves the investigation of victimization and coping experiences in order to get a better idea of the amount of *undetected and unreported crime*. This information is an important supplement of official crime statistics. However, although appealing at first glance, comparing survey data of selfreported victimization and official crime statistics is not without its problems. These problems are primarily grounded in the fact that the units of enumeration used in crime statistics and in victim surveys - though likely to overlap - are anything but identical (cf., Block & Block, 1984; Sacco, 1990): While events recorded in official statistics are identified according to legal definitions, selfreported victimization is based on lay definitions of crime. Thus, behavior classified as criminal in terms of law may not be perceived as either an injury or an injustice by the victim; therefore, it is unlikely to be reported as a criminal act in a victim survey. On the other hand, people may quite well interpret a personal experience as criminal victimization (e.g., fraud) although it does not fit legal criteria. This problem is illustrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Overlap of crime as defined by law, perceived injury and justice



In order to guarantee a high correspondence between the definition of crime in official statistics and survey data, we do not use abstract labels in formulating questions on victimization. Instead, we ask for classes of events and behaviors which are crucial for the legal definition of the different crimes under consideration. These questions are supplemented by examples in order to facilitate the interviewee's decision whether or not to subsume a concrete experience under the respective category of events.

On the whole, subjects are *screened* for past victimization on *sixteen different types of crime*. In order to avoid telescoping effects (Garofalo & Hindelang, 1977; Loftus & Marburger, 1983; Rubin & Baddeley, 1989; Skogan, 1981; Sudman & Bradburn, 1973), they are first asked whether they had ever before been a victim of the criminal behaviors and events under consideration. Next, the period is identified within which the victimization occurred, using additional screening questions. In addition to life-span, the past year (1991) and the last five years (1987-1991) are used as reference periods of investigation. Both prevalence and incidence are recorded for the one and for the five year periods. In addition, reporting to the police is recorded for every incident during the one-year period. Sample items illustrating the screening procedure are included in the Appendix.

Following this screening, additional information is collected for the *most serious and difficult victimization* as perceived by the interviewee. Questions relate to the social and situational context of victimization, its immediate and further consequences, coping and reporting behavior, social support, etc. (see Bilsky, Pfeiffer, & Wetzels, 1993, for more detail). As with the screening part of our survey, the additional information is collected in face-to-face settings.

The screening and the additional questions sketched out thus far are formulated in such a way that the interviewees' attention should be directed to both, victimization within and outside the family. However, from past research we know that family violence, for example, is not necessarily understood as a subset of (criminal) violence in general. Instead, the amount of family violence assessed by surveys is strongly related to the respective research setting. Since the focus of our research is on victimization of the elderly, and since older persons are more likely than others to be victimized within the family, we take precautions to ascertain facts on *intrafamily violence and victimization* by devoting a special part of our instrument to this domain of research. Problems picked up in this part relate (a) to the way conflicts are handled by family members, (b) to different forms of violence (including sexual violence), and (c) to property crime. In addition, (d) interviewees older than sixty years of age are asked whether persons in charge of them have exercised any form of neglect or maltreatment, and (e) interviewees younger than sixty are questioned about different forms of sexual victimization in early life. The following paragraph outlines how this special part is integrated into the overall design of the study.

Design of the Study

Most of the crimes to be considered in our study are rare events, and the relative number of victims of a particular crime will be small in any representative sample. Consequently, in order to arrive at reliable conclusions about undetected and unreported crime, it is necessary to investigate a large sample of respondents. On the other hand, investigation into personal feelings of safety, fear of crime, attitudes, and additional explanatory variables is not restricted to the field of victims, and can therefore be carried out with much smaller samples. Another aspect to be considered in choosing an appropriate research design is the obvious discrepancy between our interest in a multitude of different variables and the necessity to conduct the individual interview within a reasonable period of time. This latter aspect has one far-reaching consequence: interviewees can only be asked to answer part of our research questions.

These divergent pressures on the design of the study require (a) using a research instrument with obligatory and optional modules and (b) splitting the overall sample into subsamples, each of which is representative of the populations to be investigated. With this design, questions contained in the obligatory modules can be applied to all subsamples while questions from the optional modules are employed in selected subsamples only.

Following these lines of reasoning, three *obligatory modules* were designed: module A, comprising variables on well-being, trait-anxiety, and feelings of personal safety; module F for the registration of victimization and coping behavior; module S, for socio-demographic variables. The remaining variables are split up in four *optional modules*, namely: module B on attitudes towards crime; module C on fear of crime; module D on loneliness, social network, and social support; module E on coping style, interpersonal trust, self-concept of competence and locus of control. Questions on intrafamily victimization and violence are summarized in a separate module K.

From the possible alternative methods of administering these modules - by telephone, face-to-face, and by mail - the latter was ruled out from the beginning because of the known low rate of response. To carry out the entire survey in the form of a telephone interview, using the CATI technique (see Killias, in this book), was not considered feasible either, because the number of telephones per head of population in the former East Germany is currently too low. Another alternative, to adopt a combination of telephone and face-to-face interviews in the old Federal States, and to use face-to-face exclusively in the new Federal States (whilst promising the interesting possibility of comparing different methods), was ruled out for reasons of time and money. The economic advantages of using a telephone survey would be lost with a combination of both survey methods since this would necessitate two different sampling procedures and the development of two separate questionnaires. Furthermore, due to the large number of questions, the interview lasts for more than thirty minutes, which is more than the optimum economic length for telephone interviews in Germany. Thus, with the exception of module K on intrafamily victimization, all modules were designed for application in *face-to-face interviews*.

As mentioned before (Wetzels, in this book), the context of questioning is of crucial importance with respect to the attention of the interviewee and, consequently, with respect to the data to be obtained. Thus, changing the focus of interviewing from criminal victimization in general to victimization within close relationships is facilitated by changing the setting and the technique of questioning. In order to profit from such a change and in order to guarantee the total anonymity of responds , both vis-a-vis the interviewer and other family members, we therefore decided to use a *modified drop-off technique* with module K: Having responded to the questions of the other modules, interviewees are asked to fill in a self-report questionnaire on physical and sexual abuse within the family and on property crime, without the help of the interviewer. After completion, the questionnaire is put into an envelope by the interviewee and only given back to the interviewer after having been sealed.

The design for collecting data in independent subsamples, as indicated above, is based on the organization of the *ADM master design* (Schaefer, 1979) which is used by all institutes conducting social research in Germany. In our study, collection of data is carried out in *ten nets of sample points*. Of these, eight are mutually independent and representative exponents of the old Federal States and two of the new Federal States. In each net, 1.000 people over sixteen years of age, and an additional 500 people over 60 years of age will be sampled. By using this method, we can be sure that the results from those questionnaire modules which are not activated in all nets enable conclusions to be drawn for the entire population of Germany. In addition, this method enables comparisons between the old and new Federal States. The differential distribution of the questionnaire modules within the ten nets of sampling points as well as combinations of modules and sample sizes arise out of the research design outlined in Table 3.

Table 3: *Research design*

Module	S	A	F	B	C	D	E	M	K
Variable	Demography	Well-being, Trait Anxiety, Feeling of Safety	Victimization, Coping Behaviour	Attitudes towards Crime	Fear of Crime	Loneliness, Social Network, Social Support	Coping Style, Social Trust, Self-concept of Competence, Locus of Control	Media Exposure	Intrafamily Violence, (Drop Off)
Old Federal States									
1st net	x	x	x	variant 1	x		x	x	variant 1
2nd net	x	x	x	variant 2	x	x			
3rd net	x	x	x	variant 3	x	x		x	variant 2
4th net	x	x	x	variant 4	x				
5th net	x	x	x						
6th net	x	x	x						
7th net	x	x	x						variant 1/2
8th net	x	x	x						
Total	12,000	12,000	12,000	6,000	6,000	3,000	1,500	3,000	4,500
New Federal States									
1st net	x	x	x	variant 4	x	x	x		
2nd net	x	x	x	variant 3	x			x	variant 1
Total	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500

Research Perspective

In spring 1992 the instrument outlined above was applied to a representative German sample of 15.771 people. This sample is split up into four subsamples: subsamples (1) and (2) from the old Federal States, including 7.318 interviewees between 16 and 59 years of age, and 5.339 interviewees of 60 years and above; subsamples (3) and (4) from the new Federal States, including 1.679 and 1.435 interviewees, respectively.

Subsequently, preparation of the raw data set was completed by the institute in charge of the field work (GFM-GETAS, Hamburg). Following this, several series of data checks were conducted during the second half of 1992. Since then, some preliminary and mostly descriptive results on different research topics have been presented at several symposia. However, more detailed and subtle analyses will not be published before late 1993. Therefore, in order to guarantee an undelayed and continuous flow of information, researchers interested in our current research are encouraged to contact the KFN which will provide them with an updated list of research reports and publications.

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Appendix

B1 INT: shuffle yellow cards and pass to interviewee

Now, we shall change the theme of the interview.
On these cards you will find different statements. Tell me how much you agree or disagree with each statement. If you completely agree with a statement, choose number 6. If you disagree completely with a statement, choose number 0. You can express your opinion by grading the statements up or down, using numbers 1 to 5. Please let me have the relevant letter, followed by the number of your choice.

INT: ring one number per line		completely disagree — completely agree	do not know
A	Someone who deliberately creates damage must pay for it	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
B	Severe sentences make convicted persons more aggressive	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
C	A lenient sentence is more likely to bring about an improvement in the perpetrator than a severe one	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
D	For many perpetrators, the only way to stop recurrence is through deterrence by heavy sentencing	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
E	The perpetrator will be more reasonable with the use of compensation for the crime and a talk with the victim, rather than through punishment	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
F	Severe sentences are necessary to deter others from committing crimes	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
G	Many are only really put on the wrong road after a prison sentence	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
H	If compensation and a talk with the victim are the only consequences, most perpetrators would be encouraged to commit further crimes	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
J	Punishment is necessary to strengthen public trust in the law and social order	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
K	Compensation and arbitration of conflicts are for the most part more important for both victim and perpetrator than conventional sentences	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
L	Prison sentences are sensible, because the perpetrator is out of circulation for a substantial period of time as a result	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8
M	Heavy sentences destroy the perpetrator's public and economic base, and the risk of re-offending increases as a result	0 / 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 / 6	8

C6

I am afraid, at home or elsewhere, of a stranger or someone I know:	very frequently . . . . . 1 frequently . . . . . 2 sometimes . . . . . 3 seldom . . . . . 4 never 5

A	-	of being burgled
B	-	of being beaten and injured
C	-	of being mugged and robbed
D	-	of being sexually molested
E	-	of being sexually abused or raped
F	-	of being the victim of a road traffic accident

C8, C9

You fear that you will be ... by someone you know, or a stranger:

A	-	burgled
B	-	beaten and injured
C	-	mugged and robbed
D	-	sexually molested
E	-	sexually abused or raped

Question C8: Where do you fear this is most likely to happen?	1) at home 2) at work 3) on public transport 4) on the street 5) in a secluded area 6) somewhere else
Question C9: Whom do you fear the most?	1) a stranger 2) several strangers (e.g. a group or a gang) 3) someone known or related to you

C11

How likely is it that one of the following will happen to you in the next 12 months?

very probable 1
probable 2
not so probable 3
improbable 4

A - being burgled
B - being beaten and injured
C - being mugged and robbed
D - being sexually molested
E - being sexually abused or raped
F - being the victim of a road traffic accident

F1 INT: place green card A-01 in front of interviewee

Has anyone ever snatched a handbag or any other kind of bag from you personally by force, and taken it away, or tried hard to do so?

Yes	1	→ F2
No	2	→ Put away card A-01, go to F7

F2 In which year did this last happen to you?

INT: ring relevant year

1991	1990	1989	1988	1987	1986 and earlier

F3 Such a thing can happen to a person more than once. Please think again, a bit more precisely this time, back to and including 1987. How often in each year has this happened to you?

INT: Under the stated year in question F2, note "Number of Incidents" for the "last" year. After that, ask about each of the further years below, and, if necessary, enter "Number of Incidents".

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987



INT: Go to F4	INT: Ring card A-01 on the summary table. Leave card in front of interviewee. Go to question F7	INT: Put away card A-01. Go to F7

F141

Do not agree at all	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	Agree completely

A - The perpetrator must be deterred by a severe sentence, so that he never does such a thing again

B - A lenient sentence would more likely reform the perpetrator than a harsh one

C - The perpetrator must be severely sentenced, so that people will continue to put their trust in law and order

D - A compensatory order and a talk with me would make the perpetrator more reasonable than sentencing

E - The perpetrator should pay for what he has done to me

F - Punishment of the perpetrator is not so important for me. I think that the perpetrator should above all pay me damages, and, where applicable, compensation

G - The perpetrator should be severely punished, so that others will be discouraged from committing crimes

H - The perpetrator should only be punished when he refuses to compensate for the damage and apologise

J - Nothing would improve in my case as a result of imposing a harsh sentence on the perpetrator

Name Index

Subject Index

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Early in 1991, the Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony (KFN) was given the task of carrying out a representative German victim survey of persons over 16 years of age. The aim of this survey, entitled »Feeling of Personal Safety, Fear of Crime and Violence and the Experience of Victimization amongst Elderly People«, is to gain knowledge about the extent and the structure of self-reported criminal victimization with special focus on the elderly. The area of intra-family victimization is especially emphasized. Analyzing fear of crime, subjective well-being, and personal feelings of safety with reference to relevant theory is another topic of research. Finally, attitudes towards crime and crime control and public opinion on current criminal justice issues are included within the framework of this survey.
In spring 1991, the KFN organized a workshop on these topics with experts from the USA, Canada, Great Britain, Switzerland, and Germany. The revised papers and statements that were discussed during this meeting are summarized in this reader. They range from reports about the authors' own experiences with problems of victim surveys to broad theoretical and methodological reviews.