We analyze indirect evolutionary two-player games to identify the dynamic emergence

of (strong) reciprocity in a large number of economic settings. The underlying evolutionary

environment allows for an arbitrary initial population state provided that

every degree of the compact space of reciprocity is adherent to at least one individual

of the corresponding continuum population. The basic results, which essentially

maintain the evolutionary viability of reciprocity, are, in several directions, context

dependent, and minimum valid for the wide class of evolutionary dynamics which

hold for regularity and payoff-monotonicity. The evolutionary solution concept which

is applied to elevate the explanatory power of emerging Nash equilibria is dominance

solvability, in this case, for continuous strategy spaces. An asymmetric aspect comes

into play since the actions of the evolutionary players are not only determined by the

current state of reciprocity but also by their inherent, context-free preferences towards

others which differ among one another devoid of being endogenized in the time span

of the dynamic process at hand.