In a recent paper, Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel (2011) study communication

games of common interest when signals are simple and

types complex. They characterize strict Nash equilibria as so-called

Voronoi languages that consist of Voronoi tesselations of the type set

and Bayesian estimators on the side of receivers. In this note, we introduce

conflicts of interest in the same setting. We characterize strict

Nash equilibria as distorted Voronoi languages that use all messages.

For large conflicts, such informative equilibria need not exist. If the

bias is sufficiently small, however, these equilibria do exist. This establishes

the robustness of the results in Jäger, Metzger, and Riedel

(2011) to biased interests. We finally give examples of strict Nash

equilibria, one of them using simulations to illustrate an equilibrium

with many messages and non-uniformly distributed types.