We study the effect of strategic and partisan voting on electoral outcomes, and on the

relative popularity of the victor. Voters are randomly assigned to be partisan or strategic.

When all voters are strategic in a plurality election, any equilibrium manipulation of the

outcome elects a popular leader. Voting populations with a large proportion of partisan voters

are more at risk of electing an unpopular leader: in elections with three candidates, if only

one-third of the population is partisan, then the winner of the election may be unpopular

with two-thirds of voters. We derive exact bounds for the proportion of the population

that benefits from manipulation of the election outcome by strategic voters, for arbitrary

numbers of voters, candidates, partisans and strategic voters. The analysis also shows that

the unpopularity of the election winner differs between partisan and strategic voters. When

most voters are partisan, they may be the vast majority of those who gain from strategic

voting.