We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending

a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message.

While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information,

but has to choose an action depending on the message he receives. The action then

yields to some utility for Sender and Receiver. We only make a few assumptions about the

utility functions of both players, so situations may arise where the Sender’s preferences are

such that she sends a message trying to convince the Receiver about a certain state of the

world, which is not the true one. In a finite setting we state conditions for full revelation,

i.e. when the Receiver always learns the truth. Furthermore we describe the player’s behavior

if only partial revelation is possible. For a continuous setting we show that additional

conditions have to hold and that these do not hold for "smooth" preferences and utility, e.g.

in the classic example of quadratic loss utilities.