

Politikwissenschaft

Germany and the foreign policies of Norway and Sweden

- strategic challenges and opportunities

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# List of Abbreviations

AA	Auswärtiges Amt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Germany)
AC	Arctic Council
AEPS	Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy
AMAP	Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
BSR	Baltic Sea Region
BSSSC	Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation
CBSS	Council of the Baltic Sea States
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CLCS	Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
CLRTAP	Convention on Long-Range Transported Air Pollution
CSCE	Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSR	Common Strategy on Russia (EU)
EC	European Community
EU	European Union
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESA	EFTA Surveillance Authority
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EP	Northern Dimension of the European Union
EUND	Northern Dimension of the European Union

FM	Foreign Minister
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GNC	Gas Negotiating Committee (Norway)
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force for Afghanistan
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PfP	Partnership for Peace (NATO)
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PM	Prime Minister
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team (NATO, Afghanistan)
PSC	Political and Security Committee (EU)
SEA	Single European Act
UGS	U.S. Geological Service
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
WEU	Western European Union
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction



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# Introduction

The initial point of this thesis was the working paper of the Norwegian diplomat Sverre Jervell who, writing in 2003, suggested that the Norwegian foreign and security policy should finally recognise the changed conditions for national security policy since the end of the Cold War and choose Germany as its European strategic partner.<sup>1</sup> This indicates that Germany has become a more important actor in Europe, a topic thoroughly debated over the last two decades. It has, however, hardly been analysed from a Nordic point of view. The aim of the thesis is thus to further the understanding of the possibilities and impediments of Germany in Europe. Why is Germany important, and how important is Germany, to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway and Sweden? What limitations exist in regards to Germany's role in Northern Europe? The conclusions reached on Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden are also an evaluation of German foreign policy as well as recommendations on the further development of German policy in northern Europe. In an even larger context, this should also highlight the EU's role in northern Europe as the foreign policy direction of Germany is decisive for the overall European developments. A foreign perspective on German foreign policy will hopefully give new arguments to the discussion on Germany's role in Europe and ultimately new insights on European cooperation.

The first question coming up is thus where to search for Germany's importance, in the bilateral relations or in the larger context of the challenges and opportunities of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies? Good bilateral relations are rather the reason why Germany is considered in the first place, in addition to Germany's economic power and leading role in the EU. A comparison of the strategic challenges and opportunities of these small, peripheral and very similar

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<sup>1</sup> JERVELL (2003).

and closely related European neighbours, who are quite distinct when it comes to foreign and security policy, should lead to an identification of the factors of importance to their foreign policies. Do these factors, decisive for good foreign policy solutions, differ due to different geographic areas of interest, foreign policy traditions, institutional frames of foreign policy, i.e. the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), or is the larger context of Nordic security the decisive factor? When it is obvious where to search for Germany's importance, the question is what theoretical implications this has for the further analysis. Finally, what influence does Germany have on the factors decisive for the two countries' strategic challenges and opportunities? This is both a question of what a potential there is for such an influence, and of whether Germany's potential opportunities are fully utilised or not. If this is not the case, the question is moreover why this is so and what policy direction in different issue areas are desirable. Finally, Germany's importance is also a question of how northern Europe is prioritised by German politics and how Germany's power is defined.

The factors decisive for both Nordic countries' foreign policy challenges and opportunities are Russia, international law, regional cooperation and US presence in Europe. A legal based international order and multilateral cooperation is of particular importance to Norway and Sweden in questions concerning war, peace, environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources. This conclusion of part I leads to move the theoretical analysis of part II beyond pure power politics, and the theory suitable to guide the following empirical analysis is derived from the English School, the advocate of a theory of international society which recovered an older European stream of thinking which recognised the habit of cooperation and the importance of law in the practice of international relations. This implies that German policy must be tested in regards to its ability to find the least common denominator between the actors decisive for Norway's and Sweden's strategic situation and moreover to broaden their common agenda. However, it must also be tested in regards to Germany's role as a European leader. Hence, consensus, legitimacy and independence are key terms of part III, and the most interesting situations of the analysis are connected to the legitimacy of the chosen foreign policy means when there is a conflict be-

tween order and justice. Sometimes even legitimacy is not sufficient to make the necessary policy solutions, which rather demands a will to make choices when a consensus is missing. Different principles of “good international citizenship” derived from the study of Linklater and Suganami (2006) are used to evaluate German policy in the case studies undertaken. The issue areas of the case studies were singled out due to the criteria of topical representativeness and dissimilarity in regards to the applicability of the theoretical guidelines of part II. The case studies focus on the regional contexts of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy which include the sub-contexts of the Nordic power triangle, i.e. the Russian, European and transatlantic triangle. Germany’s compatibility with the principles of good international citizenship is compared between issue areas in order to assess the overall importance of Germany to Norway and Sweden and also to recognise the mechanisms which limit Germany’s potential as a good international citizen in northern Europe. The conclusion is finally made that Germany’s potential for northern Europe is great. However, there is a lot of room for improvements of the policy conducted. German policy in certain areas is still an open question or is deliberately ignored. German policy on Russia and its neighbours needs to move in a solidarist direction in order to advance Russia’s integration in Europe. In order to be able to do so, Germany needs the EU and its member states as team players in order to be able to use its power. However, in order to prevent Germany from becoming too powerful due to its increasing impact on the EU, the power in the EU has to be defined, i.e. basic principles created, in order to have the necessary fundamental preconditions. Otherwise today’s situation continues which implies that the EU can not agree on the substance. Russia is the best example in this regard.

The conclusion can also be formulated in regards to Germany’s role in Europe that its experience leads to great opportunities as a foreign policy actor, and Germany’s importance is found in what it really is and not what it sometimes pretends to be. To a larger extent than before, Germany can make its own choices of direction. The political self-confidence is, however, still lacking.

Norwegian, Swedish and German quotations are translated to English in order to broaden the understanding. Some exceptions are made in regards to German, as

it is a quite acquainted language. As the interviewees are concerned, the original quotations are rendered in footnotes.



Part I.

Nordic Security



# 1. General conditions of Nordic security

The end of the Cold War reintroduced, with certain modifications, the relevance of the traditional power triangle to the Nordic region. The Swedish historian and political scientist Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922) wrote that the Nordic countries were trapped in a power triangle which at the time included Russia, Germany and England. Today, the power triangle is comprised of Russia, the EU and the US. The most constant factor of the power triangle around the Nordic region is the US dominating position as a sea power. The world economy increasingly depends on the US superior strategic position and ability to secure their own and other countries' communications at sea. The US also guarantees the stability in the central energy production areas and along the most important energy transport routes from the Middle East to Asia, America and Europe.

Today's Russia is a challenge both to the US and to Europe. According to former German foreign minister (FM) Joschka Fischer, both America and Europe continue to put off the question as to which role Russia will have in the new European order of states. Is it to be treated as a difficult partner or a strategic opponent?<sup>1</sup> The conflicts between the US and Europe on the one hand and Russia on the other are several. First, the question is how far NATO will move forward on previous Soviet territory. Moreover, the possible NATO memberships of the Ukraine and Georgia have large conflict potential. Furthermore, the plans initiated by the Bush administration to build an anti-missile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic against nuclear missiles from Iran also led to very strong objections from Russia. President Obama redesigned the anti-missile defence plans but it is still a difficult topic. Also other topics contribute to the difficult relationship: In Aserbajdjan there is a strong US commitment to bring the oil on the world market without going through the Russian pipeline network. As Kosovo

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<sup>1</sup> FISCHER (2009).

was acknowledged as a sovereign state in 2008 by most Western states, Moscow expressed strong objections. Since the war in Kosovo in 1999, the US-Russia relationship increasingly worsened.

The changed security situation after the end of the Cold War is also visible in the Arctic. After having receded into the background of Western attention, climate change has led to growing attention on Arctic security, not least because of the possible access to off-shore petroleum fields and other resources as well as the possibility of new Arctic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) in three passages - the Northwest Passage, the Northeast Passage and directly across the Polar Basin. The three corners of the power triangle are relevant to the Arctic as well. Stability and prosperity in the High North, as well as in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), can only be achieved with Russia's active and positive participation. If Russia is to be perceived as a strategic opponent, the West has to fundamentally change its agenda according to Fischer. Russia is still a great power in Europe and Asia, and the West needs to cooperate with Russia in order to solve regional conflicts and global challenges. This will be difficult with a strategic confrontation with Russia. The question is how severe the Russian threat really is. As Russia's geopolitical location and potential will stay a strategic factor, it is in the interest both of the EU and the US to include Russia in a strategic partnership.<sup>2</sup>

The dilemmas concerning the European-Russian relations will here be exemplified with energy relations. In a working paper of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Leonard and Popescu draw a picture of an EU divided between those states that view Russia as a potential partner that can be drawn into the EU's orbit through a process of "creeping integration", and those that see and treat Russia as a threat.<sup>3</sup> The authors furthermore characterise Russia's predominance in the relationship with the EU as surprising because it is actually the EU that outranges Russia both in regards to soft and hard power indicators. As energy is concerned, Russia's share of EU gas imports declined from 50 per cent to 40 per cent between 2000 and 2005 whereas 70 per cent of Russia's sales went to the EU. As long as there are no pipelines to China, Russia in the medium term

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<sup>2</sup> FISCHER (2009).

<sup>3</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007).

has no alternative to the EU market.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the EU's population is three and a half times the size of Russia's, military spending is ten times bigger and its economy 15 times the size of the Russian economy. Nonetheless, the EU is wasting the most effective power tool over Russia: its unity. Hence, Russia is able to build its relationship with the EU on different bilateral relations with the different EU members and to set the agenda in the EU-Russia relationship. As a centralised state, Russia deals with autonomous foreign policies. Russia has thus been able to top its influence on the EU whereas Europe has turned weaker, unable to use its power potential.<sup>5</sup> Hence, if power is defined as "the ability to achieve objectives rather than as the resources a country commends", Russia is in the better position, using its power to weaken the EU because it is able to split it.<sup>6</sup> According to Fischer, "Moscow will understand every signal of divergence and the weakness of the Western camp as an encouragement to return to great-Russian power policy."<sup>7</sup>

This policy has been well known during the presidencies of both Putin and Medvedev. The gas-supply conflict of Russia and the Ukraine of January 2009 to a large extent hit EU-countries.

"Moscow apparently wants to use the cold winter to convince the Europeans of the gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea. If the EU finally would create a common gas market, with which the pipelines also run from West to East, the situation would look completely different to Moscow and Kiev. Europe would be in a considerably stronger position."<sup>8</sup>

The 1200 kilometer Nord Stream pipeline to Germany is above all of strategic importance to the Russian Gazprom<sup>9</sup> as the existing pipelines go through transit states, e.g. Poland and the Ukraine. With the new pipeline, Gazprom can dictate the conditions. Russia, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands supported the Nord Stream pipeline project, whereas Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Belarus and the Ukraine were against it. Should Latvia and Lithuania wish to connect to the pipeline, they would not necessarily be allowed to

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<sup>4</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 8.

<sup>5</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), pp. 9-10.

<sup>6</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> FISCHER (2009).

<sup>8</sup> FISCHER (2009).

<sup>9</sup>The companies participating in the pipeline project are the Russian Gazprom and German Eon and BASF.

do so. The former Russian gas network passed through Belarus, the Ukraine and Moldova, whereas the Nord Stream pipeline bypasses them (as well as the Baltic states) and enables Russia to turn off the tap of other pipelines without risking their exports to Western Europe.<sup>10</sup> Hence, the pipeline will enhance Russia's power over the gas tap to Poland, the Ukraine, Belarus and to some extent to the Baltic states. It is also possible that a leg will be built to Kaliningrad, which would enable Russia to supply its exclave and weaken Lithuania's leverage on Kaliningrad<sup>11</sup> at the same time. Gazprom owns 51 per cent of the pipeline, whereas German BASF/Wintershall and E.ON/Ruhrigas own 24,5 per cent each.<sup>12</sup>

Russia decided to prioritise natural gas deliveries to Europe instead of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) deliveries to the US. The strategic energy dialogue between Russia and the EU is strongly attached to deliveries from the Russian fields on shore and, in the near future, from West Siberia through the Nord Stream gas pipeline. As far as the Barents Sea is concerned, pipeline-transported gas capabilities from this area can easily be developed towards Europe depending on the market development. The Nord Stream pipeline system could be coupled to the resources in the the Barents Sea through new pipelines on shore from the Murmansk area to Vyborg at the Gulf of Finland whenever needed.<sup>13</sup>

New oil and gas areas close to the US and European markets will be of great economic and security interest. With its proximity to these markets, great expectations are attached to the Barents Sea as a future "Atlantic energy basin". Estimations made by the U.S. Geological Survey (UGS) suggest that a high percentage of the world's undiscovered resources of oil and gas are situated in the Arctic. The survey of July 2008 estimates the petroleum reserves north of the Arctic Circle could amount to 13 per cent of the total undiscovered oil and about 30 per cent of the undiscovered natural gas. Arctic fields already under exploration make up approximately 10 percent of the world's known petroleum resources. However, the numbers are not based on comprehensive geological surveys of the

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<sup>10</sup>See also figure I.2 on page 80.

<sup>11</sup>Kaliningrad's need of energy imports is to a large part satisfied through the Lithuanian nuclear power plant Ignalina. However, as Ignalina will be closed down due to EU requirements, Lithuania will become completely dependent on importing natural gas from Russia.

<sup>12</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 17.

<sup>13</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2005A), p. 8.




Figure I.1.: Russia's energy resources in the Barents Sea. (Source: Sherpa Konsult)

areas involved, and approximately 84 percent of the oil and gas is located offshore.<sup>14</sup> As Holtsmark and Smith-Windsor remark, some of the most promising fields are situated within the littoral states' exclusive economic zones (EEZs)<sup>15</sup>, i.e. in undisputed areas. There is no assurance that the potential new or the already identified fields will be exploited. The first precondition is a consistently high petroleum price.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the assumption that

“there may be huge undiscovered petroleum reserves in the 'Arctic' (...) leads to the apparent conclusion that in view of expected scarcity of energy, there is a significant potential for violent conflict. The argument, of course, builds on the unspoken assumption that the expected new petroleum resources are in disputed areas. This, as a matter of fact, is hardly the case. The real situation is the direct opposite - the major share of the predicted recoverable oil and gas resources lie well within the Arctic Ocean states' undisputed ... EEZs.”<sup>17</sup>

Offerdal also argues “that development hinges upon industry interest in the region,

<sup>14</sup>U.S. Geological Survey (2008): *Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle*, <http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/>.

<sup>15</sup>A coastal state's economic zone is a special maritime zone that is outside but contiguous with its territorial sea. The EEZ is not part of the state's territory and subject to its sovereignty, unlike the territorial sea which is an ocean area contiguous with its land territory and internal waters.

<sup>16</sup> HOLTSMARK/ SMITH-WINDSOR (2009), p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> HOLTSMARK/ SMITH-WINDSOR (2009), p. 14.

and that this is more fragile than what certain policy statements rest upon.”<sup>18</sup> The littoral states’, i.e. Russia, the US, Denmark, Canada and Norway, economic interest in the area is nonetheless obvious, and most of the interesting areas are Russian.

The Russian development is moreover characterised by a high degree of unpredictability. The interconnection between the Russian state and the energy sector has to be mentioned as Russia’s energy exports have partly substituted, partly complemented the other power policy tools, particularly in a regional context.<sup>19</sup> The energy policy in Russia also aims at ‘energy security’, which implies a secure access to the consumer markets as well as a diversification of these markets. Moreover, a reduction of the transit routes over third-state territory and a vital infrastructure under state control are other elements of this security thinking.<sup>20</sup> Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, approved of by president Medvedev on 12 May 2009, also stresses the role of energy security. Russia’s energy reserves are thus decisive for Russia’s international position, and a “pragmatic policy and political use of its natural resources” has increased the country’s influence in the world.<sup>21</sup>

Since 1991, Russia has in a broad sense pursued a tough price policy, supply interruptions or threatened with such interruptions in approximately fifty cases. The states involved have been the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Moldavia or Georgia. The underlying and interconnected driving forces have been to force concessions in ongoing negotiations, to enable a Russian takeover of infrastructure, to force economic advantages or to send political signals. This behaviour to a large extent takes place in the grey zone between politics and market.<sup>22</sup> However, Russia has in general been a credible supplier of energy to Western Europe. The tough price policy occurred both under Jeltsin and Putin, whereas the supply interruptions were almost reduced by one half under Putin. Russia has in principle had a legitimate explanation in all the cases of supply interruptions. However, the way Russia is pursuing this policy, the topical con-

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<sup>18</sup> OFFERDAL (2009), p. 178.

<sup>19</sup> LARSSON (2006A), p. 11.

<sup>20</sup> LARSSON (2006B), pp. 48-49.

<sup>21</sup> Cited in ZYSK (2009).

<sup>22</sup> LARSSON (2006A), p. 13.



text, the time of action as well as the presented demands or comments testify to political interconnections, that according to Larsson were very obvious in over thirty cases. Moreover, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and former Eastern European states in particular, have experienced a dramatic increase in Russian takeovers of infrastructure and energy companies. Most of the states involved, including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, are taking the Russian actions seriously and have for the most part classified energy imports as a security question.<sup>23</sup> Russia's imperialistic policy does, however, not have any impact on the West's willingness to import Russia's energy, although the EU has stressed the necessity of imports diversification as a guiding principle.<sup>24</sup>

The developments prior to the financial crisis show that Russia wanted to increase its influence and owner shares at the expense of foreign companies that own oil and gas fields in Russia.<sup>25</sup> Gazprom, which within a few years has been transformed from a company with a private stock majority to a political tool, is almost always behind these decisions. Secondly, the income from the oil and gas production is the precondition for the improvement of the Russian economy, which again is the precondition for the strengthening of the Kremlin's political power. The increased state control with Russia's energy resources also raises questions of what direction the economic-political system in Russia is heading. The financial crisis hit Russia hard with low oil prices and is challenging Putin's energy doctrine, which does not seem to work in bad times. In order to develop its energy resources, Russia will have to attract foreign capital investments. In early April 2012 the Russian Economic Development Ministry lowered its forecast for the country's 2012 GDP growth from 3,7 to 3,4 per cent.<sup>26</sup> Before the financial crisis, the Russian economy was growing at more than 7 per cent per year. The reliance on oil revenues makes it vulnerable to a slowdown in economic growth and a sudden drop in commodity prices. The global crisis thus put an end to

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<sup>23</sup> LARSSON (2006A), p. 13.

<sup>24</sup>European Commission (2006): *Green Paper - A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu> (accessed 18 January 2009). Caspian energy and Turkey as an energy hub could be alternatives to some European countries.

<sup>25</sup>This has affected e.g. Shell, which cooperates with Japanese companies, the French Total and the Norwegian Hydro that together own and conduct a field in Siberia, as well as British Petroleum which has emphasised cooperation with Russian interests through the company TKN-BP.

<sup>26</sup>[http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/18/c\\_131533631.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2012-04/18/c_131533631.htm)

economic growth in Russia, and its post-crisis economic performance has been disappointing with only moderate growth and high inflation.<sup>27</sup> In the National Security Strategy (2009), the Russian economy's dependence on exports of raw materials is recognised as a security threat. Foreign involvement in the national economy is, however, also characterised as such.<sup>28</sup> Despite enormous gas reserves, Russia falls short in both production capability and means of supply. Exploiting and developing new resources have been sacrificed in order to control the energy production.

Whereas energy relations to a large extent exemplify the European-Russian challenges, the core challenge in Western-Russian relations is NATO, which still is a tool for US anti-Russian policy. Putin on the other hand has apparently not realised that an aggressive Russian foreign policy is the best and most efficient life insurance for NATO. Russia has suggested negotiations over a new European security order. In this regard, Fischer has some very interesting thoughts, building on the conclusion that Russia has to be the West's difficult partner and not a strategic opponent:

The West should not repudiate the Russian desire for new negotiations. It should use it as a chance to finally answer the key question of Russia's role in Europe. In doing so, NATO will have to play the pivotal role because it is indispensable to the very large majority of Europeans as well as for America. The balance of interests could consist in the unmodified existence of the principles and institutions of the European order of states. In return, Russia would become a fundamentally expanded role inside NATO, including the outlook of a full membership. (...) Why not consider to rebuild NATO to an efficient European security system, including Russia? (...) Admittedly, this proposal postulates two things that are not presently given: first a common transatlantic exposure to Russia, second a significantly more united and hence stronger EU."<sup>29</sup>

Also Russia's new national security strategy comments on the weakness of the current global and regional security order, as it is favouring NATO. It still opposes the eastern enlargement closer to the Russian borders and a global function of NATO. On the other hand, the strategy expresses preparedness for negotiations and developing relations with NATO if the prerequisites of equality and respect

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<sup>27</sup>IMF Survey Magazine (2011) "Russia Should Leverage Commodity Boom to Boost Growth", 27 September at <http://www.imf.org> (accessed 30 September 2011).

<sup>28</sup>Cited in ZYSK (2009).

<sup>29</sup> FISCHER (2009) [author's translation].

for Russia's interests are accounted for.<sup>30</sup>

The Russian challenge to the West is the overall essential factor to Nordic security. The following chapters will analyse the different Norwegian and Swedish challenges in this regard.

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<sup>30</sup>Cited in ZYSK (2009).



## 2. Germany as a strategic partner?

To determine how to proceed with the assessment of Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden, the possibility of a strategic partnership will be examined in the case of Norway as suggested by Jervell.<sup>31</sup>

In 1999, the Norwegian government launched the so called "Strategy on Germany". The strategy has been followed up by subsequent governments, i.e. is the responsibility of the State Department, and was revised in October 2007 as a result of Germany's economic and political importance to Norway, being Norway's third largest export market and second largest trade partner. The content of the strategy will be analysed in order to draw a picture of Norway's existing policy on their German partner. Moreover, in order to examine what ambitions Norway really has in regards to its relationship with Germany, and what the reactions are on the German side, in-depth elite interviews have been conducted with main primary sources, i.e. persons vital to the German-Norwegian relationship. These interviewees are persons with a large amount of expertise on the subject, however, the number of experts on both sides is considered to be very limited:

The Norwegian politician Bjørn Tore Godal from the Labour Party was Minister of Trade and Shipping from 1991 to 1994, then Minister of foreign Affairs 1994 to 1997, and Minister of Defence 2000 to 2001. From 2001 to 2007 he was the Norwegian ambassador to Germany. From 2007 he has acted as special adviser to the Norwegian State Department in international energy- and climate issues. Further, Inge Lønning is a long standing parliamentarian from the Conservative Party (Høyre), president of the "German-Norwegian Society" and the laureate of the Willy-Brandt-Award in 2009.<sup>32</sup> Major Odd Haugdahl is a former representa-

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<sup>31</sup>See the introduction.

<sup>32</sup>The Willy-Brandt-award is handed out by the "Willy-Brandt-Foundation", a Norwegian-German initiative to further mutual knowledge of both countries' society, culture and language

tive of the Norwegian army at the German-Dutch corps in Münster (Germany). An interview in the Norwegian State Department has also contributed to illuminate Norwegian policy thinking, but did not allow for citation. On the German side, the contact person for the economic service at the Federal Republic of Germany's embassy in Oslo, Alfred Grannas, has been the interviewee.<sup>33</sup>

Germany is an important market for Norwegian natural gas, fish and auto parts, and the largest market for Norwegian tourism.<sup>34</sup> Cooperation in economy, technology, research, science, defence etc. is extensive, and Germany has also become "one of Norway's closest cooperation partners" in questions concerning foreign, security and defence policy.<sup>35</sup> Germany is also one of Norway's closest cooperation partners within NATO and the EU.

"As closely linked to the EU, but without membership, Norway has a special need to advance its interests bilaterally toward the single EU countries. Because of its size, location and political culture, Germany is a particularly important partner to Norway in the EU."<sup>36</sup>

Moreover, Norwegian governments have realised that "there is today not a satisfactory connection between Germany's importance to Norway and the consciousness Norwegians have of Germany's importance."<sup>37</sup> This may indeed be an obstacle to a strategic partnership with Germany, although the problem is at least recognised by Norwegian authorities. Furthermore, it is stated that it is of particular importance

"to build up networks and personal contacts on all levels in such an important EU country as Germany. Because of this, the Strategy on Germany not only discusses the official Norwegian relations with Germany but also the role of political parties, cultural and research institutions, organisations of economy etc."<sup>38</sup>

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and to strengthen the cooperation and contact between different groups in the Norwegian and German societies. The award goes to persons or institutions rendering outstanding efforts to develop the Norwegian-German connections.

<sup>33</sup> According to the embassy, only two persons here are well versed in the topic of this thesis.

<sup>34</sup> Yearly, 450 000 German tourists visit Norway.

<sup>35</sup> Strategy on Germany part I at <http://www.regjeringen.no/n/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringa-Stoltenberg-II/Utanriksdepartementet/423153/2003/tysklandsstrategi/1.html?id=448603> (accessed 10 October 2008). In the following cited as Strategy on Germany part I.

<sup>36</sup> Strategy on Germany part I. Author's translation.

<sup>37</sup> Strategy on Germany part I. Author's translation.

<sup>38</sup> Strategy on Germany part I. Author's translation.

In the first phase of the strategy, actions were implemented in order to increase Norway's accessibility in Germany<sup>39</sup>, to increase the knowledge of German circumstances in Norway<sup>40</sup> and to further mutual knowledge of each other in Norway and Germany.<sup>41</sup> The overall purposes of the "Strategy on Germany" are to

- "Strengthen the consciousness in Norway of Germany's importance for the development of our country, both on the economic, political and cultural field."
- "Establish Norwegian competence on the German language and German affairs."
- "To intensify the bilateral contacts with Germany because of the country's understanding of Norwegian considerations and interests and the country's great importance in the EU."<sup>42</sup>

How the Norwegian government is going to achieve the aims of strengthened consciousness of Germany's importance and establish more Norwegian competence on the German language is questionable. Reports from the Norwegian school show that German is disappearing as a foreign language. Hence, the development went in the opposite direction of what was expected when the Berlin wall fell and Germany again appeared as the most important and central country in Europe. Moreover, despite the fact that Germany is Norway's most important cooperation partner within the EU's programs for research and technological development, a decreasing number of Norwegian students go to study in Germany: 20 years ago, the number was 4000, in 2008 it was 207, of which only ten were studying economics.<sup>43</sup> According to Jørgen Fodstad at the Norwegian-German chamber of commerce, many of the Norwegian leaders of companies and enterprises today are fluent in German and know the German culture. However, when they retire, this could have consequences for Norwegian-German trade.<sup>44</sup> The German ambassador to Oslo, Mauch, has stated the following:

"Germany appears to be reduced to the "Elbtunnel" to many [Norwegians], at the end of which the sun of the south appears. German is rarely taught as a second foreign language in the Norwegian school any-

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<sup>39</sup>The "norwegen - die offizielle Seite in Deutschland" site at [www.norwegen.no](http://www.norwegen.no) was established.

<sup>40</sup>The national resource center for German at the University of Oslo was established in 2001.

<sup>41</sup>The Norwegian-German Willy Brandt foundation was founded in 2000.

<sup>42</sup>Strategy on Germany part I. Author's translation.

<sup>43</sup> AFTENPOSTEN TEMAUTGIVELSER (2008), p. 22.

<sup>44</sup>Cited in AFTENPOSTEN TEMAUTGIVELSER (2008), p. 22.

more. Among business people English is increasingly used as a compromise language between German and Norwegian. The consequence is that an immediate understanding is difficult, misunderstandings could even constrain further contacts. The language makes it possible to get to know and understand the neighbour and the neighbouring country in a better way.”<sup>45</sup>

The centre-left Stoltenberg government has abandoned the demand of two compulsory foreign languages in the Norwegian junior high school or “ungdomsskolen” (levels 8-10). Norway is the only country in Europe with only one compulsory foreign language. Thus, the intentions of the Norwegian government, regardless of the “Strategy on Germany”, do not seem to have a long-term perspective. Such a strategy can not be successful unless the overall government policy aims at achieving the purposes of the strategy listed above. Godal comments the government’s second language decision as follows:

“I don’t agree with the decision made, but it was not directed at German in particular, but rather at teaching a second foreign language in general. But the effect was indeed that it weakened the opportunities for German to thrive. But it is sad, and we have to make amends with whatever means we can. The Oslo schools have been very active on Germany. An example is the City Council of Oslo’s councillor of education who is committed to Norwegian-German relations, and has provided exchange programs between Oslo and Berlin. This is an example to be followed. (...) However, other countries have become more attractive destinations for a university education.”<sup>46</sup>

Lønning on the other hand remarks that it has been a shortfall of Norwegian school policy for several decades:

“The perception that if you have a tolerably good grasp of the English language, then all problems are solved is a simplification of how the world really works. (...) We have in a way viewed this as a lost cause, and there is no longer any good-will capital which can be activated. And then it is assumed that as long as there are a few people here or there who have some particular reasons to learn German, it is enough.”<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup>Cited at [http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/de/02/Galleri\\_Ambassadorer\\_Seite.html](http://www.oslo.diplo.de/Vertretung/oslo/de/02/Galleri_Ambassadorer_Seite.html) (accessed 9 April 2009) [author’s translation].

<sup>46</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Jeg er ikke enig i beslutningen, men den var jo ikke rettet mot tysk, men mot et annet fremmedspråk. Men effekten var jo at den svekket tyskens muligheter. Men det er trist, og vi må ta igjen det vi kan. Oslo-skolen har f.eks. vært veldig aktiv på Tyskland. Skole-byråden i Oslo har et engasjement på Tyskland og har sørget for utvekslingsordninger mellom Oslo og Berlin som er et eksempel til etterfølgelse. (...) Men andre land er blitt mer attraktive universitetsmål.”

<sup>47</sup>Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “forestillingen om at hvis man behersker engelsk sånn noelunde så er alle prob-



At the top political level, German-Norwegian relations are close. Germany gets an excellent testimony from the former FM, DM and ambassador Godal:

“My experience is that the Germans were the most important to communicate well with, both during the EEA and the EU negotiations, which I followed closely first as Minister of Commerce with the responsibility for the EEA agreement, and later as a foreign minister. And there was no doubt that the German leadership felt it was important to include Norway, for Pan-European reasons. They see the European map as incomplete if Norway is not a member. And then everyone can make their own opinion in that regard, but it is clear that it is a benefit to us politically which we have used when needing support from Germany in issues like, for instance, the salmon case.<sup>48</sup> There have not been many conflicts with the EU during these years, but this is one example, and I experience Germany as an ally.”<sup>49</sup>

Whereas Americans, the British and the French have hardly sent a top-ranking politician to Norway in a generation<sup>50</sup>, Merkel’s visit to Norway in April 2008 was the fifth visit of a German chancellor to Norway in less than eight years. FM Steinmeier has visited Norway several times, Svalbard included. Former Norwegian PM Bondevik visited Germany six times during his terms of office.<sup>51</sup> PM Stoltenberg has also made several visits to Berlin and decided to meet Angela Merkel for talks, with Russia as the main topic, only one week before he went on an official visit to Moscow in May 2009 to meet both president Medvedev and PM Putin.<sup>52</sup>

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lemer løst. Og det er klart at så enkel er verden ikke. (...) Man har på en måte ansett dette som et tapt slag, og der ligger det ikke lenger noen kapital som det er mulig å aktivere. Og så har man gitt seg med at bare det finnes en håndfull mennesker her eller der som av litt sære interessegrunner lærer seg tysk, så er det nok.”

<sup>48</sup>In January 2006 the EU Commission introduced a minimum price on salmon imported from Norway, after Scottish salmon farmers claimed that Norwegian salmon was sold to EU nations at prices below production cost. Norway rejected the accuse of subsidising the salmon industry and that salmon is sold at dumping prices on the EU market. The dispute was brought before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

<sup>49</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Min erfaring er at det var det landet det var viktigst å kommunisere med, både under EØS- og EU-forhandlingene, som jeg fulgte tett både som handelsminister med ansvar for EØS-avtalen og siden som utenriksminister. Og det var ingen tvil om at lederskapet på tysk side syntes det var viktig å ha Norge med, av alleuropeiske grunner. De ser på europakartet som ufullstendig hvis ikke Norge er med. Og så kan man mene hva man vil om det, men det er klart at det er en kapital for oss politisk som vi også har brukt når vi har trengt støtte fra Tyskland i spørsmål som i laksesaken for eksempel. Og det er ikke mange konflikter vi har hatt med EU i disse årene, men dette er et eksempel på det, og Tyskland opplever jeg som en støttespiller.”

<sup>50</sup>The exception was Bill Clintons visit in 1999.

<sup>51</sup>Cited in UDGAARD (2008).

<sup>52</sup> UDGAARD (2009).

In October 2007, Norway's King Harald V stated in a Berlin speech that "Germany is Norway's most important partner in Europe."<sup>53</sup> As Udgaard remarks, the words were noted in Oslo's diplomatic environment, as the king's speeches are created in close contact with the government. Another sign of the increased Norwegian emphasis on Germany was the reopening of the consulate general in Hamburg, whereas others have been closed.<sup>54</sup> Although the Norwegian public is not aware of how close Norway's relations with Germany have become, politicians obviously are. In January 2008, a "Norwegian-German friendship group" was created consisting of 35 members of the Norwegian parliament. Such a move is not common in the Storting, which until then only had a "Friends of Israel" group. A part of the group has already visited the parliamentarians and government departments in Berlin.<sup>55</sup>

The main obstacle to a strategic partnership with Germany seems to be, in addition to the lack of knowledge of the German language and vice versa of course the lack of knowledge of the Norwegian language, the term "strategic partnership" itself. It is hardly used by any Norwegian politician to describe the relationship with Germany.

"I don't think the foreign minister or others have used the term strategic partnership. But in reality it is close to being just that. At least I think so, but if you use the term strategic partnership in this case, then why not with the countries x, y, z. Then you get in a hopeless situation, and that is probably why it is not used. But I would think that the cooperation with Germany is a pillar of Norwegian foreign policy, and it is the large EU-country that is closest to us - politically, economically and culturally. That does not diminish the importance of others, but times have shown, with the exceptions of the two world wars, that there is a dimension in the Norwegian-German cooperation that is much closer than what many now realise."<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Cited in UDGAARD (2008).

<sup>54</sup> UDGAARD (2008).

<sup>55</sup> UDGAARD (2008).

<sup>56</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: "Jeg tror ikke utenriksministeren eller andre har brukt uttrykket strategisk partnerskap. Men i realiteten er det jo meget nær å være det. Men hvis man først bruker ordet strategisk partnerskap, hvorfor da ikke med land x, y, z. Da kommer du inn i en håpløs situasjon, og det er vel derfor det ikke er brukt. Men jeg vil mene at samarbeidet med Tyskland er en bærebjelke i norsk utenrikspolitikk, og det er det av de store EU-landene som står oss nærmest, politisk, økonomisk og kulturelt, men det er ikke til forkleinelse for andre. Det har vist seg gjennom tidene med unntak av de to verdenskrigene at det er en slags dimensjon i det norsk-tyske samarbeidet som er mye nærere enn mange nå er klar over."

A strategic partnership is in Norway perceived to be something the EU can have with Russia, or Germany with Russia and France, and other great powers can have with whom they may chose. It is, however, nothing the Norwegian State Department wants to be official Norwegian policy, because, among other things, this might give the impression that other states are less important. In most cases they are, but that does not have to be spoken out loudly. Norway also has “country strategies” on France, Russia, and the US. The “northern areas dialogues” are also conducted with many states in addition to Germany. Despite the German helpfulness and the open doors to Norwegian concerns, the concept of a strategic partnership is not suitable for the Norwegian policy makers and is also not mentioned in the “Strategy on Germany”. Could it be though, that Norway practically has a strategic partnership with Germany on a high level but without the foundation of the Norwegian population? Godal answers the following:

“I think that creates a false sense of conflict. I don’t like the term because it is very selective. Out of the large EU countries, Germany is the closest to us, and we have to develop that further. I would not call it strategic partnership, because that would be to think categorically. Is France suddenly not so important anymore? This is why I do not use the word to anyone. (...) And even less so would I say that we have this on a top level but not amongst people. That would be to trivialise it. I would rather say that we have, firstly, a close and tight relationship with Germany, and secondly, that it is important to further develop the connections between the Norwegian and German people. That is why the Strategy on Germany describes measures to realise this.”<sup>57</sup>

There is reason to believe that Godal’s objections to the term “strategic partnership” explain why the FM is not using it either. In the terminology of the State Department, Norway has a bilateral strategy on Germany, not a strategic partnership with Germany. Then PM Bondevik from the Christian Democratic Party suggested a strategic partnership between Norway and Germany in Berlin in 1999: “We have to build on what we have achieved through many years of com-

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<sup>57</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Jeg synes det er en kunstig motsetning. Jeg er ikke så glad i uttrykket fordi det er veldig selektivt. Tyskland er det av de store EU-landene som står oss nærmest, og det må vi utvikle videre. Jeg vil ikke kalle det strategisk partnerskap, for det blir å tenke i bokser. Er plutselig ikke Frankrike så viktig lenger? Det er derfor jeg ikke bruker ordet overfor noen. (...) Og enda mindre vil jeg si at vi har det på toppnivå men ikke blant folk. Det blir en banalisering av det, men jeg vil heller si 1. vi har et tett og nært nabolikapsforhold til Tyskland, og 2. å utvikle og gjøre de folkelige kontaktene bedre er også viktig, og der har vi mye å hente. Det er derfor Tyskland-strategien beskriver tiltak for å få det til.”

mon history and should (...) look forward and move toward a strategic partnership between Norway and Germany.”<sup>58</sup> However, this idea has not been supported by the overall political and diplomatic elite in Norway, as nobody has seized the suggestion posed by Bondevik. Lønning shares a similar opinion to Godal’s on the term “strategic partnership”. If Norway would become a member of the EU, the isolated perspective Norway - Germany would be left behind, according to Lønning,

“then we would face a more complicated situation where we would have to relate to all the member countries of the EU in the capacity of being an EU member (...) That is also something which to a minor degree happens today through the EEA agreement, of course, but ... that is where Norwegian diplomacy has to find the right balance, because if you, for instance, demonstratively and at every opportunity would join bilateral alliances directed toward others inside the EU-system, forces would immediately activate to counteract. So you can not have a one-sided focus on a bilateral partnership between Norway and Germany.”<sup>59</sup>

Lønning also thinks the term is inappropriate when it is used to describe the relationship between two countries, whose sizes differ to such a great amount.<sup>60</sup> Grannas on the other hand thinks such an argument is rather an excuse in order to keep options open.

“The important thing is that both countries have something to offer each other. It does not have to be directed against others. It is German policy to involve as many countries as possible. The substance [of the German-Norwegian relations] is available, it does not matter how it is named.”<sup>61</sup>

According to Grannas, it is thus rather German policy to listen to all small and middle-sized countries and then forming an opinion. Further, a Norwegian mem-

<sup>58</sup>Kjell Magne Bondevik, speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Berlin, 29 November 1999. Cited in JERVELL (2003), p. 93 [author’s translation.]

<sup>59</sup>Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “for da går vi plutselig inn i et mer komplisert bilde hvor vi skal forholde oss til alle EUs medlemskapsland i egenskap av EU-medlemskap. Det gjør man jo i mindre måleskottokk i dag og gjennom EØS-avtalen, selvfølgelig, men, og det er jo der naturligvis norsk diplomati må balansere, for hvis man demonstrativt og i tide og utide liksom inngår bilaterale allianser rettet mot andre innenfor EU-systemet, for eksempel, så vil det jo straks utløse motkrefter innlysende nok. Sånn at du kan ikke satse ensidig på et bilateralt partnerskap mellom Norge og Tyskland.”

<sup>60</sup>Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo.

<sup>61</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. The statement in German: “Beide müssen etwas zu geben haben. Es muss sich nicht gegen andere richten. Es ist die Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, so viele wie möglich einzubinden. Die Substanz ist da, wie man sie bezeichnet, ist egal.”

bership in the EU would increase the degree of integration, and the possibilities for cooperation would be deepened. Furthermore, there would be a great potential for creating alliances, as the approaches in Norway and Germany are very similar in regards to the definition of a problem and how it is to be solved. A very significant example are the nuclear disarmament initiatives in NATO.<sup>62</sup>

The Norwegian reluctance to use the term “strategic partnership”, was met with some surprise from a German point of view.

“Practically, it is a strategic partnership. We do not have any problem characterising it as such. When you look at the substance, the relationship [with Germany] is the closest.”<sup>63</sup>

Grannas agrees that the description of Norwegian-German relations as a strategic partnership on a high level but without the foundation in the respective populations is appropriate.

“The Norwegian-German partnership is an elite project, just as the German-French partnership. It is operated from above as a project of the political, cultural and economic elites. It is a partnership that results from several interests and has similar effects as a project. What does not take place, is that [in the case of Germany and Norway] the substance does not go beyond the circle of the persons concerned. They are countries that are important to each other but take little notice of each other.”<sup>64</sup>

An interesting part in this regard is the network establishments. One aim of the “Strategy on Germany” is e.g. to develop a German-Norwegian network of young, active people who can be expected to capture important positions in the societies of both countries in the future.<sup>65</sup> A relative new network is the “German Norwegian Network” (GNN), established for young leaders in politics, diplomacy and economy aiming at both informal and professional connections to develop

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<sup>62</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.

<sup>63</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in German: “In der Praxis ist es eine strategische Partnerschaft. Wir haben keine Probleme, das Verhältnis so zu bezeichnen. Wenn man die Substanz anschaut, ist die Beziehung [mit Deutschland] am dichtesten.”

<sup>64</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. The statement in German: “Die norwegisch-deutsche Partnerschaft ist ein Elitenprojekt, genau wie die Deutsch-Französische Partnerschaft. Sie wird von oben getrieben als ein Projekt der politischen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Eliten. Es ist eine Partnerschaft, die sich aus verschiedenen Interessen ergibt, die ähnliche Wirkungen wie ein Projekt haben. Was nicht stattfindet ist, dass die Substanz [der Norwegisch-Deutschen Beziehungen] aus dem Kreis der Befassten herausgeht. Sie sind Länder, die wichtig füreinander sind, die aber wenig voneinander wahrnehmen.”

<sup>65</sup>Strategy on Germany part I. Author’s translation.

FLOW OF GOODS	VALUE		SHARE IN TOTAL	
	Norway	Sweden	Norway	Sweden
Imports to Germany	22 251	14 182	2,72 %	1,73 %
Exports from Germany	7 647	20 648	0,77 %	2,08 %
Trade Balance	-14 604	6 466	-	-

Table I.1.: Trade balance of Germany with Norway and Sweden (in million EUR) 2008.

German-Norwegian links in a larger perspective.<sup>66</sup> However, the close cooperation, as it is also commented in the strategy on Germany, is little known in Norway, and according to Godal, he would like to see more content on Germany in Norwegian media and communication channels. Only three Norwegian newspapers regularly report on German matters. This is the most important factor in German-Norwegian relations that should be improved.<sup>67</sup>

Economic cooperation is an important part of the German-Norwegian partnership, and energy is again the most important part of that. The relevance of the bilateral relationship to energy companies is e.g. apparent through sponsoring of students, especially from the German side. The sponsors of the yearly German-Norwegian youth forum are moreover StatoilHydro and E.on Ruhrgas.

“I often experienced that German industry leaders felt there were few Norwegians sufficiently fluent in German for jobs they wanted to fill. I think it is a commendable and praiseworthy effort when they attempt to promote German skills and recruit Norwegians to Germany and vice versa.”<sup>68</sup>

As table I.1<sup>69</sup> shows, it is not a very equal economic relationship between the two

<sup>66</sup>GNN, that has chosen an English name, has 100 members, of which 30 are active. “GNN’s purpose is to bring together young decision takers and to expand the contact net and to lift the level of knowledge of our members, all to the pleasure and use for our work within the German-Norwegian cooperation” according to their vice president, Christoph Morck. Cited in AFTENPOSTEN TEMAUTGIVELSER (2008), p.17.

<sup>67</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.

<sup>68</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statemenet in German: “Jeg opplevde ofte at tyske industriledere syntes det var for lite tilfang av nordmenn som kunne tysk til jobber som de ville besette. Jeg mener at det er et aktverdig og prisverdig formål at de forsøker å fremme tysk kunnskap og rekruttering av nordmenn til Tyskland og gjerne omvendt.”

<sup>69</sup>Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) *Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im*

parts, which thus, can be improved. Germany's trade with Sweden on the other hand is more balanced. In 2008, Norway had the 14th position on the German ranking list of trade partners in regards to imports to Germany and the 28th in regards to exports from Germany, whereas Sweden took the positions 18 and 14 respectively.<sup>70</sup>

“30 per cent of the gas market in Germany is supplied by Norway, whereas the Russians have 40 percent. Our market share increase, while the Russians' decrease. So to the Germans, it is important to have Norway as a trustworthy, long term supplier. We are interesting to them, but they are also paying a high price for the resources, even though the price goes up and down. And ... we are of course interested in getting more on equal terms in our relationship with Germany, because we profit much more from the Germans than they do from us. (...) I think it is important to get the Germans as partners in the value creation process happening on the Norwegian side, it is good for the bilateral relations, I think. And fortunately we see that German oil companies start taking an interest in the North Sea. (...) There is no German tradition for offshore activity except for special equipment and technique, freezing techniques and other things that are being used at Melkøya<sup>71</sup> and other places, but the companies have had little activity on the Norwegian shelf. Now, however, they are coming, and RWE, Wintershall and Verbundnetz are on their way and have small, increasing shares of ownership.”<sup>72</sup>

As table I.2<sup>73</sup> shows, the Norwegian proportion of Germany's imports of natural gas has increased to a large extent from 1993 to 2008, whereas the dutch share has decreased and Russia has been and still is a very solid energy supplier to Germany. It is, however, also a German interest to participate in the exploration of oil and gas:

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*Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008.* Wiesbaden.

<sup>70</sup>Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) *Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008.* Wiesbaden.

<sup>71</sup>The world's largest natural gas liquefaction plant is outside the Norwegian town of Hammerfest.

<sup>72</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: “30 prosent av gassmarkedet i Tyskland er norsk, russerne har 40 prosent, vi øker, russerne minsker. Så for dem er det viktig å ha Norge som en troverdig, langsiktig leverandør. Vi er interessante for dem, men de betaler også dyrt for de ressursene. Selv om prisen går opp og ned. Og ... vi er jo interessert i å få litt mer likeverd inn i relasjonen til Tyskland, for vi tjener mye mer på tyskerne enn de tjener på oss. (...) Det å få tyskerne med på verdiskapning på norsk side mener jeg er bra for de bilaterale forbindelsene. Og heldigvis ser vi nå at tyske oljeselskaper begynner å utvise interesse for Nordsjøen. (...) Det er ingen tysk tradisjon for offshore-aktivitet bortsett fra spesielt utstyr og teknikk, fryseteknikk og annet som brukes på Melkøya og andre steder, men selskapene har vært lite aktive på norsk sokkel. Men nå begynner de å komme, og både RWE, Wintershall, Verbundnetz Gas er nå alle på vei og har små, økende eierandaler.”

<sup>73</sup>The table is based on data from Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2009) *Zahlen und Fakten. Energiedaten. Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung*, <http://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/Technologie-und-Energie/Energiepolitik/energiedaten.html>

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	1993	1998	2003	2008
NETHERLANDS	39 %	27 %	20 %	19 %
NORWAY	17 %	25 %	31 %	33 %
RUSSIA	42 %	44 %	44 %	44 %
OTHER	2 %	3 %	5 %	4 %

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Table I.2.: Share of natural gas imports to Germany for selected years.

“In order to preserve our interest of secure energy supply from countries like Russia, we have to participate more intensely in the exploration and extraction of new sources. In order to get into this production business, Germany needs *Global Players* strong on investments that can cooperate with the firms in the producing countries.”<sup>74</sup>

An example of German-Norwegian energy relations is the cooperation between StatoilHydro und Linde AG on the LNG liquefaction plant of the island Melkøya near the town of Hammerfest. The plant receives natural gas through a 150 km long pipeline from the gas field Snøhvit in the Barents Sea. It is important to include Germany and other countries in order for them to pay attention to the developments on the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea, and in order to include an important European importing country and outbalance the influence that Russia might have on Norwegian policy. According to Jervell, an integration of Norwegian companies with German companies would make an important foundation for a strategic partnership. The possible advantages of such an integration might lead to increased support from German energy companies. Such a support could e.g. have been valuable in the case of the energy directive<sup>75</sup>, which will be referred to in chapter 3.4. In addition to a Norwegian membership in the EU, Grannas mentions Norwegian-German-Russian cooperation as another opportunity to deepen the relations between Norway and Germany. Norway and Germany have very similar approaches to Russia. Common projects on energy, environment and climate would thus be very interesting.<sup>76</sup> However, this seems to be an idea not yet considered by Norwegian authorities.

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<sup>74</sup>Cited in DER SPIEGEL (2007) [author’s translation].

<sup>75</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 92.

<sup>76</sup> Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation.



Norway's national budget and economy is strongly dependent on the energy business, and the gas business makes up an increasing part of the petroleum industry. The Norwegian gas export accounts for approximately 20 per cent of the European consumption, and the Norwegian Oil and Energy Ministry expects the gas sales to reach a level of between 105 and 130 billion Sm<sup>3</sup><sup>77</sup> in 2020.<sup>78</sup> The bilateral relationship is strongly shaped by the energy relations, and the assessment of these can not be solely positive from an economic point of view. The infrastructure for gas-fired power plants is given in Germany, which also leads to a reduction of CO<sup>2</sup> emission. However German energy companies are bleeding because of expensive long-term gas contracts with Norway and Russia whereas the Norwegian oil and energy minister Borten Moe aims at German guarantees for Germany's willingness to buy more Norwegian gas. After the financial crisis the electricity prices in Europe have been so low that the natural gas distributors in e.g. Germany get difficulties as electricity produced by Norwegian gas has become very costly. The long term contracts have a level above the market price and thus impede the importers as the German VNG (Verbundnetz Gas). VNG thus negotiates with both Statoil (Norway) and Gazprom (Russia) in order to adjust the gas agreements. According to the German company, the future of the Norwegian gas adventure is dependent on a Norwegian adjustment to the market situation.<sup>79</sup> Michael Ludwig, board member of VNG and executive chair of VNG Norway, assesses the Norwegian-German energy cooperation in the following way:

“Norway has lately at several opportunities expressed the wish that the German government commits itself to buying natural gas. That will not happen under these circumstances. (...) German authorities have on several occasions lately expressed themselves positively in regards to natural gas. To secure that the sale of Norwegian natural gas will continue to be successful in Germany, it does not take more than what was given in the early 1990s. Then there were competitive prices and an excellent sales structure which made gas the winner (...). Natural gas will continue to have an important role in the German energy supply for several years ahead. It is the perfect partner for renewable energy both in the market for heating but also in the electricity market where the natural gas can play a larger

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<sup>77</sup>Normally, oil is measured in million standard cubic metres (MSm<sup>3</sup>) and gas in million standard cubic metres (GSm<sup>3</sup>). 1MSm<sup>3</sup> = 1 000 000 Sm<sup>3</sup>; 1GSm<sup>3</sup> = 1 000 000 000 Sm<sup>3</sup>. Standard cubic metre indicates how many cubic metres there is of a substance when it has a temperature of 15°C and a pressure of 1,01325 bar pressure (standard air pressure).

<sup>78</sup>Cited in HELGESEN (2012), p. 40.

<sup>79</sup> HELGESEN (2012), p. 40.

role since Germany has chosen to shut down the nuclear power plants.”<sup>80</sup>

In the field of energy cooperation there are thus diverging interests between Norway and Germany, which at the same time are very interested in a continuation of a successful history of cooperation. The point made by Jervell, who launched the idea of a strategic partnership, was that through a strategic partnership with Germany, which in practice would mean that Berlin is considered with special care in Oslo in a way that Norway regularly considers how Norwegian diplomatic output is functioning in regards to Berlin, Norway would improve its possibility to gain support in difficult questions like the (by now settled) delineation dispute with Russia or over Svalbard.<sup>81</sup> The Norwegian State Department on the other hand regard the current cooperation forms as sufficient and there is no strategy aiming at gaining German support in difficult questions. As Grannas remarks, “support must also be asked for.”<sup>82</sup>

In matters of defence, the Netherlands is a favoured cooperation partner of Norway and seems to be the easiest choice for Norway to make as they are easy to cooperate with. However, it is important to stress that military cooperation with the Netherlands is not possible without involving Germany, as the two neighbours have, to a large extent, an integrated military cooperation. This fact is often ignored in Norway.<sup>83</sup> Godal answers the following when asked if Germany is important to Norwegian defence and security policy:

“We stand together in Afghanistan, a very close cooperation. We had a special assisting military attaché in Berlin who kept in contact with the headquarters for German operations abroad. We have had many officers trained at the Führungsakademie in Hamburg. So there has been a connection for many years, which is important. And it complements the British and American dimension in the NATO defence. It is important to foreign affairs and security policy to have close contact with a large continental country in NATO as Germany.”<sup>84</sup>

<sup>80</sup>Cited in HELGESEN (2012), p. 40.

<sup>81</sup>JERVELL (2003), p. 92.

<sup>82</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in German: “Unterstützung muss auch nachgefragt werden.”

<sup>83</sup>Major Odd Haugdahl, interview with author, 5 May 2004, Greven.

<sup>84</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Vi står sammen i Afghanistan, et veldig nært samarbeid. Vi hadde en egen assisterende forsvarsattaché i Berlin som holdt kontakten med det tyske hovedkvarteret for tyske utenlandske operasjoner. Vi har hatt mange norske offisersutdannede fra Führungsakademie i Hamburg. Så det har vært en forbindelse i mange år som er viktig. Og den utfyller den britiske og amerikanske dimensjonen i NATO-forsvaret. Det å ha en tett kontakt med et stort

Germany has a significant maritime capacity which is trained in Norwegian coastal waters. However, German combat forces lack an amphibious capacity which is relevant for operations in Norway. Nonetheless, the German marine is about to develop the ability to operate far from home and is capable of contributing significantly to support operations connected to intervention or expedition operations initiated from the sea. German naval forces will thus be relevant in relation to US, British and Dutch forces that are deployed in the Norwegian area. When asked whether Germany has the capacity to cooperate on defence in Norway's proximate areas Godal answers yes,

“we have already for several years had exercises in northern Norway with both Germany and other NATO allies participating, and this is likely to continue. The number of exercises have been reduced but this is not linked to Germany in particular, the whole exercise pattern has decreased in general, and will eventually stabilise at a relatively low level.”<sup>85</sup>

This chapter shows that Germany is perceived to be very important in Norway and even constitutes a “pillar of Norwegian foreign policy” as stated by Godal. The reasons for its importance are the following:

1. size, location and political culture;
2. the economic strength;
3. the great importance in the EU;
4. the proximity to Norway (politically, economically and culturally);
5. a great understanding of Norwegian considerations and interests.
6. good Norwegian experiences with Germany as a political ally.

These factors are in fact preconditions for an assessment of Germany's importance. If they were not given, it would be less interesting to analyse Germany's importance at all. In order to assess this, the strategic challenges and opportunities of Norway's foreign policy must be the starting point. The term strategic partnership is, as shown, not the proper description of the Norwegian-German

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kontinentalt land i NATO som Tyskland, det er viktig utenrikspolitisk og sikkerhetspolitisk.”

<sup>85</sup>Bjørn Tore Godal, interview with author, 6 May 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Vi har i mange år allerede hatt øvelser i Nord-Norge med både Tyskland og andre NATO-allierte, og det kommer sikkert til å fortsette. Mengden på de øvelsene er avtatt, men det er ikke spesielt med Tyskland, hele øvelsesmønsteret er gått nedover og flater vel etterhvert helt ut.”

relations. The conclusion must thus be drawn that Germany's importance to Norway is not found in a strategic partnership, although Germany is a preferred cooperation partner of Norway and Norway is an important energy partner of Germany. Political, economic as well as military cooperation are important areas of mutual interest but do not indicate why Germany is of particular importance to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policy of Norway. It is not even given that the bilateral relations are particularly important when it comes to Germany's importance to Nordic security. A comparison with Sweden will thus be added in order to identify the factors that are decisive for the assessment of Germany's importance. Do Norway's challenges differ from Sweden's and do they necessitate other solutions? Do the different institutional contexts of their foreign policies contribute to different needs in international relations? Do the different regional frames of their foreign policies make a difference in regards to German importance to their strategic challenges and opportunities? These are the questions that must be answered in order to proceed with the assessment of Germany's importance.

### 3. The foreign policies of Norway and Sweden

The Kingdom of Norway has an area of 385 199 km<sup>2</sup>, an extensive coastline along the North Atlantic Ocean and borders Sweden, Finland and Russia. Its population amounts to 4 799 300 (2009). This makes a population per km<sup>2</sup> of 12,5.<sup>86</sup> The state church is Evangelical Lutheran. Further, Norway is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary regime. The “Storting” is a unicameral, semi-circular national assembly and can be characterised as a “working parliament” directed towards decision-making. The specialist standing committees thereby play a central part and their work emphasises the parliamentarian’s role as an expert.<sup>87</sup>

Archer’s description of what features Norway has in common with other European states, and of what differences exist, is applicable also to the comparison with neighbour Sweden:

“The sameness can be summed up in the phrases (...) Western, democratic, rich, European. (...) A brief examination of the Norwegian economy shows it to be as service-based and export-dependent as those of many West European states, and growth, inflation and unemployment to be fairly similar, though with all three veering to the lower end of the scale. The economy has been as touched by globalisation as that of its neighbours. The differences can be seen in the current conditions, but more so in the history of the country. It is richer than other West European states, with only Luxembourg and Switzerland challenging this happy position. It has a smaller immigrant share of the population than most West European nations, though this has been rapidly changing. It is an oil producer and exporter in a way that outstrips other North Sea states, and is more global in its petroleum, shipping and fisheries sectors. With its possession of Svalbard, it is the most northern of European states outside Russia (...), and

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<sup>86</sup> *Store norske leksikon*, <http://www.snl.no/Norge>

<sup>87</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 221.




Figure I.1.: Norway and Sweden. (Source: sitesatlas.com)

with its long coastline is perhaps one of the most Atlantic.”<sup>88</sup>

The Kingdom of Sweden is 449 964 km<sup>2</sup> with coastlines both to the Baltic Sea in the east and the North Sea in the west and borders Norway and Finland. Sweden has 9 263 900 inhabitants (2009), which makes a population per km<sup>2</sup> of 20,6.<sup>89</sup> 85 per cent live in the southern part of Sweden, in particular in the urban areas (82 per cent). The state church is Evangelical Lutheran, but Sweden has large minorities of Moslems and Catholics.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, Sweden is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary regime. The “Riksdag” is a unicameral, semi-circular national assembly and a “working parliament”.

Norway and Sweden are thus fairly similar, although Sweden has almost twice as many inhabitants and a history as a regional power. Few nations have a closer relationship than Norwegians and Swedes, who trade and invest together, get married with each other, have a common electricity market and a good tone when politicians meet. Nevertheless, politicians from the two states have less

<sup>88</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 193.

<sup>89</sup> *Store norske leksikon*, <http://www.snl.no/Sverige>

<sup>90</sup> <http://www.landguiden.se>

and less significant topics to talk about. Hardly any European countries will have a weaker developed cooperation on security political questions than Norway and Sweden. Norway is solely a NATO member, Sweden solely member of the EU. Thus the two countries do not meet on these two basic arenas for politics, security and development in Europe. A Nordic defence cooperation is in the making, but the Norwegian choice of the US Joint Strike Fighter over the Swedish produced Gripen in 2008, as Norway's F-16s are looking to be replaced, showed that although a closer Nordic defence cooperation is stressed, it is not important enough to abandon the close ties to the US. Sweden's Prime Minister (PM) has furthermore often been the first to dismiss Norway's claims in European Economic Area (EEA) negotiations. Furthermore, although the common border is long, their relationships to their proximate areas differ a lot. Whereas 30 per cent of Sweden's population live north of Stockholm, 50 per cent of Norway's population live north of Oslo. Where the settlement in the north stops, Swedish interests abate. Where the Norwegian settlement stops, important Norwegian interests begin. Whereas Norwegian interests are to the north, Swedish interests are to the south - in the Baltic Sea Region. Sweden wants to advance its political and economic interests along the Baltic Sea's southern coast.

These obvious similarities and differences make Norway and Sweden suitable for a comparison with respect to Germany's importance for the respective strategic challenges and opportunities facing their foreign policies.

### 3.1. Historical developments

Norway became an independent state as late as 1905 when the union with Sweden was dissolved. There were three formative eras in independent Norway's foreign relations until 1949. The first period lasted from 1905 to the First World War and was formed by "classic" neutralism or isolationism. However, the neutralist policy had confidence in an automatic protection, i.e. British support in the case of war.<sup>91</sup> With the dissolution of the Swedish-Norwegian union, the validity of a treaty from 1885, whereby the western Great Powers guaranteed Sweden and Nor-

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<sup>91</sup>The British naval power facilitated Norway's foreign trade and merchant shipping.

way protection against Russian aggression, was uncertain. Hence Norway sought a new security guarantee, and in 1907 an ‘Integrity Treaty’ was agreed between Norway and the Great Powers. The triple purpose of the treaty was, firstly, to demonstrate Norway’s intention to preserve neutrality in any future conflict in Northern Europe, secondly to declare the intention of the Great Powers to leave Norway in peace and, thirdly, to enable Norway to call on British assistance if this intention should be “overtaken by circumstances”.<sup>92</sup> Publicly declared neutrality and an implicit British guarantee thus characterised Norwegian foreign policy after 1905.

Further, Norway defined its foreign relations as economic. The Norwegian Foreign Service was to a large extent “the handmaiden of trade and shipping.”<sup>93</sup> Here Udgaard sees a parallel in current Norwegian debate on the EEA agreement. It enables Norway to regulate literally all economic questions<sup>94</sup> with the rest of Europe. At the same time it allows the Norwegians to stay out of the diplomatic fight concerning the European diplomatic order. There is no current Norwegian debate on what political interests Norway has in Europe and how these are affected by different concepts of Europe’s future.

The second formative period until 1949 was the inter-war period when Norway moralistically advocated international law in the League of Nations. Foreign policy was ignored by the Norwegian elite and Norway’s security policy in the 1930s was intransigent. Internal budgetary and political needs were prioritised at the expense of external requirements. This naivety did not fade until the Second World War approached. The Storting debated security policy for the first time in 1937 and Norway lacked experienced diplomats and a capable leadership when the country was occupied by Nazi Germany in April 1940.

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<sup>92</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 80.

<sup>93</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 77. A descriptive example from 1906 was a proposal from the Conservative Party of an alternative foreign budget. Its aim was to abolish the division of diplomacy and consular envoys in order to underline the primacy of economic interests. The party’s spokesman thus favoured a major reduction of diplomatic envoys and a corresponding increase of the overseas envoys.

The first Norwegian budget for the Foreign Service allowed for only eight diplomatic envoys: In Stockholm, Copenhagen, London, Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburg, Washington D.C., and Buenos Aires. Consular envoys numbered 14, assigned to ports of particular importance for Norwegian shipping, including Shanghai, Hong Kong, Yokohama and New York. RISTE (2005), p. 81.

<sup>94</sup>The exceptions are agricultural goods and, in part, fish.



Finally the the third formative period (1940 to 1949) was characterised by an active internationalism. Exile Foreign Minister (FM) Lie formulated the Atlantic policy during the first years of war in London. Thus the Second World War and the following NATO membership of 1949 shaped a new Norwegian diplomatic tradition, which stressed security policy.

Swedish foreign policy has on the other hand been associated with neutrality. Since 1945, Sweden has officially pursued a non-alignment policy aiming at neutrality in case of war. It is thus not of the legal (Swiss) type backed by international guarantees in the event of war. Today, the Swedish neutrality tradition seems inseparable from the Swedish national identity and

“Sweden’s unique track record, above all during the Second World War, has made it virtually impossible for any Swedish government to think in terms of anything but a continuation of this singularly brilliant formula. Herein lies both strength and weakness.”<sup>95</sup>

The Swedish neutrality policy’s history of origins started 200 years ago with the changes in Europe after the defeat of Napoleon, and Sweden has not been at war since 1814. Sweden lost most of its possessions on the eastern and southern shores of the Baltic Sea during the Napoleonic wars. From being an important European power Sweden had become rather insignificant, a view that the annexation of Norway did not affect. King Karl Johan’s strategic plan for the Kingdom of Sweden and Norway aimed for a balanced position between major European powers. Swedish foreign policy tried to escape from political engagement and alliances that could have led to the country getting involved in great power conflicts. From being an ad-hoc strategy, neutrality became a long term policy.

Sweden’s neutrality kept it out of wars throughout the 19th century, and this status was strengthened as the neutrality survived the two world wars. Until the Second World War, Swedish neutrality was not even based on adequate national forces. Unlike Norway, however, Sweden preserved its neutrality despite of poor and inefficient armed forces. On the other hand, Sweden approached the Second World War with a policy of economic defence while considering military and civilian needs.<sup>96</sup> Swedish foreign policy towards Germany before the outbreak of

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<sup>95</sup> HULDT (2003), p. 46.

<sup>96</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 271.

war was also very much influenced by the fear of Soviet Russian dominance in the Baltic Sea.<sup>97</sup> During the Second World War, Sweden practised a “friendly-minded neutrality” towards Germany. It was impossible for Sweden to act perfectly neutral as it was dependent on the United Kingdom for metal goods, chemicals and oil and on Germany for coal. Moreover, after the *Weserübung*<sup>98</sup>

As opposed to Sweden’s neutrality policy, Norway signed the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) on 4 April 1949. The reliance on support from a Western power should from now on be rooted in a formal and explicit guarantee (Article 5 NAT) instead of assumptions. External pressure contributed to form a relative interest oriented Norwegian foreign policy. Norway bordered one of the Soviet Union’s largest military concentrations but had to struggle to get NATO to take the defence of its northern flank seriously. The Northern Region was important to the US as a base for early warning, intelligence, communication and navigation but had otherwise a relatively low priority to the Americans, especially during the 1970s. Despite some new and more mobile allied force elements that made the Alliance more visible in the high north in the 1960s,<sup>99</sup> Soviet naval build-up in the north in the late 1960s<sup>100</sup> demonstrated Norway’s vulnerability and a lack of an allied capability to successfully defend Norwegian territory against a Soviet attack.<sup>101</sup> The development of the Soviet Northern Fleet was put on speed in the 1970s and was already at this point of time used by the Norwegian government to pursue a strategy of US engagement and military involvement in the north.<sup>102</sup> It was an important part of Norwegian defence strategy to involve the Americans directly and as early as possible. The Norwegian-US relationship with its several bilateral agreements has been characterised as an “alliance in the alliance” as Norway’s NATO membership emerged more and more as a frame for a bilateral military relationship with the US. Norway emerged as one of the US’ most loyal

<sup>97</sup>Finland was attacked by the Soviet Union in 1939.

<sup>98</sup>The German occupation of Denmark and Norway in April 1940.

<sup>99</sup>Such elements were the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force, which was established in 1960 and started to train in Norway in 1964, and the Standing Naval Force Atlantic which was set up in 1967 and included frigates and destroyers from a number of NATO navies, including the Norwegian. Further, NATO’s Allied Command Baltic Approaches was created in 1961 and brought the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) more into the defence of the Baltic Straits “which represented the ‘soft underbelly’ of Norway”. ARCHER/SOIGNER (1998), p. 103.

<sup>100</sup>As regards the build-up of the Soviet Northern Fleet and the militarisation of the Murmansk area with the expansion of the Kola bases, see ARCHER/SOIGNER (1998), pp. 101-102.

<sup>101</sup> ARCHER/SOIGNER (1998), pp. 101-102.

<sup>102</sup>See ARCHER/SOIGNER (1998), pp. 104-105.

allies in Europe in the 1980s and the Norwegian Atlantic line had clear ideological traits.<sup>103</sup> Jervell even states that those who fundamentally questioned it risked being shut out of Norwegian foreign policy's "good company" or were deprived of information.<sup>104</sup>

Most importantly, the security gain was indeed huge and the close cooperation with the US was not perceived as a sacrifice. However, the Reagan administration's new strategy was built on a "horizontal escalation". Here the thought was that if the Soviets pushed vital US interests in an area where the Americans had difficulties answering, they would instead threaten Soviet resources e.g. on the Kola peninsula. This challenged the vital Norwegian strategy of preserving the balance between involvement in NATO defence arrangements and the retention of the Nordic region as an area of comparatively low tension.

Britain's role as Norway's partner and protector after 1814<sup>105</sup> and 1905 is the element of continuity in Norwegian foreign relations which Riste considers to be the most important one. According to Archer, the Atlantic policy line also "demonstrates the physical separateness from Continental affairs". In fact, Norwegian policy makers had considered the maritime factor of the defence realm to be the decisive one already from 1905. Norwegian interests were considered to be shared with the UK and the United States of America (US).<sup>106</sup> The Atlantic policy line almost completely ignored the Continental powers, which was understandable in war but increasingly unproportional to the political and economic "normalisation" in Europe after 1945. On the other hand, Riste notes that the 1990s were another formative period of Norwegian foreign policy as economy displaced national security as Norwegian foreign relations' principal determinant. As a result of this "primacy of economic concerns", Germany rivals the UK to be Norway's principal partner in Europe - a tendency noticeable already in the

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<sup>103</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 20.

<sup>104</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 23.

<sup>105</sup> In the springtime of 1814, Norwegian men chose the representatives of a constitutional assembly, which again unanimously resolved upon the Constitution of 17 May 1814. The Eidsvold assembly further chose the Danish heir apparent, Christian Frederik, to King of Norway. As a result Denmark and Sweden were at war fighting over Norway for approximately two weeks. On 4 November, the Storting enacted the new constitution for a union between Sweden and Norway.

<sup>106</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 32.

1970s.<sup>107</sup> Today, Germany is “Norway’s most important partner in Europe”, as stated by both Norway’s King Harald and FM Gahr Støre, however, not solely because of economic concerns.

In his analysis of Norway’s foreign relations, Riste concludes that current Norwegian foreign policy is characterised by a difficult balance between the elements that constituted the formative periods of early Norwegian foreign and security policy:

“As long as the Cold War lasted, Norway’s security needs meant that participation in power politics through NATO had the upper hand. Since the 1990s, however, this trend has been checked by a neutralist desire to keep out of the EU, combined with the awkward prospect of having to choose between an American and a European security guarantee. Unwilling to make that choice, and deeply divided on the issue of membership of the EU, Norway has instead chosen to emphasise the one foreign policy issue on which all parties can agree: the ‘missionary impulse’ towards profiling the country as the champion of peace, human rights, and development aid.”<sup>108</sup>

The mixed experience from the war led to a period of new thinking on Swedish security as well in the second half of the 1940s. A Swedish initiative on a Nordic defence union appeared, but failed. Sweden decided to join the United Nations (UN) and Swedish neutrality entered a new phase. National defence forces were upgraded and a strong and national independent defence industry was developed. As late as in the 1990s, almost 65 per cent of Swedish defence material were products of the national industry.<sup>109</sup> Strong Swedish armed forces, which included one of Europe’s strongest air forces, were also an important contribution to the defence of the Nordic area. The goal of the neutrality policy was to be kept out of the East-West block construction and to have good relations with the Western bloc without ignoring Soviet sentiments.

The technological cooperation with the US and NATO made it possible for Sweden to develop a defence industry of a high technical level, e.g. with SAAB fighters from “Draken” to “Gripen”.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, although Sweden emphasised the UN and later the CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Eu-

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<sup>107</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 286.

<sup>108</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 275.

<sup>109</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 99.

<sup>110</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 251.

rope) as an international platform, and official Swedish foreign policy focused on playing a role as a bridge between East and West during the whole Cold War, there was never any doubt that Sweden was a Western country in every way. Sweden needed to be a part of the West in order to trade and receive technical support. A potential military threat would have come from the Soviet Union. Whereas official policy was strictly neutral, a secret cooperation began with Norway, the UK and the US which included exchange of military intelligence, Swedish access to technology and preparations to receive Western support in case an attack on Sweden would occur.<sup>111</sup>

Thus neutrality was first and foremost attached to the official part of Sweden's foreign policy. Sweden held a high neutral profile on the rhetoric level, and by the 1970s Swedish neutrality had achieved doctrinal status as it had become tantamount to official ideology. Although Sweden accepted the obligation to back UN Security Council resolutions, it viewed the voting system as a guarantee that military sanctions would never in practice be required of Sweden.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, an active Swedish foreign policy for Europe and the Nordic area was lacking. Instead, Sweden, especially under Palme, raised interest in the Third World, and Swedish foreign policy focused mainly on countries like Nicaragua, South Africa, Vietnam and Chile.

The predictability of Swedish foreign policy was emphasised, and Swedish security policy was supported by all political parties. On the other hand, politics accepted that a secret military cooperation with NATO was taking place. In comparison, Finland was perceived to be swinging more to the east through "finlandisation", which in short was the Soviet influence on Finnish foreign policy.<sup>113</sup> Today, however, the picture seems to be that Finland was rather the real neutral country

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<sup>111</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 250.

<sup>112</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 274.

<sup>113</sup> For a detailed analysis on the Finlandisation of Finland under Kekkonen, see ARTER (1999), p. 288-297. The expression "Finlandisation" originally emerged in Austria in the 1950s but became a part of the vocabulary in international politics mainly as a result of critical evaluations in the FRG during the early 1970s. When Willy Brandt became German chancellor in 1969, his political opponents and particularly the Christian Democrats, supported by the newspapers *Die Welt* and *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, used the expression to describe a threatening situation in West Germany as a result of Brandt's Ostpolitik. CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss even "claimed that Finlandisation signaled nothing less than the destruction of Western Europe as a political force." ARTER (1999), p. 289.

of the two.<sup>114</sup> Vaahtoranta and Forsberg sum up the most interesting aspects and questions regarding Sweden's neutrality policy during the Cold War from a contemporary point of view:

“It now seems that the Swedish neutrality applied only to peacetime. Officially Sweden was non-aligned in peacetime in order to stay neutral at war, but in reality she seems to have pursued the policy of neutrality in peacetime aiming at aligning herself had war broken out. This conclusion raises two related questions. To what extent did neutrality form the basis of Sweden's security? Why did Sweden pursue the policy of neutrality in the first place? As for the first question, much depends on what the Soviet Union knew about the cooperation between Sweden and NATO. If she did not know, neutrality was crucial for Sweden's security. However, if the Soviet Union knew about the NATO cooperation, as is claimed, the Swedish neutrality would have had a more narrow peacetime significance of a political nature aiming at keeping the tension low in Northern Europe by maintaining the “Nordic balance”. A major reason for Sweden staying outside NATO would have been the concern for Finland. In case Sweden had joined NATO, the Soviet Union may have strengthened its hold on Finland. These steps could have increased the level of tension in Northern Europe and perhaps lowered the threshold of open hostilities between the military blocs. Of course, Sweden's aim at strengthening her own security helped Finland stay independent.”<sup>115</sup>

In the following, the question is raised whether Sweden's neutrality/ non-alignment policy line is compatible with Sweden's strategic situation today.

## 3.2. Security and defence cooperation

### 3.2.1. Norway

The challenge of Norwegian security and defence policy after the Cold War has been to find an appropriate form of defence structure and an appropriate framework for security policy. Norway was one of the last countries to accept NATO's new strategic concept of 1991, and the success of Norwegian security policy during the last period of the Cold War meant that Norway was only able to respond slowly to the changes of 1989 - 1991. Norway even had an ambivalent attitude to the ending of the East-West conflict. The political leadership was sceptical

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<sup>114</sup>See VAAHTORANTA/FORSBERG (2000), pp. 111-113.

<sup>115</sup> VAAHTORANTA/FORSBERG (2000), pp. 12-13.

as the new situation of international relations implied less interest in the Nordic region. Another point was the more independent role of the EU in European security policy. Norway feared that this would reduce the US interest in Europe and leave Norway more vulnerable to possible pressure from Russia.<sup>116</sup> A report from the Norwegian Defence Commission from 1990 expressed that “Europe must under no circumstances send signals that might reduce NATO’s role or weaken the basis for the US engagement in the Alliance.”<sup>117</sup> During the first half of the 1990s, Norway continued to stress territorial defence and NATO. However, the US interest in Norway decreased,<sup>118</sup> the NATO command structure was reorganised and Norway’s only NATO command, the command North at Kolsås (near Oslo), was abolished. Finally, the US required changes in the support arrangements with Norway that covered support to Norway in a crisis situation. For example, US military pre-stockings in Norway were closed. Norwegian resources were on the other hand invested to change the US decisions and plans.<sup>119</sup> A Norwegian success in this respect was the establishment of a lower NATO command, the European Joint Warfare Centre in Jättå, Stavanger, in 2003. Norway’s “alliance in the alliance” with the US inside NATO has nevertheless come to an end.

Finally, Norwegian governments reacted to the changed conditions of the international environment and established the ‘Telemark Battalion’ for NATO’s Immediate Reaction Forces. However, territorial defence continued to be given priority, and Norway stressed collective defence as NATO’s main task and was reluctant to embrace the new NATO and its Combined Joint Task Forces and Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. The perception of the military as a political instrument met little understanding in Norway in the early 1990s. Adjustments to the new international situation were, however, undertaken by the Norwegian government

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<sup>116</sup> RIEKER (2001), p. 9.

<sup>117</sup> Cited in RIEKER (2001), p. 9.

<sup>118</sup> The Forward Maritime Strategy was adjusted in the autumn of 1990. The airport at Brønnøysund and other support-installations were abolished. In 1992, the US Congress decided to cut grants to the Norwegian secret services which led to a loss of financing of one third of the positions. It was the most important security policy resource the Norwegians had offered the US which suddenly had become less interesting. ( JERVELL (2003), p. 24.)

<sup>119</sup> Minister of Defence Holst went to the USA several times to collect US support for a reconsideration in Congress. He had long conversations with US politicians and military leaders in order to keep as many US installations in Norway as possible. However, Congress did not change the decision and Norwegian authorities decided to take over the responsibility for a part of the US-financed Norwegian secret service positions. On the other hand, Holst succeeded in reducing the extent of the closing of US arrangements in Norway. In return, Norway had to take over a larger part of the expenses. ( JERVELL (2003), pp. 67-68.)

in regards to 'soft' security initiatives, supporting the establishment of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992 and the Barents cooperation in 1993. The latter, a Norwegian initiative, was seen as more important to Norway due to the strategic importance of the Barents Sea.<sup>120</sup> But for all that, this scheme of cooperation was met with considerable resistance among the Atlantic oriented parts of the civil servants in the Norwegian State Department. The military planning also continued to concentrate on an eventual Russian invasion at the same time as the Barents cooperation was developed.<sup>121</sup>

The strong Atlantic line in Norwegian foreign and security policy after the Second World War entailed an underdeveloped European dimension. The European element of Norway's defence was placed in the NATO context. The re-emergence of the Western European Union (WEU) during the 1980s allowed for discussions on Western European defence issues, but at this point of time Norway was not allowed to participate, and neither was it wished for. Norway participated in the CSCE<sup>122</sup> process with its consideration of a wider definition of security, although as a part of the NATO grouping. Further, the country supported the diplomatic initiatives of the European Community (EC) countries in the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The fear was that a decreased US commitment to Europe, with Norway being outside the EC, would lead to a marginalisation and isolation of Norway. This led to the EC membership application in 1992, but the electorate did not see security as a salient issue when it rejected membership in the referendum of November 1994. Norway thereafter sought close cooperation both with the WEU and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The importance of the EU was increasingly recognised in Norway as the European integration process moved on.<sup>123</sup> However, the EU was perceived to be important to the general foreign policy, and to complement NATO on the soft security side, rather than to national security. Norwegian foreign policy tends to separate foreign and security policy on the one hand and defence policy on the other.<sup>124</sup>

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<sup>120</sup>The Barents Region Initiative led to the establishment of the Barents Council. It followed the logic of the CBSS, with emphasis on civilian problems and representatives from different European countries and the European Commission. The purpose was to promote cooperation between the northwestern parts of Russia and the Nordic states north of the Arctic Circle.

<sup>121</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 68.

<sup>122</sup>The CSCE preceded the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

<sup>123</sup>See ARCHER (2005) and RIEKER (2001).

<sup>124</sup> KNUTSEN (2000), p. 21.



A Norwegian tactic of denial prevailed shortly after the Treaty of Amsterdam, which included the WEU in the EU. However, the British-French meeting in Saint-Malo in the autumn of 1998 forced Norway to change its policy.<sup>125</sup> Norway hereafter explicitly supported the ESDP process and recognised the need for a transformation of the defence forces.<sup>126</sup> The ESDP process was something the Norwegian political leadership did not wish for but had to support in order to avoid a total marginalisation. Norway continued to discuss ESDP matters with the EU at all levels but could only obtain minimal attention. “Its interaction with the EU has been a matter of exchanging information rather than of consultation”.<sup>127</sup> Altogether, despite Norway’s lack of influence on the ESDP process, the role of the EU in European security policy has contributed to a greater Norwegian acceptance of the EU as an important security factor and a recognition of the EU as a political factor in general, stronger focus on international crisis management as well as a review of the traditional understanding of national security by the political leadership in Norway.<sup>128</sup>

In the late 1990s, Norwegian policy makers were interested in full participation in the security and crisis management arrangements developed in the EU. Then FM Vollebæk emphasised that participation in the ESDP was important in regards to Norwegian influence in NATO.<sup>129</sup> After the European Council in Helsinki of December 1999 it became clear, however, that non-EU European countries would have difficulties becoming a part of the decision-making structure of the ESDP in the way they had been as WEU associate members. Thus the lacking Norwegian EU membership is both a problem to Norway’s relations with the EU as well as to Norway’s role inside NATO. Fact is that the EU plays an increasingly central role in the European part of the transatlantic dialogue. The debate initiated by

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<sup>125</sup>In front of the Amsterdam EU summit in 1997, the merger of the WEU into the EU was dismissed by the UK. The about-turn came in 1998 at the French-British summit in St. Malo when Britain agreed to develop a European defence. Thus the real integration of the WEU into the EU began, as did the ESDP.

<sup>126</sup>The support even came from a coalition government of parties all opposing an EU membership.

<sup>127</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 150.

<sup>128</sup> RIEKER (2001), p. 17.

<sup>129</sup>In 1999, FM Vollebæk prepared a pro memorandum for the European Council in Helsinki. He wanted Norwegian participation in EU-led crisis response operations to be based on full participation in the decision-shaping process. (Vollebæk’s pro memorandum to all NATO and EU states, cited in ARCHER (2005), p. 146.) As a non-member, however, the participation in the planning of these operations was impossible.

Gerhard Schröder on the future of NATO through a speech performed by his Minister of Defence Struck at the 2005 security conference in Munich further clarified the Norwegian dilemma and caused deep worries in Norway. Schröder claimed that NATO “is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.”<sup>130</sup> NATO has, according to Schröder, not adapted to the new international realities as the EU should have a more central role in the relationship between the US and Europe. Such a development would mean that even more central questions are transferred from NATO to an organisation of which Norway is not a member. The leadership in the NATO-friendly country Germany questioned for the first time NATO’s central position in European politics. The four NATO countries not included by the axis Washington - Brussels, Norway, Canada, Iceland and Turkey, thus only have a limited impact on the transatlantic cooperation. However, not even this incident brought about a new debate on the EU in Norway. The pro-EU parties, the Conservative party and the Labour party, have been in government from 2000 until today, but in coalitions with smaller parties all opposing a Norwegian EU membership. Thus they have not been able to promote it.

In November 2004, Norway was requested to participate in the EU Battlegroups.<sup>131</sup> FM Petersen thereon declared that Norway was prepared to contribute 200 soldiers to a battlegroup under a Swedish command in which also Finland would participate.<sup>132</sup> This again led to a debate in Norway as to how far the country should participate with soldiers in an organisation it is not a member of. How and where the battlegroups are deployed is up to the EU alone to decide. Norway’s preparedness to participate was one of many examples of trying to get into the EU through the back-door. Norway has no influence on the political process concerning the use of military power in the EU, i.e. before the forces are deployed.

Norwegian diplomatic activity and military involvement in multinational operations are thus aiming at minimising Norway’s international marginalisation. However, the country does not have enough resources for an involvement in too many

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<sup>130</sup> SCHRÖDER (2005).

<sup>131</sup>The EU defence ministers initiated 13 small and mobile multinational battlegroups. These groups should be deployed worldwide in crisis regions on behalf of the UN.

<sup>132</sup> FISCHER (2004).

activities, and so a choice has to be made in regards to Norway's preferences for NATO, UN and EU activities. The cases of Afghanistan and Libya show that NATO operations have been prioritised, hanging on to the maritime tradition with its North Sea neighbours and prioritising its links with the US and the UN. Only limited resources remain for the EU.<sup>133</sup> Half-hearted attempts to get access to the EU through the back-door only conceals Norway's difficult position in European security policy. In other words, influence is not gained through troops alone but necessitates an EU membership. Norway's problem is how to be sure that allied countries will be interested enough in Norway in a given situation with provocations in the north.

### 3.2.2. Sweden

Whereas the end of the East-West conflict did not imply immediate changes in Norwegian security policy, it did enable Sweden to approach the EC/ EU as a membership of the Union was no longer incompatible with the neutral policy line. Sweden applied for membership in the EC in 1991 and became a member of the EU in 1995. This, in turn, generated further changes in Swedish security policy as the neutrality concept behind the policy was moderated in order to be compatible with the EU membership. The European approach was started with an economic initial point as the Swedish government chose to focus on the broader socio-economic challenges and minimise the issue of foreign and security policy.

After the EC application, the "Riksdag" stated that a membership would not change the Swedish security policy as the EU was not a collective defence alliance and Sweden would remain a military non-aligned country.<sup>134</sup> Finally, however, the Maastricht Treaty and the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), "[which] shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including

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<sup>133</sup>The conservative-centrist Bondevik II government (2001-2005) stressed the orientation towards the US and contributed in Iraq after the UN mandate was secured, whereas the centre-left Stoltenberg government (2005- ) withdrew Norwegian NATO officers from Iraq and decided not to expand its Afghanistan engagement to the south. Norwegian forces have on the other hand been participating in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the maritime EU NAVFOR Somalia - Operation "Atalanta" in the Gulf of Aden.

<sup>134</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 252.

the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence”,<sup>135</sup> and increasing European integration made it difficult for Sweden to hold on to the neutrality concept, as Swedish policy had to be related to the CFSP. Sweden’s formulation of its security policy, “non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in the event of war”, was at this point of time somewhat corrected. “Non-aligned” was changed to “military non-aligned” and “aiming at neutrality in the event of war” to “be able to stay neutral in the case of war in the vicinity.”<sup>136</sup> Hence, neutrality was being suppressed in official usage and replaced by “military non-alignment”, first used by the non-socialist Bildt Government (1991-94), referring strictly to defence issues in military terms.<sup>137</sup> The security policy doctrine was in this way redefined to fit into the EU. The Maastricht Treaty was accepted without exceptions and Sweden committed herself to coordinate her foreign and security policy with e.g. atomic powers like France and Britain. However, the Maastricht Treaty’s emphasis on the long-term goal of a common defence continued to be problematic for Sweden, as did the WEU. The Swedish government stated that an observer status in the WEU was considered to be compatible with Sweden’s non-alignment policy.<sup>138</sup> Sweden feared a militarisation of the EU as a result of the Maastricht Treaty’s formulation of a common defence. This fear was shared by Finland, and both countries together initiated the suggestion of including the “Petersberg tasks”<sup>139</sup> in the Amsterdam Treaty. This turnaround of the EU’s security dimension was perceived as a diplomatic success in Stockholm and Helsinki as the development toward a common defence was led toward crisis management instead, which was more compatible with their non-aligned status.<sup>140</sup>

The changes in Swedish security policy also demonstrated a will “to actively support or even shape developments in the Baltic-Nordic area. Such an active

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<sup>135</sup>Treaty on European Union Title V, Art. J 4/1.

<sup>136</sup> VAAHTORANTA/FORSBERG (2000), p. 252.

<sup>137</sup>The term “non-allied” is to a large extent used in Sweden instead of “non-alignment” but will not be pursued here.

<sup>138</sup> RIEKER (2002), p. 31.

<sup>139</sup>The WEU Ministerial Council adopted the Petersberg Declaration, which defined the WEU’s operational role, on 19 June 1992. This resulted in what has later been referred to as the “Petersberg tasks” which include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

<sup>140</sup> RIEKER (2002), p. 22.

Swedish foreign policy had not been seen since Napoleonic times.”<sup>141</sup> In 1996, several Swedish initiatives were taken by the new social democratic government of PM Persson in the Baltic region through the Swedish chairmanship of the CBSS. They were to a large extent based on the “soft security” concept and were thus compatible with retaining military non-alignment. PM Persson furthermore stated his support of Baltic NATO membership in case the three Baltic states should favour this.<sup>142</sup> Some observers, e.g. former British FM Douglas Hurd and Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick from the RAND Corporation indicated another solution to Baltic security, with greater obligations for Sweden and Finland to Baltic security.<sup>143</sup> Rudberg, Ring and Jeppsson indicate that the Swedish attempt of not giving the impression of taking a leading role in the Baltic area or to offer the Baltic States a security guarantee, i.e. the Swedish focus on “soft security” concepts, led US president Clinton to visit Copenhagen instead of Stockholm on his 1996 visit to Scandinavia as Danish policy toward the Baltic states was of a “firmer” character.<sup>144</sup>

Despite the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty, the development was still hard to swallow. Sweden thus frequently joined Britain during the 1990s as they shared the scepticism of an extended and supranational security cooperation in the EU. At the same time, Sweden made its support of a continued US engagement in Europe more visible and stressed the importance of the transatlantic link for the stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, which indeed was a considerable change of policy compared to the criticism of US dominance in Europe from the Palme era.<sup>145</sup> Interestingly, the decision to participate in NATO’s PfP programme did not cause any controversy in Sweden as opposed to debates in the fellow neutral countries Austria and Switzerland. Launched in January 1994, the programme enabled Sweden to participate in NATO’s peace-keeping operations and to extend military support to the Baltic states. The PfP programme was closely identified with both Sweden’s CSCE policy and its peace-keeping tradition.<sup>146</sup> However, Sweden has not yet announced the aim of giving

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<sup>141</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 254.

<sup>142</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 253.

<sup>143</sup> Cited in RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 253.

<sup>144</sup> RUDBERG/RING/JEPPSSON (2001), p. 254.

<sup>145</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 60.

<sup>146</sup> RIEKER (2002), p. 18.

up military non-alignment and to join NATO, or to accept European security guarantees through the WEU.

After the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, Sweden's security policy was once again reformulated, from "military non-alignment aiming at be[ing] able to stay neutral in the event of war in the vicinity" to military non-alignment "*with the possibility of neutrality* in the event of conflicts in our vicinity."<sup>147</sup> Further formal and informal changes after the Amsterdam Treaty were also taking place in Swedish security policy. This is particularly obvious in the realm of defence. International military cooperation becomes commonplace in Swedish politics, the territorial defence loses its dominant position in Swedish defence strategy and the ability of participating militarily in international operations becomes priority with an increased focus on "interoperability". Further, the strategy of self-help regarding armament acquisitions is abandoned and new political consensus is created for an international armament industrial cooperation.<sup>148</sup> The most important change of the post Amsterdam Swedish security policy is according to Wegge the EU as the new "centre of gravity". The ESDP has become a great influence on the Swedish security strategy, and Sweden, to some degree reluctantly, integrates in the hierarchy of European security policy. Security policy has to a larger extent become a "legitimate object for discussion and new thinking"<sup>149</sup>, and the decision makers in Swedish politics face new demands in regards to the reaction time to security developments.<sup>150</sup> The UK, France and Germany are accordingly about to have a greater influence on Swedish security policy as a result of their leading roles as the ESDP and the European Capability Action Plan are concerned. Some dominance has been exerted, particularly by France and Britain, leading to a certain frustration being expressed. This dominance is especially present through strong preferences on the practical ESDP cooperation combined with the use of short time limits.<sup>151</sup>

Hence, Sweden participates actively in the decision making within the Union, cooperates with and creates interoperability with NATO and adjusts its mili-

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<sup>147</sup>Cited in WEGGE (2003A), p. 62.

<sup>148</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 62.

<sup>149</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 63 [author's translation].

<sup>150</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 63.

<sup>151</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 71-72.

tary forces to face increased cooperation on crisis management. Nevertheless, Sweden remains militarily non-aligned, and despite the fact that both Sweden and Finland have a positive view of NATO, they have not been willing to join it. The option of joining NATO in the future is, on the other hand, kept open, and Sweden participates in NATO operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. In the beginning of 2007, FM Bildt clearly stated “no” to the question if Sweden is still a neutral country, “but we are still a militarily non-aligned country”.<sup>152</sup> The Swedish population is still passionate about neutrality, a fact which was shown e.g. in the referendum on the euro in 2003 and the Swedish attitude toward “federalism” and “supranationalism” in the EU. On the other hand, Sweden generally supports a stronger role of the EU in international security and it is unlikely that Sweden would be neutral in case of an attack on an EU country.

With the Baltic States’ NATO memberships of 2004, US influence increased in the Baltic region and possibly also affected Sweden’s ability to act independently in the region. Among the non-socialist Swedish political parties, many favour a NATO membership. Quite stable electorate figures, however, tend to show a clear majority against it. According to Huldt, the question is ‘why NATO now?’ for Sweden.<sup>153</sup> FM Bildt states that

“[w]e are non-aligned as long as we want to, but I don’t see an urgent need to change that. I now do not see any military threats directed to Sweden, e.g. is the Baltic Sea a far less militarised area than 25 years ago”.<sup>154</sup>

What might lead to a reconsidering of the Swedish security position? A major international crisis and a negative development of Russia’s relations with the West are according to Huldt no such reason as Sweden’s traditional

“way to respond to such crisis is to dig in where we stand - not to engage in innovations. Sweden’s armed forces are today designed to fit into a NATO-led operational framework. All forms of co-operation, schooling and training are involved - it is difficult to see what immediate added value in an acute crisis could be produced by NATO membership. The advantages of the latter would most likely be in the longer term.”<sup>155</sup>

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<sup>152</sup>Cited in SYVERTSEN (2007) [author’s translation].

<sup>153</sup> HULDT (2003), pp. 49-50.

<sup>154</sup>Cited in SYVERTSEN (2007) [author’s translation].

<sup>155</sup> HULDT (2003), p. 50.

Accordingly, the international environment does not seem to have much influence on the formulation of Swedish security policy. Rather, a gradual realisation that the current non-alignment is not sufficient, as the good reasons for staying outside are evanescent, might lead to the end of non-alignment. This would, however, depend on how NATO develops. A reconsideration could follow if Swedish influence and international leverage would be perceived to fall dramatically.<sup>156</sup> The increased prioritisation of the ESDP compared to NATO in the Swedish State Department and the Ministry of Defence characterises a situation where the former predominates.<sup>157</sup> The results of Wegge's research indicate that the ESDP has taken over PfP's role and now predominates Sweden's cooperation on security policy.<sup>158</sup>

### 3.3. National defence structure and budget

#### 3.3.1. Norway

The general conditions superior to Norwegian defence planning is the overall NATO development. The US carries the economic burden of the transatlantic defence cooperation almost on their own, contributing 698 billion \$ annually to the US defence (2010) which accounts for 3/4 of NATO's total expenses.<sup>159</sup> The US message to the Europeans is to take responsibility and contribute with their part. Increasing European military budgets is however implausible as long as the euro crisis prevails. At the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012 it was exactly money which was the focal point of the discussions. "Smart defence" is thus the apparent solution, i.e. more bang for each dollar, euro - and kroner.

According to former Supreme Commander of Norway's Armed Forces, general Diesen, it is politically accepted that small nations like Norway can not carry the costs of a complete military defence alone anymore. Hence, long-term strategic cooperation with other small states will have to be the answer in order to be

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<sup>156</sup> HULDT (2003), p. 50.

<sup>157</sup> See WEGGE (2003A), pp. 71-72.

<sup>158</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 72.

<sup>159</sup> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2011) *Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010* at <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/factsheet2010>



able to bear the costs of military forces and capacities. Such a profound defence integration is firstly a matter of Nordic cooperation, i.e. with Sweden and Finland. As NATO will finally include almost 30 nations all over Europe with different strategic interests and no common, existential threats, the substance of the collective security guarantee will be weakened according to Diesen. The Nordic countries' strategic interest community becomes a more important factor than different formal affiliations of alliances.<sup>160</sup> Thus, a standardised Nordic battalion, common educational institutions, common exercises, common staffs, common assertion of sovereignty at sea and airspace, all within the frames of the EU and NATO, might become reality. However, the question has to be posed whether a defence cooperation without mutual security guarantees really gives security, or if the result will be reduced freedom of action and priority conflicts.

“Is Sweden willing to guarantee the eastern borders of Norway and Finland? Are Finland and Sweden willing to guarantee Norwegian security or Danish interests in the northern areas? Hardly! The Danes have realised it. That is why Denmark is outside [the Nordic defence cooperation].”<sup>161</sup>

The new strategic defence concept of 2005 and the long term defence proposition also stressed the so called “North Sea Strategy”, a Norwegian initiative on systemising the bilateral cooperation with the particularly close allies the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark in order to create a more comprehensive framework for military cooperation.<sup>162</sup> The operational capabilities of the participating states should be increased through more cost-effective solutions. The initiative also aims at strengthening important allies' competence on operations in an arctic climate and holding military presence in Norway on a high level.

According to former defence minister Krohn Devold<sup>163</sup>, one of the defence reforms' aims was to “scale down the non-operational parts of Norway's Armed Forces to a volume and structure that is sufficient to serve a smaller but more agile operational structure.”<sup>164</sup> The ability to participate in multinational operations abroad and the threat of international terrorism have been the formative factors of

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<sup>160</sup> DIESEN (2008).

<sup>161</sup> STEIRO (2009) [author's translation].

<sup>162</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2005).

<sup>163</sup> Kristin Krohn Devold (Conservative Party) was minister of defence from 2001 - 2005.

<sup>164</sup> KROHN DEVOLD (2004).

the Norwegian armed forces in the last decade, not a regular military attack. It is, however, problematic when the dismantling of the Norwegian defence forces have been justified by the existence of NATO and its collective security guarantee, which weakened substance is now the main reason for the necessity of Nordic defence cooperation. There has been substantive efforts to increase the number of the armed forces since around 2005.<sup>165</sup>

The following 2012 assessment describes the Norwegian situation in regards to defence spending:

“The Norwegian defence budget has been increasing since 2005; however, with average annual increases either under or marginally over the rate of inflation, this has not translated into a real-terms rise in defence spending. Such a small rise in the budget means that any increase to the spending power of the Ministry of Defence ... is negligible. Whilst the increase in spending is limited, the fact that the budget has not been subjected to cuts goes against the current trend in Western Europe. Furthermore the Ministry of Defence has been able to make efficiency savings to ensure that despite a small overall rise in the spending, the budget for the Army, Navy and Air Force has been increased.”<sup>166</sup>

The Norwegian armed forces counted 15 800 personnel in 2009, of which 6700 were in the army, 4100 in the navy and 5000 in the airforce.<sup>167</sup> According to the estimates made by IHS Jane’s, Norway’s total strength (2012) is made up of 9538 conscripts serving their National Service and 549 are civilian staff which is a “relatively small force considering their oversees operational commitment and desire to maintain a territorial defence capability.”<sup>168</sup>

Resources are limited, also in the airforce. During the Cold War, the traditional Norwegian concept of ‘national balanced forces’ was questioned within NATO by facts such as that the Norwegian airforce had too few aircrafts and too few experienced pilots and thus difficulties providing adequate command and control for allied air operations.<sup>169</sup> As the F-16s will end their life cycle around 2015, the Norwegian government decided that the new generation of combat aircrafts

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<sup>165</sup><http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html> (assessed 1 May 2012).

<sup>166</sup><http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html> (assessed 1 May 2012)

<sup>167</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2009), p. 32.

<sup>168</sup><http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Sentinel-Security-Assessment-Western-Europe/Defence-budget-Norway.html> (assessed 1 May 2012).

<sup>169</sup> ARCHER/SOIGNER (1998), p. 109.

will be 48 F-35 Lightning II, that will be delivered by the US producer JSF. The Swedish JAS Gripen (SAAB) and Eurofighter were the other competitors of the contract. Eurofighter pulled out of the competition with the explanation there was no real competition, i.e. the Norwegian choice would anyway be JSF. The choice has produced many critical voices, above all the argument that the costs will not be easy to estimate. One of the Norwegian government's most important arguments was the lack of 'stealth' abilities of the Gripen aircrafts, which means that the aircraft is hard to detect on a radar. These abilities are stressed by the development of JSF. Norway has thus emphasised abilities that enable combat from a long distance from the airbase. Thirdly, Norway demanded an aircraft with large and heavy weapons aiming at targets on the ground, in addition to full equipment for self defence. As the stealth technology is concerned, Robert Hewson<sup>170</sup> comments that this is very important to the US and can be used offensively to invade countries like Iran, Iraq and maybe China. However, a small country like Norway pays an enormous charge for a product it does not need. Furthermore, stealth and all other technology is top secret and will be completely controlled by the US. Thus, Norway does not even get the same aircraft as the US. When JSF at some point of time is produced, it will be good - but expensive and delayed, according to Hewson's predictions.<sup>171</sup> In addition to Nordic cooperation, the aircraft decision for JSF shows the importance ascribed to the US as Norway's most important ally.

Critic Steiro remarks that whereas Finland, with a defence budget of somewhat above half of Norway's, is able to mobilise an army of 260 000 soldiers, Norway has trouble sustaining a little brigade of 3300 soldiers.<sup>172</sup> 500 army personnel were serving in Afghanistan alone in 2008. The average Norwegian contribution to international operations abroad was about 650 personnel in 2008.<sup>173</sup> The Norwegian military presence will be carried to an end by 2014. The army has

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<sup>170</sup>Robert Hewson is editor of the the military journal "Jane's".

<sup>171</sup>Cited in SPENCE (2008).

<sup>172</sup> STEIRO (2009).

<sup>173</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2009), pp. 38-39. With the high number of soldiers in Afghanistan, the army is according to the chairman of the Norwegian Officers Association, Moe, practically without an operative capability. "Not until the necessary national capability is available do we have enough forces to live up to our international commitments." At the current point of time though, the operative capability of the army is too little and the total defence forces too weak. MOE (2006).

no territorial responsibility or countrywide presence, a task which is overtaken by the Home Guard.<sup>174</sup>

The consequence of the defence reforms from 2000 onwards was a highly technological defence, expensive in purchasing and even more expensive to operate. The volume is so small that it is close to the lower limit of what is necessary to keep the competence upright and of what is militarily sensible. The government concentrates the fields of activity geographically so that the military presence in vulnerable parts of the country becomes strongly reduced. The thought that the defence forces will combat with allies is the answer to this policy and thus implies that there will not emerge situations where the Norwegian defence in shorter or longer periods would have to manage on their own.<sup>175</sup>

### 3.3.2. Sweden

The Swedish concept of “Total Defence”<sup>176</sup> is still effective today. The disagreement in regards to defence reforms after the end of the East-West conflict was significant among both military personnel and politicians, also because the strong territorial defence and the neutrality concept were closely tied to the Swedish security identity.<sup>177</sup> Thus a permanent defence commission, the Swedish Defence Commission (Försvarsberedningen) was created in 1994 in order to obtain national consensus and assigned the task to prepare major defence resolutions on defence programmes by publishing a series of reports which again are a basis for government bills to the Riksdag.<sup>178</sup> A Defence Commission report from 1995 indicated a first, real change as it stressed Swedish international commitments rather than national defence. This led to certain changes, but substantial defence reforms were not initiated until the period 1997-2002. The decision to undertake

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<sup>174</sup>The 2008 Home Guard consisted of 45 000 soldiers.

<sup>175</sup>Defence reform critic Børresen also remarked positive tendencies in the Norwegian defence reform. The defence forces’ main task is again to prevent war; a clear connection between the tasks and the superior aims is established; a strengthening of the bilateral connections to the US is stressed; a further allied participation in training and exercises in Norway is emphasised; the strengthening of the defence forces’ operative units and a de-escalation of the overdimensioned non-operational organisation are focused; the retention of conscription is still fundamental. BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>176</sup>The term is used for the military and civilian parts of the defence altogether.

<sup>177</sup> WEGGE (2003B), p. 40.

<sup>178</sup> RIEKER (2002), p. 34.

a major reform of the Swedish defence forces was not taken by the Riksdag until 1999. The government proposal 1999-2000, “*Det nya försvaret*” (“The new Defence”) represented a clear change from territorial defence toward smaller, flexible forces. A significant quantitative reduction was to be followed by a thorough modernisation of the remaining forces, aiming at a significantly higher quality. Further, the forces were to be divided into “deployable forces” for use in Sweden and abroad, and “national protection forces” related to the Home Guard.<sup>179</sup> The Home Guard consists of around 30 000 men and women and constitutes the greater part of Sweden’s territorial defence forces.<sup>180</sup>

The Defence Commission emphasised that military planning and structure had to be directed toward international crisis management to a larger extent and that the military activity should be coordinated with other EU countries. Moreover, in the late 1990s Sweden joined the West European Armament Group. Because of its significant armament research and industry, Sweden was furthermore embraced in a group of six nations ( Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden) for integration, coordination and harmonisation of Europe’s armament industry. This cooperation strengthened Sweden’s influence in military analysis and development but at the same time increased the European great powers’ influence on Swedish priorities.<sup>181</sup>

Over the last decade, successive reductions have been made in the capability required of the Swedish armed forces, and the operational organisation has been slimmed down. “The reason for this is that the Parliament, the Government and the Military all share the view that the risk of an armed attack on Sweden in a medium term perspective is very remote.”<sup>182</sup> Between 2000 and 2008, Swedish defence spending fell by almost 20 per cent, and the 2009 budget amounted to 3,5 billion euro. Correspondingly, the Swedish armed forces will continue to decrease, from 63 700 soldiers in 2009 to 49 000 in 2014, a projected cut of 23 per cent.<sup>183</sup> Counting soldiers is not the only way of describing a modern defence, but the changes undertaken in Sweden become quite distinct when considering

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<sup>179</sup> WEGGE (2003B), p. 41.

<sup>180</sup> SWEDISH ARMED FORCES (2009), p. 15.

<sup>181</sup> WEGGE (2003B), p. 46.

<sup>182</sup> SWEDISCH ARMED FORCES (2007).

<sup>183</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 5.

Sweden's ability of mobilising 700 000 soldiers in 1990. Moreover, the Swedish parliament decided to abolish the conscription, which became effective in 2011. Contrary to Sweden, Finland has to a large extent retained its territorial defence and, according to former Finnish president Halonen, Finland "is situated in such a geostrategic situation that we can not do like the Swedes and leave it to the neighbours to take care of the defence."<sup>184</sup> In September 2007, Sweden's minister of defence Odenberg resigned as a result of the Swedish government's plan to reduce the budget for defence equipment by several million SEK within a few years. JAS 39 Gripen, a multi-role combat aircraft, is the attribute of the Swedish defence industry. According to some observers, the Swedish armed forces have functioned as the defence industry's "milk cow". For example, 204 Jas-planes were ordered even if the Swedish forces needed only about half of them.<sup>185</sup> Sweden has 165 combat aircrafts and thus the Nordic region's greatest air combat capacity, whereas Norway only has 52 combat aircrafts.<sup>186</sup>

As the number of soldiers is decreasing, the level of participation in international operations is increasing. Hence, due to the same logic underlying the Norwegian defence reforms, the Swedish armed forces are transformed from an invasion defence to a so called deployment defence with international operations as its main task. Sweden has been a supporter of international peace operations since the 1950s but the "strategic posture" has widened over the last two decades. Swedish soldiers are participating in EU, UN and NATO operations, of which the largest contributions are in Afghanistan (NATO, ISAF) with approximately 500 persons. The country also contributed with eight fighter jets to NATO's Operation Unified Protector in Libya. Within the framework of the EU, Sweden is the main contributor to the Nordic Battle Group.<sup>187</sup> The restructuring of the Swedish forces aims at around seven modular maneuver battalions, including artillery, air defence, and engineering units supported by its navy and air force. This should allow for both independent and multinational operations, and by 2014 virtually all of Sweden's forces should be deployable as opposed to only around 60 per cent in 2009.<sup>188</sup> In

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<sup>184</sup>Cited in Width, Henrik (2004) "Nordiske naboer i utakt", *Aftenposten* 11 October. Author's translation.

<sup>185</sup> BRORS (2004).

<sup>186</sup> TJØNN (2009A).

<sup>187</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 5.

<sup>188</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 5.

regards to military materiel, almost all core capabilities will be sustained, and the number of new helicopters will increase successively.<sup>189</sup> According to Keller, Sweden demonstrates the value of highly professional niche capabilities, in particular in cooperation with other and stronger EU partners. “Hence, Sweden is a good example of the possible benefits from further EU defense integration because of the increased capabilities Sweden gains from such cooperation and, in turn, the capabilities it can offer to others.”<sup>190</sup> Furthermore, the weighting of armament

“shows that Sweden, beyond participation in international missions, is hedging against conflict in its immediate neighbourhood, especially the Baltic Sea. It is no accident that in a March 2009 press release by the ministry of defense, ‘the war in Georgia’ was named as a reference point for future risks and developments. Accordingly, Sweden is one of the driving forces behind the increased Nordic defense cooperation. It is doubtful, however, that the Swedish model of streamlined forces and sustained armament will prevail under increasing budgetary pressure.”<sup>191</sup>

The cooperation with other and stronger EU partners is anyhow a necessity to Sweden, and the *Bundeswehr* reform are thus also of great relevance, not least because Germany’s geographical position makes it the most relevant of the stronger EU partners to Swedish defence aims. The *Bundeswehr* and its reforms will be more thoroughly analysed in chapter 1.3.7 of part III. The European defence perspective is obviously very important, and Keller’s conclusion points at the real need for reform:

“In practice ... every country plans and acts for itself. There are two dozen national defense transformations and reforms underway in Europe, but hardly any truly European reform. Unless a greater degree of cooperation and common planning develops among at least a few of the major European powers, the national militaries are doomed to kludge.”<sup>192</sup>

Another consequence of the Swedish defence reforms is that the cooperation with NATO has become a cornerstone of the Swedish defence and Swedish security policy. The development from an invasion to a deployment defence has thus taken

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<sup>189</sup>The number of Gripen fighter jets will remain at or above 100; artillery and antiaircraft capabilities will not be reduced, and the five submarines will be retained. Some of the tracked armoured vehicles will be transferred to reserve units, while five additional corvettes will be procured. Fifteen Black Hawk (UH-60M) helicopters were procured in May 2011. KELLER (2011), p. 5.

<sup>190</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 5.

<sup>191</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 5.

<sup>192</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 7.

place parallel to the Swedish cooperation with NATO, and NATO's standards and demands have become the norm for the Swedish armed forces deployed abroad, and furthermore of the total Swedish Defence as it is difficult to adapt only the forces in international operations.<sup>193</sup> Further, Sweden participates in about 30 exercises with NATO or single NATO states every year, which all have to be approved by the Swedish government. Sweden and Finland are moreover praised for their contributions to NATO operations, and both countries have led a multinational brigade in Kosovo. From 2006, Sweden also led a NATO mission in the north of Afghanistan. The Liberal Party is the only political party in parliament that favours a Swedish NATO membership.<sup>194</sup> The only limitation to the close cooperation with NATO for the former Social Democratic government was common defence guarantees. In his report made on behalf of the five Nordic foreign ministers on the options of future Nordic cooperation on foreign and security policy, former Norwegian FM Thorvald Stoltenberg also suggests a common Nordic solidarity declaration:

“Nordic governments should draw up a mutual security political declaration of solidarity where they in a compulsive manner clarify how they will react if a Nordic country is being exposed to an external attack or to improper pressure.”<sup>195</sup>

Before this, then-Swedish minister of defence Sten Tolgfors stated the following:

“It is very difficult to foresee a situation where Sweden should leave another Nordic country or EU-country alone to meet an impairment of security policy. To the contrary, Sweden's security is built together with our neighbours. It is not possible to see a situation where a military conflict in the proximity should solely affect one of our [Nordic] countries, without having essential consequences for the others, or which one country should have to meet alone.”<sup>196</sup>

Also, all parties of the Riksdag supported a 2007 declaration of the Swedish Defence Commission that stated: “Sweden will not be acting passively if a catastrophe or an attack should hit another member country [of the EU] or Nordic country. We expect that these countries act the same way if Sweden gets hit.”<sup>197</sup>

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<sup>193</sup> ALBONS (2006B).

<sup>194</sup> ALBONS (2006B).

<sup>195</sup> STOLTENBERG (2009) [author's translation].

<sup>196</sup> TOLGFORS (2008) [author's translation].

<sup>197</sup> Cited in BERGSTRÖM (2008) [author's translation].



The road could thus be paved for Nordic defence cooperation both in the BSR and in the High North. However, it is questionable if e.g. Norway and Sweden have the same interest in defending both the Baltic states on the one hand, and the Barents region on the other. Stoltenberg states that the Nordic countries' ability to defend themselves would become larger through a defence community than it would by the sum of the single states' contributions. At the same time the defence capability of each country can become reduced from an isolated point of view.<sup>198</sup> Nordic cooperation would therefore have to go off without a hitch. It is in this context not a good sign of smooth cooperation when Sweden's then-minister of defence Tolgfors, the day after Stoltenberg's report was made public, stated to Swedish television that "Norway miscalculated when they decided what aircraft to go for, and that mistake will now make it more difficult for us to sell our aircrafts."<sup>199</sup> The Swedes were clearly annoyed, but the Norwegian-Swedish armament cooperation has already changed for the better as Norway buys Swedish materiel amounting to over 1,3 billion euro in 2012: new combat vehicles (CV90) will be built in Sweden, whereas the old will be upgraded. Sweden is also using this armoured vehicle which enables the countries to exercise together and to conjointly upgrading the vehicles. Another Norwegian investment in Sweden is the Arthur Artillery Hunting Radar, a cooperation project between the two countries.<sup>200</sup> "Our [armement] industry is dependent on exports. That is why this is a double stroke of luck. Our production can further strengthen our cooperation" says Swedish minister of defence Karin Enström.<sup>201</sup> Nevertheless, Norway's choice for a US aircraft at a price of 8 billion euro (end price estimates are speculative) only shows what alliance really matters the most: the bilateral relations with the US.

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<sup>198</sup> STOLTENBERG (2009).

<sup>199</sup>Cited at <http://www.hegnar.no/nyhetsoversikt/article359539.ece> (accessed 11 February 2009. Author's translation.)

<sup>200</sup> NORDLI (2012).

<sup>201</sup>Cited in NORDLI (2012).

## 3.4. European policy

### 3.4.1. Norway

Norway's relation to European integration can be described as ambivalent: Norway aims at maintaining its autonomy and increasing its influence at the same time. The country two times rejected a membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Community (EC) in 1972 and 1994 respectively. Norway's relations to the EU are above all shaped by the EEA (European Economic Area) agreement, but also the Schengen agreement and agreements on immigration, security and defence policy, regional and regional development policy and several other areas. Norway participates in the most important EU programmes on research, innovation, social dialogue, culture etc. and is associated with 26 EU-bureaus. Norway is unilaterally adapting to the EU e.g. in regards to the immigration policy. Norway has often been the initiator of enhanced cooperation with the EU. Norway's correlations to the CFSP have been analysed above. Here, the EU's importance to Norway and Norway's handling of the situation of being "outside and inside" the EU at the same time, which is the title of a Norwegian report on the country's agreements with the EU ordered by the Norwegian state department, presented in January 2012.<sup>202</sup>

Norway's first step towards European integration was in 1960 when the UK and the Scandinavian countries, Portugal and the neutrals Switzerland and Austria formed the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The British applications of 1961, 1967 and 1969 to the EEC were all followed up by Norway.<sup>203</sup> According to Riste, the most remarkable thing about the 1972 referendum on a Norwegian membership in the EEC is not the majority rejection, but that the majority was very narrow - 53,5 against and 46,5 in favour.<sup>204</sup> Whereas the 1972 decision was more a choice of identity, the 1994 referendum was rather a policy choice of the exact relation between Norway and the institutions of European integration.<sup>205</sup>

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<sup>202</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012).

<sup>203</sup> de Gaulle's vetoes against British membership twice put an end to the negotiation process, but Norwegian reservations and requests for special arrangements would have made it difficult to achieve compromises anyhow.

<sup>204</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 244.

<sup>205</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 2.

Here focus will not be laid on why Norway two times rejected a membership but on the consequences of not being fully integrated. Since 1994, Norway has become more like most European states in a number of ways, including important societal elements such as increased immigration. Notwithstanding, Norway remains richer than its neighbours to the south and it has only partial access to the EU institutions through the EEA.

Since 1 January 1994, Norway's commercial relationship with the EU has been based on the EEA agreement. From January 1995, however, the EFTA side of the EEA was reduced as Austria, Finland and Sweden<sup>206</sup> became new members of the EU.<sup>207</sup> The EEA was maintained so that the three remaining countries Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein were able to participate in the internal market. Thus they benefit from the EC's four economic freedoms of movement of goods, services, labour and capital.<sup>208</sup> The EEA agreement excludes agriculture and fisheries, which are included only to a very limited extent. In 2004 and 2007 the EEA was enlarged at the same time as the EU in order not to disturb the functioning of the internal market. This implied a ten-fold increase in the financial contributions of the EEA-EFTA states to social and economic cohesion in the internal market. Norway in fact contributes more per capita to the new states than any other EU or EEA-EFTA country. From 2004 to 2009, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein paid about 1,307 billion euro to 15 recipient countries. Norway's part of the EEA grants is of 10 billion nkr, or 1,2 billion euro.<sup>209</sup> The Lisbon Treaty has so far not implicated the need for a revision of the EEA or any of the other agreements Norway has with the EU. However the treaty has substantially influenced Norway's relation with the EU in many ways.

The EEA agreement gives the EEA-EFTA states the right to be consulted by the Commission during the formulation of EC legislation, but not the right to

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<sup>206</sup>Switzerland decided not to participate in the EEA.

<sup>207</sup>The EEA Agreement was negotiated between the EC and the then seven member countries of the EFTA and was signed in Oporto on 2 May 1992.

<sup>208</sup>In addition to accepting the community acquis in the fields of the four freedoms, the agreement allows for cooperation between the EU and the EEA-EFTA countries in regards to research and technological development, information services, environment, education, social policy, consumer protection, small and medium-sized enterprises, tourism, the audio-visual sector and civil protection.

<sup>209</sup>Europaportalen (2009) "EØS-midlene", <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/sub/europaportalen/eos-midlene.html?id=115262> (accessed 11 February 2009).

a voice in decision-making. The EEA institutions are based on the willingness by the EFTA states to adapt EC legislation on competition law whereas the EC will not apply anti-dumping measures to EFTA exports.<sup>210</sup> The agreement is implemented through institutional arrangements.<sup>211</sup> For instance, the EFTA Court hears appeals against the action of the EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) and deals with disputes involving EFTA states. This court, however, bases itself on the EU courts supranational legal practice.

A challenge in principle for Norway is that the Lisbon Treaty cancelled the former pillar structure which formally parted EU cooperation in three different parts (the EC, the CFSP, and the cooperation in the realm justice- and home affairs). This might present a problem to Norway because the Norwegian agreements with the EU still are based on the pillar structure. The EEA only applies to the subject matters of the first pillar, whereas Norway also has agreements within the former second and third pillars.<sup>212</sup> Also, the institutional changes in the EU with the strengthening of the European Council and the European Parliament (EP) as a result of the Lisbon Treaty, constitute a change of reality for Norwegian European policy makers. These are institutions which Norwegian authorities might have larger difficulties to interact with compared to the Commission and the Council. Furthermore the EU established a new common European External Action Service (EEAS) which has led to certain changes in the way the EU handles its relationship with Norway, and to anxiety on the Norwegian side that the EU could “downgrade” it. The most important long-term challenge to Norway is however according to the Norwegian report on the EU that the Union is about to develop a foreign political instrument which should contribute to a stronger coordination of the EU member states’ foreign policies.<sup>213</sup> Norway’s relationship with the EU is both foreign policy and home affairs. As a whole, the accords with the EU are Norway’s most important foreign policy agreement, which not only regulates the relationship with the Union but also with the 27 member states

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<sup>210</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 71.

<sup>211</sup>The Single European Market was about being created when the EEA agreement was being negotiated. It was to be part of a future EU rather than the existing EC with which the EFTA states were negotiating. The EEA agreement accordingly refers to the Treaty of Rome rather than to the Maastricht treaty.

<sup>212</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 83.

<sup>213</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 83.

which to an increasing extent coordinate their foreign policies. The EEA is thus also Norway's most important Nordic cooperation agreement.<sup>214</sup>

In fact, some of the legislation formerly carried out by the Norwegian parliament now comes from the EU. Through the EEA agreement, Norway is practically copying EU legislation for the internal market. This weakens the role of the Storting, and the EEA process is easily treated as an element of foreign policy rather than as legislation. Whereas Norway's relationship with the EC/ EU has been the most controversial single issue in Norwegian politics for the last forty years and still might be so, the content of the continuing EU adaption is not very disputed. Whereas the EU has fragmented Norwegian politics, the EEA has had a uniting effect. In the period 1992 to 2011 Norway has adopted over 6000 new EU legal acts through the EEA, whereas the right to veto, which is inherent, has only been seriously discussed in 17 cases. According to the Norwegian constitution, the Storting must give a special approval every time Norway accepts new obligations of particular importance. In the period 1992 to 2011 the Storting has voted in 287 cases of this kind; 265 of them were decided unanimously, and the rest were basically decided with a large majority.<sup>215</sup>

According to Archer, a "Europeanisation" of the central administration has taken place in Norway through the EEA process.<sup>216</sup> Nevertheless, the Norwegian state administration's EEA related work has room for improvement, as shown by a report conducted by the office of the Auditor General of Norway on the Norwegian state administration's work with the forming of EEA relevant rules and regulations. The report, presented in November 2005, concluded that the Norwegian state administration, and first and foremost ministries such as the ministry of the environment, the ministry of trade and industry and the ministry of petroleum and energy, does not take the work with the EEA seriously: The ministries do not as presumed participate in the administration's coordination on top level.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 17.

<sup>215</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 20.

<sup>216</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 94.

<sup>217</sup> Oral and general instructions are standard practice as signals to the Norwegian members of the EU working groups that elaborate the legislation which is being imposed on Norway as an EEA country. Furthermore, of the hundreds of directive drafts about EEA cases which are elaborated by Norwegian ministries, 63 per cent are about cases already adopted by the EU. Only 32 per cent allude to cases which are still in the decision making stage. (Riksrevisjonen (2005) *Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningens arbeid med utformingen av EØS-relevant*

All of the current 17 government ministries are more or less preoccupied with EU/EEA matters, and the same is the case with most of the government agencies and all of the 429 municipalities which experience that EEA related questions have a great role in workaday life. Of about 600 Norwegian laws about 170 of them comprise EU law to a greater or lesser extent. This also applies to around thousand Norwegian directives.<sup>218</sup>

The Europeanisation of Norway, both of the state administration and society, in the period 1992 to 2011 has not been a public topic, and few politicians have an interest in highlighting this matter. Also, no political party wants to initiate a new membership discussion in the nearest future. This is also a result of the European economic crisis. In this regard former FM Godal expresses the situation with a Groucho Marx citation: "I do not want to belong to a club that would accept me as a member."<sup>219</sup> Educational books are almost completely silent in regards to the EEA and Europeanisation of Norway. "There are not many other spheres of Norwegian democracy in modern times where so many have known so little about so much as in the European policy."<sup>220</sup> The democratic problem Norway has in regards to the EU has been the main argument of the EEA oponents. There are definitely structural tensions and problems in the EEA construct, and it has obvious democratic deficits. At the same time however it has functioned seemingly well for almost 20 years and has created a predictable frame for both Norway's relations with the EU, its closest neighbouring states and most important economic partners. The EU itself has been through several ups and downs from 1992 to 2011, but the frames of Norway's affiliation have been stable on the one hand and flexible enough on the other hand to bear the changes. The cooperation with the EU is also gaining momentum, and seems to be without

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*regelverk*. Riksrevisjonens administrative rapport no. 2, <http://www.riksrevisjonen.no> (accessed 30 November 2006), pp. 7-8.) The picture drawn by the report is that Norwegian governments and the state administration have resigned and are attuned to only executing a function of a formal authoriser in the interrelation with the EU. A statement from the MFA mentions the reasons for this picture to be the EU's enlargement and a significantly smaller EFTA side, treaty changes in the EU with expanded fields of cooperation, the Lisbon strategy, new working methods and new EU agencies which do not have its counterparts on the EFTA side and with which Norway has to negotiate special arrangements in order to be associated. Cited in Riksrevisjonen (2005) *Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningens arbeid med utformingen av EØS-relevant regelverk*. Riksrevisjonens administrative rapport no. 2, <http://www.riksrevisjonen.no> (accessed 30 November 2006), p. 50.

<sup>218</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 18.

<sup>219</sup> GODAL (2012).

<sup>220</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 20.

limits, because it is politically safe as the decision is taken not to apply for a membership. Also the political parties opposing a membership are getting used to a new proximity, and the same could be the case with the Norwegian people.<sup>221</sup> Former EU ambassador to Norway, Gerhard Sabathil, stated in 2004 that through the EEA agreement, Norway is to 60-70 per cent already a member of the EU.<sup>222</sup> Norway has in fact adopted 3/4 of EU law compared to those member states which participate fully, and has implemented it more efficiently than many other countries. From the EU's point of view, Norway is the third country which is the closest attached to the Union. The EEAS writes that "Norway is as integrated in European policy and economy as any non-member State can be".<sup>223</sup> The major disadvantage of the EEA to Norway is the limited amount of influence on policy-making and the undermining of parliamentary authority. The EU became increasingly aware of the lack of democratic ruling in the EU after the French and Dutch denials of the European Constitution draft. As a result, the EU commission now sends all its suggestions and surveys directly to the national parliaments. This, however, does not apply for the Norwegian parliament.

Archer (2005) examined the relationship between Norway and the EU on the basis of the EEA. His first conclusion is that this has been "remarkably successful for Norway in general economic terms." However, it is impossible to say whether or not Norway would have fared economically better had it been a full EU member.<sup>224</sup> Through the EEA, Norway has the autonomy to control and regulate certain sectors of the economy, i.e. agriculture and fisheries and to some extent energy, which it would not have had as a full member. Norway's system of agricultural support, and with it the rural areas, may benefit from being "outside". Norway's right to regulate fisheries in order to conserve the stocks has furthermore been a clear advantage as the Common Fishery Policy "has been seen to be a miserable failure, even on the Commission's own admission."<sup>225</sup> Then-FM Godal signed the EEA Treaty on behalf of Norway twenty years ago. Today he points at one important weakness: The EEA does not give full access to the EU's

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<sup>221</sup>In regards to the Stoltenberg government's European policy, see the Parliament report no. 15 (2008-2009) *Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk*.

<sup>222</sup>Cited in UDGAARD (2004).

<sup>223</sup>Cited in SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 838.

<sup>224</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 128.

<sup>225</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 128.

internal market for all Norwegian fishery products.<sup>226</sup> The EU is Norway's most important market for fishery products. Norway's relations with the EU in this realm is complex and comprehensive.<sup>227</sup>

Archer's case studies also demonstrated where Norway has been able to exert a certain autonomy and influence in the EEA and where not. In areas of great importance to the country, such as gas, regional aid and fisheries, expectations that Norway would have greater success proved to be wrong. The case studies rather show that even if Norway might expend more political efforts on these important areas, the assertiveness is likely to depend on the importance attached to these issues by the EU and certain key member states.<sup>228</sup> One case Archer examined was the Gas Market Directive, which started through the EU decision-making process in 1997 and was adopted in summer 1998. By the autumn of 1998 the EEA-EFTA states had been invited to adopt it. Until the gas directive came, the EU had not been able to fully liberalise the gas market. Given Norway's dominant position in the ownership of European energy and its growing importance to the Continental gas market,<sup>229</sup> in addition to a traditional intrusive position of the government in the Norwegian oil and gas business, Norway's position in negotiations with the EU on natural gas was assumed to be strong. However, it proved not to be. In 2001, the Commission sent a 'Statement of Objections' for breaking the rules of competition to all the companies that sold gas from the Norwegian offshore fields. This was a direct challenge to the policy of the Norwegian government, especially that of supporting its Gas Negotiating Committee (GNC). The GNC managed the task of concluding contracts for the sale of Norwegian offshore gas, preferably long term contracts with preferred buyers, thus providing stability and profitability. This cartel activity of Norwegian gas sales came to an end as the GNC ceased its activities from 1 January 2002 due to the intervention of the Commission and ESA. On the other hand, the Commission dropped a case against Norwegian gas companies.<sup>230</sup>

"Some seven years after Norway had failed to join the EU, its government

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<sup>226</sup> GODAL (2012).

<sup>227</sup> See for further details SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), pp. 666-685.

<sup>228</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 131.

<sup>229</sup> See chapter 4 of part I.

<sup>230</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 109.



had accepted lock, stock and barrel EU regulations on one of its major export industries and a central part of its economy. (...) It seems that in such an important activity Norway had exercised very little influence (compared with the potential muscle provided by such gas resources) and had lost a great deal of autonomy to market forces and to the EU as their regulator.”<sup>231</sup>

An interesting point is that the oil gave Norway “the economic capacity for society to wait” in the referendum of 1994 instead of “rushing” into the EU.<sup>232</sup> The state defended the Norwegian petroleum industry during the EC membership negotiations in the early 1990s.<sup>233</sup> In this period the EU tried to regulate the energy sector. This policy was however not compatible with the Norwegian petroleum regime. As Archer has shown in the case of gas, it is now Brussels and not Oslo that regulates important parts of the energy market. This means that at least the gas part of the Norwegian energy industry is affected by a certain Europeanisation.<sup>234</sup> Furthermore, the EU is moving towards a common energy policy as a result of a growing “resource nationalism”, rising prices and decreasing reserves worldwide. Whereas the main responsibility for energy still lies with the member countries, competition will at the same time increase through a dissolution and opening of the monopolies and mains. Norway thus has to clarify where its energy interests lie, not only economically but also politically. Despite the very important energy relations between Norway and the EU, there has been a tendency in Norway of ignoring the EU’s importance. On the other hand, Norway is rarely mentioned by the EU or its members states when they discuss energy. The country is remarkably aloof in the debate and is probably taken for granted. The Commission presented the Energy Roadmap 2050 on 15 December 2012 which considers different energy mixes in a long-term perspective in order to achieve the Low Carbon Society. Early in the report’s making, natural gas was not a focal point and this distressed Norwegian authorities. In the final version gas is however defined as critical to the transformation of the energy system. The vision is that gas will replace coal in a short to medium-term period but also for a long period of time. From 2030 it is however necessary with carbon capture and storage in order to secure the long-term position of natural gas in the Eu-

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<sup>231</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 109..

<sup>232</sup> INGEBRITSEN (1998), p. 139.

<sup>233</sup> INGEBRITSEN (1998), p. 140.

<sup>234</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 113.

ropean energy mix.<sup>235</sup> It is difficult to assess what this document will mean to the future of Norwegian gas, but the EU's importance as an export market is crucial and thus the European energy policy is vital. The Norwegian delegation to the EU have reported in a letter to the Oil and Energy ministry that there is a large disagreement on the report and thus not very probable that the energy efficiency directive will be as ambitious as the proposal of the Commission. The Commission's suggestion e.g. presupposes over 1000 billion euro of investments in the energy sector prior to 2020, whereof 200 billion euro in power grids and pipes. In the current financial situation this is thus very ambitious.<sup>236</sup>

According to parliament report no. 15 on Norwegian foreign policy (2008/2009), the most comprehensive cooperation arrangements with the EU are the Schengen agreement, the CFSP and the maintenance of fish stocks.<sup>237</sup> The original Schengen cooperation took place outside the EU's institutions.<sup>238</sup> Norway signed agreements with the Schengen countries on 19 December 1996 (Schengen I) that were ratified by Norway in 1997. Originally, Schengen was only open to full membership by EU states, which excluded e.g. Norway and Iceland. The cooperation on legal matters within the EU and the inclusion of Sweden, Finland and Denmark would have posed problems for Norway, but the separation of Schengen from the EU allowed some latitude and made a joint Nordic approach possible.<sup>239</sup>

<sup>235</sup>The European Commission (2011) *Power Perspectives 2030. On the road to a decarbonised power sector*, p. 64 at [http://www.roadmap2050.eu/attachments/files/PowerPerspectives2030\\_FullReport.pdf](http://www.roadmap2050.eu/attachments/files/PowerPerspectives2030_FullReport.pdf)

<sup>236</sup>Cited in HELGESEN (2012), p. 43.

<sup>237</sup>Parliament report no. 15 (2008-2009) *Interesser, ansvar og muligheter. Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitik*, p. 52.

<sup>238</sup>On 15 June 1985, representatives from Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Germany signed an agreement in the Luxembourgian town Schengen aiming at abolishing border control of persons between these countries. This was later on followed up by the Schengen convention of 19 June 1990. The cooperation formally started on 26 March 1995 and was later on joined by Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. 19 of the EU's 25 members are a part of the cooperation. The UK and Ireland have chosen not to participate in the part of the cooperation which implies an abolishment of border control. Bulgaria, Cyprus and Romania do not yet participate in the Schengen cooperation. Switzerland has also accepted the Schengen rules.

<sup>239</sup>The Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden have for more than 40 years had a common regulation of passport and free traveling, in short the Nordic passport union. Nordic citizens have thus been allowed to travel to (persons from outside the Nordic region included) and stay in another Nordic country without a passport for several decades. The future of the passport union was suddenly uncertain as Denmark, Finland and Sweden wanted to join the Schengen cooperation. Thus common Nordic negotiations were started with the Schengen countries on a cooperation agreement with Iceland and Norway. The Nordic situation before Schengen I was one EU member with an opt-out from justice issues (Denmark), two new EU members with no such opt-out (Finland and Sweden) and two non-EU but EEA members (Iceland and Norway).

Despite of the Schengen agreement, the EU keeps Norway out of important parts of the justice and police cooperation. The Amsterdam treaty decided that the Schengen cooperation would become a part of the EU. The Amsterdam treaty, effective from 1 May 1999, implies that former Schengen questions now are being treated by the EU's ministers of justice as the system was transferred to the Community-based Pillar I.<sup>240</sup> Thus Norway is kept out of and is not allowed to join the policy shaping process of this realm. The moving of the Schengen treaty into the Treaty of Amsterdam meant that Norway's relationship with the Schengen system had changed. In order not to create a border between three Nordic EU states and two Nordic non-EU states, a new Schengen II agreement between the EU and Norway and Iceland was necessary and agreed on. Norway and Iceland joined Schengen II on 25 March 2001.

“Though the Schengen structure reached into the heart of sovereignty, it did not cover so many aspects of socio-economic activity as the EEA. The agreement reached did not provide for any supranational authority over Norway and also meant that Norway could be bound only by laws which it had accepted.”<sup>241</sup>

From 1999 to 2011 the Schengen agreement has been extended by 158 legal acts of totally about 300. This has not created much political debate in Norway despite both principal and sensitive questions, and a political consensus on both Schengen and the other agreements on judicial policy with the EU prevails in the Storting.<sup>242</sup>

Norway cooperates on justice matters within forums such as the Council of Europe, Interpol, Nordic cooperation and the CBSS but the cooperation within the EU is considered to be broader and more integrated. Norway was the first non-EU state to sign an agreement with Europol in May 2001 which allowed practical participation through a Norwegian liaison officer based in the organisation's head-

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<sup>240</sup>The cooperation on civil right and certain parts of the cooperation on asylum and immigration were transferred to pillar I and subordinated the procedure of codetermination with the EP. A European Council decision of 2004 transferred the remaining part of the cooperation on visa, asylum and immigration to this procedure. The exceptions were the rules on legal immigration which are still to be agreed on unanimously. As regards the cooperation on criminal law and police (pillar III), changes were made through the Amsterdam treaty. For instance, the European Commission became the right to initiate legislation next to the member states. NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2006), p. 20.

<sup>241</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 161.

<sup>242</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 691.

quarters in the Hague. Norway also takes part as an observer in Eurojust meetings and cooperates with the European police academy and a convention on criminal law. Nevertheless, the Norwegian parliament proposition no. 23 (2005/2006) on European policy referred to the experience of being kept out of the EU police cooperation, even though Norwegian governments explicitly want to participate, as one of Norway's big challenges in its relations with the EU.<sup>243</sup> The report further states that the EU and Norway on several occasions have disagreed on what should be regarded as Schengen-relevant. Further, the EU's interpretation of the Schengen agreement is characterised by the Norwegian government as a consequent and restrictive approach.<sup>244</sup> This situation makes it hard to ignore the arguments that favour a full Norwegian integration in the EU. Altogether, the global character of the challenges of violence, terror, crime and the change in the nature of migration makes the national level insufficient to handle these matters. The increasing overlap between justice and home affairs matters. The "European Security Strategy", adopted by the EU in December 2003 and updated in 2008, calls for "better action between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies" in the EU.<sup>245</sup> This makes the situation even more to the dislike of Norway. The EU's conditions of agreeing on a broader political approach have improved with the Lisbon Treaty. The EU thus acts on a basis which is more integrated because the rules of decision making are more congruent. The foreign and security policy is still intergovernmental but the coordination is strengthened through the EEAS. The need of coordination is articulated in the overriding EU strategy documents which are resolved upon by the heads of governments in the European Council. Norway does not have access to the European Council, and none of Norway's agreements with the EU give access to the processes leading to the concrete action plans elaborated by the Commission.<sup>246</sup> Norway's agreements with the EU are thus only tied to certain elements of European cooperation, and these elements are not coordinated in a way which secures Norwegian participation in integrated cooperation measures. EU activities towards third countries in regards to migration is one example of only a partial Norwegian connection

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<sup>243</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2006), p. 25.

<sup>244</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2006), p. 21.

<sup>245</sup> Cited in ARCHER (2005), p. 167.

<sup>246</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 690.

through Schengen and Dublin.<sup>247</sup> Another example is the agreements with the US in order to exchange information on terrorism and other crimes which might have direct influence on Norwegian matters.<sup>248</sup>

As shown in this chapter and elsewhere, Norway's strategy of maintaining its autonomy, and at the same time increasing its influence, has not been very successful. Overall, the links between Norway and the EU must furthermore be characterised as complicated. The EU is brought into the country's internal space as far as the political and interest elites are concerned. As the wider population is concerned, Norway's part in European integration has affected what they can buy and when, their terms of employment, their security and how freely they can travel abroad. Astonishing in this context is the lack of attention paid to this relationship both in the Norwegian parliament and in the public.<sup>249</sup>

New EU enlargements, which could concern the Ukraine, Turkey, the Balkan and Caucasus, would possibly furthermore affect the EEA agreement. German chancellor Merkel's party fellow Matthias Wissmann, chairman of the Bundestag's Committee on the Affairs of the European Union from 2002 to 2007, published an article on graduated forms of EU membership as a solution to the difficult matters of further enlargements. Accordingly, the "graduated membership" that currently exists for Switzerland and Norway might also be a good solution for countries like the Ukraine, Moldova and, possibly also at some point of time, for Belarus.<sup>250</sup> Merkel has also pointed to this as a possible solution. Norway on her part has no influence on this process. The probability that Iceland becomes a member of the EU has also increased with the financial crisis and the following membership application, which was delivered to the Swedish presidency in Stockholm on 23 July 2009. With Iceland as an EU-member, the EEA-EFTA countries would be Norway and Liechtenstein. In this case, the future of the EEA agreement seems very doubtful. And should the EEA agreement be broadened to include a solution for large countries in the East, Norway would have to go to Kiev and Minsk to defend its EEA interests. The possibility that the EEA agreement will

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<sup>247</sup>The so called Dublin cooperation regulates how an asylum application should be treated if it is applied for in more than one country.

<sup>248</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 691.

<sup>249</sup> ARCHER (2005), p. 189.

<sup>250</sup> WISSMANN (2006), pp. 64-68.

be jeopardised in the future is getting increasingly probable. The question is what the Norwegian reaction would be.

### 3.4.2. Sweden

Unlike Norway, Sweden is a full member of the EU since 1995. This necessitates a deeper examination, beyond Swedish European policy, which includes many aspects of Sweden being in the EU. Miles has examined Sweden in the EU from a fusion perspective and argues in particular that Sweden's policy-making is fast becoming fused with that of the EU and hence, Swedish policy-making has become further supranationally oriented. Although Norway also has had to adapt to the EU, the missing membership keeps it out of EU polity. In the case of Sweden on the other hand, Miles' fusion perspective seems suitable for examining Sweden's Europeanisation as an EU member.

According to the fusion theory's originator, Wolfgang Wessels, fusion explains the process of European integration "by which national and community actors increasingly merge resources in joint institutions and complex procedures".<sup>251</sup> On this basis, Miles applies a micro-level fusion perspective consisting of the elements performance fusion, political fusion and compound fusion, which are three different but complementary ways that national policy-makers view European integration.<sup>252</sup> As *performance fusion* is concerned, the point from a micro-level fusion perspective is that most national policy-makers are predominantly pragmatic and view European integration through performance-related criteria. EU governments need a positive output, i.e. a welfare gain, from EU policy in order to obtain popular support for the Union. As a full EU member, the Union's success is an "infused" part of a state's national interest.<sup>253</sup> Thus it is in Sweden's national interest that the EU stays successful, which is an important difference to Norway's situation.

Further, *political fusion* constitutes "the vitally important, if often vague, political viewpoint of the governing elite of a respective state towards the desirability of

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<sup>251</sup> WESSELS (2001), p. 199.

<sup>252</sup> MILES (2005), p. 30.

<sup>253</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 32-33.

differing options covering the future direction of the evolving EU system.”<sup>254</sup> Accordingly, most European countries regard integration as a ‘third way’ between intergovernmentalism and federalism, most elites being pro-supranational integration but federo-sceptic. Federalism is disliked as a result of its constitutional character. Moreover, political fusion is ongoing as national adaption continues regardless of public EU scepticism, which can only influence the pace of the process.<sup>255</sup>

Finally, *compound fusion* is about the EU being regarded by national EU policymakers as a compound polity, i.e. “a state-like politico-administrative system that works in conjunction with the existing nation states rather than serving to replace the latter.”<sup>256</sup> Compound fusion thus emphasises both to what extent national administrative principles have extended into the EU as well as the changes in national procedures as a result of participation in EU committees. Hence, federal models are politically sensitive because they attempt to make an explicit cut between the national and EU levels. Compound fusion on the other hand does not. It is furthermore increasingly difficult to reverse the fusion trends emanating from the member states’ participation in the EU compound polity. The alternative seems to be leaving the Union altogether.<sup>257</sup>

Domestic debates concerning aspects of compound fusion are usually concerned with the negative democratic implications emanating from the lack of public accountability as public resources are merged across governmental levels and responsibilities are diffused. Compound fusion should, however, result in a decline of opposition to EU-membership, starting with the elite level and perhaps become extended to the public level. The process of Europeanisation thus lock the member states into the process and may even enable them to move to the EU’s inner core.<sup>258</sup> Opinion polls show that the support for the EU is rather increasing in Swedish opinion after the outbreak of the financial crisis, and the Swedish turnout of the 2009 EP elections 2009 was over the EU-average and far above the 2004 result.<sup>259</sup> Moreover, an increase of obligations and commitments takes place

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<sup>254</sup> MILES (2005), p. 34.

<sup>255</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 34-37.

<sup>256</sup> MILES (2005), p. 38.

<sup>257</sup> MILES (2005), p. 41.

<sup>258</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 42-43.

<sup>259</sup>The Swedish turnout was 45,53 per cent compared to the overall 43 per cent. In 2004,

simultaneously with a Europeanisation of the national political elite. The term Europeanisation is in this context defined in two different but not mutually exclusive ways. The first considers a shift of attention by national policy makers as the EU's growing importance to their work is recognised, and more involvement in the EU policy cycle leads to a positive orientation towards EU governance. At least, a large amount of time is invested by national policy-makers to deal with EU policies and legislation. The second definition concerns the procedural character of Europeanisation as national procedures are reformed to meet the demands of EU obligations, resulting in institutional adaption and altering of the domestic rules.<sup>260</sup>

Miles shows that Sweden has sophisticated mechanisms at the domestic level of formulating political consensus behind national EU policy.<sup>261</sup> The domestic level is furthermore connected to the projection of Swedish policy interests and the Swedish government's ability to influence the EU's agenda.<sup>262</sup> According to Börzel, an effective national EU strategy needs to "upload" national policy arrangements to the EU level for three reasons: firstly, to reduce the need for legal and administrative adaptation in "downloading" EU policies into national policy structures. This may imply financial and political costs. Secondly, to prevent competitive disadvantages appearing for domestic industry and finally, to enable national governments to address problems that preoccupy domestic constituencies but can not be dealt with effectively at the domestic level.<sup>263</sup> Here, a comparison must be made between Norway and Sweden because this is the largest difference between being inside the EU (Sweden) and being both inside and outside the EU (Norway). The report on Norway's relations with the Union<sup>264</sup> states that Norway might be able to exercise a certain influence on EU decision making, or achieve particular exemptions, through an active European policy. Norway however is not represented in the European decision making institutions and is thus outside the decisive processes whereas the country at the same time

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the turnouts were 37,85 per cent (Sweden) and 45,47 per cent (EU). See [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/sweden\\_en.html#ancre4](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/archive/elections2009/en/sweden_en.html#ancre4) (accessed 13 August 2009).

<sup>260</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 45-46.

<sup>261</sup> See MILES (2005), pp. 52-175.

<sup>262</sup> See MILES (2005), p. 177.

<sup>263</sup> BÖRZEL (2002), p. 196.

<sup>264</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL. (2012)



has committed itself to implement large parts of the EU policy and legal acts. The formal sovereignty is thus an illusion.<sup>265</sup> The possibility of influence from the outside through e.g. lobbying is very limited. Norway's affiliation with the EU has thus been both depoliticizing and increasingly technocratic because the combination of being outside the EU and political compromising result in few incentives for political engagement. Rather, power is displaced in favour of the civil service.<sup>266</sup>

As opposed to its neighbour, Sweden is able to pursue different policy priorities within EU policy, and Miles has identified different categories of policy priorities: *Championed Policy Priorities*, *Normative Policy Priorities* and *Policy Dilemmas*. Börzel's three ways in which EU states have responded to Europeanisation in both the decision-making and implementation stages of the policy process - by pace-setting<sup>267</sup>, foot-dragging<sup>268</sup> and fence-sitting<sup>269</sup>, is embedded in Miles' model.<sup>270</sup> *Championed policy priorities* (pace-setting) thus identify issues which are championed by the Swedish governments within the EU policy-making process. Most of those are related to

1. "Swedish desires to improve the democratic credentials of the Union, such as greater EU openness and transparency",
2. "those policy areas where the Swedes are usually perceived to be market leaders, such as, in the environmental and societal policy spheres" and
3. "those aspects of the EU external relations portfolio that Swedish policy-makers believe (if developed) will reinforce existing foreign policy priorities, such as in the Baltic Sea Region and/or European crisis management."<sup>271</sup> Here, Swedish standards and policy lines are being projected on the EU, Sweden acts proactive and usually favours extensive supranationalism. The Swedish policy priorities during its 2009 presidency were, in relation to this, economy and employment

<sup>265</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 827.

<sup>266</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 828.

<sup>267</sup>The pace-setters try to "shape European policies according to their domestic preferences and priorities". BÖRZEL (2002), p. 197.

<sup>268</sup>Foot-dragging is aimed at preventing other states from "uploading" their domestic policies to the EU level or trying to obtain "some compensation in the form of side-payments or package deals". BÖRZEL (2002), p. 203.

<sup>269</sup>Fence-sitting implies "taking an indifferent and neutral position" or building coalitions with pace-setters and foot-draggers. BÖRZEL (2002), p. 206.

<sup>270</sup> BÖRZEL (2002), pp. 194-195.

<sup>271</sup>See MILES (2005), p. 178.

and climate. A further priority was the Stockholm programme, which shows a proactive Swedish attitude in regards to EU cooperation on legal and domestic questions in order to assure cross-border legal certainty. Important aspects of the Stockholm programme are the strengthening of human rights in EU law, as well as the implementation of procedures in the common migration policy. The programme also continues the effort of improving the exchange of information between national authorities and the EU in the realm of judiciary policy. For instance, the EU is about to implement a system for direct access to reaction registers in member states, and a similar system for access to police registers in the different countries is also considered. Common rules on the collecting and exchange of passenger data are also being considered, and none of these suggestions will be EEA or Schengen relevant.<sup>272</sup> Other important policy priorities of the 2009 Swedish presidency were the EU's Baltic Sea Strategy, "the EU, the proximate areas and the world" as well as "new parliament, new commission and the Lisbon Treaty".<sup>273</sup>

Sweden's *normative policy priorities* (fence-sitting) of Miles's second classification category are reflected in the desire to be perceived as a mainstream member state and a 'good European'. These issues are not so openly championed, but political and/or economic advantages are anticipated. Research and economic development and Schengen cooperation are examples of such activity where Sweden is acting more neutral. However, supranational cooperation has usually been favoured by Sweden in regards to normative priorities, and here Swedish attitudes have altered progressively.<sup>274</sup>

As the final classification of *policy dilemmas* (foot-dragging) is concerned, the priority of the Swedish government is to openly defend and usually protect Swedish interests, which might result in a peripheral position to the EU development. Here, intergovernmental solutions, at least the avoidance of supranational arrangements, are favoured. Examples of Swedish policy dilemmas are the protection of Swedish alcohol monopolies and to a lesser extent the attitudes towards EU monetary integration. Such 'foot-dragging' is in very few cases able to prevent

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<sup>272</sup> SEJERSTED ET AL.(2012), p. 688.

<sup>273</sup>[http://www.se2009.eu/sv/ordforandeskapet/arbetsprogram/arbetsprogram\\_for\\_det\\_svenska\\_ordforandeskapet\\_i\\_eu](http://www.se2009.eu/sv/ordforandeskapet/arbetsprogram/arbetsprogram_for_det_svenska_ordforandeskapet_i_eu) (accessed 13 August 2009).

<sup>274</sup>See MILES (2005), pp. 178-180.

problematic policies but can result in some compensation, for example opt-outs, that may enable Sweden to stay outside the disputed policy field.<sup>275</sup>

Miles' next move in describing Swedish policy dynamics regarding the EU is to connect this policy typology with fusion.<sup>276</sup> In this case he outlines the optimistic type of scenario (interpretation 1),<sup>277</sup> the balanced type of scenario (interpretation 2)<sup>278</sup> and the pessimistic type of scenario (interpretation 3).<sup>279</sup>

Miles (2005) further classifies Sweden's full membership into four distinct, inter-linked periods for convenient reasons. This historiography is a basis for considering further aspects of Swedish European policy and Sweden's role in the EU. The first period, period A, is termed "reactive shock" and applies to the period 1995-97. Championed policy priorities (pace-setting) of period A were openness/transparency, environment, employment and enlargement. Normative policy priorities (fence-sitting) were EU research and EU crisis management, as well as continued Swedish participation in the Single European Market, whereas policy dilemmas (foot-dragging) were the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the EU defence dimension and Schengen cooperation.<sup>280</sup>

The years 1997-99 are period B in Miles' history of Swedish governmental EU policy positions. At this point of time, anti-membership attitudes were marginal

<sup>275</sup>See MILES (2005), pp. 180-181.

<sup>276</sup>Here, Ekengren's and Sundelius' distinction between the Swedish state and Swedish society in terms of Europeanisation/ EU-isation is embedded in the description of the three different scenarios of Swedish policy towards the EU. See EKENGREN/ SUNDELIUS (1997).

<sup>277</sup>An optimistic scenario would occur if " (a)there is already a large and stable number of issues that can be classified as championed policy priorities (1) or; (b) if there is a sizeable number of issues moving upwards from Classification (2) - normative policy priorities - to Classification (1), then Sweden is already a leading and fully Europeanised state." MILES (2005), p. 183.

<sup>278</sup>"If we see more issues that are moving from Classification (3) - so that there are fewer policy dilemmas for the Swedes - to Classification (2) and/or (1), then we can assume that the Swedish government is becoming accustomed to working in the Union, but that the average Swede is not fully Europeanised. (...) The results of the survey would suggest that there is still a delicate balance, with the Swedish state (the political elite and governmental apparatus) being fully Europeanised and acting as the protectors of full membership status, whilst Swedish society remains more sceptical." MILES (2005), pp. 185-186.

<sup>279</sup>"If a large number of important policy areas can be detected as policy dilemmas (Classification 3) then we can interpret this as meaning that there are still substantial domestic constraints affecting Swedish policy toward the Union. Sweden has some way to go before becoming comfortable with its full membership status". Here, even a withdrawal from the EU stays a real possibility as large parts of Swedish society are disillusioned with the membership. Few championed policy priorities, minimal normative priorities and plenty of policy dilemmas would further be the reality of the third scenario. MILES (2005), p. 187.

<sup>280</sup> MILES (2005), Table 5.4, p. 189.

within the mainstream political parties and thus gave the government more elbowroom. One explanation for the positive development was the successful advocating of the abovementioned championed issues as they were incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty.<sup>281</sup> In regards to Miles's policy typology, crisis management was upgraded to become a championed priority in this period. In addition, Swedish concerns relating to certain aspects of the third pillar and Schengen in particular became more subdued, and supranational solutions were increasingly accepted here. Miles thus sees a "slight increase" in the number of normative policy priorities. The prospects of EU enlargement furthermore enabled Sweden to pursue new policy issues in order to make the EU more acceptable to the Swedish population. It was also increasingly realised that Sweden's political future was closely connected with EU ambitions.<sup>282</sup> The most crucial questions of this period, the EMU and the EU defence dimension, were disputed in Sweden and showed that Sweden's federal-scepticism puts limits on Sweden's ability to engage in "first-rate integration". Miles places Sweden within the balanced scenario during this period.

Then, period C from 1999-2000 is characterised by "positive adjustment" and a more proactive European policy. External and structural pressures<sup>283</sup> made it necessary for Sweden to improve its image in the EU. Both the EU defence dimension<sup>284</sup> and the euro were promoted by the Persson government, and the political elite had taken a leading role on domestic debate on European integration. Sweden accepted, among other things, the supranational Schengen arrangement in order to preserve the Nordic Passport Union. This however did not mean that intergovernmentalism and the policy dilemmas were abandoned.<sup>285</sup>

Finally, period D, i.e. the Swedish EU Council Presidency 2001, is the last period examined by Miles. The championed policy priorities set to form the Presidency were enlargement, employment and environment, whereas the aim of the Swedish

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<sup>281</sup> As mentioned in chapter 3.2, Sweden and Finland were successful including the Petersberg tasks in the Amsterdam Treaty.

<sup>282</sup> MILES (2005), p. 193.

<sup>283</sup> These were the launch of the EMU Third Stage in January 1999, the debates on a new EU Treaty and preparation for Sweden's EU Council presidency.

<sup>284</sup> The prior separation of the CFSP into civil/ foreign policy on the one hand and military and security components on the other hand was played down.

<sup>285</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 195-198.

Presidency in regards to enlargement was to fulfill the Nice obligations, which were not very high and therefore a key to success.<sup>286</sup> Miles attaches the greatest significance to the achievement of making progress on the target date for the accession of the leading candidate countries and in that way ensuring that the high-speed enlargement was made irrevocable.<sup>287</sup> The Swedish strategy was result-oriented and Swedish policy-makers accordingly *de facto* performance fusionists, especially highlighting the relationship between the processes of economic transition and EU accession. In contrast, Sweden wanted to avoid a general debate on the future of Europe.<sup>288</sup> As stated by Sweden's then-FM Anna Lindh in a speech on the Swedish Presidency: "I do not believe in a big bang reform of the EU or in an United States of Europe ... I believe in a step-by-step approach - realising differences between countries."<sup>289</sup>

Ojanen stated in 2000 that Sweden (and Finland) is "in many ways on the borderline in questions of European integration."<sup>290</sup> First, the geographic location is an important factor which also has implications for Sweden's national interests and makes the Union's external policies and its frontier regimes particularly important to Sweden. Second, Sweden is on the borderline in regards to "the ideology and tradition of European integration" due to not being one of the core countries in the process of European integration.<sup>291</sup> Swedish federal-scepticism was also clearly shown in the reactions to former German FM Fischer's widely discussed keynote address of May 2000 on the future of the EU, which both Swedish PM Persson and FM Lindh officially criticised.<sup>292</sup> The opinions in Sweden about a European constitution treaty showed, when compared to Finland, a larger scepticism towards federal aspects of European integration. The Left Party and the Green Party were the parties most negative about the Constitution and the only parties supporting a referendum. Although being minor parties of the Riksdag, the majority of the Swedish population tended to support their view on both

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<sup>286</sup>The 'road map' to accession had been agreed on at the Nice European Council Summit in December 2000.

<sup>287</sup> MILES (2005), pp. 205-206. It was formally recognised that negotiations should be concluded before the end of 2002 for the leading candidates in order to achieve accession in 2004.

<sup>288</sup> MILES (2005), p. 207.

<sup>289</sup>Cited in MILES (2005), p. 210.

<sup>290</sup> OJANEN (2000), p. 1.

<sup>291</sup> OJANEN (2000), p. 1.

<sup>292</sup>Mr. Fischer later modified his position, not least because of the perspective of Turkish membership in the EU.

a petition for a referendum and the views on a European Constitution as such, which was a somewhat unhappy name as the emphasis on the maintenance of sovereignty in EU affairs is pivotal to the Swedish electorate.<sup>293</sup> This also explains the federo-scepticism of all Swedish political parties. What seems to rather unite the Swedish public opinion and the Swedish political elite is a policy of seeking substantial changes to the way the EU operates. The Swedes are apparently also very aware of the fact that they are one of the primary net payers in the EU.<sup>294</sup> Furthermore, all Swedish political parties represented in the Riksdag supported the enlargement process of the EU and all parties agreed that the Copenhagen criteria should be the basis for further enlargements.<sup>295</sup> Both political camps emphasised the policy areas environment, foreign policy and security, i.e. favoured more substance similar to the policy line of the European Commission, and both thus supported the results achieved by the German presidency in June 2007.<sup>296</sup> PM Reinfeldt was able to support chancellor Merkel with the ratification process of a reformed constitution treaty, gathering praise in Berlin.<sup>297</sup>

That Sweden today, after yet another two EU enlargements, is still perceived as a borderline country or “on the margins of Europe” is not so evident anymore. Sweden has for example been one of the strongest advocates for a continued eastern enlargement of the EU. Furthermore, Sweden shows “a much stronger commitment to policy initiation at the EU level and to supranational policy-making in general than one would expect from a country widely labeled as EU-sceptic”.<sup>298</sup> Another point is that the country, in addition to its geographic location and lacking ideological traditions of European integration, is a small to middle-sized European country. This fact did however not always prevent Sweden from joining the large EU countries in regards to European integration. One example was former PM Persson’s support for a French proposal regarding the European Constitution in 2003. The proposal was to introduce a president for the European Council, which by most minor EU member states was conceived to be a strengthening of the Council at the cost of the European Commission, and therefore also

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<sup>293</sup> HEROLF (2005).

<sup>294</sup> HEROLF (2005).

<sup>295</sup> SEEGER (2007).

<sup>296</sup> SEEGER (2007).

<sup>297</sup> LEWENHAGEN (2007).

<sup>298</sup> MILES (2005), p. 211.

of the small member states as the rotation of presidencies could be abolished and substituted by a permanent president. Some Swedish experts thus deemed it necessary to remind Persson of the fact that Sweden is not a great power in Europe, a notion which was “obviously present” and thus accordingly risked Swedish interests. A good point here is that Persson could hardly have achieved a target date for the accession if he had not been in the chairman position.<sup>299</sup> Sweden’s support could further have minimised the opportunity of coalition building with the other minor member states, which almost unanimously opposed the French proposal, and Sweden was temporarily excluded from meetings where the EU’s minor member states discussed the strategy for the continuing reform process. The real ability of influence in the EU depends on expertise in factual issues, alliances with other participants, structural power resources and access to the EU presidency position.<sup>300</sup>

Sweden rejected the euro through a referendum in September 2003, and the monetary union remains the main policy dilemma and the last reason for some to claim that Sweden is an EU-reluctant country. However, should Sweden’s neighbours Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania become euro-countries in the near future, Sweden’s attitude might change. The financial crisis in 2008 raised the voices of those arguing for Sweden to join the monetary union, as its export-led economy had been hit hard by the crisis.<sup>301</sup> Comparisons with Finland, whose EMU economy performed better than the Swedish through the financial crisis, contributed to the debate. According to an opinion poll undertaken for the Swedish Liberal Party (Folkpartiet), the support of the euro as currency was larger than the opposition in August 2009: 47 percent favoured this whereas 44 percent were against.<sup>302</sup> As late as 2008, the numbers were the opposite: about 38 percent were in favour and 50 against the euro as currency, whereas Swedish scepticism against the euro has reached new heights with the euro crisis (about 80 per cent against).<sup>303</sup> The question is whether this would be a good thing for Sweden to

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<sup>299</sup> OLSEN/ TALLBERG/ MÖRTH/ PETTERSON (2003).

<sup>300</sup> OLSEN/ TALLBERG/ MÖRTH/ PETTERSON (2003).

<sup>301</sup> The relative number of unemployment was 9,8 per cent in June 2009. The GNP in the second quarter 2009 was -6,2 per cent compared to second quarter 2008. See Statistics Sweden, <http://www.scb.se/> (accessed 6 August 2009).

<sup>302</sup> [http://www.folkpartiet.se/ImageVault/Images/id\\_5826/ImageVaultHandler.aspx](http://www.folkpartiet.se/ImageVault/Images/id_5826/ImageVaultHandler.aspx) (accessed 6 August 2009).

<sup>303</sup> Sveriges Riksdag (2012) “Sverige sa nej till euron”, *EU-upplysningen* 12 January at

do.

As opposed to Denmark and the UK, Sweden has no formal exception from adopting the euro. This implies that Sweden according to the EU Treaty will implement the currency when the country fulfils the EU convergence criteria. In the latest hearing of May 2010 Sweden did not fulfil the criteria of price stability and a stable exchange-rate. The latter has never been fulfilled because Sweden has chosen not to participate in the optional exchange-rate mechanism ERM2 which premises that one's currency is tied to the euro. Sweden does not participate in the monetary union and does thus not join the ministers of finance from the euro countries when they meet in the euro group. Sweden does however participate in the other parts of the EMU. This implies that Sweden participates in the EU's stability and growth pact and that Sweden follows the EU's procedures on a coordination of the member states' economic policy.<sup>304</sup>

Scandinavia's biggest economy will see growth slow to less than one per cent in 2012, down from 4,5 per cent in 2011, according to the National Institute of Economic Research.<sup>305</sup> It is even claimed that Sweden has some lessons for the rest of Europe when it comes to economic policy:

“The value of monetary independence is the first and most important Swedish lesson. Sweden stayed out of the euro system when the currency was introduced in 1999, and in the past several years, the government has used this monetary flexibility to the full. (...) [In the 1990s] budget deficits widened and national consensus formed around the need to curb government spending and stabilize the public finances. Sweden's subsequent success in doing that is nothing less than remarkable. Hence, Sweden's second lesson: Fiscal stimulus isn't a necessary condition for economic recovery. Through the course of the recent recession, the government's cyclically adjusted budget stayed in surplus. As a result, Swedish government debt stands at less than 40 percent of gross domestic product, among the lowest of any rich country. (...) Fiscal policy still helped to cushion the recession and support a recovery (...). Should others follow this example? For one group, the answer is plainly yes. Members of the EU that have not yet adopted the euro are nonetheless committed in principle to doing so. (...) Sweden proves, if further proof were needed, that euro membership is a mistake. (...) Sweden is better placed than most to deal with the further economic setbacks the EU seems determined to dispense. More interest-

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<http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Sverige-i-EU/Sverige-sa-nej-till-euron/>

<sup>304</sup>Sveriges Riksdag (2012) “Sverige sa nej till euron”, *EU-upplysningen* 12 January at <http://www.eu-upplysningen.se/Sverige-i-EU/Sverige-sa-nej-till-euron/>

<sup>305</sup>Cited in Bloombeq (eds.) “Sweden shows Europe how to Cut Debt, Weather the Recession: View”, 4 January.



rate cuts and a shift to budget stimulus, if needed, are options that few other rich economies have.”<sup>306</sup>

It is thus interesting to see how Swedish politicians are attuned to the euro in times of the European debt crisis. Former PM Persson has the effects of the current euro crisis in mind when he favours a Swedish membership also in the monetary union. A future deepened cooperation in the euro zone and a new common tax are accordingly predicted by Persson, as the euro countries apparently are adjusting the early mistakes of the monetary union. It is further “important to Sweden” that the monetary union is “fixed”. He also believes that the deepened cooperation will have consequences for Sweden. Just like Switzerland which was forced to tie the swiss franc to the euro, Sweden has not a very open economy. When currencies rise a lot, an export dependent country like Sweden is very vulnerable.<sup>307</sup> “I will definitely not exclude that a Swedish membership is quite close” Persson estimates.<sup>308</sup> There are thus both political and economic reasons that favour a Swedish membership. Former Swedish PM and current FM Bildt supports the view of Persson and points at the “storms on the currency markets” in the beginning of the 1990s “which sooner or later would have torn apart the Common Market”<sup>309</sup> Bildt admits that Sweden has benefited from staying outside the euro cooperation, but at the same time Sweden has been favoured a lot by the existence of the euro.<sup>310</sup> The Swedish government is furthermore distressed by the the fact that Sweden is kept out of the elaboration of the future EU structure. Bildt above all criticised the direction which French then-president Sarkozy represented, i.e. a partition of the EU in two of which one consists of the euro states whereas the rest is more or less marginalised.<sup>311</sup> Finally also German chancellor Merkel stated that she supports a two-speed EU, with a core group in the euro implementing deeper integration than the others.<sup>312</sup>

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<sup>306</sup>Cited in Bloomberg (eds.) “Sweden shows Europe how to Cut Debt, Weather the Recession: View”, 4 January.

<sup>307</sup>Cited in LARSSON (2011).

<sup>308</sup>Cited in LARSSON (2011). Author’s translation.

<sup>309</sup>Cited in OLLEVIK (2011).

<sup>310</sup>Cited in OLLEVIK (2011).

<sup>311</sup>Cited in OLLEVIK (2011).

<sup>312</sup> BUERGIN (2012).

## 3.5. Other aspects of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy

### 3.5.1. Norway

Another important aspect of Norwegian foreign policy is the strong support of the United Nations (UN), the OSCE, the Norwegian development aid policy and peace diplomacy. The moralistic tradition of the inter-war period was followed by a missionary tendency in Norwegian foreign policy in the 1960s, with development aid as the most important factor in the country's global engagement. Norway's self-perception today is linked to being an exponent of international activism and engagement, i.e. 'little country saves the world'. The standard expert view in Norway in regards to the country's foreign relations after the Second World War, is that these have been swinging like a pendulum between "the will to secure the state and its territory and the will to represent a global cosmopolitan spirituality."<sup>313</sup> This coincides with the traditional realism-idealism dichotomy within the studies of international relations. This dichotomy is a "dominant theoretical ingredient in most current analyses of Norwegian foreign policy, and is a favoured perspective from which politicians celebrate Norway's post-cold war role on the international scene."<sup>314</sup>

The goal of this policy is above all the international recognition it is assumed to bring. Thus, the main importance is the visibility of the accomplished actions and not the actual achievements. The policy's success is decided by its degree of attention. A good example is the withdrawal of the Norwegian forces in Bosnia in 1999 to facilitate the Kosovo operation which, compared to Bosnia, had a higher profile in the international public.<sup>315</sup> After the EU referendum in 1994, Norway has been engaged in Guatemala, Sudan, southern Africa, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan in order to gain influence internationally. According to Thune and Ulriksen, who describe Norway as an "allied activist" aiming at "prestige and penance through peace", the Nor-

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<sup>313</sup> THUNE/ ULRIKSEN (2002), p. 3.

<sup>314</sup> THUNE/ ULRIKSEN (2002), p. 3.

<sup>315</sup> THUNE/ ULRIKSEN (2002), p. 7.

wegian state would have had “a serious image problem” if it had not been for the massive engagement in peace promotion and development assistance.<sup>316</sup> This foreign policy profile is justified in different ways. One rationale is that Norwegian humanitarian engagement makes Norway a valuable label, gives foreign policy capital to use when the country is negotiating commercial terms, seeking cooperation or wanting guarantees from larger powers. It is, however, not possible to extract any such direct foreign policy capital as a result of Norway’s engagement for peace and development, and the “soft power” of Norway has a scant basis. Moreover, both the “Oslo process” between Israelis and Palestinians and the UN mediator role of former FM Stoltenberg in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s showed the lack of “power and influence required to convert a temporary truce into a sustainable peace.”<sup>317</sup> This conclusion can be also be applied to e.g. Sri Lanka. Schmutzler’s dissertation analyses the different groups of actors, their functions and relations to each other in the “Norwegian model” of international peace diplomacy. It concludes that the “Norwegian model” is offering an efficient method of establishing contacts with the conflicting parties and for the gathering in official negotiations. The problem lies at the negotiating stage, in which Norway has to rely on more powerful states or international organisations because of problems related to power and influence.<sup>318</sup>

Norway’s first step of a bilateral aid programme was the Indian - Norwegian fisheries project started up in 1952. In addition to the person-to-person character of this project, the fact that Norway was the first non-colonial country to engage in bilateral development aid was according to Rise a major public relations coup for the country.<sup>319</sup> Another Norwegian “peace effort” was the extensive participation in military or semi-military UN peacekeeping missions. At the beginning of 2005, over 50 000 Norwegian military personnel had participated in 31 UN or UN-mandated peacekeeping operations since 1947. The main effort has been the Middle East where 33 000 Norwegian soldiers served in the UNIFIL force in Lebanon from 1978 to 1998.<sup>320</sup> From 1976 to 1998, the focus of the “un-securitised” Norwegian foreign policy was also on the Middle East, with

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<sup>316</sup> THUNE/ ULRIKSEN (2002), p. 16.

<sup>317</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 272.

<sup>318</sup> SCHMUTZLER (2009), p. 227.

<sup>319</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 257.

<sup>320</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 266.

the climax being the Oslo agreement between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1993. In the 1990s, however, it became increasingly problematic to make a distinction between the “realistic” and “idealistic” parts of Norwegian policy, as the policy arenas converged and humanitarian values were supported and enforced by military means in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Crisis management previously handled by the UN was now partly taken over by NATO. Norway’s participation in the NATO act of war in Kosovo from 24 March to 10 June 1999 reflected a new mindset in Norwegian foreign policy “that justice is not always served by strict adherence to international law.”<sup>321</sup> Furthermore, the main dilemma confronting the Norwegian decision-makers has been finding the right balance in order to satisfy close allies on the one hand, and the US in particular, and the Norwegian national self-perception on the other hand.<sup>322</sup> Unlike Norway, Sweden abdicated its role as a global model and great power of the UN diplomacy after the end of the Cold War. The attention was directed towards the Baltic Sea instead and the Swedish foreign ministry was accordingly reorganised.<sup>323</sup>

It is said about Norway’s current FM, Gahr Støre, that he takes foreign policy back to the country and the proximate areas. On the other hand, the Norwegian foreign policy elite is described as “liberal idealists” or “internationalists” who “dream of a united world led by the UN.”<sup>324</sup> Altogether, NATO, the EU and the UN are the important cornerstones of Norwegian foreign policy. NATO is important, but has an uncertain future. The European debt crisis might in the end lead to a political union whereas Norway still refuses to make a choice which enables it to take the responsibility of its affiliation with Europe. Thus the UN would still be Norway’s main venue but is again too loosely organised to make any difference.

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<sup>321</sup> RISTE (2005), p. 273.

<sup>322</sup> THUNE/ ULRIKSEN (2002), p. 7.

<sup>323</sup> STEIRO (2005).

<sup>324</sup> KVALVIK (2006).

### 3.5.2. Sweden

A significant aspect of Swedish foreign and security policy is the defence industry policy,<sup>325</sup> because the Swedish state, as a part of its non-alignment policy, has traditionally pursued a policy of self-sufficiency in the production of defence equipment. The change in Swedish defence policy becomes clear when considering the defence industry policy, which today is focused on international collaboration, European cooperation and exports. Another interesting aspect is the Swedish emphasis on soft security in the ESDP whereas the country at the same time is a significant European exporter of weapons. In 2011, Sweden exported defence material to 63 countries, and the sale to totalitarian regimes is increasing. Swedish weapon exports have experienced a triple increase in ten years. Sweden sold military equipment for 1,57 billion euro in 2011. More than one half of the exports went to countries outside Europe, whereas EU countries, the US and Canada used to be the largest customers. Now, Thailand, Saudi-Arabia, India and Pakistan are, in this order, Sweden's largest customers.<sup>326</sup> The current production of the very ambitious JAS Gripen fighter is an example of the successful Swedish independent defence industry policy which was prioritised after the Second World War. In June 1995, British Aerospace and Saab signed an agreement to jointly market the Gripen fighter abroad. The Swedish Air Forces have ordered 204 planes rather than the intended 350-400. Gripen's two great competitors are The Joint Strike Fighter developed by the United States and the Eurofighter Typhoon.

The Swedish defence industry has been characterised by three developments. Firstly, compared to other countries with a similar size, population and defence political ambitions, Sweden has a great defence industrial breadth as a result of the non-alignment security policy doctrine. Secondly, it has a high level of competence. Only a few states have a defence industry with the high level of technology and competence as Sweden. Thirdly, the Swedish defence companies are small by international standards, although thirteen Swedish defence industry companies have been merged into eight over the last 25 years.<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>325</sup>Defence industry policy is according to Britz found in an intersection of several policy areas as defence policy, industry policy, regional policy and technology policy. BRITZ (2004), p. 6.

<sup>326</sup>Cited in SKJAEVESLAND (2012).

<sup>327</sup> ENHETEN FÖR STRATEGISK UTVECKLING (SIF) (2003), pp. 12-13.

Today, Sweden's defence industry policy is going through a process of Europeanisation that begun in the late 1990s. Defence equipment supply first became a political issue in Sweden in the mid 1990s as it became clear that the domestic defence industry would change both in regards to the actual products and the industrial structure. As Britz has shown, self-sufficiency was to a lesser and lesser extent seen as an option in Sweden. Closer collaboration with other states was soon pointed out as necessary, but issues based on fear of dependence on other countries were raised.<sup>328</sup> The international ownership in the Swedish defence industry today is significant. Hence, Swedish defence industry is not just a Swedish interest but to a large extent also an object of European and transatlantic interest.<sup>329</sup>

Sweden with its significant defence industry never seriously considered to stay out of the European industrial cooperation that developed among Europe's great producers in the late 1990s.<sup>330</sup> The eventual limited award in respect to Swedish security would not have been worth the economic consequences,<sup>331</sup> and economic reasons led to exporting of defence equipment, as the internal market was not big enough anymore for the Swedish defence industry to survive. In order to keep the industry's competence, capacity and competitiveness, exports and international collaboration were needed. Thus exports were also seen to have a strategic importance, because it helped keeping the production volumes up and creating a long-term base for technology supply.<sup>332</sup>

The domestic aspect thus seems to disappear in Swedish defence industry, which is internationalised at the same time Sweden's armed forces are active both in a national and international frame. The question is if Swedish defence industry has

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<sup>328</sup> BRITZ (2004), p. 9.

<sup>329</sup>Volvo Aero and Ericsson Microwave Systems are completely Swedish owned. Saab has a Swedish major owner whereas British BAE Systems owns 35 per cent. Among the other companies, foreign owners prevail and Sweden's defence industry has been internationalised in a short period of time. ENHETEN FÖR STRATEGISK UTVECKLING (SIF) (2003), p. 15. All of the larger, former national companies have assumed a transnational character and have fused with, or become bought up by foreign investors. A sector integration of the former rather national oriented industry has taken place.

<sup>330</sup>Shrinking defence budgets in most European countries combined with a great technology development, increase in material costs and harder competition from the US made obvious that European weapon producers had to undertake serious measures in order to survive. Enlarged cooperation and fusions of establishments across the European borders had to take place.

<sup>331</sup> WEGGE (2003A), p. 66.

<sup>332</sup> BRITZ (2004), p. 16.

to become more forward-looking. Defence equipment include complex systems which it takes five to 15 years to develop, in addition to the operative lifetime of 15 to 30 years. Defence decisions on the other hand, have a three-year perspective whereas the equipment supply process demands a longer decision horizon in order to develop optimally. It is thus the question if large scale attacks on Swedish territory should be completely ignored in the defence equipment planning. The development of Swedish defence industry policy further underlines the unwillingness to raise questions of whether non-alignment still serves Swedish security. Non-alignment blocks solid arguments that favour another direction. It is comparable with the Norwegian paranoia in regards to a membership in the EU.

### 3.6. Conclusions

Table I.2 shows the development lines in Norwegian foreign policy. The arrows show similarities between the three formative periods until 1949 and current Norwegian policy. Although the elements of the formative periods do not necessarily have a direct influence on the developments after 1949, there seems to be a certain recurrence. A new element which has emerged is Germany's increased importance to Norway relative to the UK. The problematic aspects of the country's current policy will be examined further in the next chapter, when Norway's strategic situation is analysed. Udgaard's description of current Norwegian policy sums up the core of the problem: Norway is "quietly and peacefully sliding back to non-committal in-between positions. We are happy to share a little wealth with others, but otherwise we are better off alone."<sup>333</sup>

Figure I.3 shows the development lines from the beginning of Swedish neutrality policy until today. As shown, the main change to modern Swedish foreign policy did not take place until the 1990s. Although there is a certain continuity from the older periods of neutrality to the current Europeanised foreign and security policy of Sweden, there are fundamentally new directions which can not automatically be derived from the Swedish neutrality tradition. The aspects of developing a European policy, more engagement in the BSR and increasing international en-

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<sup>333</sup> UDGAARD (2005) [author's translation].




Figure I.2.: Development lines in Norwegian foreign policy.

agement and cooperation on security policy have resulted in changing definitions of neutrality/ non-alignment. However, certain aspects, like the emphasis on soft security and federo-scepticism, are influenced by elements of the neutrality tradition, although the main difference is the predominating Swedish pragmatism as opposed to the, at least official, idealistic tendencies in the post-war period. The latest example of pragmatism predominating idealism is the political turmoil that resulted in the resignation of defence minister Sten Tolgfors in March 2012 because Sweden has contributed to the building of an arms factory in Saudi Arabia. According to former chief executive at the research institute of the Total Defence, which was strongly involved in the weapons project, a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia was created whereas the real aim of Swedish governments has been to help Saab<sup>3</sup> and Ericsson<sup>4</sup> selling the radar system Erieye to Saudi Arabia. If the Saudis would buy Erieye, the Swedes would contribute with a weapon research cooperation.<sup>334</sup>

Finally, a concluding comparison can be made between Norway's and Sweden's policies on Europe. Norway has not been able to make any choice at all in regards

<sup>334</sup>Cited in CLAUSSEN (2012).






Figure I.3.: Development lines in Swedish foreign policy.

to the country’s affiliation with the EU. It does not dare to stay inside, and does not dare to stay outside. The EEA seems like a well-functioning agreement in many ways but contributes to undermine democracy. It would thus be better to stay completely out of the EU and take the consequences, or to join the EU and take the consequences. Not to choose is the worst possible solution because those consequences are of a more substantial nature. Sweden has taken this choice, and has become a well-integrated, successful EU-member. However, as the Swedish euro debate shows, their *motives* of joining or not joining the monetary union are dubious. Sweden is cautious in its approach to Europe and rather joins in when the coast is clear. When the circumstances change, Sweden probably goes with the tide. It is a simple calculation of economic and political interests. What is the quality of European cooperation if every member state thinks similarly? How is it possible for small countries to have a say in the EU? For both Norway and Sweden it is important to see the whole picture, and not only what they want to see, in order to make the right choices. That however also applies to the EU by itself.



## 4. Strategic challenges and opportunities

### 4.1. Norway

Norway's strategic situation is dependent on the strategic relevance of Norwegian sea and land areas. The country keeps a territory of great geostrategic importance dominated by naval military conditions. The sea areas are of particularly great strategic importance, because they are of vital relevance to Norway's economy and security situation, and thus related to national survival. These offshore areas are also of great interest to foreign powers in regards to military strategy, economy and energy supply. Moreover, most of the Norwegian economic zone, and one third of the mainland's coastline, is situated north of the Arctic Circle. Norwegian offshore areas comprise areas with sovereign Norwegian rights: the Norwegian continental shelf and hereunder the Norwegian EEZ around the Norwegian mainland,<sup>335</sup> the Fishery zone around the Jan Mayen Island<sup>336</sup> and the Fishery protection zone around the Svalbard archipelago.<sup>337</sup> Norway has thus established three zones of 200 nautical miles (see figure I.1). Further, abutting sea areas in the Kattegat, the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Greenland Sea and the Barents Sea are also strategically decisive for Norway. Above all, the Barents Sea is of great strategic relevance, as it is rich on resources and of great geopolitical interest to Europe, the US and meanwhile also China. The Barents Sea area amounts to more than three times the Norwegian shelf south of the 62<sup>nd</sup>

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<sup>335</sup>The Norwegian EEZ is 878 575 km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>336</sup>The fishery zone around Jan Mayen is 296 611 km<sup>2</sup>; Jan Mayen Island is 55 km long and 375 km<sup>2</sup> large situated in the Arctic Ocean, 600 km north of Iceland, 500 km east of Greenland and 1000 km west of the Norwegian mainland.

<sup>337</sup>The Fishery protection zone is 803 993 km<sup>2</sup>. This is a special case as regards Norwegian rights and will be discussed later in this chapter.




Figure I.1.: Norwegian offshore areas. (Source: Norway's official site for information about seafood safety, fisheries and aquaculture management)

degree of latitude.<sup>338</sup>

The strategic opportunities facing Norway's foreign policy are thus related to the country's enormous natural resources, above all oil and gas, and the power potential this entails. The strategic challenges of the foreign policy are the factors that challenge Norwegian interests, be it other states' conflictive interests, environmental threats, the security policy situation, unsettled matters in regards to international law, Russia as a transcontinental great power neighbour or the geopolitics of oil and gas in general. The common denominator for both Norway's opportunities and challenges is Europe's High North.

About half of Europe's oil and gas reserves are located on Norwegian territory. From here, 20 per cent of Europe's gas demand is covered. The Norwegian pipeline network extends from the Norwegian basin in the North Sea to England, Germany, Belgium and France,<sup>339</sup> where Norwegian gas makes up between

<sup>338</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2005A), p. 5.

<sup>339</sup>Norway is the largest operator of underwater pipelines worldwide.

20 and 35 per cent of the total usage.<sup>340</sup> At the pipeline level, only Norwegian gas can compete with the Russian. Nevertheless, Europe is, and will continue to be, dependent on deliveries from Russia, now supplying about 30 per cent of Europe's gas. It is easy to couple new pipelines to the large established pipeline systems for natural gas from Norway and Russia to Europe, and political stability is another asset of the area. Today, no offshore petroleum activity exists in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. The gas field "Snøhvit" is found and has recently been completed in the Norwegian part. In addition to the "Goliat" field, "Snøhvit" is the biggest Barents Sea oil and gas field next to the huge Russian Shtokman field.<sup>341</sup> However, this alone is not very impressive. The Stoltenberg government has opened up the possibility of initiating oil activity outside Jan Mayen in the Norwegian Sea and has signalled a green light to complete the "Goliat" field, which would be the first oil field in the Barents Sea to be developed.<sup>342</sup> According to Øystein Michelsen, Statoil's executive vice president of development and production in Norway, says the Barents Sea region could produce about 400 000 to 500 000 barrels of oil equivalent per day by 2020, more than four times what Statoil gets from "Snøhvit" today. Success in the Barents Sea also opens further possibilities even farther north.<sup>343</sup> The arguments that disfavour such an active strategy are of an environmental nature.

A key factor is the security of supply, to Europe in particular. This is a great strategic opportunity facing Norway. The EU will need more natural gas over the next decades, which will have to come from currently unexploited production areas.<sup>344</sup> The current level of Norwegian gas exports can only be maintained until 2025, and the Barents Sea<sup>345</sup> is the only realistic resource area which gives Norway

<sup>340</sup> HELGESEN (2012), p. 40.

<sup>341</sup>The gas of the "Snøhvit" field amounts to almost a quarter of the total discovered gas resources in the Barents Sea of 770 billion MSm<sup>3</sup> gas. NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE (2003), p. 54.

<sup>342</sup>Norwegian Ministry of Energy and Petroleum (2009) "Goliat - an important part of the development in the High North", Press release no. 60, 8 May.

<sup>343</sup>Cited in REED (2012).

<sup>344</sup>The identified resource basis is higher in the Norwegian Sea than in the Barents Sea. The Norwegian oil directorate estimates the total resources in the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea south of Bjørnøya (the southernmost part of Svalbard in the southern part of the Barents Sea, approximately halfway between Spitzbergen and the North Cape.) to be about 1220 MSm<sup>3</sup> oil equivalents (o.e.). About  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the resources on the Norwegian side is expected to be gas, of which again  $\frac{3}{4}$  is unidentified. NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE (2003), p. 54.

<sup>345</sup>The UGS reported that the total exploitable resources in the Russian part of the Barents Sea amount to about 24,359 MSm<sup>3</sup>, whereof 97% is gas and about 86% of the total resources is still undiscovered. Cited in BARLINDHAUG (2005A), p. 10.

the possibility to continue its role as an important gas exporter to the EU beyond 2050.<sup>346</sup> Norway's competitive advantage is the security of the supply, as Russia at times has proved to be an unpredictable supplier to its neighbours Belarus, Georgia and the Ukraine, with negative effects also for EU states. The Nord Stream pipeline through the Baltic Sea is capable of transporting 27,5 billion m<sup>3</sup> natural gas per year directly to the West European market.<sup>347</sup> This is about half of the entire Norwegian gas export and might influence Norway in terms of pricing pressure, and perhaps even lower market shares.

The Norwegian attitude of depoliticising energy exports has been a successful strategy, but new developments show the outline of a Norwegian oil and gas strategy in the north as an integrated part of Norwegian foreign policy.<sup>348</sup> Although the oil companies have chosen to see gas pipelines as commercial investments in a new transport capacity, they have always been vital "geopolitical tools" for the states concerned. Norway, Russia and the EU - with Germany and the UK as the leading nations - are the geopolitical main actors, whereas Statoil (Norway) and Gazprom (Russia) have the leading parts on the commercial side, in addition to French Total and the gas importers in Germany and the UK.<sup>349</sup> The gas companies in Germany and the UK are negotiating on future gas deliveries from Norway and are interested in as low prices as possible.<sup>350</sup> Both Germany and the UK have traditionally related such contracts with the domestic security of supply. Thus the influence of the governments is large. If the price is too high, gas will be too expensive for the energy competition on the domestic markets. If the price is too low, it will not be economically sustainable to extend the pipelines to the Barents Sea.<sup>351</sup> Without an exporting gas pipeline it will not be commercially interesting to search for natural gas in the Barents Sea. Russia on the other hand is the most important actor in the Arctic and wants to strengthen its geopolitical position by developing the offshore infrastructure in the Barents Sea.<sup>352</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2012), p. 59.

<sup>347</sup> <http://www.nord-stream.com/de/ueber-uns/>

<sup>348</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2012), p. 59.

<sup>349</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2012), pp. 60-61.

<sup>350</sup> See chapter 2 of this part.

<sup>351</sup> An analysis shows that there will be a need for a \$4.4 billion pipeline to connect the Barents Sea deposits with the existing facilities in the Norwegian Sea by 2020. Cited in REED (2012).

<sup>352</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2012), pp. 61-62.

“Given the prevailing situation it is obvious that Norway’s future oil and gas strategy in the Barents Sea is closely related to Germany’s and England’s long-term energy policy. Norway has to appear as a long-dated and trustworthy supplier of gas to Europe the next 40 to 50 years, and Germany and England will have to be willing to pay for this security of supply.”. BARLINDHAUG (2012), p. 62.

Thus, Norway’s strategic possibilities in being a future main actor in the Arctic geopolitical development is thus decisively dependent on Norway’s relations with the EU. It is thus a paradox that Norway has refused to make a choice in regards to its political affiliation with Europe, as shown in chapter 3.4 of this part. Energy is the single most important motive for the increased interest for the Arctic. Energy is also Norway’s most important footprint in the EU, and Norway also supports the EU’s application for a status as a permanent observer in the Arctic Council (AC).<sup>353</sup>

The unresolved delineation question of the Barents Sea between the economic zones of Norway and Russia was Norway’s most delicate strategic challenge but was finally solved after 40 years of negotiations in April 2010, during the presidency of then-president Medvedev.<sup>354</sup> The treaty defines a single maritime boundary that divides the states’ continental shelves and EEZs in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean. It furthermore obliges the states to continue their cooperation in the sphere of fisheries and contains provisions on the coordinated exploitation of transboundary hydrocarbon resources. “It is almost unbelievable” as stated by Norwegian commentator Dragnes.<sup>355</sup> The Russian leadership is not famous of compromising but in this case they must have assessed the time to be ripe. Medvedev noted that this will have consequences also for European security.<sup>356</sup> In the 1970s, Norway and the Soviet Union could not agree on the principles of delineation, which resulted in the establishment of a temporary “grey zone” in 1978 to protect the fishery in the area.<sup>357</sup> According to maritime law, treaties on the delineation of economic zones in the ocean are to build on the sources of international law in order to establish an equitable solution. Also, according to

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<sup>353</sup> KNUTSEN (2012), p. 7. The Arctic Council was established in 1996 by Russia, the US, Canada, and the five Nordic countries.

<sup>354</sup> Negotiations started in 1974.

<sup>355</sup> Cited in DRAGNES (2010).

<sup>356</sup> Cited in DRAGNES (2010).

<sup>357</sup> The grey zone was approximately double the size of the German federal state Northrhine-Westphalia.

continental shelf law, the main way of accomplishing this is a treaty.<sup>358</sup> However, in the absence of a treaty the mid-line counts, unless another delineation can be justified due to particular circumstances. Norway's position in the delineation question favoured the mid-line, which implied that the border is drawn directly between the two states' territory, whereas Russia claimed an exception and wanted a sector-line solution, which implied that the sea border is drawn in a straight line from the border point on shore to the North Pole. The final result was a compromise between the mid-line and a sector-line.

The formerly disputed area is probably where the largest occurrences of hydrocarbons in the Barents Sea are, a fact that complicated the negotiations.<sup>359</sup> According to estimations made by Statoil, the formerly disputed area could contain about 12 billion barrels of oil and gas.<sup>360</sup> The Russians made seismological and other geophysical explorations in the formerly disputed area until 1992 and found very surprising structures. In fact, 40-50 million years ago, the ocean bed of the Barents Sea started to ascend, and so the seepages began. This uplift hit the Norwegian part the hardest and the part that today belongs to Russia to a lesser extent. The borderline between the uplifted area and the not-uplifted is probably somewhere in the formerly disputed area. This is where the most accessible resources in the northernmost part of Northern Norway, that could secure activity in the north, are situated.<sup>361</sup>

The delineation agreement between Norway and Russia officially came into effect on 7 July 2011 and includes maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the polar sea which implies that the formerly disputed area of 175 000 km<sup>2</sup> is parted in two approximately equal parts. The solution solved the most important bilateral question between Norway and Russia and is a good basis for the further development of Norwegian-Russian cooperation. The agreement should furthermore be related to the superior changes in regards to security policy, economy, international law and climate changes which apply to the Arctic.<sup>362</sup> Climate change and ice melting have led to speculations of a security political

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<sup>358</sup>The legislation on economic zones does not incorporate the shelf.

<sup>359</sup> AALE (2005A).

<sup>360</sup>Cited in DRAGNES (2005).

<sup>361</sup> ASK (2005).

<sup>362</sup> KNUITSEN (2012), p. 5.



and economic race toward the High North. Hence, it would be of advantage both to Norway and Russia if the rules would be clear before this eventually happens.

The solution to the delineation question in the Barents Sea was necessary in order to further develop the regional cooperation between Russia and Norway. According to Norwegian FM Gahr Støre, the Norwegian-Russian cooperation “has probably never been better and more comprehensive” and includes people-to-people cooperation, culture, energy, economy, research and education.<sup>363</sup> The evolving Norwegian-Russian energy cooperation in the north is of particular interest because it involves a Russian engagement by president Putin. The cooperation between Gazprom, Statoil and Total in developing the Shtokman field has been difficult because it was originally thought as a LNG project, but US shale gas discoveries reduce the cost effectiveness of such a project. Statoil, which is 67 percent-owned by the Norwegian government, has been criticised off the record by Gazprom for “not being able to agree on anything without being able to explain why.” Investment decisions have been postponed several times because of high costs. This even led to a meeting between Statoil boss Helge Lund and Vladimir Putin in May 2012.<sup>364</sup> Lund met Putin also on another occasion in May 2012 when Norway and Russia made a historical deal on a mutual access to both countries oil areas in the Barents Sea. Without the delineation agreement, this would not have been possible. However, Norway’s cooperation with Russia will always be an uncertain undertaking as long as corruption is such a great part of Russian economic life. President Putin himself is the cooperation agreement’s political guarantor, but nobody knows at this point of time if his presidency will last for six or twelve years.

Norway’s biggest strategic challenge is the jurisdiction of the sea areas around Svalbard. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 gave Norway sovereignty over the archipelago, although with certain restrictions: All of the signature states got the same right to exploit Svalbard’s natural resources. The enormous sea areas outside Svalbard were not part of the negotiations. In 1965, Norway gained major parts of the ocean bed in the North Sea, and in the 1970s the UN maritime law conference lay the legal basis for 200 nautical miles (370 km) economic zones. The

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<sup>363</sup> GAHR STØRE (2012), p. 16.

<sup>364</sup>Cited in DYRNES (2012). Author’s translation.

question was how this new international law should be applied on Svalbard and thus how the right to regulate fishery outside Svalbard's territorial water should be applied. As no agreement was achieved, the solution applied was that Norway introduced the so called "Fishery protection zone" in 1977.<sup>365</sup> Norway administers the zone, allocates fishery quotas to other countries and intervenes when the quota limit is exceeded.<sup>366</sup> The disagreement today over the Fishery protection zone around Svalbard is both real and potential, and the issue is more difficult than the delineation question was, as there are more than two parties involved. Most countries comply with the Norwegian view without accepting it officially, whereas Russia does not think Norway has any legal basis to capture Russian ships in the Fishery protection zone.<sup>367</sup> Episodes including Russian trawlers occurred in 1998, 2001, 2005 and 2011. All four incidents demanded diplomatic skill to resolve and damaged Norwegian-Russian fishery relations for a while, or resulted in a Russian ban on imports of Norwegian salmon. The incident of October 2005 when the Russian fishing trawler 'Elektron' fled from the Norwegian Coast Guard with two Norwegian inspectors as hostages, is a significant example. As the oil production moves north, the conflict may become even more acute. The question is thus what Norway does the day a Russian, or a European ship for that matter, starts drilling on the sea bed around Svalbard. In 2007 the US asked the Norwegian state department to answer several questions in regards to the basic conditions of foreign oil companies on the continental shelf surrounding Svalbard.<sup>368</sup> The US has rather sat back in the international dispute over sovereign rights outside Svalbard and has not yet given its opinion on whether to support Norway's demand of full sovereignty over the natural resources or to invoke the conditions set by the Svalbard Treaty. This inarticulate position which is neither in favour nor against the Norwegian view is still valid. "We can live with that", states Norway's FM Støre.<sup>369</sup> The question is however what happens if Norway should open up the area to oil drilling, or if the conflict level in the fishery pro-

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<sup>365</sup>See figure I.1.

<sup>366</sup>The Fishery protection zone is a special regulation without any international parallel. Practically, Norway has largely regulated and controlled the fishery here after the same principles as in the Norwegian economic zone.

<sup>367</sup>The Norwegian coast guard examines the fishing boats but does not apply measures beyond a written warning in the case of violations.

<sup>368</sup>Both the questions and the answers appear in documents from the US embassy in Oslo which were leaked to *Wikileaks* and *Aftenposten*. See PEDERSEN (2011).

<sup>369</sup>Stated in PEDERSEN (2011). Author's translation.

tection zone should rise again. The US would possibly have to change its policy and comment on the Svalbard question, and the conclusion does not necessarily have to be in Norway's favour.

What is probably harder to live with for the Norwegian FM is an EU report on Svalbard from 2011 elaborated by then-vice president of the EP, Diana Wallis, which presents concrete suggestions on how to challenge Norway's sovereignty on Svalbard. The report is however not official EU policy on the matter. The report e.g. suggests that Norway's sovereignty should be renegotiated in regards to the surrounding sea areas. Moreover, collective control measures should be established which secure the interests of all EU member states, and existing mechanisms of maritime zones as well as the right to search for and use resources consistently with the Law of the Sea should be developed and strengthened. It is also stated that the EU should play an important role in the Svalbard question in order to assure that the treaty is being followed up.<sup>370</sup> The EU's ambassador to Norway however quickly denied that there is any EU pressure on Norway in the Svalbard question and referred to the official EU position confirmed by top EU officials "who repeated that the EU has no plans to raise questions about various legal interpretations regarding the maritime areas in the region."<sup>371</sup> Even though this was simply a report, there is reason to be alarmed for Norwegian governments, and there seems to be a certain pressure from the UK in particular. At an earlier point of time the EU has been very clear in its criticism of the Fishery protection zone which is only tolerated, not approved of. Allegations of illegal fishing only show the peak of disagreement between Norway and the EU, Russia, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and other active nations of the protection zone. Thus the potential for a downfall of Norway's ambitions is considerable. Norway is in the middle of a triangle of interests consisting of Russia, the EU and the US.

The Norwegian shelf's external border on the international ocean bed has been part of a process in the UN on continental shelf delineations.<sup>372</sup> The Norwegian view claimed that the Norwegian continental shelf is continuing past Svalbard,

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<sup>370</sup>Cited in AALE (2011).

<sup>371</sup>Cited in Berglund, Nina (2011) "Svalbard sovereignty not under threat" 28 October at <http://www.newsenglish.no> (accessed 29 October 2009).

<sup>372</sup>Russia, Canada and Denmark (Greenland) already have or are about to finalise demands on enlarged northern borders of their continental shelves.

both to the west and to the east and as far as 85° north, which implies that the archipelago does not have a shelf of its own but rests on the Norwegian shelf. This view indicated that the Svalbard treaty's decisions about equal rights to exploitation of natural resources are not valid as the continental shelf around Svalbard is concerned but only applies to the archipelago and the surrounding territorial water. Accordingly, all of the shallow waters from mainland Norway to beyond Svalbard would be the cohesive Norwegian shelf. Norway thus has a shelf area six times larger than its land area. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) finally entitled Norway to its claims, and the Norwegian continental shelf was enlarged.<sup>373</sup> Thus Russia also accepted Norway's claims on the continental shelf. This fact, in addition to the delineation agreement of 2010, lead to the assessment of Holten Jørgensen who states that Russia has never been closer to an actual recognition of Norway's sovereignty in the Fishery protection zone.<sup>374</sup> Norway's FM Gahr Støre comments on the decision of the CLCS:

“This establishes a clear division of responsibility and creates predictable conditions for activities in the High North. It confirms that Norway has substantial rights and responsibilities in maritime areas of some 235 000 square kilometres. The recommendation is therefore of historic significance for Norway”.<sup>375</sup>

Jensen, a Norwegian researcher on the Law of the Sea, comments on the CLCS decision that it is not up to a commission in New York to decide whether Svalbard has a continental shelf of its own or not:

“The Svalbard question is thus not solved. The discussion on Svalbard has never been a question of geological conditions on the seabed. (...) When other states claim that Svalbard has a shelf 'of its own', they have not meant 'own' in the way that there is a physical break in the shelf between mainland Norway and Svalbard. They have meant that Norwegian governance around the island group should be subject to the limitations following the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 (...). This has little to do with the determination of the limits of the continental shelf.”

The Arctic is the second area in the world beside the waters around Svalbard with

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<sup>373</sup>The new continental shelf reaches from the Ekofisk field in the south to a point almost half the way between Svalbard and the North Pole. Norway's shelf is thus one of the world's largest.

<sup>374</sup>HOLTEN JØRGENSEN (2011).

<sup>375</sup>Cited in Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009) “Extent of Norway's continental shelf in the High North clarified”, Press release no. 025, 15 April.

uncertain legal conditions. From Svalbard the discussion can thus be stretched to the Arctic as a whole, and EU interests in the region. The white paper “The High North: visions and strategies” (2011)<sup>376</sup> published by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry states that “The High North is Norway’s number one foreign policy priority”. It furthermore outlines seven development lines which will shape the Norwegian efforts and priorities in the “northern areas” policy.<sup>377</sup> Diana Wallis again presents an EU perspective on a matter concerning the High North and states that Norway has to find a way of dealing with both a growing awareness and commitment to the region, demonstrated by the queue of those wishing to join the AC as permanent observers.<sup>378</sup> Wallis and Stewart criticize the white paper’s ignorance of the EU’s importance to the High North:

“Suddenly, like it or not, what is happening in the Arctic and how it is dealt with becomes everyone’s business. This is an issue which Norway and other Arctic states have to accommodate - a growing number of players have a legitimate interest in what happens in the Arctic and therefore in the ‘governance’ regime there. It is unlikely, and probably not appropriate, that mere Permanent Observer status will be sufficient to satisfy this demand and there may have to be a whole scale overhaul of Arctic Council structures. (...) Norway is to be congratulated on its management of fish stocks (...). It should also be born in mind that the EU as a whole is the biggest market for Norwegian fish (...). The point is that the customer in terms of the EU has a huge potential to say how fish are caught and the industry managed, so the Arctic fisheries are unable to escape neither EU involvement or regulation. The same is true of energy (...), as with fish, the EU and its Member States are the key market. This means that they have the potential to have a say about where and how, and indeed one might even add if, energy supplies should be exploited from Arctic. (...) The sense of the need for a more protective regime for the Arctic was articulated already as the European Commission looks at the EU wide safety rules for offshore oil drilling.”<sup>379</sup>

The global interest in the Arctic is thus a huge strategic challenge to Norway. Wallis and Stewart also criticised the Ilulissat Declaration made by the five littoral Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US), which claimed their special responsibility for the Arctic.<sup>380</sup> In many ways Russia has more interests in common with Norway than what the latter has with the EU. The

<sup>376</sup>[http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordområdene/UD\\_nordomrodene\\_innmat\\_EN](http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Nordområdene/UD_nordomrodene_innmat_EN)

<sup>377</sup>See also GAHR STØRE (2012), pp. 12-18.

<sup>378</sup> WALLIS/ARNOLD (2012), p. 20.

<sup>379</sup> WALLIS/ARNOLD (2012), pp. 23-24.

<sup>380</sup>See [http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat\\_Declaration.pdf](http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf). See also chapter 2.1.1 of part III.

common interests of the five littoral Arctic states are moreover affiliated with the Law of the Sea. Norway however needs to take European annoyance very seriously, especially because of the EEA agreement. European interests in the Arctic are obvious, and official Norwegian politics has the tendency of ignoring them. This again shows the seriousness of Norway's refusal to make a choice on its political affiliation with the EU. Norway is dependent on the Union regardless of its influence in the AC, but it has no political influence in Europe. Norwegian politicians should thus reconsider whether they are comfortable with this situation.

The EU aims at an observer status in the AC but fails to achieve this due to Canadian objections because of the EU ban on trade with products of arctic sealing. Norway on the other hand prevents China from becoming a permanent observer status due to the impaired Chinese-Norwegian relations resulting from Chinese reactions to the Norwegian Nobel Committee's decision to award Liu Xiaobo in 2010. China shows an increasing interest in the Arctic and has already had several expeditions with the icebreaker Xuelong and pursues examinations also in regards to an oil and natural gas business and the extraction of minerals. Norway's FM Gahr Støre openly states that China has to pursue an open and transparent political dialogue with all member states in the AC, Norway included, in order to become a permanent observer.<sup>381</sup> International law has made it possible for Norway to shape the political cooperation in the north with other vital actors, i.e. the Arctic littoral states.

#### **4.1.1. Economic and security interests**

Norway has a "global interest portfolio." In addition to its very important role as an energy producer and supplier, the country is also the world's second largest fish exporter after Thailand, and one of the world's ten largest fishery nations. Norway's importance as a global food provider has increased, and the significance of its merchant fleet, which today is the world's third largest, has grown. Norway has also gained market shares vis-à-vis the world's cargo markets, being an important cargo shipper of raw materials. The country is also a significant public and

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<sup>381</sup>Stated in DRAGNES (2012A).

private capital investor. The role as an energy producer leads Norway to become a “banking nation”, which implies that investment management is an important branch of the economy, and carries a diplomatic potential as well. Both the energy production and the merchant fleet are dependent on the world’s energy markets and the political development in important production areas. Any changes in the relations between energy producers and energy consumers, and of the producers’ and consumers’ inner relations, will immediately have consequences for Norway.

In line with the strategic challenges and opportunities analysed above, Børresen’s disposition of Norway’s interests is suitable to arrange the Norwegian economic and security interests, however with some modifications. Accordingly, Norway’s “interest portfolio” can be graded into three different groups: “vital interests”, “very important interests” and “important interests”.<sup>382</sup> The vital Norwegian interests are

to protect Norway against political and military pressure and aggression,  
to sustain the Norwegian ocean domain and  
to avoid a breakdown of the world’s central trade and finance systems or commodity markets.<sup>383</sup>

As to the first point, Norway has a lot to defend but it is not particularly clear against who it has to defend itself. As Russia is concerned, the official Norwegian position is that Russia does not represent any threat at all. The absence of a threat from the east has been the basis for the reorganisation of the Norwegian armed forces. However, in regards to the development in Russia in relation to the northern areas, the minister of defence stated in the beginning of 2007 that “the development might take another direction than what we wish for and expect.”<sup>384</sup> The official position is furthermore being increasingly challenged. In an analysis made by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2006) of the threat scenarios facing Norway, Russia is again identified as a military threat to Norway - not through an invasion, but from a limited, military action.<sup>385</sup> The report was an important basis for the premises of the defence forces in the period 2009-2012.

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<sup>382</sup> BØRRESEN (2005A), p. 11.

<sup>383</sup> BØRRESEN (2005A), p. 11.

<sup>384</sup> Strøm-Erichsen, Anne Grete (2007) *Verdier å verne*. Speech at Oslo Military Society on 8 January, <http://www.regjeringen.no> (accessed 15 January 2007), author’s translation.

<sup>385</sup> JOHANSEN (2006).

Regardless of if or to what extent Russia might put political or military pressure on Norway, it is vital to contribute to a continued low tension between the great powers in the region's sensitive sea areas. Norway can not protect itself against pressure and aggression alone and therefore needs political and military allies and a multilateral frame for its security policy. The question is if a NATO membership is sufficient or if an additional EU membership would strengthen the country's situation.

To an even larger extent than the first point, the second point has to be dealt with by national governments, because it is of minor interest to Norway's allies to sustain the Norwegian ocean domain. In order to do so, it is vital to preserve sovereign rights at sea by controlling the activity both politically and economically. In fact, the current Norwegian strategy in the north seems to be "activity strengthens sovereignty". The government declaration of 2005 defined the northern areas as "Norway's main strategic interest" and indicated a strengthened presence of the defence forces and the exertion of sovereignty there.<sup>386</sup> The military component has until now been rare in Norwegian security policy. The Stoltenberg government, a centre-left coalition, signalled a strategy with emphasis on the use of power and influence in the northern areas in order to secure Norway complete control and most of the sovereignty over Svalbard and the huge zones around the archipelago. The logic of the strategy is that the strong geopolitical interests in Europe's high north necessitate a high Norwegian activity level. This serves the interests of the states with the strongest interests in the Barents Sea in order to assert the Norwegian sovereignty of its northern areas. As Svalbard is concerned, too low activity from the Norwegian side could be an incentive for some nations to challenge Norway's position.<sup>387</sup>

Moreover, Norway is responsible for the maintenance of living resources in Europe's largest economic zone of about six times mainland-Norway and possesses over 30% of Europe's continental shelf. The basis for this resource wealth is, as shown above, international law. Norway's fortunate situation thus also implies that Norway has commitments to secure other nations' interests in the High North. The environmental aspect is of course a vital part of sustaining the Norwe-

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<sup>386</sup> NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT (2005), pp. 6-7.

<sup>387</sup> BARLINDHAUG (2005A), p. 11.



gian ocean domain and furthermore the reason why the petroleum development in the Barents Sea is a very disputed subject in Norwegian politics, the current government inclusive, and in the Norwegian population generally. Minimum standards and rules have still not been established for the economic activity in the north. What the oil companies want to exploit are sensitive areas that are not yet opened to petroleum activities. The delineation agreement has however led to new drilling activities in the Barents Sea. If Norway's maintenance role in the high north is going to be operable, it needs the acceptance from Russia, the US and the most important EU states. This may be difficult to achieve if Norway claims 'petroleum free zones.' Thus it is in Norway's interest to combine the petroleum activity with a sustainable environmental development. Whether this is possible, is still a disputed question. However, there is reason to believe that the more Norway controls the development itself, the more environmental considerations will be taken into account.

As the latter point of Norway's vital interests is concerned, to avoid a breakdown of the trade and finance systems, this is solely a strategic challenge on a global level. However, it is a national matter how the Government Pension Fund<sup>388</sup> is managed. Norway's sovereign wealth fund, the world's third largest, lost 633 billion kroner (\$90,5 billion) in 2008, wiping out the accumulated gains of the fund since started investing the country's oil revenue 12 years ago. The Pension Fund - Global's investments fell 23 percent in 2008 as measured by a basket of foreign currencies. The fund, worth 2,28 trillion Norwegian kroner, lost 41 per cent on stocks and 0,5 percent on bonds.<sup>389</sup>

Further, "very important Norwegian interests" are the following:

1. To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies
  - to work for continued respect for the international law of war as it is put down in the UN charta and the Geneva Convention,
  - to work for a further development and strengthening of maritime international law as it is codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and

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<sup>388</sup>Norway, the world's fifth largest oil exporter and the third largest gas exporter, set up the fund to manage its petroleum riches after discovering oil in the North Sea in 1969.

<sup>389</sup>Laroi, Vibeke/ Stigset, Marianne (2009), *Bloomberg* 11 March.

- to secure a sustainable development of the living resources in Norway's ocean domain.
2. To sustain and develop the alliance with the US through NATO and with it
    - to fight international terrorism,
    - to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
    - to fight international crime and
    - to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia.
  3. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with the North Sea countries Germany, France, Great Britain and the Netherlands, the so called North Sea alliance.
  4. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with the Nordic countries.
  5. To maintain and develop good [and deeper] relations with the EU [and with it to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia<sup>390</sup>].<sup>391</sup>

Respect for international law is essential to a small state in order to be able to protect its interests. Furthermore, the alliance with the US and the membership in NATO is above all important in order to handle problems on the global level of security policy. NATO and the US influence Norway's bilateral relations with Russia as they give a protective potential to Norway's security situation, but its value further depends on NATO's ability to embrace Russia. The thesis here, however, is that some European states, and above all the EU, are more important in order to develop good relations with Russia than Norway's membership in NATO. "To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia" is thus added to the fifth point of the very important Norwegian interests. The disposition indicates that this is only possible in a multilateral framework and with the support of close allies. This view is also represented in the following. A sixth point can thus be added to Børresen's disposition: To maintain and develop good relations with Russia in a multilateral framework. As argued in chapter 1 of this part, Russia should be given enhanced influence in the Western security cooperation.

Finally, Norway's "important interests" in Børresen's disposition are to forward

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<sup>390</sup>Added by the author.

<sup>391</sup> BØRRESEN (2005A) [author's translation].

Norwegian export and economic interests, and hereunder

- an inflation trend in line with Norway's trade partners and market access for Norwegian export products,
- to have an arrangement which regulates the total national offer of gas,
- to develop a channel to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),
- stability in the Middle East and Caucasus so that extreme fluctuations of the oil price is avoided and Norwegian investments are made possible.<sup>392</sup>

One important question here is to what extent the EEA agreement is good enough for Norway's economic interests in

In table I.1 Børresen's disposition is advanced. It arranges Norway's vital, very important and important interests according to the level(s) where the interests are found and the organisation(s) decisive for the respective Norwegian interests at the different levels, independent of Norway's status in these organisations. The table further refers to either Russia, the EU and/ or the US if one or more of these affect a Norwegian interest, or represent/ could represent a threat to them. Thus Russia as a factor for Norwegian vital and very important interests, at the national and regional levels in particular, and the importance of the EU to Norwegian interests at all three levels, are the most interesting conclusions of the table. The EU is at least equally important to Norwegian interests as what NATO is, which is a point that needs to be emphasised as Norway is not a member of the organisation.

As the table shows, Russia is the most important factor affecting Norwegian interests. Norway and Russia also have common interests in several areas. The fisheries in the Barents Sea are of great economic importance to both countries. The Northern European sea areas are also important to the world's marine biological resources. Both countries have an interest in a distinct administrative regime in order to secure a sustainable development. In addition to fishery, environmental threats and petroleum activities are decisive for wealth and development in both Norway and Russia. The proximity to an essential Russian military area on the Kola peninsula makes it important to avoid a conflict of interests. Further,

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<sup>392</sup> BØRRESEN (2005A), p. 11 [author's translation].

Level Organ.	NATIONAL	REGIONAL	GLOBAL
USA NATO	To sustain the Norwegian ocean domain (R)		<i>To sustain and develop the alliance with the US and NATO and with it</i> -to fight international terrorism -prevent proliferation of WMD -fight international crime
	To protect Norway against political and military pressure and aggression (R)		
	<i>To sustain and develop the alliance with the US and NATO and with it to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia (R)</i>		
EUROPEAN UNION	To sustain the Norwegian ocean domain (US, R)	<i>To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia</i>	
	<i>To maintain and develop good bilateral relations</i> -with the North Sea countries G, F, GB, NL -with the Nordic countries -with the European Union (R, US)		
		To forward Norwegian export and economic interests, and hereunder -market access for Norwegian export products -to have an arrangement which regulates the total national offer of gas -a cost trend line with Norway's trade partners	
UN	To sustain the Norwegian ocean domain (R, US, EU)		
	To maintain and develop a strong UN, hereunder -respect for international law of war (R, US) -strengthening of the UNCLOS (R, US, EU) -sustainable development of the living resources in Norway's ocean domain (R, EU)		
NEITHER	To forward Norwegian export and economic interests by developing a channel to OPEC		To avoid a breakdown of the world's central trade and finance systems or commodity markets

Table I.1.: Norway's interest portfolio arranged due to international level, organisations of importance and reference to Russia (R), the EU (EU) and/or the USA (US). The interests are specified by the font as follows: *vital*, *very important*, important.

the growing petroleum export from Northwest Russia has led to a significant increase in sea transport along the North Norwegian coast, which is worrying from an environmental point of view.<sup>393</sup>

How then should Norway act towards its transcontinental great power neighbour? The view represented here is compatible with that of the critics of the Norwegian defence reforms. Where interests are diverging, Norway should signal clearly what the vital Norwegian interests are in order to prevent uncertainties or misleading analyses on the Russian side. A military vacuum in northern Norway is inconvenient as a crisis would imply force deployments that could lead to an unwanted accentuation of the situation. The strategic importance of the north indicates that a permanent military presence here is necessary to secure quick and adequate Norwegian reactions. This would not be ‘gunboat diplomacy’, as a state of this size cannot have any militarily deterrent effect, but rather a signal to the environment that Norway has strategic interests in these areas.

Finally, and first and foremost, it is important to aspire to the relationship with Russia being as good and trustworthy as possible based on cooperation in areas where the two countries have common interests. Another common interest, in addition to the regional aspects mentioned above, is e.g to keep the energy prices stable and high. “In fact, Norway and Russia are heading for a new alliance in the north driven by the geography, the geology and the world’s increasing energy demand”.<sup>394</sup> Russia’s importance to the development of the northern sea areas is obvious and Norway thus seeks a status as Russia’s privileged partner in the north.

Despite rapidly surging Russian defence budgets, an increasing economic self confident and militarily modernising Russia, and a fierce Russian way of expressing, at least prior to the financial crisis, this development does not represent any direct threat to Norway. The current Norwegian-Russian relationship can in a historic perspective indeed be characterised as good.<sup>395</sup> The political cooperation is broad

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<sup>393</sup> BERGGRAV (2004), p. 11.

<sup>394</sup> UDGAARD (2006).

<sup>395</sup>In April 2005, the Russian FM Sergej Lavrov stated that Russia’s relations with Norway are better than with any other neighbouring country. (Cited in AALE (2005B). In November 2006, minister of defence Sergej Ivanov suggested that Norway and Russia should soon abolish the border patrols along the common land border.(Cited in RUSSLAND.RU INTERNETTAVISEN (2006).

and profound, and Norwegian government ministers have been visiting Russia almost on a weekly basis. A similar increase in contact also implemented on the state secretary and state bureaucracy level.<sup>396</sup> Further, the economic cooperation is increasing. Whereas a correspondent economic normalisation has taken place between Russia and the other Nordic countries as well, the political relations between them and Russia are rather frigid. Several times, irritations have occurred between Moscow and Copenhagen, Helsinki and Stockholm.<sup>397</sup> This indicates that Norway's interests are more connected to and dependent on Russia compared to the other Nordic states. The common border in a strategic important area is also a reason for regular talks. However the past also shows that Norway has wished to inform "key figures" in the EU's "key countries" about difficulties with the Russians in the north.

The Norwegian-Russian relations on a regional level are to a very large extent concerned with fishery, which is of greater direct importance to both Norwegians and Russians in the Barents Region than oil and gas interests. The Norwegian-Arctic codfish is particularly important to the Norwegian-Russian fishery relations; it is the most important fish stock in the Barents Sea and one of three stocks in the Barents Sea that is defined as common Norwegian/ Russian. Its area of dispersion covers most of the Barents Sea, including the areas with disputed jurisdiction.<sup>398</sup> As Norway and the Soviet Union failed to agree on the border between their economic zones in the 1970s, important fishing areas were located in the disputed area of about 155 000 km<sup>2</sup>. In 1978, Norway and the Soviet Union agreed on a temporary agreement for the regulation of fishing in the most important area within the so called "Grey zone" to secure the control of fishing.<sup>399</sup> This defined an area in which Norway and the Soviet Union/Russia have agreed on specific temporary procedures for the regulation and control of fishing. The Grey zone agreement was brought to an end with the coming into effect of the delineation treaty. Moreover, the area north of the Norwegian economic zone's border near Svalbard is excellent for fishing and especially important as a spawning area for the Norwegian-Arctic codfish. The regulation of fishery in the Norwegian and

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<sup>396</sup>Cited in AALE (2005B).

<sup>397</sup>See AALE (2005B).

<sup>398</sup> HØNNELAND (2005), p. 73.

<sup>399</sup>See figure I.1.

Russian economic zones would thus have had very limited effect if there would have been free access to fishing in the Svalbard sea areas.<sup>400</sup> As shown above, the issue of regulating the fishing activity outside Svalbard's territorial waters is still unresolved, but in practice regulated by the fishery protection zone. However, unless something else is decided, the quotas for the Barents Sea are determined for the whole area of a fish stock's dispersion and not for the single zones. As the "Loophole"<sup>401</sup> is situated far away, and the fishing there is unstable, the area has had only minor importance as a fishing area.

The fishing pressure in high seas grew considerably after the establishment of the EEZ of 200 nautical miles in 1975. Thus a new agreement in the UN on fishing in the high seas was determined in August 1995. The agreement states that coastal states and states with trawlers fishing in high seas are obliged to cooperate on maintenance of the respective fish stocks in regional administrative organisations. This is the general basis for the Norwegian-Russian administrative cooperation of fishery in their common fishing areas.

"Whereas the Barents cooperation and Norway's environmental engagement in Northwest Russia emerged in the wake of the late 1980s' political changes in the Soviet Union, the Norwegian-Russian fishery maintenance-regime in the Barents Sea is a rare example of a formalised East-West cooperation that begun during the Cold War. It is even more sensational that this cooperation took place in a high tension area of security policy, and that it happened relatively smoothly and with a relative high degree of aims achievement. The détente from the end of the 1980s enabled a significant extension of the established management cooperation between the two states, and the Norwegian and Russian fishery sector were also attached in a totally different way than before."<sup>402</sup>

This is the very positive background of the Norwegian-Russian cooperation on fishery management. The common Norwegian-Russian fishery regime shows a successful cooperation in this area for many years and thus exemplifies the im-

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<sup>400</sup> HØNNELAND (2005), p. 76.

<sup>401</sup> A large area north of the 'Grey zone' is still international water. This "Loophole" attracted much attention in the early 1990s as there was a long lasting conflict between Iceland on the one hand and Norway and Russia on the other. Iceland claimed historical rights in the Barents Sea whereas the two latter countries showed a common attitude against the "intruder". An agreement was signed between the three states in 1999. Iceland got a general quota in the Barents Sea but abstained from fishing codfish in the Svalbard Fishery protection zone. In return, Norway and Russia obtained fishing rights in the Icelandic zone. HØNNELAND (2005), p. 78.

<sup>402</sup> HØNNELAND (2005), p. 73 [author's translation].

portance of common interests for the development of good bilateral relations. However, fishery disputes caused on the lower levels soon form national policy and thus show the explosiveness that fishery entails for the Norwegian-Russian relations in general. Norway's good bilateral relations with Russia on the top level can thus not belie the problems attached to the neighbourhood with Russia, clearly exemplified by the fishery disputes. An incident in the Fishery protection zone easily led to export embargoes of Norwegian salmon, which was the case in both 2005 and 2011. Russia is one of Norway's largest export markets for fish.

#### **4.1.2. Factors of strategic importance and threat perceptions**

The most important strategic factor of a permanent character is the geography. Norway's security and its strategic position, i.e. Norway's value for the surrounding great powers, are dominated by maritime conditions as a consequence of being a coastal state and a maritime nation. Norway is dependent on close relations with the central naval powers along the Norwegian coastline. These are for the time being the US and Russia. Traditionally, Norway's strategic position has been connected to the country's location near strategically important sea routes. In the 17., 18. and 19. century, the Baltic Sea was the decisive route for the great powers in the north. In the 20. century, the transit from the North Sea to the Atlantic was decisive. Germany's attempts to get access to the open sea and the British attempts to stop them led to the German occupation of Norway in 1940. During the Second World War, the sea route over the Norwegian Sea,<sup>403</sup> around the North Cape to the Barents Sea and Russia became strategically important.<sup>404</sup> During the Cold War, the importance of the northern sea route increased. The Soviet Union planned and prepared to get over the Norwegian Sea to interrupt NATO's supply lines over the Atlantic, whereas the US and NATO planned and prepared to stop them from doing so. In order to threaten the Western supply lines, the Soviet navy had to pass the bottle neck outside the Norwegian coast.

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<sup>403</sup>The Norwegian Sea is part of the Atlantic Ocean and situated between the North Sea, the Greenland Sea and the Barents Sea.

<sup>404</sup>Norway's geographic location was central both as regards the allies' attempts to militarily support the Soviet Union over the Kola White Sea harbors, and Germany's attempts to stop them.



Thus Norwegian territory was important in order to control this area. From a Soviet point of view, Norwegian territory was also an important preliminary terrain for the defence of the large Kola military complex. The Nordic countries thus constituted a flank to this front. Their territories could have become important as an axis to reach the central European front.<sup>405</sup>

After the Cold War, the necessity of controlling the northern sea route disappeared due to the disappearance of the Soviet threat, and Norwegian territory lost its strategic importance. With the central front the flank dimension disappeared as well. This enabled the central European countries to reduce their military structures. The Nordic countries were on the other hand more reluctant, as the Russian capacity was still sufficient to represent a threat. Although the threat based on ideology had disappeared, the military complex on the Kola peninsula was still of great importance to Russia. As Russia was weakened conventionally, the nuclear second-strike capacity was comparatively more important and therefore also the northern sea areas. Russia could no longer utilise the supply lines through the Baltic states and the previous Eastern European states. Hence a problem remained in the north after the Cold War and contributed to a decelerated reduction of the armed forces in Finland, Norway and Sweden compared to other European states.<sup>406</sup>

The northern sea area's military strategic importance has been reduced despite the fact that the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea have kept its role as an operative area for strategic submarines from both the US and the three European nuclear powers (Britain, France and Russia), and as a home base and an exercise area for the Russian northern fleet. The northwestern region has furthermore become strategically more important to Russia as a result of the geopolitical developments in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.<sup>407</sup> Thus Russia is to a greater extent a Northwestern European country than what the Soviet Union was. Finally, energy resources in the Barents Sea and northwest Russia underline this area's importance to the Russian Federation. Norway and other Nordic countries will be important as both the production in these areas and the energy transit to

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<sup>405</sup> BERGGRAV (2004), pp. 3-4.

<sup>406</sup> BERGGRAV (2004), pp. 3-4.

<sup>407</sup>The Soviet Union had its harbours here but Russia has no access to them today.

the European market are concerned. In addition, the Nordic region is the region where Russia meets the US as a global fleet power and in regards to vital interests of Central and Western Europe. Norwegian territory would thus become interesting in a crisis where Russian, US and/ or European interests are involved.<sup>408</sup> Altogether, the northern sea areas are perhaps more important than ever before. The importance is now above all of economic nature, tied to production and transport of oil, gas and fishery products. The melting of the Arctic ice adds additional interest to the High North, as shown in chapter 1.

Hence, the great powers' interests in Norway are basically related to maritime concerns, and above all to Norway's role as an important oil and gas producer and exporter.<sup>409</sup> Given the importance of the great power interests linked to a secure access to energy and the demand of fish and fishery products, there is potential for a conflict about rights or access, that in a worst case scenario could become a military dimension.<sup>410</sup> The control of Norway also implies the possibility to control the sea routes outside the Norwegian coast, to threaten them or to protect them.<sup>411</sup> "Such control, to whom Norway is allied and how Norwegian alliance policy is performed is thus not indifferent whether in relation to Russia, the US or the EU."<sup>412</sup> Altogether, new factors of strategic relevance are Norway's petroleum activity and the transport routes for petroleum and gas, in addition to strategic nuclear weapons of intercontinental reach. Both factors tie Norway's security to the security developments in distant areas.<sup>413</sup>

Today there are 70 fields of petroleum production on the Norwegian continental shelf which produce more than 2,0 billion barrels of oil per day (2011) and totally about 100 billion Sm<sup>3</sup> natural gas. This constitutes a production of marketable petroleum of totally 229,7 billion Sm<sup>3</sup> o.e. Norway is ranged as the world's seventh largest oil exporter and the fourteenth largest oil producer in the world. In 2010 Norway was the second largest gas exporter and the sixth largest gas

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<sup>408</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 135.

<sup>409</sup> Norway co-operates on energy policy with its most important political and economic partners in the International Energy Agency (IEA). These are primarily importers of oil and gas. Norway also has important shared interests with other oil-exporting countries both inside and outside the OPEC.

<sup>410</sup> BØRRESEN (2005B), p. 4.

<sup>411</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>412</sup> BØRRESEN (2004) [author's translation].

<sup>413</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 127.

producer in the world.<sup>414</sup> About 60 percent of Norwegian oil is exported to Western Europe and about 15 per cent to North America.<sup>415</sup> The Norwegian gas export covers about 20 per cent of the European consumption. The largest part of the export goes to Germany, the UK, Belgium and France, where Norwegian gas makes up between 20 and 35 per cent of the total consumption. The Norwegian oil directorate estimates a gas export on a level between 105 and 130 billion Sm<sup>3</sup> around 2020 and between 80 and 120 billion Sm<sup>3</sup> in 2025.<sup>416</sup> Also, the reliance on Norway becomes even more apparent since a memorandum of understanding on gas cooperation between Algeria, the EU's third biggest supplier with a market share of 11 percent, and Russia came into effect.

To sum up, Norway has become a potential influence on other countries' national security and economic developments. The production and deliveries of strategic resources will have security consequences for Norway.

“Threats against the Norwegian energy production will for the most part depend on the international situation and will increase in periods of conflict in our area and in other parts of the world where Norway, NATO, producers on the Norwegian shelf or the recipients of Norwegian energy are involved. Assaults or attacks may also be a result of conflicts where Norway initially is not involved. The intention of assaults against the oil and gas industry could be to exert a political and military pressure against Norway, NATO or countries that are dependent on energy deliveries from Norway. The primary target could thus be the recipient countries, with the result that Norwegian security interests get affected.”<sup>417</sup>

Thus Norwegian security also depends on the security of important energy partners. The risk of war in Europe today seems marginal. However, the security challenges and threat perceptions are very unpredictable, whereas the most visible force in the geopolitical game seems to be the interests linked to energy. The world's dependency on fossil energy is a relative constant factor in an otherwise dynamic international situation. This dependency will probably increase, so that Norway would soon be influenced by eventual changes or conflicts in the world's energy regions. Accordingly, Norway's geostrategic situation has become more complex because national interests get influenced by areas dominated by energy

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<sup>414</sup> NORWEGIAN PETROLEUM DIRECTORATE (2012), p. 20.

<sup>415</sup> *Norway's oil and gas industry. Key figures 2005*, [http://www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/253233/nokkeltall\\_2005\\_e.ppt](http://www.odin.dep.no/filarkiv/253233/nokkeltall_2005_e.ppt) (accessed 16 July 2006).

<sup>416</sup> Cited in HELGESEN (2012).

<sup>417</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 133 [author's translation].

geopolitics.<sup>418</sup> Further, interest conflicts in distant areas can have consequences for Norway as a result of developments in warfare technology, and national security is threatened through the merchant fleet. Norway's interest areas are tied to developments in, firstly, Central Asia, Caucasus and the Black Sea area, secondly in the Arabic Gulf and the Middle East, and, thirdly, in South-East Asia and East-Asia.<sup>419</sup> A destabilisation of the Middle East might for instance create petroleum crises that can have serious consequences for Norway's administration of its oil and gas resources and its control of the transport routes between Russia and the US. Steiro argues against the pretension that Norway is not strategically important:

“The pressure between the US' and other Western countries' permanently increasing import needs, and Russia's interests as an oil-exporting nation competing with Norway, might create unclear situations in foreign policy and alliances that not necessarily follow the patterns we know today. (...) It should be sufficient to look to the Middle East in order to understand what importance the oil has and increasingly will get in international politics.”<sup>420</sup>

Norway has thus in reality become “a player in the geopolitics of oil”.<sup>421</sup> The question is what strategy Norway has, given the strategic importance of energy in a situation where the Middle East is in a permanent crisis, the oil and gas supply from Russia from time to time is disturbed by bilateral conflicts and the world's energy demand increases every year. According to Hansen Bundt, Norway has perceived the oil and gas activity to be solely a resource question and the products to be solely trade objects, whereas the country's environment also perceives the significant amount of Norwegian oil and gas activities as a question with clear foreign and security political implications and consequences.<sup>422</sup> Energy questions must become an integral part of all external EU relations, says a policy review of the European Commission,<sup>423</sup> published after the disturbances of the oil supply from the important Druzhba pipeline in the beginning of 2007, a result of a bilateral conflict between Russia and Belarus. As the EU furthermore has

<sup>418</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 133.

<sup>419</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 134.

<sup>420</sup> STEIRO (2004) [author's translation].

<sup>421</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>422</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 134.

<sup>423</sup> European Commission (2007) *Mitteilung der Kommission an den Europäischen Rat und das Europäische Parlament. Eine Energiepolitik für Europa*, Kom (2007)1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:DE:PDF> (accessed 28 February 2007), p. 22.

troubles convincing Russia to open its gas market, it also calls for stronger ties to former Soviet states, Algeria and Norway.<sup>424</sup>

Moreover, the infrastructure related to the production of oil and gas is of great strategic importance. An attack or a threat of attack to this infrastructure could have serious consequences for the economic interests of many nations and cause a considerable impairment of NATO's military capacity. Even if such a threat does not exist today, NATO is aware of the risk of an attack or damage. Thus the Norwegian petroleum industry, especially the production, processing and gas pipelines, has become a potential target in the case of war, or a target to terrorists who wish to hit Norway or some of its recipients.<sup>425</sup> The question is still if Norway does have a strategy. Independent of what threat perceptions exist, the military strategic importance of Norway and the adjacent sea areas will be decided by how important Norwegian territory is perceived to be in international crises and wars. This chapter shows that its importance is great. Decisive is thus Norway's real ability to uphold its decisions and priorities in regards to energy. Such an ability would at least imply diplomatic skills and a relevant military ability. Norway's capability to guarantee safe deliveries of oil and gas in different crises and war situations is probably Norway's most important contribution to European security. According to Hansen Bundt, Norway's credibility as an alliance partner depends on this ability, which at the same time demands a clear strategy and an opinion on what energy deliveries will have to be prioritised in different crisis scenarios. Otherwise, other players will take this decision for Norway.<sup>426</sup>

The defence reforms of Norway presuppose that eventual aggressions from outside only would aim at laying pressure on Norway in a given situation without the intention of conquering territory. The threat perception of the last decade was first of all the asymmetric threat of international terrorism. However, international terrorism first of all challenges the secret services, and only the defence forces have the necessary command organisation and instruments to handle attacks on

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<sup>424</sup>European Commission (2007) *Mitteilung der Kommission an den Europäischen Rat und das Europäische Parlament. Eine Energiepolitik für Europa*, Kom (2007)1, <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0001:FIN:DE:PDF> (accessed 28 February 2007), p. 29.

<sup>425</sup>HANSEN BUNDT (2002), pp. 132-133 (footnote 28).

<sup>426</sup>HANSEN BUNDT (2002), pp. 134-135.

e.g. petroleum installations at sea.<sup>427</sup> According to a report of the the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, the initial phase of a strategic assault of Norway will basically have to be handled on the national level.<sup>428</sup> Norway's problem according to the report and several Norwegian researchers independent of the Armed Forces or the Defence Ministry, is that the army has become too small, has lost the ability of maneuver warfare and that troops are bound to operations abroad, i.e. mainly Afghanistan. Moreover, the aerial defence is not sufficient to defend all the important spots that need to be defended. Also problematic is the planned reduction in ground based air defence.<sup>429</sup> The report also concludes that if interest conflicts between Norway and Russia increase as the coherence of NATO deteriorates, then a Russian military attack of Norwegian territory can not be excluded.<sup>430</sup> The problem is that the defence forces do not develop in a short or medium period of time.<sup>431</sup> The question is thus if Norway is sufficiently prepared if the situation should change for the worse. When strategic choices are made, it should be clear why one strategy to be preferred to another. It has to be spoken out loudly that something is given a higher priority than other things.

Even close allies will not have completely coinciding interests with Norway. There is no guarantee that they are just as concerned to secure Norwegian rights and interests, e.g. fish resources that are rare and thus disputed. Børresen criticises the view that when the state is not threatened through hostilities, a close defence cooperation with other similar states based on a large degree of division of labour is the solution.<sup>432</sup> Rather, it should be the interest of a small state surrounded by great powers that these use their power in accord with the small state's interests. The small state has to aim at a relationship with the great powers where their dependence on the small state is as great as possible. This would necessitate that the great powers' ability to discipline the small one is minimal. How can Norway operationalise such a strategy? The dependency is connected to the importance the great powers assign to the control of Norwegian territory in the case of crisis

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<sup>427</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>428</sup> BUKKVOLL ET AL. (2009), p. 22.

<sup>429</sup> BUKKVOLL ET AL. (2009).

<sup>430</sup> BUKKVOLL ET AL. (2009), p. 23.

<sup>431</sup>It takes 30 years to produce a land or sea commander and 20 to 25 years to produce a brigade chief etc. BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>432</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

and war. As this proves to be great, this is where the dependency on Norway is. The question of what prize they are willing to pay to obtain such control is connected to Norway's ability to discipline them. Their considerations in such a context would be influenced by the policy Norway has towards the different parties in a conflict and of what military resources Norway possesses. The greater Norway's military capacity is, the larger the potential costs of a political and military pressure against Norway are.<sup>433</sup> This, however, is not sufficient. An institutionalisation and increased cooperation in terms of the mutual interests existing between Norway and the great power would decrease the necessity to discipline Norway at all. Further, a common security community with all great power neighbours would be the optimal strategy.

### 4.1.3. The strategic environment

Due to its importance as a global naval power, the US' importance for the coastal state Norway has increased rather than decreased. The US sets the preconditions for what economic, judicial and security policy regimes develop at sea. Moreover, the large geographic distance to the US, in contrast to the proximity of Russia, is convenient to Norway. In comparison, Norway is closer to the US than Russia in regards to language, culture and societal developments. The US is Norway's most important ally.

Russia on the other hand is, and will continue to be, a challenge for Norway. Regardless of the future developments, Norway has to handle a transcontinental great power neighbour. Even if Russia's influence in the international system seems to be weakened compared to the Soviet Union, Russia has several geopolitical, military, economic and political qualities that make it a far more attractive partner to both the EU and the US.

“It is a common misunderstanding that if only Russia gets more democratic, capitalistic and liberal, more like us, the challenges of the neighbourhood will be solved. The Latin American countries' and Canada's problematic relationship with the USA testifies that this is not necessarily the case. Great powers have a tendency to act as great powers, driven more by geopolitics and interests than by ideology and values. A demo-

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<sup>433</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

cratic, wealthy and self-confident Russia in a multipolar world will hardly be an easier neighbour to handle than the Soviet Union of the Cold War. Maybe rather quite the contrary.”<sup>434</sup>

Its role as an essential global energy supplier broadens Russia’s strategic possibilities and strengthens the Russian economy, although it makes the Russian economy very vulnerable to declining oil prices. Russia’s weakness after the Cold War was accompanied by its need to make a strong appearance. Russia has become less flexible as territorial questions, defence of sovereignty and power exertion are concerned.<sup>435</sup> However, except for Russia’s status as an energy power and its nuclear arsenal, Russia has a weak resource base for a great power. Russia still perceives itself to be in an inferior position vis-à-vis NATO, and its nuclear capability is still militarily decisive. For the time being, it is very unlikely that Russia would risk an escalation of political tensions into hostilities that would involve a direct confrontation with NATO countries. Military power is used to keep the country together, as the war in Chechnya shows, but also to attack regions in a neighbouring country, Georgia, which according to Russian thinking belongs to Russia’s sphere of interest.

NATO developments are on the other hand decisive for Norway’s relationship with Russia and the overall European security. These concern new enlargements, the US’ future dispositions and Europe’s answers to these, and NATO’s ties to Russia. The latter factor in particular is very decisive for Norwegian security. Should Eastern European countries like the Ukraine and Georgia become NATO members, it would probably lead to severe difficulties in the organisation’s relationship with Russia. NATO territory would move closer to Russia and make the impression of an encirclement, created by US activities in Central Asia, even more acute. Negative Russian reactions in connection with discussions of a Ukrainian NATO membership indicate this.<sup>436</sup> US plans to position an antimissile defence in Eastern Europe has also led to negative Russian reactions. The question is whether NATO wants to signal how the strategic partnership with Russia will be developed. Until now, Russia has not gotten the impression of being seen as an adequate partner.

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<sup>434</sup> BØRRESEN (2004) [author’s translation].

<sup>435</sup> NEUMANN (2002), p. 10.

<sup>436</sup> WEISSER (2006).



“As, however, global stability is only secured through close cooperation between America, Europe and Russia, the substance of the cooperation has to be significantly improved - eventually even through a Russian membership in the Alliance. Still there is time not to force Russia in the arms of China. NATO and the EU now have to contribute to that purpose.”<sup>437</sup>

The EU on the other hand seems to have difficulties involving Russia in its future plans for a European security structure and in giving the country an adequate role. NATO seems to be more suited for cooperation on security policy with the former Soviet states, Russia included, than the EU, given the significant institutional weaknesses of the ESDP. NATO is thus more than a military power in Europe. However, the indifference to Russian complaints about e.g. NATO enlargements and the lacking Western ability to include Russia in the transatlantic security community is a problem to European security.

Russia is the factor that decides the importance to Norway of the two other corners of the power triangle.

“It is a superior consideration that all conflicts that could become too big for Norway but too small for our allies to take the burden of involving themselves in, are reduced as much as possible. The answer to this dilemma lies partly in a stable and concise relationship with Russia but first of all in a close alignment with the allies, that is as close as we can get them. Norway as a small state with Russia as neighbour has to ask for support from the power triangle’s other two corners.”<sup>438</sup>

It is , however, problematic if a “stable and concise” relationship with Russia should prove to be incompatible with “a close alignment”. Thus a lot depends on the inclusion of Russia in Western security cooperation. An antimissile defence in Eastern Europe would from this point of view not be in Norway’s interest. Russia’s need of acceptance is most of all directed towards the US and then towards the EU. Its relationship with Norway is according to Neumann first of all seen as a function of this, and Norway to an alarming extent appears to Moscow as the US’ extended arm in the north. The Arctic is the large frame of Norway’s strategic environment. The report “Arctic Strategies and Policies” elaborated by the Finnish researcher Heininen describes a geopolitical situation in the Arctic characterised by a defensive buildup of tension, i.e. taking care of own inter-

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<sup>437</sup> WEISSER (2006) [author’s translation].

<sup>438</sup> NEUMANN (2002), p. 20 [author’s translation].

ests, and at the same time by clear offensive traits, especially on the rhetorical level. Arctic nations are thus monitoring each other (and China) and seek to build up an offensive capacity in order to be able to react if other nations should cross any limits.<sup>439</sup> Engen and Nilsen indicate that Norway to a large extent has US support for Norwegian claims in the north. The factors favouring such an assessment are a Russian policy in defiance of US interests, the politicised Russian energy sector and a closed and risky Russian economy. Finally, Russia needs large societal investments. At a time with uncertain outlooks for the oil price, the US would clearly prefer that a loyal NATO ally like Norway possesses as much as possible of the presumed oil and gas resources. Nevertheless, they argue, Norway's ambitions of sovereignty in the north should not disturb the long term stability with Russia. Norway should leave the current US anchored unilateral policy based on one state, the US, and instead cooperate inside the EU's multilateral and multinational partnership with Russia.<sup>440</sup> This thesis will be the initial point for the further discussion on the balance between the two options for a Norwegian security strategy. Not to change the Norwegian foreign and security policy at all would imply that choices are made unconsciously. Norway needs to find the balance between the US' importance as the world's dominating naval power and the increasing strategic importance of the EU. As shown above, the Atlantic line still dominates the Norwegian foreign and security policy but is to a certain extent weakened by external developments. According to Engen and Nilsen, US support would not boost Norwegian interests in a long term perspective compared to a stronger cooperation with the EU. A good point is that the US has not even ratified the UNCLOS.<sup>441</sup> However, the National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9 January 2009 on "Arctic Region Policy" strongly emphasises the importance of US accession to UNCLOS.<sup>442</sup> Hillary Clinton has moreover, both as a senator and as Secretary of State, given positive statements in regards to an accession to UNCLOS.<sup>443</sup> Also of great importance to Norway is that the Directive argues that the "geopolitical circumstances of the Arctic region differ sufficiently from those of the Antarctic

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<sup>439</sup> HEININEN (2011).

<sup>440</sup> ENGEN/NILSEN (2005).

<sup>441</sup> ENGEN/NILSEN (2005).

<sup>442</sup> National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9 January 2009 on "Arctic Region Policy" at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm>

<sup>443</sup> HOLTSMARK/ SMITH-WINDSOR (2009), p. 22.

region such that an 'Arctic Treaty' of broad scope - along the lines of the Antarctic Treaty - is not appropriate or necessary."<sup>444</sup> Given the increasing strategic importance of the High North due to the melting of the Arctic ice, and its implications for the great powers' interest in the region, a clash between this interest and international rule of law would indeed be problematic to Norway. "We dismiss the claim that the Arctic is some kind of an anarchic area, which immediately needs a treaty to become manageable, because we have a solid and good initial point in the Law of the Sea".<sup>445</sup> In contrast to this, a decision of 9 October 2008, made by the EP, stated that the EU Commission should initiate international negotiations on a new agreement to protect the Arctic. The agreement, which is regulating the activity in the Antarctic, is mentioned as a concrete example on what such an agreement could look like.<sup>446</sup> According to the EP, the UNCLOS "was not formulated with specific regard to the current circumstances of climate change and the unique consequences of melting ice in the Arctic Seas." Moreover, "the Arctic region is currently not governed by any specifically formulated multilateral norms and regulations, as it was never expected to become a navigable waterway or an area of commercial exploitation."<sup>447</sup> However, despite this initial scepticism, the EU has concluded that current international law must be respected also in this regard. The EU has without doubt both interests in and influence on the High North, but there are different opinions on how the increased interest in the Arctic should be handled. A reconsideration of the views of the EP was to a large extent put forth by the centre-right European People's Party with the German EP member Michael Gahler in the front. The EP thus decided on a new resolution with the title "A sustainable EU policy for the High North" (2011) which not refers to any new treaty or a resource moratorium but focuses on how the EU can play a positive role in the region.<sup>448</sup>

According to John Hamre, director of the Center for Strategic and International

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<sup>444</sup>National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive of 9 January 2009 on "Arctic Region Policy" at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm>

<sup>445</sup>FM Jonas Gahr Støre cited in AFTENPOSTEN (2008) [author's translation].

<sup>446</sup>European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0474+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (accessed 22 October 2008.)

<sup>447</sup>European Parliament resolution of 9 October 2008 on Arctic governance at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2008-0474+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN> (accessed 22 October 2008.)

<sup>448</sup> ØSTHAGEN, ANDREAS (2012), p. 66-68.

Studies (CSIS) in Washington, NATO will not focus on the northern areas despite an increased emphasis being laid on Europe in the US after the Georgia-crisis. The US does not focus on the High North and will not do so for a long time, at least not in Washington, according to Hamre. Hamre also states that it will be difficult to pass the UNCLOS, despite the fact that even then-president Bush and other important interests, also military, have argued for this option.<sup>449</sup>

The argument that Norway needs US protection, with the implicit political option of subordination this has implied, is not so convincing anymore. However, considering two of the the vital Norwegian interests (see table I.1) to be protection against political and military pressure and aggression and maintenance of the Norwegian sea domain, the dependency on the US is still the most important element of Norwegian security and defence policy. Moreover, though, a membership of the EU would have made it easier to develop a new anchor point in Norwegian security policy. The development of the EU as a more independent partner of the US has until now not been perceived to be in Norway's interest, as the US is the only power capable of guaranteeing military security in the North Atlantic. If Norway should be left alone with pressure from a foreign power, being anchored in the EU would not be enough to secure Norway's freedom of action. As the EU will never have the military power of the US, Norway has only one relevant military ally.<sup>450</sup> However, if the EU countries are able to coordinate their positions in regards to foreign and security policy, Norway would be even more politically and diplomatically marginalised. Transatlantic consultations on foreign policy already take place between the EU and the US on a high, daily-based level. The failure of the transatlantic dialogue inside NATO has been obvious, at least since the Iraq crisis in 2003. Important international matters, like the dialogue with Iran on its nuclear programme, showed the absence of NATO in the transatlantic coordination between the EU and the US. The important topics are not always on the NATO agenda, which to a large extent is reduced to military questions.

An alternative Norwegian policy would be to broaden the partnership with Russia in the north inside a European frame and include all interested parties in something broader than the Barents cooperation. The EU has extended its "strategic

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<sup>449</sup>Cited in DRAGNES (2008B).

<sup>450</sup> BINGEN (2003).

partnership” with Russia as the member states agreed to reinforce the cooperation with Russia through four Common Spaces in addition to the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. These common spaces cover “economic issues and the environment; issues of freedom, security and justice; external security, including crisis management and non-proliferation; and research and education, including cultural aspects.”<sup>451</sup> A membership in the EU would create long term, stable frames around Norway’s relationship to Russia. If the EU in a long term perspective becomes an increasingly important corner of the power triangle, Norway must according to Neumann avoid a policy that, from an EU point of view, appears to be one-sided US oriented. If Norway should end up with such a situation it could, in a worst-case scenario, lead to a situation where Norway stands alone with Russia in the north without support from the other two corners of the triangle.<sup>452</sup> Nevertheless, the EU’s difficulties with Russia, e.g. in the energy cooperation, show that Norway needs both the US and the European corner of the power triangle. As Putin has underlined several times, the EU does not speak with one voice about Russia, as the different member states have different preferences depending on their geographic proximity to the eastern neighbour. Katinka Barysch, a Russia expert at the Centre for European Reform in London, gets to the point: ‘The EU has looked on helplessly as Putin has exiled his critics, renationalized the country’s biggest oil firm and abolished regional elections (...). No amount of upbeat statements after summits can hide the fact that the the two sides do not agree on what their partnership should look like.’<sup>453</sup>

Further, the strong dynamics in the relations between the US and European corners of the power triangle, in short the transatlantic relationship, is assumed to be a central challenge for Norwegian diplomacy. Transatlantic tensions will probably be a dominating figure in the power triangle in the nearest future. The probability that this will lead to constant open conflict is, however, not very high according to Neumann. In regards to security policy, NATO structures these tensions effectively enough to hide them. The permanent transatlantic erosion will, however, increase the possibility that conflicts reach the public.<sup>454</sup>

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<sup>451</sup>European Commission, [http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external\\_relations/russia/summit\\_11\\_04/m04\\_268.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_11_04/m04_268.htm) (accessed 20 September 2007).

<sup>452</sup> NEUMANN (2002), p. 21.

<sup>453</sup>Cited in BILEFSKY (2006).

<sup>454</sup> NEUMANN (2002), p. 16.

The ESDP might not be an alternative to NATO for Norway, as only the US is able to balance Russia. However, the fact that a strategic entity in addition to NATO exists means a significant change. Norway has to comply with increasing transatlantic tensions. The weighting of the security cooperation with the two corners might give the impression that Norway is choosing one of them.<sup>455</sup> In fact, however, Norway just follows suit without taking real choices. Regardless of which corner of the power triangle is the most important one, and regardless of changes in the strategic environment, Norway needs to evaluate its policy in order to make independent choices. In regards to European security cooperation, Norway has not yet made that choice.

#### **4.1.4. The necessity of political and military allies**

As shown in chapter 3.3, Norwegian governments started substantial reforms of the defence forces, becoming more mobile and flexible in order to participate in international operations abroad and adjust to new strategic circumstances. In the following, a comparison of two different views regarding the defence reforms will be used to exemplify the important connection between the necessity of military and political allies on the one hand and Norway's relevance to those on the other hand.

The first view is affiliated with Janne Haaland Matlary, currently professor of international politics at the Department of Political Science, Oslo University. She welcomed the 2005 strategic concept of the Norwegian Armed Forces which stressed military power as a foreign policy tool, instrumentalised to promote Norwegian interests.<sup>456</sup> Military deterrence is accordingly no longer necessary as Russia is no longer a military threat. Rather, political deterrence is in demand as limited conflicts about resources may arise.<sup>457</sup> According to this view, a bilateral Norwegian-Russian conflict about energy in the north would hardly involve NATO because this is not primarily about security. Rather, if military power is increasingly used as an integrated part of the security policy, i.e. Norwegian par-

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<sup>455</sup> NEUMANN (2002), p. 20.

<sup>456</sup> NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (2005).

<sup>457</sup> HAALAND MATLARY (2005A).

participation in international operations, Norwegian relevance and usefulness in this area would, together with an EU membership, create a European engagement in the north, according to Haaland Matlary. This because the EU has an increasing demand for relevant military power, as have the NATO and the UN. Norway's comparative advantage in foreign policy, crisis management and peace keeping operations, could thus be complemented by military power.<sup>458</sup>

This view is opposed by Commodore and defence analyst Jacob Børresen. He criticises the new defence concept for being based on threat analyses imported from the desires of the US and NATO. In other words he presumes that the Ministry of Defence did not undertake independent analyses of Norwegian interests before reforming the armed forces. This also implies that the desires of NATO and the US are not necessarily compatible with Norwegian interests, and furthermore that the defence concept does not sufficiently assess the fact that Norway is in a different strategic position than some of its allies and thus has other defence needs as a small state and a significant energy producer. Instead of favouring military power as a foreign policy tool in international operations, Børresen stresses that military power causes constant political change first of all through control of territory.<sup>459</sup> Haaland Matlary on the other hand stresses political rear cover from allies with common energy interests as Norway and sees military deterrent power of only secondary importance or, if misused, as counterproductive because it demands a great power status. Instead, great powers will have to be integrated in a common platform with Norway.<sup>460</sup>

Haaland Matlary definitely has a point when she stresses the necessity of political allies in the north with common energy interests but also the necessity of a Norwegian membership of the EU. Norway does need political support from key countries in the north. However, Russia will automatically be noticed more by the EU as long as Norway is not a member. The possibility of consolidating Norwegian views with other European states would be better inside the EU, but it is impossible to say if or when Norway will become a member. Norwegian politicians, and FM Gahr Støre in particular, stress the importance of the High North

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<sup>458</sup> HAALAND MATLARY (2005A).

<sup>459</sup> BØRRESEN (2005C).

<sup>460</sup> HAALAND MATLARY (2005B).

when they meet leading European politicians and arrange bilateral and multi-lateral meetings in the north, but this can not substitute an EU membership. The question then remains how military power can be transformed into political influence. There is reason to doubt the plausibility in Haaland Matlary's argument that Norwegian contributions to e.g. EU operations in turn would strengthen Norway's interests in the north, whereas an EU membership probably would. The international engagement of the defence forces is meaningful in many regards: to strengthen the organisations Norway depends on, to gain contacts and influence with great powers and to measure military efficiency. This, however, does not automatically assure Norway the support of the great powers if the country should be militarily threatened. The political relations with e.g. the US can, however, be degraded as a result of failing Norwegian engagement. Notwithstanding, the support of London and Washington is only ensured if these consider it to be in their interest to take any economic, political or military risk to help Norway out of a difficult situation.<sup>461</sup> In this way Børresen contradicts Haaland Matlary's argument that Norwegian contributions to EU troops would give Norway political support in the north. This could be helpful but does not influence Norway's position in security policy. Rather, political alliances in the north can be achieved through Norway's reliability as an energy supplier. As shown above, Norway's importance to the EU is linked to the energy supply strategies of the EU countries.

The challenges related to Norway's own territory will have to be handled in order to improve the strategic situation. Børresen argues that for a small state at war with a superior enemy, the aim is not a military victory but to impress the international opinion and thus possibly contribute to a good starting point for peace negotiations.<sup>462</sup> Therefore there is a basis for claiming political and diplomatic relevance of a relative voluminous force that has endurance through its numbers and is capable of operating in a terrain and under climatic circumstances that favour the defender.<sup>463</sup> The counter-argument is that military presence in itself is not a deterrent regardless of its military quality. Further, as Norway is not

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<sup>461</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>462</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>463</sup> BØRRESEN (2004). As international operations are concerned, the forces would not have the offensive ability to be involved in an attack on behalf of a great power ally but would be more suited to contribute to peace and stability.



capable of defending its territory alone, the country's armed forces have to be capable of operating effectively alongside its allies.<sup>464</sup> This can be provided by regional military integration aiming at international operations abroad. Rear admiral Berggrav claims that even raising budgets will not be enough to strengthen Norway's independent military capability enough to have a real deterrent effect. Further, if the member countries don't contribute to the cooperation of armed forces, NATO will be eroded. Firstly, the toolbox becomes less complete, and, as a consequence, the ability to cope with tasks decreases. Secondly, the political coherence becomes undermined. It is in Norway's interest that NATO remains an authentic defence organisation and that Norway remains a credible security partner. This credibility would be affirmed by Norwegian participation in international operations.<sup>465</sup>

However, as Børresen has argued, the defence forces should be modelled to be able to react to military pressure and aggression in a way that makes the aggressor change his behaviour to the small state's advantage. The defence forces should not be a "miniature edition" of Norway's great power allies' forces. Neither are other small states proper models as the geographic location, topography, climate and demography are specific criteria that have to be considered. This does not mean that Norway can ignore the developments of weapon technology. However, the defence forces have to be modelled according to Norwegian tasks and premises and have a structure based on Norwegian challenges in order to offer its duties to the UN, NATO or the EU. To do the opposite, to model the defence forces according to NATO or great power needs, would reduce the Norwegian government's freedom to act in conflicts and crises in the vicinity, and thus threaten Norwegian security.<sup>466</sup> Furthermore, the benefit of military deployments in the "worldwide war against terrorism" is increasingly assessed with scepticism. First of all, international police cooperation is required to control the threat of terrorism. "There are only two concrete constellations where terrorism will demand the deployment of armed forces: the danger of nuclear anarchy and extortionary access denial to the world's energy reserves."<sup>467</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> BERGGRAV (2004), p. 15.

<sup>465</sup> BERGGRAV (2004), pp. 16-17.

<sup>466</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

<sup>467</sup> WEISSER (2006).

Although Norway on the one hand is totally dependent on military assistance in a crisis situation, the *military* attention to Norway and the *military* strategic importance of the Northern European areas have on the other hand declined after the end of the Cold War. This fact will not change because of mobile and flexible Norwegian armed forces capable of operating with its allies abroad. Norway has chosen to build a defence based on quality at the cost of quantity and contingency which according to Toje practically is a supplementary defence where single capacities can be plugged into the American machine. Norway does this at a time when the US is shifting focus towards Asia.<sup>468</sup> NATO is the alliance which Norway has to trust in the case of war in its vicinity. Toje uses the example of Georgia to exemplify the lacking military support from the US despite the fact that Georgia sent its troops to Iraq. This example rather clarifies the important fact that an agreement is not an agreement unless it is in writing. This is the case with NATO's Article 5. However, NATO's development and the fact that "the transatlantic alliance is dead", i.e. NATO is not longer a defence alliance, it is a political-military consultation forum<sup>469</sup>, shows that a treaty is not a viable treaty unless it is reconsidered from time to time. The question must then be if Norway, and others, can rely on any help if this should be necessary. The problem with the essence of the North Atlantic Treaty, that an armed attack of a NATO member should be considered as an attack at all NATO members which again will take necessary measures, is that it has not been undertaken a reconsideration of the agreement after the Cold War. An agreement has to live, which means that the interpretation of it has to be clear, because if that is not the case, it does not follow up new times. NATO has elaborated new strategies with new strategic situations, but it has done so without reconsiderating the mandate. Thus the lacking enthusiasm of both European and American allies is quite obvious. The Europeans have changed, the US has changed, and the world has changed. NATO has also changed, but there has been no reconsideration of its original mandate. How then can it be successful? Adapting to a new situation is not the same as having an aim. NATO has to have clear aims, and in order to allow for this, a reconsideration of the old system has to be made in order to develop clear intentions. Toje suggests that Norway should take the lead and build on the

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<sup>468</sup> TOJE (2012).

<sup>469</sup> TOJE (2012).

NATO alliance with a formal Norwegian-American defence pact which settles all ambiguities.<sup>470</sup> The question is then first of all how interesting Norway is to the US. A reconsideration of the history would still have to be undertaken, because what would be the basis of such a bilateral defence pact? Do Norway and the US have the same strategic interests and the same aims? First, strategic choices must be made in order to consider whether such a basis exists. Anything else would be another adaption to a new situation without having considered what should be achieved.

Haaland Matlary points to the remarkable fact that former officers of all people have criticised the alliance policy of the US and NATO and the consequences for Norwegian security.<sup>471</sup> Børresen for example claims that Norway is among those countries that go the furthest in taking the NATO and US “propaganda” about the need of flexible and mobile expedition corps literally. As the situation is today, he claims, the task of the Norwegian defence forces is mainly to contribute with military capacities to the international community of like minded “Western” states, which in reality is a form of “neocolonialism”. This might conform to Norwegian missionary traditions but clearly conflicts with Norwegian military tradition and is hardly in Norway’s interest.<sup>472</sup>

Norway’s geostrategic situation is different from its European NATO allies and the Nordic neighbours. Norway thus needs to cooperate with other states’ armed forces in regards to the defence of Norwegian territory without loosing the ability to play a decisive military role itself. It is both important that Norway’s military allies have the ability to operate under the climatic and topographic conditions in the north, and that they have an interest in getting involved in northern security issues. The so called North Sea Strategy mentioned in chapter 3.3 presents Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Great Britain as Norway’s primary military cooperation partners. The Nordic countries also gain importance as increased Nordic defence cooperation is in the making. Considering its strategic challenges and possibilities, Norway needs allies that can contribute to solve crises and conflicts between Norway and other countries and contribute to strengthen

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<sup>470</sup> TOJE (2012).

<sup>471</sup> HAALAND MATLARY (2005D).

<sup>472</sup> BØRRESEN (2004).

Norway's bargaining position towards Russia, and to some extent in the EEA. Norway needs close political relations to all relevant European countries. This in particular applies to European powers that have compatible interests with Norway in regards to energy, environmental questions and other international questions and to a significant extent depend on Norway. In addition it is important that they have good relations with both Russia and the US, at the same time great influence both inside NATO and the EU and are aware of the importance of the transatlantic security community. Norway's allies' influence in the international system generally and inside these organisations depend on their size and status.

Until now, the US has been Norway's most important ally and, until recently, Britain has been the most important European ally. The Norwegian diplomat Jervell questioned this strategy in his working paper from 2003. Accordingly, Norway's strategic challenges and opportunities require a gradual closer commitment to Europe as a result of the political changes in the US, the moving of US strategic focus from Europe to the Middle East, and the lack of will to respect international law. Norwegian analysts have generally seen the UK as Norway's most important European ally. Hansen Bundt in 2002 pointed to the US and the UK as Norway's most important NATO allies, which probably also have the greatest influence on the ESDP process and the future relationship between NATO and the ESDP. Further, these two countries' views on the ESDP are the most compatible with the Norwegian and thus the most suitable states to promote Norwegian interests in the EU and NATO.<sup>473</sup> However, the tendency of a bilateralised NATO rather favour Germany as it, to a larger extent than Britain, has a more balanced view in regards to the Atlantic and European components of security policy. Britain went too far in its support for Bush' policy and has marginalised itself inside the EU. Moreover, the Norwegians should bear in mind that Britain strongly supports the dynamic development of the European integration of defence and armed forces because it is on this field they can play the leading part in the EU. The most important element is however not which country is the most important but the fact that EU members do not guarantee the security of the other members, and a collective defence between the defenceless is not an alliance but a suicide pact, as

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<sup>473</sup> HANSEN BUNDT (2002), p. 141.

stated by Toje.<sup>474</sup> The most important result of the financial crisis is that where Germany is heading, Europe is heading. According to Toje, the weak reaction of NATO to the war in Georgia was due to Germany's protection of Russia inside the alliance.<sup>475</sup>

## 4.2. Sweden

Whereas Norway is an important European energy supplier, Sweden is increasingly dependent on energy imports. Sweden's strategic challenges and possibilities are found in the BSR but maritime conditions do not play such a great role as they do in Norway's case. First, the challenges in the BSR are of an environmental character, as the pollution in the Baltic Sea makes the environment increasingly unsustainable. Second, the conditions for economic development are good considering "a very well educated workforce, expertise in innovation, especially in knowledge-based industries, a spacious and relatively unspoiled land environment rich in natural resources and a strong tradition of intra-regional cooperation."<sup>476</sup>, but the region has still some way to go before becoming prosperous. Better transport links should be developed and security should be improved. Sweden is also not so directly linked with bilateral relations to Russia as in Norway's case, but Russia still plays a crucial role in the security of the BSR and thus also in Sweden's.

The already mentioned Nord Stream pipeline could have implications for the stability of the BSR and is thus a strategic challenge to Sweden:

"It is ... reasonable to assume that the NEGP<sup>477</sup> will affect the strategic pattern and be a source of friction. It is a project that divides the littoral states of the Baltic Sea into factions, which may rock the regional stability and thus reduce the potential of the new EU members to become security providers in the region. It also gives increased leverage and influence to

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<sup>474</sup> TOJE (2012).

<sup>475</sup> TOJE (2012).

<sup>476</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2009) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region*. COM (2009) 248 final, p. 3.

<sup>477</sup> The Nord Stream pipeline was previously named North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP).




Figure I.2.: North European Natural Gas Network. (Source: ec.europa.eu)

Russia”<sup>478</sup>

As figure I.2<sup>479</sup> shows, the pipeline crosses the Baltic Sea from the Russian town of Vyborg, situated by the Gulf of Finland, to Greifswald in Germany, and is connected to further terminals in the Netherlands and the UK. The pipelines’ consequences for regional stability has been discussed in chapter 1. The Swedish and Finnish governments granted permits to utilise their EEZs for the pipeline through the Baltic Sea on 5 November 2009. The pipeline will pass through 506 km of the Swedish EEZ.<sup>480</sup> Sweden’s approval was a crucial step for the Nord Stream project and came two weeks before a EU-Russia summit to take place in Stockholm during the Swedish presidency. This resolved what had become a dispute between Stockholm and Moscow.<sup>481</sup> The Swedish social democratic party criticised the decision from an environmental point of view. Pertti Joenniemi at

<sup>478</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 12.

<sup>479</sup> Accessed at [http://ec.europa.eu/ten/energy/documentation/doc/2004\\_brochure/natural\\_gas\\_network\\_01\\_en.jpg](http://ec.europa.eu/ten/energy/documentation/doc/2004_brochure/natural_gas_network_01_en.jpg)

<sup>480</sup> <http://www.nord-stream.com/press-info/press-releases/sweden-and-finland-grant-permits-to-nord-stream-255/>

<sup>481</sup> *Energy Daily* (2009) “Nord Stream unleashes criticism in Sweden, Finland” 6 November at <http://www.energy-daily.com> (accessed 12 December 2009).

the Danish Institute for International Studies said it was “clear that the Baltic Sea region cannot become ... a model for European development unless the (environment and security) fears related to the pipeline project are cleared out of the way.”<sup>482</sup> The Sweden approval however led to a revival of Swedish-Russian relations and led to the first visit of a Swedish PM to Russia in ten years in March 2010. Sweden is not dependent on Russian gas unlike many other European countries and has criticised Russia more freely than others, e.g. during the war in Georgia. A Swedish-Polish initiative to a “partnership in the east” between the EU and the former Soviet republics Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, the Ukraine and Belarus also provoked Russia. Then-PM Putin stated during the Swedish visit that “Russia and Sweden have to develop closer economic and political ties. Russian governments will support all suggestions that can strengthen these ties”.<sup>483</sup> The second aspect in this regard is Sweden’s energy situation, which is also a strategic challenge for Sweden’s foreign policy, not least because of the increasing dependence on energy imports from Russia. The option of having Russia as an energy supplier must be seen as a challenge rather than a possibility, at least not a possibility without risks.

Sweden’s power generation, totally 155 TWh<sup>1</sup>, was made up of 45 per cent nuclear power, 47 per cent hydro power and 6 per cent renewable power in 2005.<sup>484</sup> Sweden’s primary energy supply depends mainly on nuclear energy (37 per cent), oil (29 per cent) and renewable sources, mainly hydro power (26 per cent), whereas natural gas takes up only 2 per cent and solid fuels 6 per cent. The consumption of the two latter elements is significantly lower than the EU-27 average (24 per cent and 18 per cent respectively).<sup>485</sup> Domestic energy production is largely limited to electricity generation, and this again is limited to nuclear and renewable energy (mainly hydro power). 10 nuclear reactors provide almost half of the generated electricity in Sweden, and the country’s electricity generation is almost independent of coal and oil. Sweden is the third largest producer of nuclear energy in the EU, and the production results from renewable sources has been far

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<sup>482</sup>Cited in *Energy Daily* (2009) “Nord Stream unleashes criticism in Sweden, Finland” 6 November at <http://www.energy-daily.com> (accessed 12 December 2009).

<sup>483</sup>Cited in BAKKEN (2010).

<sup>484</sup>E.ON NORDIC (2006).

<sup>485</sup>“*Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007*”, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy\\_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix\\_se\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf) (accessed 29 September 2007).

above the EU-27 average of 12 per cent.<sup>486</sup> Swedish energy policy has, however, put limitations on its usage and expansion of both hydro power and nuclear power.<sup>487</sup> Hydro power will not be expanded as rivers are protected. The decision of abandoning nuclear power in a long-term perspective was taken as early as in 1980, but the date 2010 has later been discarded.<sup>488</sup> The four government parties presented a historic energy package at the beginning of February 2009 and open up to the establishment of new nuclear reactors that can replace the current ones. The Swedish government's intention of building new nuclear reactors shows that increased gas imports are not a real option. The Social Democratic Party however still favour a nuclear phase-out because of domestic reasons.<sup>489</sup> The Riksdag resolved upon the main direction of a government proposition in June 2010, which suggested to abandon the central element in Swedish nuclear policy: the aim to phase out nuclear power within 2010. Up to 10 new nuclear reactors can thus be built to displace those operating today. The proposition does not include any exact aims for the future nuclear production but the level is expected to be approximately the same as it currently is.<sup>490</sup> After the accident in the Fukushima Daiichi power plant there has been no serious debate on the future of the Swedish nuclear power as the case was in Germany. An enquiry undertaken on 22 March 2010, i.e. 11 days after the accident in Fukushima, still indicates a considerable decrease in the support for nuclear energy compared to a similar enquiry from 2008. Another enquiry after the accident, published on 19 March 2011, also shows large resistance against nuclear power. Here, 64 per cent rejects new nuclear power plants in Sweden whereas 27 per cent is positive.<sup>491</sup>

36,5 per cent of Sweden's primary energy depends on imports. This was below the EU-25 average in terms of import dependency. The majority of imports is oil

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<sup>486</sup>“*Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007*”, [http://ec.europa.eu/energy\\_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix\\_se\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf) (accessed 29 September 2007).

<sup>487</sup>Simultaneously, Swedish energy policy aims at reducing its dependence on oil.

<sup>488</sup>In 1997, then PM Persson made a compromise with the Centre Party to close the power plant Barsebäck and at the same time reverse the decision of a nuclear phase-out until 2010.

<sup>489</sup>Then-social democratic leader, Mona Sahlin, wanted to build a new government coalition alternative with the Environment Party and the Left Party and hence decided to oppose previous PM and leader of the Social Democratic Party Göran Persson's policy of ignoring a phase-out until 2010.

<sup>490</sup>“En samanhållen klimat- och energipolitik. Energi.” Proposition 2008/09: 162 at <http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/12/27/85/65e0c6f1.pdf> (accessed 20 December 2011)

<sup>491</sup>Cited at [http://www.bellona.no/factsheets/atomkraft\\_sverige](http://www.bellona.no/factsheets/atomkraft_sverige) (accessed 20 December 2011)



(84 per cent) whereas 12 per cent was solid fuels in 2004.<sup>492</sup> Russia (32 per cent), Denmark (28 per cent) and Norway (27 per cent) were Sweden's main suppliers of crude oil in 2007. Sweden has imported an increasing amount of oil from Russia in the last decade, whereas oil imports from Norway and Iran are decreasing. Denmark is above all a country of dispatch and not really a source of crude oil. Oil imports from Russia amounted to 32 per cent in 2007, a decrease of 5 per cent from 2006.<sup>493</sup>

Also when it comes to electricity, Sweden is increasingly dependent on imports from Russia, and Russia's importance is expected to increase in the future.<sup>494</sup> Gas only makes up 1,5 per cent of Sweden's TPES<sup>495</sup> but has 20-25 per cent of the available market where it has been presented. The Swedish industry sector uses 44 per cent of the consumed gas within this area.

Due to the general characteristics of gas power plants, including the lowest CO<sub>2</sub> emission among the thermal plants, gas plants appear to be the best technology both in terms of efficiency and climate policy. Natural gas is also predicted to represent the major increase in additional power generation capacity for Europe in general. However, this source of electricity is facing high price risks and increases the dependency on gas exporting countries. Only Russia and Norway have the capacity to be the gas suppliers of Sweden. From this perspective, the dependence on Russian energy exports will be discussed mainly from a gas perspective, although Sweden is also increasingly dependent on crude oil imports from Russia.<sup>496</sup> The risks associated with nuclear power plants must be compared to the impact the dependencies arising from increased energy imports make.

Before looking at the option of Norway as a gas supplier, which is mainly a question of resources and capacities, the Russian option must be further analysed. Sweden's dependence on Russia would without a doubt increase should it be cou-

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<sup>492</sup> "Sweden-Energy Mix Fact Sheet January 2007", [http://ec.europa.eu/energy\\_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix\\_se\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/energy_policy/doc/factsheets/mix/mix_se_en.pdf) (accessed 29 September 2007).

<sup>493</sup> Svenska Petroleum Institutet, <http://www.spi.se/statistik.asp?omr=1&kat=5> (accessed 29 June 2009).

<sup>494</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 43.

<sup>495</sup> The total primary energy supply, i.e. the ratio of the energy loss measured at the raw materials compared to the final energy output at end consumers.

<sup>496</sup> In Sweden, the transport sector uses 60 per cent of the imported oil, the industrial sector 22 per cent, the residential sector 6 per cent as well as 6 per cent for non-energy usage. IEA INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY (2004), p. 74.

pled to the Nord Stream pipeline or generally lean on more energy imports from Russia. Dependence can be defined as a “state of being determined significantly by external forces”.<sup>497</sup> If Sweden has no viable options to energy imports from Russia, then the situation goes from one of sensitivity to one of vulnerability.<sup>498</sup>

As Larsson states,

“Sweden’s energy imports of Russian energy in specific can in conclusion be characterised as highly sensitive and highly dependent. An import index is however no proof of vulnerability, but only of sensitivity.”<sup>499</sup>

Larsson also points to the fact that in a political security context, sensitivity is important for a dependent state as well. However, there is no immediate danger as long as nothing happens that triggers a crisis.<sup>500</sup> “Should a large conflict or even war materialise, unlikely as it seems, dependence on Russian energy would be devastating.”<sup>501</sup> Larsson furthermore sees sensitivity leading to vulnerability if there are no sufficient ways of tackling dependence problems, or if the supplier is unreliable, something Russia has proved to be towards its eastern European customers.<sup>502</sup>

Norway’s FM Gahr Støre has stated that “another possibility” for Sweden would be the building of a gas pipeline from Kårstø outside Stavanger on the Norwegian west coast, which would supply the Swedish west coast with natural gas.<sup>503</sup> However, this does not seem to be of preference to the current Swedish government.

<sup>497</sup> KEOHANE/ NYE (2001).

<sup>498</sup> According to the Complex Interdependence Theory of Keohane and Nye, *sensitivity* is a “liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered to try to change the situation.” KEOHANE/ NYE (2001), p. 13. *Vulnerability* is on the other hand the “liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been altered.” KEOHANE/ NYE (2001), p. 13. Moreover, “the vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.” KEOHANE/ NYE (2001), p. 13.

<sup>499</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 43.

<sup>500</sup> Such triggers are wars, revolutions, civil unrest, nationalisation, state monopolies, boycotts and transport availability. Sweden does not have the resources to act by itself in case e.g. a boycott should occur. Of the above trigger elements, Russia has had all of them since 1990. LARSSON (2006B), p. 46.

<sup>501</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 61.

<sup>502</sup> LARSSON (2006B), p. 39.

<sup>503</sup> 15 Norwegian and Swedish companies are investing in the project, and the pipeline will presumably be ready for gas deliveries in 2012. Sweden for the time being uses about one billion m<sup>3</sup> natural gas per annum but is estimated to need three times as much in a few years. The pipeline from Norway is planned to have a capacity of six billion m<sup>3</sup> per year, whereas only three billion m<sup>3</sup> in the beginning. As opposed to this, the Nord Stream pipeline has a capacity of 27 billion m<sup>3</sup> per year. ERIKSSON (2006).

Then-minister of trade and industry, Maud Olofsson (Centre Party), stated in 2007 that she sees no future in Norwegian gas as she prefers renewable energy sources, nuclear energy included. Despite a certain amount of imports to the Swedish west coast, Sweden has according to Olofsson “a lot of biomass and also a lot of hydro power and nuclear power”.<sup>504</sup> Unlike the minister, Swedish industry is interested and asks why the gas is not transported to Sweden when the demand is existent.<sup>505</sup> Sweden’s FM Bildt on the other hand sees the potential for energy cooperation between Norway and Sweden as there are synergy effects between the two countries which previously have been underestimated. “To be drilling for oil and gas has not always been so “sexy” in the political debate, but this is not the case anymore.”<sup>506</sup>

In the following sections, the importance of the BSR to Swedish security becomes apparent, and Sweden’s non-alignment is further discussed in relation to the regional security situation.

#### 4.2.1. Economic and security interests

Børresen’s disposition applied in figure I.1 will now be adjusted to Sweden’s economic and security interests. However, the disposition only involves vital and very important interests. Because Sweden is an export nation comparable to Germany and dependent on its exports industry, the importance of Sweden’s export and economic interests is here upgraded to the “very important” Swedish interests. The last category of the disposition, “important interests”, is thus omitted. Free trade is essential to a nation totally depending on imports and exports and is thus added to the list of vital interests. Sweden’s *vital* interests are then as follows:

- to protect Sweden against political and military pressure and aggression
- a favourable world order, i.e. free trade
- to avoid a breakdown of the world’s central trade and finance systems and
- to avoid a situation of vulnerability (and sensitivity) in regards to energy

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<sup>504</sup>Cited in CERVENKA (2007) [author’s translation].

<sup>505</sup> CERVENKA (2007).

<sup>506</sup>Cited in CERVENKA (2007) [author’s translation].

imports

The latter vital interest has been discussed above, whereas the third point is dependent on worldwide developments. The financial crisis hit Sweden hard, layoffs affecting the labour market and unemployment rising to 9,8 per cent in June 2009.<sup>507</sup> According to Statistics Sweden, industrial production dropped to its lowest level in at least 18 years in January 2009, when domestic and foreign demand fell as the global economy slowed.<sup>508</sup> Economy had a top priority during the Swedish 2009 EU presidency.

The first two interests will be discussed as they seem to be prioritised differently by the Swedish formulations of its foreign and security policy. The prevailing importance attached to the interest also depends on its topicality. Is there any threat in the present situation against the interest, or are there in fact possibilities to advance this interest? This question is decisive for a government's policy formulation. In times of solid international cooperation and a favourable economic development, a policy which promotes a general favourable world order seems more suitable. In contrast, the need to strengthen the defence to protect national survival seems less urgent. Conversely, in an international situation characterised by strong antagonisms, the importance of an interest is the opposite.<sup>509</sup> Tunberger et al. argue that Sweden has a strong national interest in contributing to a European and global development that returns to the cooperation which existed in the 1990s. A stable, collaborating and economic successful Europe is what Sweden needs. At the same time, it is in national interest to be able to avert and protect oneself in case of a more negative development. Hence, they describe two main components of Swedish national interests: to promote Swedish valuations in international relations on the one hand, and to defend and protect national freedom of action, self-determination and national survival on the other hand.<sup>510</sup> This to a large degree depends on the development of the international situation but also on how Swedish politics view their possibilities of influencing the development. Swedish ambitions have proved to be great on the European

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<sup>507</sup>Statistics Sweden, <http://www.scb.se/> (accessed 6 August 2009).

<sup>508</sup>Cited in Carlstrom, Johan (2009), *Bloomberg* 19 March. The success of Sweden's economic recovery has been described in chapter 3.4.2 of this part.

<sup>509</sup>TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 33.

<sup>510</sup>TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 33.

stage, and the Swedish assessment of the urgency of its national interests has prioritised the focusing on a favourable international development.

Furthermore, Sweden's *very important* interests are the following:

1. To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies
  - to work for continued respect for the international law of war as it is put down in the UN charta and the Geneva Convention.
2. To sustain and develop the relations with the US and cooperate closely with NATO and with it
  - to fight international terrorism,
  - to prevent the proliferation of WMD,
  - to fight international crime and
  - to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia.
3. To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with all neighbouring Baltic Sea and North Sea countries.
4. A future successful EU and with it
  - to maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia
  - to obtain political emphasis on Northern Europe
  - to fight international crime and environmental threats
  - to improve the situation within energy security
  - to increase economic stability
  - to contribute to a stable and positive development of the BSR
5. To forward Sweden's export and economic interests.

Sweden's interest portfolio does not have a global character to the same extent as the Norwegian, but Sweden as an export nation depends on global developments. Of Sweden's exports in 2011, Europe's share was 71,0 per cent (EU-27: 56,0; EMU-17: 37,7; others 15,0), whereas 3,8 percent of Sweden's exports went to Africa, 10,0 per cent to America, and 12,8 per cent to Asia. Oceania and Antarctica had an export share of 1,5 per cent. The shares of imports were the following (in percentage): 84,7 (Europe), 0,6 (Africa), 4,7 (America), 9,6 (Asia), and 0,4 (Oceania and Antarctica).<sup>511</sup> The value of Swedish exports amounted to

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<sup>511</sup>Statistics Sweden (2012) [http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_329692.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease_____329692.aspx)

SEK 1 213 billion (137,1 billion euro) in 2011, an increase of 7 per cent from 2010. Imports also increased by 7 per cent and amounted to SEK 1 141 billion (128,9 billion euro) which resulted in a net trade surplus of SEK 72 billion (8,1 billion euro).<sup>512</sup> Norway and Germany are the two markets that compete for being Sweden's largest which is rather fascinating due to the difference in population sizes. In the order of their percentage of total dollar value, Sweden's most important trade partners in 2011 were the following: Norway (10,61 per cent), Germany (10,2 per cent), the UK (7,45 per cent), Denmark (7,35 per cent), Finland (6,44 per cent), the US (6,36 per cent), France (5,05 per cent), and the Netherlands (4,67 per cent).<sup>513</sup> Sweden's most important export goods are machinery and transportation equipment and electrical/ electronic products. Sweden's major industrial sectors are telecommunications, transportation equipment, forest products, mechanical engineering and machinery, iron, steel and other fabricated metals, pharmaceuticals and food processing.<sup>514</sup> Through the country's EU membership, Sweden's trade premises are very good, as Europe is the most important market. The EU's foreign trade relations are also important to Sweden as an export nation. However, the further European development of solving the euro crisis and defeating recession is thus vital to Sweden's economic development. Germany is the most important country in this regard and thus vitally important to Sweden.

Further, compared to the EU, NATO seems in Sweden to be valued more for its global engagement and its value in regards to regional security is not considered to be high enough for Sweden to apply for a membership. Nevertheless, the importance of close relations with the US is essential to Sweden due to Russia's power in the BSR. Moreover, "to actively participate and contribute to a positive development of the EU" is important in many regards. A good example is the Swedish participation in EU missions, as the country seems to follow the logic that participation equals influence, which is comparable to Norway's logic, that participation in NATO operations equals support in the case of a crisis or war on Norwegian territory. Sweden has been a fervent participant in EU missions, as opposed to Denmark and Finland, and has volunteered to play an active role in

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<sup>512</sup>Statistics Sweden (2012) [http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_329692.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease_____329692.aspx)

<sup>513</sup>[http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco\\_exp\\_par-economy-exports-partners](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_exp_par-economy-exports-partners)

<sup>514</sup>Statistics Sweden (2012) [http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease\\_\\_\\_\\_\\_329692.aspx](http://www.scb.se/Pages/PressRelease_____329692.aspx)

Level Organ.	NATIONAL	REGIONAL	GLOBAL
USA NATO	To protect Sweden against political and military pressure and aggression (R)		A favourable international order, i.e. free trade
	<i>To sustain and develop the relations with the US and cooperate closely with NATO, and with it to</i> -maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia (R) -prevent Russian-German dominance of the BSR (R)		-fight international terrorism and crime -prevent the production of WMD
EUROPEAN UNION	To protect Sweden against political and military pressure and aggression (R,US)	A favourable international order, i.e. free trade	
	<i>A future successful European Union, and with it to</i> -fight international crime and environmental threats -forward Sweden's export and economic interests  -maintain and develop good bilateral relations with Russia (R) -obtain political emphasis on Northern Europe (R) -improve the situation of energy security (R) -contribute to a stable and positive development of the BSR (R)		
	<i>To maintain and develop good bilateral relations with all neighbouring Baltic Sea and North Sea countries</i>		
UN	<i>To maintain and develop a strong UN, which implies to work for continued respect for the international law of war (R,US)</i>		
NONE	To avoid a situation of vulnerability as regards energy imports (R)		To avoid a breakdown of the world's central trade and finance systems
	<i>To forward Sweden's export and economic interests</i>		

Table I.2.: Sweden's interest portfolio arranged due to international level, organisations of importance and reference to Russia (R), the EU (EU) and/or the USA (US). The interests are specified by the font as follows: *vital, very important.*

EU security policy from the very beginning. This is seen as a strategic possibility for a medium-sized state to gain international power and standing. Another factor was that Sweden did not want to make the impression of only taking interest in Northern Europe where its national interests are assumed to be but to take interest in areas which are important to the entire Union. Hence, Sweden enables itself to get to the “inner core” of the EU. If Sweden has ambitions to influence international crisis and conflict management according to its national interests, the ability of rapid reaction can constitute a significant “influence currency” according to Tunberger et al. In addition to the greater possibilities of influencing both aim and choice of the instruments applied, another aspect is that a state with a high international profile in crisis and conflict management “can expect greater solidarity from the other states if it is being threatened itself.”<sup>515</sup> The plausibility of this view will be challenged in the next chapter. Nevertheless, Swedish interests are to a greater extent than the Norwegian connected to gaining influence in the EU.

In table I.2, the disposition of Sweden’s interests is advanced. Compared to Norway, the UN does not seem equally vital to Sweden. The reasons are the absence of disputed international questions and the lack of responsibility for matters of international interest on Swedish territory, and the fact that Sweden is inside the EU. The EU is the framework of choice when Swedish interests are affected by either the US and Russia. The latter seems to affect Swedish interests equally frequently as Norwegian interests, although Norway and Sweden have different institutional frameworks in NATO and the EU. In turn, Norwegian interests seem to be more affected by both the US and the EU than what is the case with Sweden.<sup>516</sup>

There is no doubt that Sweden wishes to promote its political and economic interests along the southern coast of the Baltic Sea. As both Swedish economic and security interests are attached to the developments here, the regional aspect of Swedish economic and security interests will be highlighted in the following. As Kaliningrad is a good example because most aspects of the further develop-

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<sup>515</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 67 [author’s translation].

<sup>516</sup> See table I.1.



ment of the BSR are concerned, the problems and possibilities affiliated with the Russian exclave will be analysed. Here, Russia's relations with the EU and the possibilities and difficulties of integrating Russia in Europe become clear. At the same time, military developments in the BSR can be anticipated through Kaliningrad developments. Also, the Swedish policy on the BSR has to be seen in a European perspective, where the north often opposes the south in regards to political attention and economic resources. Regional cooperation is moreover to a large extent dependent on Moscow and Brussels and the political will here. The case of Kaliningrad is of great relevance as it shows the still existing borders in the BSR in regards to political, geographic, economic and mental developments. The future of the *oblast'* Kaliningrad is considered to have a substitute function for the superior European-Russian relationship. The options for Kaliningrad are either to become a Russian window to Europe or a Russian fortress in Europe. As figure I.3<sup>517</sup> shows, the Russian exclave is situated in the middle of EU and NATO territory. In addition, uncertainties regarding Russian military activity here, serious different problems of environmental character, poverty, bad conditions for economic development and HIV to mention some, have been facing Kaliningrad, which again impairs the security of the neighbouring states and the BSR in general. Kaliningrad's possibilities to develop are dependent on both Russia and the EU, but there is not much appreciation between Moscow and Brussels as Kaliningrad is concerned. Brussels has wanted to secure the EU area against negative influence from the Russian exclave, whereas Russia wishes to secure its integrity and Kaliningrad's possibilities as Russian territory. One Russian fear is that Kaliningrad might be absorbed by the EU. The chance of integration in the European economy through the EU enlargement depends on the Russian will to open up its exclave, but nothing indicates that Russia has any interest of doing so.

A solution to the border and visa question is decisive for how well Kaliningrad can function being a part of the BSR.<sup>518</sup> Russian laws are in force, but as an enclave in the EU, the area depends on the environment's conditions and influence to a larger extent than before. Brussels did not accept a "corridor solution" through

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<sup>517</sup> Accessed at <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=30942590>

<sup>518</sup> See chapter 2.2.2 of part III.



Figure I.3.: Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea Region. (Source: wikimedia.org)

the neighbouring Lithuania and Poland for the citizens of Kaliningrad without a visa. In 2001, Sweden's PM suggested an exceptional position for Kaliningrad in the EU but this was not realised with the new quasi-visa-regulation.<sup>519</sup>

The next consideration concerns the military character and uncertain aspects of demilitarisation associated with Kaliningrad, especially as the transport of gas is increasing in the BSR. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union, the number of military personnel in Kaliningrad was estimated to be between 100 000 and 120 000, including about 25 000 naval forces. Moreover though, Kaliningrad's 900 000 inhabitants were all more or less devoted to the functioning of the military area of Kaliningrad.<sup>520</sup> According to the IISS<sup>521</sup> the deployed ground forces in Kaliningrad went from 103 000 in 1993 to 10 500 in 2001.<sup>522</sup> The high degree of militarisation proved to be incompatible with the economic development of the 1990s. More autonomy from Moscow was wished for in order to transform

<sup>519</sup> A step in the right direction might be that the inhabitants of Kaliningrad no longer have to go to Moscow to get a German Schengen visa. There are 600 kilometers between Kaliningrad and Berlin whereas the distance between Kaliningrad and Moscow is twice as much - in the opposite direction. PLATH (2007).

<sup>520</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 178.

<sup>521</sup> International Institute for Strategic Studies

<sup>522</sup> Cited in CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 178.

Kaliningrad into a Hong Kong of the BSR. However, economic interests were not strong enough in comparison to the growing strategic value of the region following the EU and NATO memberships of the three Baltic states in 2004.

The questions remaining in regards to military developments are to what extent Kaliningrad is *de facto* demilitarised, and whether or not nuclear weapons are situated here. As Chillaud and Tetart state,

“it would be highly doubtful that Russia unilaterally demilitarizes Kaliningrad - even if the country were to decide unilaterally to demilitarize, it would be a moratorium without legal value. The only thinkable pattern would have been to set up such [a] zone bilaterally (with NATO) or multilaterally (with Poland and Lithuania).”<sup>523</sup>

The topic of demilitarisation and the demand for it by the exclave’s neighbours became acute with the crash of a Russian SU-27 fighter which violated Lithuanian air space in September 2005. Moreover, Russian warplanes shuttling to and from Kaliningrad are responsible for most violations of NATO airspace. A demilitarisation of Kaliningrad, whether *de jure* or *de facto* is obviously not on Russia’s agenda.<sup>524</sup> On the contrary, then-president Medvedev announced in a November 2008 speech to the Russian parliament the possible storage of Iskander missiles<sup>525</sup> in Kaliningrad as a result of the encroachment of NATO to Russia’s border and the planned US antimissile defence in eastern Europe. After the US’ decision to abandon the anti-missile defence in eastern Europe, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin, stated that Russia will not store missiles in Kaliningrad either. However, the exclave is strategically important because NATO keeps enlarging. Furthermore, Kaliningrad is the only part of Western Russia that is not bound by the “flank” restrictions of the CFE Treaty, limiting troop redeployments.<sup>526</sup> The military activity of the Baltic Fleet could also increase as a result of the gas supply line passing through the Baltic Sea.

Further, the question of a denuclearisation of Kaliningrad is uncertain. According to rumours, Moscow chose Kaliningrad as destination in the beginning of the 1990s for the relocation of nuclear weapons from former Warsaw Pact countries

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<sup>523</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 173.

<sup>524</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 174.

<sup>525</sup> Iskander is a surface-to-surface missile with an operating distance of 415 kilometres.

<sup>526</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 177.

to the Russian mainland. An article by the Washington Times published in January 2001 indicated that Russia had transferred short-range tactical nuclear missiles to Kaliningrad six months earlier. The accusations have never been proven. Another point is that Russia has no legal obligation to restrain itself as Kaliningrad is Russian territory and has never been formally denuclearised.<sup>527</sup> Rumours further indicate that Kaliningrad has a tactical (not strategic) nuclear storage site with some land-based missiles and some nuclear warheads for artillery (SS21). However, it is not clear if the storage sites in Kaliningrad are full or empty, which can be an asset from a Russian point of view.<sup>528</sup>

#### **4.2.2. Factors of strategic importance and threat perceptions**

The importance of a state's geography can be influenced by political changes in neighbouring states and by developments of strategic importance. Sweden's geographic location does not imply that the country has the same level of strategic importance to the great powers as Norway does due to its long coastline. Sweden does not have any natural resources of strategic importance comparable to oil and gas either. However, the strategic importance of the Nordic region in general due to global energy interests and the transport routes of these resources might also increase the interest in Sweden.

The BSR is the decisive region for Swedish security and strategic interests. For several hundred years, a pattern has developed in the Baltic Sea where the strongest regional powers have tried to make it a *Mare Clausum* under their control. Their challenger among the great powers have traditionally tried to counteract such a dominance by securing the sea as a *Mare Liberum*. The latter variant is compatible with Swedish interests. The trade across the Baltic Sea has been intensified and new trade patterns have been created after the end of the East-West conflict. Sweden as an exporting nation has profited from the new trade situation. Sweden is thus dependent on developments in the neighbouring Baltic Sea littoral states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany,

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<sup>527</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), p. 176.

<sup>528</sup> CHILLAUD/ TETART (2007), pp. 176-177.

Poland and Russia. The BSR has with the enlargements of the EU and NATO become integrated into European and Euro-Atlantic security structures. In 2003, the Swedish Defence Commission described the situation as follows:

“The development and deepening of relations between Russia and the United States, the EU and NATO has contributed substantially to the improved situation. The Baltic Sea countries are not just in a new security policy environment; they also enter into an integrated system of European cooperation now, where it is very difficult to imagine a serious threat to the security of one state that does not also concern the other states in our part of Europe. (...) The conditions for meeting common threats and challenges in our immediate vicinity will improve when all the countries around the Baltic Sea participate in shaping the European Union’s common policy, in close partnership with Russia. (...) Sweden’s security will also be enhanced as a result.”<sup>529</sup>

The picture drawn by the Swedish Defence Commission in several reports is that security is threatened mainly by an insecure world and to a lesser extent by developments in the vicinity. Nonetheless, Sweden’s strategic situation is primarily decided by regional developments, not least by Russian developments, and the war in Georgia was met with deep concern and was food for thought in Sweden. A factor of strategic importance to Sweden and the BSR is the lack of ability to integrate Russia and its western regions, and Kaliningrad in particular. Security-building cooperation has little sense in the BSR if Russia is not a part of it, be it in the frame of the EU, NATO or other regional cooperation. According to many experts, Swedish security can only be won through cooperation with other states, above all within the EU, but also through NATO.<sup>530</sup> This is a new turn in Swedish security policy thinking, in contrast to what was prevalent during the East-West conflict. However, as long as these two organisations are not capable of including Russia when it comes to security policy, such cooperation can not take place.

The geopolitics of energy, and Russia’s role within it, has strategic implications for Sweden as well. Russia gradually becomes more military capable of handling enemies outside the former Soviet Union by “strategic irruptions”. According to Leijonhielm, this also applies to Sweden, if its security policy stays the same.<sup>531</sup>

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<sup>529</sup> SWEDISH DEFENCE COMMISSION (2003), p. 3.

<sup>530</sup> HULDT (2005), p. 9.

<sup>531</sup> LEIJONHIELM (2007), p. 11.

Moreover, the negative developments in Russia in regards to democracy, human rights, freedom of NGO's etc., combined with Russia's aim to regain its position as a superpower, implies a reevaluation of Sweden's strategic situation that also questions the policy of military non-alignment. Finland, which due to a clear public majority against NATO membership will probably not join NATO in the nearest future, has experiences with the great Russian neighbour that may be of value to Sweden, as well as Norway.<sup>532</sup> Finland is the only Nordic country keeping a territorial defence with a maximum wartime strength of about 350 000 people (2008). The strength of the Army is 240 000, the Air Force 38 000 and the Navy 28 000.<sup>533</sup> The country also cooperates closely with NATO. Finland's strategic thinking seems to be stable and not formed by strategy cycles or changing trends of security policy. There are reasons to believe that Finland's historical experiences with the great neighbour have led to a greater understanding of "realpolitik" compared to Norway and Sweden, in addition to a greater understanding of Russia's strategic thinking. According to statements made by Nikolai Makarov, chief of the general staff of the armed forces of Russia and deputy minister of defence, Finland's participation in NATO's military exercises constitutes a military threat to Russia's security. Moreover, he presented a map of the planned missile defence in Europe. Here, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were marked as "Russia's sphere of interest".<sup>534</sup> Thus Finland at least has a very clear basis for action and strategy.

Finland's then-supreme commander of the armed forces, admiral Kaskeala, stated in 2007 that "Norden", i.e. Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, has probably nothing to fear from the Russians. However, the possibility of single episodes grows with Russia's operative ability.<sup>535</sup> The increase of energy

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<sup>532</sup>The Ribbentrop-Molotov German-Soviet non-aggression pact of August 1939 allocated Finland, along with Latvia and Estonia, to the Soviet sphere of influence, and Stalin opened the Winter War when the Soviet Union attacked Finland on 30 November 1939. 25 000 Finns died in the Winter War, which lasted until the Peace Treaty of 12 March 1940 was signed, and the entire Karelian peninsula in southeastern Finland was transferred to the Soviet Union. During the Continuation War against the Soviet Union from 1941 to 1944, Finland fought as a co-belligerent with Nazi Germany. As a precondition of the armistice with Stalin in 1944 the Finns agreed to remove the German troops from Finnish soil.

<sup>533</sup> PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION OF THE FINNISH DEFENCE COMMAND (2008), p. 6. The real employees of the Finnish Armed Forces are about 8800 soldiers and about 7200 civilians (2008).

<sup>534</sup>Cited in DRAGNES (2012B).

<sup>535</sup>Cited in FYHN (2007B).

transports in the Baltic Sea is seen as a key factor in this regard. In the view of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Finnish Parliament, the Baltic Sea and the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland are attaining an increasingly important strategic position. The main reason for this is that Russia is increasing the use of its terminals on the far end of the Gulf of Finland.<sup>536</sup> The Nord Stream pipeline has its initial point at the end of this gulf (see figure I.2). Russian plans are to nearly double the exports of oil through the Primorsk oil terminal at the eastern end of the Gulf of Finland.<sup>537</sup> The risk of a terrorist attack might of course be the most important reason for the increased Russian military activity in the Baltic Sea. The protection of energy interests will, however, enhance the strategic relevance of Finland and Sweden. Moreover, A gas pipeline through the Kola peninsula down to Vyborg which connects to the planned Nord Stream pipeline is also intended (see figure I.2). The plans also imply to lay the pipeline between the Danish island Bornholm and the South Swedish region of Skåne.<sup>538</sup> A transport system may be built up capable of transporting about 100 million tons of fossil products in 2015. The increasing importance of energy supply thus implies more attention, increased deployment of armed forces due to the fear of terrorist attacks and competition. Sea transport, pipelines and harbours are vulnerable, and the risk of terrorist attacks could close down the whole transport system. This, in addition to the general developments in Russia, leads some of Sweden's military analysts to stress a renewed focus on domestic and regional defence.

A regional focus of the armed forces would have to be combined with a closer alliance with the US in order to be able to discipline Russia if this would become necessary. The greater Sweden's military capacity is and the closer the alignment with the US, the greater are the potential costs of political and military pressure against Sweden. For the time being, Russia's ability to discipline Sweden is not significant but could increase if Sweden's dependency on Russian energy increases. The membership of the EU gives Sweden a multilateral framework for its relations with Russia. However, the EU can not save Sweden from an eventual vulnerability

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<sup>536</sup> HELSINGIN SANOMAT (2007).

<sup>537</sup> HELSINGIN SANOMAT (2007).

<sup>538</sup> Sveriges Radio (2007): "Gasledning mellan Bornholm och Skåne", 22 August 2007 at <http://www.sr.se> (accessed 23 August 2007).

from dependence on Russian energy, and neither from the lacking ability to defend its territory. An argument against an enforced focus on domestic issues of the Swedish armed forces is that Sweden can not tackle a threat alone in case of a worsening of the security situation. Hence, more cooperation and integration with other states is the solution. Widman argues that this is impossible if Sweden, as the only European country focuses on a military invasion from Russia. Rather, the experience from international operations, that are taking place in a very tough environment, is the best instrument to gain defence capacity. The international operations should in this capacity dimension the Swedish defence.<sup>539</sup>

“And if we now are afraid that Russia in twenty years will have a military capability which can challenge the West, there is an apparent and immediate way to strengthen our safety: A Swedish membership in NATO.”<sup>540</sup>

However, it is not given that the interests and strategies of the US and NATO are compatible with Swedish interests - or Norwegian for that matter. The need to have a national ability to defend one's country until allied help arrives is thus still essential as the allies do not always have the same interest in defending a partner's territory. Sweden is to a larger extent than Norway a middle-sized state with higher ambitions of international influence. Sweden's historical role in the Baltic Sea area can to some extent explain this. However, being in the EU's inner circle, and engagement beyond the national interests of the proximate areas, do not automatically improve Sweden's security situation.

Rather than bilateral Swedish-Russian conflicts, the troublesome relations between the Baltic states and Russia is likely to be the largest security risk in the BSR and thus to Swedish security. Should a situation occur where military assistance to the Baltic states is needed, this requires a leading role for Sweden. The question is how both the EU and NATO can contribute to improving the situation, and what role they could play in case conflicts militarise. Another aspect is the Swedish interest of influencing the development both inside the EU and through NATO. Instability and crisis in the BSR are likely to be interlinked with the security of three Baltic states. To actively contribute to a stable region is an obvious Swedish interest, and Sweden has actively supported Baltic

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<sup>539</sup> WIDMAN (2007).

<sup>540</sup> WIDMAN (2007) [author's translation].



sovereignty since the early 1990s. The Baltic States' memberships in NATO were highly compatible with Swedish interests as Sweden had no desire to carry a larger responsibility for their security. This was shown in chapter 3.2. However, the future vitality of NATO is not given.<sup>541</sup> Signs furthermore indicate that the alliance wants the Baltic states to concentrate a large part of its military priorities on certain niche capabilities that would be useful in NATO led international operations. This, however, implies that the resources available for national "threshold defence" are minimised. If instability or a crisis with military components should occur in the Baltic states, military reinforcement arriving too early could make the situation worse. A refraining from undertaking measures could on the other hand create an even more unstable situation. This dilemma would be reinforced by the weak defence ability of the Baltic states, which accentuates the need of a rapid reinforcement.<sup>542</sup> An alternative would according to Tunberger et al. be EU action or a "Coalition of the Willing", that could accomplish a "preventive deployment" with a long-term political profile. This would also be the result if NATO loses its importance.<sup>543</sup> In such a scenario, it would be in Sweden's interest to both contribute to a stabilised situation, and to a largest possible extent influence other states which participate in crisis management by means of military contribution. In a security political fragmented Europe a situation would even be plausible where Swedish initiatives are decisive for the deployment of an international operation.<sup>544</sup> In a regional crisis, the military value that Sweden could offer would naturally be larger than in military operations in distant areas. Air and naval forces based in Sweden would thus be able to support the deployed forces. The Swedish defence forces should therefore be able to "accomplish a time limited power effort significant to an international operation in the proximate areas."<sup>545</sup>

US support would be necessary in order to outbalance Russia in the BSR. An alliance with the US is thus necessary regardless of the future development of NATO. Sweden then needs to develop good connections with the US and be

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<sup>541</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 73.

<sup>542</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 73.

<sup>543</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 73.

<sup>544</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), pp. 73-74.

<sup>545</sup> TUNBERGER/ BLOMQVIST/ ANDERSSON/ GRANHOLM (2004), p. 74 [author's translation].

willing to contribute to secure its own vicinity. Sweden's strength is its defence industry and its contribution to the Nordic neighbours' defences. A Nordic defence cooperation would thus be a step in the right direction for Sweden. In addition, several factors indicate the necessity of a Swedish NATO membership. The argument that the EU can guarantee Swedish security is dismantled by Liljgren, who was Sweden's ambassador in Washington from 1993 to 1997 and is the current chairman of the Swedish Atlantic Committee. He questions not only Europe's ability but also the will to defend northern Europe, as the EU has shown weak interest in strategic aspects of European security.<sup>546</sup> Since the end of the Second World War, the main reason for Swedish non-alignment has been not to provoke Russia. Interestingly, Russia's former ambassador in Helsinki, Derjabin, stated that it is only a question of time before Sweden and Finland join NATO. "We are about to getting used to what is happening. We can't do anything to prevent it. Those times are gone. But we don't like it."<sup>547</sup>

Sweden's largest problem seems in fact to be its inability to make choices in regards to security policy, and compared to Norway and Finland which pursue predictable security and defence policies, Sweden rather makes its security policy very anonymous. The country cooperates closely with NATO but does not want to join the alliance. The close cooperation was probably also given during the Cold War, and the phobia against siding with someone became very clear during World War II when Swedish policy shifted with the turning point of the war.<sup>548</sup>

### 4.2.3. The strategic environment

In contrast to Norway, Sweden is itself a part of the southern component of the Nordic power triangle. As the Baltic states are integrated both in the EU and NATO, Sweden and Finland's lack of NATO membership probably reduces their role in the BSR security policy. The power triangle of Northern Europe has moreover a variant in the BSR where Germany is a decisive factor in the EU corner of the triangle. Germany's ability to combine a good relationship with

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<sup>546</sup> LILJEGREN (2007).

<sup>547</sup> Cited in FYHN (2007C).

<sup>548</sup> See chapter 3 of this part.

Russia on the one hand and the ability to act solidly united with e.g. the Baltic states and make the EU speak with one voice on the other hand, is decisive for the strategic situation in the BSR. Russia has been able to split up the EU in regards to energy security. Disputes between Russia and its neighbours in the BSR is a strategic challenge to Swedish foreign policy. The US influence in the BSR stabilises the situation somewhat as the security of the Baltic states and Poland has another focal point. Their fear is rather that the EU may uncouple itself from NATO. From a Swedish point of view, it is not positive that Russia and Germany develop too strong of a partnership, and an increased US influence in the BSR would again strengthen the influence of the smaller states of the BSR. A Swedish, or Finnish, membership in NATO would increase this influence even more. Of course, the relationship with Russia could be worsened for a period of time.

Unlike the scarcely populated Barents Sea Region, the BSR is characterised by several different cultural influences. The littoral states are situated close to each other and their relations go far back in history. Thus the review of some historical aspects will be undertaken in order to clarify some of the region's current conflict lines and relations. Subsequently, the failing ability of the EU to integrate Russia's western regions in European cooperation will be discussed.

The era of the German culture begun in the early 13th century. The Hanseatic cities, with Lübeck in front, controlled the Baltic Sea trade from Flanders to Novgorod. The relations across the Baltic Sea were not solely economic, but also developed political power factors. The Hanseatic influence was strengthened through German settlement in the eastern parts of the Baltic Sea area in the 12th and 13th century. Hence, rivalries occurred between the German cities and the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden. The influence of German merchants prevailed, whereas the German order of knights conquered Gdansk and Pomerania in 1308 and German settlers came to the region. On the other hand, through the personal union with Lithuania of 1386, Poland was strengthened and the German order of knights was finally beaten in 1410. Poland-Lithuania was a relative significant factor for about 150 years, whereas Sweden was to become the dominating power factor, as its political consolidations started already in the



Figure I.4.: The Baltic Sea Region. (Source: nordregio.se)

beginning of the 13th century. The Western parts of Russia were not experiencing the same rise of power, as their power position was weakened by the invasion of the Mongolians.<sup>549</sup> The Swedish possessions were significant. Between 1560 and 1658, Sweden created a Baltic empire centered on the Gulf of Finland and included the provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Estonia, and Livonia. During the Thirty Years War Sweden gained tracts in Germany as well, including Western Pomerania, Wismar, the Duchy of Bremen, and Verden. In 1645 and 1658, Sweden conquered Danish provinces north of the Sound (1645 and 1658).

In the Great Nordic War (1700-21), Sweden's supremacy was threatened through the alliance of Russia, Denmark-Norway and Poland-Saxony.<sup>550</sup> Sweden was beaten by Russia in the battle of Poltava in 1709 and the defeat significantly contributed to Sweden's final defeat. By 1720 Sweden had lost its north German possessions to Hanover and Prussia. Nevertheless, Swedish influence had been significant: Karl XII ruled over Saxony for a short period in 1704. The southern coast of the Baltic Sea was Swedish territory for a short period. West Pomerania-

<sup>549</sup> KLINGE (1994), p. 32.

<sup>550</sup> Prussia and Hanover joined the coalition from 1715. Sweden on the other hand was helped by the Ottoman empire.

nia was a Swedish province from 1648 to 1815, which was a longer period than the Prussian one later on. And finally, the city of Wismar formally belonged to Sweden until 1903.

Russia with the new capital of St. Petersburg replaced Sweden as the dominant power of the Baltic Sea and became the new great power of the region. Sweden lost Finland to Russia in 1809, and after the Congress of Vienna in 1814 the Russian empire ruled over the entire eastern part of the Baltic Sea from the Finnish-Swedish border along the Finnish coast to Ingermanland, and from Estonia and Livonia to the area of Königsberg (East Prussia).<sup>551</sup>

During the first decade of the 20th century, six new states were created or recreated: Norway, Finland, Estonia, Livonia, Lithuania and Poland. The weakness of Russia and Germany after the First World War contributed significantly to the consolidation of the new states. The peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Russia and the Central Powers created a *cordon sanitaire* which isolated Russia from the rest of Europe. Furthermore, a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles was that Germany had to abandon the area between Pomerania and the river Visla (West Pomerania) in order to provide Poland access to the Baltic Sea. The Polish corridor thus divided the city of Danzig (Gdansk) and East Prussia from the German Reich. However, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 between Germany and the Soviet Union divided Eastern Europe into their respective spheres of interest. After the German defeat in 1945, Estonia, Livonia and Lithuania had become Soviet republics, whereas Finland kept its sovereignty. Extensive “resettlements” and banishments took place, especially in East Prussia and Lower Pomerania. The Soviet Union annexed Königsberg, that changed its name to Kaliningrad. During the Cold War, the communication between the western and eastern parts of the Baltic Sea area was reduced to a very low level, a situation which did not change until the end of the Cold War.

Thus, except for some periods of Danish or Swedish expansions, the BSR has been characterised by German or Russian dominance, which was only limited through periodical interventions of the so called sea powers Holland, England and, during the Cold War, the US. These interventions led to a certain protection for the

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<sup>551</sup> KLINGE (1994), p. 17.

smaller states of the region. The situation in 1989-91 was unique as both Germany and Russia had limited interest and small opportunities to act in the BSR. This vacuum implied possibilities for the smaller states, i.e. the Nordic states, Poland and the Baltic states, to act on their own. This was also encouraged by the Clinton administration. Today, the Russian need of a “European window”, i.e. access to the Baltic Sea, is possible because of its exclave Kaliningrad. For Russia’s neighbours in the BSR, security questions are related to Russia. German influence, which formed the region for more than seven hundred years, has significantly declined.

Unlike the historical relations of the Baltic Sea area, that stayed regionally rooted, the current conflict lines of the BSR can not be defined solely by regional factors. The US influence in the BSR has increased through the NATO memberships of the Baltic States and Poland. Russia disliked the eastern enlargement of NATO but had no choice but accepting it. Both the EU and the US are decisive factors in determining the security policy and integration policy in Europe generally, as well as in the BSR. Brussels and Washington are the key points of reference, although the US has not been a geographic or historical factor here. The increasing influence of NATO in the BSR and the security of e.g. the Baltic states on the one hand has to be balanced with the ability of NATO and the EU to consider Russian interests and fears on the other hand. The US plans of an antimissile defence in Eastern Europe, somewhat moderated by president Obama, are only the latest example of the Western indifference to Russia’s interests since the end of the East-West conflict. The question is how the security of Russia’s neighbours can be protected and at the same time making sure Russia is not ignored. The question is also how Russia can become an equal partner of NATO. The preconditions after the Cold War were good as the Warsaw pact was dissolved. The other defence alliance, however, continued to structure the developments in Europe. The West has ever since been unable to include Russia, which is now turning into a difficult partner for both NATO and the EU. A military threat is non-existent but Russia is using its power for what it is worth to regain its old power position. It is in Russia’s interest to make sure its new energy empire is secure. This to a large extent involves and affects the BSR.

The relations between the EU and Russia largely take place in the BSR. With the EU memberships of the three Baltic states and Poland, all Baltic Sea littoral states except Russia are inside the EU.<sup>552</sup> The EU's external borders were adjusted to the east and thus Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova represent the border regions. The question is how the EU can integrate e.g. Russia's western regions. This is decisive for the further development of the BSR. The BSR's triangular pattern includes EU members, aspiring EU members like the Ukraine and Georgia, and Russia as the EU's "strategic partner". As the perspective of a Russian membership of the EU is not even being discussed given the size of the country, the institutional border of the BSR might grow even tighter. The potential of the BSR lies in Russia's resources and manpower, the transit routes of the Baltic states and the financial and technological base of the EU.<sup>553</sup> In order to exploit this potential, barriers as customs, visa, different legal norms and different infrastructure has to be abolished, and the precondition for this is a positive political partnership between the EU and Russia, a solid Eastern Policy of the CFSP, and integration prospects for Eastern Europe, i.e. the Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova. An important criteria for the EU memberships of 2004 was the technical-administrative security of the new member states' eastern borders in order to prevent problems like organised crime and illegal migration. The Schengen agreement foresees visa for Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian citizens. The Schengen border complicates the relations with e.g. Russia's western regions. A clarifying example of the region's position within the EU are the EU priorities for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) compared to the Balkans. The EU projects earmarked Eastern Europe for the year 2003 amounted to 94 million euro (Russia), 48 million euro (Ukraine) and 20 million euro (Moldova). The budget for the Balkans was 775 million euro.<sup>554</sup> Thus the gravity of the EU's neighbourhood policy becomes clear. Kempe and van Meurs further show the lacking mechanisms of the EU in regards to security and stability in the CIS area and ask for concepts and capacities beyond the enlargement policy.<sup>555</sup> Duleba asks why the EU has not yet developed any regional strategy

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<sup>552</sup>Here, Norway and Iceland are not considered to be Baltic Sea countries, although they are members of the CBSS.

<sup>553</sup> TRENIN (2000), p. 67.

<sup>554</sup> KEMPE/ VAN MEURS (2002), p. 33.

<sup>555</sup> KEMPE/ VAN MEURS (2002), pp. 35-37.

towards Eastern Europe:

“This is especially intriguing since the EU has developed its regional strategies towards Southern neighbours - the Mediterranean Region (covering twelve countries) and the countries of the Western Balkans. It seems reasonable for the EU - if it wants to be more capable of pursuing its own interests in Eastern Europe - to develop its regional policy in addition to the existing bilateral frameworks of its relations with East European countries.”<sup>556</sup>

The EU therefore needs a new Eastern policy. The first point is that the existing EU policies towards the eastern neighbourhood was formulated before the entry of the Central and Eastern European countries that border this region. Secondly, the CFSP is not possible without an effective Eastern policy as the EU will never become a major player in world politics if it fails to be one in Europe. Duleba considers the most challenging deficit in the existing framework of the EU’s approach to the Eastern neighbours to be the discrepancy between goals and instruments. Another point is that the EU’s energy dialogue with Russia should not take place without the other East European countries.<sup>557</sup>

The Northern Dimension of the EU (EUND), initiated by the Finnish presidency and turning into EU policy in 1998, could be a project with potential success in this regard if there is also a political will behind the projects from the “heavier” EU members and the European Commission, and is strongly supported by Sweden. The EUND is not strictly geographically defined and places much emphasis on cross-border cooperation with Russia. Furthermore, the European Commission adopted a Communication on the EU Strategy for the BSR on 10 June 2009, which is the first time a comprehensive strategy, covering several Community policies, is targeted on a ‘macro-region’. The aims of the strategy will be to make the BSR a. environmentally sustainable (e.g. reducing pollution in the sea), b. prosperous, c. accessible and attractive (e.g. better transport links) and d. safe and secure.<sup>558</sup> The Baltic Sea strategy is a priority of the Swedish EU presidency of 2009. This shows that Nordic countries inside the EU can successfully promote

<sup>556</sup> DULEBA (2005), p. 11.

<sup>557</sup> DULEBA (2005), pp. 8-11.

<sup>558</sup> Commission of the European Communities (2009) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region* COM (2009) 248 final.



regional initiatives. However, in order to influence the regional development, support from at least one significant European power is needed. This is where Germany's importance to Sweden's is great. The question is whether the BSR is a heavy enough priority for Germany compared to other European regions. Moreover, a real breakthrough in the EU-Russia relations should not be expected as long as Russian politics dominate Russian economics.

#### 4.2.4. The necessity of political and military allies

Sweden's need for allies can be linked with the discussion on Swedish NATO membership and Sweden's place in the Euro-Atlantic security community. As shown above, Sweden's reforms of its armed forces completely rely on the integration with other states' armed forces, based on NATO standards. The Swedish defence forces alone can not defend Sweden against a substantial attack. The perception that the EU will develop to a new defence alliance in Europe is unrealistic as the EU's strategic direction is unclear. Moreover, 75 per cent of the EU's member states are also NATO members and therefore allied to e.g. the US.<sup>559</sup> As Winnerstig emphasises, it is the nation states and not the common institutions which are the key players within security policy. Their different national interests are still decisive.<sup>560</sup> Thus

“the EU will not ‘take over’ NATO’s role as the main military entity in Europe. The Swedish military leadership can thus not count on EU cover for the reductions of our own defence: As a consequence, the Swedish non-aligned security policy becomes unsustainable both in theory and practice. Military non-alignment has always presupposed a real independent defence capability: the environment must continuously rely on that the non-aligned state is able to protect its territory even against substantial attacks. However, our defence is now transformed to almost solely handling international crises abroad.”<sup>561</sup>

As the assertion of sovereignty becomes more important to all the Nordic countries as a result of the increased importance of Europe's High North, this may be one of the reasons for the plans of a mutual defence cooperation between Sweden,

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<sup>559</sup> WINNERSTIG (2006).

<sup>560</sup> WINNERSTIG (2006).

<sup>561</sup> WINNERSTIG (2006) [author's translation].

Norway and Finland.<sup>562</sup> This is positive as the national and regional dimension of defence policy has been neglected in Sweden since the defence reforms started.<sup>563</sup> Finland's former FM Kanerva stated that there are no questions regarding foreign or security policy that can not be discussed between the three countries. According to current defence minister and then-Norwegian state secretary of the Defence Ministry, Barth Eide, Nordic security cooperation is about practical cooperation where the formal memberships of organisations is less important.<sup>564</sup> This might be of minor importance to Nordic cooperation, although Haaland Matlary remarks that Nordic defence cooperation without supranational control through NATO and the EU would be to prefer an ad-hoc solution and hope for the best.<sup>565</sup> Again, however, there is no mutual defence guarantee in writing, and thus the defence cooperation is not really much worth despite the cost savings. A common defence declaration would however change this picture although Nordic cooperation alone will hardly be sufficient to secure Sweden against a substantial attack. Sweden is firmly rooted in the EU and has the security benefits of this, but Sweden can not rely on EU cover for the cutbacks of the Swedish defence either, as there is no formal European guarantee for the security of other members. It is a proximate assumption that Sweden needs a military guarantee from the US, which is the only state capable of this. In order to achieve such a guarantee, Sweden would however have to make a choice in regards to its status as non-aligned and leave its anonymous security policy. As Sweden has chosen to turn around its military strategy, the basis for non-alignment has vanished. In order to obtain a second security anchor, Sweden needs to join NATO to approach the US.

The arguments for a Swedish NATO membership have been summarised by Liljegren, here appearing abbreviated:

1. "Better protection for Swedish territory. If we become the object of threats other members will be expected to come to our assistance according to Article 5. Most important is the transatlantic link to the US and Canada.
2. Better possibilities to influence our own and the region's security through participation in the decision making of NATO.

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<sup>562</sup>See chapter 3.3 of part I.

<sup>563</sup> ERICSSON/MOORE (2007).

<sup>564</sup>Cited in FYHN (2007A).

<sup>565</sup> HAALAND MATLARY (2007).

3. Better insight in and influence over planning at an early stage of NATO-led operations in which Swedish personnel participate.
4. Better economy for the Swedish defence.
5. Better conditions in many cases for Swedish weapon exports.
6. Better conditions for active participation in the transatlantic security policy dialogue and for influencing the coordination between the EU and NATO.
7. Better possibility to influence the dialogue between NATO and Russia.
8. Better possibility to demonstrate our solidarity with those who stand up for western values such as democracy and human rights. In addition it can be argued that Sweden has a moral duty to extend the same security guarantees as EU members who are also members of NATO have extended to Sweden.”<sup>566</sup>

As shown in chapter 4.1.4 of this part, however, NATO can hardly be named a defence alliance anymore and has problems defining its aims.

The Reinfeldt government has actually given some signs of a new thinking in Swedish security policy. The Statement of Government Policy of 19 September 2007 left the regular element in every Swedish government statement out, i.e. the declaration that Sweden is non-aligned. This can not have been a coincidence. Nevertheless a Swedish membership application to NATO is hardly probable in the near future as this can only be applied for with the support of the Social Democrats. The Swedish Social Democrats generally oppose a NATO membership, and the public scepticism is still hard to ignore. It is nevertheless interesting that former leader of the Social Democratic Party and then-member of the Defence Commission, Håkan Juholt, suggested to drop the non-alignment, which is not the same as joining NATO, in order to increase the possibilities of cooperation with Sweden’s neighbours.<sup>567</sup>

### 4.3. Conclusions

Table I.3 shows the strategic challenges and opportunities *facing Norway’s foreign policy*, which all have Europe’s high north and the Barents Sea as their common

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<sup>566</sup> LILJEGREN (2007).

<sup>567</sup> Cited in STENBERG(2007).

denominator. The first apparent conclusion of the table is that Norway's challenges are far more numerous than the opportunities, and that the latter are almost solely found in the power potential of Norway's energy resources. On the other hand, although the opportunities are fewer, the power of those should not be underestimated. The challenges and opportunities which will prove to be those Norway has to handle alone are accentuated.

Table I.4 shows an overview of Sweden's strategic challenges and opportunities facing its foreign policy. Sweden's strategic opportunities seem to be found in more realms than what is the case with Norway, due to Sweden's membership in the EU. Sweden's challenges are to a very large extent connected to Russia, although not so much in a bilateral as rather in a regional context. The opportunities and challenges that can and must be handled by Swedish governments alone are accentuated.

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS OF STRATEGIC RELEVANCE					
	ENORMOUS NATURAL RESOURCES (OIL AND GAS)	ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS	SECURITY POLICY SITUATION	THE ARCTIC REGION	JURISDICTION OF THE SEA AREAS AROUND SVALBARD
CHALLENGES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Geopolitics of oil and gas in general</li> <li>•Scarce global oil and gas resources' impact on the jurisdictional amount of the Barents Sea</li> <li>•Russia as a competitor on oil and gas (pricing pressure, market shares)</li> <li>•Other states' (conflictive) energy interests in the high north</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Nuclear facilities and pollution sources in northwest Russia</li> <li>•Retired submarines, nuclear-powered icebreakers, nuclear fuel, nuclear waste, dumped waste, nuclear accidents</li> <li>•Arctic climate change</li> <li>•Oil and gas transport in the Barents Sea and along the Norwegian coastline</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Integration of Russia in the Western security community</li> <li>•Nuclear-powered submarines and warships operating from naval bases on the Kola peninsula</li> <li>•Future development of NATO</li> <li>•Being outside the European Union</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Increasing importance for global politics</li> <li>•International cooperation</li> <li>•Great power interests vs. Norwegian interests</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Number of parties involved</li> <li>•Lacking support for Norway's administration of the "Barents Sea North" (the Fishery protection zone)</li> <li>•Problematic relationship between Norwegian claims and the limited capacity to act as a small state</li> </ul>
OPPORTUNITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Security of energy supply (Europe, North America)</li> <li>•Proximity to the European and North American markets, Norway's position in these markets</li> <li>•Key to more independence from Russia for some European states</li> <li>•Know-how as regards the further developments of the oil and gas business in the Arctic areas</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Political stability, low level of tension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Member of the Arctic Council; influence on arctic developments</li> </ul>	

Table I.3.: Challenges and opportunities facing Norwegian foreign policy.

THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS OF STRATEGIC RELEVANCE					
	SCARCE ENERGY RESOURCES	ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS	SECURITY POLICY SITUATION	THE BALTIC SEA REGION	MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
CHALLENGES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Increasing dependence on energy imports</li> <li>•High sensitivity and high dependence vis-à-vis Russia</li> <li>•Great competition for energy resources and failing capability of common EU energy policy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Nuclear facilities in Sweden and the BSR</li> <li>•Increasing transport of fossil fuels in the Baltic Sea and along the Swedish coast</li> <li>•Pollution of the Baltic Sea</li> <li>•Nuclear power plants as alternatives to dependence on electricity imports</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Integration of Russia in the Western security community</li> <li>•Russia's relations with the Baltic Sea littoral states</li> <li>•The Nord Stream pipeline; increasing Russian military activity</li> <li>•<i>Being outside NATO</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Failing integration of Russia's westernmost regions</li> <li>•Kaliningrad</li> <li>•Russia's relationship with the Baltic states</li> <li>•Energy as a Russian foreign policy tool</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Bilateral strategies on energy cooperation in the EU</li> <li>•Swedish interests vs. influence as a small state</li> </ul>
OPPORTUNITIES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•<i>Situated in the neighbourhood of Europe's second largest supplier of natural gas</i></li> <li>•<i>Proximity to the North Sea and Barents Sea regions</i></li> <li>•<i>Nordic cooperation as key to more independence from Russia</i></li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Political stability, low level of tension</li> <li>•Being inside the EU</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Swedish possibilities of economic and political influence</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>•Multilateral frame boosting Sweden's relations with e.g. Russia</li> <li>•East-West integration in the BSR and in general</li> <li>•Enhanced possibilities for Swedish economy</li> </ul>

Table I.4.: Challenges and opportunities facing Swedish foreign policy.

## 5. Conclusions and further considerations

By comparing issues of great importance to Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies respectively, focus has been on the differences facing the two countries. The differences are the regions of pivotal importance (the BSR and the Barents Sea Region), the institutional frames of the EU and NATO, the foreign policy traditions, foreign trade and the nature of the challenges and opportunities themselves. This notwithstanding, the similarities of both countries' challenges and opportunities are more important. The common denominators are Russia, international law, regional cooperation and US presence in Europe. The question thus arises if not both countries are dependent on the same factors in order to achieve a positive development in regards to the challenges and opportunities facing their foreign policies, and the logical answer to this is yes. Both Norway and Sweden have tried to contribute to the creation of an international order increasingly based on international law, engaging in a more legal based international order since the days of the League of Nations. Small countries with open economies are particularly dependent on predictability and protection in questions concerning war, peace, environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources. The most important factor which can be derived from the analysis above is international law. One can for example only try to imagine where Norway would have been today without the UNCLOS.

Six fundamental principles can be abstracted from the practice of international law in different international societies across nearly three millennia: sovereignty, recognition, consent, good faith, international responsibility, and self-defence. Since Hugo Grotius a seventh fundamental principle has been regarded: the freedom of the seas. The freedom of the seas concerned not only traffic and trade, but

also exploitation and fishing. With the growth of technology came the possibility of exploitation of the sea-bed and subsoil. Freedom of exploitation would lead to exploitation by the rich and technologically highly developed states. They would be the only states able to use this freedom. They would dominate the sea and sea-bed economically, as they had dominated foreign lands politically in former centuries. Freedom serves in fact the interests of the rich and powerful. Hence, with respect to the sea-bed, Malta proposed at the 1967 UN General Assembly to replace the regime of freedom by a regime of order, serving the whole of mankind, an order in which the poor and less developed nations might share in the benefits of exploitation. The Maltese proposal led to a thorough review of the Law of the Sea by the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-82). The developing countries generally supported a restriction of the 'freedom of the seas', which they considered to be a reprehensible product of the mighty maritime nations.<sup>568</sup> The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982, and the positive implications it has had on Norway can not be exaggerated.

Moreover, the main factor of both countries' challenges and opportunities has proven to be an integration of Russia in the Western security structure, notwithstanding the fact that Norway has a lot more bilateral issues to handle with Russia compared to Sweden, which first of all has regional challenges in this regard. Both countries' security situation is highly dependent on Russian developments. If they do not develop positive relations with Russia, not a single strategic challenge or opportunity is solved satisfactorily. As noted in chapter 1 of this part, the 'Russian challenge to the West is the overall essential factor to Nordic security.' It is thus of equal importance to both Norway and Sweden that Russia sticks to international law. They are all members of the international society of states with its common rules. Russia's domestic development would, however, have to move in a democratic direction in order to broaden the basis for cooperation. It is obvious that that such an undertaking would be dependent on greater actors than the two Nordic countries. This is the point of origin before determining what actually accounts for Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden. Before analysing Germany's importance to the issues thoroughly elaborated in part I, a theoretical frame should be found for this analysis.

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<sup>568</sup> RÖLLING, B.V.A. (1992), p. 286.



Part II.

Theoretical implications



# 1. International society theory

The analysis has to move beyond pure power politics, and the theory suitable to guide the following empirical analysis is derived from the English School, the advocate of a theory of international society which recovered an older European stream of thinking which recognised the habit of cooperation and the importance of law in the practice of international relations. Here, the antimony between realism and idealism underpins the most interesting works.<sup>1</sup>

International society theory emphasises the existing structure of the society of states, with its language of sovereignty, law and rights. It is a constructivist approach as the English School rejects rationalism, in sharp contrast to neorealism and neoliberalism, which both share the positivist assumptions that actors are rational, interests are given, and outcomes can be explained (or predicted). In international society theory, the society of states is not a given. It has been constructed by states but is not reducible to them. As a structure, it contains the behaviour of states through institutions (or practices) which embody highly developed forms of intersubjective identity that rationalism cannot comprehend.<sup>2</sup> The task for neo-institutionalists is to show how compliance with the rules is maintained by the requisite proportion of incentives and sanctions. In short, the crucial element of the rational actor model is that cooperation can be understood without recourse to common beliefs or shared values (the US neo-institutional model of cooperation). A core assumption of Hedley Bull, one of the most famous English School theorists, is the way in which interstate cooperation has developed out of 'the subjective sense of being bound by a community'. Broadly summarized, for international society theorists, the pull of societal values means that cooperation is prior to regimes, whereas for institutionalists, regimes create

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<sup>1</sup> DUNNE (1995), pp. 128-129.

<sup>2</sup> DUNNE (1995), p. 145.

cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

Before continuing, an excursion will be made in regards to what is meant by the 'English School'. There have been considerable discrepancies in the way its identity has been construed, but Suganami and Linklater have undertaken a critical examination of the history of *the idea* of the English School. Accordingly, it is best seen as a historically evolving group of mainly UK-based contributors to International Relations. Ties were cultivated within the *British Committee on the Theory of International Politics* but there were no rigid classification of 'insiders and outsiders'. Central figures of the school are nonetheless C.A.W. Manning, Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Alan James, John Vincent and Adam Watson. They were first active in the latter part of the twentieth century and broadly see rationalism, in Wight's sense, as a particularly important way to interpret world politics.<sup>4</sup> Martin Wight considered there to be three traditions of international thought: 'Rationalism', 'Realism' and 'Revolutionism'. Wight's rationalism, sometimes labelled 'Grotian', should not be confused with the rationalism in the American political science of international relations, according to which states as key actors are rational utility-maximisers.<sup>5</sup> The rationalist tradition in Wight's terminology sees that inter-state relations are governed by normative principles despite the formally anarchical structure of world politics. Thereby states do to a remarkable degree behave reasonably towards one another.<sup>6</sup> Rationalism was furthermore a *via media* between Realism (also known as 'the Machiavellian' or 'Hobbesian' tradition) and Revolutionism (also known as the 'Kantian' tradition).

There has been a distinction within the English School between *classical international society theorists*, who have contributed to understanding key 'international theorists', and *critical international society theorists* who more explicitly view international political theory as a site for normative exploration. Above all Hedley Bull and Martin Wight among the classical authors are said to belong to the 'Grotian tradition' in international relations, a tradition with a 'constitutional approach' distinguished from the tradition based upon Hobbesian or realist

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<sup>3</sup> DUNNE (1995), p. 145.

<sup>4</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> See KEOHANE (1989).

<sup>6</sup> WIGHT (1991), pp. 13-14.

assumptions, and from conceptions resting upon Kantian or universalist assumptions. Huig de Groot (Hugo Grotius) was a 17th century Dutch jurist and is said to exemplify a particular tradition in international law. His works comprehend issues like international law, the law of the sea, *jus ad bellum*<sup>7</sup> and *jus in bello*<sup>8</sup>.

“Grotius asserts that the law of nature is the law that is most in conformity with the social nature of man and the preservation of human society. This law of nature in its 'primary sense' prohibits the taking of what belongs to others, demands restoration to others of what is their property, imposes the duty to fulfil promises and to make reparation for injury, and confers the right to inflict punishment. In other words it yields the requirements for 'just war'.”<sup>9</sup>

Grotius was convinced of a society of states as much as there existed a society of men comprising a state. His relevance for the present international system is more than doubtful due to technological developments, the process of democratisation within the nation state, and the process of democratisation in the world, i.e. the expansion of the number of states forming the legal community in which international law matters. His writings on 'just' and 'unjust' wars are nonetheless of interest as they stress the necessity of judicial settlements of international matters.<sup>10</sup>

“It is evident that the sources from which wars arise are as numerous as those from which lawsuits spring; for where judicial settlement fails, war begins. Actions, furthermore, lie either for wrongs not yet committed, or for wrongs already done.”<sup>11</sup>

Cutler argues that while Wight, Bull and some regime theorists have much in common with Grotius, they do not rest their thinking on natural law foundations and are thus termed “neo-Grotians”. She furthermore distinguishes between “solidarist” and “pluralist” views of international society, that both accept the existence of a society of states and reject the argument that international relations is a pre-contractual state of nature. The disagreement concerns the role of war in international society, their identification of the source of international law and

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<sup>7</sup>The law on resort to war.

<sup>8</sup>The law on the actual conduct of war.

<sup>9</sup> DRAPER (1992), p. 194.

<sup>10</sup> DRAPER (1992), p. 194.

<sup>11</sup>Grotius cited in DRAPER (1992), p. 194.

the status of individuals in international society.<sup>12</sup> The “pluralist” view, e.g. represented by Hedley Bull, assumes that states do not exhibit ‘solidarity’ in regards to the standards governing state action. Moreover, states “are capable of agreeing only for certain minimum purposes which fall short of that of the enforcement of law.”<sup>13</sup> Hence, as Bull argues, there is no universal consensus as to right and wrong conduct in international relations. Laws granting the ‘just party’ special status in war rather threaten to weaken the reciprocal enforcement of the laws of war. Particular rules of intervention could thus undermine the principle of territorial integrity as long as a societal consensus on how they should be applied is failing.<sup>14</sup> This view is problematic today as international law is increasingly adjusted to the international military interventions pursued by NATO in particular and supported by almost all Western states. Germany is a country which at least has thoroughly debated the role of military interventions.

Critical international society theorists on the other hand have a more compatible view with the concept of a civilising foreign policy. Although progressive, for a critical theorist the society of states is an incomplete moral sphere as it leaves the potential for self-interested action largely untouched. In its place, Linklater articulated an ethical universalism “whereby states enact their roles as members of an international law-making community ... as the primary ethical reference group in the area of foreign policy.”<sup>15</sup> According to Dunne, the task for critical international society theory is to work towards a global consensus in three interrelated areas: “strengthening states by broadening and deepening the principles of good governance; civilizing foreign policy by promoting the concept of international citizenship; and reforming international institutions in accordance with the goal of a world common good.”<sup>16</sup> This would imply to rethink the external obligations of states, which was something argued for by the pro-civilising foreign policy concept in Germany, and to explore more thoroughly the ethical bases of political community.<sup>17</sup> The difficulties obviously appear when there is a conflict between what is defined as ‘vital security interests’ and the rules and

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<sup>12</sup> CUTLER (1991).

<sup>13</sup> BULL (1968), p. 52.

<sup>14</sup> Cited in CUTLER (1991), p. 54.

<sup>15</sup> LINKLATER (1990), 195.

<sup>16</sup> DUNNE (1995), p.138.

<sup>17</sup> DUNNE (1995), p.138.

norms of the international society of states. This difficulty is also a challenge to small states like Norway and Sweden. However, the tension will automatically be greater when German foreign policy is concerned. In the case-studies following in part III, German foreign policy will be examined on issues of vital importance to Norway and Sweden.

As a critical remark, it can be said that “English School authors have not themselves been very explicit about the epistemological nature of their contentions”.<sup>18</sup> The English School has mainly been dealing with broad questions such as ‘how does the institution of the balance of power contribute to the maintenance of international order?’, and has tended to structure discussions in terms of the contest between two opposing positions, pluralism and solidarism. The argument in regards to the first part of this thesis is that the pluralist norms and rules emanating from the modern society of states are the basic platform on which Norway and Sweden have to build their relations with e.g. Russia. However, the thesis is that in order to really improve the relations, which is the basic prerequisite to both countries’ strategic challenges *and* opportunities, solidarism has to be developed in these relations. Further questions thus concern how and to what extent this is possible, and what factors influence such a process. In the following, the tension between pluralism and solidarism will be discussed. In order to use the approach of the English School, which highlights coexistence and cooperation, as well as conflict, in the relations between sovereign states, the project outlined by Linklater and Suganami “to engage in a normatively grounded empirical analysis of the immanent possibility of a radically improved world order” must be the point of departure as they indicate a coherent way in which to proceed with the achievements of the English School.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 6.

<sup>19</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 41.





## 2. What are the English School's arguments?

There are three basic and inter-related orientations in the English School's investigations into world politics that may be named 'structural', 'functional' and 'historical'. The 'structural' orientation's main contribution is the identification of the institutional structure of contemporary international society, and some of the most important works are Manning's *The Nature of International Society* (1975), James' *Sovereign Statehood* (1986) and parts of Bull's *The Anarchical Society* (1977). The word 'structure' can be associated with the institutional framework of the world rather than with Waltz's materialist definition as a distribution of capabilities. Thus, where 'great powers' are discussed, they rather think of the "socially recognized status of a small number of powerful states, rather than merely their outstanding military capabilities."<sup>20</sup> Bull distinguishes between an 'international system' and an 'international society'. The former exists when two "or more states ... may be in contact with each other and interact in such a way as to be necessary factors in each other's calculations without their being conscious of common interests or values, conceiving themselves to be bound by a common set of rules, or co-operating in the working of common institutions."<sup>21</sup> International society exists "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions"<sup>22</sup> In Bull's thinking, this ideal-type of international society is dependent on the practice of states and in competition with the elements of international system and of world

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<sup>20</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 44.

<sup>21</sup> BULL (1995<sup>2</sup>), p. 13.

<sup>22</sup> BULL (1995<sup>2</sup>), p. 13.

society. These three ideal types thus approximate the the Realist, Rationalist and Revolutionist interpretations of world politics, respectively.<sup>23</sup>

In the 'functional' study of international society, the institutional structure of contemporary international society is studied in regards to how, and how satisfactorily, it has functioned and is also compared with other possible institutional structures. This orientation to world politics is illustrated by parts of Bull's *The Anarchical society*, Vincent's *Nonintervention and International Order* (1974) and *Human Rights and International Relations* (1986). Among recent works, N.J. Wheeler's *Saving Strangers* (2000) and Jackson's *The Global Covenant* (2000) should be mentioned. According to Bull, six basic goals must be fulfilled in order to sustain an international society:

1. the preservation of the system and society of states itself against challenges to create a universal empire or challenges by supra-state, sub-state and trans-state actors to undermine the position of sovereign states as the principal actors in world politics;
2. the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual states;
3. peace in the sense of the absence of war among member states of international society as the normal condition of their relationship, to be breached only in special circumstances and according to principles that are generally accepted;
4. limitation of inter-state violence;
5. observance of international agreements, and
6. the stability of what belongs to each state's sovereign jurisdiction.<sup>24</sup>

"Order" is the key term of the English school in this realm.

The third orientation of the English School concerns the historical evolution of the institutional structure of international relations. Wights's *System of States* (1977), Bull and Watson's *The Expansion of International Society* (1984), and Watson's *The Evolution of International Society* (1992) are important studies. Watson produced a world-historical analysis of different types of international system. An important reason for current efforts to resume the work of the British Comitte is the wish to build on historical-sociological works instead of

<sup>23</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 53.

<sup>24</sup>Bull in *Anarchical Society* (1977) cited in LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 57.

the "ahistoricism of neo-realist theory" in order to reveal "important differences in the nature of states and their moral purpose, in the conduct of their external relations, and in the character of international systems".<sup>25</sup>

## 2.1. Radicalised Revolutionism

Linklater and Suganami's efforts to further develop solidarist tendencies of the English School will be used as the theoretical fundament for the case studies developed in part III. They strongly favour a reassessment of the English School's subsumption of Kant's writings in the category Revolutionism and rather suggest to put Kant in the category "radicalised rationalism". Wight categorised different species of revolutionism. The first form was cosmopolitanism, which he described as a perspective defending the idea of a

"civitas maxima ... by proclaiming a world society of individuals, which overrides nations or states, diminishing or dismissing this middle link. It rejects the idea of a society of states and says that the only true international society is one of individuals ... This is the most revolutionary of Revolutionist theories and it implies the total dissolution of international relations."<sup>26</sup>

Bull as well criticised the Kantian tradition for threatening the fragile structure of international society. On the contrary, Linklater and Suganami argue that Kant's defence of world citizenship is a conception of an international society in which the sovereign equality of its constituent parts and the duty of non-intervention are universally respected.

"At no point then did Kant celebrate the right of any enlightened transnational elite to use force to impose its will on the rest of humankind; instead, he envisaged an international society which would respect individual human rights, and to that extent his position was solidarist in the sense of defending cosmopolitanism although he did not support 'cosmopolitan law enforcement'. His defence of the principle of non-intervention reveals that he did not break entirely with the pluralist conception of international society, fearing that global despotism was the most likely alternative to a world based on territorial sovereignty."<sup>27</sup>

<sup>25</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), pp. 189-190.

<sup>26</sup> WIGHT (1991), p. 45.

<sup>27</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 162.

As Kant's vision of a world order combines sovereignty with respect for human rights and cultural diversity, it has little in common with Wight's description according to Linklater and Suganami. Rather, Kant should be regarded as "a dissenting voice within the Grotian tradition" and furthermore as a great exponent of "a radicalized form of revolutionism" which aims at a "progressive" use of the harm principle<sup>28</sup> in international affairs. The harm principle's validity should thus be extended from intra- to inter-state relations and, ultimately, to all of humanity.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, the Kantian view is that international society should be built on sovereignty, but states should be held responsible for observing global moral principles. Kant's idea of a "cosmopolitan condition of general political security" is thus a state in which the respect of individual human rights everywhere is essential and makes up the core of radicalised rationalism.

A cosmopolitan condition of general political security is not in any way given in Europe's relations with Russia. Isolating Russia is difficult because vital interests are attached to cooperation. Integration and not isolation thus seems necessary. The war in Georgia in 2008 and the respective reactions to it exemplifies the closeness of Norwegian and German views in order to keep the dialogue with Russia going, whereas Sweden canceled several military visits and meetings with Russia as a result of the war. A great Russian visit to Sweden in September 2008 was also postponed. The disagreement on Russia after the war in Georgia was apparent both within the EU and NATO, despite a common statement of the latter. Germany, Italy and France did not want to isolate Russia, whereas Great Britain, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states - among others - wanted to do so. Norway on the other hand argued for keeping the possibility of using the NATO-Russia-Council for a dialogue with the Russians.<sup>30</sup> The argument is that in this realm of Norway's and Sweden's strategic challenges and opportunities, solidarist elements have to be considered when assessing Germany's importance. The question is whether Germany has the potential, ability and will to encourage such a policy. The question is furthermore when solidarist and pluralist rules respectively are the most effective to achieve improvements in relations with Russia,

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<sup>28</sup> A cosmopolitan harm principle argues that the failing universal conception of justice should not restrain the acknowledgement of an obligation to limit transboundary harms.

<sup>29</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 163.

<sup>30</sup> ANDREASSEN (2008).

and on other matters as well. The balance between e.g. keeping a dialogue going on the one hand and not ignoring global moral principles on the other hand will be crucial when developing case studies on Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden. The general question should be raised whether German policy envisages the progressive application of the harm principle in international affairs. Before proceeding, more attention should be given to a "progressive" transformation of international society, and the tension between order and justice will be discussed.

## 2.2. The good international citizen

The dichotomy between preserving and strengthening international society on the one hand and moral global justice are apparent when comparing Bull's writings. It took a new generation of writers in the English School who were strongly influenced by solidarist tendencies in Bull and Vincent's last writings to discuss what the "good international citizen" can do to promote the transformation of world politics, i.e. release existing potentialities in world politics and eradicate human suffering.<sup>31</sup> Thus, Vincent's work on human rights and Bull's more explicit normative standpoint have been used to develop the idea of good international citizenship to a case for a solidarist international society. Former Australian FM Gareth Evans first used the expression in the late 1980s when describing a vision of a more internationalist Australian foreign policy in which the promotion of legitimate national interests and goals would be moderated by what Bull called 'purposes beyond ourselves'.<sup>32</sup> This also strongly resembles the foreign policy image Norway and Sweden have been aiming at.<sup>33</sup> Wheeler and Dunne even go as far as to state that "in exceptional cases" the good international citizen can exercise the right to act alone even though unilateralism "weakens the rule of law in the society of states".<sup>34</sup> This goes far beyond the English School's thinking.

Linklater and Suganami point out that liberal-democratic societies aspiring for a good international citizenship will have to develop principles of foreign policy

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<sup>31</sup>See WHEELER/ DUNNE (1998) and WHEELER/ DUNNE (2001).

<sup>32</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 227.

<sup>33</sup>See chapter 3.5 of part I.

<sup>34</sup> WHEELER/ DUNNE (1998), p. 869.

relevant to relations with very different types of states. The modern society of states moreover remains “essentially pluralist in character”. On the other hand is the EU an example of solidarism strengthening the ties between “core liberal-democratic powers and also in the standpoint they adopt in their dealings with the rest of the world.” States attached to solidarism may have abdicated power to substate and transnational authorities.<sup>35</sup> States like China or Russia, however, rather commit to pluralist principles of international relations and, as a result, hostile to external interference in domestic affairs. Russia thus has pluralist responses to the EU.

Liberal-democratic societies are able to intervene in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, but this will never be possible to accomplish in larger and more powerful states. In the present society of states, there is no consensus that ‘human rights outweigh sovereignty’. States still form the basic elements of international relations. Western interventions thus sometimes appear as imperialistic actions in the name of freedom. Here, there is tension between solidarists and pluralists. Linklater and Suganami have considered different principles of good international citizenship, in order to work out a best possible solution for world politics today, i.e. what is really a good international citizenship? Before applying their conclusion on this thesis’ research purpose, the three categories of principles will be presented.

1. The first category, in the following named *pluralistic principles of good international citizenship*, applies to “the principles of good international citizenship which are relevant to a condition in which great power rivalries suggest that agreement on pluralist rules of coexistence, or on some basic international harm conventions, is all that can reasonably be hoped for”.<sup>36</sup>
2. In the second category the principles, in the following named *solidarist principles of good international citizenship*, are considered “where like-minded states are capable of progressing beyond a pluralist contract to a solidarist agreement to establish cosmopolitan harm conventions which protect individuals and non-sovereign communities from unnecessary suffering”.<sup>37</sup> These principles are in the following named “solidarist principles” of good international citizenship.
3. Finally, the third category reflects the principles “which apply in circumstances where societies which are evolving in a broadly solidarist direction have relations with weaker societies which are committed to pluralism and

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<sup>35</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 231.

<sup>36</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 232.

<sup>37</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 232.

which resent or fear efforts to make them comply with what they see as alien notions of human rights.”<sup>38</sup> These principles are in the following named *universally applicable principles of good international citizenship*.

Despite the differences of these principles, they are united by “the ethical aspiration to build a global community that institutionalizes respect for the harm principle and grants all human beings the right to express their concerns and fears about injury, vulnerability and suffering.”<sup>39</sup>

### 2.2.1. Pluralist principles

An important remark is that a pluralist system of states, where the conduct of foreign policy ideally follows the principles below, is one which strongly favours the dominant powers and ignores the interests of smaller states and minority peoples as well as victims of human rights abuses within national borders.<sup>40</sup> Norway and Sweden definitely are small states, so this must be a factor to be considered in the following. Good international citizenship which enables common progress of states “in creating and maintaining pluralist arrangements” should at least include the following principles:

1. states are the basic members of international society;
2. all societies have a right to a separate existence subject to the need to maintain the balance of power;
3. intervention in the internal affairs of member states to promote some vision of human decency or human justice is prohibited;
4. states should relinquish the goal of acquiring preponderant power in the international system;
5. the duty to cooperate to maintain an equilibrium of power is incumbent on all states;
6. diplomatic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the assumption that each state is the best judge of its own interests;
7. an 'inclusive' as opposed to 'exclusive' conception of the national interest should be pursued so that other states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages;

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<sup>38</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 232.

<sup>39</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 232.

<sup>40</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 238.

8. because of their unique military capabilities the great powers should assume special responsibilities which are determined by mutual consent for preserving international order;
9. an essential purpose of an 'inclusive' foreign policy is to make changes to international society which will satisfy the legitimate interests of rising powers and new member states;
10. force is justified in self-defence and in response to states that seek preponderant power; and
11. proportionality in war should be respected along with the principle that defeated powers should be readmitted as equals into international society.<sup>41</sup>

### 2.2.2. Solidarist principles

It will be argued that in order to protect e.g. small states in their relations with great powers, international law and cosmopolitan values must be added as principles of the international society of states. Linklater and Suganami have further derived the more important principles from those English School writings considering current possibilities for transforming world politics in a solidarist direction:

1. individuals and the various communities and associations to which they belong are the fundamental members of international society;
2. unnecessary suffering and cruelty to individuals and their immediate associations should be avoided in the conduct of war;
3. pluralist commitments to sovereignty and sovereign immunity should be replaced by the notion of personal responsibility for infringements of the laws of war;
4. superior orders do not justify violations of humanitarian international law;
5. breaches of the laws of war should be punishable in domestic and international courts;
6. the sovereignty of the state is conditional on compliance with the international law of human rights
7. sovereignty does not entitle states to be free from 'the legitimate appraisal of their peers' with respect to human rights;
8. states have responsibilities as custodians of human rights everywhere;

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<sup>41</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), pp. 238-240.



9. individuals have the legal right of appeal to international courts of law when violations of human rights occur; and
10. regard for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnecessary suffering.<sup>42</sup>

### 2.2.3. Universally applicable principles

Whether Vincent nor Bull argued that good international citizens had the right, or duty, to intervene on humanitarian grounds. Vincent, however, perceived the emergence of a “world civil society” with responsibility for monitoring compliance with human rights law to be an effective compromise between pluralism and solidarism.<sup>43</sup> Hence, there are many methods below military intervention to influence a regime violating human rights. The EU as an example has rules governing the acceptance of new member states, which have to commit to solidarism with respect to human rights.<sup>44</sup>

Far more disputed, of course, is the question of whether the good international citizen is entitled to defend human rights by using force. There is thus no simple answer to the question of how to respond to gross violations of human rights. Although this was not the initial reason for invading Afghanistan in 2001, it is often used as a legitimising argument towards the public in the participant countries, under which Norway, Sweden and Germany are found. The question further discussed by Linklater and Suganami is “how far solidarists should apply the principles which pertain to relations between themselves to relations with pluralist societies (and, conversely, how far relations between solidarists and pluralists should be governed by distinctive principles of good international citizenship).” Based on Bull’s remark on the consensus that certain acts are so abhorrent that the idea of natural rights is legitimised, they have come to the following: First, pluralist regimes should not be exempt from solidarist principles regarding the conduct of war. Second, pluralist regimes should not be immune from close scrutiny by peers. This implies that the principles listed in chapter

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<sup>42</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), pp. 243-244.

<sup>43</sup> VINCENT (1992), p. 291.

<sup>44</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 248.

2.2.2 of this part also apply to the solidarist's relations with pluralist states.<sup>45</sup> Finally, a third list of recommended principles of good international citizenship is concerned with humanitarian responsibilities for minimising harm to members of vulnerable societies and based on English School discussions of human rights:

1. subject to United Nations approval, solidarist states can exercise a collective right of humanitarian intervention when gross violations of human rights occur;
2. the good international citizen may believe there is a strong moral case for unilateral intervention, but doubts about legality require a global dialogue to ascertain whether states can agree that supreme humanitarian emergencies justify new principles of humanitarian intervention;
3. solidarists have a prima facie duty to avoid being complicit in human rights violations in other societies;
4. there is a related obligation to avoid exploitation (in the sense of 'taking advantage of the vulnerable') as well as profiting from unjust enrichment;
5. there is a duty to protect vulnerable peoples from terrible hardship such as extreme poverty and curable disease;
6. affluent societies have global environmental responsibilities to ensure that vulnerable populations enjoy a safe natural environment;
7. obligations to protect the vulnerable require the establishment of global political structures - involving close cooperation with international governmental and non-governmental organizations - that institutionalize the universal right to be able to protest against actual or potential harm.<sup>46</sup>

Applying such a logic, this means that Norway and Sweden should act accordingly toward their great neighbour Russia, Norway would probably have to adjust its policy more in the Swedish direction. Nonetheless, considering obvious inequalities, this is probably not possible for a state outside the EU. The policy recommendation must thus be both a Norwegian EU membership and an improved EU policy on Russia. A counterargument pertaining to principle three listed above might be that pressure on e.g. China in the human rights domain could jeopardise its support for global non-proliferation norms.<sup>47</sup> From this also follows that it is sometimes necessary with a cautious response, not least when great powers are concerned.

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<sup>45</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 253.

<sup>46</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 254.

<sup>47</sup> WHEELER/ DUNNE (1998), p.865.

### 3. Further considerations

Linklater and Suganami conclude that “the key issue ... seems to be the legitimacy of the chosen means.”<sup>48</sup> This would furthermore secure the conception of solidarism from become a self-serving doctrine, and a modified interpretation of solidarism would rather be

“a political attitude which insists that we must not be pessimistically fatalistic about the extent to which progress can be made in international relations; that we must nurture those potentialities, perceptible in the world, which, when realized, will make it a more orderly and just place; and *that in attempting to actualize such potentialities, care must be taken to act on the basis of sound consensual legitimacy.*”<sup>49</sup>

Finally remains the question what a “sound consensual legitimacy” would be. One implication is to take a pluralist stance where a necessary consensus is absent.<sup>50</sup> Consensus and legitimacy are thus seemingly the key terms both when considering humanitarian interventions, which are only possible in certain weaker states, and of improving world politics in general. This means that solidarists and pluralists must find the least common denominator and act from here to broaden the common agenda. This is also what the West is trying to do with Russia, but the different approaches of e.g. Norway and Sweden show that not even liberal-democratic states can agree on what is the right way to go. It moreover shows that states act on the basis of their own preferences and their own presumed strengths. The core of Norway’s and Sweden’s strategic challenges is thus to challenge the right of the strongest, i.e. principles should be based on legitimacy and not power. Some further aspects must however also be involved in the further analysis because the analysis of part I moreover shows that it is not only a matter of principles but also of mechanisms. Why do some states

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<sup>48</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 271.

<sup>49</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 271.

<sup>50</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 272.

become more power than they necessarily need to have? What is the impact of fear in international politics? Consensus and legitimacy are key terms, but consensus at what price? Is it better that states pretend to agree when they actually disagree instead of taking a dispute at an early stage? Do large states get more powerful simply because they are allowed to? Is the international society of states simply too afraid of the powerful? Where is the legitimacy when some states can be invaded whereas other states are allowed to do whatever they want to because of their size or economy? Principles should be equally applied to all states regardless of their status. This is the point where it is the hardest to apply a “sound consensual legitimacy”. To avoid disputes with great powers at almost any price just gives them increased power. This however also implies that the West does not have the legitimacy to say “this is the way things should be”. If there are disagreements between states, this should still imply that the views of the opponent are respected. If problems with great powers are brushed under the carpet, the international society of states is letting them do whatever they like. A policy, which allows for disagreements but still respects the opponents, would allow for more foreseeability and less power games. If the power is given away, somebody else will take it. If a significant actor is allowed to break international law without significant reactions, then you really got a significant problem in the end. Consensus and legitimacy are thus terms that should be complemented by independence. States, and alliances, need to have strategies and cannot solely lean on international law or multilateralism either. There is thus no definite conclusion on what a good international citizenship should comprise, because the preconditions are always changing and because of this, a policy or a principle also need to be reconsidered. The risks must thus always be considered when a solidarist position is taken instead of a pluralist, but the most important part must be *conscious* policies, i.e. that the aim is clear and the risks as well. Developments can not always be predicted, but if the policy is not reconsidered, the problems will return because no improvement has taken place. What might prevent such reconsiderations are rather the power structures as such, and that is why they are so dangerous. It must be possible to take a position in order to change this at a later point of time. This also implies that a solidarist policy direction in one case might be the right decision at one point of time and the

wrong position at a later point of time. These additional reflections should be added to the theoretical background of international society theory.

This is the theoretical basis which will attend the further analysis. Is Germany a “good international citizen” who can unify the best of pluralist and solidarist principles to the best of the international society of states? This will also be dependent on the mechanisms prevailing in German politics and the ability to reconsider its policy. A thorough analysis of German foreign policy from 1945 until 1990 will be conducted first. Then, the most important actors and institutions shaping Germany’s foreign policy and their roles are analysed. This is the setting of today’s German foreign policy. Finally, case studies will be designed in order to analyse Germany’s approaches in areas of significance to Norway and Sweden with special focus on a. whether German policy is based on acting “on the basis of sound consensual legitimacy” and b. German attitudes on the legitimacy of the chosen means when there is a conflict between order and justice. Its post-war foreign policy history is the initial point for picking Germany as the most probable exemplar of a good international citizen in the international society of states. Being European also increases the topicality for north European issues.



Part III.

Germany's foreign policy on  
Northern Europe





# 1. German foreign policy

## 1.1. Historical classification of German foreign policy

Kenenth Waltz'1954 distinction of three levels of foreign policy analysis comprised the level of the international system of states, the level of collective innerstate actors and the level of individual innerstate actors.<sup>1</sup> This historical construction will, as outlined by Haftendorn, be seen as a structural explanation of development patterns and specific interaction between actors and system.<sup>2</sup> The actors here are the political elite of West Germany. The most important reference system of West German foreign policy was the Euro-Atlantic area. Security, the German question, European integration and foreign economics were important key aspects. According to Haftendorn, foreign policy is in a theoretical perspective understood as a process of interaction, where one state tries to realise its basic goals and values in competition with the other states. The process is influenced by the demands from the international system and by the domestic society and state. The result is thus a dynamic process of two-way adaption and influence, which is performed both on the international and domestic level.<sup>3</sup>

According to Watson, French, German and British policies were during the Cold War still rooted in their experience in the European system of the *grande république* and had to be "painfully adapted to the very different patterns of power which ... prevailed in the world".<sup>4</sup> The rift between the two super-systems was not as great as it is sometimes portrayed. The world remained very much one sys-

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<sup>1</sup>See WALTZ (2001<sup>3</sup>).

<sup>2</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 14.

<sup>3</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 13.

<sup>4</sup> WATSON (1993), p. 293.

tem strategically, and each superpower was the principal military concern of the other. The world also remained formally one international society, with a common structure of international law, diplomatic representation and other rules and institutions inherited from the European society. Watson also notes that Russian policy for the last three centuries has usually had a “considerable preference for stability in the European *grande république* and for expansion elsewhere.”<sup>5</sup>

German foreign policy is often characterised as more suitable for small European countries than what is usually common for a European power. A historical classification is necessary to understand the basis of Germany’s current foreign policy. In order to do, one should go as far back as the period 1945 to 1949 when Germany was parted in two and occupied by the victorious powers from the Second World War - the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and France. The great task of West Germany’s foreign policy was to regaining the freedom of action for German politics. The way the politicians answered to challenges like foreign control, limitations and boundaries imposed by Germany’s occupiers is important. Voluntarily abandoning sovereignty was in many cases necessary to achieve an increased freedom of action.<sup>6</sup>

The history of West German foreign policy is thus also a history of European integration. West German foreign policy until 1990 was to a large extent characterised by a cautious foreign policy style, military abstinence, the firm integration in international and supranational organisations and the denial of any kind of national great power policy as well as any “*Sonderwege*”.<sup>7</sup> Famous is the kneeling down of Willy Brandt in 1970 after the wreath ceremony on the memorial of the victims of the Warsaw ghetto revolt of 1943. This did not lead to improved relations between Poles and Germans, but what began as a confession of guilt by a German head of state, was on 6 December 2000 converted to a Polish conciliatory gesture when a memorial of the kneeling down was disclosed.

“Anhand des Kniefalls lässt sich exemplarisch verdeutlichen, wie umfassend die außenpolitischen Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik von der Vergangenheit, in erster Linie der nationalsozialistischen, geprägt sind. Mehr noch: Ohne Kenntnis dieser Vergangenheit lässt sich die Außenpolitik der

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<sup>5</sup> WATSON (1993), p. 293.

<sup>6</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> SCHWELLING (2007), pp. 102-103.

Bundesrepublik nicht verstehen.”<sup>8</sup>

The politician Willy Brandt also played a special part in Germany’s damaged relations with Norway and Sweden. Moreover, the political parties, and the social democratic ones in particular and their political élites even more so, played a crucial role in the recovering of German-Scandinavian relations after the Second World War. This, although not counting to the core policy areas or top priority of post-war West German foreign policy, will be the closing issue the following analysis. The focus will be on German foreign relations with Norway and Sweden, and as opposed to the other chapters, this will be dated further back in history in order to put German-Scandinavian relations in the right perspective and illuminate what a great break the Second World War accounts for.

### **1.1.1. The strategy of Westintegration**

Four years after the end of the Second World war the US, Great Britain and France established a German “West-state” of their three occupation zones which was based on a liberal democracy and market economy. The Soviet Union on the other hand created the GDR as the German outpost of its communistic sphere of control. Two German provisional constituent states thus existed from 1949 on under allied provisos. They were thus only to a very limited extent able to make their own foreign policies.<sup>9</sup> Four fundamental principles for Germany were established by the occupying powers: demilitarisation, denazification, decentralisation and democratisation. In the West, four High Commissioners resided on the Petersberg above Bonn, whereas the Soviet Control Committee was situated in Berlin-Karlshorst. It was not until 1951 that the FRG had a Foreign Office at its disposal. With growing scepticism towards the Soviet Union the US initiated a new turn in their policy on Germany in the autumn of 1946 which preferred a political rearrangement of Germany. Since February 1948 the Western allies discussed ways to create a federal system of governance in West Germany and the possibility of Germany joining the Marshall plan. In the Frankfurt documents, the prime ministers of the German countries were authorised to convene a con-

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<sup>8</sup> SCHWELLING (2007), p. 102.

<sup>9</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 14.

stituent national assembly. Not a constitution but a temporary “*Grundgesetz*” of 8 May was agreed on in order to prevent an enduring partition of Germany. From a foreign policy point of view, the *Grundgesetz* communicated two national objective dispositions (Staatszielbestimmungen): First, there was the commitment “in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands zu vollenden” (preamble). Second, the preparedness to delegate sovereign rights to interstate arrangements in order to bring about and secure “eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa und zwischen den Völkern der Welt” (Art. 24) was important.<sup>10</sup>

There were three competing conceptions of foreign policy in this early stage of the FRG, developed by the decisive party politicians Konrad Adenauer (CDU), Kurt Schumacher (CDU) and Jakob Kaiser (CDU). According to Adenauer's view, the old world was threatened by a relationship of inferiority in regards to the two super powers. This picture could only be corrected if the European democracies joined forces through integration. To Adenauer, the prerequisite for Europe's recovery was the overcoming of the antagonism between Germany and France.<sup>11</sup> He also considered the “*Westbindung*” to be more important than German unity, whereas Kaiser, the CDU chairman in the Soviet occupation zone (SBZ), was of the opinion that Germany could prevent the partition and function as a bridge between East and West. The social democrat Schumacher only approved of *Westbindung* to an extent which allowed West Germany to erode the power system in the SBZ. His higher goals were independence, equality and self-determination for Germany.<sup>12</sup> Adenauer's view was to be established with his long chancellorship from 1949 to 1963. He additionally even acted as a foreign minister from 1951 to 1955 as foreign policy was a matter of the German chancellery until 1955. Adenauer's policy was unique because he sought to achieve the aim of national sovereignty through a sort of “payment in advance” to the Western powers which should result in the claimed equality. The formula “Souveränitätsgewinn durch Souveränitätsverzicht”<sup>13</sup> thus demonstrates this policy.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 3

<sup>11</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 16.

<sup>12</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), pp. 4-5; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 16.

<sup>13</sup>“gain of sovereignty through abandonment of sovereignty”

<sup>14</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 16.

In 1949, West Germany lacked both an international reputation and full sovereignty. To Adenauer the gain of security and sovereignty, the anchoring as an equal member of the western society of states and the firm connection with the US was more important than unity. Lappenküper describes the period 1949 to 1955 as “sovereignty through integration”.<sup>15</sup> Germany was a structural dependent system which regularly needed to adapt its policy.<sup>16</sup> Economic prosperity was dependent on the end of the dismantlement and control of the West German industry, in addition to accession to the world market by the West German industry. In the question of a remilitarisation of West Germany, the Western powers disagreed, and France was a strong opponent. NATO had decided to increase the size of its troops. This was only achievable with a West German participation. Adenauer’s concept “security through integration” thus seemed suitable to combine military necessities with the emotional and political sensitivities of the Western European neighbours. From a West German point of view only the US and the Atlantic Alliance were able to protect West Germany’s security. A prerequisite was a certain amount of democratic behaviour as well as a settlement with France. In order to achieve this, Bonn voluntarily took on limitations in areas which could jeopardise France’s security. In addition to favouring supranational or strong intergovernmental solutions through the abandonment of sovereign rights, the allied proviso rights in regards to Germany as a whole and Berlin contributed to the German self-restraint.<sup>17</sup> Keeping Germany outside any alliance in a European security system would have been an alternative to the unconditioned Westintegration followed by Adenauer’s government, which made a German reunion impossible in a short and medium term perspective. Adenauer wanted inner stabilisation and protection from outside. As the interests of the Western powers were concerned, Adenauer had no choice but supporting the views of particularly France and the US in order to increase its political freedom of action. On 6 March 1950 the same year the Western powers implemented a “small amendment” of the occupation charter and allowed the FRG to reestablish a Foreign Office and to have diplomatic relations with foreign states. On 18 April 1951 the foreign ministers of the FRG, France, Italy and the Benelux-states signed

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<sup>15</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 5

<sup>16</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 57.

the treaty of the establishment of the the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). A further foreign policy success of Adenauer was the German accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Further German allowances were, however, met with some irritation by the Western powers, and German rearmament was still supposed to be organised in a European Defence Community and not in NATO. In March 1952, Stalin suggested to its three Western counterparts the closing of a peace treaty with a neutralised, united Germany (Stalin Note). This, however, rather accelerated the negotiations on the ending of the occupation charter and the rearmament of West Germany. The “Treaty on Germany” was concluded on 26 May 1952 in Bonn and entitled the FRG to the full power of its domestic and international affairs. However, the Western powers kept the supremacy and several provisos in regards to Berlin, German unity and the deployment of troops. Thereafter, the treaty on the European Defence Community was signed in Paris. This project, however, soon came to a grief in 1954 due to French sentiments.<sup>18</sup>

Adenauer attached the readiness of a German military contribution to the claim of an abolishment of the occupation charter and succeeded. The legal validity of the Treaty on Germany was from the beginning attached to a military and security political west-integration of the FRG. The Western powers finally confirmed the modified Version of the Treaty on Germany from May 1952 in the Paris Treaties of 23 October 1953. Important is thus that West Germany developed to an important ally of the West in the conflict with the Soviet Union, not least as a result of its geographic position. This made up Germany’s political weight. When the UK accepted a permanent West German troop presence in Europe and the FRG stated the abandonment of ABC weapons production, France finally gave up the resistance against West Germany’s admission to NATO after having achieved the membership of Germany in the WEU, which it acceded to on 7 May 1955. Two days later West Germany joined NATO, whereas East Germany became part of the Soviet’s Warsaw Pact. West Germany was thus both in a transatlantic and European way integrated in the western security alliance. With the end of the occupation charter, the establishment of the ministry of defence and with it the creation of the Bundeswehr, a large extent of sovereignty was created for the

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<sup>18</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), pp. 8-11; KRONENBERG (2009), pp. 16-17.

“Bonn republic”.<sup>19</sup>

### 1.1.2. European policy

As a long-term objective of West German foreign policy was the creation of a United States of Europe. The European policy of Adenauer thus had a post-national perspective. Such federative ideas were, however, far too far-reaching not least to France, and the French national assembly finally deleted the idea of a European federal state with the rejection of a common European defence. From then on, Adenauer chose a double track to pursue his European policy: supranational approaches and interstate cooperation as far as possible. Adenauer thus set the benchmark for the following federal governments.<sup>20</sup>

An economic way to Adenauer’s long-term objective of a united Europe seemed rather plausible as compared to the failing attempts to create an EPC. The connecting factor was the ‘Schuman plan’ or the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). French FM Robert Schuman had presented the suggestion of such a union between France, the FRG, the Benelux-states and Italy in 1950. Such an economic association of the West European heavy industry should thus through a supranational control authority contribute to promote Europe’s political unification. The German chancellor saw the possibility in the ECSC to provide Germany equal rights in Europe and to strengthen the West altogether, to achieve a compromise with France in the Saar-question<sup>21</sup> and at the same time to make the allied limits put on the West-German economic capacity redundant. The ECSC Treaty was signed on 18 April 1951 and came into effect on 23 July 1952. Thus the so called “Ruhr statute” which had put limits on the German production ceased to exist.<sup>22</sup>

The supranational form of organisation which the ECSC comprised was a case

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<sup>19</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 18

<sup>20</sup> BREDOW(2006), pp.220-221.

<sup>21</sup>From 1947 onwards, the Saar was detached from the French occupied zone in Germany and became part of a customs, economic and monetary union with France. The Saar Regional Government did enjoy political autonomy but remained under the authority of the French High Commissioner. There was, therefore, a real economic frontier between the Saar and the rest of Germany. The Saar Treaty signed on 27 October 1956 solved the question and the Saar became a full federal state of the FRG.

<sup>22</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 18.

sui generis and was intensely discussed in domestic German politics. Adenauer also faced great opposition to the achieved German membership of the European Council as an associated member without a seat in the committee of ministers although at the same time the Saarland should be accepted as a member. Adenauer however was convinced that a national abandonment of sovereignty through integration in European (ECSC) and Atlantic (NATO) structures was the best way to accomplish German interests which were *Freiheit, Frieden und Wiedervereinigung* (Freedom, Peace and Reunion).<sup>23</sup>

After having resolved the Saar-question with France in 1956, as the region was incorporated in the ambit of the *Grundgesetz*, the negotiations on a common European market experienced a breakthrough. The Treaties of Rome were both signed on 25 March 1957 by the six countries pursuing European integration. The first treaty signed was the one establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The second treaty established the EEC, often referred to as the Treaty of Rome.<sup>24</sup> The EEC came into effect on 1 January 1958 and with it was the contractual integration of Germany in the West completed in the first instance.<sup>25</sup>

The concepts of European policy in France and Germany were different in significant aspects. In 1958 the federal government of West Germany aimed at accelerated implementation of the Treaties of Rome and the development of the EEC. Furthermore, it was the opinion that the EEC, which institutions were the Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Assembly, already had become the core of a political community. French president de Gaulle on the other hand preferred an EEC reduced to its politico-economic functions, and additional policial cooperation should be organised due to interstate principles.<sup>26</sup>

In July 1960 de Gaulle suggested a German-French alliance, with which a closer cooperation between both states in all realms of politics, economy, culture and

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<sup>23</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 19.

<sup>24</sup>This treaty was renamed Treaty establishing the European Community (the EC Treaty) by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Since 1993 it has been joined by the Treaty on European Union (TEU).

<sup>25</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 19; HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), pp. 134-135.

<sup>26</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 73.



defence should be achieved. The supranational institutions of the EEC should on the other hand be repositioned and reduced to consultant and technical functions according to de Gaulle, who also suggested to displace the integrated defence programme of NATO with a closer military cooperation of the six and thus reduce the US dominance in the alliance.<sup>27</sup> Adenauer was very much situated in a dilemma between not annoying the French and at the same time not jeopardising the US security guarantee. In regards to monetary policy West Germany belonged to the world's fifth strongest states but was otherwise a political dwarf and dependent on Western goodwill. The French were very firm in their support for the West German view on Berlin, and when the building of the Berlin wall started on 13 August 1961, this contributed to Adenauer's decision to open up to the French proposals. In mid 1962 the chancellor even opted for a bilateral alliance with France and to some extent left the multilateral path. On 22 January 1963 de Gaulle and Adenauer signed the treaty on German-French cooperation in order to tie the union to international law. In the parliamentary legislation process, however, a close coordination with the US and a comprehensive political opinion process was performed in West German politics before the Elysée Treaty was ratified by the Bundestag in May. In the preamble of the ratification law, the multilateral linkage of the FRG was stressed and thus relaxed the exclusive alliance.<sup>28</sup> Germany also acceded to NATO's nuclear policy and to an active collaboration on a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) planned by president Kennedy. According to Kronenberg, Adenauer's great merit was to have conducted the policy of Western alignment consequently and against any resistance. A further merit is thus the reconciliation policy with France which culminated in the Elysée Treaty, shortly before the end of his term in office. Both sides affirmed the intention to arrange common consultations on important foreign policy questions. In addition, the foreign- and defence ministers of both states should meet four times a year, achieve a harmonisation in strategic questions and intensify the cooperation in questions of youth and culture.<sup>29</sup>

However, the following West German government coalition between CDU and

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<sup>27</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 73.

<sup>28</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 17; HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 78; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 20.

<sup>29</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 20.

FDP resulted in a liberal foreign minister, Gerhard Schröder, who was very much dedicated to Anglo-Saxon politics. Both Schröder and the new chancellor Erhard stressed a transatlantic partnership and a British membership in the EEC. Ludwig Erhard (CDU), who felt a close affinity with British politics, succeeded Adenauer as chancellor in October 1963. As France asked for German support in the nuclear question, Bonn faced the difficult alternative of choosing between Paris and Washington. This was a conflict of priority which designated West German foreign and security policies in the following years.<sup>30</sup> The fusion of the institutions of the EEC, the ECSC and the EAEC to the European Communities by 1 January 1963 could not cover the many conflicts with France that now faced the FRG. The peak of the dissonance between France and Germany on the topic European policy was reached in 1965 when de Gaulle questioned the majority rule in the Council of Ministers. France's return to the supranational processes of the EEC was eventually reached in January 1966 with the 'Luxemburg compromise' which allowed for a refusal to be overruled by the majority in questions of vital national interests.<sup>31</sup> Conflicts were moreover apparent in the alliance policy, the *Ostpolitik* and the policy of détente. These difficult questions further increased the distance between those who prioritised amicable adjustments with France as the first foreign policy goal ("Gaullists") and those who first and foremost tried to sustain the Atlantic Alliance and the relationship with Washington ("Atlanticists"). This conflict even affected the potency of West German diplomacy according to Haftendorn.<sup>32</sup> However, there was no such thing as two dividing camps among West German foreign policy actors according to Lappenküper. This because the "Atlanticists", who one would find in every political party, did not want to suspend the understanding with France, and the "Gaullists" of the CDU/ CSU were by no means unconditionally following de Gaulle.<sup>33</sup>

Eventually, things improved when Erhard and de Gaulle left their offices. The European policy of the social-liberal coalition led by Brandt was based on four principles: the enhancement of European unity, the deepening and enlargement of the EEC, the bridging between West European conciliation and transatlantic

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<sup>30</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 81-82.

<sup>31</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 21.

<sup>32</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 83-84.

<sup>33</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 87.

partnership and the normalisation of the relations to Eastern Europe.<sup>34</sup> The EPC, stipulated on the summit of Den Haag in December 1969, coordinated the foreign policies of the member states within an intergovernmental framework. In March 1971 it was agreed on the gradual implementation of an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was generated, and in the mid 1970s France and Germany again started being the engines of European integration. Chancellor Brandt further demanded new efforts to implement the enlargement of the communities. The EPC was more successful than the EMU and was joined by the UK, Ireland and Denmark in March 1972. This new consultation mechanism was not part of the Treaties of Rome as a result of French resistance but was limited to interstate processes. At the same time transatlantic tensions were apparent as European assertiveness in both monetary and energy questions ignored a coordinated policy with the US. As a result, a new charter on transatlantic relations was signed by the NATO member states. Both sides furthermore decided to intensify consultations. Thereafter it was up to every member of the EPC to claim the consultation with a third state (the US) before a decision-taking. Denmark, Ireland and the UK moreover became members of the EC in 1973, not least as a result of an active German diplomacy.<sup>35</sup>

The second social-liberal coalition government was led by Helmut Schmidt from 1974 to 1982. As opposed to the *Ostpolitik* and defence policy of Schmidt/Genscher, their European policy has not been a common research subject. 1974 has, however, been classified as a break in West German European policy as the new government put a cost-benefit aspect in the centre of the decision-making. Further, there is evidence that Schmidt perceived the political cooperation in Europe as indispensable from the very beginning of his chancellorship but that the traditional preference for the Anglo-Saxon option did not weaken before the deficiency of the US leadership became apparent and was thus exchanged with a preference for France.<sup>36</sup> According to Kronenberg, Schmidt often prioritised European over German interests.<sup>37</sup> Schmidt's cooperation with Giscard d'Estaing has been thoroughly examined, which he consolidated out of

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<sup>34</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 100.

<sup>35</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 85-88; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 26.

<sup>36</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 105.

<sup>37</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 26.

pragmatic considerations. As a result of the oil crisis of 1973 president Giscard d'Estaing and chancellor Schmidt agreed on a new platform of economic gathering, which later developed into the G-7 and accordingly G-8. A new European body, the European Council, was also created during Schmidt's term in office in addition to direct elections of the European Parliament in 1979. The European Monetary System (EMS) created in 1978 was the greatest common French-German effort. The economic division of the EC as a significant obstacle to growth should thus be overcome. The EMS should stabilise the European currencies through a so called exchange rate mechanism which determined the fluctuation of the currencies in certain specified fluctuation margins.<sup>38</sup>

Precisely through the initiative of the EMS and through the always close attunement with the French president Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt succeeded in taking the leading role in the EC together with France and also in strengthening the EC internationally and not least also towards the weakened US under president Carter. However the selective achievements under the pressure of the economic conditions could not hide the fact that the European processes of integration stagnated from the mid 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s."<sup>39</sup>

In the beginning of the 1980s the European integration got into a stage of stagnation. Necessary reforms (Common Agricultural Policy and public finances law) failed, as did also the attempt to arrange a "European foreign policy". FM Genscher and his Italian colleague Colombo initiated a "European Act" in 1981 in which further task areas of the foreign and security policy, the development policy, the technology and energy policy as well as the societal and culture policy should be communitarised.<sup>40</sup> Genscher's initiative on revitalising the political unity was opposed by Schmidt. Whereas Genscher tried to pursue a reform of the EEC treaty system, the chancellor concentrated on the German-French connection as the core of European cooperation.<sup>41</sup> Genscher continued as a FM in the new government of Helmut Kohl (CDU), and Kohl's attitude was positive. He perceived himself as a guardian of Adenauer's European policy and envisioned the idea of a political union in the larger context of the Atlantic Alliance. The policy of distinctive bilateralism with France, beginning in 1984, played a key

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<sup>38</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 27.

<sup>39</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 27. Author's translation.

<sup>40</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 135.

<sup>41</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 106.

role in shaping the Single European Act (SEA), which as an expansion of the EC foundation treaties created the legal basis for the accomplishment of the Single Market in particular.<sup>42</sup> The federal government was not interested in a collectivisation of foreign policy, although Genscher tried to reform the institutional decision-making process of the WEU. The FM of the FRG was an exponent of integration policy as opposed to interest policy.<sup>43</sup>

To sum up, the priority conflict Paris/Washington was the structural precondition of the West German foreign policy which constrained Bonn's freedom of action. However, the cooperation in the EC also enabled Bonn to add more weight to its own interests towards the US.<sup>44</sup> According to Haftendorn it was not very hard for Bonn to play the European card as Europeanisation was one of the ideological pillars of the FRG, which from the 1960s on conformed to the West German economic interests.<sup>45</sup> As the economic historian W. Abelshauser stated, nothing has shaped the West German state so strongly as its economic development.<sup>46</sup>

### 1.1.3. Ostpolitik and policy of détente

The overall Western détente policy, beginning with US president Johnson's visionary speech in 1966 of a bridging between East and West, composed the frame of the German *Ostpolitik* and policy of détente.<sup>47</sup> President Johnson's visionary speech of a bridging of East and West in 1966 was a sign of détente policy. Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, both advisers of the State Department, demanded of the West German government to pursue efforts to improve the East-West relations without linking it to progress in the German question.<sup>48</sup> At the approximate same time, France intensified its relations with the Soviet

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<sup>42</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 135. The SEA was the first major revision of the Treaty of Rome. The act set an objective for the EC to establish a single market by 31 December 1992, and codified EPC, the forerunner of CFSP.

<sup>43</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 109.

<sup>44</sup> HELLMANN (2006), p. 96.

<sup>45</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 93.

<sup>46</sup> Cited in HELLMANN (2006), p. 95.

<sup>47</sup> Important steps of Western détente-policy was the teststop treaty, signed in August 1963 between the UK, the Soviet Union, and the US, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1968. Moreover, US-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and negotiations on the abdication of Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) begun in the late 1960s. Both led to agreements in 1972.

<sup>48</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 173.

and East European states. In 1963 and 1964 the West German federal government was able to begin economic relations with Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, in addition to stipulating the exchange of trade missions. However, unsolved questions in regards to borders and status conflicted with closer relations to these states. As signs became apparent of a future Soviet West-policy in the end of 1965, West German state secretary Karl Carstens (CDU) went to Moscow to signal interest in resuming a dialogue. The federal government hence decided to start a diplomatic initiative (“Note zur Abrüstung und Sicherung des Friedens”) in order to keep records of its preparedness of détente. On 25 March 1966 the federal government directed a note to all states with which the FRG had diplomatic relations and to the East European and Arabic states, except of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Here, the government’s Germany and détente policies were presented. It was argued for both a peaceful solution of the German question and for a consistent disarmament policy. Concrete suggestions were the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, military confidence building and exchange of non-violence declarations.<sup>49</sup> Mutual statements on renunciation of violence were suggested in order to meet the security needs of the Eastern European states. The decisive change in the German *Ostpolitik* from 1963 to 1966 was that the policy of détente was no longer dependent on concrete progress in the German question. In his first government declaration, chancellor Kiesinger moreover uplifted the maintenance of peace to the highest goal of federal foreign policy in place of reunification.<sup>50</sup>

Problematic core issues were the Oder-Neiße line as Poland’s western border, the invalidity of the Munich agreement of 1938 and the existence of the GDR as a state. Karl Carstens encouraged a revision of the Germany-policy, i.e. a modification of the *Alleinvertretungsanspruches* (the right of West Germany to represent the whole of Germany by itself). A more active *Ostpolitik* towards the states of the Warsaw pact necessitated a softening of this pretension to represent Germany on their own.<sup>51</sup> From 1966 onwards the great coalition of CDU, CSU and SPD also advanced their position on this policy. This implied that the GDR should be recognised as a state-connatural entity, confidential talks with the so-

<sup>49</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 174-175.

<sup>50</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 21.

<sup>51</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 22.

viet Union should be established. Germany also established diplomatic relations with Romania in 1967 but as a result some Warsaw pact states agreed on the so called “Ulbricht-doctrine” whereby no socialist state was allowed to exchange ambassadors with the FRG as long as the GDR was not accepted according to international law by Bonn. In Moscow talks on the abandonment of violence (Gewaltverzichtsgespräche) stopped in July 1968 as a result of the Soviet Union’s wish to strengthen its leader role in Eastern Europe because of the happenings in Czechoslovakia which ultimately led to the Brezhnev-doctrine. This proclaimed the limited sovereignty of the socialist satellite states and the subsequent Soviet right to intervene. The German government seemed to have pursued the strategy of achieving an opening access to Moscow via the Soviet “satellites”. The experience of Prague thus taught the government not to make the impression of pursuing any differentiated détente policy without Soviet participation. It was not until the Soviet Union was dependent on détente in the West due to Soviet-Chinese disputes on the common border that new perspectives were opened. However the Brezhnev-doctrine was still valid.<sup>52</sup>

With the “appeal of Budapest” of March 1969 the Warsaw pact states put a European security conference on the political agenda. In Germany, the positions on the *Ostpolitik* and Germany policy further diverged. Whereas chancellor Kiesinger (CDU) was not prepared to give up any legal positions, SPD and FDP argued for a new approach in the *Ostpolitik*. In the summer of 1969 the government initiated new talks on bilateral violence abandonments and presented new drafts for non-violende declarations. Preparedness of participation in a European security conference was also signalled. To FM Willy Brandt, there was no alternative to a policy of détente, and a normalisation of the relations with the Soviet Union was only possible on the terms of the status quo. In the autumn of 1969 considerations of a basic agreement with the GDR were outlined.<sup>53</sup> The new government of Willy Brandt (1969-1974) took the created realities and territorial integrity of the eastern partners as the initial point of its policy. In his government declaration from 28 October 1969 Brandt spoke as the first German chancellor of “two states in Germany” which could not be foreign countries

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<sup>52</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 91; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 22.

<sup>53</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 177-178.

to each other. However, no acknowledgement of the GDR according to international law followed. The new about the *Ostpolitik* was the attempt to find a *modus vivendi* for the dead hands of the Second World War and thus mitigating the East-West confrontation. The basis for this policy was the formula “Wandel durch Annäherung” elaborated by leader of the planning department of the AA and upcoming state secretary, Egon Bahr. Aims of the *Ostpolitik* were to overcome the military confrontation, to decrease the political tensions, to deepen the cooperation and develop understanding between nations.<sup>54</sup> The government was furthermore prepared to approve of the GDR as a state, which, however, premised the protection of Berlin. This policy thus meant a factual acceptance of the partition of Europe and Germany<sup>55</sup> The wish to also involve the GDR in this policy was a completely new element compared to Kiesinger’s government, and chancellor Brandt spoke of “zwei Staaten in Deutschland”.<sup>56</sup> Egon Bahr was the head and heart behind the “new *Ostpolitik*”, which saw the key to the German question in Moscow. Brandt and Bahr wanted to create the premises for a slow change of the status quo in the frame of a European order.

The first German-Soviet talks began in december 1969. Questions concerning Germany as a whole, its borders and Berlin could, however, only be debated after having consulted the three Western powers. In May 1970 a framework contract (“*Leitsätze für einen Vertrag mit der UdSSR*”), also known as the “Bahr paper” was agreed on which entailed the main issues of the future treaties with Moscow and Warsaw. Political concessions and the agreement on an economic countertrade of Soviet natural gas supply through West German pipelines affected Moscow to reduce their own claims, i.e. the recognition of the GDR, immutability of the borders, and a West German abandonment of German reunification.<sup>57</sup> The paper led to controversies within West Germany, in particular was the stated “Achtung der territorialen Integrität der DDR” highly disputed. The acceptance of the Oder-Neiße border also meant that there was no chance of winning back the areas of Pomerania, Silesia and East Prussia in a peace treaty.<sup>58</sup> FM Walter Scheel (FDP) continued the official negotiations with the Kremlin. The Treaty

<sup>54</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 179; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 23.

<sup>55</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), p. 179.

<sup>56</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 27.

<sup>57</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), p. 28.

<sup>58</sup> HAFTENDORN (2001), pp. 183-184.



of Moscow was signed on 12 August 1970. Both governments committed to reciprocal renunciation of violence, approved the sanctity of the existing borders and agreed on the extension of the bilateral cooperation. A “letter concerning the German unity” rendered by Scheel still verified the government’s intention to retain the aim of reunification. The treaty moreover served as a standard for similar agreements with other Eastern European states and the GDR.<sup>59</sup>

The Treaty of Warsaw was moreover signed on 7 December 1970. This was above all a border treaty and secondly a treaty of renunciation of violence. The German phrasing that both states were to ascertain that the Oder - Neiße line composes Poland’s western border was in the end accepted, but the Poles were annoyed that the corners of the border arrangement was already inclosed in the Bahr-paper. In 1975/76 the treaty was mended due to political developments in both countries: The FRG promised Poland a economic compensation of 1,3 billion D-mark to Polish pension claims, and Poland promised exit permits to further 120 000 to 150 000 German resettlers. The closing of the two treaties had a positive effect on the negotiations in the Berlin question. The four occupation powers for the first time agreed on a judicial settlement on 3 September 1971. The implementation of the provisions was realised in inner German negotiations with the transit agreement of 17 December 1971 which governed the traffick on the streets and railway between the FRG and West-Berlin.<sup>60</sup> Inner German negotiations were thereafter again resumed and resulted in the “Grundlagenvertrag” of 21 Decmeber 1972.<sup>61</sup> The eastern treaties and the Grundlagenvertrag moreover made both German states become full members of the UN on 18 September 1938. The last West German treaty with Czechoslovakia was signed on 11 December 1973. Besides a mutual diplomatic recognition, the 1938 Munich Agreement was declared null and void as the inviolability of the common borders and the abandonment of all territorial claims were agreed on. Hence the FRG had diplomatic relations with most of the states of the Warsaw pact which would have been impossible ten years earlier.<sup>62</sup> The Norwegian Nobel committee awarded Brandt for his *Ostpolitik* with the

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<sup>59</sup> LAPPENKÜPER (2008), pp. 28-29; KRONENBERG (2009), p. 23.

<sup>60</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 24.

<sup>61</sup> The treaty comprised the agreement on good neighbouring relations, the sanctity of borders as well as respecting each state’s independency in its inner and foreign matters. The exchange of “foreign representatives” were moreover agreed on. KRONENBERG (2009), p. 25.

<sup>62</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 26.

Noble peace price of 1971. At home, the policy was highly disputed, but the eastern treaties were ratified during 1972.<sup>63</sup> The Germany-policy in Schmidt's term in office showed that the policy towards East-Berlin initiated by Brandt did not achieve the sustainable improvements, particularly in regards to humanitarian alleviations, which it had aimed at.<sup>64</sup>

Nonetheless was the new, and in the beginning parliamentary highly disputed, course of the *Ostpolitik* and policy on Germany of the FRG from the late 1960s just as necessary as the policy of Westintegration in the 1950s. The reconciliation with the West was followed by the normalisation or at least the improvement of the relations with the east. With this policy of “*Westbindung + Ostverbindungen*” (Werner Link) the FRG achieved more freedom of action in foreign policy and thus avoided the imminent threat of isolation in the world - also in the western world. The new *Ostpolitik* did not lead to any turning away from the West. After all the firm integration in the Western alliance ultimately allowed for the social-liberal policy towards Central- and Eastern Europe.”<sup>65</sup>

The opening up to the east through a “*Wandel durch Annäherung*” was thus only conceivable through the firm integration with the West.

Brandt also concentrated on reducing the military confrontation through disarmament and troop reductions. The federal government participated in the CSCE from July 1973. The conference closed on 1 August 1975 with the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by all participating states (all European states except of Albania, and Canada and the US). The aim was a definition of the territorial status quo in Europe. The formulation “peaceful change” was however from the FRG's point of view still compatible with keeping the option open for a German reunification. The humanitarian principles of the final act's chapter VII were thus also signed by the GDR and the Eastern European states and symbolised in the late 1980s the very important reinsurance for the civil rights movements in different Eastern European states.<sup>66</sup> From the autumn 1973 the FRG participated in the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact on Mutual Balanced Forces Reductions (MBFR), which was joined by only twelve NATO countries and seven members of the Warsaw pact. Brandt's aim of a Europeanisation of the détente between the superpowers was not dependent on France's attitude

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<sup>63</sup>The Treaty of Prague was ratified on 20 June 1974.

<sup>64</sup>KRONENBERG (2009), p. 27.

<sup>65</sup>KRONENBERG (2009), p. 27. Author's translation.

<sup>66</sup>KRONENBERG (2009), p. 26.

but on the collaboration with the US and the agreement with the Soviet Union. However even one year after the signing of the CSCE final act the Soviet Union set out to site intermediate-range missiles type SS-20. Chancellor Schmidt as one of the first demanded a Western rearmament if the negotiations on armament reductions should not succeed. The most important heads of government met in Guadeloupe in January 1979 and created the basis of the so NATO “Double Track” decision of December 1979 which signalled both the Western preparedness to mutual disarmament on the one hand, and the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles type Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe on the other hand if the negotiation talks should fail. Chancellor Schmidt supported this position despite massive domestic protests, and also within the SPD. The NATO “double track” decision ultimately also contributed to Schmidt falling through as a chancellor due to decreasing support in his own party.<sup>67</sup>

Hans-Dietrich Genscher continued as a FM under chancellor Kohl, who seized power in October 1982, and thus signalled continuity in foreign policy. Kohl committed himself to both parts of the NATO “double track” decision already in his first declaration of government, i.e. also the deployment of Pershing missiles on German ground and declared the Atlantic security alliance to be the central point of German reason of state. He also confirmed the will to pursue an “active peace policy” towards Central- and Eastern Europe. On 22 November 1983 was the decision of deployment taken despite the largest mass protests in the history of the federal republic.<sup>68</sup>

“This enforcement, a symbol of the reliability and predictability towards NATO was a political show of strength which Kohl and Genscher dared to accomplish as a “proof of alliance loyalty” (Wolfram F. Hanrieder) - and to which they could refer to again and again in the following years, particularly in the course of the negotiations on the German reunification in 1990.”<sup>69</sup>

The Kohl government was moreover sceptical towards US president Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) as well as the confrontational US policy towards Moscow and rather hoped for a détente policy through substantial eco-

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<sup>67</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 27.

<sup>68</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 28.

<sup>69</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 28.

conomic contacts towards the East.<sup>70</sup>

#### 1.1.4. The German reunification

The “Two Plus Four talks” on the international aspects of German unification between the FRG, the GDR, the US, the UK, France and the Soviet Union began on 5 May 1990 and were finalised on 12 September with the signing of the “Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany”<sup>71</sup> (Two Plus Four Agreement) which replaced the allied reservation rights. Germany regained its full sovereignty and became a completely equal partner in the international system. The preconditions of the Soviet acceptance of the German reunification were the acknowledgement of the sanctity of the European borders, payments of economic aid to the Soviet Union as well as a German preparedness to stay outside NATO. The latter was on the other hand a core claim of the US. However the negotiators managed to modify the Soviet claims through a solid economic package from the FRG to the Soviet Union. The NATO defence strategy was also revised and thus made a German reunification in peace and freedom possible on 3 October 1990 after a free federal election. The GDR was joined the ambit of the Grundgesetz due to article 23 GG. In the Two Plus Four Agreement Germany’s borders were defined as final, and Germany again let go of the right the right to produce or possess ABC weapons. Moreover an upper limit of the Bundeswehr was set to 370 000 men and women.<sup>72</sup> The reduction of the number of soldiers was to be accomplished within three to four years according to a declaration of both German states (August 1990) in the frame of the CFE Treaty. The *Bundeswehr* was furthermore only allowed to be mobilised in accordance with the German constitution and the UN charter.

The reunited Federal Republic was free to choose its alliance, and thus stayed a member of NATO. The West German foreign policy aims of reunification and a full reintegration in the international community were thus accomplished. In a separate treaty between Germany and Poland, the Oder-Neiße-border was con-

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<sup>70</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), p. 28.

<sup>71</sup>“Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland”.

<sup>72</sup> KRONENBERG (2009), pp. 28-31.

firmed as the final border. The preamble of the Two Plus Four Treaty confirms the preparedness of consolidating world peace in accordance with the UN charter and values Germany's unification with its full sovereignty as a contribution to peace and stability in Europe.

An agreement with the Soviet Union was also reached in regards to a pull-out of the Soviet troops until the end of 1994. A deployment or relocation of nuclear weapons and foreign armed forces were furthermore prohibited after the accomplished Soviet redrawing. Moreover, the process leading to German unity enabled both the integration of the five former East German states into the ambit of the *Grundgesetz* as well as the integration of the united Germany in a deepening European community. In this process, Germany was addicted to the continuation and acceleration of European integration. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 and the created European Union was thus also a qualitative jump which was rooted in the German unification.<sup>73</sup> The demands for a German mediator role between the present, the new and the future members were significantly increasing in the early 1990s. The regaining of its full political freedom of action made Germany a new exporter of security and moved the country in Europe's middle - geographically, politically and economically.

With the German reunification, the West German strategy of multilateralism, both Atlantic and European, proved of value. Although the frames of German foreign policy changed, there has largely been assessed a constituent German foreign policy after reunification.<sup>74</sup> An important exemption is the change in military policy. In addition, the picture changes somewhat when focus is directed to the connectivity between the German past and German foreign policy. The conciliation policy pursued by all West German governments did not abruptly end with reunification but went through processes of change during the 1990s. First, there was a decreasing power of the past as a main point of orientation to foreign policy making. This became apparent both in the German debate and in the attitudes of Germany's neighbours. Secondly, there has been a trend towards a "Europeanisation" also of the Holocaust commemoration, which has changed both the German self-perception and how Germany is perceived by other nations

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<sup>73</sup> WEIDENFELD (2007), p. 120.

<sup>74</sup> RITTBERGER (2001).

as a political actor.<sup>75</sup>

The development from a broad anti-military consensus, which was apparent during the Gulf war in 1991, to a recommendation of a military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 did basically take place among the political élite. Here, both the changed expectations of Germany's allies and a break in the collective memory are according to Schwelling important explanations for the change of attitude in this short period of time.<sup>76</sup> Moreover, chancellor Gerhard Schröder used key terms as “self-confidence of a grown-up nation”, “normality”, and “German interests” and contributed to a loss of importance in regards to the German past and its implications for German foreign policy.<sup>77</sup> He proclaimed a “German way” during the Iraq conflict, insisted on a permanent seat in the UN security council and furthermore described Germany as a “great power”.<sup>78</sup> The post-unification German foreign policy is further analysed in the following chapters 1.2 and 2.

### 1.1.5. Foreign relations with Norway and Sweden

As far as foreign relations between the Scandinavian states and Germany are concerned, this is very much a question of the small states' relations with and policy on Germany. If the perspective is reversed, there is not much to say simply because there is not much focus in Germany on neither Norway nor Sweden. Former chancellor Helmut Schmidt, as an example, devoted less than seven pages to the “taciturn Norwegians” in a book of more than 1000 pages.<sup>79</sup> Nonetheless, Germany's *Wiedergutmachungspolitik* after the Second World War also applied to Norway, but it took more than confidence-building multilateralism to restore the political relationship with Norway (in particular) and Sweden. The great cultural influence of Germany in the Scandinavian countries prior to the Second World War, and with it the German language, has not been able to regain a similar role. History is an important factor when the German-Scandinavian relations are assessed. These compose the important basis when Germany's importance to

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<sup>75</sup> SCHWELLING (2007), p. 104.

<sup>76</sup> SCHWELLING (2007), p. 104.

<sup>77</sup> SCHWELLING (2007), p. 109.

<sup>78</sup> See PETERS (2001), p. 32, footnote 3.

<sup>79</sup> GILBERG/DREWS (1993), p. 147.

Norwegian and Sweden foreign policies is assessed.

#### 1.1.5.1. Norway

Norway is historically attached to two European powers in particular, the UK and Germany. The Anglo-Saxon direction was substantiated after 1945. The Norwegians had their resistance headquarter in London during the Second World War. Additionally, Norway was historically a nation of merchant shipping and thus dependent on cooperation with the British. However, if the perspective is broadened, German territories have been more important to the developments in Norway. The Hanseatic League linked Western and Northern Norway to a European trading system with its centre in Lübeck by the Baltic Sea in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. Knowledge of mining thus came to Norway. Copenhagen had very close connections to German territory in the south, continued to be the Norwegian political and cultural centre,<sup>80</sup> and as a result the most important academic, cultural and religious incentives in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries came from Germany and German territories. The Norwegian church, the military tradition, the tradition of the civil services and the university system are some of the elements with strong German incentives. When Norway finally got a university in 1811, the complete model of organisation was taken from the Humboldt-University in Berlin. The German influence on the Norwegian university tradition is assessed by Inge Lønning, Norwegian parliamentarian and former principal of the University in Oslo:

“German influences had a very strong impact on the Norwegian church, and already during the time of the reformation, there were many Norwegians studying in Wittenberg, and later at the north German universities of Rostock and Greifswald. (...) The first Norwegian student in Rostock was matriculated in 1435, and the intriguing part of it is that it is a reminder of the fact that the most important influences to Norway from Europe, and from Germany in particular, were brought home by the youth and the students. Student mobility was of course tremendously higher than it is today, and the reason was naturally that there was no university in Norway, so those who wanted an education had to venture out on the [European]continent.”<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup>Norway belonged to the Kingdom of Denmark from 1536 to 1814.

<sup>81</sup>Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Norsk kirke ble jo veldig sterkt preget av impulsen fra Tyskland, og det var

By contrast, Jervell refers to the German occupation 1940-1945 as a “mental humiliation of a young nation.”<sup>82</sup> The Norwegian post-war society was affected by a deep scepticism towards Germany. Especially the political elite and the media took long to get over this reluctance. Norway announced the formal termination of the state of war with Germany in July 1951. In 1953, Norway’s occupation force of 6000 soldiers was withdrawn from northern Germany. A restitution treaty with Norway was furthermore signed in August 1959.<sup>83</sup> Unlike the slow resumption of political cooperation, which first gained momentum in the 1970s, the secret services in both countries developed contacts early in the postwar period. They cooperated especially in the north, e.g. in Finnish-speaking areas. The cooperation could take place without much clearance from political authorities.<sup>84</sup> The defence of the northern part of Germany was furthermore subject to the Kolsås NATO command near Oslo whereas the German navy had the defence of southern Norway as a special task. For most of the 1950s and 1960s, NATO was the basis of Norway’s relations with Germany.

Norwegian governments postponed the process of normalisation and thus contributed to maintain the negative sentiment towards the Germans. This reluctance continued longer in Norway than in other European countries with corresponding experiences with the Nazi regime. Moreover, Norwegian political parties disregarded opportunities to make good contacts with German colleagues. Nevertheless, close contact existed between Norwegian and German politicians in the 1970s and 1980s in questions concerning foreign and security policy. This was especially the case with politicians from the social democratic parties, the Norwegian Labour party (DNA) and the German social democratic party, SPD. Knut Frydenlund, Thorvald Stoltenberg, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Thorbjørn Jagland were most active on the Norwegian side, Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr and Karsten Voigt on behalf of the SPD. Although this was a small number of politi-

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mange norske studenter som studerte i Wittenberg allerede på reformasjonstiden, og siden ved de nordtyske universitetene Rostock og Greifswald. (...) Den første norske studenten i Rostock hadde skrevet seg inn i 1435. Og det interessante ved det er at det er jo en påminnelse om, de viktigste impulsene Norge hentet hjem fra Europa og særlig fra Tyskland, det var jo gjennom ungdommen og studentene den gang. Og studentmobiliteten var jo eventyrlig mye høyere enn i dag. Og det skyldes selvfølgelig at det fantes ikke noe universitet i Norge, så de som ønsket å få utdanning ble nødt til å begi seg ut på kontinentet.”

<sup>82</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 87 [author’s translation].

<sup>83</sup> GILBERG/DREWS (1993), pp. 145-146.

<sup>84</sup> JERVELL (2003), pp. 88-89.



cians, it was an important network for Norway. Willoch from the Conservative Party (Høyre), was one of the first Norwegian politicians who saw the necessity of a reestablished cooperation with Germany. Helmut Kohl and Willoch met frequently and had a good relationship, both as opposition leaders and heads of government.<sup>85</sup> The greatest impact on Germany's improved reputation in Norway and Scandinavia as such was the election of Willy Brandt to West Germany's chancellor in 1969. Brandt came to Norway as a young political refugee, joined the anti-Nazi resistance, married a Norwegian woman, acquired citizenship, and returned to Germany as a Norwegian foreign service officer in January 1947. Willy Brandt was thus perceived as invaluable for the improvement of Norwegian-German relations, and he definitely brought particular preconditions for a breakthrough in Norwegian-German relations. The political course corrections he made also contributed to the creation of "particular relations" with Norway.<sup>86</sup> Interestingly, the change of government in West Germany also changed the Norwegian position on European policy. The Norwegian social democrats now saw a possibility of improving the social democratic influence on European cooperation. This delivered the political reasons needed for an approval of a Norwegian accession to the EEC. At the same time, Brandt both as a FM and chancellor engaged in the particular problems of the Scandinavian states.<sup>87</sup> In fact, Germany became Norway's most important ally in the country's efforts to obtain access to the EEC. Although the improved relations were rather ignored by the public also in the following years, the consciousness of a particular relationship was growing in the political-administrative circles.<sup>88</sup> Brandt used his positions as FM and chancellor to stress the political importance of the inclusion of the Nordic countries in the Community within the German government and also engaged in Norwegian and Scandinavian issues in the dialogue with European colleagues. According to a contemporary British diplomat, Brandt's efforts in the negotiations on fishery led to the acceptance by all participants of Norway's classification as a *special case*. Allers' examination of German-Norwegian relations from 1966 to 1974 also show, however, that Brandt's efforts were liable to limits both in regards to domestic policy and the interests of other European

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<sup>85</sup> JERVELL (2003).

<sup>86</sup> ALLERS (2009), p. 393.

<sup>87</sup> ALLERS (2009), p. 393.

<sup>88</sup> ALLERS (2009), p. 389.

countries.<sup>89</sup>

After Norway's negative referendum on EC membership in 1972, the bilateral relations did not develop or intensify much further. Germany showed little interest in Norwegian affairs. Moreover, the real normalisation first occurred with the large agreements on natural gas in the 1980s.<sup>90</sup> According to Lønning, the symbolic turning point that brought the relationship Norway - Germany back on the track it had followed through centuries can be dated quite exactly to the state visit of then Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU) to Norway in 1986. It was not the first state visit after the Second World War but it was the first that was followed closely by the media. King Olav V of Norway and von Weizsäcker were brought to the town of Elverum, which had been the most dramatic location of 9 April 1940 when the German ambassador came from Oslo to meet King Haakon VII and demanded an unconditioned capitulation.<sup>91</sup> "And this was King Olav's personal idea, not the State Department's. (...) He wanted to show on this specific place that this chapter was in a way finished, and a new chapter was opened in the relationship between Norway and Germany."<sup>92</sup> Thereafter, the Norwegian-German relations have not only gone back to business as usual but have had an especially positive development compared to Norway's other bilateral relations. Here, Lønning stresses the solid historic lines. "It certainly is an imposing demonstration that such historic lines of tradition are far more persistent and strong than what one would think. It takes more than a break of a few decades to erase them."<sup>93</sup> The state visit did, however, not change the pattern of the relationship, being "friendly, stable, and predictable but not very dynamic."<sup>94</sup> In the realm of military matters, it was not until February 1990 that a large contingent of German soldiers were allowed to participate in NATO's

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<sup>89</sup> ALLERS (2009), p. 402.

<sup>90</sup> JERVELL (2003), p. 87.

<sup>91</sup> King Haakon, however, refused to comply with German demands to appoint a new government under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling and thus, together with the government, left the country on 7 June 1940 before the Norwegian capitulation of 10 June.

<sup>92</sup> Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: "Og det var jo Kong Olavs personlige idé, ikke UDs. (...) Han ønsket å markere akkurat på det stedet at nå er på en måte det kapitlet avslutta og nå har vi begynt på et nytt kapittel i forholdet mellom Norge og Tyskland."

<sup>93</sup> Inge Lønning, interview with author, 17 June 2009, Oslo. Author's translation. Statement in Norwegian: "Det er ihvertfall en inntrykksfull demonstrasjon av at sanne historiske tradisjonslinjer, de er mer seiglivede og sterke enn man tror. Det skal mer til enn et avbrekk på noen tiår for å utradere."

<sup>94</sup> GILBERG/DREWS (1993), p. 147.

winter maneuvers on Norwegian soil. This despite the fact that West Germany and Norway had cooperated on military matters ever since the German NATO membership of 1955.<sup>95</sup> The conclusion made by Gilberg and Drews can thus be approved of:

“Norwegian-German relations have been a function of Oslo’s perception of, and response to, the postwar world order.”<sup>96</sup>

#### 1.1.5.2. Sweden

For centuries, Sweden was more aggressive towards Germany than the other way around as Germany in its various forms never attacked Swedish territory. During the Thirty Years War, into which king Gustav Adolf brought Sweden in 1630, his soldiers spread fear and terror on German territory. There are many examples of Swedish influence, particularly in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, beginning with the various acquisitions under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. King Karl XII ruled over Saxony in 1704, and the southern coast of the Baltic Sea was Swedish territory for a short period of time. West Pomerania was a Swedish province from 1648 to 1815, which was a longer period than the Prussian one later on. And finally, the city of Wismar formally belonged to Sweden until 1903. Sweden had lost most of its north German possessions to Hanover and Prussia by 1720, and the Swedish glory vanished in the 18th century as Russia and the North German states grew stronger and disintegrated the Swedish hegemony in the Baltic. Nevertheless, Swedish influence remained. An important factor in German-Swedish relations was royal marriages and the role of the nobility in foreign relations.

Swedish-German trade flourished in the late 19th century and economic growth in Sweden was closely linked to developments in Germany. The Ruhr area’s need of an iron ore for its iron and steel industry gave Sweden a powerful ally in the south. As Salmon points out, Germany was more dependent on Swedish iron ore than Sweden on German industrial goods.<sup>97</sup> The Emperor Wilhelm II was

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<sup>95</sup> GILBERG/DREWS (1993), p. 142.

<sup>96</sup> GILBERG/DREWS (1993), p. 144.

<sup>97</sup> SALMON (1997), p. 37.

interested in creating a Zollverein to formalise his country's economic relations with Sweden, that he wished to turn into a German federal state. Conservative Swedes on the other hand favoured a partnership with Germany in order to achieve hegemony in northern Europe.<sup>98</sup> The fear of the Soviet Union and scepticism toward the entente enforced the traditional pro-German attitudes of the Swedish elite. Sweden lost Finland to Russia in 1809 and since then, Russia had become a very close neighbour not least because they controlled the Åland islands situated not very far from Stockholm. In the event of a Russo-German war, Sweden preferred a German victory. Nevertheless, public opinion in Sweden was divided and the Social Democrats favoured the Western powers. As the Åland islands are concerned, the German Emperor offered king Gustav his support for a Swedish occupation if Sweden supported Germany with iron exports.<sup>99</sup>

During the Second World War, Sweden practised a "friendly-minded neutrality" towards Germany. According to Arter,

"commercial cross-pressures strained Swedish neutrality to the limit and beyond. At the start of hostilities the German steel industry was based on annual imports of around 20 million tons of iron ore, almost half of it emanating from Sweden. Since steel was a crucial material for war production, the Allies exerted strong pressure on Sweden to terminate supplies to Hitler."<sup>100</sup>

Sweden permitted the transit of the Engelbrecht division consisting of 14 712 armed troops across Sweden to join *Operation Barbarossa* against the Soviet Union. This decision sharply divided the four-party coalition and the *Riksdag*. Further, between June 1940 and August 1943 approximately 2 140 000 German soldiers on leave were permitted to cross through Sweden travelling to and from Norway and Finland. Germans were even allowed to mine the Sound on the Swedish side. The concession policy ceased as the war went on. The transit agreement was cancelled in July 1943, and the transportation of troops and war materials came to an end in August the same year.<sup>101</sup> Sweden feared the prospect of a postwar northern Europe totally dominated by the Soviet Union and thus balanced a policy which responded to wartime circumstances but focused on the

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<sup>98</sup> SALMON (1997), pp. 49-50.

<sup>99</sup> ARTER (1999), pp. 258-261.

<sup>100</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 272.

<sup>101</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 272.

postwar future. The only long-term perspective for a Great Power balance in the Baltic was a place for a democratic Germany in the postwar order. Also, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, wartime refugees in Sweden, were writing to Washington about how Germany and Austria as new democracies should be integrated in the allies' plans for the postwar world.<sup>102</sup>

Nonetheless, the war changed the perspective on Germany in Sweden as well, and despite the traditional German influence on Swedish society, the Western reorientation was in its effectiveness impressively accomplished. August Strindberg once described Sweden as a 'German colony' and the Swedish language as 'plattdeutsch'<sup>103</sup>, divided into twelve dialects'. An example from the beginning of the current decade that perfectly characterises the Anglo-Saxon reorientation in Sweden was the maiden speech of the director of the Goethe institute in Stockholm, that was held in English in front of a German speaking audience.<sup>104</sup>

The Social Democratic parties in Sweden and West Germany re-established industrial relations during the years of the *Wirtschaftswunder*. As Swedish governments were considering joining the EC in the 1960s and 1970s, connections between the governing social democrats in Sweden and West Germany were equally important.<sup>105</sup> In addition to good connections between sister parties in both countries, good relations also developed between trade unions and other organised interests.<sup>106</sup> In times of economic recession, the value of a healthy Common Market based on an expanding West German economy and stable political relations between France and Germany were stressed as particularly important for Sweden's economic recovery.

"Sweden had long recognized the 'Bonn-Paris axis' in the EC, but even if French President de Gaulle often made the headlines, it was West Germany that was regarded as more important and politically, economically as well as culturally closer to Sweden."<sup>107</sup>

Furthermore, unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden had focus on East Germany.

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<sup>102</sup> KOBLIK (1993), p. 167.

<sup>103</sup> Low German.

<sup>104</sup> LEITNER (2004).

<sup>105</sup> LINDAHL (2002), pp. 159-160.

<sup>106</sup> LINDAHL (2002), p. 165.

<sup>107</sup> LINDAHL (2002), p. 160.

The Scandinavian Left saw the GDR as an example of ‘successful socialism’ (‘gelungener Realsozialismus’) in some realms. Sweden’s and Finland’s positions as neutral countries made it easier to have a certain level of exchange with East German institutions. In the 1960s there was academic contact between the two Nordic countries and the GDR through the universities of Rostock and Greifswald. Both Sweden and Finland officially visited the East German regime and strongly supported the West German *Ostpolitik*, which was perceived to be very important for the political and military situation in northern Europe. The normalisation achieved opened up for increased contact with the GDR and prospects of Baltic Sea cooperation.<sup>108</sup>

## 1.2. Basic principles and structures

### 1.2.1. European developments

Dislimitation proceses have changed the policy fields of great importance to the West-German foreign policy of the 1980s. The development of the European Union and its influence on German foreign policy will be assessed in the following because it is the most important dislimitation process German foreign policy is facing. It is the frame comprising German foreign policy.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1991) added the EMU and a political union to the Single Market. The European Union became an integrated structure of supranational institutions and communitarised policies as well as intergovernmental task fields. The EU thus consisted of three pillars, the EC, the CFSP, as well as the Cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs. From a German point of view this was a significant progress in the European unification process. However, it became clear that the historical founded will of integration, which until now had been supported by the majority of the German population, for the first time reached its domestic limits. The German will of further integration was however continued by the disposition to abstain from the Deutsche Mark.<sup>109</sup> The EU was

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<sup>108</sup> LINDAHL (2002), p. 165.

<sup>109</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 136.

enlarged by totally twelve new member states from 2004 to 2007. The necessary institutional changes due to this process were aimed at but the Treaties of Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2000) did not bring upon any essential new direction of the institutional context of the EU Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon was an example of a further integration of the different political and judicial levels of decision in the frame of the EU.<sup>110</sup>

Did anybody suggest to reconsider the policy of European integration on the terms created by the post-war period? Did anybody question the compatibility of the basis on which European integration was built with the European dissimilarities? Was the fear of the Germans and war in Europe and the German fear of itself still the main reason behind European integration? The European project and German European policy has not been questioned. Germany had come to term with its world war past, this is at least true for its Western half, but the same reflection has not taken place in regards to the Cold War period. The German reunification was thus followed by a discussion on whether Germany should be more conscious of its foreign policy power. Germany's future in international organisations was also part of the discussions. Both the German government as well as the opposition stressed the continuity of German foreign policy priorities. From the mid-1990s however, a "creeping change of paradigm" has been visible up to a more independent German foreign policy.<sup>111</sup> Signs of a "national policy of interests" were recognisable. However, the insight that it would now be the time to simply trust the Germans because they have proven to be trustworthy, which would be the logical conclusion if the Cold War period would be the basis of the assessment, did not prevail. The legitimacy to reconsider Germany's success story in order to make further improvements seems to have been non-existent, and thus German policy is condemned to overlook the policy lines which need to change due to new times. The "easiest" way is simply to adjust to new circumstances without having an aim of its policy.

The problems which follow such a policy strategy, or rather the lack of a such, becomes clear during the current European euro- and debt crisis. Meantime

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<sup>110</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), pp. 136-137. On the legal order and the institutional organisation of the EU see HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), pp. 138-148.

<sup>111</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 149.

Germany again stands alone in Europe as a negative power factor. This time it is only a war fought with money. Germany apparently gets the power whether it wants it or not, despite being in a union with several other states. Is it then not time to question the union? The problem is the superior forms of cooperation: it is not defined how Europe must cooperate. There is no structure in the EU on the distribution of power and thus there is no tool for governing the European integration. Is the EU supposed to be a controlling organ or is it about superior cooperation? Is it a community of sovereign states or is it supranational? The EU has a legal basis but there is nonetheless a lack of a common platform. What is the EU good for? Is the aim to get the best out of each country? If the answer to the latter is yes, then the question is how to achieve this. The Germans would like to abstain from its sovereignty because of its self-extinguishing philosophy, but they are probably the only state in Europe. If the other states still want to be sovereign, then why does integration has to be implemented by a jungle of rules? Does the current policy of integration allow for the *fact* that every member state is different from the other? The lacking ability to create a common platform, which is a consequence of the fact that no balance has been drawn, now culminates in the European debt crisis. Germany thus needs to take the dispute now. The EU needs to clarify how the cooperation will look like also in regards to the failing power distribution. To simply invent new governing instruments for the economic and monetary cooperation would be to take the symptoms as initial point for a new strategy. A reconsideration of the whole philosophy of European integration is necessary.

### 1.2.2. Normative foundation and structural preconditions

The German constitution, the *Grundgesetz*, comprises the basic guidelines and rules for German foreign policy. Already the first sentence of the preamble refers to the three oldest and most important guidelines of federal foreign policy:

“als gleichberechtigtes Glied in einem vereinten Europa dem Frieden der Welt zu dienen”.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>112</sup>*Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stand: September 2010)* at <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10060000.pdf>



This peace postulate is furthermore substantiated through article 26 para 1 GG:

“Handlungen, die geeignet sind und in der Absicht vorgenommen werden, das friedliche Zusammenleben der Völker zu stören, insbesondere die Führung eines Angriffskrieges vorzubereiten, sind verfassungswidrig. Sie sind unter Strafe zu stellen.”

Moreover article 24 para 2 GG states Germany’s preparedness

“sich zur Wahrung des Friedens einem System gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit einordnen; er wird hierbei in die Beschränkungen seiner Hoheitsrechte einwilligen, die eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa und zwischen den Völkern der Welt herbeiführen und sichern”.<sup>113</sup>

Article 23, which was reformulated because of the creation of the EU in 1992, commits Germany to the further development of the EU and allows for the transfer of sovereign rights to the EU through law-making provided that the Bundesrat and the German states are closely involved in the process. On the other hand article 23 also creates obstacles to the relocation of constitutional rights in favour of the EU because a two-thirds majority is required.<sup>114</sup> Article 25 GG establishes the primacy of international law over national law, and article 9 para 2 GG forbids associations which turn against the thought of international understanding. An “open multilateralism”, i.e. the preparedness to accept cooperation based on rules and a balance of interests with several international partners, is thus firmly anchored in the normative basis of German foreign policy.<sup>115</sup> The articles 23 - 26 GG and some basic rights are the so called substantive (*materielle*) specifications which comprise the limits of policy making. Procedural (*verfahrensrechtliche*) rules on the other hand decide what governmental bodies are in charge of foreign policy actions and what other governmental bodies they have to collaborate with.<sup>116</sup>

As the previous chapter shows, the federal republic from the very beginning established itself as a state which rejected any striving for dominance and aggression, and rather displaced this through cooperation on the basis of common norms and

<sup>113</sup> *Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Stand: September 2010)* at <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/10060000.pdf>

<sup>114</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 6.

<sup>115</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 6.

<sup>116</sup> WOLFRUM (2007), p. 157.

institutions. The term “Zivilmacht” (Hanns Maull) characterised this direction of (West) German foreign policy. Germany has thus experienced that restraint in regard to the country’s own power potential rather continuously increases the German influence.<sup>117</sup> If the NATO countries are grouped according to their willingness to use military power as a political tool, Germany and Great Britain have represented the anti poles in Europe. Most analysts of German post-unification security policy moreover stress the continuity in German security policy, i.e. multilateralism and aloofness when it comes to use military force.<sup>118</sup> Due to changes after 1990 Germany has however been forced to modify its identity as a civil power. As its allies pushed for a German military engagement, Berlin had to decide whether the policy of restraint should be continued or whether it should place a higher value on the relationship with its allies, the so called “Bündnisraisonverpflichtung”. According to Varwick, the Gulf war of 1990/91 was the “hour of birth” of a new conflict on what direction German foreign policy should take. The leadership of CDU/CSU was basically willing to conform to US expectations in regards to military participation in missions outside NATO territory but could not accomplish such a policy change within the coalition with the FDP. The latter pursued a constitutional interpretation which assessed a deployment of the *Bundeswehr* outside the NATO ambit to be incompatible with the *Grundgesetz*. The party was prepared to agree to a constitutional change, but this would not be possible without the approval of the largest opposition party, the SPD, which together with the Greens and the PDS followed the line of the German peace movement and criticised the US approach in the Gulf and thus disapproved of the theoretical possibility of a German participation in combat operations abroad.<sup>119</sup>

The policy statements of the political parties mirror the dissent over this topic. Point 129 of the CDU policy statements of 1994 says the following:

“We Germans are prepared and capable of fulfilling increased foreign political responsibility. Germany must like all other partners participate in the European defence and the common tasks in the frame of the NATO alliance. Germany must be able to fully realise its rights and duties which it has adopted through the accession to the UN. We wish that Germany can participate in the frame of the UN Charter in the actions of the UN,

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<sup>117</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 7.

<sup>118</sup> See BAUMANN (2001), pp. 141-142.

<sup>119</sup> VARWICK (2007), pp. 274-275.

NATO, WEU and the CSCE to the keep *and restore* peace.<sup>120</sup>

In 1997, the FDP policy statements “Wiesbadener Grundsätze” includes the following passage of importance:

“International law cannot protect itself. It must be protected by the community of free constitutional states. Those which decline to secure peace and freedom also with military means in case of need, leave the people in the lurch. Who murders, tortures and rapes should not be allowed to feel safe anywhere. War criminals belong in an international court of law.”<sup>121</sup>

Thus, both the CDU and the FDP express a position compatible with solidarist principles in the question of whether the good international citizen is entitled to defend human rights by using force. The German parties took up the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and a broad consensus developed “that the *Bundeswehr* should participate in multilateral peace-keeping operations with a strong peacekeeping character.”<sup>122</sup> Whereas the CDU and CSU demanded the participation in both forms of operations, the FDP initially only endorsed participation in peacekeeping operations and did not support combat operations before 1994.<sup>123</sup>

The SPD on the other hand dismissed through a party conference decision on the “perspectives of a new foreign and security policy” both the “militarisation of the European Union” and the participation of the *Bundeswehr* in deployments which exceed the peacekeeping missions of the UN.<sup>124</sup> Even in such limited cases, the SPD underlined the necessity of a constitutional change.<sup>125</sup> The SPD also approved of peace-keeping operations and humanitarian operations in 1994, but NATO-led operations including the use of force were not embraced until 1998, and the imprecise term ‘peace missions’ was used.<sup>126</sup> The SPD did not openly favour multilateral combat operations at this point of time. The Greens opened up to peacekeeping operations as late as 1998, and the PDS opposed any *Bundeswehr*

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<sup>120</sup>Cited in <http://www.grundsatzprogramm.cdu.de/doc/grundsatzprogramm.pdf> (Author’s translation, author’s accentuation).

<sup>121</sup>Cited in <http://www.fdp-bundespartei.de/files/363/wiesbadg.pdf> (author’s translation).

<sup>122</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 167.

<sup>123</sup>Cited in BAUMANN (2001), p. 167.

<sup>124</sup>Cited in VARWICK (2007), p. 275.

<sup>125</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 275.

<sup>126</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 167.

deployment outside German territory.<sup>127</sup> All the supporters of out-of-area operations moreover stressed the necessity of a firm international legal basis, of which the most important is a mandate from the UN Security Council.<sup>128</sup> As Baumann underlines with the example of the SPD's support for the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (SFOR), which was technically a combat operation but could be titled a 'robust peacekeeping' operation,

“the crucial point is not whether an operation falls under chapter VII of the UN charter. Rather, the operation needs to have a strong peacekeeping character for German participation to be consistent with societal norms.”<sup>129</sup>

In the question of *Bundeswehr* deployments abroad, i.e. combat operations, a conflict on basic principles in regards to Germany's role in foreign policy is revealed according to Varwick. The question was whether Germany should normalise its foreign policy behaviour and thus bring its policy more in line with other European middle-sized powers also in the case of military deployments. The alternative would have been taking a role as a “civiliser” of international relations in line with the political tradition of the left parties.<sup>130</sup> The Federal Constitutional Court decided in 1994 that the *Bundeswehr* is allowed to participate in out-of-area operations within the framework of collective security as long as the *Bundestag* approves of it.<sup>131</sup> Moreover, NATO was considered by this court to be a system of collective security. The constitutional limits are on the other hand also at hand: “German participation within a collective security system must serve the maintenance of peace (art. 24 para 2 GG); the fundamental rules of international law are part of German federal law (art. 25 GG); and preparation of a war of aggression is unconstitutional (art. 26 para. 1 GG).”<sup>132</sup>

The massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995 was the turning point in the value conflict between human rights and peace. Military missions aiming at the defence of human rights became legitimate, and this resulted in the deployment of German bombers in the Kosovo war of 1999. It was now more the duty of Germany to defend human rights, if necessary also with military means. This is exemplified by

<sup>127</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 167.

<sup>128</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 168.

<sup>129</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 168.

<sup>130</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 275.

<sup>131</sup> See chapter 1.3.7 of this part.

<sup>132</sup> BAUMANN (2001), pp.166-167.

the considerations made by then FM Fischer, whose statement made on 7 April 1999 reflects the value conflict which sometimes exists between human rights and peace: “Ich habe nicht nur gelernt: Nie wieder Krieg. Ich habe auch gelernt: Nie wieder Auschwitz.” As Varwick comments, whereas the historical heritage from the Second World War had been used to legitimise the policy of civilisation in international relations, Germany was now presumed to be obliged to protect human rights worldwide also with military means if necessary.<sup>133</sup>

The development in the 1990s thus developed from no troops (1990-1991) to non-combat troops (1992-1996) and combat troops (1996-1999).<sup>134</sup> Most of the out-of-area operations Germany participated in were legitimised by the UN Security Council acting under chapter VII of the UN Charter. The important exception in the case of Germany was the air strikes against Serbia and Montenegro in the Kosovo conflict. There was no resolution made by the Security Council which legitimised the air strikes, and thus the legal basis for this operation was questionable.<sup>135</sup> Testing the predicative power of constructivism as a foreign policy theory, Baumann notes that the

“importance of observing international law is stressed both at the societal level and in Germany’s international environment. Still, Germany has participated in a combat operation that may have violated one of the core elements of international law, i.e. art. 2 para. 4 of the UN Charter. Even if we accept that, in the Kosovo conflict, Germany acted in line with a norm calling for humanitarian intervention, it would remain a puzzle for constructivism why Germany has given priority to such a norm over one of the cornerstones of the international order, even more so because German participation does not rest on an established societal normative consensus.”<sup>136</sup>

The German government thus cut across “the domestic normative consensus” e.g. in regards to the deployment of combat troops with SFOR and in the war against Serbia and Montenegro.

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<sup>133</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 278.

<sup>134</sup> Since 1992, Germany has participated in the following NATO missions: the monitoring and enforcement of UN-mandated sanctions against (former) Yugoslavia (1992-96); the Implementation force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-96); the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-2005); the strikes against Iraq (1998); the air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Kosovo conflict (1998-99); the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) (since 1999) and the UN-mandated NATO-ISAF mission in Afghanistan (since 2003). The exception is the non-participation in the Iraq crisis of 1998.

<sup>135</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 175.

<sup>136</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 177.

“It is very plausible to assume that such steps have themselves shaped the development of the societal norm since the German public got used to engagements of the *Bundeswehr* step by step. This implies that, to some extent, the policy of the German government has been based on a deliberate strategy to accustom the German people gradually to out-of-area operations of the *Bundeswehr*. Apparently, for German decision makers the domestic norms operated as constraints they could not fully ignore but nevertheless tried to overcome slowly.”<sup>137</sup>

Whereas the German participation in Kosovo was legitimised by humanitarian considerations, this aspect was less articulated in the case of Afghanistan. Then minister of defence Peter Struck (SPD) made the famous and often criticised statement in 2003 that Germany’s security was being defended in the Hindu Kush.<sup>138</sup> The *White Paper on German Security and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (2006) also mentions national interest as a justification of military action, and the guarantee of free trade and energy security as one of the German forces’ tasks.<sup>139</sup>

The White Paper states that

“German security policy is forward-looking. The new risks and threats to Germany and Europe have their origin in regional and global developments, often far beyond the European area of stability. They are multifarious and dynamic, and will spread if not addressed promptly. Preventive security can hence be guaranteed most effectively through early warning and pre-emptive action, and must incorporate the entire range of security policy instruments.”<sup>140</sup>

This direction of German security policy is new. It is still however observable that German restraint in regards to military interventions is still existent, and the allies’ expectations are not always the crucial factor. Germany’s clear “no” to a war against Iraq in 2002 was a sign that the country still represents an antipole in regards to using military power as a political tool. Germany’s inactive attitude to the UN resolution 1973 (2011) on the situation in Libya, which “authorized Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of

<sup>137</sup> BAUMANN (2001), p. 178.

<sup>138</sup> Cited in MERZ (2007), pp. 1-2.

<sup>139</sup> Cited in MERZ (2007), pp. 1-2.

<sup>140</sup> German Ministry of Defence (2006): *White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* at [http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany\\_white\\_paper\\_2006.pdf](http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/germany_white_paper_2006.pdf)

any form on any part of Libyan territory”<sup>141</sup> is also an example of such restraint. Ten countries voted in favour the resolution whereas five (Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia) abstained from doing so. Whereas the first decision to a large extent was supported by both states and political commentators, the latter decision was sharply criticised not only by Germany’s Western allies but also by German politicians and commentators.<sup>142</sup>

According to Gareis however the German self-perception remains that of a “civil power” despite the increased implementation of military instruments.<sup>143</sup> Nonetheless, Germany can just as much be characterised as “Handelsstaat Deutschland” (Michael Staack) because it is existentially dependent on good and stable economic relations to as many states as possible. Trade associations as the “Deutsche Industrie- und Handelskammertag” (DIHK) and the “Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie” (BDI) but also companies from all the large German industry branches thus make efforts to contribute to prosperous political-diplomatic relations between Germany and its partners which also effect the economic cooperation. This picture becomes clear when the chancellor or the FM are accompanied by business delegations on their foreign travels abroad. Economic lobbyists often aim at a more cautious human rights policy towards attractive economic partners such as China, or favourable international standards in regards to social security, environment and climate in addition to advantageous market regulations. More than every fourth Euro is generated through the export of German products. Thus the importance of German foreign trade for the economic development and prosperity in Germany can not be overestimated.<sup>144</sup> German exports amounted to 1060 billion Euro in 2011 according to the Federal Statistic Office of Germany, 11,4 per cent more than in 2010.<sup>145</sup> However there has been a radical adjustment of the most important German business markets as a result of the European debt crisis. China has thus increased its percentage in German exports from three to six within a few years, and the Chinese economy is for the first time more impor-

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<sup>141</sup>UN Security Council (2011) at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>

<sup>142</sup>One example was previous FM Fischer who stated that the federal government’s dealing with the Libya conflict was perhaps the worst foreign policy debacle since the creation of the Federal Republic. Cited in *Spiegel Online* (2011) “Fischer rechnet mit Nachfolger Westerwelle ab”, 27 August at <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,782882,00.html>

<sup>143</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 7.

<sup>144</sup> GAREIS (2009), pp. 7-8.

<sup>145</sup>Cited in BELLER/ OHANIAN (2012).

tant than the Italian. With an export quota of 6,1 per cent China is number five among the most important trade partners of Germany and thus ranks dead level with Great Britain.<sup>146</sup> Germany's leading role in Europe has become increasingly clear with the Euro crisis, i.e. the European debt crisis. At the same time, regions outside Europe have become increasingly important to Germany as opposed to Europe from an economic, and ultimately also political, point of view.

This leads to the third picture of Germany as a foreign policy actor. In addition to being a "*Zivilmacht*" and "*Wirtschaftsmacht*" Germany can also be characterised as a "*Zentralmacht*". According to Janning, Germany's centrality in Europe appears in the economic geography through the movement of goods, exporting and importing structures and the development of the traffic volume. The political centrality is characterised by three factors:

1. Germany is present in more geographic spaces in the enlarged EU than any other large member state - in the Baltic Sea area, in Central-Eastern Europe, in the old core of Western Europe and also in the south of Europe due to Germany's economic power and the changing positions of other actors.
2. The ongoing European integration is domestically less disputed than in other large member states and is thus also more compatible with Germany's own role definition, although the degree of "diffuse acceptance" of integration is declining in Germany as well.
3. Germany's positions and preferences are more relevant than those of most other member states in a majority of the topics on the European agenda. The big exception and Germany's weakness is found in the security and defence policy.<sup>147</sup>

When analysing Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden, it is of minor importance whether Germany is defined as a *Zentralmacht*, a *Zivilmacht* or a *Wirtschaftsmacht* as long as it uses its *Macht* to consolidate the international society of states.

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<sup>146</sup> BELLER/ OHANIAN (2012).

<sup>147</sup> JANNING (2007), p. 756.



## 1.3. Actors and institutions

What characterises the political system of Germany is the prevailing existence of coalition governments, the accentuated role of the Federal Constitutional Court, the federal system as such as well as the particular role of the Bundesrat (Federal Council) and the increasing relocation of competences to the European level. This presupposes several negotiation processes which to a certain degree relativise the system of competitiveness between the political parties. In the following the institutions and actors of German foreign policy will be analysed which are regarded as the most important ones in the context of this thesis' topic.

### 1.3.1. The German Federal President

The German Federal Presidents have from the beginning represented the “core values” of German foreign policy rather than co-deciding the government's position in concrete questions.<sup>148</sup> As a soft power actor, the federal president can concentrate on the long lines and aims of foreign policy and of being the highest representative of democratic Germany.<sup>149</sup> The symbolic value of a federal president can even make a difference in Germany's foreign relations as shown by the example of Richard von Weizsäcker in chapter 1.1.5 of this part.

### 1.3.2. The Bundestag

There are first and foremost laws of instrumentality which are ascribed to the Bundestag because the federal government emanates from the majority of the parliament. Thus neither the constitution nor the political practice provide for any competition between a strong executive and a powerful parliament.<sup>150</sup> However, the Grundgesetz does not offer any terminal allocations of rights and duties, and the partition between the Bundestag's and the federal government's compe-

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<sup>148</sup>The Federal Presidents from 1949 on were Theodor Heuss (1949-1959), Heinrich Lübke (1959-1969), Gustav Heinemann (1969-1974), Walter Scheel (1974-1979), Karl Carstens (1979-1984), Richard von Weizsäcker (1984-1994), Roman Herzog (1994-1999), Johannes Rau (1999-2004), and Horst Köhler (2004-).

<sup>149</sup> JOCHUM (2007), p. 173.

<sup>150</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 10.

tencies does pose some problems in practice. As a basic principle, the creation of Germany's foreign relations is the responsibility of the federal government.<sup>151</sup> Also, the legal practice of the Federal Constitutional Court favour the federal government in regards to foreign policy making. The only two matters open to a stronger parliamentarisation are the participation in the further development of the EU and the foreign missions of the Bundeswehr (Federal Armed Forces).<sup>152</sup> The Grundgesetz also deals with potential conflicts of competence between the German federation and the German states, moreover the Bundestag (the Federal Parliament) and the Bundesrat (Federal Council).

The German Bundestag and its members have the right to address any foreign policy questions. This can be done in plenum as well as in the constitutional stipulated committees on foreign relations and defence (Article 45a GG) as well as the committee on European matters (Article 45).<sup>153</sup> The increasing number of departments in German ministries concerned with foreign affairs, and the increasing importance of the functional departments compared to the classical ministries of foreign relations, are also reflected in the Bundestag. Almost all functional committees of the Bundestag deal with foreign affairs issues in addition to the committee on foreign relations, the committee on economic cooperation and the defence committee. Based on this development is the traditional designation that the executive has the power of managing foreign relations increasingly disputable.<sup>154</sup> As mentioned above, the Bundestag is only allowed to intervene in the government's handling of foreign relations based on particular constitutional provisions (art. 59 para. 1 GG). The Bundestag has the decision-making power in wordings (art. 59 para 2 GG), in the transfer of sovereign rights as well as in the cases of defence and peace agreements (art. 115 a and art. 115 1 GG). According to art. 24 para. 1 GG, the transmission of sovereign rights to interstate arrangements can follow with a simple majority of the Bundestag without the affirmation of the Bundesrat. This also applied to the EC until 1992. The Grundgesetz can thus be perceived to pave the way for supranational organs in the interest of a "peaceful and enduring order for Europe and between the nations

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<sup>151</sup> WOLFRUM (2007), p. 157.

<sup>152</sup> WOLFRUM (2007), p. 157.

<sup>153</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 10.

<sup>154</sup> ISMAYR (2007), p. 177.

of the world”(art.24 para. 2 GG).<sup>155</sup> As a consequence, the Federal Constitutional Court has e.g. decided that the decisive changes of NATO’s strategy after the Cold War must be understood as a further development and firm establishment of the open-ended decisions of the NATO treaty.<sup>156</sup> Several legislations on the armed forces were affiliated in the *Grundgesetz* in 1956, which e.g. resulted in the Bundestag’s defence commission having the rights of an enquiry commission (Article 45a) and the creation of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces (Article 45b). The Federal Constitutional Court moreover made a decision in regards to some Bundeswehr missions of the early 1990s that the constitution obliges the federal government to obtain the constitutional affirmation of the Bundestag. Thus, according to the “*Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland*” (*Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*), which has been in force since 2005, the deployment of armed German forces must have the affirmation of the Bundestag with simple majority when the Bundeswehr is involved in armed operations. A proposition to deploy the armed forces can however only be accepted or completely rejected, which is also the case with other propositions from the federal government. The Bundestag’s right to participate is thus limited. However the parliamentary debate in front of a Bundestag decision contributes to both transparency and publicity in regards to the practice of Bundeswehr deployments. They thus also give signals to the federal government of potential opposition from the Bundestag, which thus indirectly is given the opportunity to influence the content of the deployment mandate. In the case of deployments of minor intensity and reach, the approval might be obtained in a simplified procedure, whereas every parliamentary group or five per cent of the Bundestag members may demand that the Bundestag deals with the issue. A subsequent affirmation by the Bundestag is sufficient under exceptional circumstances where delay could mean an endangerment. The Bundestag is not allowed to change a petition but may revoke its compliance with a Bundestag deployment.<sup>157</sup>

Another topic of interest is the Bundestag and the EU. Totally, about one third of all adopted federal laws are of a European origin, about the half determined

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<sup>155</sup> ISMAYR (2007), p. 178.

<sup>156</sup> ISMAYR (2007), p. 179.

<sup>157</sup> ISMAYR (2007), pp. 179-180.; GAREIS (2009), p. 10-12.

by EU directives. The spheres of consumer protection, nutrition and agriculture as well as environment, nature protection and nuclear security make up about 70 per cent.<sup>158</sup> The so called “Europe-Article” 23 § 1 of 1992 which was implemented from the pressure of the federal states as the Treaty of Maastricht was ratified, implies that in order to transfer sovereign rights to the EU’s institutions, a qualified two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat are required for.<sup>159</sup> Through the articles 23 and 45 GG, the Bundestag’s position compared to the government’s has also become strengthened in the European decision-making process, in addition to the revised position of the Bundesrat. The government has to inform the Bundestag in a comprehensive way and to the earliest possible point of time about all of the EU’s intentions which could be of interest to Germany. The Bundestag’s positions on EU drafts must be “accounted for” by the government before its participation in the EU’s legislative enactment. Hence, the national parliament is supposed to enter the consultations on European policy drafts at such an early point of time that it has a possible impact on its contents. However, failing interest and delayed possibilities of information and reaction in urgent cases are still apparent.<sup>160</sup> As the EU is becoming more and more competencies, it is important for the Bundestag to participate in shaping European policy, adjusted to the European parliament, in order to avoid a further loss of competence. In the beginning of the 13th legislative period, the “*Ausschuss für Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union*” (EU committee) was established and prescribed in article 45 German constitution. It is the main location for the parliamentarians’ participation in matters of the EU and is responsible for questions of principle in regards to European integration, institutional issues and enlargement questions. Members of the European Parliament are also members of this committee, and close contacts are cultivated with the European committees of other national parliaments in the EU. This thus applies to its Swedish counterpart. The Norwegian parliament’s European committee on the other hand is only allowed to meet a delegation from the European parliament once a year to maintain a certain dialogue. The European Committee of the Bundestag furthermore gives the direction of the Bundestag’s statements on European integration. And

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<sup>158</sup> ISMAYR (2007), p. 187.

<sup>159</sup> For more details see ISMAYR (2007), p. 179.

<sup>160</sup> ISMAYR (2007), pp. 187-188.

as a cross sectional committee it aims at uniting the different policy fields. As an expert committee for European matters it has a consultatory function for drafts of importance to integration policy and as EU law is concerned. However, EU directives already passed are the cases of the competent expert committees. In order to secure a timely handling of EU drafts in the Bundestag, a plenary decision can legitimise the EU committee to administer the Bundestag's rights towards the government. Nevertheless, the matters are in most cases of little dispute between the governmental and the opposition's parliamentary groups and rather cases for specialists.<sup>161</sup> This picture has however become somewhat moderated through the federal constitutional court's verdict on the Lisbon treaty (BVerfGE 123, 267 = NJW 2009, 2267), which criticised the Bundestag members for having too easily given up on their political voice and too easily having assigned rights to Brussels, even more than what the German constitution allows for. Two verdicts following the Lisbon verdict furthermore stated that the Bundestag must not be fobbed off with vague information and systematic secretiveness neither in regards to minor interpellations nor in investigating committees.<sup>162</sup> The verdict of the federal constitutional court thus led to a "surprisingly rapid settlement" between the parliamentary groups and also between the Bundestag and the federal government.<sup>163</sup> Thus new accompanying laws which complemented and substantiated the Europe-article were created.<sup>164</sup> The coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD decided on provisions which exceeded the court's demands. Accordingly, it is mainly up to the parliamentarians to use the new possibilities given. Wefing speaks of a "new architecture" (Norbert Röttgen) of the Bundestag's foreign policy laws of instrumentality.<sup>165</sup>

To a certain degree the Bundestag is also able to pursue an independent foreign policy, though not operative according to international law, as the representatives participate in parliamentary conventions and international organisations, meet with politicians from other states, discuss political questions and thus contribute

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<sup>161</sup> ISMAYR (2007), pp. 189-190.

<sup>162</sup> Cited in WEFING (2009).

<sup>163</sup> Cited in WEFING (2009).

<sup>164</sup> "Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union; Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union.

<sup>165</sup> Cited in WEFING (2009).

to a differentiated picture of Germany in the world. The Bundestag can also invite e.g. heads of states to speak in plenum and furthermore position itself through comments. With its resolutions on Tibet has the Bundestag set a different course as opposed to the pragmatic policy on China of the federal government.<sup>166</sup>

### 1.3.3. Federal states and Bundesrat

The international presence of Germany's 16 federal states has reached an impressive level. They have worldwide about 130 offices first and foremost to serve their foreign trade interests and provide political information. The Brussel offices of the sixteen states come in addition to 20 external representations in the US. Further focal points are in Asia, Russia, and Central and Eastern Europe. Participation in interregional and cross-border cooperation on the subnational level is also given, in addition to an active shuttle diplomacy of politicians. Hence, this activity is not very compatible with the constitutional disposition that the relations with other countries are in principle "Sache des Bundes"<sup>167</sup> (article 32 GG).<sup>168</sup> The Brussel agencies of the German states are by way of example a parallel action to the federal level in regards to European policy which is rather conflict-ridden.

Article 24 para. 1 GG comprehends the constitutional principle of an open political system (statehood). The federation is thus authorised to transfer sovereign rights through statutes not requiring the assent of the Bundesrat. This article thus enforced European Community law domestically. To the extent allowed by article 79 para. 3 and article 20 GG, the federation was allowed to transfer competencies of the federal states to the European level. Although this was a matter of substantial constitutional amendments, whether the Bundestag's approval nor a two-third majority were necessary. This was the situation until the constitutional amendment of 1992 when the "Europe Article" 23 was admitted to the constitution.<sup>169</sup> Through this article are not only domestic participation rights of the German states broadened, but they also have direct access to EU decision-

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<sup>166</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 12.

<sup>167</sup>"The federal level's concern."

<sup>168</sup> FISCHER (2007), p. 192.

<sup>169</sup> FISCHER (2007), p. 193.

making procedures through the possibility of direct involvement in the Council of Ministers and through the Committee of the Regions. Fischer comments that focus is no longer on the federal states as a “collective actor”. Instead, the German states want to win back independent scope of action which ultimately could result in an increased competition between the states and a stronger emphasis on cultivating individual foreign relations.<sup>170</sup>

The collective cooperation rights obtained through article 23 are the following:

1. German approval of changes to European constitutional law is dependent on a two-third majority in the Bundesrat.
2. The federal states take part in matters concerning the EU through the Bundesrat and in the decision-making of the Federation if the issue is part of their domestic competency. If mainly the federal states’ legislation competencies are concerned in projected European legal acts, then the federal government has to account for the position of the Bundesrat in a significant way. The same is the case when the composition of the states’ administration or their administrative procedures are concerned.
3. In cases where the exclusive Land legislation is affected, the German conduct of negotiations in the Council of Ministers must be led by a minister from one of the German states appointed by the Bundesrat.<sup>171</sup>

In addition, about 300 authorised representatives of the regional government authorities in about 300 advisory boards of the Council and the European Commission are appointed by the Bundesrat for a period of three years. They have the task to inform the German states, initiate the positions of the Bundesrat, represent the Bundesrat statements on EU level and, if necessary, work towards further statements of the Bundesrat.<sup>172</sup>

Another point of interest is the federal states’ cooperation with other European regions. Two types of regional associations are identified. First, in the *transborder cooperation with local authorities of neighbouring states* the aim is above all to manage common problems in order to achieve a stronger integration of border areas with considerable geographic, historic-cultural or socio-economic similarities. The forms of neighbourhood cooperation resulting from this natural commonness are completely covered by the competencies of the German states. Such

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<sup>170</sup> FISCHER (2007), p. 195.

<sup>171</sup> FISCHER (2007), p. 197.

<sup>172</sup>Homepage of the State of Berlin at <http://www.berlin.de/rbmskzl/europa/europapolitik/netzwerkbundesratsbeauftragte.html>

cooperation can, however, also be a matter of inter-municipal cooperation and also mixed forms of the federal level, the federal states and municipalities. As opposed to this, *transborder cooperation with non-neighbouring regions* does not have an integrative purpose but rather aims at networking to develop mutual political or economic benefits. The tension between the federal and state level is most obvious in the first group. Article 24 para. 1A GG gives the German states the right, with the affirmation of the federal level, to transfer sovereign rights to neighbouring establishments (“*grenznachbarschaftliche Einrichtungen*”). An increasing legal regulation has been the tendency since the 1990s.<sup>173</sup>

The competencies dilemma of the German federal system is here admittedly less important than the possible implications for Northern European cooperation with the, compared to other regional actors, very influential German states. Interreg IV B is a support programme of the EU for the strengthening of economic, social and spacial coherence in Europe. The North Sea Region and Baltic Sea Region are thus two of totally 13 European cooperation regions in which Norway is able to participate through the EEA treaty. The North Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 of the European Union (Interreg IVB) involves regions in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. The German states involved are Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein. The Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013 on the other hand consists of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden as well as the partner countries Belarus, Norway and Russia. The German states participating are Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Brandenburg, Berlin and the Region Luneburg. Moreover, The Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC) is open to all regional authorities of the Baltic Sea area immediately below the level of central government. The German members are Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Other associations to be mentioned in this context are the Union of the Baltic Cities and the Baltic Sea Chambers of Commerce.

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<sup>173</sup> FISCHER (2007), p. 199.



### 1.3.4. Federal chancellery

In the realm of foreign policy-making, the Federal chancellery is together with the Ministry of Defence and the Auswärtiges Amt<sup>174</sup> (AA) the central corridors of power. German foreign policy was created in the Federal chancellery until 1955 as mentioned in chapter 1.1 of this part. The German constitution on the other hand does not say anything about the scope of duties of the chancellery. The actual activities reach from the secretary to the government headquarters. Moreover, the foreign policy of the Bundeskanzleramt is characterised by “Führen, Koordinieren, Strippen ziehen”.<sup>175</sup> The first characteristic leads to the chancellor principle (Kanzlerprinzip), whereby the chancellor decides the guidelines of the policy. This is supported by the right to form the cabinet (Kabinettsbildungsrecht) in article 64 para 1 GG and the leadership competence (Leitungskompetenz) in article 65 para. 4 GG. Hence, the power of organising (Organisationsgewalt) is derived. Governmental declarations are often used to show the leading aspirations of the chancellor in the realm of foreign policy.

The coordination function of the chancellor first of all applies to the cooperation between the functional departments. The AA has the pivotal competence in the management of foreign relations. However, this role is softened by the strong constitutional role of the chancellor and his foreign political assistants in the German chancellery, in addition to the competencies of other ministries. The third characteristic, to be the puppet master, leads to what the chancellor can do to compensate a possible loss of power, e.g. use party power in combination with the parliamentary group of the Bundestag. It also refers to the minor coalition partner, which since 1963 is represented by the vice-chancellor and since 1966 by the foreign minister.<sup>176</sup> The Federal chancellery thus governs the different principles of policy making in regards to the competencies of the chancellor, the departments, the parties and the coalition in addition to the principle of collective responsibility. It also has the competency of introducing a bill according to article 76 GG. In matters of foreign policy it is responsible for the Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and, until 1990, for the operative

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<sup>174</sup>Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>175</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 204.

<sup>176</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 204-205.

management of the Germany policy.<sup>177</sup>

The leading section of the Federal chancellery consists of the chancellor, the respective minister of state and the staff and offices assigned to them. The chancellery is led by the Head of the Federal Chancellery in the intersection between administration and politics. He prepares and participates in the cabinet meetings. He sets the agenda and organises the decision-making and the implementation of governmental tasks. Finally, the so called working levels of the Federal chancellery contain six departments, which again are structured in groups, which are structured in units. Department 2 is responsible for foreign relations, development policy, European policy and security policy and mirrors the bodies of the AA, with which it has to cooperate closely.<sup>178</sup>

Also belonging to the Federal Chancellery is the Federal Security Council. Originally, it was meant to have the role as a coordinating organ of German security policy. According to Varwick, it is neither capable of taking this role nor able to act as a decisive centre of gravitation for the strategic forming of the political will of the federal government.<sup>179</sup>

In foreign policy, the chancellor principle is often used to overrule the departmental principle. The Federal chancellery is a particularly central European policy actor and plays a key role in all bilateral relations to the EU partners, is strategically important to the preparing of European Council meetings and supports every initiative on European policy of the chancellor without accounting for particular departmental responsibilities.<sup>180</sup> In regards to the coordination of the governmental performance on foreign policy, the Cabinet is the most important decision-making institution of the executive. The weekly agenda gives the chancellor the possibility of an assessment of the international situation, which the other members of the Cabinet have to follow up. With other words, it regulates the political language of the government in foreign policy matters.<sup>181</sup> The Cabinet committees have an advisory, preliminary function in front of the cabinet meetings, which in the case of foreign policy are the committees for European

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<sup>177</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 205.

<sup>178</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 206.

<sup>179</sup> VARWICK (2008), pp. 80-81.

<sup>180</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 207.

<sup>181</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 208.

policy and the Federal Security Council.<sup>182</sup>

### 1.3.5. The Federal Ministries

The several international departments and units of the the federal ministries are examples of a differentiation of the governmental-administrative field of actors participating in foreign policy making. They are concerned with specific topics and the practical work of foreign policy. Every federal ministry has its own institutional capacities for the administration of European and international matters. Hence is also clear that the German foreign policy is not anymore just a matter of high politics. Rather, foreign relations necessitate a an attunement of highly differentiated task fields and policies. The question of an effective horizontal coordination of the German ministries is thus also of great importance to the making and implementation of foreign policy.<sup>183</sup> A good example is the climate policy which next to the federal chancellery and the AA involves the ministries of environment, economy, research, finance and economic development in order to formulate and implement the appropriate policies of importance.<sup>184</sup> Clashes of interests between different ministries are obvious from time to time, and they do not disappear just because political decisions are taken on the international level. The international dimension is obvious in all other ministries in addition to the AA, which on the other hand follows their work closely but is not able to control them.<sup>185</sup> Particularly interesting is the fact that Germany coordinates and adjusts political activities and decisions with other states mainly in the frame of the EU. Every ministry has its own units for EU matters, totally over 50. Moreover, every federal ministry is more than ever also a “foreign ministry” of its topic.<sup>186</sup> This must be something to consider for Norway which, firstly, launched a “Strategy on Germany”<sup>187</sup> in order to strengthen its relations with Germany

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<sup>182</sup> KORTE (2007), p. 208.

<sup>183</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), pp. 150-151.

<sup>184</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 151.

<sup>185</sup> WELLER (2007), p. 210.

<sup>186</sup> WELLER (2007), p. 211.

<sup>187</sup>In 1999, the Norwegian government launched the so called “Strategy on Germany”. The strategy has been followed up by subsequent governments, i.e. is the responsibility of the State Department, and was revised in October 2007 as a result of Germany’s economic and political importance to Norway, being Norway’s third largest export market and second largest trade partner.

despite the fact that it stays outside the EU's political decision-making. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stresses the cooperation with Germany as flawless, both Norway and Germany are pleased with the existing cooperation. The doors of the AA are open to Norwegian diplomats.<sup>188</sup> This, however, ignores the differentiation of foreign policy making. According to Alfred Grannas, contact person for the economic service at the Federal Republic of Germany's embassy in Oslo, Germany and Norway to a larger extent than what is the case with Sweden have to coordinate issues because Norway is not a member of the EU. As opposed to this, Germany's relationship with Sweden is deeper, as topics are more thoroughly discussed within the EU.<sup>189</sup> The EU membership is thus also mirrored in the federal ministries.

### 1.3.6. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Auswärtiges Amt)

The government is the most important foreign policy actor on the federal level with the right to initiate legislation and a general political mission. The federal government, and first and foremost the AA, is responsible for the diplomatic relations with other states, negotiates treaties and agreements according to international law and has great authority in regards to their interpretation and further development. The AA has a permanent working crisis reaction centre in order to keep track of international developments. Also, commissioners and coordinators of particular policy fields such as human rights, humanitarian aid and disarmament, as well as for countries and regions, are situated in the AA.<sup>190</sup> Germany's cultural foreign policy is also a matter of the AA. In addition to European integration and the transatlantic partnerships are international crisis prevention and conflict management, global economic cooperation, development policy as well as environmental and climate questions high on the agenda of German foreign policy makers.<sup>191</sup>

The organisation of the AA consists of the following elements (2009): The main office in Berlin, 229 diplomatic representations (149 embassies, 62 consulates gen-

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<sup>188</sup>Interview at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 6 May 2009.

<sup>189</sup>Alfred Grannas, interview with author, 7 July 2009, Oslo. Author's translation.

<sup>190</sup>GAREIS (2009), p. 8.

<sup>191</sup>GAREIS (2009), p. 9.

eral, 12 permanent representations, 6 further representations), diplomatic relations with 190 countries, representatives in twelve intergovernmental organisations, 5862 employees of which about 3000 are stationed abroad, chambers of foreign trade in 80 countries, establishments of the foreign cultural policy and with it six Germany-centres in Brasilia, Kairo, Mexico, New Delhi, Paris, Beijing and Washington.<sup>192</sup> The 2012 budget for the AA is estimated to be 3,3 billion Euro.<sup>193</sup>

Here, the task allocation in the AA will be highlighted, i.e. the Europe Department and the Political Department 2 are of particular interest.<sup>194</sup> First, the Europe Department of the AA is in charge of the conception and creation of the federal government's European policy, adjusted to the other federal ministries. The competency of the AA on European questions concerns the EU's foreign relations, institutional questions (basic and legal questions included), questions of EU enlargement and deepening as well as the bilateral relations to the member states. The AA moreover coordinates important European negotiations, for example the future EU financial frame.<sup>195</sup> More detailed, the focal points of the Europe Department are the following:

1. Preparing, implementing and accompanying the projects on European policy and the decisions of fundamental importance (e.g. enlargement and deepening);
2. coordination-function inside the federal government for the European Councils;
3. supporting and developing the bilateral relations to the member states of the EU, and France in particular;
4. language questions in the EU;
5. public relations on European policy;
6. supporting the relations between the federal level and the German states in regards to the EU.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>192</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 9.

<sup>193</sup> See the Auswärtige Amt (2011) at [http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/AAmt/00Aktuelles/111123\\_Haushalt\\_2012.html](http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/DE/AAmt/00Aktuelles/111123_Haushalt_2012.html)

<sup>194</sup> Departments of the AA which will not be mentioned are the Disarmament Department, the department Culture and Communication, the Political Department 3, the protocol, the Legal Department, the United Nations department, the Economic Department, the Corporate Department as well as a department for further matters.

<sup>195</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 228.

<sup>196</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 229.

These are the tasks of nine units, the EU coordination group, the task force France and the task force EU financial perspectives. Country units attend to the bilateral relations with the EU's partner states. The bilateral relations between the partners in the union are still of great importance despite the close cooperation inside the EU. Not least due to the large number of states in the EU, a regular bilateral exchange has become increasingly important, as European cooperation will only be successful if issue-free bilateral relations are the basis, which are especially important in regards to the small countries of the community.<sup>197</sup> This is thus also the department where Germany's bilateral relations with Sweden are taken care of, as opposed to Norway, which belongs to another political department of the AA. Other units serve the relations with the European Parliament and the European parties, are responsible for e.g. questions concerning the Lisbon process, the EU single European market or the EU policies on economy, currency and finance, are preoccupied with legal aspects of the EU or questions of enlargements and foreign relations.<sup>198</sup>

Second, the Political Department 2 analyses, plans, frames and coordinates German foreign policy towards European, North American and Central Asian states. It is also responsible for the shaping of the CFSP and all aspects of European and transatlantic security relations. The leader of the political department is the political director. He is supported by a representative for stability policy in Southeast Europe as well as a representative for Russia, Caucasus and Central Asia. The assistant political director is at the same time responsible for security policy and multilateral tasks.

The working unit "European Correspondents" of Political Department 2 manages the coordination of all CFSP topics, which includes basic questions and the coordination of the CFSP, the ESDP included, with EU partners and in the AA. Other units observe and analyse the domestic and foreign policies of the US and Canada and offer counselling to the political leadership in regards to a conception of and German interests towards both states. Questions concerning the G8-process is also taken care of here. These units are also responsible for basic questions of the

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<sup>197</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 229.

<sup>198</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 229. See also [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/Europaabteilung\\_node.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/Europaabteilung_node.html)

defence and security policy, whereas the Atlantic alliance is the operative centre of gravity. Key activities are the military foreign missions of the Bundeswehr, the forming of the partnership relations of NATO, the NATO-Russia-Council, the NATO-Ukraine-Commission, the Mediterranean dialogue, the strategic questions of the Alliance and the ESDP.<sup>199</sup>

The Political Department 2 is also responsible for the OSCE, and other units take care of the relations with the European Council, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway. In addition comes the task field of the representative for Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia, whereas key activities are the bilateral relations with Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the CIS and their relations with the EU. The relations with the states of the southern Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan) and of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) and again their relations with the EU are also taken care of in the Political Department 2.<sup>200</sup>

Reinhard Bettzuege refers to the necessity of a Europeanisation of German foreign policy which then again necessitates the Europeanisation of the Foreign Service, which in particular has to be prepared on the future European diplomatic service. In order to pursue a multilateral foreign policy, more German diplomats need to be found in international corridors of power. International developments moreover presuppose the development of a real “Weltinnenpolitik”, which again necessitates a “value dialogue” with other societies.<sup>201</sup>

### 1.3.7. Bundeswehr

In 1990, Germany’s armed forces counted just under 600 000 men and women which had to be reduced to 370 000 by 1994 (amount in peace-time). From 1991 on Germany has participated in several missions abroad. In the beginning, there were solely humanitarian action or logistic support measures of UN missions to Cambodia (1992) and Somalia (1993) as well as multinational surveillance

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<sup>199</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 229-230. See also Auswärtiges Amt at [http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/PolAbteilung2\\_node.html](http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/AAmt/Abteilungen/PolAbteilung2_node.html)

<sup>200</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), 231.

<sup>201</sup> BETTZUEGE (2007), pp. 225-226.

measures (aircraft grounding in Bosnia-Herzegovina and embargo control in the Adriatic Sea). Next to the Balkan missions and Afghanistan (from 2002), the federal government has sent larger contingents of the marine (more than 1000 soldiers) in the frame of the operation *Enduring Freedom* to the Horn of Africa (since 2001), to the coast of Libanon for surveillance in the context of the UNIFIL mission (since 2006) and furthermore with the EU mission *Atalanta* for combating piracy in the Gulf of Adan and by the coast of Somalia (since 2008). Moreover, several smaller deployments for the logistic support of allies or the UN can be added to the big picture of German missions abroad.<sup>202</sup>

In 2004, a reorganisation was accomplished under defence minister Struck. The crisis reaction forces and main defence forces were grouped in three power categories: 1. The intervention forces for operations of high intensity and short duration (35 000 soldiers); 2. the stabilisation forces for operations of low and middle intensity and longer duration (70 000 soldiers) as well as the support forces for logistic, basic establishment and education (147 500 soldiers). The categories moreover comprise the military branches army (about 107 000), airforce (47 000) and navy (20 000).<sup>203</sup> The decisive change was to move the emphasis from defence to crisis management “out-of-area”. Effectively, conflict prevention and crisis management were to a large extent equalised with collective defence in regards to intensity and complexity.<sup>204</sup> Thus, the new organisation was very compatible with NATO’s strategic concept of 1999. On the other hand, however, the Bundeswehr was considered to be chronically underfunded, which of course was problematic in regards to its huge international commitments.<sup>205</sup>

The importance of European defence policy to Sweden’s defence was pointed out in chapter 3.3.2 of part I. Also Germany found out quickly that their military capabilities did not fit with the tasks of the out-of-area missions the country was taking part in (above all Kosovo and Afghanistan). Economic necessities moreover contributed to “a whole new dynamic and seriousness” to the defence reforms, and as a reaction to the financial crisis, Germany passed a constitutional

<sup>202</sup> HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 153.

<sup>203</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 252.

<sup>204</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 253.

<sup>205</sup> The 2004 defence budget amounted to 23,8 billion Euro, 5 billion less than France and 10 billion less than the UK, which made up 1,4 per cent of GNP in the lower third among NATO states. VARWICK (2007), p. 254.



amendment limiting new federal debt to 3,5 per cent of GDP. The German defence ministry thus had to cut 8,3 billion euro between 2010 and 2014 (2015), and with an annual budget of the German defence of about 30 billion euro, these are concussive numbers.<sup>206</sup> Just like Sweden, Germany's then-defence minister zu Guttenberg was able to abolish conscription.<sup>207</sup> The reform package moreover comprises the reduction of the number of soldiers from about 252 000 (2011) to about 180 000. The organisational structures will also be changed but the real saving will not come from cutting personnel but from cutting equipment, both of the materiel in service and those projected to be procured.<sup>208</sup> This is thus a distinct difference from the Swedish example.<sup>209</sup>

The German rearmament after the Second World War was followed by constitutional regulations and principles which secured certain control competencies of the parliament towards the armed forces and distinguished the Bundeswehr from former types of military. There is no single chapter in the German constitution for the Bundeswehr, which on the other hand appears in several other articles. This is meant to link it to the whole constitutional order and prevent a special position ("Sonderrolle") of the armed forces. The political leadership is moreover distinctly placed by the civil minister of defence with the supreme command of the armed forces in times of peace.<sup>210</sup> Furthermore, the defence committee of the Bundestag has extensive control rights, and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces supports the parliamentary control of the Bundeswehr and also secures the single soldier's right to complain. Another important aspect is the substantial multinational integration of the Bundeswehr in NATO. It was not initiated as a national army but as a German contribution to the defence of the Alliance, which is pointed out by the abandonment of the production of ABC weapons and the control of the federal units by NATO command. Today, all Ger-

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<sup>206</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 2.

<sup>207</sup> See HESSE/ELLWEIN (2012), p. 154.

<sup>208</sup> KELLER (2011), p. 3. Active weapon systems, including six U206A submarines, fifteen Transall transport aircraft, 100 Tornado fighter-bombers, and 60 Marder armored tracked vehicles will be put out of service. In regards to major defence projects, cuts will be made to strategic and tactical airlift (A400M transporter and NH-90 and Tiger helicopters) programmes. Also, the procurement of 37 Eurofighter jets will be stopped if possible, in addition to the projected 400 Puma armoured tracked vehicles and the missile defence system MEADS. KELLER (2011), p. 3.

<sup>209</sup> See chapter 3.3.2 of part I.

<sup>210</sup> The supreme command in times of war belongs to the chancellor.

man army corps are multinational integrated and participants of the Eurocorps (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg, Spain), the German-Dutch Corps, the multinational Corps North-East (Germany, Denmark, Poland) and two German-US Corps and the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (14 nations). The exception is the IV Corps in Potsdam.<sup>211</sup>

A subjective view of Major Odd Haugdahl, a former representative of the Norwegian army at the German-Dutch corps in Münster (Germany) will be used as initial point of a debate on the core dilemmas of German security policy. This is of particular interest as it is the realm of German foreign policy where “change” instead of “continuity” has prevailed. Haugdahl stated in 2004 that

“Germany is a challenging cooperation partner as the organisation and culture in the Bundeswehr can be very bureaucratic. Further, there is not much history and recent experience in thinking multinational solutions out of geopolitical challenges. I think maybe that a new generation officers and politicians who do not have the “dead weight” of the postwar period would be better capable of this. Until now, I think, the Bundeswehr might have deliberately preferred to cooperate with “small” partners where they have been able to implement their norms on others without much resistance. Another challenge is failing abilities in English among the German *soldiers*. (...) What I have depicted are types of challenges in relation to culture and history that will be found in military cooperation between nations in multilateral solutions.”<sup>212</sup>

History is indeed an important part of the current challenges which the Bundeswehr and German defence policy in general is facing. The FRG had actually lost its strategic sovereignty with its NATO membership of 1955. As the only NATO member state, all the units of the Bundeswehr were put under the control of the alliance, and a strategic centre of the federal military policy was non-existent. Strategy was developed at the level of the alliance. The “strategic culture” of the old federal republic was thus characterised by silence on the topic.

<sup>211</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 248.

<sup>212</sup>Major Odd Haugdahl, interview with author, 5 May 2004, Greven. Author’s translation. Statement in Norwegian: “Tyskland er en utfordrende samarbeidspartner da jeg mener at organiseringen og kultur i Bundeswehr kan være byråkratisk, og at det ikke finnes særlig historikk og fersk erfaring i å tenke multinasjonale løsninger ut fra geopolitiske utfordringer. Jeg tror kanskje at en ny generasjon offiserer og politikere som ikke har etterkrigstidens “ballast” vil være bedre i stand til dette. Jeg tror inntil nå så har Bundeswehr kanskje bevisst foretrukket å samarbeide med små partnere hvor man har kunne implementere sine normer på uten større motstand. En annen utfordring med samarbeidet er mmanglende engelskkunnskaper blant de *tyske soldatene*. (...) Det jeg har pekt på er typer av utfordringer i forhold til kultur og historikk som vil finnes ved militært samarbeid mellom nasjoner i multinasjonale løsninger.

If a debate did take place it was rather enforced by e.g. the *Nachrüstungsdebatte* of the 1980s.<sup>213</sup> One of the core problems of the strategic stagnation of German security policy is thus the trust in the established practice which was well-functioning for 40 years. Germany's two main strategic problems are according to Naumann the marginal benefit of the established multilateral style of action, and secondly the paralysing antagonism of hard and soft power in security policy.<sup>214</sup> There is no alternative to multilateral action. However, the problems are beginning beyond this basic conclusion. "Assuming that what is good for Europe, the Alliance or the community of states also coincide with the German interests, a political commitment was construed on the quiet which gave little room for initiatives."<sup>215</sup> Also chancellor Schröder's refusal to participate in the war in Iraq was basically a defensive decision not accompanied by alternative suggestions according to Naumann. The same can be said about the neutral position Germany took prior to the NATO operation in Libya in 2011.<sup>216</sup> A defensive attitude thus characterises German security policy, international requests are waited for, and reservations and limitations are included in the mandated missions. Germany's policy on Afghanistan is a good example.<sup>217</sup>

The federal government's action plan "Zivile Krisenprävention" from 2004 composes an integrated and cross-departmental concept of "enhanced" security prevention. This concept was furthermore mentioned as a "Baustein" in the 2006 White Paper on German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr.<sup>218</sup> Accordingly, the

"Bundeswehr undertakes operations at national and international level. This similarly necessitates an all-round, networked approach that effec-

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<sup>213</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 14.

<sup>214</sup> NAUMANN (2009), pp. 10-11.

<sup>215</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 11. Author's translation.

<sup>216</sup> See chapter 1.2.2 of this part.

<sup>217</sup> The German policy on Afghanistan has become well-known as a restrictive interpretation, and the deployment mandate has been further narrowed through amendments. Provisos as a ban on flying after dark has brought criticism both inside and outside NATO. Other safety regulations imply that German PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) troops are not allowed to stay outside their camps overnight, i.e. long-range patrols are not possible. Patrols have to go along with armoured ambulance, which implies larger and less flexible convoys. Moreover, Kunduz was chosen as the location of the first German PRT because of safety reasons. The German policy leaves a "light footprint" which leads Germany to be an advocate of the PRTs as "islands of security" made up by troops of a limited number. Germany also established the only PRT with a shared military and civilian command. MERZ (2007), pp. 8-9.

<sup>218</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 10.

tively combines civilian and military instruments. Such an approach is of paramount importance in the context of comprehensive security provision, particularly for conflict prevention and crisis management operations.”<sup>219</sup>

According to Naumann, German policy has a good concept in regards to the civilian-military challenges. What is not provided for is the institutional upholding of promises made by the enhanced security concept.<sup>220</sup>

In a verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court of 12 July 1994<sup>221</sup> it was decided that the participation in all types of missions is permitted which take place in the frame of collective security systems (UN, NATO, WEU). Mere national missions are thus not constitutional. The Bundestag has to approve of Bundeswehr missions with a simple majority in advance, with certain exceptions in urgent cases (*Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz*). It can also reverse all foreign missions by revoking its approval<sup>222</sup> However, as Naumann remarks, there is no cross-sectional structure of security policy in the parliament. The *Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz* is limited to the military part of the deployments and thus leads to a further marginalisation of the non-military components of the missions. The annual routine of prolonging the mandates of the missions is limited to the size of the contingents, their spaces and instruments, and are not characterised by strategic thinking and the formulation of aims.<sup>223</sup> Naumann poses the question what political-institutional logic is followed by German security policy and states that even this basic question can not be answered.<sup>224</sup> In short, “the pronounced will to think strategically dies in the institutional structures. Germany is acting predictably but fails dramatically to reach its full potential.”<sup>225</sup>

### 1.3.8. Political parties

Acting in a parliamentary democracy, the government is borne by parties and can not act against the basic values and convictions of their supporters without destroying the basis of their practice. This also applies to the field of foreign

<sup>219</sup> FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY) (2006).

<sup>220</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 12.

<sup>221</sup> See also the previous chapter on the Bundestag.

<sup>222</sup> VARWICK (2007), p. 250.

<sup>223</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 14.

<sup>224</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 10.

<sup>225</sup> NAUMANN (2009), p. 14.

policy, where the importance of political parties primarily concern the fundamental decisions of direction. All such decisions were accompanied by intense disputes between political parties. Interestingly, however, the opposition parties have sooner or later accepted the decisions and finally carried them on, due to requirements stemming from the international system.<sup>226</sup> A good example is the *Ospolitik*. During the Iraq crisis in 2002, some dissent was apparent between the coalition partners Green party and the SPD on the one hand and the opposition parties CDU/CSU and the FDP on the other hand.<sup>227</sup> The opposition parties were showing a more cooperative attitude towards the US. Here, the weighting of supporting its most important ally on the one hand and preventing a war which was more than doubtful in regards to international law, was decisive. Moreover, the conflictual situation between the US' partners in Europe following the crisis was also about what role the EU should have as an actor in world politics. The EU as a more independent military actor has advocates in all German political parties, except of the Left party.<sup>228</sup>

A further interesting feature of German parties is the large amount of consensus in regards to basic convictions or foreign political basic orientations. The basic values of peace, freedom, democracy, human rights and solidarity are present in all party programmes legitimising foreign policy actions. The succession of these values, however, differ. The policy statements of SPD and FDP are somewhat out of the ordinary according to Oppelland, who points to the SPD statements from 1989 which assessed peace to be of superior importance. The FDP's "*Wiesbadener Grundsätze*" of 1997 rather stress the universality of the human rights as its normative basis. The "liberal world community", moreover, is in need of a "global legal order".<sup>229</sup> Nevertheless, the normative content of foreign policy, i.e. the basic agreement on Germany's integration in multilateral structures, and a united Europe in particular, and as the strengthening of the UN as the guardian of world peace, is evident despite differences in the practical policy making. Consensus is also obvious in the topics *not* mentioned by the party platforms. Key terms of the realistic school of foreign policy thinking like power, hegemony or balance of

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<sup>226</sup> OPPELLAND (2007), pp. 269-270.

<sup>227</sup>The very US-critical Left party is a case sui generis.

<sup>228</sup> OPPELLAND (2007), pp. 278-279.

<sup>229</sup>[http://www.koch-mehrin.de/uploads/2009/08/Wiesbadener\\_Grundsaeetze\\_1997.pdf](http://www.koch-mehrin.de/uploads/2009/08/Wiesbadener_Grundsaeetze_1997.pdf)

power are not mentioned.<sup>230</sup> Writing in 1977, Bull states that

“it has been contended that international society is only one element in world politics, that this element of society shares the stage of world politics with the elements of war or conflict, and the element of human community, and that the working of what have been called the rules and institutions of international society [i.e. balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the role of great powers] have to be seen in relation to these other two elements, as well as in relation to international society.”<sup>231</sup>

The question is thus if German parties should be praised for not using these “hard” terms as most Western states use in their discourse on foreign policy. It is tempting to assume that whereas Norwegian polity likes to think of itself as moral superior to most other states (especially in regards to the US and the EU), German polity still does not have the self confidence to pursue a foreign policy which calls a spade a spade. Hans-Peter Schwarz is mentioned as the (not very honourable) exception, perceiving Germany to be the “Zentralmacht” of Europe.<sup>232</sup> That Germany *is* the most central power in Europe - geographically, economically, politically - does, however, not make the political parties verbally recognise the same reality. The West German policy of uniting and reconsiling Europe after the Second World War, and its very restrictive military policy, supported by the German public, entail very valuable lessons. However, Germany does not take a leading role in the global foreign policy discourse after reunification but adapts to the policy direction of its Western allies from the 1990s on. However, being the second largest troop provider in Afghanistan is not compatible with the avoidance of difficult vocabulary. War is a matter of fact.

## 1.4. Conclusions and Outlook

After this presentation of German foreign policy, what implications are there for the assessment of Germany’s importance to Norway and Sweden? Henry Kissinger’s famous remark “Who do I call if I want to speak to Europe?” could be converted into “Who do we call if we want to speak to Germany”. Is it a

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<sup>230</sup> OPPELLAND (2007), pp. 272.

<sup>231</sup> BULL (1995<sup>2</sup>), pp. 307-308.

<sup>232</sup> OPPELLAND (2007), pp. 274.

necessity of a federal state to be so clouded when it comes to foreign political strategies? The question is how many Scandinavian foreign policy actors take the time to study the federal structures and “disorder” of German policy making. Gareis concludes that German foreign policy at large has become “more complex, peripheral and also more specific in the single departments.”<sup>233</sup> There has been a certain debate in Germany when it comes to new security challenges and the way the political system is able to adapt to new situations. The CDU/CSU claimed a new security strategy in 2008, which demanded a national security council capable of concentrating the internal coordination on German security policy. The advantages of a such are obvious, according to Varwick:

“Those who talk about cross-linked security also finally need to link their own actions on security policy to a larger extent. There is certainly no lacking of non-committal political and ministerial networking dimensions in this country (maybe there are even too many of them). What is not provided for, however, is a strategic link-up to the highest level which helps the network to find a united will, and to implement it as well. (...) Beside the improved internal coordination of different security-political instruments and ideas, such a council could, provided that the adequate will of the political leadership is given, socialise more systematically with the partner countries and integrate the security political concepts and strategies of the Federal Republic internationally.”<sup>234</sup>

The counterargument is among other things that a national security council does not fit in to the “proven, adaptable arrangement”<sup>235</sup> of the decision processes on German foreign and security policy. A further counter-argument is the danger of a militarisation of security policy.<sup>236</sup> From a Scandinavian point of view, however, such a council would definitely simplify the question of who to call at least in the field of security policy. It is true that as a parliamentary democracy, a lot of constitutional aspects make Germany different from the US and may question a national security council. However, if it is only a matter of lacking self-confidence leading to self-containment instead of improving its ability to enhance its (from a Scandinavian point of view assumed volitional) influence on world politics, then major Haugdahl’s outlook for the Bundeswehr may also have parallels in the larger picture of German foreign policy. It certainly demands great expertise

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<sup>233</sup> GAREIS (2009), p. 13.

<sup>234</sup> VARWICK (2008), p. 81. Author’s translation.

<sup>235</sup> Author’s translation.

<sup>236</sup> STAACK (2008), p. 82.

and resources in small countries to follow up the federal world of German foreign policy.

This conclusion must be taken even further in order to assess the importance of German foreign policy to Norway and Sweden. At least, some important questions must be raised. In order for Germany to be an important partner, it can not live in the past. If Germany could choose the perfect policy, would it then pursue the foreign policy of today? Is Germany still trying to make amends for its past sins by trying not to be powerful? In that case they are getting hold of the wrong end of the stick like the rest of the world is misunderstanding Germany. Hence, German policy makers would be misunderstanding the definition of power because it is all about how one *uses* its power. The last chapter shows that Germany has a lot to contribute to in Europe and the world. They have the necessary experience, have learned the necessary lessons, and has come to terms with the (militant) past and would not let anything similar happen again. The question which must be raised however is whether they have undertaken a similar reconsideration of the experiences made during the Cold War. German foreign and security policy, its principles, structures and institutions, rather shows that the probable answer to this is no. In order to have policy aims, it seems necessary to use time intervals to reconsider the old policy. Instead of solely adapting to new situations, new goals should be set. The fear of power can thus prevent clear intentions. The world is changing, but the Germans seem to think that they have not changed. EU developments however show that although Germany does not want the power, they have now received it. They can thus no longer play the game of adapting to others. Germany has to *choose* and then take the consequences instead of refurbishing the world to others. The German federal and institutional distraction of power also leads to the question who is taking the responsibility for German foreign policy. The least what must be expected is that Germany takes responsibility for itself. If everyone is just defending their own role, how is it possible not reconsider anything at all?

The following perception of former German FM Joschka Fischer on German policy in the European debt crisis is very alarming if it represents the majority view in German politics, regardless of how one thinks the euro crisis should be solved:



“In the 20th century Germany twice devastated itself and the European order to subjugate the continent. Germany has drawn the right conclusions and only like that - through a convincing reversal and the integration of this large country in the middle of the continent in the West and the EU - was the approval of the German unity accomplished.”

So far so good, but he continues:

“It would be a tragedy and irony at the same time if at this point of time, in the beginning of the 21 century, the reunited Germany would destroy the European order a third time, this time peacefully and with the best of intents.”<sup>237</sup>

Does Germany have more responsibility for other states' choices than the other EU members? Does Germany's reunification prohibit the right of the Germans to say out loud what is not functioning? Would the EU work better without “Ordnung muss sein”, is there a point in having the same rules for different countries? This actually implies that every country is the same. The less laws and rules, the more openness one would get. In the current situation, there is no point in being engaged in European policies. Does the success of German European policy during the Cold War, i.e. its legitimation for being “good” again, prevent it from taking necessary decisions or asking necessary questions? The necessary reconsideration has obviously not been undertaken. In order not to stay a negative power factor in Europe because of its economic power, Germany has to handle the disputes and cut through in order to establish a new, sensible and comprehensible European order. It is never too late to create something new.

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<sup>237</sup> FISCHER (2012). Author's translation.



## 2. Case Studies

In order to elaborate case studies on Germany's importance, three issue areas are selected. Each issue area, i.e. Germany and the Arctic, Germany and the Baltic Sea Region, and Germany and Russia comprise one or more case studies. In all issue areas, German foreign policy will be put to the test in regards to whether it is the "good international citizen" it is required to be in cases of great relevance to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway and Sweden.

Three groups of independent variables have been included in the research design in order to classify German policy in the different cases along the scale between order and justice. These are the three groups of principles of good international citizenship (pluralistic principles, solidarist principles, and universally applicable principles)<sup>238</sup> The aim is, as concluded in chapter 3 of part II, a "sound consensual legitimacy" which implies that a pluralist stance should be taken where a necessary consensus is absent.<sup>239</sup> In some cases, however, a more solidarist policy might be necessary and possible. The question is thus if German policy unifies the best of both solidarist and pluralist principles in the different cases, and whether the principles are applied to small and large actors in a similar way. One case consists of several observations of German policy on a specific, limited issue within the issue area. The independent principles which need to be discussed might, moreover, vary from case to case.

First, the issue areas were singled out due to the criteria of topical representativeness, macropolitical contexts, and dissimilarity in regards to the applicability of the theoretical guidelines of part II. The topical representativeness was thus derived from the tables I.3 and I.4, whereas the macropolitical contexts are con-

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<sup>238</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006).

<sup>239</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006), p. 272.

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ISSUE AREA	CASE
Germany and the Arctic	1. Arctic sustainable development
Germany and the BSR	2. The Baltic states 3. Kaliningrad 4. Regional cooperation
Germany and Russia	5. Russia’s integration in Europe

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Table III.1.: Case studies assessing Germany’s importance.

nected with the tables I.1 and I.2.<sup>240</sup> The issues thus reflect both the topics of particular interest to Norway and Sweden and the importance of the power triangle surrounding the Nordic region. Second, one or more cases were selected for each issue area due to certain criteria. First, the issue should be politically important to Norway and/ or Sweden. Second, Germany’s foreign policy on the issue is assessed to be important. And third, a meaningful classification of German policy due to the balance between justice and order must be possible.

The case studies focus on the regional contexts of Norwegian and Swedish foreign policy. The overall focus is on international law and cosmopolitan values. Finally, Germany’s compatibility with the principles of good international citizenship should be compared between issue areas in order to conclude on the overall importance of Germany to Norway and Sweden. Depending on the decisive actors of international society that emerge in the different cases, pluralist principles might be more important than solidarist in some cases and the other way around, whereas the universally applicable principles might be the most decisive in cases with both “pluralist” and “solidarist” actors. If German policy should take a more solidarist direction in some cases in order to be a good international citizen, a more pluralist stance could just as well be eligible in other cases. The question is whether there is a red thread running through the different cases, or if the assessment of Germany’s suitability as the good international citizen on Nordic matters vary strongly from case to case. In other words, the evaluations will consider a. whether German policy is promoting a “sound consensual legitimacy” which unifies the best of pluralist and solidarist principles and b. German policy when there is a conflict between order and justice.

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<sup>240</sup>All tables are situated in chapter 4 of part I.

## 2.1. Germany and the Arctic

The Arctic accounts for one sixth of the global landmass, comprises more than 30 million km<sup>2</sup> and 24 time zones. The Arctic has a population of about 4 million, including over 30 different indigenous peoples and dozens of languages.<sup>241</sup> The natural resources are vast and the environment clean compared to other parts of the world. A big environmental challenge, however, is the ice melting caused by global warming, which not only raises the sea level - and 150 million people today live less than one metre above sea level - but also imperils the general living conditions of e.g. the polar bears. Other implications of the ice melting are the new sea routes for shipping as described in chapter 1 of part I.

### 2.1.1. Case 1: Arctic sustainable development

#### 2.1.1.1. Introduction

The first case study chosen for this chapter on the Arctic concentrates on environmental questions. The most important reason for picking this area of study is that a sustainable development in the Arctic is like no other realm dependent on international cooperation and regimes. International law has been a topic in regards to economic interests and delineations of continental shelves in part I, but environmental regimes seem more important when international law is considered because they display a broader approach.

For once, NATO and the EU are not the main organisations of importance. Rather, the Arctic Council (AC), established with the Ottawa Declaration of 1996, is the only institution solely preoccupied with this geographic area. Importantly, the AC includes both Russia and the US in addition to Canada, Denmark (representing Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. The council describes itself as “a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sus-

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<sup>241</sup><http://arctic-council.org/article/about>

tainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”<sup>242</sup> It adopts non-binding declarations at its bi-annual ministerial meetings and must be defined as a soft-law institution. Between the meetings, the Senior Arctic Officials of the eight member states supervise the activities of the six working groups. The organisation is open to international organisations and non-arctic states as observers. Until now, six non-arctic countries have been permitted a permanent observer status: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the UK. China, South Korea and the EU are moreover among those eager to become permanent observers. Moreover, also inter-governmental and inter-parliamentary organisations (global and regional) as well as non-governmental organisations can participate. Despite not being directly involved in Arctic questions, the EU is not without importance. As mentioned in chapter 4.1.3 of part I, the European Parliament in 2008 suggested new international negotiations on a new agreement to protect the Arctic, as the ice melting and the new conditions caused by this are believed to require new multilateral norms and regulations which the UNCLOS is not covering. Although revoking this position, the considerations of the European Parliament annoyed not only the Norwegian FM but also e.g. Canada. The question of multilateral norms and regulations is important. Also earlier mentioned are the Russian national strategy for the region published in September 2008 and the US strategy of 2009. In addition of course comes Norway’s northern areas policy, Norway being the most activist arctic state so far.

**2.1.1.1.1. The environmental hazards of the Arctic** Global environmental changes affect the Arctic more strongly than other parts of the world, especially in regards to change of temperature and bioaccumulation of pollutants. The average temperature in the Arctic has risen more than twice as fast compared to the rest of the world. The arctic sea ice withdrawal opens possibilities of new navigation sea routes in the summertime. The Northern Sea Route could replace the route through the Suez Canal, and the Northwest Passage along the northern coast of North America could replace the route via the Panama Canal (see figure

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<sup>242</sup><http://arctic-council.org/article/about>




Figure III.1.: Main shipping lines, settlements and protected areas in the Arctic. (Source: nordregio.se)

III.1<sup>243</sup>).<sup>244</sup> Greenland's glaciers and the permafrost is melting, the snow cover is reduced. These changes also deeply affect the way of living of the Arctic's indigenous peoples. Sea ice thickness of the Arctic as a whole has decreased by about 40 per cent for the most recent several decades.<sup>245</sup> Arctic warming is directly connected with the importance of sea ice in the global climate system as sea ice, and snow-covered sea ice in particular, is a "highly reflective surface", high albedo, as compared to the darker low albedo ocean. Sea ice reduction thus exposes more open ocean to sun rays in the arctic summer, and additional sunlight (energy) is absorbed, which again warms the ocean surface and the air above. This results in increased ocean and air temperatures that again melt even more sea ice.<sup>246</sup>

<sup>243</sup>The cartographer: Johanna Roto and José Sterling. Data source: World protected areas database, UNEP-WCMC 2005. Russian data digitalised by WWF in 2005 by official sources; Population: National statistical institutes.

<sup>244</sup> CHAPMAN (2009), pp. 6-7. The probability of an open Northwest Passage is not as high as for the Northern Sea Route as the sea ice is thinner within the latter.

<sup>245</sup> CHAPMAN (2009), p. 8.

<sup>246</sup> CHAPMAN (2009), pp. 8-9.

Important is also the fact that the Arctic serves as a “sink” for many hazardous substances with their origin in other parts of the world, e.g. reprocessing plants in the UK and France, forty or fifty year old atmospheric nuclear tests, and fall-out from Chernobyl. This is the case with most of the radionuclides found in Arctic marine and terrestrial environments. Strong south-north air flows, rivers and ocean currents contribute to the transportation of hazardous compounds, of which the persistent organic pollutants (POPs) are particularly alarming. These include organochlorine pesticides used in agriculture, industrial chemicals such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB), and combustion products. The particular feature of the Arctic is thus the “cold trap” which prevents their further transportation. The Inuit of Canada and Greenland have one of the highest exposures to PCB and mercury in a global comparison. Heavy metals, and mercury in particular, are found in high concentrations in arctic areas, often caused by waste incineration and coal burning power plants from as far away as Eastern China. Also, some of the highest PCB levels measured in fat and blood are found in polar bears around Svalbard and Franz Josef Land.<sup>247</sup>

Whereas long-range transported hazardous substances are significant, regional sources of hazardous substances within the Arctic states also generate a substantial share of regional marine pollution such as organochlorines, heavy metals and hydrocarbons. “Bad examples” are the Norilsk mining and metallurgical complex, the West Siberian oil and gas industries, the huge Kuznetz coal basin, and the nuclear reprocessing plant in Mayak on the southeastern slopes of the Urals. The Yenisei and Ob rivers are the main channels for river-borne pollution into the Arctic. In addition, two-thirds of the atmospheric heavy metals and most of the sulphur found within the Polar Circle originate from industrial activities in Northwestern Russia.<sup>248</sup>

**2.1.1.1.2. Arctic governance** In May 2008 the coastal Arctic states Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US gathered in Greenland and concluded the Ilulissat Declaration which asserted that

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<sup>247</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 5.

<sup>248</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 9.



“the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.

This framework provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal States and other users of this Ocean through national implementation and application of relevant provisions. We therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern the Arctic Ocean.”<sup>249</sup>

In regards to a sustainable development in the Arctic, the vital question is whether there is time for a new Arctic Treaty, as predicated by Donald R. Rothwell<sup>250</sup> or whether the existing institutions “can provide better venues”, as argued by Olav Schram Stokke.<sup>251</sup> Before discussing this more thoroughly, the EU’s arctic policy and role in this area will be discussed as it is part of the same set of discussion.

The EU, with the exception of the Danish dominions of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, does not have arctic territory or a clear role in this area. The EU’s first step towards an arctic policy was the “Arctic Window” of the Northern Dimension which, however, did not attract much attention. In 2007, the European Commission’s Integrated Maritime Strategy mentioned the Arctic Ocean in the global warming context. In regards to the European Parliament, the debate of October 2008 led to a Resolution on Arctic Governance which mentioned that the Arctic is not governed by specific norms and regulations. It also stressed concern about the policies on environment, naval traffic, energy and security in this region and suggested an observer status for the European Commission in the AC as well as an international treaty for protection of the Arctic based on the Antarctic Treaty.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>249</sup>The Ilulissat Declaration pp. 1-2 at [http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat\\_Declaration.pdf](http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf)

<sup>250</sup> ROTHWELL (2009). Rothwell is a specialist in international polar law and professor of International Law at the ANU College of Law, Australian National University.

<sup>251</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009). Schram Stokke is Senior Research Fellow at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway.

<sup>252</sup>See <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-0474&language=EN> The Antarctic Treaty covers the area south of 60°S latitude. 46 countries (making up around 80 per cent of the world’s population), as opposed to the initial 12, have acceded to the treaty which has simple objectives: 1. to demilitarise the Antarctica and make it a nuclear free zone, also free of radioactive waste, and ensure its use for peaceful purposes only; 2. to promote international scientific cooperation and 3. to abandon disputes over territorial sovereignty. See the Antarctic Treaty at [http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about\\_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update\\_1959.php](http://www.antarctica.ac.uk/about_antarctica/geopolitical/treaty/update_1959.php)

The following Arctic Paper of the European Commission (2008) emphasised, as an answer to the European Parliament, the implementation of existing obligations rather than new instruments in arctic governance. The development of frameworks and adapting to arctic conditions were on the other hand stressed, and the Arctic should be integrated in EU policies and negotiations. Other suggested steps were that the EU should closely follow UNCLOS negotiations in particular and have a permanent observer status in the AC. EUND projects on environment and energy in particular should be developed, and a Maritime Strategy Framework directive should be integrated in the EEA. Environment, sustainable exploitation of resources and enhanced multilateral governance are the three important issues of the Commission guidelines.<sup>253</sup> The Commission Paper thus rather underlined the EU emphasis on existing frameworks (UNCLOS, AC, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)). Bailes here rises an important question:

“But is the EU joining the ‘grab for the Arctic’ as a knee-jerk reaction of global self-assertion and typical Commission activism? Or does it have real interests to protect, contributions to offer and useful assets for promoting them?”<sup>254</sup>

The European state with the “clearest and most assertive”<sup>255</sup> Arctic policy has been Norway, belonging to the EEA. There is also the possibility of Iceland becoming an EU member in the near future. Bailes notes, that if the EU wants to take a leading role in climate change issues, an arctic policy is necessary as the region is decisive for the further development. The Commission Report on the Arctic is also assertive where EU interests are at stake and stresses the importance of freedom of navigation and passage, and an observer status of the AC is the institutional tactic. “But why should other powers and institutions make way for the Union, as a relative newcomer, to join the High Northern game?”<sup>256</sup> Bailes’ arguments are the following:

First, in a territorial sense, the EU is already there, as an important energy partner (Russia, Norway), and a climate partner (the US). Through the EEA

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<sup>253</sup>See [http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/com08\\_763\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/com08_763_en.pdf)

<sup>254</sup> BAILES (2009).

<sup>255</sup> BAILES (2009).

<sup>256</sup> BAILES (2009).

membership of all Nordic states, EU norms are relevant in several areas of arctic importance. Second, the asset of the EU compared to NATO is a greater freedom due to its “non-threatening” image and could possibly act as “a cushion or moderator between great-power interests up North.” Third, more than arctic institutions themselves, the EU has “competence in just about every part of the emerging Arctic agenda except hard defence, but including ‘hard economics’.” Fourth, the EU’s large funds and direct legislative powers are relevant to complex challenges of Arctic management, whereas the EU’s vast scope on the other hand represents the main disadvantage of the EU in this regard. In addition to the bureaucratic challenge comes the political challenge of achieving the consensus among the EU 27, in addition to partners like Norway, when deciding how to prioritise the high north. EU policy would also have to be tuned with NATO’s policy on the Arctic.<sup>257</sup>

The question thus rises if there is any need for a “lead mediator” in the north when the arctic coastal states have agreed on the UNCLOS as the legal foundation for arctic activities which places rights and responsibilities with the coastal states. Moe questions this role as a mediator. “At present the EU lacks an institutional focus for its alleged interest in the Arctic. Only when ambitions are reflected in organisational measures and the capacity for concrete action will EU have an important role to play.” The EU’s knowledge resources would on the other hand be more important to the arctic development than a mediator role.<sup>258</sup>

Returning to the question whether the UNCLOS provides a sufficient foundation for resolving arctic issues, different views will be taken into account. As mentioned above, Rothwell assesses the UNCLOS to be unable to settle all arctic challenges, although providing the foundation of problem solving in some cases. Since 2001, claims of a continental shelf extending beyond the uncontested 200 nautical miles to possibly 350 nautical miles offshore have been made.<sup>259</sup> However, the convention does not provide clear rules of how shared maritime space should be divided. In regards to the AC, Rothwell acknowledges it as a forum for Arctic issues. However, it has avoided contentious issues. Thus a regime based on

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<sup>257</sup> BAILES (2009).

<sup>258</sup> MOE (2009).

<sup>259</sup>In regards to the Norwegian claims, see chapter 4 of part I.

a regional treaty which again is “based upon respect for existing sovereign rights compatible with current legal frameworks” is suggested.<sup>260</sup>

“A relatively short framework treaty addressing fundamental sovereignty and dispute resolution mechanisms which included a set of overarching regional management principles would provide a sound foundation for the regime. (...) Comprehensive arctic-wide environmental management with a strong oceans focus would also be essential. (...) The time has come for a reassessment of the reluctance of the arctic states to support a fully functioning regional organisation. The current arctic regime is a patchwork of soft political responses in need of an overarching binding treaty framework which UNCLOS cannot provide. The time for an Arctic Treaty has come.”<sup>261</sup>

As opposed to this it can be argued that the Arctic was indeed a focal point when negotiating the UNCLOS. This becomes clear in Article 234 which allows coastal states to adopt rigorous pollution prevention measures in ice-covered regions. The Arctic was also an important incentive when drafting article 76 on the extended continental shelf, and together with the CLCS the UNCLOS provides “an invaluable basis for dispute resolution and avoidance”.<sup>262</sup>

Before pursuing with further views on whether new regimes are needed in the Arctic, the term ‘international regime’ must shortly be approached more specifically. The study of international regimes is concerned with governance as an issue and focuses on formal and informal rules, institutions and practices of international relations.<sup>263</sup> They have also been “broadly defined as governing arrangements constructed by states to coordinate their expectations and organize aspects of international behaviour in various issue-areas”.<sup>264</sup> While states are often the formal regime actors, they often act through non-state actors. Regimes can be created by negotiation, by powerful states imposing them or by “spontaneous coordination of state activities”. The reasons for complying with regime rules might be explained to be a result of “calculated self-interest” or, in terms of Oran Young, a “general sense of obligation, simple habit, utilitarian considerations of self-interest, reciprocity and the fear of damage to reputation, as sources of compliance” can be

<sup>260</sup> ROTHWELL (2009), pp. 7-8.

<sup>261</sup> ROTHWELL (2009), p. 8.

<sup>262</sup> BYERS (2009), p. 21.

<sup>263</sup> CUTLER (1991), p. 61.

<sup>264</sup> Kratochwil F./ Ruggie, J.G. (1986) “International Organization: A State of the Art on the Art of the State”, *International Organization* 40, p. 759, cited in CUTLER (1991).

the underlying reasons.<sup>265</sup>

Returning to the question whether new arctic regimes are needed in regards to environmental governance of the Arctic, Schram Stokke negates this question. “Not because strengthening of legal measures is unnecessary, but because there already exist institutions (...) that can provide better venues.”<sup>266</sup>

The AC was established to coordinate and oversee the different working groups of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), which was a result of a Finnish initiative of intergovernmental cooperation on protection of the arctic environment (1991). The AEPS consisted of four activity areas which were coordinated by respective working groups: the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP), Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME). Later, the Working Group on Sustainable Development has been added.<sup>267</sup> The AC is an organisation including two important actors of climate politics, the US and Russia. This makes the organisation “a high-level international forum for discussing and acting on a range of regional challenges and for generating arctic premises in broader debates on environmental regulation.”<sup>268</sup> Although significant for regional environmental governance, other instruments such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto protocol are more important as most of the rapid arctic changes are caused by global warming. Also the environmental damage resulting from e.g. industrial activities in different other regions demand measures within broader institutions such as the regional Convention on Long-Range Transported Air Pollution (CLRTAP). Schram Stokke thus points to the fact that regional states and institutions have to engage in broad international regimes in order to address the POPs problem in the Arctic, in which the separate POPs Protocol under the CLRTAP covering Europe and North America and the Stockholm POPs Convention are important as they commit states to eliminate or even restrict the production, use and trade of some harmful substances.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Cited in CUTLER (1991), p. 61.

<sup>266</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 8.

<sup>267</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 4.

<sup>268</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 8.

<sup>269</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 9.

The UNCLOS on the other hand is characterised as “the most important single instrument regulating arctic activities” as it “provides a legally binding framework for addressing a wide range of arctic issues, also in the environmental field. Salient provisions of the treaty have become customary international law and are therefore binding on all states, whether or not they have ratified it.”<sup>270</sup> In regards to the AC, activities of the AMAP have played an important part in achieving the instruments just mentioned and has thus “successfully acted as a catalyst for broader action.”<sup>271</sup> In fact, environmental monitoring activities have proven to be a special realm of the AC, and the AMAP examines pathways and levels of hazardous contaminants, heavy metals, radionuclides and hydrocarbons and their effects on human health, arctic flora and fauna as well as the impacts of climate change.<sup>272</sup> The AMAP has had positive effects on both Russian and US developments in this realm and

“the soft-law nature of the AEPS and the Arctic Council has not impeded their ability to induce states to invest more in Arctic environmental monitoring and to harmonize some of those activities. (...) For the Arctic states as a group, environmental monitoring has stood out as an attractive object of cooperation - in part because it does not raise controversial questions about the appropriateness of international regulation, but also because of the substantial benefits of harmonizing data collection and analysis throughout the circumpolar area, especially given the high costs of conducting environmental research in the Arctic.”<sup>273</sup>

In regards to offshore oil and gas activities in the Arctic (see figure III.2<sup>274</sup>), “fact-finding” is the best characterisation of the AC’s action in this realm.<sup>275</sup> It has adopted *Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines*, a soft-law instrument which lacks reporting and review procedures. The AC’s potential as a negotiating body is thus “modest”, as the members are both states with and without jurisdictions over the arctic continental shelves. The shelf-states would lose regulatory leeway through binding rules on hydrocarbon activities, whereas the political and environmental benefits would be common to all. Stokke thus concludes that sub-regional fora seem more suitable when considering more ambitious regulations

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<sup>270</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 9.

<sup>271</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 9.

<sup>272</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 5.

<sup>273</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 6.

<sup>274</sup> Cartographer: Johanna Roto and José Sterling. Data source: Grid-Arendal, ACIA, AMAP, Gaz de France, East European Gas Analysis, NSIDC, United States Geological Survey.

<sup>275</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 9.




Figure III.2.: Resources in the Arctic. (Source: nordregio.se)

in the Arctic, e.g. sub-sets of arctic states or the OSPAR Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North Atlantic.<sup>276</sup> The pros and cons of legal binding rules in the realm of arctic oil and gas activities are assessed in the following:

“The normative force of these various guidelines is low ... and there has been no systematic review of whether governments or others actually make use of them. Had the norms articulated in these documents been legally binding, their level of implementation would probably have been subjected to greater scrutiny. On the other hand, given the caution that states usually display in accepting legal constraints on their freedom of action in areas important to them, negotiating such rules would have been far more difficult. Moreover, procedures for review of follow-up activity can be introduced also for non-binding norms.”<sup>277</sup>

In regards to arctic shipping, the AC has chosen a cautious approach. The UNCLOS restricts the scope for regional action in some issue areas. While dumping is subject to minimum requirements, maximum standards are set for rules on other

<sup>276</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 10.

<sup>277</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2007), p. 7.

ways of pollution by foreign vessels. The scope of action for the coastal state is significant within 12 nautical miles from the shore as it does not impede innocent passage. In the EEZs, however, the coastal state can unilaterally only make rules commensurate with the generally accepted international rules and standards established through the IMO.<sup>278</sup> Restrictions placed by the UNCLOS on coastal states' regulation of navigation beyond its territorial sea, and the navigational interests of the leading powers that produced the different constraints, thus implies little room for the arctic states to regulate maritime transport alone.<sup>279</sup> The limits are, however, prevalent regardless of whether an arctic institution is a soft-law forum or based on a binding treaty. Broader institutions are thus necessary "because much of the activity that gives rise to environmental problems either occurs outside the region or fall under the jurisdiction of non-arctic states. (...) When it comes to environmental governance, the Arctic is often either too small or too big."<sup>280</sup> Hence, the AC's emphasis on monitoring and fact-finding activities makes sense. It has improved the knowledge necessary for environmental measures, produced practical guidelines on risk reduction, and has used broader institutions to highlight arctic problems in addition to supporting arctic states to implement the agreed commitments. Thus, instead of a legally binding arctic environmental regime, Stokke prefers "an approach to strengthening substantive commitments for protection of the arctic environment (...) in seeking productive interplay between arctic institutions and existing issue-specific regimes."<sup>281</sup>

Such a policy coordination should promote better solutions to environmental problems in the Arctic, which are becoming increasingly pressing. An additional point of view presented by Berkman<sup>282</sup> is that the prevention of international discord in the Arctic Ocean as the sea-ice disappears is the most important issue as "all activities in the Arctic Ocean are jeopardized without coherent strategies for peace and stability."<sup>283</sup> Hence, peace and stability have to be the basis for an environmentally sustainable arctic development. The UNCLOS is the "over-

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<sup>278</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 10.

<sup>279</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 10.

<sup>280</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 10.

<sup>281</sup> SCHRAM STOKKE (2009), p. 10.

<sup>282</sup> Paul Arthur Berkman is Head of the Arctic Ocean Geopolitics Programme from the Scott Polar Research Institute at the University of Cambridge.

<sup>283</sup> BERKMAN (2009), p. 16.



arching policy-making system for the Arctic Ocean” and the five coastal states have committed themselves to it (Ilulissat Declaration). The AC on the other hand is “the most important arrangement for cooperation in the Arctic Ocean”. The necessary coordination between institutions associated with Arctic Ocean governance could furthermore be facilitated by the AC “in a manner that further acknowledges the special role and responsibilities of the arctic states and indigenous people’s organizations.” However, “an inclusive dialogue about security risks and responses relating to the Arctic Ocean has yet to emerge” which was exemplified by the five coastal states in the Ilulissat Declaration asserting their “stewardship role” in the Arctic without mentioning security or peace.<sup>284</sup> It should be noted that security threats involve non-state actors such as drug smugglers, illegal immigrants, terrorists and gunrunners. Russia is with its several dozen icebreakers, of which some are nuclear powered, the best equipped of the Arctic countries in terms of military capability.<sup>285</sup> National strategies are, however, not sufficient, and the essential question is how to balance national and international interests in the Arctic.

#### 2.1.1.2. Case description and dependent variable

These considerations on environmental hazards and governance in the Arctic will now be followed up by an assessment of the dependent variable, i.e. German interests and, if existent, an outline of a policy on the matter.

Former FM Steinmeier stressed some aspects that could point to a certain amount of German arctic policy in the AA:

“The global hunger for [energy] resources and global governance<sup>286</sup> threaten to clash to an increasing extent. Our energy, foreign and security policies have to rise to these challenges.<sup>287</sup>”

“One has to be sure that no countries make their own definitions of how the continental shelf has to be delineated. It is important that they keep to *the international rules present in international law*”.<sup>288</sup>

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<sup>284</sup> BERKMAN (2009), p. 16.

<sup>285</sup> BYERS (2009), p. 19.

<sup>286</sup>“Weltordnungspolitik”.

<sup>287</sup> STEINMEIER (2006A) [author’s translation].

<sup>288</sup>Cited in DRAGNES (2007) [author’s translation, author’s accentuation].

Energy, peace and climate protection are thus German concerns:

“Energy security policy is also peace policy. Only if we make sure that the availability of energy resources does not become the sole decisive currency of power, can we defuse potential tensions and allow for long term stability. (...) I thus advocate that the EU and the US put the topics of energy security and climate protection on the top of their common agenda.”<sup>289</sup>

Further:

“And when the eternal ice is melting, not only the polar bears are threatened. The global warming is already causing the second footrace over the region around the north pole. This time it is not only about national and scientific glory but about hard economic interests: Because the raw materials and mineral resources of the Norwegian Sea region is not just attracting bold adventurers. International allocation conflicts of resources could threaten in the High North already in few years.”<sup>290</sup>

Steinmeier was confident with the situation in the High North, which he visited several times. This indicates that German interest in the north exist both in regards to environmental and global energy perspectives. The statements cited above indicate interest in a coherent policy combining different policy fields, and the importance of international law and peace policy. The question is if the underlying German interest above all is to ensure the safe accessibility to the Arctic’s rich resources in a way that serves Germany’s interests as a high-tech nation. Sea routes should also be of great interest to an exporting nation, and in September 2009 it was reported that two German cargo ships had travelled the Northern Sea Route (from South Korea to Rotterdam). The route saves 4000 nautical miles of the standard 11 000 miles via the Suez Canal. This implies less time and less fuel costs.<sup>291</sup> Almost 90 per cent of the German foreign trade is seaborne.<sup>292</sup> According to Haftendorn the importance of the Northern Sea Route to the German East Asia trade will increase in future.<sup>293</sup> Rather than seamanlike problems, time-consuming Russian approval procedures impede the option of this future Sea Route for German foreign trade. A German aim would thus be a simplified approval practice at a lower price in the overall arctic area,

<sup>289</sup> STEINMEIER, (2007A) [author’s translation].

<sup>290</sup> STEINMEIER, (2007B) [author’s translation].

<sup>291</sup> DODDS (2009), p. 11.

<sup>292</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 75.

<sup>293</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 75.

and Haftendorn also suggests the attempt of integrating the transit traffic in the German-Russian negotiations on economic cooperation.<sup>294</sup> There is moreover no judicial consensus on whether these sea routes are international waters, which conforms to the view of the EU, or passages of coastal waters subject to national control as claimed by Russia and Canada.<sup>295</sup>

Another topic of interest to Germany is connected with the growing arctic tourism industry which demands a broader rescue system in the region. The first international agreement written exclusively for the Arctic region was actually signed at the AC ministerial meeting in Nuuk on 12 May 2001, also attended by US foreign secretary Hillary Clinton. The agreement deals with search and rescue of aeronautical and maritime vessels and passengers and was also the first international agreement made by the AC. Berlin wanted to participate in the elaboration of the treaty but this was not allowed for by the AC member states.<sup>296</sup>

Germany's dependence on Russian and Norwegian energy supplies have been analysed above.<sup>297</sup> The additional factor of German know-how which is offered to Russian and Norwegian energy partners in order to achieve an effective exploitation of their crude oil and natural gas resources should however not be underestimated. With the 2010 Barents Sea frontier agreement between Russia and Norway new opportunities have been opened in regard to the energy industry in arctic waters. However a profitable business is dependent on the world market price and demand, and Germany is an important market. At the second German-Norwegian energy conference "Challenges towards a sustainable energy security", the Norwegian side of the energy business stressed the necessity of long-term contracts and continued high demand scenarios in order to invest in future production and infrastructure. A representative of the German gas business on the other hand indicated a possible future scenario where subsidised alternative energy could outbalance the future demand for gas in Germany because natural gas would be a too expensive option. This would among other things be dependent on the economic capability of continued subsidies of the alternative energy

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<sup>294</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 75.

<sup>295</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), pp. 75-76.

<sup>296</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 76.

<sup>297</sup> See figure 2.1.1.3 and table I.2.

business.<sup>298</sup> A future prominent role of Norwegian or Russian gas in Germany is thus not as given as one might think. Close cooperation with Germany on the strategic perspectives of the Arctic energy business should however be in the interest of all parties.

The question is then how Germany views the Ilullisat declaration and the coastal countries' decisive roles. This is again a question of how the assignment of roles of the arctic states and the non-arctic interested states and organisations should be, and how the cooperation should look like, i.e. if Germany, the EU, China and others should have a say in the region. As mentioned above, Germany is one of six non-arctic states with a permanent observer status in the AC. Germany is solely an Arctic player in regard to polar research but is contributing significantly to polar research through the Alfred-Wegener-Institute, and German institutes are cooperating with research programmes of the EU, the Nordic Council and the AC. And polar research is not an insignificant matter. The importance in regard to German interests is connected e.g. to the future protection of a city like Hamburg which is sensitive to a future sea-level rise. The German economy has also an interest in estimating the conditions for further oil- and gas production in these areas, and long-term trends are also indispensable when estimating future possibilities for the merchant shipping in the northernmost regions. A comprehensive polar research is however limited by the very restrictive policy pursued by the arctic states in regard to authorising research projects. The preconditions moreover vary from state to state. Russia is the most restrictive country and only allows for basic research with additional Russian participation.<sup>299</sup> The conditions for international research are thus a matter where German interests are not compatible with those of the Ilullisat countries. A common arctic policy on improving the terms of international research would be something Germany would support in addition to increased cooperation and knowledge exchange in multilateral institutions.<sup>300</sup>

Germany is a leading nation in environmental questions and at the same time an industrial state with a large demand for commodities. Germany prioritises the

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<sup>298</sup>“2nd German-Norwegian Energy-Conference: Challenges towards a sustainable energy security” in Oslo, 29 September 2011.

<sup>299</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 73.

<sup>300</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 74.

cooperation with Russia in the EU environmental activities.<sup>301</sup> In Westerwelle's term of office the AA has become increasingly active, hosting two international conferences on the Arctic in Berlin where the key topic was future polar research. At the second conference FM Westerwelle recommended the free access of all nations to the Arctic.<sup>302</sup> The impression of German concern about the development connected with the Ilullisat declaration is strengthened by the following notice:

“From fish to natural resources to shipping routes, the region is of great interest for Germany, according to officials at the Foreign ministry. The diplomats are worried that the five countries bordering the Arctic (...) plan to divide up the previously ice-covered ocean among themselves. They argue that there is a risk that the Arctic could be completely nationalized when the sea ice melts, providing access to the sea floor. (...) Germany ... wants to ensure that the region remains the 'common heritage of all mankind,' say Foreign Ministry officials in Berlin. The five countries bordering the Arctic, on the other hand, feel that Germany should not intervene in their affairs.”<sup>303</sup>

*Spiegel Online* also cites Rolf Einar Fife, chief international law expert at the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, who states that no “others than the coastal nations should be concerned about the question of overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic”. Despite respecting international maritime law the German FM nevertheless argue that Germany and other states should have a say in what happens in the Arctic.<sup>304</sup> Due to ecological and economic core interests Germany aims for strengthening regional stability in the Arctic which is the only way to secure the access to the resources and enabling a well-regulated shipping traffic as well as common programmes on environmental protection and climate. The comprehensive attempt made by the EU to aim at a treaty similar to the Antarctic Treaty of 1961 was also supported by the federal government of Germany. However Germany has realised its limitations and rather seeks to expand the existing networks of multilateral agreements and institutions.<sup>305</sup> The problem is apparently that Germany only has only very limited access to the most important institution, the AC.

Haftendorn remarks that there is no systematic German strategy on the Arctic:

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<sup>301</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 76.

<sup>302</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 72.

<sup>303</sup> SCHWÄGERL/SEIDLER (2011).

<sup>304</sup> Cited in SCHWÄGERL/SEIDLER (2011).

<sup>305</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 76.

German interests are not formulated coherently, and there are no institutional instruments available for an arctic policy. The different ministries primarily pursue the specific departmental interests. The AA emphasises the aspects under international law and the unit 504 'The Arctic and Antarctic' is situated in the Legal Directorate-General. Although there is no recognisable security threat in the Arctic at present, the unit FÜS III 2 of the Military Policy and Arms Control department in the defence ministry aims at developing an overall view on the matter. Inside the federal government there is however no comprehensive assessment of the chances and risks in the Arctic stemming from global warming.<sup>306</sup> Haftendorn moreover misses a synopsis of German arctic policy, i.e. an interconnection of the policies on commodities, environment, shipping and security. This would be necessary in order to create an image as an arctic player in more realms than polar research. According to Haftendorn partner countries actually complain about missing contact persons in Berlin on arctic matters. The ministries are thus not sufficiently acquainted with the region, and in the AA only the departments of bilateral relations are in charge. In front of the NATO summit in the autumn of 2010 where the Arctic was expected to be specifically mentioned in the summit document, the German defence ministry initiated an internal study on the topic in order to upgrade its knowledge.<sup>307</sup> The partition in different departments furthermore prevents the existence of any public relations of the federal government on the Arctic. The government could moreover pursue German interests in a more effective manner if they were embedded in a coherent and visible policy on the Arctic.<sup>308</sup> An increased exchange with Nordic colleagues might be a good idea. German engagement is definitely welcomed, and the public attention in e.g. Norway when a German FM visits the country's high north is high. A visit by chancellor Merkel in the Barents Region would be a perceived as an acknowledgement of the region's importance.

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<sup>306</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 73.

<sup>307</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), p. 78.

<sup>308</sup> HAFTENDORN (2011), pp. 78-79.

### 2.1.1.3. Independent variables and policy assessment

This chapter rather assesses how the German role in regard to arctic governance from an environmental point of view *should* look like rather than assessing a German Arctic policy in its fledgling stages. The assessment will be undertaken when including the independent variables which are the different principles of good international citizenship (pluralistic, solidarist, and universally applicable principles) cited in chapter 2.2 of part II. Those with the greatest relevance of this case study will be used to assess how Germany could be a good international citizen in this particular case. First, the pluralist principle 1 (“States are the basic members of international society”) has to be discussed. Without doubt, the arctic states are the main regime actors in the Arctic, not only in a formal manner. Compared to the BSR<sup>309</sup>, the arctic states and first and foremost the coastal states, play the decisive role. The Ilullisat declaration has been interpreted to form an “inner circle” of arctic cooperation. The five coastal states are of particular relevance in regard to fishery regimes<sup>310</sup>, and have undefined border questions in regard to the extension of their arctic continental shelves. Also, the arctic coastal states have the jurisdiction over arctic petroleum activities, also beyond 200 nautical miles. In addition, they deliver the infrastructure for safe shipping. And last but not least the coastal states are responsible for the military presence in the High North and are thus the closest to assess procedures to keep the tension low and control the activities. Hence, an “inner circle” of Arctic cooperation made up of five states may even be a necessity. Another obvious difference to the BSR is the relative absent role of the EU in the Arctic. However, whereas the coastal states are important, the largest challenges in the north are of an environmental nature and demand action from many non-arctic (state and non-state) actors. Also, with the melting ice in the Arctic new fishery opportunities could occur, which necessitate a clear legal framework of living resources. In regard to legal cooperation, the Arctic High Seas could thus be a potential area of cooperation. Berkman suggests

“to draw a clear distinction between the sea floor (much of which may

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<sup>309</sup>See the following chapter.

<sup>310</sup>The bilateral Norwegian-Russian fishery commission is for example decisive for international cooperation in the Barents Sea.

well come under arctic coastal state jurisdictions) and the overlying water column. Ecologically and legally distinct from the sea floor, the overlying water column reveals an alternative jurisdictional configuration for arctic and non-arctic nations alike to share in the governance of the Arctic Ocean. (...) By reframing the issues of Arctic Ocean governance from the center outward rather than from the coastal periphery inward (...) the High Seas opens the door for stable international governance in the Arctic Ocean without contravening the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the arctic coastal states. This governance solution involves the integration of science diplomacy tools (notably ecosystem-based management) with recognition of international space and common interests in the Arctic Ocean for the lasting benefit of all humanity.”<sup>311</sup>

A further input to the discussion is the solidarist principle number 10 (“regard for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnecessary suffering”). Non-sovereign communities are important in order to handle the environmental threats facing the Arctic. The international society’s respect and protection is thus important. The Inuit and other indigenous peoples of the Arctic are not only those who experience the environmental changes directly but are also part of the solution when environmental monitoring in the Arctic becomes increasingly important. Just as the EU can play a more important role in arctic environmental protection, “community-based monitoring” is an important asset as suggested by Bravo.<sup>312</sup> He also highlights the important role of the AC and dismisses the idea of an Arctic Treaty:

“History ... shows us that the real weakness in seeking adequate conservation measures in the Arctic is that the political and cultural diversity of the eight arctic states is far greater than first meets the eye. The arctic territories are at least eight backyards and many homelands - and not one backyard that will be subsumed by a powerful environmental regime. That is why we have an Arctic Council and why an Arctic Treaty is politically a non-starter. That, together with the peripheral situation of arctic geography, makes negotiating and ratifying comprehensive regional environmental deals much, much more difficult. (...) The arctic communities, Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council and settler peoples, are very adept at forming transnational partnerships.”<sup>313</sup>

The next pluralistic principle of importance here is principle 7 (“an ‘inclusive’ as opposed to ‘exclusive’ conception of the national interest should be pursued so

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<sup>311</sup> BERKMAN (2009), p. 17.

<sup>312</sup> BRAVO(2009).

<sup>313</sup> BRAVO(2009), pp. 12-13.



that other states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages"). An inclusive conception of national interest seems of particular importance in the Arctic, as a sustainable development is important to both the arctic states and the rest of the world. An inclusive focus is thus equally important both to the coastal states with energy and territorial interests, and to the EU and EU member states when making an arctic approach. This leads to the universally applicable principles number 3,6 and 7 which are of particular interest to arctic governance:

Principle number 3 states that "solidarists have a prima facie duty to avoid being complicit in human rights violations in other societies." Here, human rights violations must be extended to apply also for environmental hazards that again lead to the violation of e.g. indigenous rights. Principle number 6 is equally important, i.e. "affluent societies have global environmental responsibilities to ensure that vulnerable populations enjoy a safe natural environment." Finally, principle 7 states that "obligations to protect the vulnerable require the establishment of global political structures - involving close cooperation with international governmental and non-governmental organizations - that institutionalize the universal right to be able to protest against actual or potential harm." Here, "the vulnerable" must also be considered to be the arctic environment as such. What policy recommendations are then to be derived from this case study to German policy making? First, Germany should not support the idea of any Arctic Treaty but rather support the coordination of the existing regimes. Second, European focus on environmental issues in the Arctic, governance included, as well as climate issues are important, and Germany could enhance these efforts in the EU. In addition, Germany could enhance both the transatlantic dialogue on arctic issues, as well as a European-Russian dialogue on the matter. Third, Germany should promote the role of the arctic indigenous communities in environmental regimes. Finally, Germany could advocate an approach of an "alternative jurisdictional configuration" for the overlying water column as proposed by Berkman, i.e. a shared governance of the Arctic between arctic and non-arctic states. However, this must be pursued in close cooperation with the Arctic states and the AC and should not be made in an alliance with e.g. China which might have many common interests with Germany in the Arctic but definitely is no cutting edge in

environmental questions. In order to be able to do so Germany needs to develop a coherent arctic policy as proposed by Haftendorn and increase the diplomatic efforts in the region. There should be a clear conception of Germany's arctic policy and competent contact persons in the AA. And vice versa the arctic coastal states in particular need to welcome Germany's and other nations' important contributions to e.g. arctic research. For example, the Alfred Wegener Institute for Polar and Marine Research is making an important contribution which would be of importance to an ecosystem-based management of the Arctic Ocean.

## 2.2. Germany and the Baltic Sea Region

The Baltic Sea area is not a very highlighted topic in German political discussion. The exemption is the controversies caused by the planning and building of the North Stream Pipeline. A good example are German-US tensions connected with US suspicion in regard to German-Russian relations, of which the pipeline substantiates such a suspicion.<sup>314</sup> Standard works on German foreign policy however tend to neglect this region. For instance, Schmidt, Hellmann and Wolf's "Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik" (2007) analyses Germany's foreign relations with several states and regions - the US, France, the UK, Poland, East-Central Europe, Russia, the CIS, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey, the Middle East, Israel, the Maghreb states, Africa south of the Sahara, Latin America, Southeast Asia and India - but ignores a region it is a part of, represented by the federal states of Schleswig Holstein, Hamburg, and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. Moreover, Berlin is situated very close to region. The relative low level of conflict might be a reason for the absence of interest. On the other hand is this a very important region where Russia meets Europe. And as noted before, Europe can not become an important actor in world politics before it solves the challenges in its own neighbourhood. A leading role for Germany is a precondition for a successful integration in the BSR. The question is whether this is at hand or not, and if it is the case, what preferences do German policy actors have. The three cases chosen for this issue area will moreover show whether there are different tendencies in

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<sup>314</sup>See for example BESTE/ MEYER (2008).

German policies on the different topics or if a coherent policy on the BSR exists.

### 2.2.1. Case 2: The Baltic states

The importance of the Baltic states to the security of the Nordic region was analysed in part I. Also, their strategic importance to Sweden was stressed. Here, the question what characterises Germany's foreign policy on the Baltic states must be pursued and finally, what is required of Germany in order to show a good international citizenship?

#### 2.2.1.1. Case description and dependent variable

Germany's policy on the Baltic states is the dependent variable. It will be looked at two different indicators. First, German policy on the Baltic states will be evaluated in regard to European integration (EU and NATO). Second, German reactions to Baltic-Russian disputes will be evaluated.

The Baltic states declared their independency from the Soviet Union on 11 March (Lithuania), 4 May (Latvia) and 8 May (Estonia) 1990 respectively. After the bloody clashes of the independence movements in Lithuania and Latvia with the Soviet special operation force OMON in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991, chancellor Kohl demanded of Gorbachev to stop the use of force and return to the path of dialogue and understanding.<sup>315</sup> Genscher received the provisional foreign ministers of Estonia and Latvia a few weeks later in Bonn and thus signalled German support although their sovereignty was still not acknowledged.<sup>316</sup>

The preceding Baltic efforts to accomplish their independency were however widely ignored by the German federal government. As late as 10 July 1991, Helmut Kohl misjudged the development in the Soviet Union as he characterised the "undifferentiated support of the strivings for independence of the single Soviet republics" as a "dangerous stupidity" ("gefährliche Dummheit"), because thus the "risk of a breaking apart of the Soviet Union" would be provoked.<sup>317</sup> In order

<sup>315</sup>Cited in KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 68.

<sup>316</sup>Cited in KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 68.

<sup>317</sup>Cited in GARBE (2002), p. 187. Author's translation. See also KLEIN/ HERRMANN

not to jeopardise the German unity and the stability of the USSR, contacts with forces who could weaken Gorbachev's position were avoided. In August 1991, after the recognition of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania by Russia's president Boris Yeltsin, the Baltic states' foreign ministers were welcomed in Bonn by FM Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the resuming of diplomatic relations was agreed on. The new circumstances allowed German support for the Baltic states without risking anything.<sup>318</sup> Germany formalised its relations with the Baltic states as one of the first Western states on 28 August 1991, shortly after the August putsch in Moscow. It must also be noted that Genscher was the first high-ranking Western politician who visited the Baltic states. German embassies were opened in Tallin, Riga, and Vilnius on 2 September 1991, before the official recognition by the Soviet Union.<sup>319</sup> The first German ambassadors to Tallin and Riga were of German-Baltic origins. Genscher assured his colleagues from the Baltic states that the German government would advocate the accession of the three countries to the PHARE<sup>320</sup> programme within 1 January 1992 and the completion of cooperation agreements with the EU a few months later.

The federal government however positioned itself far more distanced in the case of a NATO enlargement reaching Russia's Western border. Rather, the AA hoped that closer political consultations and economic cooperation in the Baltic Sea area would satisfy the security needs of the Baltic republics. The institutionalised cooperation of the CBSS, a Danish-German initiative<sup>321</sup>, was thus Genscher's answer to the necessity of equally integrating both the Baltic states and Russia in common structures.<sup>322</sup> According to Klein and Herrmann the CBSS was, in addition to the Baltic states' approaching of the institutions of the European Council, the EU and NATO, contributing to a temporary dualism between the AA and the federal chancellery. The foreign minister was far more interested in the Baltic states than the chancellor himself. They moreover prioritised differently, the foreign minister concentrated on the three Baltic states whereas Kohl was

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(2010), pp. 67-68.

<sup>318</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 54. See also KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), pp.67-70.

<sup>319</sup> GARBE (2002), p. 191.

<sup>320</sup>Created in 1989 as the "Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies" programme.

<sup>321</sup>See also chapter 2.2.3 of this part.

<sup>322</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 72.

preoccupied with the relations to Moscow. This assignment of roles applied to Kohl and Genscher in 1991/1992 and later to Kohl and Kinkel from 1992 to 1998. The federal chancellery was both indifferent and sceptical in regard to future EU memberships of the Baltic states and decelerated such attempts.<sup>323</sup> According to Garbe, the regional affiliation might also have been a factor which explains the reluctant Baltic engagement of chancellor Kohl, a catholic from the Rhineland. The missing initiative from the chancellor in Germany's early policy on the Baltic states led to a shifting of competencies in favour of the AA and FM Genscher, who developed an emotional relationship to the three states and advocated their memberships in international organisations. His successor Kinkel did not have such a personal connection to the Baltic states. Moreover, chancellor Schröder's official visit to the Baltic states showed that a lot more would have been possible in the 1990s.<sup>324</sup>

Nonetheless, the basis of the German policy on the Baltic states was the commitment to bear a particular responsibility for the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 which ended the Baltic independencies. The German government committed to a distinguishable political, economic and cultural contribution in order to come to terms with the comprehensive problems facing the young republics.<sup>325</sup> The former Estonian PM Mart Laar has confirmed that there was a very active informal cooperation between Germany and Estonia.<sup>326</sup> German "Vertragspolitik"<sup>327</sup> between 1994 and 1998 aimed next to economic cooperation also at the development of democratic structures and the making of market-oriented economic arrangements in the Baltic states. The Kohl government also formulated some guiding principles for its cooperation with the Baltic states in the "*Agenda der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den baltischen Staaten*" from 1998. Here Germany is characterised as the "*Lawyer of the Balts*."<sup>328</sup> Germany thus became the "lawyer of the Balts" in its own diplomatic vocabulary. Germany and the Baltic states moreover agreed on the issue that an institutional approach to Europe would stabilise the

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<sup>323</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), pp. 73-74.

<sup>324</sup> GARBE (2002), pp. 246-247, footnote 1.

<sup>325</sup> WISTINGHAUSEN (2004), pp. 156-157.

<sup>326</sup> GARBE (2002), p. 244, footnote 1. See also PICKLAPS (2007)

<sup>327</sup> Important agreements were made on road transport, environment protection, problems related to foreign workers, transborder passenger traffick and youth-political cooperation.

<sup>328</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), pp. 245-246.

political and economic reform process and thus secure Baltic independence in the long run.<sup>329</sup> The Baltic hope rooted in the common cultural history with the Germans and in their pretension of a certain “Wiedergutmachung” of the consequences stemming from the Hitler-Stalin pact. The former Estonian FM Trivimi Velliste (1992-1994) expressed the Baltic hope for German support:

“After all, we are linked to Germany by some 800 years of common language and cultural space. This investment has been made during 20-30 generations and it would be madness not to use it”<sup>330</sup>

This hope however slowly died, and during his state visit to Germany in 2000, Estonia’s president Meri used the opportunity to criticise Germany’s policy on the Baltic states. The efforts of the government Kohl to be the “lawyer” of the Baltic peoples in the Western society of states - opening doors both to the EU and NATO - were in their view more an illusiveness than rooted in reality. The “Ostpreußenblatt” reflects Estonian dissapointments at this point of time:

“Indeed, the Bundeswehr facilitates armaments and education for the Estonian armed forces on behalf of NATO, some few small-scale companies have settled in Estonia, some German municipalities cultivate fruitful relations with Estonian counterparts, evangelical churches and German-Baltic families engage in Estonia on a private basis. However, the government in Bonn did no look at Tallinn or Riga but at Moscow. And despite nice sounding words, Schröder’s Berlin does not act differently.”<sup>331</sup>

In the last twenty years, German policy on the Baltic states has rather alternated between being the lawyer of the Balts on the one hand and a position of an *advocatus diaboli* on the other hand according to Klein and Herrmann, particularly when German relations with Russia were endangered.<sup>332</sup> German politicians and diplomats as well have criticised the quality of the German-Baltic relations. Germany’s first ambassador to Estonia, Henning von Wistinghausen (1991-1995), is very outspoken when he points to the early “misjudgement” of German politicians in regard to the Baltic states, the lack of interest from the German economy, and the “schoolmasterly” tone of some political representatives towards the young Estonian republic.<sup>333</sup> His refusal to visit the Baltic states was

<sup>329</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p.55. See also KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 66.

<sup>330</sup> Cited in GARBE (2002), pp. 193-194.

<sup>331</sup> SCHUBBE (2000). Author’s translation.

<sup>332</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 66.

<sup>333</sup> WISTINGHAUSEN (2004), p. 162.

“politically ill-advised”.<sup>334</sup> The initial hopes of a strong German engagement were according to Germany’s first ambassador to Latvia, Hagen Graf Lambsdorff,

“disappointed in the 1990s through the extraordinary contained policy of the federal government which was so considerate of its Russian relations that the Balts were in fact always kept on a distance. And it is not a coincident that chancellor Kohl never called on the Balts.”<sup>335</sup>

The question is thus how the apparent German neglect of the Baltic states in the 1990s should be assessed. The findings of Rittberger’s study on post-unified Germany’s foreign policy concludes that this

“has almost always adhered to the value-based expectations of appropriate behaviour shared within the international and domestic society. At the same time, however, post-unification Germany has intensified its influence-seeking policy. Particular in the ‘high politics’ issue areas, it has stepped up its efforts to increase its influence on collective decision making and collective action. Finally, and in line with its tradition as an institutionally integrated trading state, post-unification Germany has pursued a gain-seeking policy, in the making of which demands of assertive private actors have played a prominent role.”<sup>336</sup>

Dauchert’s conclusion in regard to the low-key approach towards Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania rejects the conclusion that Russia-oriented *realpolitik* was prioritised over its traditional value-based policy. Accordingly, the underlying reasons for the German detachment was rather the policy of creating a peaceful and integrated post-Cold War Europe and the difficulties it created. It was thus a consequence of the efforts to pursue three ambitious political aims at the same time: the enlargement and deepening of the EU and the integration of Russia in Europe.<sup>337</sup> Picklapp has a somewhat different angle of assessment when he states that Russia was economically and politically Germany’s most important partner in Central and Eastern Europe whereas the Baltic region had to stand back. The interesting question thereby is why the German foreign policy makers had such difficulties with explicitly expressing this matter of fact and rather constantly talked about representing the Baltic states’ interests as their “lawyer”. The sole sensible explanation seems to be attitudes based on moral-historical concepts and

<sup>334</sup> WISTINGHAUSEN (2004), p. 586.

<sup>335</sup> Cited in GARBE (2002), pp. 193-194. Author’s translation.

<sup>336</sup> RITTBERGER (2001), p. 323.

<sup>337</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p.57.

an idealist-political world outlook prevalent in German foreign policy norms.<sup>338</sup> Statements beyond a designed essential common identity (e.g. in regard to European integration) were unpopular, very uncommon and classified as insensitive in German foreign policy making. There was thus a real discrepancy between the political language which came to the fore and the cognitive background of the German foreign policy makers' statements. The rhetoric substance of the stated preferences were thus to a large extent ignored.<sup>339</sup>

Initially, the federal government of Germany got very actively involved with Baltic memberships in the CSCE, the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the CBSS, and with their integration in the EU. On the other hand this commitment trickled away with the end of Genscher's time in office in May 1992. German restraint was also apparent in regard to the European integration of the Baltic states. Already in 1993 the German government reacted negatively to the proposal of the Danish presidency of the European Council of promptly adopting free trade agreements with the Baltic states. At this point of time negotiations on association treaties were also considered by Bonn to be unrealistic and the federal government thus signalled that the three countries were not yet considered to be ready for accession.<sup>340</sup> The German restraint however yielded during the German presidency of the European Council, beginning in July 1994. The aim was formulated by the German presidency that the Eastern and Central European states should be brought closer to the EU and that association agreements with the three Baltic states should be signed within six months.<sup>341</sup> The German presidency furthermore appealed to EU member states to approve of such rapid association talks, and the European Council decided unanimously on the summit in Essen of 9 and 10 December 1994 to start negotiations on Europe Agreements with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. They were finally signed in June 1995. According to Klein and Herrmann, Germany had thus "decisively promoted" the European integration of the Baltic states. The decisions also "underlined (...) the sovereignty and the European perspective of the three states."<sup>342</sup> Despite the support during the German presidency the federal government con-

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<sup>338</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 277.

<sup>339</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), pp. 277-278.

<sup>340</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 74.

<sup>341</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 75.

<sup>342</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 75. Author's translation.



tinued to be reluctant to a distinct schedule for the accession of the Baltic states to the EU. Due to the consideration of Russian interests the German chancellor initially only favoured the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to the EU and NATO.<sup>343</sup> Despite that German representatives of the government consistently claimed to be the “lawyer of the Balts”, Picklaps assesses the efforts of the German government to be “rather modest”.<sup>344</sup> This direction of the European enlargement policy was also continued after the change of government in 1998.<sup>345</sup>

In particular was the German government’s rejection of Baltic NATO memberships compatible with the position of the Russian leadership, which was basically against any enlargement of the alliance.<sup>346</sup> Germany’s cautious policy on the Baltic states has been motivated by the great importance of the three states to Russia in regard to economy and security politics, in addition to the large Russian minorities here. The train of thoughts has been that unless Germany acts with reluctance, the suspicion could be aroused that Germany strives for a dominant role in the Russian ‘sphere of interest’. In other words the German-Baltic relations were and are to date overshadowed by the German-Russian relations. First, the German reunification was the crucial point of German foreign policy as the foreign relations with the Baltic states were concerned, but the federal government stressed the importance of not annoying Moscow also after the German reunification.<sup>347</sup> Hence, German policy on the Baltic states is basically realised in a multilateral frame, and Germany does not allow itself to show more initiative than other states on the Baltic states - as opposed to the Scandinavians who can pursue an active Baltic policy because Russia does not suspect an interest of domination. The creation of the CBSS was thus also an attempt to support the Balts in a multilateral frame.<sup>348</sup> However, when German and Baltic security interests were compatible, which was the case of the negotiations on the pull-out of the Russians troops from the Soviet Union’s previous territory, the German government supported the Baltic interests, i.e. the demand of troop retreat.

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<sup>343</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 76.

<sup>344</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 269.

<sup>345</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 270.

<sup>346</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 57.

<sup>347</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 70.

<sup>348</sup> GARBE (2002), p. 244.

The protection of Russians abroad was one of few issues of which the Russian elites could agree on in the early 1990s. The Baltic states have large Russian minorities. The numbers of the mid-1990s were 34 per cent in Latvia, 30,3 per cent in Estonia and 9,3 per cent in Lithuania.<sup>349</sup> Hence, the tensions in this regard were more severe in the two former states. The policies of Estonia and Latvia in particular towards the Russian minorities were also criticised by Western states, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Russian FM Kosyrev added the Baltic states to Russia's "near abroad", whereas minister of defence Gratschov dramatically declared, the Russian troops would not redraw from the Baltic states. The negotiations on the redrawals could thus not be brought to an end because Russia considered the new electoral and naturalisation laws in the Baltic states to be discriminating against the Russian minorities. The exception was Lithuania, from which the last Russian troops redrew in July 1993. In Latvia and Estonia, 13 000 and 2500 Russian soldiers respectively still resided.<sup>350</sup> Concerned, the Balts sent their representatives to Germany in the beginning of March 1994 in order to uncover their close relationships with Germany and to secure German support. FM Kinkel stated that Germany did not want to be the third part at the negotiation table, but as the "lawyer of the Balts" Germany would speak to both sides. He demanded a just treatment of the Russian minorities and a troop redrawal on schedule until 31 August the same year. Furthermore, the imperialistic thinking in "spheres of influence" had to be prohibited according to Kinkel. The aggressive Russian tone was thus met by a firmer German attitude towards Russia. It had to be clear that the Russians should not go beyond a certain line.<sup>351</sup> Bonn thus supported the Baltic states and engaged internationally for the quick withdrawal of the Russian troops from Estonian and Latvian territories which was accomplished on the due date of 31 August 1994.<sup>352</sup>

Despite criticism from the Russian leadership in regard to the NATO enlargement, minister of defence R ue continued to support this process. R ue explicitly supported the enlargement by the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary,

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<sup>349</sup>Cited in Mattusch, Katrin (1996): *Demokratisierung im Baltikum?  ber die Begrenzung von Demokratisierungschancen durch politische Kulturen*. Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang, p. 14 (table).

<sup>350</sup> GARBE (2002), pp. 207-208.

<sup>351</sup>Cited in GARBE (2002), p. 208.

<sup>352</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 71.

but memberships of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were opposed by reason of military-strategic considerations. The relocation of NATO's eastern border would fill the military vacuum which was created in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War, and Germany would thus be free from its position as a front-line state. The inclusion of the Baltic states in the defence alliance was however not of particular relevance for this matter as a result of their missing strategic depth, exposed position and military weakness. Rühle even rather feared that their memberships could jeopardise the inner coherence of the alliance. Chancellor Kohl on the other hand had geopolitical objections to the NATO enlargement as such, despite enhanced security from a military-strategic point of view, as the German-Russian relationship was not to be strained. This also implied that Germany should have a hands-off approach to Russia's "near abroad".<sup>353</sup> It was thus only FM Kinkel who considered the Baltic states' security needs to be compatible in principle with German interests. Although recognising the danger of antagonising the Russian leadership, he also considered an exclusion of the Balts as a potential danger for the stability in the region. Their security status would as a consequence of the enlargement by other states possibly be weakened, which again could stimulate objectionable actions towards them.<sup>354</sup> Kohl finally ended the NATO discussions in his government in September 1995 with a pro-Russian position on the matter.<sup>355</sup> At the same time however the US government ended its initial hesitation in regard to NATO enlargements. The German government accepted the US plans but insisted that the enlargements of NATO and the EU should be continued simultaneously. The Baltic States finalised their Europe agreements<sup>356</sup> in June 1995 and anticipated memberships in both the EU and NATO. However, instead of advocating Baltic memberships in both organisations, the German government openly distanced itself from this option and concentrated on preparing the EU integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Estonian president Meri's state visit to German in July 1996 was held "in reticence" and no German state-

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<sup>353</sup> FÖHRENBACH (2000), p. 143.

<sup>354</sup> FÖHRENBACH (2000), pp. 139-141.

<sup>355</sup> FÖHRENBACH (2000), p. 144.

<sup>356</sup> The Europe agreements constituted the legal framework of relations between the European Union and the Central and Eastern European countries. These agreements were adapted to the specific situation of each partner state while setting common political, economic and commercial objectives. In the context of accession to the EU, they formed the framework for implementation of the accession process.

ment to the press was given. Moreover, R uhe commended the deepening of the Baltic states' security cooperation with Finland and Sweden instead of seeking "the path through the centre of Europe".<sup>357</sup>

After Meri's state visit to Germany, the security situation of the Baltic states was not assessed by his German counterparts to be serious enough for a NATO membership, and Germany, i.e. Western Europe, could not give the Baltic states any security guarantee unless their situation would change for the worse.<sup>358</sup> Such an assessment was without doubt peculiar as the situation in the second half of the 1990s could hardly have been much worse with the great eastern neighbour instrumentalising the minority question in the Baltic states to prevent their integration Euro-Atlantic structures. Threats and verbal attacks from Russian politicians on the Balts were not or only ineffectual contradicted by the German side. The US however covered for the Baltic interests in regard to security policy and NATO accession, whereas the German government primarily solicited understanding for the Russian position. Bonn advocated a compromise between full membership and the loose cooperation in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council<sup>359</sup>.<sup>360</sup> The "*Agenda der Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den baltischen Staaten*" included the notice of intent that the German government would advocate "a maximum of rapprochement [of the Baltic states] to the alliance"<sup>361</sup> - a process which on the other hand should not create security political grey zones in the Baltic Sea. The agenda thus also clarified the missing will to guarantee the political and territorial integrity of the Baltic states, as it was clear that the three states were de facto situated in a political grey zone.<sup>362</sup> As opposed to German policy, the role of the Nordic members of the EU must be accentuated:

"The German government reduced its Baltic policy to sharing decisions prepared by others. Thus the invitation to enlargement talks made at the 1999 Helsinki summit of the EU Council, which came about due to pressure from the Nordic states in particular, showed that the federal government to a large extent had handed its role as "lawyer of the Balts" over to Denmark,

<sup>357</sup>Cited in DAUCHERT (2008), p. 61. Author's translation.

<sup>358</sup>Cited in ALTENBOCKUM (1996).

<sup>359</sup>The NACC was founded as a consultative forum between NATO and its partners in Eastern and Central Europe. In 1997 it became the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

<sup>360</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 74.

<sup>361</sup>Cited in DAUCHERT (2008), p. 62. Author's translation. See also PICKLAPS (2007), pp. 245-246.

<sup>362</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 62.

Sweden, and Finland. In the end, it was due to their cohesive advocacy that the enlargement decisions in favour of the Baltic states were made at the December 2002 Council summit in Copenhagen.”<sup>363</sup>

Chancellor Schröder officially visited the Baltic states as the first German chancellor in June 2000. He supported the Baltic EU accession but did not alter the security political viewpoints of Kohl and Kinkel. In the context of his state visits, Schröder stated that Germany’s “overriding goal is the enhancement of security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe at large. We do not want new graves but an order which avoids security political grey zones and disjunctions.”<sup>364</sup> Germany was in fact still an obstacle in regard to Baltic memberships of NATO. However, with Russia’s new foreign policy direction, boosted after 11 September 2001, Putin announced to reassess the Russian resistance to NATO enlargements if NATO would develop into a political rather than a military organisation and provided Russia was allowed to participate in this process.<sup>365</sup> This influenced the German position, although the federal government was still very cautious to comment on Baltic memberships and the enlargement as such. Several pro-Baltic voices of the Bundestag became stronger. On the other hand, a report developed by former minister of defence Rühle showed that the federal board of the CDU still declined the inclusion of the Baltic states in the next NATO enlargement round, which was substantiated with the argument that the Baltic states were not situated in a crisis area but in a politically stable region and did not need the protection of a NATO membership. The memberships of Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria were, in contrast, favoured.<sup>366</sup> The German government did not commit itself to specific candidates. As a result, the chairman of the section for European Security at the RAND corporation, Stephen F. Larrabee, recommended the US government to oppose the German position with an explicit pro-baltic position.<sup>367</sup>

The German opposition finally demanded the accession of the Baltic states to NATO, and the federal government soon followed suit. Symptomatic was how-

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<sup>363</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 62. Author’s translation.

<sup>364</sup>Cited in *Die Welt* 7 June 2000 at [http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article517556/Schroeder\\_haelt\\_in\\_Riga\\_ein\\_Plaedoyer\\_fuer\\_Russland.html](http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article517556/Schroeder_haelt_in_Riga_ein_Plaedoyer_fuer_Russland.html) Author’s translation.

<sup>365</sup>Cited in DAUCHERT (2008), p. 64.

<sup>366</sup>Cited in DAUCHERT (2008), p. 65.

<sup>367</sup>Cited in DAUCHERT (2008), p. 66.

ever the missing public debate in Germany on the NATO enlargement. In a parliamentary debate in May 2002 on this topic, before the NATO summit in Prague later this year where seven states (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia) were invited to begin accession talks with NATO, FM Fischer was the only prominent politician participating. Despite the aloofness of the German government, he showed himself convinced that the NATO enlargement was inevitable. He moreover underlined that this was in the interests of Germany, Europe and the transatlantic relationship. Thus a prominent member of the German government for the first time publicly mentioned the dimension of the enlargement and that the government would not try to prevent it.<sup>368</sup>

In front of the Vienna EU summit in December 1998 chancellor Schröder stressed that the date of accession was not yet certain and stated that remaining open questions would make such promises frivolous.<sup>369</sup> Despite positive statements of FM Fischer in regard to a Baltic NATO accessions as mentioned above, no federal minister of the red-green coalition was actually engaged in the Baltic.<sup>370</sup> Berlin neither emphatically advocated the progress of the EU negotiations with Estonia nor the catching-up process of Latvia and Lithuania which, however, successfully implemented the *acquis communautaire* in the second turn. All three Baltic states thus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, whereas they had already joined NATO earlier that year. A negative factor from a Baltic point of view was moreover the process leading to the Nord Stream Pipeline, in which they were not included. They also did not feel well enough informed by the German and Russian governments. The close relationship between chancellor Schröder and president Putin was an important element in this process.<sup>371</sup>

The government coalition of SPD and the Greens (1998 to 2005) basically continued the policy on the Baltic states of their predecessors.

“Because of the ... existing low potential of conflict between Germany and the Baltic states and a basic attitude of German foreign policy making characterised by trade interests, the bilateral relations developed contin-

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<sup>368</sup>Cited in LOHSE (2002).

<sup>369</sup>Cited in KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 77.

<sup>370</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), pp. 77-78.

<sup>371</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), pp. 77-78.

uously positively from 1994-1998 and also from 1998-2002. A change in the foreign political attitude of the German societal, economic and political elites after the change of government in 1998 is not identifiable. There were also no important discernible changes in the decision findings. The foreign policy decisions were characterised by liberalism and national trading and not power-political determined and was framed by an idealised language of the German elites.”<sup>372</sup>

This assessment is compatible with Rittberger’s conclusion on German post-reunification foreign policy cited above.

In regard to German direct investments in the Baltic states, the amount between 1994 and 2002 was relative small compared to investments in e.g. Scandinavia. From 2000 on there was however a certain dynamic visible. The European perspective increased the willingness of German establishments to invest in the Baltic states. This tendency was strengthened by the increased Russian willingness to cooperate in questions concerning the Baltic states.<sup>373</sup> There was moreover an increase taking place during Schröder’s early chancellorship in the intensity of the contacts between representatives of the German economy and the heads of states and governments in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Schröder’s visit to the Baltic states in 2000 was thus accompanied by a business delegation. These contacts were also cultivated when the Baltic heads of states and governments visited Berlin in the autumn of 2000. Economic relations were thus intensified compared to Kohl’s term in office.<sup>374</sup> Picklaps, who analysed German foreign policy relations with the Baltic states from 1994 to 2002, concludes that both the government of Kohl and Schröder aimed at the development of the economic cooperation between Germany and the three Baltic states as well as at the stabilisation of their political conditions.<sup>375</sup>

Although now being members of the EU, the security situation in the BSR is affected by the fact that the Baltic states are not treated by Russia as if they are but with arrogance, which indicates that they are not yet accepted as independent actors. A representative example of the continuation of the “Russia first” policy by chancellor Merkel’s government coalition between CDU and SPD was the neutral

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<sup>372</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 279.

<sup>373</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 268.

<sup>374</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 266.

<sup>375</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 277.

position of EU chairwoman Merkel during the Estonian-Russian dispute on the removed Soviet soldier statue in Tallin of April/ May 2007 as opposed to the EU solidarity with Estonia that would have been possible in this case. The Russian-Estonian crisis also reminded of how the Russian populations in the Baltic States can be mobilised by Russia. Subversive methods might thus be the instrument which can be the hardest for the EU to answer. The motive of such actions might both be of a general power policy character as well as related to the will of full control over a new Russian energy empire. The Nord Stream pipeline with its “security corridor” might thus fuel the Russian tendency to consider the areas within as belonging to the Russian sphere of interest. The most important factor to consider for Russia would be the presumed US counteractive measures.

Klein and Herrmann state that the current German-Baltic relations without doubt can be characterised as “good and intensive”.<sup>376</sup> As an evidence of good relations they mention the consultation meeting of FM Westerwelle with his three colleagues from the Baltic states in the autumn of 2009 in Brussels, shortly after his assumption of office. These consultations were continued in July 2010 in Tallinn. When minister of state Cornelia Pieper visited the Baltic in the beginning of 2010, talks were held on the extension of the cultural cooperation with partners in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.<sup>377</sup> Chancellor Merkel moreover visited Lithuania and Latvia and met with their presidents and prime ministers during a two day visit to the region in early September 2010. She praised the Baltic states’ handling of the economic crisis and signalled support for the further integration of the region’s energy supplies with Western Europe:

“The Baltic states are still isolated; they are outside the EU’s energy market. The European Council will discuss ways to integrate Latvia and Lithuania into the internal energy market, and we are glad to say that Germany’s EU Commissioner Guenther Oettinger from Germany highly supports the development of the internal market”.<sup>378</sup>

Klein and Herrmann furthermore stress that the dialogue with the Baltic neighbours is taking place within the institutions of the EU as well as in Berlin. Latvia’s

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<sup>376</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 65.

<sup>377</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 65.

<sup>378</sup> Cited in *Baltic Times* at <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/26911/> (accessed 20 February 2011).



then president Valdis Zatlers (2007-2011) and prime minister Valdis Dombrovskis (2009-) both had one of their first official foreign trips to the German capital for political talks in January 2008 and April 2009 respectively. In March 2010 the foreign committee of the Estonian parliament moreover had talks with the foreign committee of the German Bundestag and the federal government in Berlin. And also the German states as well as twin cities and towns in Germany and the Baltic states are contributing to the consolidation of the bilateral relations.<sup>379</sup>

At large however the Baltic states have had no reason to be satisfied with German policy as far as they are concerned. Dauchert suggests an expanded focus beyond the German-Baltic relations which includes the German integration policies in regards to NATO and the EU as a whole. "According to this, the disregard of the Baltic states is not a result of an interest maximising stemming from realpolitik but the unfortunate result of a policy aimed at creating an integrative European balance."<sup>380</sup> Accordingly, the German policy line aimed at integrating Russia and was not led by the efforts of improving Germany's own security situation inside NATO. Economic interests might have had a finger in the pie but can not be used to account for any disruption of continuity in German foreign policy according to Dauchert.

"Despite all the legitimate criticism of the German compliancy towards the authoritarian and jingoistic tendencies within the Russian leadership, both the mode of the cooperation and the criticism of this demonstrate continuity from the West-German *Ostpolitik* and, accordingly, Russia-policy of the 1970s and 1980s. Already the *Ostpolitik* of the Brandt/Scheel government emanated from the premise that changes of the European overall structure could only be achieved in consideration of Soviet interests. Thus ... the first of the Eastern treaties was concluded with the Soviet Union, which leading role in the East-West relations was acknowledged. Accordingly, the federal government exposed itself to the well-known allegation that it would subordinate the interests of the small countries of Central and Eastern Europe to its interest of good relations with the Russian leadership."<sup>381</sup>

The Baltic region's importance for German security policy was thus far behind Russia's, Poland's or the Czech Republic's importance to Germany. Also economic interests were more important to German governments than the Baltic

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<sup>379</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), pp. 65-66.

<sup>380</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 67. Author's translation.

<sup>381</sup> DAUCHERT (2008), p. 69. Author's translation.

states' wish of a rapid access to the EU.<sup>382</sup>

“For the German foreign policy, the Baltic states are, despite the historical responsibility, only one factor among others. (...) Russia is Germany's most important partner in Eastern Europe. The German-Russian relationship is, compared with the German-Baltic, much more vital, although more ambivalent, in security political, economic and historical terms (...).”<sup>383</sup>

It should thus be noted that when Germany chose a restrained position in regard to the aims of the Baltic states, this was because of German interests.

“Germany always actively stood up for the Baltic issues when such an attitude did not imperil the attainment of its own national aims. (...) All in all it can be stated that all German governments from Helmut Kohl via Gerhard Schröder to Angela Merkel got involved with the Baltic states both in international organisations as well as through bilateral arrangements, even though with shifting intensity.”<sup>384</sup>

Picklaps concludes that German foreign policy towards the Baltic states was a balancing act between public promises and assertions and the actual protection of interests. Eventually the real making of German policy was more directed at national trade interests and to a lesser extent at “paying lip services”, and the limits of the German engagement for the Baltic states became increasingly clear.<sup>385</sup>

#### 2.2.1.2. Independent variables and policy assessment

The independent variables here are again the pluralist, solidarist and universally applicable principles of good international citizenship. The assessment of German policy on the Baltic states, and thus the test of its importance to Norway and Sweden, will be conducted in regard to whether Germany is acting on the basis of a “sound consensual legitimacy” and whether there is a conflict between justice and order. The question is whether a change of direction in German policy is necessary in order to be a good international citizen.

As the analysis of Germany's policy on the Baltic states shows, preserving interna-

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<sup>382</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 270.

<sup>383</sup> GARBE (2002), p. 243. Author's translation.

<sup>384</sup> KLEIN/ HERRMANN (2010), p. 79. Author's translation.

<sup>385</sup> PICKLAPS (2007), p. 278.

tional order was the main interest in the initial phase of this policy as nothing was undertaken which advocated the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Also in the time following, “order” was prioritised over “justice” by a German policy attempting to balance between Russian and Baltic interests. Just as changes of the European political structure could only be achieved in consideration of Soviet interests during the Cold War, Germany’s plan to create a peaceful and integrated post-Cold War Europe (“order”), which also implies a functioning cooperation with Russia, was prioritised over its role as an advocate of the Eastern enlargement of the EU and NATO (“justice”). The opposition from the Central and Eastern European states when it comes to cooperation with Russia complicated the role Germany was supposed to play in this process.<sup>386</sup> A principle of particular interest here is principle 6 of the pluralistic principles listed in chapter 2.2.1 of part II, i.e. “diplomatic efforts to reconcile competing interests should proceed from the assumption that each state is the best judge of its own interests.” The German comprehension of Russian sensibilities even implies an implicit acceptance of the Russian conception of its sphere of interest in its “near abroad”. Germany clearly accepts Western restraint and the assessment that Russia is itself the best judge of its own interests. However, following this principle, the Baltic states should equally be considered as the best judges of their interests. This chapter clearly shows attempts to dismiss the Balts’ own judgements of the need to become members of NATO in particular. Bonn’s assertion that the security situation of the Baltic states is not serious enough for a NATO membership and no security guarantee will be given unless their situation changes for the worse, are examples of such a dismissal of the premise that all sovereign states are the best judges of their own interests. Due to the angle of this thesis, it is not satisfactory that Germany pursues such a policy towards the Baltic states. The aim of integrating Russia in Europe can not be pursued without at least expecting that Russia will follow the principles of good international citizenship which are of a pluralistic nature. If this is not expected of Russia, or when exemptions are made for the so called “near abroad”, it can not be presumed that Russia will follow such principles either. Swedish security in particular is strongly dependent on developments in the BSR. The example of the Baltic states might not by implication be transferred

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<sup>386</sup> DAUCHERT (2008).

to the Scandinavian states as they are, although small, not a part of Russia's self-defined "near abroad". However, it does also not give any reason to solely trust on German support if future difficulties with Russia should appear, e.g. in the Arctic. When the aim is to improve the international society of states, it is then not sufficient to refer to continuity in order to legitimise the current policy. It might feel safe to persist in one's viewpoint in order not to do anything wrong. Notwithstanding the positive achievements of Germany's *Ostpolitik*, the country should realise that its options today are wider than they used to be, unless they are liable to self-imposed restrictions. Moreover, Russia is not the Soviet Union.

In the case of the Baltic states and Russia, solidarist principles and universally applicable principles can be consulted in order to reconcile competing interests. In regard to Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia, principle 9 of the solidarist principles, "individuals have the legal right of appeal to international courts of law when violations of human rights occur", is of great importance. The individual rights of this minority should also be supported in order to minimise Russia's ability to instrumentalise them in disputes with the Baltic states. In regard to the universally applicable principles listed, principle 5, i.e. "there is a duty to protect vulnerable people from terrible hardship such as extreme poverty and curable disease" must be referred to. Fortunately, extreme poverty and curable disease are to a large extent no longer a problem in Europe. However, it must be recognised that the Balts are in many respects more vulnerable than other Europeans. Their need for protection must be fundamentally anchored in a European policy on Northern Europe.

Concluding on the questions of whether a. Germany is promoting a "sound consensual legitimacy" and b. whether there is a conflict between order and justice in this case, it must in regards to the first point be underlined that the most important thing is to apply the (at least pluralistic) principles equally on all states regardless of size or location and not make exemptions to great powers. In this case, there has moreover been a conflict between order and justice, and Germany has until now without doubt favoured order. However, a move in the solidarist direction is possible and hence necessary. The reference to continuity is not sufficient to legitimise a good international citizenship.

## 2.2.2. Case 3: Kaliningrad

### 2.2.2.1. Introduction

Several aspects concerning the exclave/enclave Kaliningrad have been analysed in chapter 4.2.1 in regards to the challenges facing Swedish foreign policy. The set of problems attendant on the *oblast'* was summarised by von Altenbockum in 2002 after the EU and Russia had agreed on a provision for travelling between Russia's exclave and the motherland:

“For the Russians living in Kaliningrad, the negotiations over train-, bus- and car journeys from and to Russia are about vital everyday life questions. For Russia it is about the future of a Soviet loot (...). Nothing thus indicates that Russia could make concessions in regards to Kaliningrad's status. On the other hand nothing indicates that things will turn for the better in Kaliningrad if it sticks to it. The area will continue to stay in no man's land between Russia and Europe, exactly where the attempts of improving the relations between the EU and Russia end for the time being.”<sup>387</sup>

The new arrangement agreed on by the end of 2002 resembled the former transit procedure between the GDR and the FRG for the traffick from and to Berlin. A Russian citizen in Moscow, St. Petersburg or elsewhere can thus buy a ticket to Kaliningrad but has to give personal information to the Lithuanian authorities. Within 24 hours the Lithuanians approve of or decline the journey. If the passenger does not get an answer, he is allowed to enter the train where he or she has to complete a questionnaire. In return, the traveller obtains a simplified travel document for the railway which again will be controlled on the border. Vehicle drivers obtain a simplified transit document in the Lithuanian consulates which accord the manifold entry and departure to and from Kaliningrad. The travellers are not allowed to stay in Lithuania for more than 24 hours.<sup>388</sup> Another topic is the visa regulations. Until 2007, a Polish or Lithuanian visa could be obtained at no charge but an agreement between EU and Russia on mutual visa alleviations resulted in a loss of this privilege to the inhabitants of Kaliningrad who are now put on a par with the rest of the Russian population. A charge fee of 35 Euro is due to visit the two countries as the bilateral agreements between Russia and

<sup>387</sup> ALTENBOCKUM (2002). Author's translation.

<sup>388</sup> WEHNER (2003).

the two countries were overruled. In addition, a health insurance, an invitation from the respective country and other forms must be added to the visa application commensurate with Schengen procedures.<sup>389</sup> Lithuania and Poland thus promoted a “short-distance border traffic” which would allow the inhabitants to travel 30 to 50 kilometres on both sides of the borders without a visa.<sup>390</sup> Many border merchants were using the possibility of multivisas at no charge, and the cross-border trade is in some cases in the rural parts of the Kaliningrad *oblast*’ the only means of existence. With the multivisas the inhabitants were also able to travel to other parts of Russia, Belarus, or in the Ukraine e.g. to visit relatives. A weekend-trip to Klaipeda or Gdansk was also a possibility. According to the Lithuanian consul general in Kaliningrad, 120 000 entry visas and 230 000 so called simplified transit documents were certificated in 2007.<sup>391</sup> The total population is 941 873 inhabitants (2010), a 1,4 per cent decrease from 2002.<sup>392</sup> According to the Russian foreign ministry in 2009, they were working on a better solution for Kaliningrad on this matter.<sup>393</sup> The Polish consulate general certificated 70 000 visas in 2010. A new agreement between Russia and Poland on the short-distance border traffick was signed in December 2011 which permits a visa-free border traffick between Kaliningrad and the border regions of Poland. The new arrangement will be effective from June 2012. All inhabitants of the Kaliningrad *oblast*’ who have resided in the area for at least three years, are due to the new agreement on the short-distance border traffick of between Russia and Poland allowed to travel to the neighbouring areas of Poland without a visa for a maximum 30 days stay. The maximum length of stay is 90 days per six months. The agreement does not allow for any business activities in Poland.<sup>394</sup> Russia’s FM Sergej Lavrov stated that the agreement was a first step towards the abolishment of the visa obligations between Russia and the EU.<sup>395</sup> Totally, the inhabitants of Kaliningrad received 174 000 visas in 2010, of which 20 000 were certificated in the German consulate general. 12 per cent of those were yearly visas or visas valid for more than a year with a maximum stay of 90 days per six

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<sup>389</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2007).

<sup>390</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2009).

<sup>391</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2007).

<sup>392</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2012C).

<sup>393</sup> Cited in KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2009).

<sup>394</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2012C).

<sup>395</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2012C).

months. The development is remarkable because of the deficient transport connection of the area. Four Schengen countries, i.e. Germany, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, are represented with visa offices in the Russian exclave.<sup>396</sup>

#### 2.2.2.2. Case description and dependent variable

Germany's policy on Kaliningrad and on topics related to the area is the dependent variable. German foreign policy in this realm is presumed to be found in the frame of regional cooperation within the many institutions of the BSR as well as in the larger frame of German-Russian cooperation, thus avoiding independent German initiatives or reducing them to low politics. It will be looked at two different indicators: Kaliningrad's German past and its influence or implications today and, secondly, Kaliningrad as a part of Germany's policy on Russia. The overriding question is whether there should be a German policy vision for Kaliningrad.

It is an interesting point that Kaliningrad's situation seems to be of greater interest to Kaliningrad's neighbours than to Moscow, except when it comes to the strategic location of the exclave and its status. It is important to the cooperation in the BSR that a sustainable concept is developed. However, this might require some courage. This topic seems to be a taboo in German politics and research altogether, which indicates that Germany does not have any policy in this realm at all. This despite, or because of, its age-long historical relations with the area of East Prussia. Thus neither Russian or German perspectives have been particularly developed in regards to visions for the future of Kaliningrad. The question is to what extent the population of the Russian exclave should be enabled to shape their own future due to its very special situation as an enclave of the EU. However, all possibilities of reforms are dependent on the political will in Moscow. The question is thus whether Germany should pursue a policy of moving the development in a positive direction.

Kaliningrad's history begins in 1944 with the banishment of the German population from East Prussia, which was divided between Poland and the Russian

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<sup>396</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2011).

Soviet republic. With new settlers coming from all parts of the Soviet Union the ethnic structure of the northern part of the former East Prussia was completely changed, and German toponyms were replaced with Russian. The process was accompanied by the creation of new patterns of identification in the cultural and architectural realm. After the Cold War, the inhabitants of the *oblast'* Kaliningrad for the first time had the opportunity of studying the German history of their home. The historical heritage, the landscape and the old buildings are silent contemporary witnesses of an affiliation with Germany over centuries. The current inhabitants of Kaliningrad are searching for a legitimation of their own belonging to the area, be it a local, Russian or a European identity. Migration of "Russian Germans" or "Volga Germans" from Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Siberia and the Volga region in the 1990s might be problematic from such a point of view but is quantitative ineffectual for the area's population growth. Moreover, hopes for German investments were also associated with the migrants.<sup>397</sup> Nonetheless, rumours of a "regermanisation" of Kaliningrad have come up at some points of time, especially in connection with offers for sale. According to an article in the Russian newspaper *Savtra* there had been a "secret treaty" in 1996 between Kohl and Jeltsin over a gradual handing over of Kaliningrad to Germany against a debt relief of the Russian outstanding debts to Germany.<sup>398</sup> In 2001, the British *Sunday Telegraph* reported on such a sales offer and "secret talks" in Moscow.<sup>399</sup> Despite the fact that the German government has assisted and established agricultural firms of the Russian-Germans from Kazakhstan in Kaliningrad<sup>400</sup>, German polity and German economy discourage any attempt to raise allegations of a regermanisation. The former governor of Kaliningrad and former commander of the Baltic Sea navy, Vladimir Jegorov, had the following view on the subject:

"The game over the regermanisation is a similar game as the nuclearisation. Every investor is welcome, regardless of whether he is engaged in industry, agriculture or in social matters. We should not constantly scrabble about in the past. Without investments we can not improve peoples' lives. Is it then a bad thing that BMW has been installing its cars here since 1999?"<sup>401</sup>

<sup>397</sup> KÖNIGSBERGER EXPRESS (2000).

<sup>398</sup> Cited in TUKMANOV (1998).

<sup>399</sup> Cited in DIE WELT (2001).

<sup>400</sup> MARGOLINA (2001).

<sup>401</sup> Cited in IHLAU (2000). Author's translation.



Whereas concerns in Moscow were concentrated on “germanisation” in the 1990s, the creeping absorption of Kaliningrad into the EU is rather the current worst case scenario. This was observable prior to the EU accessions of (among others) Poland and the Baltic states in the discussions of a transit solution for Kaliningrad. President Putin declared, consistently with the Duma and the Federation Council, an agreement with the EU over the transit problem to be the indicator of the partnership between Russia and the EU in general. The importance of Kaliningrad was also revealed through the appointment of Dimitry Rogosin, the chairman of the Duma committee on international relations, to his special deputy to Kaliningrad.<sup>402</sup> Later, Rogosin became Russia’s ambassador to NATO.

As far as identity is concerned, the question is whether the Prussian history is seen as a threat or a basis for a common identity in a multiethnic society. The interest in the Prussian past and the German language is high in Kaliningrad. This has for example led to the postgraduate degree programme “European studies in Kaliningrad” of the German Klaus-Mehnert institute, which is a yearlong degree programme in the German language aimed at graduates of all university degree programmes from all countries. Such a degree programme is so far unique in Russia. However, German engagement is not solely unproblematic from Moscow’s point of view, and Kaliningrad is used in order to pursue Russian interests in other realms. Germany already during Jeltsin’s presidency tried to open a consulate general in Kaliningrad but did not succeed until 2004 when Cornelius Sommer became the first German consul general of the former northern East Prussia. This was seen as a success of German Russia policy, and also Moscow emphasised this as a milestone in the German-Russian relations.<sup>403</sup> However, Germany did not obtain the acceptance of any building to house the consulate by Russian authorities and thus had to delay its consular work and with it certifying visas. Moscow obviously averted the opening of the German consulate general as long as it could not open its own in Frankfurt on the Main. According to the German view, these were two different cases as Germany purchased something for its own account whereas in Germany, the Russians claimed an object from the FRG’s property which according to international law would be left to

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<sup>402</sup> TIMMERMAN (2000), p. 26.

<sup>403</sup> WEHNER (2004).

the Russians in return for similar objects of the Russian property for Germany in Moscow. Municipal concerns of the community in demand, Bad Homburg, was the reason for the delayed process but were perceived as false pretences in Moscow. Hence, the Russian foreign ministry took revenge in Kaliningrad.<sup>404</sup> This might not be the greatest of examples of German-Russian relations in Kaliningrad but nevertheless shows how Moscow does not focus on the needs of the Kaliningrad population in questions concerning the *oblast*'.

Other issues have been met with real scepticism in Moscow, as in 2004 when the Russian foreign ministry excoriated a request (*kleine Anfrage*) in the *Bundstag* made by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group which concerned the future of the Kaliningrad area. The parliamentary group enquired information of the federal government on how it evaluates the considerations of creating a Lithuanian-Russian-Polish "Euroregion" which "geographically approximately accord with the historical territory of East Prussia" and might be named "Prussia". The Russian foreign ministry stated that these expressions would evoke "surprise and discomfort" and would be an attempt "to deny the results of the postwar order in Europe." The Russian foreign ministry appealed for an "unambiguous answer" from the German federal government.<sup>405</sup> The Russian ministry was on the other hand happy with the 50 answers coming from the German government which according to the Russian side clarified that an engagement for Kaliningrad will furthermore be carried out in the frame of the German-Russian cooperation.<sup>406</sup> According to the initiator of the parliamentary request, Jürgen Klimke, this was made in order to obtain a clear statement from the federal government against a revanchist idea but was obviously interpreted quite differently in Moscow.<sup>407</sup> This is an example of how sensitive the matter of Kaliningrad is to Russians - and Germans. The discussions on how to name the 750 anniversary celebration of Kaliningrad/Königsberg which took place in the beginning of July 2005 is another example. It might explain why German politics only reacts to and not shapes

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<sup>404</sup> WEHNER (2004).

<sup>405</sup> Cited in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2004). Author's translation.

<sup>406</sup> Cited in *Russland Aktuell* (2004) "Berlin will Kaliningrad nicht zu Prussia machen", 15 November at [http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin\\_will\\_kaliningrad\\_nich\\_zu\\_prussia\\_machen\\_2.htm](http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin_will_kaliningrad_nich_zu_prussia_machen_2.htm) (accessed 19 January 2005).

<sup>407</sup> Cited in *Russland Aktuell* (2004) "Berlin will Kaliningrad nicht zu Prussia machen", 15 November at [http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin\\_will\\_kaliningrad\\_nich\\_zu\\_prussia\\_machen\\_2.htm](http://www.kaliningrad.aktuell.ru/kaliningrad/lexikon/berlin_will_kaliningrad_nich_zu_prussia_machen_2.htm) (accessed 19 January 2005).

any policy on Kaliningrad. The question is only if misunderstandings would be less frequent if it did. In recent years, Berlin has at least attracted annoyance without really having any independent policy on the area. A good example was the nuisance on the part of Poland and Lithuania when Russian president Putin omitted the invitations of the two countries to the 750 anniversary celebration. President Putin had invited chancellor Schröder but not the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, countries which both border on the Kaliningrad *oblast'*. The Lithuanian foreign minister Valionis in particular criticised German foreign policy and chancellor Schröder. The cooperation with German diplomats would normally be carried out "on the basis of mutual and benevolent understanding". Sometimes, however, the impression occurs "that the single steps of Germany's political leadership insufficiently account for the historical and political sensibilities of our region".<sup>408</sup> Thus, if the aim of the lacking policy on the region is to consider historical and political sensibilities, it is questionable if it succeeds. Here, a simple act as an acceptance of an invitation has led to annoyance with German policy. Again, it is Germany's relations with Russia which causes the irritation. "Flirt between Moscow and Berlin over Kaliningrad" was thus the title made by Lithuanian newspapers. Valionis also criticised the missing clear statement from Berlin on the suggestion of the Baltic states to position the Nord Stream pipeline on shore through the Baltic states and Poland instead of through the Baltic Sea. Further, if Putin and Schröder celebrate the anniversary of the founding of the town "to the exclusion of the direct neighbouring states" this would "characterise" the relations between Moscow and Berlin.<sup>409</sup> As opposed to Kaliningrad's next neighbours, France's president Jacques Chirac was invited to the anniversary.

Both Swedish, Polish and Lithuanian politics, among others, have been highly interested in the question of Kaliningrad as it is important to the development of the BSR. German states are also involved in regional cooperation, and for example the state government of Schleswig-Holstein has since 1999 a partnership with the Kaliningrad *oblast'* in the frame of a "memorandum on regional cooperation" with cooperation areas as agriculture, education, environmental protection, culture, and cooperation between legal protection institutions. Regional coop-

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<sup>408</sup>Cited in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2005B) Author's translation.

<sup>409</sup>Cited in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2005B). Author's translation.

eration does, however, exclude the questions of the future status of the area as well as the destiny of Russia's Baltic fleet. Clashes of interests between the *oblast'* and the central power are to a large extent responsible for the difficulties of the Kaliningrad area, and a certain amount of autonomy and stability of the law are necessary for the area in order to function well.<sup>410</sup> Criticism in Kaliningrad towards the central government's handling of the transit provision discussions with the EU might have contributed to loosening Moscow's initially rigid position on the matter. When special deputy Rogosin visited Kaliningrad in mid August 2002, he was by way of example met with scepticism by the local elite and the local press.<sup>411</sup> As the discussions on the transit solution to and from Kaliningrad show, the success of integration depends on the cooperation between Russia, the EU, and the neighbouring states. The EU finally realised that Kaliningrad is a special case, and late approaches by the governments of France, Germany, Sweden and then member to come Lithuania enhanced the willingness to compromise in Brussels.<sup>412</sup> The cooperation again depends on the will of all involved parties. Whereas e.g. Lithuania has promoted the case of Kaliningrad in Moscow and Brussels, Germany is reserved. This aloofness is met with disapproval in Vilnius.<sup>413</sup> The question remains who, if not Germany, is able to move the Russian-European cooperation on Kaliningrad in the right direction.

### 2.2.2.3. Independent variables and policy assessment

The importance of Germany is limited as the case of Kaliningrad shows, simply because it is difficult for Germany to act without creating negative reactions, which are even existent without any specific policy. Here, principle 2 of the universally applicable principles of good international citizenship cited in chapter 2.2 of part II will be circumscribed in order to fit this case. The principle states that *"the good international citizen may believe there is a strong moral case for unilateral intervention, but doubts about legality require a global dialogue to ascertain whether states can agree that supreme humanitarian emergencies justify new principles of humanitarian intervention."* Here, of course, there is no question

<sup>410</sup>See for example LEBEDEVA (2001); JEGOROV (2001).

<sup>411</sup> TIMMERMAN (2000), p. 27.

<sup>412</sup> TIMMERMAN (2000), p. 28.

<sup>413</sup> ALTENBOCKUM (2000).

of unilateral military interventions. From a moral point of view, however, more should be done to relieve the situation in the Russian *oblast'*. Germany has, as opposed to the smaller Baltic Sea countries, the political and economic weight to make a difference. Doubts about the (moral) legality of German influence in the former East Prussia, however, requires a regional dialogue to ascertain whether Germany should have a more distinct role. A regional dialogue is necessary as a German discussion of German foreign policy omits foreign points of view, and a discussion without German participation is also pointless. Moreover, a Russian-German dialogue is not sufficient as it excludes the smaller neighbours which are also highly affected. A regional consensus on this matter would probably be necessary to encourage new principles of German foreign policy which is freed from taboos. There are only historical factors which impede the legitimisation of a more constructive German role in this region. The question is whether they should be assessed to be more important than the possibility of making necessary changes to European integration. What objections are there to more German influence?

An inclusive as opposed to exclusive conception of the national interest (pluralist principle 7) is perceived to be very important to the BSR as the next chapter shows. Principle 9 of the pluralist principles, i.e. "*an essential purpose of an 'inclusive' foreign policy is to make changes to international society which will satisfy the legitimate interests and new member states*" is of particular interest in the case of Kaliningrad. Its development is important to all members of the BSR and Kaliningrad's interests should not be harmed "for the sake of trivial national advantages" (pluralist principle 7). Instead, the legitimate interests of the *oblast'* should be the centre of the political discussions when attempting to reconcile different national interests. As this case has shown, the question is whether Germany should be an important political player rather than whether the policy should move in a solidarist or pluralist direction. For the time being, it has no direction at all, although there are probably pluralist considerations (efforts not to annoy Russia) leading to German passivity.

## 2.2.3. Case 4: Regional cooperation

### 2.2.3.1. Introduction

Initially, some comments will be made on the BSR in itself. The BSR can be defined as a cooperation net which function constitutes its identity. In the 1990s, a so called “region building school”<sup>414</sup> devoted its scientific work to this policy field. The school has attempted to communicate that the region as a political entity has other possibilities to deal with regional crises than states, not to mention the EU. The regional cooperation takes place at several levels: States, subregions, cities, enterprises, NGOs etc. of the entire Baltic Sea area cooperate to rebuild historic, cultural and economic relations, to discover a new identity and to position itself among the European regions. In the light of the diversity and relative complexity of the regional cooperation structures, this case is mainly focusing on the CBSS but also consider other forms of regional cooperation. Another organisation is for example the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC). Whereas the CBSS is an interstate, intergovernmental cooperation institution, the BSSSC is a political organisation for the decentralised authorities of the subregions. Both organisations have had important functions in the implementation of EU strategies in regards to the pre-accession policy and the policy of the EUND. Also the Strategy on the Baltic Sea, mentioned in chapter 4.2.3 of part I, is targeted on a ‘macro-region’. Its aims of environmental sustainability, prosperity, improved transport links, and safety and security<sup>415</sup> are not new to the regional cooperation itself, and the already existing institutions will probably be important tools in implementing a comprehensive EU strategy on the BSR in particular. Nevertheless, the last twenty years show that several projects in the BSR are generated on the local level as parts of a “bottom-up” process. Through such a “Baltic Sea regionalism”<sup>416</sup> the possibility is opened to embed the Baltic states and Rus-

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<sup>414</sup>The attribute of this school is that it was specifically preoccupied with the BSR and basically consisted of inputs from authors stemming from the Baltic Sea countries. Important is e.g. the publication *Neo-Nationalism or Regionality. The Restructuring of Political Space Around the Baltic Rim* edited by Pertti Joenniemi (Stockholm 1997).

<sup>415</sup>Commission of the European Communities (2009) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region* COM (2009) 248 final.

<sup>416</sup>See JOENNIEMI/STÅLVANT (1995), p. 23.

sia in common cooperation structures. The question is what effects the regional cooperation has on the stability and compatibility of the BSR and whether the BSR can accomplish something the EU or riparian states alone are not capable of. The hope was in the 1990s that the interaction between local, regional and national identities would create new political options, and that the Baltic Sea regionalism would be a sustainable formula for the relations between politics and cultural communities. Bernatowicz for example states that the network relations are an important side show of European unity as it supports the trend of fusion. The participants of these networks become obliged to create several intermediate levels. Hence, cooperation fields of different societies are constituted which can increase the mutual understanding and get over stereotypes. Economic cooperation is a demonstrative example as it helps overcoming recessions within regional structures.<sup>417</sup> The EU enlargement has without doubt been an important factor to increase the similarities and coordination in the BSR as well as a collective interest in the common development. On the other hand, the borderline to Russia becomes even more evident.

The participating members of the CBSS are Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden in addition to the European Commission. The CBSS consists of the foreign ministers from each member state and a member of the European Commission. The presidency of the CBSS rotates among the member states on an annual basis. The role of the organisation is “to serve as a forum for guidance and overall coordination among the participating states.”<sup>418</sup> The foreign minister of the presiding country is responsible for coordinating the activities and is assisted in this work by a Committee of Senior Officials.<sup>419</sup>

The decisions of the CBSS must be taken unanimously, and declaratory policy is weighted together with cooperation on several specific, indisputable policy areas. The political tasks are to encourage the already existing cooperation and participating in common projects with local authorities and institutions. These

<sup>417</sup> BERNATOWICZ (1995), p. 114.

<sup>418</sup><http://www.cbss.org/CBSS-The-Council/the-council>

<sup>419</sup>The Council does not have a general budget or project fund. Members are responsible for funding common activities or for seeking and coordinating financing from other sources. Since 1998, the CBSS Member States have financed jointly the Permanent International Secretariat of the CBSS.

are in the majority economic cooperation, environment protection, culture, education and tourism, communications and transport as well as measures to the protection of humanitarian and sanitary needs.<sup>420</sup> However, in order to make the role of the CBSS more relevant, it presupposes a broadening of the range of tasks and a considerable increase of responsibilities. At least the CBSS brings together the member states' foreign ministers and thus facilitates a respectable public for regional problems. This publicity alone, however, is not sufficient. The EU has the final power of decision and determines the allocation of most budget funds. What could be considered is a transfer of competencies from the EU to macro-regional institutions corresponding to the principle of subsidiarity. For example, the provision of an annual budget for the BSR, financed by EU funds but distributed by the CBSS through a consensus of the governments involved would be a step to upgrade the CBSS's status.

#### 2.2.3.2. Case description and dependent variable

Germany's policy on the regional cooperation in the BSR is the dependent variable. German priorities and preferences in regards to regional cooperation in the BSR will be evaluated as well as the importance and role of different German actors.

Hans-Jürgen Heimsöth, then chairman of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) of the CBSS<sup>421</sup>, evaluated German policy on the BSR and with it the German presidency of the CBSS starting in July 2000 and ending in July 2001. Accordingly, Germany was able to "exercise valuable influence in sense of region-building." The region should moreover become increasingly competitive and "be a trade-mark of knowledge and science". A successful policy also "has to be made in partnership with Russia".<sup>422</sup> Heimsöth's considerations must be considered valuable when evaluating German priorities and policy as he was a high-ranking representative of the AA when making these statements. Germany also holds the

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<sup>420</sup> BERNATOWICZ (1995), p. 114.

<sup>421</sup>The CSO consists of high ranking representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs of the 11 CBSS member states as well as of the European Commission. The CSO serves as the main discussion forum and decision-making body on matters related to the work of the Council between ministerial sessions.

<sup>422</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 103.



presidency of the CBSS in the period 2011/2012. A pronounced goal is to modernise the southeastern part of the BSR, and “particular focus (...) will be the development of the Kaliningrad region and the surrounding area, which have special potential.”<sup>423</sup> FM Westerwelle assesses the achievements of the organisation 20 years after its creation in the following way:

“In its original mission - to support the eastern Baltic Sea countries’ transition to democracy, the rule of law and market economies - the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) has been stunningly successful. Cooperation among all Baltic Sea countries has been greatly boosted and become a model resonating far beyond the Region itself. It’s not without reason that people look to the Baltic Sea Region to see what a successful macro-regional cooperation model could look like for the Black Sea, the Danube or the Mediterranean.”<sup>424</sup>

The federal states of Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, and Hamburg belong to the “real” Baltic Sea coastal region, whereas states as Lower Saxony, Bremen, North Rhine-Westphalia as well as Brandenburg and Berlin are increasingly interested in the region because of economic interests, cultural relations, societal proximity or historical connections. Germany’s special position in the region is constituted by its size, political weight and geographic location as a link to the rest of the EU.<sup>425</sup> After 1949, the political importance of the BSR was provided for by Germany’s close bilateral relations to all of the Baltic Sea riparian states. With Mecklenburg-West Pomerania the coast of the Federal Republic along the Baltic Sea was more than doubled after the German reunion. The foreign relations of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania were moreover considerably shaped by the BSR, and the importance of regional cooperation has increased. Since 2003 the Land Government of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania is reporting to the state parliament (Landtag) on the current and intended developments in all parts of BSR cooperation. In 2009, practical experiences in the frame of the cooperation with Russia’s northwestern areas were reported on for the first time.<sup>426</sup> The political importance of Baltic Sea cooperation is observable in several aspects. Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has six partnerships

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<sup>423</sup> FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY (2011), p. 3.

<sup>424</sup> WESTERWELLE (2012).

<sup>425</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 103.

<sup>426</sup> Landtag of West Pomerania (2009) *Jahresbericht der Landesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit im Ostseeraum und zur maritimen Sicherheit für den Zeitraum 2008/2009*. Drucksache 5/2595, p. 4.

in Europe, whereas five are situated in the BSR (South Sweden, Southwest Finland, the Leningrad *oblast*, and the Polish voivodeships Pomerania and Western Pomerania). It is also a member of several Baltic Sea organisations and thus work on the regional level. On state level, Mecklenburg-West Pomerania is involved together with Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg in the federal German participation in the CBSS and further multilateral organisations. In this regard, the task is to propose and if possible accomplish the interests of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania in realms such as environmental protection, security of vessels, traffick questions or fishery. Parliaments, local communities, universities, NGOs and other institutions, associations and interest groups are also able to participate in the networks and cooperation activities in the BSR. Moreover, the multilateral cooperation is complementet by different forms of bilateral cooperation, which in the case of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania has the emphasis on West Pomerania and Pomerania.<sup>427</sup> Thus the regional cooperation has become increasingly important to German states since the early 1990s, and they have a strong role in the practical work of BSR cooperation. In addition the Federal Government coordinates its BSR policy with the three northern German states and consults them on issues relevant to the BSR. Also Schleswig-Holstein, positioned between the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, has traditionally close ties to the BSR, and Poland, Denmark and Sweden are traditional close neighbours which have increased their importance to Schleswig-Holstein.<sup>428</sup> Both Schleswig-Holstein and Hamburg are leading board members of the BSSSC and active partners in the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC).

Whether the move of Germany's capital from Bonn to Berlin will lead to increased awareness of the BSR in Berlin can "still not be predicted" Heimsöth wrote in 2001. He indicates the "cultural importance which Berlin even used to have in earlier days in the region and towards the Scandinavian states. With the political change of 1990, geography and regional references again become vital, of which most of the current politicians can not bring to mind."<sup>429</sup> Today, however, it is quite obvious that Berlin has not changed its Western oriented policy. The for-

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<sup>427</sup>Landtag of West Pomerania (2009) *Jahresbericht der Landesregierung zur Zusammenarbeit im Ostseeraum und zur maritimen Sicherheit für den Zeitraum 2008/2009*. Drucksache 5/2595, p. 5.

<sup>428</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 106.

<sup>429</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 106. Author's translation.

foreign ministers Kinkel (1992-1998) and Fischer (1998-2005) were moreover rather indifferent to the BSR.<sup>430</sup>

The historical relations which developed in the BSR over many centuries have been analysed in chapter 4.2.3 of part I. The new geographic facts of 1949 was that the West German coast reached from Flensburg to Lübeck where the Iron Curtain subsequently began. Thus, the BSR was inaccessible for West Germany. The reunion, however, has given new opportunities for cooperation in the BSR. The CBSS, founded in 1992, was as previously mentioned the result of a Danish-German initiative, and the foreign ministers Genscher and Ellemann-Jensen are considered as its initiators. However, Björn Engholm even earlier campaigned for a Baltic Sea council and proposed a new cooperation of Baltic Sea states as far back as 1987. Björn Engholm was premier of Schleswig-Holstein from 1988 to 1993 and chairman of the SPD from 1991 to 1993.<sup>431</sup> As a federal state premier he launched the concept of the “new Hansa” as a strategy of securing northern Europe’s position compared to other fast-growing regions of Europe. The idea was mainly based on the development of communication investments and infrastructure and indicates what influence the German states can have in the multilateral frame of Germany’s relations in the BSR. The “new Hansa” concept was initiated in Engholm’s speech “*Zukunftsregion Ostsee*” on a seminar in the town of Travemünde from 12 October 1990 as well as in the publication “*Zusammenarbeit im Ostseeraum*” edited by the state parliament of Schleswig-Holstein. Importantly, the name “New Hansa” was abandoned by both Engholm and Genscher due to an implicit indication of German hegemony, and the CBSS initiative was launched in close cooperation with Danish party colleagues.<sup>432</sup> Corresponding with the creation of various BSR organisations it was a favoured policy of Germany to integrate with regional organisations and thus incorporate its BSR activities into the international, supranational and subnational levels.<sup>433</sup> Heimsoth sees the importance of the BSR above all in the superior context of European stability and security.

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<sup>430</sup> SALDIK (2004), pp. 64-65.

<sup>431</sup> He was also a federal minister in the government of Helmut Schmidt in the early 1980s.

<sup>432</sup> SALDIK (2004), p. 61.

<sup>433</sup> See SALDIK (2004).

“In this context it has to be clear that security means more than disarmament and reduction of military tensions. Both the gap of economic efficiency as well as environmental risks, migration and organised crime could reach an extent which threatens the stability of a region. The political role of Baltic Sea cooperation is found in its contribution to the pan-European security structure. For that reason the point has to be to contribute to the coalescence of the continent.”<sup>434</sup>

Most importantly, Germany prefers the EU as the central actor in this realm as well, and the German position is that BSR policy has to be seen in close connection with European policy and the EU.<sup>435</sup> For a long time, Germany was thus reluctant to chair the CBSS<sup>436</sup>, and the 2001 presidency has not been followed up since. Germany has definitely not had any leading role in the CBSS. The missing interest of federal Germany has, however, led to some frustration in the northern German states.<sup>437</sup> According to Heimsöth, Baltic Sea cooperation has become increasingly important because it is also used as a forum for meetings between heads of government as well as other ministers.<sup>438</sup> However, CBSS summits<sup>439</sup> are rarely visited by German chancellors, with the exception of the 2002 summit in St. Petersburg. In 2008, the CBSS summit in Riga was visited by all heads of government except of chancellor Merkel and president Putin. FM Steinmeier on the other hand pursued a more focused line on the BSR and joined the CBSS Ministerial Meeting in 2007 and participated in the Summits of 2006 and 2008. According to Heimsöth, German policy in the BSR has to be seen in the wider frame of European policy, and it is also important that the EU gives the region enough attention.<sup>440</sup>

Unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden had its focus on East Germany during the Cold War and strongly supported the West German *Ostpolitik*, which was perceived to be very important for the political and military situation in Northern Europe. The normalisation achieved opened up for increased contact with the GDR and prospects for Baltic Sea cooperation. After the German unification,

<sup>434</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 105. Author's translation.

<sup>435</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 108.

<sup>436</sup> SALDIK (2004), p. 65.

<sup>437</sup> See the Minister for European Affairs in Schleswig-Holstein, Gert Walter, in *FOCUS Magazin* no. 32 1999: “Der Ostseeregion gehört der Zukunft” at [http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/standpunkt-der-ostseeregion-gehört-die-zukunft\\_aid\\_180601.html](http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/standpunkt-der-ostseeregion-gehört-die-zukunft_aid_180601.html)

<sup>438</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 107.

<sup>439</sup> The annual CBSS summit was initiated by Sweden in 1996.

<sup>440</sup> HEIMSÖTH (2001), p. 108.

Swedish media as well as political debate have stressed the importance of German activities in, and political support for, the BSR.<sup>441</sup> In Swedish-German bilateral meetings, the BSR is of course a habitual topic.<sup>442</sup> However, German top-ranking politicians do not contribute to give the BSR any high profile and leaves this to e.g. Sweden and Finland. Nonetheless, Merkel stands up and defends northern Europe if necessary as was the case with the “Mediterranean Union” initiative of French president Sarkozy. She feared that northern and southern Europe would drift apart and thus pursued the line that the project should be an instrument available to all EU members.<sup>443</sup>

### 2.2.3.3. Independent variables and policy assessment

Baltic Sea regionalism nicely conforms to principle number 7 of the pluralist principles listed in chapter 2.2.1 of part II, i.e. “*an 'inclusive' as opposed to 'exclusive' conception of the national interest should be pursued so that other states, and the society to which they belong, are not harmed for the sake of trivial national advantages.*” The Baltic Sea thus exemplifies the common dependence of the littoral states. From an economic point of view, it must thus be in all states’ interest that the prerequisites for trade are given. The disadvantage of one state can not be in the interest of the others. However, disputes between the Baltic states and Russia do betray that the exclusive conception is still existent. What role does Germany have to play in order to be the good international citizen? The former chapter shows that there is a lot going on the regional level, but Germany is keeping a low profile on the federal level. As an ‘exclusive’ conception of the national interest is not so much the problem of the low politics of regional or subregional cooperation but rather something emanating from high politics, this is where a more active German role in the BSR is necessary. Germany views the EU as the sole European stage for high politics. Is the low German profile on the BSR, evident since the Danish-German initiative of the CBSS, something its neighbours are asking for or is it Germany which is afraid of itself?

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<sup>441</sup> LINDAHL (2002), p. 165.

<sup>442</sup> See for example *Pressebegegnung Merkel-Persson* 22 April 2006, <http://www.bundesregierung.de> (accessed 26 November 2007).

<sup>443</sup> *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* on 14 March 2008 at <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-gipfeltreffen-in-bruessel-die-mittelmeerunion-kommt-1.288210> (accessed 13 September 2008).

The example of the Danes disliking the term “new Hanse” does not indicate that Germany has to keep a low profile to steer clear of hegemony suspicions. It might, however, not be Denmark Germany has in mind when keeping a low profile on the BSR.

There are a lot of cooperation projects going on in the BSR. The main cooperation areas of the CBSS are environment, economic development, energy, education and culture, and “civil security and the human dimension” - the latter comprising everything from border control to task forces against trafficking and nuclear and radiation safety. Security policy is omitted. The only political instrument of the CBSS was the Commissioner on Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, renamed as the Commissioner on Democratic Development in 2000. The commissioner supported democratic institutions in the member states on matters like democracy, good governance and law-making, strengthening of civil society and human rights including minority rights. The commissioner had an ombudsman function and could also make recommendations to the members states in this regard. According to the CBSS, the mandate was “deemed fulfilled” at the end of 2003 and thus terminated “in light of the region’s progress in the field of democratic development”.<sup>444</sup> In view of the incomplete developments in Russia in regards to democracy, good governance, civil society and human rights, this leads to a discussion of principle 6 of the solidarist principles enlisted in chapter 2.2.2 of part II - “*the sovereignty of the state is conditional on compliance with the international law of human rights.*” This principle is definitely non-applicable to Russia, and this is why the BSR can not be further developed unless progress is achieved. Cooperation with Russia is desired in order to enhance the prosperity and the possibilities of the region. Here, Germany’s task is to move the cooperation in a solidarist direction as the development of the BSR can not develop at a higher level if improvements are not made also in this realm. If improvements are made, it would be easier to pursue Russia’s integration in Europe as there would be more values in common. Countries like Sweden and Denmark have confronted Russia on difficult topics to a much larger extent than Norway and Germany. This is a challenge to German foreign policy which it until now has not

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<sup>444</sup><http://www.cbss.org/Civil-Security-and-the-Human-Dimension/civil-security-and-the-human-dimension>

been willing to take. This case shows a German passivity which is self-imposed and thus unnecessary. Decisive steps are indispensable for Germany to take in order to promote a “sound consensual legitimacy”. In fear of a conflict between order and justice, Germany again prefers to keep a low profile and limits its own importance.

## 2.3. Germany and Russia

### 2.3.1. Case 5: Russia’s integration in Europe

#### 2.3.1.1. Introduction

In addition to its importance as a gas supplier to Europe, Russia is a giant market for EU exports where the buying power is increasing. On the other hand the EU is Russia’s largest trade partner and the largest investor in the Russian economy. The EU-Russian strategic partnership is supposed to be founded on common interests and shared values. However, it is difficult to identify the latter. It is difficult for the EU to have a positive influence on the developments in Russia as it is not able to export stability, security and prosperity by the instruments of accession. This option is not open to Russia for different reasons, and Russia perceives itself to be an independent player and a regional power with global aspirations, although its economic weight does not point at a position as a global player.

Vare has a pessimistic outlook in regards to the future developments of EU-Russian relations: First, as an essential political player but a moderate economic power, Russia stresses high politics over economic ties. The EU is on the other hand an economic giant and a political dwarf. Moreover, Russia has completely different ideas about the rule of law compared to the EU, “the epitome of a rulebased community”.<sup>445</sup> Furthermore, the Russian leadership sees Russia’s relations with the EU solely as a way of strengthening the domestic economy through trade and to a lesser extent investment. The EU on the other hand still thinks that,

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<sup>445</sup> VARE (2005), p. 19.

despite the autocratic tendencies in Russia, the strategic partnership should be based on shared interests and shared values. Finally, the perhaps most problematic development for EU-Russian relations according to Vare is that the EU is undermined by bilateral ties between Russia and larger EU countries, e.g. the German-Russian Nord Stream pipeline project.<sup>446</sup>

“...Russia can afford to ignore EU institutions while the larger EU member states continue to cultivate special relations with Moscow and disregard agreed-upon policy positions and long-established competencies.”<sup>447</sup>

Leonard and Popescu divide the EU member states into five different groups depending on their relations with and policies on Russia. The categories are the “Trojan Horses” (Greece and Cyprus), the “Strategic Partners” (Germany, France, Italy and Spain), the “Friendly Pragmatists” (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Portugal), the “Frosty Pragmatists” (Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK) and, finally, the “New Cold-Warriors” (Lithuania and Poland).<sup>448</sup> According to the foreign policy directives approved of by president Medvedev on 12 July 2008, the development of advantageous bilateral relations with Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands and some other countries are mentioned as means to further Russia’s national interests in European and global matters.<sup>449</sup> Russia has to a large extent been able to split the EU members, which are supposed to speak with one voice, and has arranged bilateral agreements on energy with single EU states. Russia thus seems to have minor interest in a new partnership agreement and prefer bilateral agreements with e.g. Germany.<sup>450</sup>

Leonard and Popescu’s ‘medicine’ for a stronger EU is the following: First, the Europeans should recalibrate their international diplomacy as Russia aims for recognition in international politics, which is provided from the participation in

<sup>446</sup> VARE (2005), pp. 19-20.

<sup>447</sup> VARE (2005), p. 20.

<sup>448</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 3.

<sup>449</sup> Cited in DRAGNES (2008A).

<sup>450</sup> A commentator at the EU-Russian meeting in Samara in May 2007 states the following situation: “According to the greeting that ... Barroso and ... Merkel received in Samara..., it was obvious that the German chancellor was the most outstanding guest, and not Barroso. Merkel became an affectionate reception, whereas Barroso, who had arrived ten minutes earlier, neither became flowers nor the same welcome committee.” RISA (2007). Authors translation.



G8 and EU-Russia summits. In this context, they favour a “rule of law” approach that would “keep Russia engaged in these institutions, but moderate the level of cooperation in line with Russia’s observance of the spirit as well as the letter of the common rules.”<sup>451</sup> Second, the authors favour a so called “principled bilateralism”, where “it should be possible to move towards a situation where the proliferation of bilateral contacts reinforces rather than undermines common EU objectives.”<sup>452</sup> This would e.g. mean that member states would have to consult each other on certain issues before bilateral contacts with Russia are approached, even on matters of great economic interest. Third, the “neighbourhood policy” accordingly needs to be reformulated. The proponents of “creeping integration”<sup>453</sup> have tended to pursue a “Russia first” policy in order not to upset the Kremlin and thus oppose an active EU policy in its Eastern neighbourhood. The “soft containment” proponents on the other hand have favoured EU support to governments in e.g. Georgia and the Ukraine in their disputes with Russia as well as rapid NATO enlargemetns. The long-term design of the neighbourhood policy needs to be complemented with rather shorter term measures in order to enable these states to withstand Russian pressure. As an example the European Energy Community could be extended and lead to the unbundling of energy companies in states like Turkey, the Ukraine and Moldova. This would lead to a greater transparency of the respective energy sectors - and ultimately to greater energy security for Europe. Russia would not be able to use energy to exert political pressure to the same extent as before. Finally, the EU needs to rethink law enforcement. Here, a “rule of law” approach should favour mutual agreements and investments but insist on their implementation as well. The European Commission would first of all need to be empowered to apply competition policy in the sphere of energy, that is to have the political support of the member states in addition to its already existent formal competencies.<sup>454</sup>

As referred to in chapter 1 of part I, the EU has better soft and hard power indicators than Russia, but as long as the latter splits the former, Russia is in the better position. Thus, in order to counteract such a fragmentation of European

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<sup>451</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 58.

<sup>452</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 59.

<sup>453</sup> See chapter 1 of part I.

<sup>454</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), pp. 58-61.

power, the need is for a new paradigm: Promoting the rule of law.

While the long-term goal should be to have a liberal democratic Russia as a neighbour, a more realistic mid-term goal would be to encourage Russia to respect the rule of law, which would allow it to become a reliable partner. The rule of law is central to the European project, and its weakness in Russia is a concern for all Europeans working there. Russia's selective application of the law affects businesses who worry about respect of contracts, diplomats who fear breaches of international treaties, human rights activists concerned about authoritarianism, and defence establishments who want to avoid military tensions. An approach based on the rule of law would also have positive echoes within Russian society, where even citizens who have become cynical about the language of democracy are concerned about corruption and the arbitrary exercise of power by the state.<sup>455</sup>

The suggested adjustments to EU policy are thus a *conditional engagement with Russia*, a *principled bilateralism*, to *integrate the neighbourhood*, to *enforce the law* and, finally, to *rebalance the relationship* which does not mean to minimise the contacts but rather to change a relationship where dependence is rather unidimensional.

### 2.3.1.2. Case description and dependent variable

German policy concerning Russia's integration in Europe is the dependent variable. It will be looked at two different indicators. First, the bilateral relations between Russia and Germany will be evaluated because of their importance to Russia's integration in Europe and European security and stability. Second, German preferences for EU policy on Russia will be evaluated.

**2.3.1.2.1. The bilateral relations** According to Stent, Germany's cooperation with Russia is predicated on a tangible economic cooperation and Germany's wish to integrate Russia in Europe - a process which was disrupted for a century by the Bolshewik revolution. Moreover, Germany's post-communist *Ostpolitik* is a result of its recovered full sovereignty, its leading role in the EU and the enlargement process, as well as its partnership with the US and NATO. Geographic and historic conditions have led Berlin to play the decisive role as to whether

<sup>455</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 3.

the integration of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic structures of the next decades succeed or not.<sup>456</sup> In a historic perspective, shifting phases of cooperation and confrontation between the powers Germany and Russia in different shapes have been dominated by two decisive factors: no natural borders and two economies which mutually complemented one another.<sup>457</sup> In his layout of the evolution of the international society, Watson notes that both Russia and the United States, which later were the two superpowers of the global system, became members of the European society of states in the 18th century. Russia was Europeanised and its tsar accepted as a member of the *grande république*.<sup>458</sup> According to Stent, Germany has represented technological development and intellectual inspiration to Russia - from Peter the Great (1689 to 1725) to Vladimir Putin. Peter the Great was Russia's first great moderniser who brought German immigrants to the country in order to develop the economy. Under his successor Catherine the Great, a German princess, a great German colony developed along the Volga to develop the agrarian sector. The German nobility moreover had governmental positions in the Russian Empire.<sup>459</sup> Germany was of course not the sole source of inspiration, and Peter the Great preferred to learn military techniques from Russia's principal enemy Sweden and the other mechanical and technical aspects of westernisation from the most advanced states of his days, Holland and England. Peter the Great abandoned Moscow for his new western city of St Petersburg, built to be the capital of modernized Russia and also a great port on the Baltic, a new Amsterdam. With the help of Russia's westernised elite Peter erected a European *stato* on the backs of the uncomprehending and often resentful Russian people. However, while the Americans inherited the European pattern of a *grande république* divided into several states, the Russians were heirs of the limitless, monocentric authority of Byzantium and the Tartars. By the middle of the eighteenth century the Romanov dynasty was accepted into the sovereigns' club, and conformed to its rules. From then on Russia has played a major part in shaping the destinies of Europe and the world.<sup>460</sup>

Three central elements of the German-Russian relations are noticeable accord-

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<sup>456</sup> STENT (2007), p. 436.

<sup>457</sup> STENT (2007), p. 437.

<sup>458</sup> WATSON (1993), pp. 224-225.

<sup>459</sup> STENT (2007), pp. 436-437.

<sup>460</sup> WATSON (1993), pp. 225-226.

ing to Stent. The first element is Germany's decisive importance for Russian developments both in the domestic and foreign policies. Russia has indeed also played an important role for Germany's development, but in a historic perspective Germany has been more important for the Russian development than the other way around. The second factor refers to the cooperation between both states. German-Russian cooperation has until now had a positive effect on both Russia and its neighbouring states. Germany has had a key role in the modernisation of Russia as Berlin has had a moderating influence on Russian policy and has tried to integrate Russia in Europe. On the other hand there is also the heritage of a damaging kind of cooperation, e.g. the secret military cooperation in the inter-war period, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the Soviet cooperation with the GDR. Finally, the third factor is the German-Russian antagonism which led to two world wars in the twentieth century and the division of Europe.<sup>461</sup> Although Europe has changed after the end of the East-West conflict, two factors are still given: The pivotal importance of the German-Russian relations for Europe's development as well as the importance of German-Russian cooperation for Russia's integration in Europe and the European security and stability.<sup>462</sup>

The institutional basis for Germany's relations with Russia and the normative foundation of Germany's Russia-policy are exposed in the chapters 1.2 and 1.1 of this part. The integration of the German-Russian relations in a larger European context is seen as a possibility to resolve the historical perception of a *Sonderweg* in the relations with Russia, which triggers doubts in the neighbouring countries. Hence, Germany has tried to multilateralise its relations with Russia as far as possible, and in the phrame of the EU in particular.<sup>463</sup> The developments in the German-Russian relationship of the early 1990s have also been evaluated in chapter 2.2.1 in the case study on the Baltic Sea Region. Chancellor Kohl stressed geopolitical considerations in order not to disturb the good German-Russian relations. Russia's importance to the completion of the German unity was a decisive factor. Accordingly, anything which could distract the cooperation with the Russian leadership, should be omitted. This also included the declared sphere of influence, of which Germany should keep away from. Kohl's

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<sup>461</sup> STENT (2007), p. 438.

<sup>462</sup> STENT (2007), p. 438.

<sup>463</sup> STENT (2007), p. 440.

personal relations to Boris Jeltsin were a main factor in the developing German-Russian relations. Despite Jeltsin's limited democratic leadership qualities, Kohl unreservedly supported him as the alternative was a return to the communists. Despite the military intervention in Chechnya, criticism in regards to the fairness of the election campaign and rumours of corruption towards the inner circle of Jeltsin's leadership, Germany supported Jeltsin's second candidacy of presidency in 1996. Kohl supported Jeltsin stronger and more explicit than any other head of government in the western world. As the behaviour of the Russian president became increasingly unpredictable, the public criticism of Kohl's policy increased. Kohl recognised the asymmetry of the German-Russian relationship: Germany was far more important to the transition process taking place in Russia than the other way around.<sup>464</sup> Germany supported Russia with 40,25 billion US dollars from 1990 to 1993 and was Russia's largest donor country both in regards to the overall and population figure.<sup>465</sup>

Germany's relationship with Russia is more complex than France's, "combining economic calculations with the legacies of the Second World War and of Soviet domination of communist East Germany."<sup>466</sup> In 2003, German chancellor Schröder praised the German-Russian relations as "could hardly be better" ("kaum verbesserbar"). At this time, the German-Russian economic relations were extended and strengthened, and the intentions of a German-Russian gas pipeline through the Baltic Sea became public. During the consultations of the German-Russian governments in Jekaterinburg in October 2003, several economic projects, especially in the energy sector, and investments amounting to 1,5 billion Euro were agreed to.<sup>467</sup> In regards to Russia's importance to Germany due to its energy power, Schröder's statements illustrate the situation:

"The German economy is Russia's preferred partner, especially in the energy sector. This becomes more important as other parts of the world

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<sup>464</sup> STENT (2007), pp. 442-443.

<sup>465</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 243.

<sup>466</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 32.

<sup>467</sup> SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG (2003). The German-Russian "strategic partnership" also included the expansion of research cooperation. In February 2005, three concrete research cooperations in the polar and ocean research, the laser technology and the information and communication technology were agreed on in addition to plans of enhanced cooperation in health research, engineer education and further education. FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2005A).

are, or become, more unstable. (...) It is our long-term interest, not just to receive gas but to participate in the exploration and the distribution.”<sup>468</sup>

Schröder thus created possibilities for an economic cooperation without comparison. Since 1997, Germany has been Russia’s most important trade partner. In 2008 the German imports from Russia amounted to 35 908,9 million Euro<sup>469</sup>, the exports from Germany to Russia amounted to 32 341,1 million Euro.<sup>470</sup> Russia furthermore supplies 42 per cent of German gas needs, which makes Germany Russia’s most important gas market.<sup>471</sup> From January to October 2008, crude oil and natural gas amounting to 22,5 billion Euro was imported from Russia to Germany. Russia’s contingent among the suppliers of crude oil and natural gas was thus 32,5 per cent of total imports, with Norway following thereafter with 21,9 per cent.<sup>472</sup> Figure III.3<sup>473</sup> describes the development of Germany’s gas imports. It shows that Russia’s contingent has been quite stable since 1991, whereas Norway has increased and the Netherlands decreased their roles as natural gas suppliers to Germany.

Today, Schröder is chair of the Nord Stream pipeline project’s management committee. German energy companies are central to the Russian-German strategic partnership. A representative of Germany’s E.ON is e.g. the only foreigner on Gazprom’s board of directors.<sup>474</sup> The foundation for the German-Russian relations in the Schröder era was the personal friendship between the chancellor and the president. Schröder promoted understanding for the ‘difficult process of democratisation’ in Russia. One argument was that too much criticism of the political grievances in Russia would rather provoke the opposite of intended results. The period 2000-2005 was a period of deepening in the German-Russian relationship. Another important aspect are by way of example the contractual based town twinning between Russian and German communities of which there

<sup>468</sup>Cited in KILZ/ PRANTL/ SCHÄFER (2004). Author’s translation.

<sup>469</sup>Thereof were 73,8 per cent imports of crude oil and natural gas.

<sup>470</sup>Statistisches Bundesamt (2009) *Außenhandel. Rangfolge der Handelspartner im Außenhandel der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2008*. Wiesbaden.

<sup>471</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 32.

<sup>472</sup>Statistisches Bundesamt (2009): “Russland ist Deutschlands wichtigster Energielieferant”, *Zahl der Woche* Nr. 002, 13 January.

<sup>473</sup>Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2009) *Zahlen und Fakten. Energiedaten. Nationale und Internationale Entwicklung*, <http://www.bmwi.de/Navigation/Technologie-und-Energie/Energiapolitik/energiedaten.html>

<sup>474</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 32.




Figure III.3.: Germany's natural gas imports from 1991 to 2008 in petajoul.  
(Data source: bmwi.de)

are over 70 (1999).<sup>475</sup> A strengthening of the ties between the civil societies of Germany and Russia were initiated with the Petersburg Dialogue, a discussion forum for civil societies, starting in 2001. Annual meetings have brought together leaders from political, economic, media, cultural, religious and NGO circles to address different issues. This is a part of the so called German-Russian “modernisation partnership” and a formal statement on this purpose was made in the presence of chancellor Merkel and president Medvedev in 2008. In 2003, Germany joined an “alliance” with France and Russia opposing the US-led invasion of Iraq of March/April 2003. The German-Russian transit agreement of 9 October 2003 moreover allowed Germany as the first NATO member ever the transportation of military equipment and personnel over Russian territory to Afghanistan.<sup>476</sup> In September 2005, Germany and Russia proposed the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline bypassing the Baltic states and Poland.

Chancellor Merkel visited Warsaw before Moscow and her inaugural visit in Moscow in January 2006 was used to criticise the democratic deficits of Russia, which provoked some irritation. Instead of a “German-Russian friendship”,

<sup>475</sup> TIMMERMAN (1999B), p. 3.

<sup>476</sup> Auswärtiges Amt: “Truppenstationierung. Zweiseitiges Abkommen” at [http://auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/InternatRecht/Truppenstationierungsrecht\\_node.html](http://auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/InternatRecht/Truppenstationierungsrecht_node.html)

that had been Schröder's term to describe the relationship, Merkel chose the more sober term "strategic partnership". The term was also fixed in the coalition agreement of 2005.<sup>477</sup>

"The feat of the chancellor was on the one hand to show distance to Russia, who is moving further and further away from democracy, while at the same time seeking closeness to Russia, whose gas and oil Germany needs, and whose help is needed to solve the nuclear conflict with Iran."<sup>478</sup>

Nevertheless, the German-Russian relations were still not suffering and FM Steinmeier, former Head of the Federal chancellery under Schröder, was well-known in the Kremlin and claimed a leading role in the German Russia policy. FM Steinmeier has criticised chancellor Merkel for pursuing a Russia policy aiming at impressing the German public. He advocated to adhere to the strategic partnership even if times are getting harsh. Russia is too important for the stability on the Balkan and in the Middle East, in addition to its importance for European energy security and arms control.<sup>479</sup>

In October 2007 during the consultations of both governments in Wiesbaden, Merkel continued to stress the economic relations as the "heart" of the German-Russian strategic partnership. The trade between the two countries had grown with 35 per cent compared to the year before, and the economic relations would not be limited to the energy sector but also include e.g. the automobile and aircraft industries.<sup>480</sup> During the German-Russian consultations in Oberschleißheim in July 2009, the Nabucco-pipeline<sup>481</sup> planned by the EU states was the only topic that caused some dissonance between president Medvedev and chancellor Merkel.<sup>482</sup>

Altogether, Germany's relations with Russia are largely characterised by Ger-

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<sup>477</sup>See the coalition accord *Gemeinsam für Deutschland. Mit Mut und Menschlichkeit. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD für die 16. Wahlperiode des Deutschen Bundestages* at [http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05\\_11\\_11\\_Koalitionsvertrag\\_Navigierbar.pdf](http://www.cdu.de/doc/pdf/05_11_11_Koalitionsvertrag_Navigierbar.pdf)

<sup>478</sup> BRÖSSLER (2006). Author's translation.

<sup>479</sup>Cited in KRÜGER (2007).

<sup>480</sup> FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (2007). Russia was according to president Putin also interested in close cooperation with Germany as regards high technology and further investments and mentioned the takeover of the Russian power plant company OGG-4 by the Eon AG with 69 per cent of the shares.

<sup>481</sup>The planned pipeline from Turkey to Austria will supposedly supply the EU with gas from the Caspian region. The start of construction is probably 2011.

<sup>482</sup> BRÖSSLER (2009).



many being Russia's largest trading partner, most important market for Russian gas, fifth biggest investor in Russia in 2006 (55 billion Euro) and by a strong political partnership and credibility in Moscow.<sup>483</sup> Moreover, 342,575 Russians visited Germany in 2006, Germany is the leading advocate of integration with Russia, opposes full ownership unbundling of EU energy companies, has a Russia-first policy on the Eastern neighbourhood, and Merkel's more critical approach to Russia has been restrained by the coalition with the SPD and by building the Nord Stream pipeline.<sup>484</sup> However, as Leonard and Popescu remark, Russia's "strategic partners" are suffering as well because of the EU's failing ability to use its most powerful tool for dealing with Russia, i.e. its unity. The strategic partners are not big enough on their own to negotiate a relationship of symmetrical interdependence with Russia, and whereas the decision to support and develop the Nord Stream pipeline has not yet enhanced Germany's energy security, it has cost a lot of political capital, i.e. soft power within the EU.<sup>485</sup> However, it is questionable if Germany is not big enough for a relationship of symmetrical interdependence with Russia, as it makes up about 60 per cent of Russia's population<sup>486</sup> and has a much stronger economy<sup>487</sup>.

Merkel's explicit more distant relationship to then president Putin contributed to improve the relations with the Central European states, and Poland in particular. Schröder to a larger extent ignored the EU's small member states. This, however, does not mean that Merkel is automatically prepared to take the side of Russia's smaller neighbours.

"Angela Merkel, the chancellor from the East, enjoys much more confidence among the neighbouring states than Schröder and even Kohl. And yet her charm is not sufficient to debilitate the fear of a German Sonderweg. The German criticism of the mounting of the US anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, and of course also those voices of the Bundestag who insist on equidistance in the relationship with Washington and Moscow, are registered with much attention in Eastern Central Europe. Those who believe, these fears can be downplayed as rhetoric outflow of Eastern European resentments, are wrong. As long as the basic

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<sup>483</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 33.

<sup>484</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 33.

<sup>485</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 55.

<sup>486</sup> Germany has a population of approximately 82 million inhabitants, whereas Russia has a population of around 142 million inhabitants (2008/2009).

<sup>487</sup> Russia's share of the international commodity trading is only about 2 per cent, not even one third of Germany's share.

sentiment in Germany is neutral in its tone, the old *Zwischeneuropa* has reasons to be worried. From this the [Central European] strategy to use the Atlantic Alliance as a counterbalance to a German-French dominated EU is derived, and works as a prevention against possible German-Russian *Sonderwege*.<sup>488</sup>

**2.3.1.2.2. EU policy on Russia** Russia's integration in international organisations has been a manifested aim of German policy on Russia in order to promote the process of democratisation, to neutralise Russia's international role and to integrate its claims towards the Baltic states in an international frame. As shown, German politics of the 1990s was convinced that European stability could only be achieved with and not without or even against Russia. This attitude has also characterised German preferences for EU policy on Russia. In the early 1990s, the EU was considered by the Russian elites to be Russia's most important transformation and modernisation partner. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 was casually even characterised as the largest success of Russian foreign policy in the post-soviet period.<sup>489</sup> Germany also showed a strong commitment when this treaty was elaborated and urged successfully for concessions to Moscow as for example the further deregulation for Russian products and the perspective of a free trade area between the contracting parties.<sup>490</sup> When the First Chechen war started in late 1994, Germany nevertheless acted through its EU chairmanship and achieved the paraphing of the first PCA between the EU and Russia in December this year. Germany also pursued the integration of Russia in the G7 from 1991 onwards,<sup>491</sup> and Russia's membership in the European Council, which was accomplished in 1996. The accession to the European Council was decided on despite the butchery in the Caucasus because of the perspective of a peace agreement. In the commendatory letter of the judiciary committee it was apparent that Russia practically did not conform to any of the admittance criteria (respect of human rights, free democracy, rule of law, free press and a human penal system). These were apparently not regarded to be as important as the symbolic affiliation with democratic Europe. The reason for Russia's admission was thus the hope of convergence with European norms which a mem-

<sup>488</sup> SCHWARZ (2007). Author's translation.

<sup>489</sup> BARANOVSKIJ (1998), p. 241.

<sup>490</sup> TIMMERMAN (1996).

<sup>491</sup> Since the 1998 Birmingham Summit, Russia is a G8 member.

bership could provoke as opposed to an isolation of Russia.<sup>492</sup> The former Russia correspondent of the *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, Ulrich Schmid, had the following comment:

“The West’s belief that it can advocate the quality of the Russian judiciary with Moscow’s admittance to the Council is not exactly an evidence of sweeping knowledge of the Eurasian giant empire but of a rather foolish and abhorrent Eurocentric overestimation of one’s own capabilities.”<sup>493</sup>

The PCA created the basis for Russia’s trade and economic relations with the EU, defined the tangible cooperation and made a regular political dialogue possible. It did not contain any membership perspective for Russia but the EU had thus announced a relationship *sui generis* which substantially exceeds an association but nevertheless stays below the option of accession.<sup>494</sup>

With the EU’s “Common strategy on Russia” (CSR), resolved upon at the Cologne summit of 1999 at the end of the German EU chairmanship, it was aimed for a coordination of political questions between Russia and the EU. Germany was decisively involved in this strategy from the beginning, and the initial drafting was to a large degree framed by the core group consisting of France, Finland, Germany, and the UK.<sup>495</sup> The CSR suggests to further develop an EU-Russia partnership in the frame of a permanent political and security political dialogue, to approach the mutual interests and search for common answers which also applies to voting in international bodies as the UN and the OSCE. The possibility should thus be verified of creating a permanent mechanism for the political and security political dialogue between the EU and Russia. This exceeds the ambitions of the PCA and includes several fields of cooperation as for example the elaboration of a European security charter, the inclusion of Russia in EU/WEU missions in the frame of the Petersberg tasks, common initiatives of conflict prevention and crisis management e.g. in Russia’s neighbouring areas. As an amendment, the cooperation is encouraged to be intensified in regional organisations as the CBSS and the Barents Council and in the cross-border cooperation, a focal point of the EUND.<sup>496</sup> The

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<sup>492</sup> GARBE (2002), pp. 130-131.

<sup>493</sup> Cited in GARBE (2002), p. 131. Author’s translation.

<sup>494</sup> TIMMERMAN (1999A), p. 997.

<sup>495</sup> HAUKKALA (2000), p. 25.

<sup>496</sup> TIMMERMAN (1999B), p. 5.

EU also increasingly emphasises the importance of civil society developments for the democratisation of Russia. Thus bottom-up partnerships should be aided, for example between cities, professional associations, universities, trade unions, enterprises and youth organisations.<sup>497</sup>

Chancellor Schröder declared Germany and Russia vital strategic partners while at the same time the second Chechen war was in full force and the Feira European council in June 2000 had not yet decided on the formal dismantling of the sanctions against Russia. The official EU line remained much harder than some individual member states' and demanded immediate cease-fire, political dialogue with representatives of Chechnya and secured access for aid agencies and other NGOs to give humanitarian assistance on the ground.<sup>498</sup> In 2001 Schröder pointed out his policy on Russia in *Die Zeit*. Although he stressed the commitment to avoid a German *Sonderweg*, he emphasised the German understanding of being an initiator in the EU's policy on Russia. He endorsed broad cooperation and dialogue, deepening economic ties and a European security structure with Russia. Schröder underlined that Russia is a strategic partner of Germany and Europe.<sup>499</sup>

Following the CSR, Germany and France boosted the creation of the Four Common Spaces with Russia in 2003 which include close cooperation in the fields of the economy, freedom, security and justice, external security as well as research, education and culture. According to statements from 2007 made by the German Minister of State, Gernot Erler, a

“future-oriented cooperation with Russia should not be restricted to energy. During the German EU Presidency we intend to consider the entire spectrum of EU-Russian relations. We are particularly eager to drive forward the implementation of the four Common Spaces agreed between the EU and Russia. (...) The common space of external security will be a particularly important aspect, specifically encompassing cooperation between Russia and the EU to stabilize their common neighbourhood. Despite reticence on the Russian side, we must keep this issue on the agenda. We must intensify dialogue particularly on how to move frozen conflicts forward. That will be a litmus test for the possibilities of closer cooperation.”<sup>500</sup>

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<sup>497</sup> TIMMERMAN (1999B), p. 3.

<sup>498</sup> HAUKKALA (2000), pp. 38-39.

<sup>499</sup> SCHRÖDER (2001B).

<sup>500</sup> ERLER (2007), p. 4.

According to the authors of the ECFR working paper frequently referred to, German FM Steinmeier has been the “most eloquent advocate”<sup>501</sup> of creeping integration with Russia<sup>502</sup> as he has introduced the principle of “Annäherung durch Verflechtung”, i.e. approximation by increased interdependence, closely related to the social democratic tradition of *Ostpolitik* and Egon Bahr’s concept of “Wandel durch Annäherung”. Referring to president Medvedev’s wish for a renewed partnership between the EU and Russia, Steinmeier favoured such an option and proposed four necessary steps in this regard: (1) An open dialogue on security issues; (2) new negotiations for a new PCA; (3) strengthening the EU-Russia dialogue on global challenges; and (4) new impulses to deal with the past.<sup>503</sup> The negotiations for a new PCA should have started during the German 2007 presidency but was delayed due to Polish and Lithuanian objections. Although the EU and Russia have declared their bilateral relations to be a “strategic partnership”, irritations remain over many topics. As Finland prepared to take over the EU presidency in June 2005, ‘to improve the EU’s relationship with Russia’ was the top priority. Half a year later, the German presidency inherited the problems related to Russia: the Russian imports ban on Polish meat, the Estonian government’s decision to move the Soviet monument and the Russian reactions to the moving, the US plans of an antimissile defence in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russia’s wish to become member in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Russia’s use of oil and gas deliveries as a political instrument and the future of Kosovo. Finland and Germany are the two EU states with the best relations with Russia, but the situation did not really improve under their chairmanships. The EU and Russia have not managed to renegotiate a new PCA although negotiations were launched at the Khanty-Mansyisk summit of June 2008 and started in July 2008.

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<sup>501</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 52.

<sup>502</sup> Advocates of this policy line e.g. argue that cut-offs of gas supply in EU member states would become less likely if Russia was allowed to buy downstream assets in the energy market as Russian companies would lose money as a result of such cut-offs. LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 52.

<sup>503</sup> Auswärtiges Amt: *Rede von Bundesminister Steinmeier anlässlich der Podiumsdiskussion bei der Willy-Brandt-Stiftung*, 4 March 2008 at <http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080304-BM-Ostpolitik.html> (accessed 9 January 2009).

On the face of it, Germany's Russia-policy is nicely embedded in a multilateral frame, stresses dialogue and has realised Russia's great importance to European security. However, as Leonard and Popescu argue, interdependence does not lead to stability unless both parties respect common rules and norms without being able to revise them unilaterally.<sup>504</sup> The "creeping integrationists" do not have an answer to the Russian strategy toward the EU, i.e. "bilateralising relations with EU member states, strengthening Russian influence in the post-Soviet space, revising the political, legal and economic basis of relations with the Union, and promoting asymmetric interdependence with a divided EU."<sup>505</sup> Germany is on the other hand not completely ignoring the importance of a solidarist development of the Russian society either. When Steinmeier as the first Western statesman visited the new Russian president Medvedev in Yekaterinburg, he held an important speech on 13 May 2008 in which he proposed the German-Russian Partnership for Modernisation and stated the following:

"The future is there for countries and societies that vigorously modernize, are innovative and courageously tackle structural change. It is my firm conviction that open societies are best able to do so. We are therefore well-advised to perceive openness and plurality of our societies not as a threat but as an opportunity and a sine qua non for peace and growing prosperity. As in the case of Germany, modernization in Russia cannot be shouldered by the state alone. This would exceed its capabilities. It is precisely for this reason that Russia needs a lively civil society and a lively entrepreneurial culture. A public arena in which different opinions freely vie with one another and reliable rule-of-law structures will likewise not harm but instead promote modernization of your country."<sup>506</sup>

The catchword is definitely *dialogue*. Germany is cautious not to put pressure on Russia except by dialogue, and discussing them through e.g. the Petersburg Dialogue is the German way to address domestic developments in Russia. The big EU powers have concentrated on economic cooperation and bilateral dialogues with Russia, ignoring other concerns to the EU such as negative domestic developments in Russia and the EU's Eastern neighbourhood. Except of Spain, all Russia's "strategic partners" in the EU have furthermore blocked Commission

<sup>504</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 53.

<sup>505</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 13.

<sup>506</sup> Federal Foreign Office of Germany: *Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the Department of International Relations of the Urals State University in Yekaterinburg* 13 May at <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/EN/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2008/080513-BM-Russland.html>

plans for energy liberalisation.<sup>507</sup>

“The Union’s energy vulnerability does not stem from the fact that Russia is such an important gas supplier, but from its own inability to achieve an integrated and flexible gas market. (...) The ultimate goal should be open competition, respect for the rule of law, and an integrated and flexible gas market.”<sup>508</sup>

Chancellor Merkel agreed to be Russia’s “special energy partner in Europe” and thus delivered an important contribution to Putin’s game with the EU: The EU does not speak with one voice, despite its superiority in regards to both soft and hard power indicators.<sup>509</sup>

In order not to irritate the great neighbour to the east, France and Germany in particular, both essential for any coherent EU policy on Russia, have been cautious engaging in the cases of the Ukraine or Georgia. The uprisings in Georgia (2003) and the Ukraine (2004) show a new dynamic in Eastern Europe connected to an orientation towards democratic values combined with the replacement of the ties with Russia. This challenged the EU in a new way, and Germany as the traditional advocate of *Ostpolitik* had to react to new claims of EU memberships. Combining its policy of good relations with the Kremlin on the one hand and being the advocate of Eastern-Central Europe on the other hand, the question was whether Germany would continue to promote an *Ostpolitik*. Even before the neighbourhood policy was on the European agenda, German analysts and members of the political planning departments were discussing the effects of the EU’s eastern enlargement on the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. The aim was to keep the division lines and asymmetries as low as possible to allow for security and stability on the other side of the EU border. Kaliningrad was a topic of its own.<sup>510</sup> The planning departments of the German and Polish foreign ministries set up a common working group which resulted in a concept for the creation of a European Union with 25 and more member states. Part of this approach was also the idea of a European neighbourhood policy, and the paper defines the Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia as neighbouring states. Subject to the respective

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<sup>507</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 36.

<sup>508</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 62.

<sup>509</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007), p. 8.

<sup>510</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 244.

stage of development of their transformation, these states were offered a broad range of functional cooperation, also the instrument of the EEA.<sup>511</sup>

The *Bundestag* debated the elections in the Ukraine and Belarus and released resolutions. Here, the importance was stressed to hold elections of a European standard. The parliamentarians moreover pointed to the options of the European neighbourhood policy to give direction to a European perspective for the transformation countries. Mechanisms of a strengthening of the democratic actors were also debated. In a debate on how to consolidate democracy in the Ukraine, then chancellor Schröder underlined Russia's importance in regards to the crisis management in the Ukraine. Before, he had used several phone calls with president Putin to resolve the situation in the Ukraine.<sup>512</sup>

“Schröder's stance exemplified Germany's ambivalent position between the German-Russian special relationship and the interest to strengthen the democratic movement in the neighbouring states. The Kremlin tried to (...) dominate the post-soviet space and to prohibit its integration in European structures. Although this policy is contrary to European interests, Russia is indispensable to the stability of the region. Schröder underlined this role of Russia and thus put up with possible deficits of democracy.”<sup>513</sup>

One of Russia's most prominent politicians in Russia's political opposition and long lasting leader of the party *Jabloko*, Grigory Yavlinsky, has also stated that Russia is far too important to be ignored, and that it has to find its way to democracy on its own. However, there is a lot Europe can do to contribute, which besides setting good examples would be to do something for the Ukraine. That democracy survives in the Ukraine would be of inestimable importance to Russia.<sup>514</sup> The crucial point is that, notwithstanding the neighbourhood policy, as long as these states are excluded from the institutional cooperation, the EU's possible course of action is limited when it comes to democratisation.<sup>515</sup> In regards to the Ukraine, Poland has had a far more progressive attitude than Germany.

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<sup>511</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 244.

<sup>512</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 245.

<sup>513</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 245.

<sup>514</sup> Cited in TJØNN (2009B).

<sup>515</sup> KEMPE (2007), p. 257.



The tensions between solidarist and pluralistic views are thus also very present in regards to Europe's dealings with Russia. Disagreements about the government's policies on Russia between chancellor Merkel and FM Steinmeier have occurred but are still minor compared to the EU's difficulties agreeing on a proper European policy on EU-Russian relations. Russia seems to be the most divisive issue in the EU today. What is the pivotal strategy, to focus on human rights or a continuing dialogue? The disagreement on Russia after the war in Georgia was apparent within the EU, as it was in NATO despite a common statement. Germany, Italy and France did not want to isolate Russia, whereas Great Britain, Sweden, Poland and the Baltic states - among others - wanted to do so. Both Steinmeier and Merkel were deeply worried and expressed their criticism to the Russian side. Steinmeier nevertheless stated that it is not possible to solve regional problems of Georgia and Caucasus without Russia and valued dialogue with Russia almost regardless of the circumstances. As he stated, it stays "the classical task of foreign policy not to lose the thread" (Gesprächsfaden).<sup>516</sup>

### 2.3.1.3. Independent variables and policy assessment

As the analysis above shows, Germany is stressing the continuing "dialogue" with Russia almost regardless of domestic Russian developments or disagreements within the EU or even NATO as opposed to the recommended medicine<sup>517</sup> for Europe's relations with Russia is a common EU approach on Russia ending the current situation between the incompatible strategies of integration and containment. The German-Russian relationship seems unshakeable, however, and thus makes Germany decisive for the future relations between Russia and the West. The question is if German policy should be improved and move in a solidarist direction. Among the pluralist principles, principle 8 should be discussed. It states that "*because of their unique military capabilities, the great powers should assume special responsibilities which are determined by mutual consent for preserving international order.*" Russia still has unique military capabilities, despite neglecting its military for over a decade, and takes a special place in international society as a cooperation partner needed by e.g. the US, the EU and China. Its energy

<sup>516</sup>Cited in BRÖSSLER (2008) Author's translation.

<sup>517</sup> LEONARD/ POPESCU (2007).

power also gives Russia other special responsibilities and power. Finding mutual consent for preserving international order is difficult, however, because it is not given what this international order involves. As the German policy on Russia shows, the preservation of order has been highly weighted. However, the developments in the post-Soviet space show diverging conceptions of what the new order should be. Russia still sees this as its “near abroad” with special “responsibilities”, whereas the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and even Belarus strive for more distance to and less dependence on Russia but are driven back to the latter as the door to European institutions is closed. Germany wants to please everyone but is in fact not promoting democratisation in Eastern Europe because Russia is perceived to be even more important as a stabilising factor of the region. Germany thus also contributes to keeping e.g. the Ukraine and Georgia out of organisations like the EU and NATO and indirectly contributes to preserving order and strengthening the pluralist way. From a solidarist point of view, however, this is problematic as more could be done to promote democratisation in Eastern Europe, which might be important to the democratisation of Russia as well.

Not provoking Russia is of course of great importance to European peace and stability, and preventing war should be the most important policy making factor regardless of how implausible it seems to be in Europe today. The question is if progress should be neglected in order not to provoke, or if there is room for a broader consensual legitimacy. The first solidarist principle enlisted in chapter 2.2.2 of part II which seems relevant here is principle 7, stating that “*sovereignty does not entitle states to be free from 'the legitimate appraisal of their peers' with respect to human rights.*” As argued in part II, it is vitally important to small states and to Norway and Sweden in equal measure that international law and cosmopolitan values are valid principles of the international society of states in order to protect them in their relations with great powers. This underlines the importance that also Russia implements the proper norms and follows them. In order to achieve this, it is not sufficient merely to preserving order. As Germany must be considered to be a very suitable peer of Russia, it is therefore very sensational if Russia is almost fully free from Germany’s legitimate appraisal with respect to human rights, which several examples from the previous chapter

show.<sup>518</sup> German aloofness when it comes to domestic Russian developments e.g. in the Caucasus also points to principle 10 of the solidarist principles, i.e. “*regard for human rights requires respect for non-sovereign communities and requires the society of states to protect minority nations and indigenous peoples from unnecessary suffering.*”

Arriving at the universally applicable principles of good international citizenship<sup>519</sup>, principle 7 is of great relevance: “*obligations to protect the vulnerable require the establishment of global political structures - involving close cooperation with international governmental and non-governmental organizations that institutionalize the universal right to be able to protest against actual or potential harm.*” Applying this principle in the case of German policy on Russia, the role of the EU is the key to the improvement of German policy. As the references to Leonard and Popescu’s working paper point up, the EU’s unity is the key to moving Russia in a solidarist direction. European political structures must be the initial point when improving European matters. The EU is not capable of moving any further in regards to Russia and its neighbours as long as the EU member states can not unite in a common approach. This is thus the factor where Germany’s importance to the foreign policies of (not only) Norway and Sweden could be greater: Not giving up on European unity which includes Russia as well. Germany’s policy on Russia should concentrate on developing the EU-Russian relationship from the least common denominator to a policy which challenges Russia to a greater extent in regards to cosmopolitan values and human rights. This requires the capability of integrating Russia in Europe as well. Germany should continue to be an important friend of Russia and counterbalance countries like the Baltic states and Poland but should put more effort into uniting EU countries on a common stance and downplaying bilateral solo attempts. In this case as well, the conclusion of the assessment is that German policy should move somewhat in a solidarist direction.

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<sup>518</sup>The picture would surely be moderated if other foreign policy actors such as the media, churches, NGOs and political foundations were included in the analysis.

<sup>519</sup>See chapter 2.2.3 of part II,

## 2.4. Conclusions and further considerations

Here, the overall picture of the case studies, i.e. German policy on Northern Europe, will be assessed. The policy assessments in the different cases made a consideration of whether German policy should move in a solidarist or pluralist direction. The evaluation of the case studies shows that in some cases (1 and 3), German policy has not yet been shaped, whereas in others (2, 4 and 5) Germany should promote a policy of a more solidarist character. Here, the focus on principles will be complemented by the mechanisms prevalent in German and European politics which lead to Germany's policy on northern Europe as analysed above. First, European structures are important in regards to what Germany is, can be, and what role it plays in northern Europe. If all responsibility for European matters is allocated to the Germans due to their economic power, by other nations or the Germans themselves, this also implies that all power is transferred to Germany. Populous states have a larger economic capacity than smaller ones, and the power follows the money. This is thus a natural power basis of Germany. However, power is also created by the responsibility given and taken. When it is claimed that Germany for the first time is the leader of Europe and as a leader of a community to a larger extent needs to consider how to use this power, i.e. also consider what is best for the community, the whole idea about one nation leading others in a community is dubious. It is a question of definitions. A community should have a collective leadership. It thus has to be clear when Germany - and others - is acting on its own behalf, and when it is acting on behalf of the community. Germany is not only the EU, but also the sovereign state. An important European problem is that the important topics are pulverised. An alternative would be to agree on the the essential and leave the details to the different countries instead of the European bureaucracy. The stated necessity of a united EU policy on Russia is a good example. Here, topics should be ranked due to importance, the important topics should be evaluated, and thus an agreement should be reached on the principal issues. This would be the initial point as the bilateral European relations with Russia are concerned. Germany and the other EU member states need to define what they want to cooperate on, and further they have to relate to both the EU and their own independence.

Another example is Kaliningrad. Germany does not have any policy on Kaliningrad but still gets negative reactions from time to time. This case in particular shows how Germany needs the EU. The EU's value is that it gives Germany team players which it needs in order not to take the responsibility alone. This shows that also Germany needs the small states and not just the other way around. The reason why this is not functioning particularly well is simply again because the EU does not have a common platform. The basis has to be clear before the members agree on something or deepen the integration. The basic principles have to be clear in order to define the power. The simple fact that there are many states participating in European integration is not the same as giving away power. It is the basic principles which decide the power structures, and in order to cooperate well together, power has to be defined. The EU does have legal principles but not a foundation based on values. In order to build such a foundation, the aim of the community has to be clear, and the development can not be decided by two major players alone. If the smaller members just do as the large ones say, they are giving them the whole power, which is easy because they do not have to take any responsibility themselves. If the smaller EU states had a larger say, Germany would actually have benefited from it. Whether Germany can play a role in the Baltic Sea Region thus depends on the EU's ability to develop a common policy. But in order to do so, the basic principles must be found because they decide the power relations. Limits have to be set which defines the core areas of cooperation, unless everything is confusing. Unfortunately, confusion is what characterises international politics.

The balance between solidarist and pluralistic principles is the other point. The basis of cooperation is that you can agree on something. This is a harder task when it comes to e.g. Russia. When certain principles are not applicable to all states, Germany's policy has to make a choice in this regard and take the consequences. It is however important that its policy rests on principles, otherwise policy is just "acting by accident".

Consequently, if Nordic foreign policy makers should try to influence their German colleagues, the following recommendations can be given:

1. Have high ambitions of what Germany can accomplish. The past has shown

that this is possible, but continuity is not always the answer to new challenges.

2. Germany's relationship with other actors mirrors its fears and limits. Its more or less close partners, allies and neighbours can not give Germany more confidence if Germany itself does not allow for it. The EU is the key to create the team players Germany needs in order to play a greater role.
3. Contribute to the balance between order and justice but do not take the responsibility which is not yours.
4. Create a new political culture which allows to address disagreements and problematic aspects.
5. Make an evaluation of the policy instead of simply adapting to new situations. Be prepared to reconsider also things which have worked well in the past. Have a clear strategy on your aims and be willing to risk something in order to improve, and be prepared to take the consequences.
6. Make efforts to reform the EU by defining the power structures and the basic principles.

Germany could thus to a larger extent use its preconditioned importance to Northern Europe if it would stop giving Russia more power than it actually has, and start applying the same principles on all states. Furthermore, it must contribute to a development which enables the EU to concentrate on core issues which has a mandate in common principles. The easiest way out is not to take the fights. What is needed of Germany is rather to contribute to mutual *respect* in the international society of Northern Europe.

# Conclusions

Why is Germany important - and how important is Germany - to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policies of Norway and Sweden? What limitations exist in regards to Germany's role in Northern Europe? These are the questions this thesis has aimed at answering. The answers are at the same time an assessment of German foreign policy.

The power triangle surrounding the Nordic region today consists of Russia, the EU and the US. The general conditions of Nordic security are also characterised by the increasing importance of the Arctic, not only to the traditional players in the High North but also to other global actors such as China, and a Baltic Sea Region where Russia meets Europe. Russia is a challenge to both the US and Europe. Whereas energy relations to a large extent exemplify the European-Russian challenges, the core challenge in Western-Russian relations is NATO. Russia can be both a partner and a threat, but the Russian challenge to the West is the most essential factor to Nordic security. If power is defined as "the ability to achieve objectives rather than as the resources a country commends", Russia is in the better position, using its power to weaken the EU because it is able to split it. If the idea of rebuilding NATO to an efficient European security system including Russia can be realised, a common transatlantic exposure to Russia and a more united EU are the prerequisites.

The initial point of the thesis was a working paper which suggested Germany as Norway's strategic partner in Europe. Germany and Norway have excellent bilateral relations, and Germany is Norway's most important cooperation partner in Europe. However, the term strategic partnership is not suitable because Norwegian politicians are not using the term. The relationship can rather be characterised as an energy partnership, which importance to both countries must

be stressed and which also comprises difficulties. Political, economic as well as military cooperation are important areas of mutual interest but do not indicate why Germany is of particular importance to the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the foreign policy of Norway. It is thus not obvious that the bilateral relations are very important when it comes to Germany's importance to Nordic security. A comparison with Sweden will thus be added in order to identify the factors that are decisive for the assessment of Germany's importance. Do Norway's challenges differ from Sweden's and do they necessitate other solutions? Do the different institutional contexts of their foreign policies contribute to different needs in international relations? Do the different regional frames of their foreign policies make a difference in regards to German importance to their strategic challenges and opportunities? The answers to these questions were elaborated through an analysis of both countries' foreign policies as well as their foreign political challenges and opportunities. First some comments on their foreign policies:

Lines can be drawn from the Second World War to current Scandinavian policies. Neither Norway nor Sweden seem to have evaluated the past but rather follow their traditions without really reflecting on them. In security policy, Norway follows the Atlantic line anchored during and after the Second World War and has made a choice in regards to its affiliation. The Norwegians are however dancing to the tune of others and the US in particular. The Norwegians have an enormous wealth of maintenance but have a hard time bearing it because they are not investing in their own country. Norway is not capable of making any choices in regards to trade policy, i.e. the EU. It does not dare to stay inside, and does not dare to stay outside. The EEA seems like a well-functioning agreement in many ways but contributes to undermine democracy. It would thus be better to stay completely out of the EU and take the consequences, or to join the EU and take the consequences. Not to choose is the worst possible solution because those consequences are of a more substantial nature. Sweden has taken this choice, and has become a well-integrated, successful EU-member. However, as the Swedish Euro debate shows, their *motives* of joining or not joining the monetary union are dubious. Sweden is cautious in its approach to Europe and rather joins in when the coast is clear. When the circumstances change, Sweden probably goes



with the tide. It is a simple calculation of economic and political interests. What is the quality of European cooperation if every member state thinks similarly? How is it possible for small countries to have a say in the EU? For both Norway and Sweden it is important to see the whole picture, and not only what they want to see, in order to make the right choices. That however also applies to the EU by itself. In regards to security policy, Sweden has made itself anonymous by trying to compromise with everyone. This started at the latest during the Second World War. Between June 1940 and August 1943 approximately 2 140 000 German soldiers on-leave were permitted to cross through neutral Sweden travelling to and from Norway and Finland. Germans were even allowed to mine the Sound on the Swedish side. The concession policy ceased as the war took a new turn.<sup>1</sup> Today Sweden is still non-aligned but cooperates closely with NATO and has participated in e.g. Afghanistan just as Norway and Germany have. Sweden needs to take a choice in regards to defence policy. As the situation is now, it is hard to assess where the country stands, as opposed to Finland. This is also mirrored in Sweden's damaged relations with Russia.

By comparing issues of great importance to Norwegian and Swedish foreign policies respectively, focus has been on the differences facing the two countries. The differences are the regions of pivotal importance (the BSR and the Barents Sea Region), the institutional frames of the EU and NATO, the foreign policy traditions, foreign trade and the nature of the challenges and opportunities themselves. Norway's challenges and opportunities are found in the High North and in regards to its role as a very important energy supplier to Europe in particular. Norway seems to have a positive relationship with Russia, having being able solve the difficult dispute on the delineation of the Barents Sea. Norway and Russia have many interests in common as major energy producers, but the European energy market (the British and German in particular) is decisive for Norway's future possibilities and European energy policy is thus accordingly important. The EU has moreover increasing interests in the Arctic which are sometimes conflictive when compared to Norwegian interests. However, there are different European interests in this regard. This is also the case with Svalbard, Norway's most important and most difficult strategic challenge.

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<sup>1</sup> ARTER (1999), p. 272.

Sweden is, as opposed to the energy exporter Norway, rather vulnerable in regards to its energy situation and is cautious not to get too dependent on Russia as an energy supplier. Sweden's challenges and opportunities are for the major part found in the BSR and the political situation here. Russia, which representatives sometimes even adds Finland to its "sphere of interest", is the neighbour with which it is difficult to cooperate with also on the regional level. Since the end of the Second World War, the main reason for Swedish neutrality/non-alignment has been not to provoke Russia. Sweden however spoke its mind e.g. during the conflict in Georgia and was reluctant to the Nord Stream pipeline for a long time, and this seemed to provoke Russia enough to worsen the relationship. Norway has rather been cautious not to provoke Russia whereas its NATO membership has become the most natural thing in the world. The BSR is also the region where the EU meets Russia and all the challenges this implies. In the BSR, NATO is still the most important factor in regards to security policy because there is no formal European guarantee for the security of the EU members. US presence in northern Europe is still a necessary counterbalance to Russia.

Notwithstanding the differences, the similarities of both countries' challenges and opportunities are more important. The common denominators are Russia, international law, regional cooperation and US presence in Europe. The question if not both countries are dependent on the same factors in order to achieve a positive development in regards to the challenges and opportunities facing their foreign policies can thus be answered with yes. Both Norway and Sweden have tried to contribute to the creation of an international order increasingly based on international law, engaging in a more legal based international order since the days of the League of Nations. Small countries with open economies are particularly dependent on predictability and protection in questions concerning war, peace, environmental survival, trade and economic capitalisation of natural resources. The most important factor which can be derived from the analysis above is international law. One can for example only try to imagine where Norway would have been today without the UNCLOS.

The analysis thus had to move beyond pure power politics, and the theory suitable to guide the empirical analysis of part III was derived from the English

School, the advocate of a theory of international society which recovered an older European stream of thinking which recognised the habit of cooperation and the importance of law in the practice of international relations. Principles of a good international citizenship based on English School writings<sup>2</sup> were thus the theoretical basis for the case studies of part III on Germany's northern European policies. Because the analysis of part I also showed that it is not only a matter of principles, some reflections on the *mechanisms* prevalent in the international society of states however needed to be added to the concept of good international citizenship, by which consensus and legitimacy are the key terms. It is thus Norway's and Sweden's common strategic challenge to question the right of the strongest because principles should be based on legitimacy and not power. The question is at what price consensus can be achieved. Is it better that states pretend to agree when they actually disagree instead of taking a dispute at an early stage? Do large states get more powerful simply because they are allowed to? Principles should be equally applied to all states regardless of their status. This is the point where it is the hardest to apply a "sound consensual legitimacy". To avoid disputes with great powers at almost any price just gives them increased power. This however also implies that the West does not have the legitimacy to say "this is the way things should be". If there are disagreements between states, this should still imply that the views of the opponent are respected. If problems with great powers are brushed under the carpet, the international society of states is letting them do whatever they like. A policy which allows for disagreements but still respects the opponents would allow for more foreseeability and less power games. If the power is given away, somebody else will take it. If a significant actor is allowed to break international law without significant reactions, then you really got a significant problem in the end. Consensus and legitimacy are thus terms that should be complemented by independence. States, and alliances, need to have strategies and cannot solely lean on international law or multilateralism. There is thus no definite conclusion on what a good international citizenship should comprise, because the preconditions are always changing and because of this, a policy or a principle also need to be reconsidered. The risks must thus always be considered when a solidarist position is taken instead of a pluralist,

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<sup>2</sup> LINKLATER/ SUGANAMI (2006).

but the most important part must be *conscious* policies, i.e. that the aim is clear and the risks as well. Developments can not always be predicted, but if the policy is not reconsidered, the problems will return because no improvement has taken place. What might prevent such reconsiderations are rather the power structures as such, and that is why they are so dangerous. It must be possible to take a position which on the other hand can be changed at a later point of time. This also implies that a solidarist policy direction in one case might be the right decision at one point of time and the wrong position at a later point of time. From this theoretical basis part III finally examines Germany's foreign policy in order to assess its importance to challenges and opportunities of Nordic foreign policies.

Germany is important to northern Europe simply because of its geographical proximity, its size and population, its economic power, and its increasingly distinct role in the EU. In order to further assess the prerequisites of a significant German role in northern Europe, German foreign policy and its principles, structures, norms, institutions and actors were analysed. Germany has come to term with its militant past and had a very successful foreign policy during the Cold War. In the end it regained its full sovereignty, had good relations with all its neighbours, and was integrated in Europe and the transatlantic alliance. If the Cold War period would be reconsidered in the same way as Germany's militant past, the logical conclusion would be that it is time to trust the Germans again because they have proven to be trustworthy. But the Germans would not have been the Germans if they thought that things were that easy, and they have apparently not yet forgiven themselves. This of course also has its consequences. Europeanisation is a decisive process which structures German policy. However, the European project and German European policy have never been questioned by German politics. Instead, the importance of continuity is stressed without further reflexions. From the mid-1990s however, a "creeping change of paradigm" has been visible up to a more independent German foreign policy. When the change is creeping and not a result of substantial evaluation, German policy is condemned to overlook the policy lines which need to change due to new times. The "easiest" way is simply to adjust to new circumstances without having an aim of its policy. Meantime Germany again stands alone in Europe as a negative

power factor. This time it is only a war fought with money. Germany apparently gets the power whether it wants it or not, despite being in a union with several other states. Is it then not time to question the union? The problem is the superior forms of cooperation: it is not defined how Europe must cooperate. There is no structure in the EU on the distribution of power and thus there is no tool for governing the European integration. The lacking ability to create a common platform, which is a consequence of the fact that the balance has not been drawn, now culminates in the European debt crisis. To simply invent new governing instruments for the economic and monetary cooperation would be to take the symptoms as initial point for a new strategy. A reconsideration of the whole philosophy of European integration is necessary.

If Germany's importance to Norway and Sweden should move beyond its simple power potential, German policy makers must stop misunderstanding the definition of power because it is all about how one *uses* its power. Germany can no longer play the game of adapting to others. Germany has to *choose* and then take the consequences instead of refurbishing the world to others. In order not to stay a negative power factor in Europe because of its economic power, Germany has to handle the disputes and cut through in order to establish a new, sensible and comprehensible European order. The German federal and institutional distraction of power also leads to the question who is taking the responsibility for German foreign policy. The least what must be expected is that Germany takes responsibility for itself. If everyone is just defending their own role, how is it possible not to reconsider anything at all? Another important point is that Germany should not take the responsibility for everything that goes wrong in Europe and the mistakes others are making. If the responsibility is left to Germany, the power is also given to Germany. Who does not want it.

Case studies were moreover conducted in order to assess Germany's policies on northern Europe, i.e. Germany's policy on the Arctic (Arctic sustainable development), the Baltic Sea Region (the Baltic states, Kaliningrad, regional cooperation), and Russia (Russia's integration in Europe). The evaluation of the case studies showed that in some cases (1 and 3), German policy has not yet been shaped, whereas in others (2, 4 and 5) Germany should promote a policy of a

more solidarist character. The balance between solidarist and pluralistic principles is important. The basis of cooperation is that you can agree on something. This is a harder task when it comes to e.g. Russia. When certain principles are not applicable to all states, Germany's policy has to make a choice in this regard and take the consequences. It is however important that its policy rests on principles, otherwise it is just "acting by accident".

The case studies give a picture of German policy on a great power on the one hand (which is given priority) and small states on the other (which are prioritised when there is consensus). The case studies moreover show how Germany needs the EU in order to become a legitimate player. This shows that also Germany needs the small states, and not just the other way around, to be able to use its power. The EU on the other hand fails to play a decisive role in the Arctic and in the BSR. The lacking of the necessary unity on Russia is a good example. Here, topics should be ranked due to importance, the important topics should be evaluated, and thus an agreement should be reached on the principal issues. This would be the initial point as the bilateral European relations with Russia are concerned. Germany and the other EU member states need to define what they want to cooperate on, and further they have to relate to both the EU and their own independence. Another example is Kaliningrad. Germany does not have any policy on Kaliningrad but still gets negative reactions from time to time. This case in particular shows how Germany needs the EU. The EU's value is that it gives Germany team players which it needs in order not to take the responsibility alone. Again, it is the basic principles which decide the power structures, and in order to cooperate well together, power has to be defined. The EU does have legal principles but not a foundation based on values. In order to have a such, the aim of the community has to be clear, and the development can not be decided by two major players (e.g. France and Germany) alone. If the smaller members just do as the large ones say, they are giving them the whole power, which is easy because they do not have to take any responsibility themselves. Whether Germany can play a role in the Baltic Sea Region and in the European High North thus depends on the EU's ability to develop a common policy. Limits have to be set which define the core areas of cooperation, otherwise everything is confusing. Unfortunately, confusion is what characterises international politics.

In an attempt to generalise the conclusions of chapter 2.4 of part III even more, the following challenges can be presented to German foreign policy makers in order to increase its importance to northern Europe:

1. Examine whether you are doing the same thing over and over while expecting a different result;
2. what others want may not be what is best for you;
3. find the substance;
4. focus on the future and leave obsessive thinking and addictions behind;
5. make sure you are in full bloom and do not resign yourself to unweeding the garden.

Finally, the thesis concludes that power is based on mistakes but should rather be based on experiences. The power position of an actor can be the decisive factor, but it is up to every state as well as the international society of states to decide how much power a state should be given. Respect is missing in the “northern European society of states”, and relations are based on fear.





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